Misunderstanding the Somali CrisisAuthor(s): I. M. LewisReviewed work(s):Source: Anthropology Today, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Aug., 1993), pp. 1-3Published by: Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and IrelandStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2783447 .

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uthro olog Vol. 9 No. 4, August 1993 Every two months oday

Contents

Misunderstanding the Somali crisis (I. M. LEWIS) page I

LORING M. DANFORTH

Competing claims to Macedonian identity: the Macedonian Question and the breakup of Yugoslavia 3

JULIAN PITT-RIVERS

The Spanish bull-fight and kindred activities 11

URSULA SHARMA

Contextualizing alternative medicine: the exotic, the marginal and the perfectly mundane 15

COMMENT 18 JONATHAN BENTHALL: L6vi-Strauss's noble notes

OBITUARY 19 T. T. S. Hayley, Robin MacKenzie

CONFERENCES 20 MARK ALLEN PETERSON on Anthropology and the 'Fourth Estate'

LETTERS 21 TOM FLYNN, CHRISTOPHER PINNEY

NEWS 22 RAI NEWS 22 CALENDAR OF EVENTS 23

CLASSIFIED 24 CAPTION TO FRONT COVER page 24

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Misunderstanding the Somali crisis The social and cultural dimensions of the crisis in Somalia, precipitated by the overthrow in January 1991 of the dictator, Mohamed Siyad Barre, have been widely misunderstood. This has inevitably affected the character and effectiveness of humanitarian interven- tion, not paradoxically however, always adversely. Thus, for a period of several months from mid-July 1992, the world's television screens presented a grue- some picture of starvation and death - yet another Afri- can 'famine' in which, in this case Somalis, featured as victims and objects of inexorable natural forces over which they had no control.1 This extremely powerful, but misleading media coverage had the positive effect of thrusting the Somali crisis dramatically up the national and international political agenda to join Yugoslavia at the top. It even jolted the British Foreign Secretary and EC colleagues into making a brief visit to Mogadishu to see the devastation at first hand.

The humanitarian response might have been less sympathetic had reporters given greater prominence to the fact that the primary cause of the disaster was the ferocious fighting between the heavily armed clan- based forces of the so-called 'warlords', all dubious relics from the Siyad era, who seek to rule Somalia and have wrought such devastation and suffering, especially among the less bellicose southern cultivators who pro- duce most of Somalia's grain. Belatedly acknowledging the contribution of fighting to the disaster (which the classic Somali proverb, 'War and famine, peace and milk' appropriately prioritizes), journalists and agency 'experts' then too readily tended to characterize the general situation as one of total anarchy. Beyond mere rhetoric, this diagnosis reflects Eurocentric assumptions about the universality of centralized political structures and a consequent inability to understand the very differ- ent political units currently in play in Somalia. The superabundance of deadly automatic weapons, supplied to the dictator Siyad by the West and the former Soviet Union has, of course, greatly contributed to the vicious- ness and intractability of the conflict. But excessive concentration on the guilt of the superpowers is apt to distract attention from the vigorous arms trade, partly financed by aid misappropriations, which currently brings fresh supplies of weapons from Kenya and Ethiopia. The problem of these ethnically porous fron- tiers is additionally complicated by partisan Somali in- volvement at a very high level in the Kenyan power structure, where the Chief of Staff is a Somali with ac- tive clan links. This issue and the related matter of the unenforced international arms embargo has yet to be seriously addressed by the UN. Supplying arms is also linked to the other major cross-border trade which air- lifts cargoes of the Kenyan- and Ethiopian-grown stimulant drug Qat (Catha edulis) to the militia fighters (and other consumers), who chew it to keep alert. Qat flights have regularly landed in Somalia when it was impossible to get food relief in.

