Space Weapons – Dream, Nightmare or Reality?

David WebbThe Praxis Centre,

Faculty of Information & TechnologyLeeds Metropolitan University

Tel +44 (0)113 283 7585Email: d.webb@leedsmet.ac.uk

Presented at the47th Annual International Studies Association

San Diego, California22-25 Match 2006-03-22

Draft version – do not cite without permission

Abstract

This paper investigates some of the technologies and major issues concerning national and international attempts to

prevent the possible weaponisation of space. As the distinction between the military and the commercial use of space

becomes less well defined through dual-use programmes and military systems become more extended with space-based

components, definitions of space, space weapons and peaceful uses have become contentious. Also, rapid advances in

and increased miniaturisation of space technologies mean that the use of space is becoming more wide-spread. The US

is the undisputed leader in space technology and has openly stated its wish to remain so – even by denying the use of

space to others. Other countries however, have no intention of being denied the use of space. There is no international

agreement on a way to prevent an arms race in outer space – there maybe little time left to find one before an accident, a

miscalculation or a deliberate policy decision results in a space war that could mean global destruction and/or the loss of

the capability to ever use or travel through space again.

1. Introduction

The military use of space is well established and has now become indispensable for the US who has built on a range of

experiences from Operation Desert Storm in 1991 to Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. The development of satellite

technology for command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) has

reached a level where a military response can now occur in minutes rather than the hours or days it had taken previously.

Space has now become “the ultimate military high ground” through the deployment of, and reliance on, space-based

weather prediction systems (the Defence Meteorological Support Program), military communications systems (to

communicate from command centres and between troops), espionage and surveillance satellites (to intercept

communications by an adversary and collect images of troop movements and weapon placements, etc.), early warning

satellites (to provide information on missile launches) and military Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites to allow

troops and vehicles to navigate and to quickly and accurately specify targets and guide "smart" weapons and unmanned

aerial vehicles (UAVs).

During the invasion of Iraq in 2003 the US deployed 6,600 GPS guided munitions and over 100,000 Precision Lightweight

GPS Receivers 1 and used 10 times the satellite capacity employed in the Gulf War of 1991. Nine days before the start of

the war a new Defense Satellite Communications System was installed to connect US military forces on land, sea and air

with the Pentagon, the White House, the State Department and US Space Command. Over 100 military satellites

supported the US and UK war effort. 27 GPS satellites were available to help determine the exact location of special

operations teams and of targets and around 24 communications satellites for command and control and to give warning of

missile attack. There were also weather forecasting, TV and other systems in operation. A February 2000 flight of the

space shuttle Endeavor was used to produce a 3-D radar map of targets 2 and the human resources available were

1 “What if Space Were Weaponized” by Jeffrey Lewis, from the Center for Defense Information, Washington DC2 As reported in the Colorado Springs Gazette, 13 April 2003

extensive. Major General Blaisdel, the Director of Space Operations, estimated that 33,600 people at 36 sites around the

world were involved in space-war activities during that time.3

The US is not alone in its use of space for military purposes. Russia has a number of military satellite programmes with

five types of short-lifetime imaging reconnaissance satellite which can be launched to update topographic and mapping

data and two series of electronic intelligence (ELINT) satellites. There are also four types of Russian dedicated military

communications satellites, with around 24 being launched since 1997 (although not all are still functioning).4 Russia also

has a number of navigation satellites and a dual-use Global National Satellite System (Glonass) which is similar to GPS. 5

The Russian armed forces were also due to be outfitted with Glonass receivers by 2005.6 In addition, there are Russian

ballistic missile early warning and space monitoring systems.

Other countries are inevitably joining in. At least 19 nations now have the ability to launch into space with around 40

operating satellites of various types. There are also somewhere in the region of 600 to 800 operational satellites currently

in orbit. 7 In terms of military applications, apart from the US and Russia, China has launched a number of military

satellites, India has imaging and communication satellites suitable for military use and Israel has military satellites and

plans for new communications, imaging and radar satellites and is also considering a system that would allow launch on

demand of small satellites from fighter aircraft.8 Other countries such as Brazil, Pakistan and Ukraine have military space

capability or potential,9 Australia has a dual use military-commercial communications satellite 10 and Iran launched its first

satellite with Russian help in October 2005 11 with plans for further launches in the future. In Europe the UK, France and

Italy make extensive use of military satellites for imaging and communications and the European Space Agency (ESA)12,

set up to be an entirely independent organisation, is slowly becoming politicised (with increasing control from the

European Commission)13 and even possibly militarised through the Galileo GPS system.14 In 2005 a report by 150 EU

experts concluded that “Europe must establish a new balance between civil and military uses of space”.15

An increasing number of space programmes are dual use – i.e. a mixture of commercial and military projects. This has

obvious cost sharing advantages to all of the parties involved but it can also help to mask or deflect interest away from

some covert military activities. This increasing grey area can make it more difficult to identify the extent and purpose of

3 “Satellites provide vital reconnaissance, communications to war effort” by Michael Woods, Post-Gazette available at http://www.post-gazette.com/nation/20030402spacewar0402p4.asp

4 See: “Current and Future Space Security - Russia: Military Programs” from the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies - http://cns.miis.edu/research/space/russia/mil.htm

5 www.fas.org/spp/guide/russia/nav/glonass.htm.6 "Platoon With a Satellite" by Nikolay Poroskov, Vremya Novostey, August 21, 2003; in "Russian General Staff Approves Plan to

Equip Troops With GLONASS Navigation Receivers," – quoted in http://cns.miis.edu/research/space/russia/mil.htm7 As quoted in “Safeguarding Space: Building Cooperative Norms to Dampen Negative Trends” by Theresa Hitchins, Disarmament

Diplomacy Issue No 81, 20058 “Israel Makes Plans for Broad Space Capabilities” by Barbara Opall Rome, Space News, August 25 20039 “Countries with advanced-launch capabilities” from the Monterey Institute of International Studies – see:

http://cns.miis.edu/research/space/spfrnat.htm10 “France Launches Australian MilSat Half Owned by Singtel”, spacedaily.com, June 11 2003 -

http://www.spacedaily.com/news/milspace-comms-03t.html 11 “First Iranian Satellite Launched”, BBC News, October 27 2005 - http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4381436.stm 12 See European Space Agency, www.esa.int, in particular www.esa.int/esaCP/SEMFEPYV1SD_index_0.html13 See for example, “Europe – the Leading Space Power?” by Regina Hagen, INESAP Bulletin #23, April 2004,

http://www.inesap.org/bulletin23/art04.htm 14 “An Evaluation of the Military Benefits of the Galileo System” by James Hasik and Michael Rip, GPS World, April 2003 -

http://www.gpsworld.com/gpsworld/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=53279 15 “Report of the panel of Experts on Space and Security”, European Commission Project Number 200446,1 March 2005 –

http://europa.eu.int/comm/space/news/article_2262.pdf

military space activity. Even so, it is widely recognised that the next step in the militarisation of space could be the

stationing of weapons in space. The purpose of this paper is to explore, from a mainly technological viewpoint, the

developments behind the push to weaponise space, some of the concerns being expressed about the wisdom and

feasibility of these developments and to attempt to assess the current situation and proposals for further developments.

To help assess trends and analyse debates it is instructive to investigate the range of space weapons technologies and

what we mean by the term ‘space weapon’.

2. Space Weapons Technologies

Space weapons can be based in space or on the ground and they may be aimed at targets in either place. So, there is the

possibility of ‘Space to Space’, ‘Space to Earth’, ‘Earth to Space’, or ‘Earth to Earth’ (through space) weapons. Also,

different technologies may be deployed to deliver the knockout blow. These could be ‘kinetic kill vehicles’ that destroy by

impact alone (as with some anti-satellite or ASAT weapons), missiles with conventional or nuclear warheads, directed

energy weapons (such as lasers), or such things as the“Rods from God” – a concept whereby tungsten rods are fired from

space to ground-based targets).16 The intent and purpose of these systems may be more obvious in some cases than

others.

Perhaps the most commonly discussed type of space weapon is the ASAT which have been developed in one form or

another by the US and Russia in a range of programmes since the Cold War. In the 1960s the Soviet Union surrounded

Moscow with nuclear-tipped inter-continental ballistic missiles to act as an Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) system. These

missiles would also have ASAT capabilities as they would be able to destroy all space-based systems in the vicinity of

their detonation. However, the main ASAT system developed by the Soviet Union was the "Co-orbital ASAT" - a satellite

suicide bomb packed with explosives. 17 The idea was to place the ASAT in an orbit close to that of the target and move it

in to destroy it within one or two orbits. Development began in the early 1960s and the first test flights were made in 1968.

