Small State Policy or Smart State Strategy? Lithuania’s Foreign Policy under Eastern

Partnership Programme in 2009-2014

Maksimas Milta

EaP Youth Policy Academy

June 9, 2016

Who am I?

Education:

• Master‘s degree in Eastern European and

Russian Studies (Vilnius University‘s

Institute of International Relations and

Political Sciences)

• Bachelor‘s degree in Cultural Heritage

(European Humanities University)

Job:

• Head of Communications and Marketing at

the European Humanities University

Fields of academic interest:

• Small state studies, history of ideas, policy

of memory, Eastern European and Russian

studies

Puzzle, Research Question and

Aim Master‘s thesis Small State Policy or Smart State Strategy? Lithuania’s Foreign Policy

under Eastern Partnership Programme in 2009-2014 was publicly defended at Vilnius

University‘s Institute of International Relations and Political Sciences on January 20,

2015.

Puzzle: Marginal capacities within EU decision-making process being disproportional to

the output of Lithuania’s foreign policy towards implementation of Eastern Partnership

(EaP) programme

Research question: How does engagement into implementation of EaP programme

correlate with Lithuania’s foreign policy’s shift to smart state strategy?

Aim: Assessment of Lithuania’s foreign policy vis-à-vis 6 EaP countries through a prism

of smart state strategy under the framework of EaP programme

Argument

Shift of Lithuania’s foreign policy towards 6 Eastern European and Southern Caucasian

countries by utilising “smart state strategy”, grounding on exercising self-interested

mediator and lobbyist roles, towards implementation of Eastern Partnership programme

in post-Lisbon treaty institutional environment, is determined by development of external

geopolitical and security settings.

Independent variable: geopolitical and security settings

Dependent variable: Lithuania’s foreign policy

Intervening variable: Eastern Partnership programme

Theory, Methodology, Novelty

Conceptually object of the study, i.e. Lithuania’s foreign policy, is tackled within the

triangle of (1) constructivist theory of European integration, (2) geopolitical dimension of

international relations and (3) securitisation concepts

Methodology is designed to trace the research question within three consequent chapters

related to dimensions of (1) small state studies, (2) purpose of EaP programme and (3)

detalised revision of Lithuania’s foreign policy contribution towards implementation of EaP

programme – on the basis of analysis of primary and secondary sources, and 7

conducted interviews with experts and stakeholders

Novelty grounds on the expansion of Anders Wivel’s introduced categories of “small state

policy” and “smart state strategy” towards EaP programme. Merging conceptual

framework of Europeanisation of foreign policy with analytical instruments of small states

behaviour, reviewed in the context of geopolitical determination of policy-making

contributes additional specialisation within the research of European integration

Structure

1. SMALL STATES’ BEHAVIOUR IN EUROPEAN UNION

1.1 Defining Small State in the European Union

1.2. Institutional Transformation of the European Union and Europeanisation

1.3. Small States’ Approaches to Influence Decision-Making in the European Union

2. PURPOSE OF THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMME

2.1 Legacy and Design of the Eastern Partnership Programme

2.2 Paradox of security narratives and criticism of Eastern Partnership programme

2.3 Engagement of the recipient countries with the Eastern Partnership programme

3. LITHUANIA'S ROLE IN IMPLEMENTING EASTERN PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMME

3.1 From European Neighbourhood Policy to Warsaw Summit

3.2 Post-Warsaw Summit – Vilnius Summit stage

3.3 Eastern Partnership after Vilnius Summit

Small States in the European

Union • Definition of the size has been historically prioritising powers possessed by states,

nor powers exercised

• Traditional small state’s approach to decision-making within European Union (EU) is

determined by vulnerability of limited absolute resources

• New institutional environment of the EU, caused by Lisbon Treaty, limited prior

capacities of smaller states in delivering influence

• Europeanisation of EU external policy imposed a shift from bargaining-led to arguing-

led approach in decision-making, thus favouring smaller states

• Proactive behaviour in exploiting own influence on European level, i.e. smart state

strategy (according to Wivel), is exercised by acting as a) lobbyist, b) self-interested

mediator or c) norm entrepreneur with a help of policy-prioritisation and limited scope

of geopolitical interests

• Smart state strategy characteristics are: a) high policy prioritisation, b) seeking

common European interest, c) mediation between larger states and coalition-building