With its teeming Qat-chewing young gangsters3 (known as mooryaan, which some Somalis derive from marihuana), Mogadishu certainly gives a surface im- pression of anarchy. More generally, however, in a sombre demonstration of the accuracy of anthropologi- cal analysis,4 Somalia has dissolved into its traditional segmentary divisions, with heavily-armed clan militias, the most destructive and ruthless of which are those led by the four main 'warlords' whose vicious power-play

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I. M. Lewis is professor of anthropology at LSE and a well-known expert on Somalia.

has so disrupted efforts to restore peace and distribute humanitarian aid. All this affects southern Somalia in- tensely. In marked contrast, in the north-east and north- west, the reversion to clan structures reveals the posi- tive side of traditional society - all the more striking in the absence of significant UN and other external agency intervention. In the north-east, in the organization of the locally based Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), traditional and modern political leadership have blended virtually seamlessly. In the north-west (the former British Somaliland which, faced with chaos in the south, declared unilateral independence in May 1991) where the clan structure is more heterogeneous, the local clan elders5 have proved much more effective in peace-making than the embryonic modern govern- ment which lacks recognition and resources.

As those of us who form the Uppsala Life and Peace Institute advisory group (which I helped to establish in 1992 6), designed to help UN policy formation in Soma- lia, have consistently emphasized, it is above all this local level leadership which must be built upon if viable political structures are to be restored in the south. UN intervention in Somalia has had an erratic and cheq1uered career which cannot be explored in de- tail here . Suffice it to say that this policy was intro- duced in the field by Ambassador Mohamed Sahnoun, the Secretary General's first Special Representative who was ideally suited for the task but was strongly critical of UN operations and left Somalia in October 1992 after only a few months in office. His successor, who failed to understand the importance of the northern elders' initiatives and conspicuously lacked insight into the general Somali situation, evidently gave only token support to our 'bottom-up' approach. In the wake of the US- led Operation Restore Hope,8 however, the same policy seems to be being pursued more resolutely by Admiral Jonathan Howe, the head of the second UN Somali operation (UNOSOM 2). While thus not paying sufficient attention to genuinely representative local leadership, both the Americans and the UN have paid too much attention (until recently unfortunately posi- tive) to the 'warlords'.9 It was of course inevitable that these menacing figures had to be negociated with, not least to limit American and UN casualties. But the war- lords skilfully manipulated the new situation, success- fully maintaining and even enhancing their positions in response to policies that were supposed to marginalize them.

Here, naturally, disarmament remains the crucial and most difficult issue. Operation Restore Hope engaged in some token action on this front, but essentially left So- malia unsanitized.10 That the warlords had no serious intention of implementing the Addis Ababa disarma- ment treaty, which they had signed at the end of March 1993, was dramatically illustrated by the engagement in which 24 Pakistani soldiers died on 5 June while trying to secure the implementation of the agreement. Follow- ing Security Council authorization on 13 June, this led to the US-reinforced assault on the forces and arms de- pots of General Aideed, who was held accountable for the attack on the Pakistanis.

By the end of June the situation had become farcical. Admiral Howe had declared General Aideed, still regu- larly holding press conferences in Mogadishu, an out- law with a price on his head. The intrepid Somali xwjar- lord had responded by offering a reward for the capture of the Admiral! In common with a significant current of Somali opinion and as a number of us had long advo- cated, the UN had now begun to play the card of accus- ing Aideed (and by implication the other warlords) of

war-crimes.11 If this new departure were to be taken full advantage of, especially in view of the civilian ca- sualties attributed to UN action, it would be necessary to persuade the other warlords to lay down their wea- pons. Otherwise, obviously, Somalis would conclude that the UN was taking sides, a suspicion already strongly held by some clans.

Whether or not UNOSOM 2 has the stomach to pur- sue that course to its logical conclusion remains to be seen. There are, unfortunately, already disturbing indi- cations that, like Ambassador Robert Oakley who headed Operation Restore Hope, Admiral Howe may be seeking to cultivate other warlords as future national leaders. This, I fear, would be a recipe for disaster - but, alas, not out of keeping with much of international intervention in Somalia.

Clearly, the Somalis should be left to choose their own leaders, however long-drawn out the process. What the international community can helpfully do, in addition to supplying humanitarian aid as needed (but not to ex- cess) is to try to establish a secure environment in which local leadership can come to the fore and armed militias will seem less necessary for survival. In helping at the same time, in partnership with local Somali pro- fessionals, to reestablish basic social services, attention should be given to the rather chaotic (even 'anarchic') NGO aid scene which would benefit from being more effectively coordinated, and, perhaps, even regulated. Certainly, the numerous agencies, many of which have worked heroically under terrible conditions, would benefit from periodic reflective assessments of their im- pact, intended and unintended, as various local Somali interest groups seek to entrap them - often rather suc- cessfully, since Somalis are such skilful politicians.