The Soviets temporarily ceased testing after signing the ABM Treaty in 1972, but resumed again in 1976 and continued

until 1982 after which they declared a moratorium on launching ASATs on the condition that no other country deployed

them. Russia appears to have continued with this policy18 and Jane's 2001-2 Space Directory describes the Russian

ASAT program as "inactive."

The US began its ASAT tests in 1959 but results were not encouraging and the project was stopped in 1963. In the 1960s

the use of nuclear explosions to disable satellites was considered but the potential damage to untargeted systems through

radiation and the electromagnetic pulse (EMP) meant that no actual ASAT tests were carried out. Even so a nuclear

carrying Nike Zeus missile was deployed at Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific from 1962 until 1966 when it was replaced, until

1972, by a Thor missile.19 The resumption of Soviet ASAT tests in 1976 could have been the result the development of the

US Space Shuttle (considered to have an ASAT capability). At this time the US was also concerned about exaggerated

reports of Soviet laser and particle beam technology and revived its ASAT programme with the Air-launched Miniature

16 “Rods from Gods: The insanity of Star Wars” by Bob Fitrakis, Global Research, 24 June 2005 - http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/FIT407A.html

17 “A History of US and Soviet ASAT Programs” by Laura Grego, Union of Concerned Scientists18 "Outer Space and the Military Security of Russia" by Aleksandr Dolinin, an interview with Space Troops Commander Colonel-

General Anatoliy Perminov, Krasnaya Zvezda, April 27, 2001, p. 1; in "New Space Troops commander Colonel-General Anatoliy Perminov interviewed on connection between Space Troops' activities and various areas of country's development"

19 See http://www.paineless.id.au/missiles/NikeZeus.html and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-satellite_weapon

Vehicle (ALMV) which carried a heat-seeking homing device and was designed to attack Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites.

The ASAT was launched at high altitude from an F-15 aircraft in a steep climb to help it reach its target in orbit and

destroy it by high speed collision. Five tests were carried out from 1984-6 and the system was actually tested against a

satellite in September 198520. Considerable cost increases led to the program being cancelled in 1988 although

development was started on new ASAT systems.

Under President Reagan’s 1983 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) ASAT projects were adapted for use as anti-ballistic

missiles (ABMs) and vice versa. Initially the plan was to put together around 40 space platforms containing up to 1,500

kinetic interceptors. By 1988 the project had evolved into four stages, the first of which, “brilliant pebbles”, consisted of a

number of single kinetic interceptors and associated tracking systems. The second stage would deploy larger platforms

and the following phases were to include laser weapons and later charged particle beam weapons. Plans were to

complete the whole thing by 2000 at a cost of around $125 billion. The only successful energy weapon to come from the

SDI was the Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser (MIRACL)21 which can produce a megawatt of output for around 70

seconds. It was developed in response to intelligence that the Soviet Union had created a similar system. However, after

it was discovered in 1989 that the Soviet system was no threat and far from completion, Congress banned the use of

MIRACL in 1991. The development of the US Army ground-based kinetic energy ASAT (KE-ASAT) system was also

banned in 1993, but was resurrected in 1996 with $45 million of funding and now forms part of the Applied Counterspace

Technology (ACT) testbed at Redstone Arsenal. It received $7.5 million of funding in 2004 and $14 in 2005 when it was

expected to produce 3 kill vehicles. Its future remains uncertain however, as systems that produce debris are not currently

favoured and have given way to directed energy weapons. The ban on using the MIRACL ended in 1996 and the following

year the system was tested by firing at a USAF satellite 420km above the Earth. It is being developed further in

conjunction with Israel.

In February 2005 a two year contract was awarded to Northrop Grumman to develop the operations, maintenance and

support of the High Energy Laser (HEL) development facility at White Sands Missile Range (which is also home to

MIRACL). HEL systems have the potential to damage systems at a distance (perhaps even into space) quickly and

accurately. This makes them particularly attractive for missile defence and the US is funding development programmes for

possible future deployment on satellites and aircraft. The Air-Borne Laser (ABL) - a high powered Chemical Oxygen-

Iodine Laser (COIL) fitted to a modified Boeing 747 would be capable of both intercepting missiles and destroying, or at

least blinding, satellites.22 It completed initial passive flight tests in July 2005 and is due to be tested against a missile in

2008. Although the Space-Based Laser (SBL) programme has been more or less cancelled, the idea of a powerful land

based laser together with mirror systems mounted on high altitude airships is being investigated23 and has been proposed

to act as a missile defence and/or space weapon. Designs of chemical lasers such as MIRACL and COIL are constrained

by the requirement for refuelling and so the US is investigating the possible use of Solid State Laser (SSL) designs. These

are likely to be lighter, smaller and have a longer operational life but are not as powerful as chemical systems.

20 The US tested the ALMV against an ageing Solwind satellite in a 555km orbit on 13th September 198521 For more information see: http://www.fas.org/spp/military/program/asat/miracl.htm 22 “Anti-satellite Capabilities of Planned US Missile Defence Systems” by David Wright and Laura George, Disarmament Diplomacy,

Issue No 68, December 2002 – January 2003. Also at http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd68/68op02.htm and from the Union of concerned scientists: http://www.ucsusa.org/global_security/space_weapons/page.cfm?pageID=1152

23 “Aerospace Realy Mirror System (ARMS)”, GlobalSecurity.org – http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/jhpssl.htm

China does not have a publicly declared ASAT program although their existing launch capabilities could provide the basis

for the development of such a system.24 A program to field a viable ASAT device consisting of a kinetic kill vehicle, high

powered laser, space early warning, and target discrimination system components, was apparently abandoned in 1980.

Preliminary research on ASATs has been carried out since then partly funded under a Program for High Technology

Development.25 In 2003 and 2004 annual reports to the US Congress on Chinese Military Power quoted an article from a

Hong Kong newspaper that reported China as having developed and tested a “parasitic micro satellite” ASAT system.

However, this information seems to have originated from an item posted in 2000 on an unreliable internet bulletin board

service run by a self-described “military enthusiast”. Some US analysts still believe that China does have a space

weapons programme in an attempt to counter US plans for power-projection and there are also reports that India and

Israel wish to develop space weapons technologies.

Another type of space weapon is used to interfere with or jam satellite communications. Jamming systems have been

deployed fairly recently against broadcasts aimed at Libya, Iran and China26 and an attempt was made by Iraq to disrupt

the US GPS signals at the start of the Iraq War.

2.1. Classification and Definition

Neuneck and Rothkirch 27 have tabulated the advantages and disadvantages of the different technologies considered for

space weapons as in Table 1. They point out that definitions of space weapons could be technical, geographical or

politically motivated and suggest that space weapons could be defined in a number of ways. For example, from:

technical lists of types of technologies;

their function or purpose;

the altitude they can reach and a definition of where space begins;

parameters such as deployment altitude or orbital characteristics.

Table 1: Advantages and disadvantages of future space weapons(from Neuneck and Rothkiech, 2003)

Principle Advantage Disadvantage/ Problems Warning TimeDEW Laser Direct effects Energy, Line of sight,

atmosphere, CountermeasuresSeconds to Minutes

Microwaves Invisible Low resolution, Countermeasures

Seconds to Minutes

Particle Beams; X-Rays

Invisible, fast Propagation. Energy production Seconds to Minutes

KEW Homing missiles/ kill vehicles

High closing speed Acceleration of the collision -mass; Homing

Minutes /Hours/ Days

Collision devices (including micro-satelliets)

Hard to identify Space debris multiplication, Minutes/Hours

Electromagnetic guns

High closing speed Energy; Technical Problems Minutes

Nuclear Nuclear weapons Lethality, destruction radii

Destroys own satellites Seconds

24 “Chinese Anti-Satellite Capabilities” from GlobalSecurity.com at http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/china/asat.htm 25 Op cit26 See for example, “Space Systems Negation”, Space Security Briefing Notes, 2005 – http://www.spacesecurity.org 27 “Space as a New Medium of Warfare? Motivations, Technology and Consequences” by Götz Neuneck, André Rothkirch, Institute

for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH), Falkenstein 1, D-22587 Hamburg, Germany, 2003.

Although there are currently no ASAT systems considered operational and no weapons positioned in space, there is a

range of space based systems that could be classified as components of weapons systems. Space based radars and

infra red detection and tracking systems are used for targeting purposes and are obviously weapons components. As

stated previously, the GPS satellites now play a crucial role in guiding not only troops but weapons to designated targets.

