missing the obvious - coping with scientific & technological change in arms control negotiations...

Missing the obvious - coping with scientific & technological change in arms control negotiationsDr John R.Walker Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit

19/04/23 1Issues and Non-issues in Science and

Medicine, Exeter University September 2013

REFERENCE POINT

‘A given topic might be hard to grasp, deliberately concealed, too mundane to be noticed, purposely not made public, unintelligible, collectively disowned, lost in history, beyond expression, or barred from appreciation.’

Brian Rappert, ‘On Holding What isn't There’

19/04/23Issues and Non-issues in Science and


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THEMES

> The hard to grasp> The unintelligible> Collectively disowned> Beyond expression



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HARD TO GRASP



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CONTENTS

> Lessons & pointers from CBW arms control and disarmament negotiations & implementation 1968-2012.

> Missing the obvious or accidentally/intentionally prescient – some questions.

> Addressing scientific & technological change in:– The origins of the BTWC & its negotiation– The Chemical Weapons Convention– The BTWC Protocol– BTWC & CWC Review Conferences

> Missing the obvious or accidentally/intentionally prescient – some answers?

19/04/23 5Issues and Non-issues in Science and


LESSONS AND POINTERS

> Why look at CBW arms control and disarmament?– Science & technology necessarily underpins the Conventions– Objects of verification/prohibition affected by S&T change– Debates framed by then current knowledge: 1960s, 70s & 80s– Conventions of indefinite duration – not time bound– Pace and extent of technological change: scientific revolutions? – Negotiations run by diplomats & shaped by wider political factors– Role of scientific & technical expertise in shaping dual-use

governance regime– Nature of mechanisms agreed to deal with S&T change; coping

with the unforeseen, unknowable & ‘known unknowns’.



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THE UNINTELLIGIBLE



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MISSING THE OBVIOUS OR ACCIDENTALLY /INTENTIONALLY PRESCIENT?

> Looking at state of BTWC & CWC today were the negotiators prescient?

> Are the regimes robust enough to cope with S&T change?

> What was missed, if anything?> Were any lacunae avoidable/inevitable?> Science advice failure or diplomatic myopia?



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THE ORIGINS OF THE BTWC

> BTWC was UK proposal in 1968; deal with BW separately from CW.> Internal preparatory work led by Chief Scientific Advisor:

- Zuckerman’s key role – most of the members were also scientists

- avoid using ‘bacteriological’ archaic term that could exclude viruses

- recognised that could not prohibit specific microorganisms

- provided definition for UK Working Paper: ‘biological agents causing death or disease by infection in man, animals or crops’

- clear that ban should not prevent production of agents for defence

- awareness of dual-use problem: capabilities would still exist

- believed verification not achievable as term traditionally understood

- did not consider inclusion of toxins (added later by US and Sweden.

- negotiations settled on a general purpose criterion.



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THE BTWC 1968-1971

> Unforeseen scientific & political developments when BTWC negotiated:

– Genetic engineering

– Chemistry-biology convergence

– Neuroscience

– Nanotechnologies

– Synthetic biology

– Super Computing

– Proteomics & other ‘omics’

– IGM Competition & Garage Bio DIY

– End of the Cold War

– CWC would take another 20 years

– Soviet and Iraqi offensive BW programmes

– Growing importance of NAM/G77

– Bioterrorism



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CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (1)

> What to include? Definitions and toxicity determinations.> Balancing two competing requirements: meaningful verification coverage of

dual-use industry without over-burdening chemical industry.> How to classify ‘super toxic lethal chemicals’, ‘other toxic chemicals’ and

‘other harmful chemicals’? What chemicals to include under verification.> All too difficult – dose dependent, lack of reliable data on LD 50s/ID50s,

conflicting agendas.> Focused on known CW agents and their intermediates and precursors.> National Trial Inspections showed limitations: too many relevant plants

would remain outside scope of verification.> Drew on BTWC General Purpose Criterion for core definition of ‘chemical

weapon’ and ‘toxic chemical’.> Future peaceful uses of Schedule 1 chemicals – medical & pharmaceutical?