Without having space to attempt any comprehensive catalogue of misunderstandings and missed oppor- tunities, mention must be made in conclusion of the extraordinary failure to appreciate that Somali culture is primarily oral and the most effective and influential medium is radio.13 The spectacle of American helicop- ters dropping leaflets, in the case of Operation Restore Hope couched in nonsensical pigeon Somali (and cer- tainly not written by anyone conversant with current Somali) is a remarkable testimony to cultural and politi- cal obtuseness as well as deafness to advice. The killing of the UN Pakistani soldiers on 5 June occurred, signi- ficantly, round General Aideed's radio station - later wastefully blown up rather than requisitioned by UN forces. Coupled with the organic structural failings of the UN as an international political body, and the chronic weaknesses of its cumbersome bureaucracies, these technical errors do not bode well for the future in Somalia, where the UN operation is already excessively grandiose and hardly impressively efficient. Unfortu- nately also, relations with the Somali public leave much to be desired, and UN officials seem to have done little to involve those Somali professionals who are still in Somalia. It will be surprising, too, if the rather hap- hazard UN recruitment procedures succeed in attracting suitably qualified and committed expatriate administra- tive staff, despite the high salaries offered to compen- sate for the danger. Although the requirements necess- ary for restoring some form of Somali state or states could, I think, be best realized under an international trusteeship, it is difficult to be optimistic about the out- come. In an ideal world, the best solution might be to subcontract the task to an appropriately qualified single country (for historical reasons not Italy), rather than en-

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trusting it to an ad hoc multi-national administration whose divisions and differences competing Somali in- terest-groups will mercilessly exploit. O

I. M. Lewis

1. Thus, when I was interviewed for a number of television programmes at this time, the people who interviewed me told me that their producers were only interested in the 'famine angle' and would be unlikely to broadcast what I said about the conflicts which had caused it.

2. Qat leaves, which look like privet hedge, are chewed raw, traditionally on religious or social occasions when a group of men meet to talk in the evening. The active agents are compounds of the ephedrine family.

3. For an excellent, first-hand study of contemporary Mogadishu street gangs by a well-informed political scientist see Ronald Marchal, 'Formes de la violence et de son contr6le dans un espace urbain en guerre: les Mooryaan de Mogadishu', Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines, no. 2, 1993. On the political economy of the militias, see the excellent first-hand anthropological study by Marcel Djama, 'Sur la violence en Somalie; genese et dynamique des formations armees', Politique Africaine, 47, 1992, pp. 147-152.

4. See I.M. Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy, Holmes and Meier, New York, 1982 (first edition, OUP, 1961); A Moder-n Histoiy of Somalia, Westview P., Boulder, Colorado, 1988; Blood and Bone: the Call of Kinship in Somali Culture, Red Sea P., New Jersey, 1993 (December, forthcoming). See also D. Laitin and S. Samata, Somalia: Nation in Search of a State, Westview P., 1987.

5. Under the aegis of the British NGO ActionAid, Ahmed Yusuf Farah and I are currently carrying out research on the effectiveness of the elders' peace-making initiatives.

6. This small group of about ten social scientists with specialist expertise on Somalia is international in composition and includes three social anthropologists. With the aid of the Swedish government, four meetings have so far been held jointly with the leadership of the political division of the UN in Somalia. The first two meetings were attended by the UN Special Envoy, Ambassador Mohamed Sahnoun. The Life and Peace Institute also publishes the

very useful and informative Horn of Africa Bulletin. 7. For preliminary and incomplete accounts see K. Menkhaus

and T. Lyons, 'What are the lessons to be learned from Somalia?', CSIS Africa Notes, no. 144, January 1993, Washington; R. Bonner, 'Why we went. How the United Nations turned its back on Somalia', Mother Jones Magazine, March/April 1993.