Recent proposals for space based mirrors to direct ground based lasers into space could also be classed as weapons

components. It could also be argued that the “Revolution in Military Affairs” requires that space based surveillance, battle

management and communications and control systems form an integral part of war fighting and thus become part of a

virtual integrated weapons system.

Another aspect to the question of what is a space weapon is that there are many space based systems that may have a

dual purpose. Some space systems can be deployed for non-military purposes and yet easily turned to an offensive

capability. For example: maneuverable micro satellites or space planes could be used to perform a number of peaceful

functions in space, including civilian communications, satellite maintenance or repair, etc. but could also be used more

aggressively as ASAT weapons.

Marshall and colleagues have tackled the space weapon definition problem by classifying military space activities into

three categories – two generally agreed areas and one grey area, as shown in Table 2. 28 The white area includes military

activities that do not involve weapons based in space while the black area comprises technologies are generally

considered as space weapons. The grey area covers a range of technologies that fall between these two.

Table 2: The spectrum of military space activity: what is a space weapon?(from Marshall et al., 2005)

Space Weapons(Generally or historicallyprohibited)

Intermediate Systems Military activities notinvolving Space Weapons(Generally allowed)

[Key Words: Degrade, Destroy- WMD or radiological weapons- Space-based directed energy

weapons- Space-based kinetic weapons- Anti-satellite satellites (ASAT)

destruction or degrade other satellites

[Key words: Deny, Disrupt- ASAT – Deny access to

satellite or ground system, passive measures, encryption

- ASAT – Temporarily interfere with satellite or ground system (cyber attacks etc.)operation

- ASAT Disrupt operations of space or ground segments permanently

- Ground-based directed (at space)weapons

- Nuclear weapons for NEO defence

- Ground based jamming- Suborbital intercept missiles

for missile defence

- Communication- Navigation- Reconnaissance (space-based

or high altitude platforms)- Space-monitoring networks- Early warning systems ICBM

with suborbital trajectory- Suborbital delivery of troops or

equipment

The authors point out that the activities designated as white are being employed by a growing number of nations while

some of the grey systems are being developed by a smaller but not insignificant number. Those in the black area are the

controversial systems that may not be fully developed or deployed, but have often been the subject of international debate

28 “Space weapons: the urgent debate”, by William Marshall, George Whitesides, Robert Schingler, Andre Nilsen & Kevin Parkin, ISYP Journal on Science and World Affairs , Vol.1, No.1, 2005 19-32 – available at: http://www.student-pugwash.org/journal/0101/0101_marshall.pdf

and disagreement. They consider the technologies within the grey area to be the most important for consideration as they

are most likely to be deployed in the short term, and can produce similar effects to the more traditional longer-term space-

based weapons in the black area.

Generally speaking, space weapons can damage, destroy or alter targets in or from space. In 1991 a study carried out by

the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) proposed the following definition:

“A space weapon is a device stationed in outer space (including the moon and other celestial bodies) or in the

earth environment designed to destroy, damage or otherwise interfere with the normal functioning of an object or

being in outer space, or a device stationed in outer space designed to destroy, damage or otherwise interfere with

the normal functioning of an object or being in the earth environment. Any other device with the inherent capability

to be used as defined above will be considered as a space weapon.” 29

The final sentence of this definition is interesting and, given the dual capability (perhaps even purpose) of many systems

currently deployed, is unlikely to be accepted by many nations with a space capability or interest. A Draft Treaty Limiting

Anti-Satellite Weapons was presented to the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee in May 1983 by the Union of

Concerned Scientists 30 but did not have the support of the administration. However, the Defense Authorization and

Appropriation bills that followed did support the general principles of the treaty by banning the testing of ASATs against

targets in space. The draft ASAT treaty called on states not to:

“destroy, damage, render inoperable or change the flight trajectory of space objects” of other states and not to

place in orbit “weapons for destroying, damaging, rendering inoperable or changing the flight trajectory of space

objects or for damaging objects in the atmosphere or on the ground”.

It also called for states to refrain from installing such weapons on celestial bodies and from testing such weapons. In 1985

at the Conference for Disarmament China proposed that space weapons be defined as:

“…all devices or installations based in space (including those based on the Moon and other celestial bodies)

which are designed to attack or damage objects in the atmosphere or on land, or at sea… ” (CD/579).31

Another definition has been proposed by the French as:

"any satellite or space object in orbit around the earth or any other celestial body which has at least one active

function capable, by direct action, of destroying, seriously damaging or intentionally interfering with the operation

of any device located on earth or above the earth within the atmosphere or in outer space should be regarded as

a weapon in space." 32

29 “Outer Space A Source of Conflict or Co-operation?” Bhupendra Jasani (Ed.), Tokio 1991, p13. (United Nations University Press) Published in Co-operation with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

30 “The Senate testimony: Controlling Space Weapons”, U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 98th Congress, 1st Session, May 18, 1983; pp.112-129 – available at: http://www.ucusa.org/assets/documents/global_security/ASAT_treaty_1983.pdf

31 CD/579, cited after Péricles Gasparini-Alves: “Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. A Guide to the Discussions in the Conference of Disarmament”, UNIDIR, New York 1991, UNIDIR /91/79, p.15ff.

32 “Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation: French Policy”, Ministry of Defence, Paris, 2000, pp. 60-64.

The Russians have proposed that the term “space weapons” could mean:

“systems or devices, based on any physical principle, launched into the orbit around the Earth or placed in the

outer space by any other way, which are produced or converted to destroy, damage or disrupt normal functioning

of objects in outer space, as well as targets on the surface of the Earth or in the air. Space weapons are created

to directly impact adversary's assets, and, by its nature, can be either weapons of mass destruction or

conventional ones, including those based on new physical principles. It is exactly this kind of weapons that Russia

has committed itself not to be the first to place in outer space.” 33

Canada has proposed that space continue to be used by the military for surveillance, intelligence-gathering and

communications but that weapons (i.e. “any device or component of a system designed to inflict physical harm through

deposition of mass and/or energy on any other object”) be banned. This is a position that some states and NGOs, who

campaign for a total demilitarization of space, do not necessarily support.34

Despite the wide range of definitions suggested for further discussion and debate, it is perhaps not surprising that there is

not one that satisfies everybody but there may be political reasons for this, as Theresa Hitchens has pointed out:

“Unfortunately, it seems that the Department of Defense and the U.S. Air Force are doing their best - although

perhaps not deliberately - to further muddy the already murky definitional waters. Masked by a combination of

confusing Pentagon-ese (always a problem) and official hair-splitting, real-world space weapon programs are

being bred and born with almost no public scrutiny. And as anyone knows who has followed weapon system

acquisition, killing a program past a certain point in the developmental (read spending) chain is well nigh

impossible.

If the current situation continues, it may be that a far-reaching shift in US strategic policy will be made as a fait

accompli, rather than as the result of the serious, in-depth public policy discussion it deserves.

Officially, as numerous senior US Air Force officials have publicly insisted over the past year, there are "no space

weapons programs on the books." The real meaning of this statement, however, is highly dependent on how one

defines space weapons and on the books.” 35

The problem with the use of deliberate obscuration and secrecy as a strategy is that it encourages others to think the

worse. Remember the famous blind men and elephant story?

There are four blind men who discover an elephant. Since the men have never encountered an elephant before, they

grope about, trying to understand and describe this new phenomenon. One grasps the trunk and concludes it is a snake.

Another explores one of the elephant's legs and describes it as a tree. A third finds the elephant's tail and announces that

it is a rope. And the fourth blind man, after exploring the side of the elephant, concludes that it is actually a wall. The same

object is seen as being completely different when only part of the whole thing is known about. When intelligence rather

33 Statement by Ambassador Leonid Skotnikov, Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation, at the Plenary Meeting of the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 1 February 2005 - http://www.geneva.un.mid.ru/speeches/19.html

34 See for example discussions at the Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space – http://www.space4peace.org 35 “When is a Space Weapon Not a Space Weapon?” by Theresa Hitchens, Center for Defense Information, 23 January 2004 -

http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?DocumentID=2012&from_page=../index.cfm

than facts is used to develop political strategy, the result is likely to be the worst possible scenario offered by the

information that is available – especially when that secrecy is accompanied by distrust and suspicion. If the information

from the blind men was to be passed on to military intelligence the outcome might be that the elephant was thought to be

a weapon of mass destruction, the blind men being credited with discovering communications and control cables, a

missile and the wall of a silo or bunker.

