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SupportingWolffsAnarchism

March22,2012

OverviewInthispaperIwillexamineWolffsdefenseofphilosophicalanarchismgivenin his paper TheConflict betweenAuthority andAutonomy. Iwill firstpresentWolffs central argument and then proceed to consider a possibleobjectionthatmightunderminehisargument. Iwillconcludebyrespondingtothisobjection,clarifyingandstrengtheningWolffsclaimthat legitimateauthoritycannotexist.

WolffsArgumentWolffbeginswithaconceptofauthority. Wolffdefines legitimateauthorityasauthoritythathastheright tocommand.Heiscleartodifferentiatethisfrompower,wherewecomplyonlyduetothreatofforce,anddistinguishesitfrompersuasiveargumentwhereweareconvinced thatweoughttocomplywithacommand. Iunderstandthistomeanthattrue legitimateauthorityimpliesthattherecanbecaseswhereIamobligatedtodowhattheauthoritytellsmetodofornootherreason thanthattheauthoritytellsmetodoit.

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Next,Wolffdescribestheconceptofautonomy.Theessenceofautonomyis that an individual is responsible for their actions. If I possess freewilland am rational, Ihavean obligation to take responsibility forhow I act.AsWolffputsit,Theautonomousman,insofarasheisautonomous,isnotsubjectto thewillofanother. Hemaydowhatanother tellshim,butnotbecause hehasbeen told todo it. He is therefore, in thepolitical senseoftheword,free (pg. 27). According toWolff, I have amoral duty to beautonomous.

Imay

take

advice

and

consider

possible

punishment

for

my

actions,butultimatelythemoralimplicationsofmyactionsfallonmyownconsciousasaconsequenceofmyfreechoice.

Wolfffinishesbyclaimingthattheconceptoflegitimateauthorityisnotcompatiblewith the concept of an obligation to autonomy. Blindly complyingwith a command from authority necessarilymeanswe do not takeresponsibility forthataction. Heconcludesthat ifwearetoacceptadutytoautonomy(ashethinksweshould), thentherecannotbe legitimateauthority.Wolffconcludesthatphilosophicalanarchismistheonlyreasonablepoliticalphilosophy.

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Summarizingtheargument,

(P1)Legitimateauthorityrequiresustoobeyindependentofotherreasons(P2)Obligationtoautonomyrequiresustotakeresponsibilityforouractions (C1)Legitimateauthorityandanobligationtoautonomyarenotcompatible

Further,

(P3)Legitimateauthorityandanobligationtoautonomyarenotcompatible(P4)Wehaveamoralobligationtoautonomy(C2)

Legitimate

authority

does

not

exist

ObjectiontoWolffI believe that (P1), (P2) and (P4) are difficult to defeat (or at least thatitwouldbeboldtotry). Thecriticwill likelyquestion(C1)/(P3),denyingthevalidityofWolffsargument. Iwilloutlinewhat I feel is the strongestargumentmadeagainstWolff. Arguments forpolitical legitimacymadebyDworkinandRazareflavorsofthiskind. Itgoessomethinglikethis:

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Considerpersonalmoralobligationsseparate frompoliticalones. Thesemayincludethingssuchas(i) Anobligationtosocialorder(ii) Anassociativeobligationtoacommunityorinstitution(e.g. basedon

respectoranunderstanding)(iii) AnobligationtoactinthemostrationalwaypossibleDworkin proposes something like (ii) andRaz something like (iii). Whatis thebestpossibleway to fulfill theseobligations? Onepossibleanswer isa general adherence to the law. It is not controversial to claim that surrendering toanauthority canbe thebestway toachieve socialorder (e.g.coordination issues)or that surrendering toanauthority thathas superiorknowledgecanbe thebestway toachieve themost rationalactions. Iamsimply

making

an

autonomous

decision

to

follow

the

law

independent

of

all

otherreasons.

Thismodel still fits the definitionWolff gives for authority. Take theexamplediscussed inclasswhereIstopatastopsign inthedesert. Ihavenomoral reason to stop and no fear ofpunishment. However, because ofmygeneralobligation to socialorder, Ihavedecided to follow traffic laws.Although I would normally feel zero obligation to stop at this stop signspecifically,myobligationtosocialorderhasinturngivenmethisobligation.Iamfollowingtherulerequiringmetostopatthestopsignonlybecauseitis law,whichaccordingtoWolff isthemarkofa legitimateauthority. This

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doesnotconflictwithmydutytoautonomybecauseImadeanautonomousdecision tosubmittothelawingeneral.