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CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (2)

> Schedules agreed, but never intended to be museum: ‘simplified change mechanism’ adopted – not used to date: purpose ‘lost in history’.

> Scientific Advisory Board to assist the DG.> Review Conference to consider ‘any relevant scientific and technological

developments’.> Unforeseen developments in the 1970s &1980s:

– Chemistry-biology convergence.

– Neuroscience.

– Nanotechnologies

– Synthetic biology

– Computing

– Incapacitating chemical agents - a likely route of evasion?> Over focus on toxins and canister penetrants?> Is Convention future proof?



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COLLECTIVELY DISOWNED



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THE BTWC PROTOCOL (1)

> An attempt to agree BTWC verification protocol 1995-2001.> Issues more political than scientific or technological; however still had to

work out measures that met technical challenges:

- ensure Article I definition protected

- compile list of agents when purpose not always clear

- find technically credible way of dealing with threshold quantities

- develop clear definitions that would not need constant revision in light of scientific & technological change

- devise declarations applying to relevant activities & facilities plus facility specific questions (equipment held) for declaration formats

- meaning of ‘work with listed agents’

- keeping Protocol relevant in light of S&T change



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THE BTWC PROTOCOL (2)

> Provision for annual S&T review> An SAB to ‘render specialised advice’ to the Annual Conference, the

Executive Council or States Parties> Five yearly Review Conferences to address S&T issues> Simplified amendment procedures for lists & declaration formats to

‘assure the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol’> Would Protocol have been future proof?

– Difficult to say for all aspects– Declarations possibly most vulnerable?– Concept of ‘transparency thresholds’ – ranges still meaningful?



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BEYOND EXPRESSION



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BTWC AND CWC REVIEW CONFERENCES

> Seven BTWC & three CWC Review Conferences since 1980.> S&T supposed to figure prominently, but hasn’t> Background papers on S&T developments relevant to Conventions

prepared by SPs & Secretariats and others (IUPAC for the CWC)> All Review Conferences stress importance of Article I & ‘the

comprehensive scope of the prohibitions’ in covering all developments – no attempt made to list all conceivable possibilities cf BTWC Final Declaration for Sixth Review Conference in 2006.

> Ducked incapacitating agents issue – at 3 CWC Review Conferences; largely political rather than failure to see importance

> But still tendency to view issues in near rather than long-term



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MISSING THE OBVIOUS OR ACCIDENTALLY /INTENTIONALLY PRESCIENT? (1)

> So after 45 years what is the track record? Dealing with the ‘not recognised’, ‘not significant’ and ‘not acted upon’:

- Key achievement: conception of General Purpose Criterion that ensured continuing relevance in face of change, so anything overlooked or yet to be invented still covered.

- GPC a deliberate artifice, not accidental.

- negotiators recognised need to think and act on change even if political realities would make this difficult

- Conventions reflect art of the possible, but with relatively small numbers of States. Technical subordinate to political



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MISSING THE OBVIOUS OR ACCIDENTALLY /INTENTIONALLY PRESCIENT? (2)

- reluctance to act upon S&T developments largely political. - nature of life sciences & C-B convergence in early 21st century beyond the conceivable or imaginable when negotiations began.

- both Conventions provide mechanisms for addressing new or overlooked issues, but less clear capable of discriminating issues and non-issues.

- grasping the ‘here and now’ much easier to hold than conceptualising the ‘what might be’ let alone taking pre-emptive action. Attending to what is absent is generally more demanding than attending to what is plainly manifest.

- We remain at the whim of human frailties.

- Keeping regimes flexible is the key to coping with the unknown.



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AND FINALLY …



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missing the obvious - coping with scientific & technological change in arms control negotiations...

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