There may or may not be a common desire to arrive at a working definition of a space weapon but the difficulties that are

encountered when attempting to do so appear to be rooted in the distrust and suspicion that accompany a lack of

openness and cooperation. The result is that while some may see space weapons as a necessary insurance for national

security, they will be viewed by others as a means to create an overwhelming military advantage.

3. So, Dream or Nightmare?

In this case one person’s dream might be another’s nightmare. The major cause for concern about the weaponisation of

space may be obvious for those countries that have little say, nothing to gain from, and no control over, the developments

of space weapons technologies. These countries are mostly developing countries from the southern hemisphere. The

major space faring states however, may feel that they have a lot to gain in developing systems that will allow them to

control and direct global forces and possibly ensure them a stronger and more secure position as world leaders. The main

motives for developing and dealing with space weapons technologies can be summarised as follows:

Maintaining Space Dominance

Negation of Space Assets

Protection of Space Assets

Force Projection, Rapid Deployment and Management of Global Conflict

3.1. Maintaining Space Dominance

This has been a vision for the US military for some time. Emanating from the space race and the Cold War, given some

focus by the famous 1983 “Star Wars” speech of President Raegan and encourage by the collapse of the Soviet Union,

the US Space Command developed and published in 1997, its “Vision for 2020”. In this document the US Space

Command describes itself as: “dominating the space dimension of military operations to protect US interests and

investment. Integrating Space Forces into warfighting capabilities across the full spectrum of conflict” and makes historical

parallels to indicate a natural progression of warfighting into the space arena:

“Historically, military forces have evolved to protect national interests and investments - both military and

economic. During the rise of sea commerce, nations built navies to protect and enhance their commercial

interests. During the westward expansion of the continental United States, military outposts and the cavalry

emerged to protect our wagon trains, settlements, and railroads. As air power developed, its primary purpose was

to support and enhance land and sea operations. However, over time, air power evolved into a separate and

equal medium of warfare. The emergence of space power follows both of these models. Over the past several

decades, space power has primarily supported land, sea, and air operations -strategically and operationally.

During the early portion of the 21st century, space power will also evolve into a separate and equal medium of

warfare. Likewise, space forces will emerge to protect military and commercial national interests and investment

in the space medium due to their increasing importance.” 36

The document also points out that “Control of Space is the ability to assure access to space, freedom of operations within

the space medium, and an ability to deny others the use of space, if required. ... Global Engagement is the application of

precision force from, to, and through space.”

The US Space Command’s associated document, the “Long Range Plan” of 1998 saw war in space as a form of resource

war, stating that “... the nation's dependence on space capabilities in the 21st Century which rivals its dependence on

electricity and oil in the 19th and 20th Centuries. Electricity and oil were critical parts of the industrial revolution; space

capabilities (e.g. communications, positioning and timing, imaging, earth resource monitoring, and weather) are emerging

as vital to the information revolution. ... US interests and investments in space must be fully protected to ensure our

nation's freedom of action in space.” 37

In August 2004, the USAF released a document entitled “Counterspace Operations, Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2.1”38

which detailed, for the first time, US anti-satellite and space weapons operations. The Foreword by Gen John P. Jumper,

USAF Chief of Staff states that

“US Air Force counterspace operations are the ways and means by which the Air Force achieves and maintains

space superiority. Space superiority provides freedom to attack as well as freedom from attack ...Space and air

superiority are crucial first steps in any military operation.”

The document discusses air-launched missiles, direct-ascent and on-orbit ASATs as possible mechanisms for destroying

satellites and, with others, serves to present a vision of space security through domination. This vision is reinforced by the

lobbying of aerospace corporations who are due to make significant financial gain from the huge contracts that arise from

the development and deployment of these technologies. However, many concerned engineers and scientists and civil

society activists are questioning these activities from the point of view of cost, desirability and even possibility. These

challenges may have been quite effective on occasion.

3.2. Negation of Space Assets

The US has recently shown an increase in funding and support for ASAT and related programmes. In 2004 the Pentagon

received $168.6 million for the development of space weapons technology and over $2 billion for weapons related

programmes.39 The Pentagon budget request for space control and space force projection related programmes for 2005

totalled over $3 billion, which included around $217 million for potential ASAT and space weapons associated projects

(described as ASAT and space-based missile defence). The appropriations committees cut nearly $1 billion from the

36 “Vision for 2020”, United States Space Command, Peterson Air Force Base, 2nd Printing, August 1997 - http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/usspac/visbook.pdf

37 “Long Range Plan, Implementing USSPACECOM Vision for 2020”, US Space Command, printed March 1998 - http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/usspac/lrp/toc.htm

38 Available from: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/afdd2_2_1.pdf 39 “Space Weapons Spending in the FY2005 Defense Budget” by Jeffrey Lewis, Presented at the 9th PIIC Beijing Seminar on

International Security, October 2004

military space budget 40 and sliced 40% from the space weapons and ASAT requests. The agreed budget included $10.6

million for initial work on the space-based interceptor test bed 41 but the Congressional appropriators directed the Force

Application and Launch from the Continental US (FALCON) program 42 not to engage in any "weapons-related work"

during financial year 2005 and cut funding for the Common Aero Vehicle (CAV) by half to $12.5 million (any effort to put

weapons on the CAV or test launch it on a ballistic missile was also forbidden). Other space programs suffered funding

cuts from appropriators including the Space Based Radar (SBR), Transformational SATCOM (T-SAT) and Counter

Surveillance Reconnaissance System (CSRS) programs.

Another controversial project with possible space weapons implications is the Near Field Infra Red Experiment (NFIRE) of

the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). The primary role of NFIRE is to gather data to help differentiate between the rocket

and its exhaust plume. The proposal was to launch a platform, termed a "kill vehicle," to closely encounter a target missile.

Such a capability could obviously be used to disable or destroy targeted missiles or orbiting satellites. The NFIRE was

originally to be launched from a Minotaur missile in summer 2004, but the MDA announced in March that there would be a

year-long delay apparently due to having received only $44.5 million of the requested $82 million of funding in 2004.

Then, in July 2004, the Congressional appropriators cut all the $68 million requested for NFIRE, although the Senate

Appropriations Committee recommended that the program should be preserved. In August 2004 was reported 43 that the

controversial sensor (the 'kill vehicle") would be removed from the program. NFIRE is scheduled for launch in June 2006,

although this may be delayed. The Senate Appropriations Committee, who approved $13.7 million for the programme,

then urged the retention of the kill vehicle but the MDA has removed it from the planned test because of possible technical

failure. NFIRE was also shifted from the Ballistic Missile Defense System Interceptor Program into the BMD Technology

Program , indicating a possible shift in function. 44

One growth area with a clear ASAT capability is the ongoing development and testing of US Micro-satellite (MS) and

Experimental Satellite Series (XSS) prototypes, including a 28 kilogram XSS-10 MS to manoeuvre around and

photograph space objects.45 The USAF launched the first satellite of these in January 2003. The “single strongest

recommendation” of the informal Air Force 1999 Micro-satellite Technology and Requirements Study, was for “the

deployment, as rapidly as possible, of XSS-10-based satellites to intercept, image, and if needed, take action against, a

target satellite.” 46 A larger version (100 kg), the XSS-11, was launched in April 2005 and is expected to remain in orbit for

12-18 months transmitting real-time streaming video from as close as 500 metres to ground stations. The small size and

weight of micro satellites keeps project costs low.

40 “Space Weapons Spending in the FY2005 Defense Budget” by Jeffrey Lewis, Presented at the 9th PIIC Beijing Seminar on International Security, October 200441 “Programs to Watch” by Jeffrey Lewis, in “Weapons in Space”, Arms Control Today, November 2004, available at:

http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_11/Krepon.asp 42 Details of the FALCON program can be found in the “US Air Force Transformation Flight Plan”, November 2003 – see:

http://www.af.mil/library/posture/AF_TRANS_FLIGHT_PLAN-2003.pdf 43 “Critics Laud Plan to Remove 'Kill Vehicle' From Satellite” by Jeremy Singer, space.com -

http://www.space.com/spacenews/archive04/nfirearch_082304.html.44 "Committee Urges Kill Vehicle Use in NFIRE Test” by David Ruppe, Global Security Newswire, 29 September 2005, -

http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2005_9_29.html45 "Arms Race in Space? US Air /force Quietly Focuses on Space Control", by Theresa Hitchens and Jeffrey Lewis, Defense News,

Sept 1 200346 “Military Microsatellites: Matching Requirements and Technology” by Matt Bille, Robyn Kane, and Maj. Mel Nowlin, Presented to the

AAIA Space 2000 Conference and Exhibition, Long Beach, CA, September 19-21, 2000, p. 9.