8. See I.M.Lewis, 'Restoring hope in a future of peace', Cooperazione, Rome, no. 123, March 1993, pp. 43-45; 'Somalia: beyond the warlords', Africa Watch, 5. 2, March 1993; 'Somalia: operation restore hope, a preliminary assessment', Africa Rights, May 1993.

9. See New York Newsday, 'Interview with Said Samatar', 11 January 1993 and the same author's editorial in the Washington Post of 2 December 1992. See also I.M. Lewis, 'Pacifying the warlords', The Times, 12 December 1992, and 'Out from the shadow of Somalia's warlords', The Guardian, letters, 16 January 1993.

10. See Africa Watch and Africa Rights cit. 11. See Amnesty International, 'Somalia: A Human Rights

Disaster', 5 August 1992 and the same organization's 'Somalia: Update on a Disaster - Proposals for Human Rights' 30 April 1993.

12. Clearly, grain requirements in Somalia need to be properly monitored. There is some evidence that the policy of flooding Somalia with aid supplies may have started depressing local market prices of grain to the point where farmers in the agricultural regions of southern Somalia no longer have an incentive in producing for the market. Here, as in so many respects, there is an urgent need to coordinate more effectively the chaotic aid scene.

13. For a brilliant demonstration of the importance of oral culture, particularly oral poetry, in politics, see Said S. Samatar, Oral Poetry and Somali Nationalism, Cambridge, 1982. Said Samatar is Professor of History at Rutgers University. The consequent importance, and popularity, of radio broadcasting and its political significance in Somalia is well-known. As I stressed at the early stages of the UN operation in my article 'In the land of the living dead' (Sunday Times, 30 August 1992, pp.8-9), control of the radio would be a crucial issue.

Claims to Macedonian identity The Macedonian Question and the breakup of Yugoslavia

LORING M. DANFORTH

The author is professor of anthropology at Bates College, Lewiston, Maine, and the author of The Death Rituals of Rural Greece and Firewalking and Religious Healing: The Anastenaria of Northern Greece and the American Firewalking Movement (both published by Princeton U.P.). He is curre 'tly writing a book on the international confl ct between Greeks-and Macedonians over which group has the right to identify itself as Macedonians.

During the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia, world attention has focused quite understandably on the hor- rors of the killing and the ethnic cleansing which have been taking place in Croatia and Bosnia. By contrast relatively little attention has been paid to Macedonia; in large part, I suspect, because the situation there has, until now at least, remained so peaceful.

Historically, however, Macedonia has often been a major source of conflict and instability in the Balkans. Even now it lies at the centre of a bitter dispute be- tween Greeks and Macedonians over which group has the right to identify itself as Macedonians. This latest phase of the Macedonian Question involves two major issues: the human rights of the Macedonian minority in northern Greece and the international recognition of the Republic of Macedonia. This controversy, in many ways a dispute over national symbols such as namns, flags and famous ancestors, has been largely confined to the arenas of international diplomacy and public rela- tions. Nevertheless, the potential for violence is real, for the conflict between Greeks and Macedonians is an ex- pression of the same forces of ethnic nationalism and

irredentism - the desire to create ethnically pure and homogeneous nation-states - that lie at the heart of the more violent conflict that rages now between the Serbs, the Croats, and the Muslims of Bosnia.

The Macedonian Question in Balkan history The Macedonian Question has dominated Balkan his- tory and politics for over a hundred years. During the Ottoman period, which lasted in Macedonia from the fourteenth century until 1913, the population of Ma- cedonia included an amazing number of different eth- nic, linguistic, and religious groups, including Slavic and Greek speaking Christians, Turkish and Albanian speaking Muslims, Vlachs, Jews and Gypsies. Toward the end of the nineteenth century the population of Ma- cedonia was increasingly being defined from various external nationalist perspectives in terms of national ca- tegories such as Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbs, Albanians and Turks. Ottoman authorities, however, continued to divide the population of the empire into administrative units, or millets, on the basis of religious identity rather than language, ethnicity or nationality. The hegemony

ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY Vol 9 No 4, August 1993 3

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