Purpose of Eastern Partnership

programme • EaP programme grounds on logics of ensuring security within eastern neighbourhood

of the EU, reflecting an orientation on narrative of “circle of friends”, originated in

post-enlargement fatigue environment and fostered by Russia’s imposed geopolitical

setting in the region (i.e. Russo-Georgian war)

• Duality of EaP programme’s design (i.e. bilateral and multilateral tracks of

cooperation) provide a wider flexibility for deepening cooperation with front-running

countries

• Progress of EaP recipient countries is determined by presence of (a) Russia’s backed

frozen conflicts, (b) domestic political settings and respective identity-led discourses,

(c) economic interdependence (i.e. trade balance) with external partners

• Revision of the EaP should be focused on ensuring political prioritisation of the

programme, preserving integrity of the programme, addressing change of security

setting in Eastern Europe after Russia’s occupation of Crimea and its contribution to

military activity in Eastern Ukraine

Lithuania’s role in implementing

Eastern Partnership programme (I) • Lithuania’s rationale behind focusing its foreign policy on EaP recipient countries

grounds on the continuum of constructivist and geopolitical perspectives,

emphasising importance of social construction factors (e.g. identity, norms and

ideas), as driving force for further integration with EaP countries on one side and risk

of existential threat, imposed by Russia’s deployed settings across Eastern Europe

on the other

• Lithuania’s imposed role of “Good European” towards majority of EU policy areas has

resulted in absence of proactive behaviour during 2008-2011 stage of EaP

implementation, as a consequence of endogenous and exogenous limits and crisis of

transition from prior role of regional leader, promoted by President Adamkus

• Post-Warsaw Summit stage of EaP implementation constitutes organisational and

institutional opportunities of rotating Presidency, utilised by Lithuania for fostering

EaP implementation

Lithuania’s role in implementing

Eastern Partnership programme (II) • Lithuania’s comprehensive preparation, ability to learn from Polish Presidency,

earned political recognition from European partners by prior active engagement in

socialization and networking determined and appearance of Council conclusions on

Ukraine in December 2012 determined appropriate initial conditions for utmost

political prioritisation EaP during rotating Presidency

• Success in coalition-building has been driven by ability of justifying EaP as common

European interest to various groupings of member states, therefore exploiting role of

honest broker within the Council

• Ability to reach set goals under EaP framework and expand internal outreach of EaP

among other CFSP areas was possible due to exercising facilitating role of

Presidency and consistently avoiding undermining of External Actions Service and

Commission roles, thus ensuring trustworthy relations, allowing Lithuania to exploit

resources of European institutions in reaching smooth consensus during negotiations

over unilateral expansion of trade preferences towards Ukraine and overall

negotiations on AA and DCFTA

Lithuania’s role in implementing

Eastern Partnership programme (III)

Geopolitical escalation in Eastern Europe, illustrated by Russia’s imposed pressure on

Armenia and Ukraine, supplemented by Crimea’s occupation and Russia’s contribution to

military resistance in Eastern Ukraine has caused a return of primarily geopolitical hard-

liner orientation of Lithuania’s foreign policy and resulted in internal demand for imposing

more hard security component of the revised EaP programme

Conclusions

• Emergence of EaP, as extension of ENP, provided unprecedented political initiative of the EU vis-à-vis its neighbourhood in Eastern Europe, which bears utmost geopolitical importance to Lithuania

• Development of geopolitical and security setting in Europe (i.e. Russia’s imposed influence vis-à-vis 6 recipient countries) determined Lithuania’s choice for utmost prioritisation of EaP, through exploiting organisational and institutional resources of European institutions during its rotating Presidency and domestic expertise, supplemented by utilisation of own smallness towards coalition-building among member states

• Fulfilment of deliverables with Georgia and Moldova, agenda-shaping of Moldova’s VLAP serve as outcomes of Lithuania’s resources being multiplied by utilisation of European ones

• Lithuania’s accumulated “smart state strategy” role is additionally justified by hard-liner standing vis-à-vis Russia in 2014 being treated differently from isolation of Lithuania during 2008 post-PCA negotiations

Avenue for further research: To what extent Lithuania’s adoption of smart state strategy is instrumental to exploit influence within policy areas beyond EaP programme

More details

Full research available for online

purchase via www.MoreBooks.de

starting June 15

Thank you for your attention – now let‘s have a discussion.

In the meantime feel free to contact me via maksimas@milta.lt