More recently, the US Air Force Research Laboratory has plans to develop a small experimental satellite to orbit close to

a host spacecraft – known as the Autonomous Nanosatellite Guardian for Evaluating Local Space or ANGELS spacecraft. 47 In addition the DART (Demonstration for Autonomous Rendezvous Technology)48 and Orbital Express 49 (to be used to

validate the technical feasibility of robotic, autonomous on-orbit refuelling and reconfiguration of satellites) use small

satellites to operate near larger ones. It is not surprising that accidents occur when working at very large distances with

very small satellites and in April 2005 DART collided with a target satellite. 50 Therefore, extreme care and international

agreement and understanding are necessary to avoid serious problems arising from an escort satellite straying too far

from its host – especially if it were to approach an operational satellite of another nation.

Despite the rhetoric in a number of US military documents and speeches, indicating the intent to develop and test space-

based weapons, the political response to funding requests appears so far to have been relatively restrained. The fact that

no space-based weapons have so far been tested or deployed is positive but it is unclear how long this will continue

before someone takes the next step.

3.3. Protection of Space Assets

A serious disadvantage to the increasing military reliance on space technology is that satellite systems are extremely

vulnerable to attack from anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. Donald Rumsfeld’s “Commission to Assess United States

National Security Space management and Organization” concluded in January 2001 that the likelihood of an attack on US

space systems - a “space Pearl Harbor” - needed to be taken seriously. 51 In fact, the first actual attack on a military

satellite system was attempted in 2003 when the Iraqi military unsuccessfully tried to jam information from satellites of the

US Global Positioning System.52 US Air Force Secretary James Roche commented that this attempt to disrupt GPS-

guided weapons demonstrated an understanding of the importance of space to the US military. Since then the US Air

Force itself has deployed a number of reversible jamming, or Counter Communications, systems in 2005.53 Electronic

systems can include an inbuilt attack detection capability but it is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain advanced warning.

The US and Russia have the ability to detect and warn about attacks on satellites through their early warning systems.

France plans to launch their own early warning satellites in 2008. In addition, the US is developing a Rapid Attack

Identification, Detection and Reporting Systems (RAIDRS) to warn of attacks on its satellites. In December 2005 the US

Air Force Research Laboratory announced plans to develop a small experimental satellite - known as the Autonomous

Nanosatellite Guardian for Evaluating Local Space or ANGELS - to orbit close to a host spacecraft and provide direct

monitoring of the near space environment of a space asset. 54 Further surveillance and situational awareness from the

ground may be provided using key optical and radar systems of the Defense Advanced Research projects Agency

(DARPA). DARPA is also developing a system known as Deep View to enable the monitoring of unknown objects in

geostationary orbit and help determine the reasons for satellite failure.

47 “Autonomous Nanosatellite Guardian for Evaluating Local Space (ANGELS)”, FBO Daily Issue,#1469 December 4, 2005 - http://www.fbodaily.com/archive/2005/12-December/04-Dec-2005/FBO-00943629.htm

48 Space Flight Center News - http://www.msfc.nasa.gov/news/dart/ 49 See GlobalSecurity.com - http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/orbital-express.htm 50 “Fender Bender: NASA's DART Spacecraft Bumped Into Target Satellite”, by Brian Berger, Space News, 22 April 2005 -

http://www.space.com/missionlaunches/050422_dart_update.html 51 Available from: http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/space20010111.html 52 “Jamming Incident Underscores Lessons About Space”, spacedaily.com - http://www.spacedaily.com/news/gps-04zzzzb.html 53 “US deploys satellite jamming system” by Jim Wolf, Reuters, SanDiego.com October 29, 200454 “Autonomous Nanosatellite Guardian for Evaluating Local Space (ANGELS)”, FBO Daily Issue,#1469 December 4, 2005 -

http://www.fbodaily.com/archive/2005/12-December/04-Dec-2005/FBO-00943629.htm

The US is also researching other systems to harden computer chips from radiation (including nuclear explosions) and

electronic attack and to enable GPS satellites to counter signal jamming by significantly boosting their signals. These

systems will provide the ability to distinguish between accidental and deliberate satellite failure and thereby aid space

security although nano-satellite technology is also being evaluated for ASAT capability. 55

3.4. Rapid Deployment and Management of Global Conflict

US Space Command’s “Vision for 2020” also recognises that the gap between the world’s rich and poor will continue to

grow and that this is likely to cause conflict. Space and associated technologies offer opportunities for integrating

warfighting operations and enabling conflicts to be directed remotely and for troops and resources to be deployed swiftly

anywhere in the world. This is an obvious attraction to any global peace keeping or war fighting force.

In his book “The Pentagon’s New Map”, Thomas Barnett suggests that the US military should be able to take control of

and manage the global distribution of resources, energy and people. He identifies the possible areas of future conflict as

being situated within a "non-integrating gap" which includes parts of Latin America, Africa, Middle East and Central Asia

all of which are key oil-producing regions of the world. Barnett argues that as manufacturing and production moves from

the US to regions where costs are lower, the primary US export will become "security." His vision is for an integrated US

military force of special operations troops he calls “Leviathan”, ready to move in to any part of the world, wherever

directed. Once their job is done a second military force that he calls “Systems Administration” will be required to police

and control the aftermath.

Although this vision of Barnett¹s may be too extreme and undesirable for many Americans, there are indications that his

ideas are very influential. The military ideas of “force projection” and “full spectrum dominance”, coupled with the

development of "lily pad" bases at the expense of those developed during the Cold War seem to be following his

suggestions. Integrated space systems would play a central role in this or any other type of strategy that involves global

management and command of forces and movement of vast amounts of people and materials. There seems little doubt

that the military (and many politicians) believe that the future development of space based weapons will help gain and

maintain superiority on the Earth as well as in space.

3.4. Ballistic Missile Defence and Space Weapons

Despite mounting world criticism and accusations of creating a new Arms Race - in December 2002, shortly after

withdrawing from the ABM Treaty, President Bush ordered the deployment of the first 10 long-range interceptors by the

end of 2004. The first batch of interceptors were installed at Fort Greely in Alaska and at Vandenberg Air Force Base in

California. These numbers were due to be increased to up to 40 by the end of 2007 with the possibility of others being

stationed in eastern Europe. With over $130 billion dollars already spent on developing the associated system

components since President Reagan’s ”Star Wars” speech in 1983, there have been growing concerns about the overall

costs (not least from the General Accounting Office). It has been estimated that the total life-cycle cost for a layered

missile defense system would be close to $1.2 trillion up to 2035.56 Perhaps in response to these concerns, and the

general lack of confidence in its effectiveness, the Pentagon announced in October 2005 that it may not progress to

further generations of the ground based interceptors. Alternative methods of interception (all of which have ASAT

55 “Space Systems Protection: Key Trends”, Space Security Briefing Notes, 2005 – http://www.spacesecurity.org 56 “The Full Costs of Ballistic Missile Defense” by R. F. Kaufman (Ed), Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, Jan 2003

capabilities), such as miniature kill vehicles or boost phase intercepts using the airborne laser or short range interceptors

are likely to be pursued instead.

While projects that are overtly developing anti-satellite or space weapons systems may find difficulty obtaining funds, the

same or similar projects are often funded when they are described as a means of defence against limited missile attack.

Therefore, much of the current US development of space-based technology and weaponry (including space based

interceptors 57 and airborne and space based lasers) is taking place under the guise of missile defence. As David Wright

and Laura George from the Union of Concerned Scientists have stated:

“… current US ASAT capability is fairly limited and, based on current funding levels, dedicated ASAT systems

appear not to be high priorities. Some of the planned missile defence systems, on the other hand, would add

significant ASAT capability to the US arsenal and have strong political and financial support. This fact should be

kept in mind when analysing US capabilities and developing policies relevant to restricting ASATs.” 58

There are a number of examples of technological systems being developed for missile defence that can easily be adapted

to war fighting or anti-satellite roles. Perhaps the most obvious is the proposal to base interceptors in space. These would

have clear ASAT capability, although it is not clear how feasible the concept of space based interceptors is as full global

coverage would require a huge number of missiles to be permanently stationed and maintained in space. Other MDA

developments such as the improvement of space tracking facilities on the ground (such as the upgrading of the early

warning radars at Fylingdales in the UK and Thule in Greenland, and the development of the X-band radar) and in space

(such as the Space Based Radar, and the Space Tracking and Surveillance Systems or Space Based Infra Red System)

can also be used for the targeting of ASATs. Interceptor missiles for the Ground-based Midcourse Defence element of

Missile Defence, designed to hit and intercept incoming missiles, could also be deployed against LEO satellites.59

The US missile defence programme has also successfully drawn in the cooperation of other states. In Europe, the UK,

Denmark and Greenland have agreed to allow radars on their territory to become part of the missile defense system.