Itwould appear thatWolffs argument is at risk as this argument implies thatpersonalautonomyand legitimateauthorityare compatibleandthereforelegitimateauthoritycan exist.

Response

Wolffsconclusionthattherecannotbelegitimateauthoritycanbesalvagedbyclarifyinghisdefinitionofauthority.

Wolffsdefinition of legitimate authority is the following: an authorityis legitimate ifwe have an obligation to obey the law simply because it isthe law. Iproposea strongerdefinition thatmoreaccurately captures theintendedmeaning of legitimate authority: an authority is legitimate ifwehaveanexternalobligationtoobeythelawsimplybecauseitisthelaw.Bythis, Imean that theobligation toobey that laworiginates froma sourcethat isnot the individualbeingsubjectedto it. Why isthis important? Iftheobligationtoobeythelawisnotexternal butinternal,stemmingfrompersonalmoralobligation, thentheobligation to the law is independentofthe authority itself. This case is anarchy, as the obligation to the law iscompletelydependentonthepersonobeyingit.

Theargumentoutlinedintheprevioussectionisacaseofinternalobligationtothelawandthereforeisnottruelegitimateauthority. IntheexamplewhereIstopatthestopsign inthedesert,theobligationtostopisnotun

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caused.Thisobligationoriginatesfrommymoralreasons(myobligationtosocialorder)andissubjecttochange,independentoftheauthority.

Inordertoshowthatlegitimateauthorityexists,Wolffscriticmustnowdemonstratethattheobligationtoobeythelawisanexternal one,contrarytowhatIhaveargued. However,thisdoesnotseempossible,as it isundeniablethatanexternalobligationdirectlyconflictswithautonomy. IfIhavean obligation thatdoes not in anyway originate frommyself, I can innoway

say

that

Iam

taking

responsibility

for

the

action

required

to

fulfill

the

obligation. The conclusion is that legitimate authority, understood in thenewandmorecorrectsense,cannotexist.

ObjectingtotheDefinitionofLegitimateAuthorityWolffscriticmightgrantthattheargumentisvalid,butdenyitssoundness,insistingthat thedefinitionof legitimateauthority istoostrongand isnotaccurate.

I have no problem instead calling the type of authority I am talkingaboutabsoluteexternalauthority (AEA).Iwillthen lettheterm legitimateauthority be interpreted in some weaker sense that does not require theauthority to imposeobligation externally (if itpleasesWolffs critic). It isstillaworthwhileendeavortoshowthatAEAcannotexist. Iwontdeveloptheideahere,butthebeliefthatAEAexistsispervasiveanditisimportanttorealizethatthisisfalse.

Anythingweaker thanAEA is consistentwithphilosophicalanarchism.6

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If Idonothave theobligation forceduponme, but instead amboundbyanobligation that isfluid,non-bindingand influencedbymyown internalreasons,howisthatnotanarchy?Politicalobligationthatisnotcompletelyindependentoftheindividualboundtoitisastateofanarchy.

AtthispointIthinkitisagoodideatoabandonnameslikeanarchyandlegitimateauthorityalongwithallthebaggagethattheycarry.Perhapsitisbettertotrytodefineanoptimalauthority.Thistermaccuratelycapturesour

interest

in

an

authority

that

is

to

some

degree

just

but

does

not

imply

anyrighttocommand.Forexample,maybeanoptimalauthorityisonethatachievesmaximal localauthority: anauthoritywherethe largestnumberofindividualspossiblehavesomeobligationtoobeythelawandanactagainstthelawisseenasamoraldisagreementandnotamoralwrong.

ConclusionIhave shownhowWolffsdefinition of authority leaves the argument susceptible to claims that legitimate authority and autonomy are not in factcontradictory. I thendemonstratedhow strengtheningWolffsdefinitionoflegitimateauthoritytoincludethenotionofexternalobligationreaffirmstheconflictingnatureofautonomyandlegitimateauthority.

References[1]R.P.Wolff.TheConflictbetweenAuthorityandAutonomy.

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