Other European countries are being tempted with associated R&D contracts and the US has also been negotiating with

Poland and the Czech Republic over the possibility of siting radar stations and/or missile interceptors there. Hungary,

Romania and Bulgaria have also been approached. On July 7 2004 Australia signed a framework memorandum of

understanding with the US outlining their future participation with missile defence development and testing over the next

25 years. Japan was the first country to agree to work with the US on ship-based missile defence because of the

perceived threat by North Korea. At the time of writing Canada is alone in pulling away from involvement in US missile

defence, although Ottawa has already agreed to amend its NORAD agreement with the US so that its missile warning

function is available to the US missile defence system and there are some concerns that it is actually collaborating with

the US in many ways.60 This apparent general acceptance of missile defence also appears also to condone the

57 The US has stated its intent to launch a space-based interceptor test bed by 2008. See for example: “Space-Based Interceptors – Still Not a Good Idea” by Theresa Hitchens and Victoria Samson, Center for Defense Information, Summer/Fall 2004 – available at www.cdi.org/news/space-security/ space-based-interceptors.pdf

58 “Anti-satellite Capabilities of Planned US Missile Defence Systems” by David Wright and Laura George, Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No 68, December 2002 – January 2003. Also at http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd68/68op02.htm and from the Union of concerned scientists: http://www.ucsusa.org/global_security/space_weapons/page.cfm?pageID=1152

59 Ibid60 See: “Election Issue: Canada DID Join Missile Defense, Open letter from the Coalition to Oppose the Arms Trade (COAT)” 10

December 2005, GlobalResearch.ca - http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=20051210&articleId=1439

development and testing of ASAT capable systems and has helped make the development (if not the deployment) of

space weapons acceptable.

Russia has stated that it would be prepared to cooperate with the US as long as an agreement on the demilitarisation of

space could be reached. However, this is unlikely and so Russia is continuing to go it alone with the further development

of its missile defence systems and countermeasures. In February 2004 President Putin announced that Russia had

successfully tested a new nuclear hypersonic missile that is capable of altering course as it nears its target. This was a

clear statement that new types of missile were being developed to overcome missile defence systems perhaps helping to

justify the criticism that missile defence would lead to an arms race in space. China too has concerns over the

implementation of missile defence and has expressed strong reservations about the deployment of land or ship based

missile defence systems in the Pacific region by Taiwan, South Korea and Japan.

3.5. Problems of Resource Limitations

The huge increase in the use of space technology for war fighting does not come without problems. A preferred position

for communications satellites in particular is the geostationary orbit which is a circular orbit in the Earth’s equatorial plane,

at an altitude of 35,786 km. As satellites in this orbit appear fixed to ground observers then no tracking equipment is

needed to follow them. Around half (just over 300) of the satellites currently in use are in geostationary orbits and demand

for slots is high. Disputes between satellite operators are becoming more frequent as competition increases and it has

been suggested that geostationary orbital slot positions should be shared equally between states. 61 To add to these

problems, the number of states developing satellite capabilities continues to increase. A Russian rocket launch in October

2005 allowed Iran to become the 43rd state with a satellite in orbit. Kazakhstan, New Zealand, Vietnam and Sudan at least

look set to follow in the next few years.

There is also a growing demand for the use of the limited frequency range available in the radio spectrum. Satellites in

geostationary orbits commonly use the 7-8 GHz frequency band and frequency interference is increasingly a problem for

satellite operators. The problem of demands on the radio frequency spectrum is being addressed in different regions by

respective organisations. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is attempting to agree to a system for

allocating frequencies by 2006. 62 In Europe, a coordinated policy for the management of the radio spectrum has been

proposed in the light of initiatives to develop a European digital economy and a single European Information Society. 63

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently reviewed the method of frequency allocation in the US and

suggested ways of modifying the existing system to allow more flexibility and commercial participation. 64

Modern weapons systems also require that communications satellites carry enormous amounts of traffic. For example,

one Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) requires about 500 Megabits per second of bandwidth (five times the

entire bandwidth required by all of the US military during Desert Storm). The US military used a much greater bandwidth

during “Operation Enduring Freedom” in 2003 but even so it was reported that the Pentagon could only deploy 4 (one 61 “United Nations Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space”, UN General Assembly document A/60/20, 2005 –

http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/reports/gadocs/pdf/A_60_20E.pdf 62 “Promoting Online Services and Applications to Realize e-ASEAN”, Association of South East Asian Nations, Jpoint Media

Satement, September 2005 – http://www.aseansec.org/17759.htm 63 “A Forward Looking Radio Spectrum Policy for the European Union: Second Annual Report”, European Commission Communication

to the Council and Parliament, document COM(2005) 411 final, June 2005 – http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2005/com2005_0411en01.pdf

64 “Radiofrequency Spectrum Management”, Government Accountability Office Briefing for Congressional Committees, document GAO-06-212R, November 2005 – http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06212r.pdf

half) of its available UAVs at any one time because there was not enough bandwidth available to fly them all. 65 Future

military requirements are likely to be overwhelming. A US Defense Science Board study has predicted that by 2010 the

Pentagon will require 16 Gigabits per second of bandwidth to support a major war.66

Space debris is also increasingly becoming recognised as a growing threat to spacecraft and satellites.67 Recent

estimates suggest that there were 9,428 objects over 10cms in size orbiting around the Earth in December 2005, an

increase of over 2% on 2004 figures.68 The rate of creation of space debris is also increasing as space activity increases

and more collisions occur, despite recent attempts to develop a code of conduct for space debris mitigation.69

Although military satellites are hardened to withstand collisions with debris, tiny fragments impacting at speeds of around

10 km per second could easily damage a satellite’s optical system or disable it in some way. A major problem could occur,

for example, if an early warning satellite is disarmed or affected, giving a false indication of a possible attack. 70

This is one area of concern that could unite commercial, military and political opposition to war in space. High-speed

impacts from air-launched and ground- and space-based anti-satellite systems could create space debris much of which

might take months or even years to de-orbit and could deter or even prevent future space launches.

4. The Reality - Preventing the Weaponisation of Space

4.1. A Space Weapons Treaty - Nightmare Prevention or another Nightmare?

There have been many attempts to develop Treaties and agreements that would prevent the weaponisation of space.

None have been successful to date. The basic framework for international space law is provided by the1967 Outer Space

Treaty, which recognises that:

the exploration and use of outer space shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries and

shall be the province of all mankind (Article I); outer space shall be free for exploration and use by all States (Article I);

outer space is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by

any other means (Article II);

international law and the UN Charter extends to the exploration and use of outer space (Article III);

States shall not place nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in orbit or on celestial bodies or

station them in outer space in any other manner (Article IV.1);

the Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes (Article IV.2);

65 “Military Feels Bandwidth Squeeze As the Satellite Industry Splutters” by Greg Jaffe, Wall Street Journal, October 4, 2002.66 As reported in “What if Space Were Weaponized” by Jeffrey Lewis, from the Center for Defense Information, Washington DC67 A detailed technical report on space debris from the International Space Information Service is available at

http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/isis/pub/sdtechrep1/index.html 68 “Orbital Debris Quarterly News”, 10, January 2006 – http://www.orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/newsletter/pdfs/ODQNv10il.pdf 69 “Space Debris Mitigation: The Case For a Code of Conduct”, spacedaily.com, 15 April 2005 -

http://www.spacedaily.com/news/debris-05c.html 70 “Space Weapons and Space Junk”, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 5 September 2005

The preamble to the treaty also recognises “the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use

of outer space for peaceful purposes.” However, it does not ban the stationing of weapons in space other than weapons of

mass destruction.71

There are other arms control treaties that regulate military operations in space:

the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty prohibits nuclear weapon tests or any other nuclear explosions in outer space

(Article I);

the 1977 Environmental Modification Convention (ENMOD) prohibits the military use of environmental

modification techniques affecting outer space (Article I/II);

the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty prohibited the developing, testing or deployment of ABM systems which are

space-based (Article V);

other arms control treaties - the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the 1990 Conventional

Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-I) forbid interference with

National Technical Means (NTM) such as satellites operated for verification purposes.

And some other relevant space treaties include: 72

the Agreement on the rescue of astronauts, the return of astronauts and the return of objects launched into outer

space, 1968;

the Convention on international liability for damage caused by space objects, 1972;

the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, 1975;

the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the Moon Agreement)

- entered into force in 1984;

the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Convention of 1932, which protects civilian satellites from

interference, amended in 1992 and 1994.

Although there is no current treaty to prevent the stationing of weapons in space – other than weapons of mass

destruction - and a treaty has not yet been negotiated to comprehensively prevent an arms race in outer space, there

seems to be a general agreement in the United Nations, including among all space faring countries, that an arms race in

outer space should be prevented. The Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) attached to the

General Assembly's Fourth Committee (Special Political and Decolonisation), and UNISPACE holds periodic meetings but

usually discusses space exploration issues. Military related problems in space are discussed by the First Committee

(Disarmament and International Security) and negotiations on these issues are held within the Conference on

Disarmament (CD).

The issue of the weaponisation of space first appeared at the CD in 1981 when it was trying to negotiate a treaty to

regulate the military use of space through a resolution called Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS).

Some slow progress in drafting a treaty was made until disagreement between China and the US in 1995 when China

insisted that it would only negotiate a Fissile Material Control Treaty if PAROS was completed at the same time. However,

71 See: http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/SpaceLaw/outerspt.html 72 See: http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/SpaceLaw/treaties.html

the US is the key opponent to a treaty banning space weapons, although it does favour the creation of a PAROS ad hoc

committee (as long as the committee has a broad mandate). In CD debates the US argues that current treaties are

sufficient and there is no need to negotiate a PAROS treaty, since there is no threat of an arms race in space and,

although there is general agreement on the need for a PAROS ad hoc committee, the differences over its proposed

mandate have continuously stalled consensus within the CD.

Despite the stalemate in the CD, in 2000 the UN General Assembly adopted a PAROS resolution by a vote of 163 to none

with 3 abstentions. The three states that abstained were the Federated States of Micronesia, Israel and the United States

of America.73, the First Committee of the UN General Assembly continues to support the mandate. At the 2002 session

the vote was 156 in favour of PAROS, none against, with Israel and the US abstaining.

More recently, on 20 October 2004, at the UN First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) in New York a

number of states highlighted the importance of preventing the deployment of weapons in outer space. The previous day,

at a special session, Russia announced its new policy of no first deployment of space weapons and joined with China to

submit a draft treaty to prevent the placing of weapons in space. Egypt and Sri Lanka also introduced their traditional

PAROS resolution emphasising “the need for further measures with appropriate and effective provisions for verification to

prevent an arms race in outer space” and called on the CD to establish a PAROS ad hoc committee in its 2005 session.

The vote was 167 for, none against and 2 abstentions (the US and Israel).74

In June 2005, a non-paper to the CD “On the Prevention of the Weaponization of Outer Space” by the Chinese and

Russian Delegations contained a summary discussion of some technical definitions and offered the following

possibilities:75

Outer Space – above 100km above sea level;

Space Weapon – any device, based on any physical principle, specially produced or converted to eliminate,

damage or disrupt normal function of objects in outer space, on the Earth surface or in its air, as well as to

eliminate population, components of biosphere critical to human existence or inflict damage to them (except those

devices needed by cosmonauts for self-defense);

Space Object - any man-made device being launched into the orbit around any celestial body, or being in the orbit

around any celestial body or on any celestial body except the Earth, or leaving the orbit around any celestial body

towards this celestial body, or moving from any celestial body towards the other celestial body, or placed in the

outer space by any other means.

The term “Peaceful Use of Outer Space” is also discussed and it is pointed out that the militarization of outer space has

already occurred with 70% of all satellites being used for military purposes, while many others can serve both military and

civil purposes. Two views on the definition of “peaceful use” of outer space are given:

73 More details in the UN Press Release GA/9829 – available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20001120.ga9829.doc.html 74 “PAROS discussions at the 2004 UN First Committee”, by Rebecca Johnson, The Acronym Institute, October 20, 2004 – available at

http://www.acronym.org.uk/un/2004paro.htm75 “On the Prevention of the Weaponization of Outer Space” A Non-Paper by Chinese and Russian Delegations to the Conference on

Disarmament, 9 June, 2005 – available at: http://www.geneva.un.mid.ru/speeches/36.html

“non-military use” - any activities that serve military purposes should not be considered as “peaceful use”, no

matter whether they are directly involved in military operations;

“non-invasive use” or “non-aggressive use” - non-armed activities as satellite reconnaissance (including

surveillance on the implementation of arms control and disarmament treaties and agreements), communication,

navigation and nuclear explosion surveillance, which are not meant for direct military use, could be regarded as

“peaceful use”.

Representatives from Brazil, Canada, Germany, Malaysia, South Africa, and Sri Lanka commended the efforts of China

and Russia in submitting these non-papers and several countries including Pakistan, Germany, and Canada applauded

efforts to establish single-topic informal plenary discussions to address issues including PAROS outside the CD. A

statement from Russia reiterated the country’s commitment not to be the first state to deploy any weapons in outer space

and also announced that all Collective Security Treaty Organization member states, including Armenia, Belarus,

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan share in the commitment of no-first deployment. However, the Russian delegate

warned that “if someone starts to place weapons in outer space we will have to react accordingly” reiterating the point

made by the Russian Defense Minister on 2 June 2005.76

The UK identified several difficulties associated with increasing codification of international law, including the lack of

consensus on further treaties. It was pointed out that additional regulation of the use of space would be difficult to agree

upon and to verify. The UK proposed to establish the “rules of the road” in space, similar to what already exists at sea, in

order to obtain immediate security benefits by reducing the risk of accidental collisions, preventing incidents, and

promoting ‘safe passage’ for satellites.77

The Chinese and Russian non-paper on definitions was among those considered at a second informal session on space

security themes held at the invitation of Russia on 16 August 2005. The meeting concluded with a series of

recommendations, proposing:

the CD adopt a PAROS resolution;

the General Assembly seek an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice regarding definition of

“peaceful uses”; and

the General Assembly convene either an open-ended working group or establish an ad hoc committee to discuss

a treaty on space security.

The first global parliamentary hearing on space security was held in September 2005 in Washington, DC in which

legislators from ten countries, including Australia, Brazil, Britain, Denmark, Ghana, Japan, Mexico, Norway, Portugal, and

the US participated. The meeting was facilitated by the e-parliament and focused on the future of outer space, including

the possible deployment of weapons in space.78

On 12 October 2005 Russia sponsored a draft resolution to the UN First Committee entitled “Measures to promote

transparency and confidence building in outer space activities” which invited states to inform the UN on transparency and

76 Statement by Ambassador Leonid Skotnikov, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation at the Plenary Meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. 30 June 2005 - http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches05/June30Russia.pdf;

77 Statement by Ambassador John Freeman of the UK to the Conference on Disarmament, CD/PV.988, 30 June 2005 78 “Parliamentary hearing on space security,” e-parliament, 14 September 2005 - http://www.eparl.net/pages/space_hearing.htm

confidence building measures. The resolution was adopted with 158 votes in favour, 1 (the US) against and 1 (Israel)

abstention.79 A draft resolution on “Initiating work on priority disarmament and non-proliferation issues” was circulated and

Canada, Brazil, Kenya, Mexico, New Zealand and Sweden sponsored a proposal calling for the establishment of 4 ad hoc

committees under the UN First Committee to address issues such as PAROS .80The proposal was withdrawn under some

pressure from nuclear states, including the US, who warned that the proposal could undermine the CD and that any

discussions outside of the CD would be boycotted.81 The meeting on the 25 October also saw the US become the first

ever country to vote against a PAROS resolution. The vote was 160 in favour, 1 against (the US) and 1 abstention

(Israel). 82 The US has often abstained in the past and its official line has always been that there is no need for a PAROS

treaty, but this was the first time that it had vote against a PAROS resolution. The US and Israel also both voted against a

PAROS resolution in the General Assembly in December 2005. 83

The recent difficulties encountered with PAROS talks illustrate a lack of political consensus on how to deal with the

deadlock at the CD. There is some encouragement that PAROS resolutions are always strongly supported and that only

once has a state voted against one – but no substantial agreement on how to move forward has come out of the meetings

so far. These meetings obviously are important in bringing international groups together but the continuing deadlock in the

CD prevents it from becoming more than just a talking shop and there may even be a danger that the CD loses its

relevance.84

Proposals for ways forward for international agreements have been made by a number of academics, including

suggestions to:

ban an attack on the International Space Station or all military activities beyond the Geostationary Orbit; 85

ask the “International Court of Justice” to give an advisory opinion on whether the testing or deployment of space

weapons would be compatible with the key principles of the Outer Space Treaty;

amend the Outer Space Treaty to impose a ban of shooters in space; 86

try to identify a middle ground for space arms control which might accept direct-ascent technologies for missile

defence, but prohibit shooting down satellites in permanent orbit.

79 UN General Assembly First Committee Voting record, A/C.1/60/L.31/Rev.1 “Transparency and Confidence Building Measures in Outer Space Activities”, 28 October 2005 – http://www.reachingcritical will.org/political/1com/1com05/votes/L.30Rev1.pdf

80 Draft Elements of an UNGA60 First Committee Resolution, “Initiating Work on priority disarmament non-proliferation issues” sponsored by Brazil, Canada, Kenya, Mexico, New Zealand and Sweden, 2005 - http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com05/docs/draftelementsinitiating.pdf

81 Memo circulated by US Delegation at UNGA First Committee “UNGA First Committee Draft on Ad Hoc Committees,” - http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com05/docs/ungafirstcommdraft.pdf

82 UNGA First Committee Voting Record, A/C.1/60/L.27 “Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space”, 25 October 2005 - http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com05/votes/L.27.pdf

83 UNGA Voting Record, A/60/462 “Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space”, 8 December, 2005 - http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com05/ga/96.pdf

84 “The CD Report,” Reaching Critical Will, 31 January 2005 - http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches05/reports.html85 “Keys to Unblocking Multilateral Nuclear Arms Control” by Clifford E. Singer and Amy Sands, July 2002, University of Illinois at

Urbana-Champaign.86 “National Missile Defense and the ABM Treaty: No Need to Wreck the Accord” by Philip E. Coyle and John B. Rhinelander, World

Policy Journal, Vol. 18, 3/2001, P. 15-22.

The problem with some partial solutions is that they might allow a degree of space-weapons build-up 87 and Rebecca

Johnson argues for a comprehensive approach employing three components: 88

a ban on testing, deployment and use of all kinds of intentional weapons in space;

a ban on the testing, deployment and use of ASATs deployed on earth and

a code of conduct for the peace-supporting, non-offensive and non-aggressive uses of space.

Neuneck and Rothkirch89 suggest that it is a good idea to start with confidence building measures to build-up trust and

improve space security. For example The Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (1975) could

be strengthened and modified to help ease problems associated with space launches and traffic. A code of conduct for

not attacking satellites could reduce threat of space debris and be in the interests of all space-faring nations.

In 2002 an International Student/Young Pugwash group recommended the establishment of an international treaty to

embody current international customary law by: 90

Prohibiting the placing of primary conventional weapons in space (except under the conditions of protection

against natural disasters, under international auspices).

Incorporating clauses which include reporting, evaluation, public examination and the passing of appropriate

disputes to the International Court of Justice (modelled on the Chemical Weapons Convention).

While, in the longer term, the UN set up an International Committee for the Long-Range Future, initially for a period of 18

months, with the following goals:

To rigorously analyze the relative weights of risks to human security in a formal scientific fashion;

To assess future space development and security needs on a 50 year time scale and beyond;

To research the feasibility and goals of a permanently established Standing Committee on the Long-Range

Future.

An International Space Preservation Treaty proposed by the Institute for Cooperation in Space 91 has been paired with a

Space Preservation Act (H.R. 2420) which was introduced to the US Congress as proposed legislation in May 2005 by

Dennis Kucinich and 34 co-sponsors. The Treaty and Bill propose:

a ban on basing weapons in space and the use of weapons against objects in orbit

an international treaty banning space-based weapons and the use of weapons against objects in orbit

They also incorporate the following definitions:

87 “New Rules in Outer Space: Options and Scenarios” by Jürgen Altmann and Jürgen Scheffran, Security Dialogue, Vol. 34(1), p. 109-116, 2003

88 “Multilateral Approaches to Preventing the Weaponization of Space” by Rebecca Johnson, Disarmament Diplomacy, 56, April 2001 [http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd56/56rej.htm].

89 Op cit90 “The Weaponisation of Space - An International Student/young Pugwash perspective” by Will Marshall, George Whitesides, Iole de-

Angelis, Yuri Takaya, Robert Schingler, Paul Reilly, Mark Lupisella – available at http://www.pugwash.org/publication/nl/nlv39n2/newsletter-dec2002.pdf

91 See: http://www.peaceinspace.com/sp_treaty.shtml

`space' means all space extending upward from an altitude greater than 110kms above the surface of the earth

and any celestial body in such space.

`space-based weapon' and `space-based system' mean a device capable of damaging or destroying an object or

person (whether in outer space, in the atmosphere, or on Earth) by:

firing one or more projectiles to collide with that object or person;

detonating one or more explosive devices in close proximity to that object or person; or

any other undeveloped means.

While this bill has come in for some criticism from some NGOs – it is possibly a good start, although unlikely to be passed

by Congress.

Perhaps it is possible for one or more of the ideas and suggestions described above to be developed further. Some

analysts suggest that a possible way forward for the development of a treaty might be along the lines followed by the

Ottawa Land Mines Treaty. This would involve a country which supports the prohibition of space weapons (such as

Canada) hosting a treaty conference for interested nations.

Progress toward any meaningful treaty will not really be impossible without full US agreement and participation. This

seems to be unlikely because, as Theresa Hitchins says:

“most US policymakers of any political stripe share concerns about closing off options in this strategic arena at a

time when technological innovation may be providing others with improved military capabilities.” 92

Hitchins also notes that:

“The political climate for achieving a space weapons ban appears as grim as during the Cold War, when both the

United States and Russia were actively testing ASAT weaponry. That said, no nation has yet committed to strong

policies embracing space weapons, or major budget support for their development. And it is fairly certain that no

nation currently has any such weapons in operation (although of course it is impossible to rule out that some

nation has covertly acquired some type of simple ASAT or on-orbit weapon). Indeed, it is clear that many nations

(and the general publics in nearly all nations) fear that the advent of space weapons will be catastrophic for the

future of the human race”

and suggests that the road to success lies in openness:

“Those nations with national security and military space assets have a common interest in assuring each other

and the rest of the world that these activities are consistent with, and non-threatening to, peaceful uses of outer

space. Such assurances are vital to avoiding misunderstandings and political tensions. Further, all nations using

space assets for military purposes have a common interest in defining for themselves and each other what

activities in space they might consider threatening, dangerous or escalatory, and in establishing norms of

peacetime behaviour that do not cross those lines.”

92 “Safeguarding Space: Building Cooperative Norms to Dampen Negative Trends” by Theresa Hitchins, Disarmament Diplomacy Issue No 81, 2005

Certainly, if no progress can be made then as technology develops, the likelihood of accidental warfare in space will

develop alongside. Hitchins lists the short term goals worth pursuing to include:

Starting from the principles that all nations have a right to space access, including for military purposes, and that all

nations have the right to react (proportionally and consistent with international law) to protect and defend space

assets, space-faring nations should work to develop domestic policies defining and articulating peacetime

obligations for space forces and rules of the road that ought to be applied to all national security/ military space

operations.

Similarly, all nations using space power for military applications should define and articulate their concepts of what

constitutes dangerous military activities in space and appropriate means for avoiding and preventing them. The aim

should be to develop national positions that could be later built upon to establish norms of behaviour among space-

faring powers. One immediate effort, for example, could be made by the US and its allies, along with national

commercial space industries, to develop informal or common law agreements regarding rules of behaviour in space

that perhaps eventually could be expanded bilaterally or multilaterally to include other space-faring nations.

Space-faring nations should undertake efforts to make their national security/military space programmes, policies

and doctrines more transparent in order to reassure each other (and publics worldwide) that these programmes are

peaceful and defensive in nature.

Space-faring nations should consider holding regular consultations, whether bilateral or multilateral, about their

space programmes - both civil and military. In order to provide transparency and venues for airing concerns, topics

for discussion could include long-range plans, budgets, strategies, doctrines, industrial developments, scientific

research and technological developments. As a first step, space-faring nations should develop a shareable

database of contacts from the various space organisations (both civil and those related to national security) in each

nation and ensure that it is kept up to date.

The CD also should consider how it might address and develop "rules of the road" for military and national security

space operations in peacetime. Perhaps through the establishment of an ad hoc committee, the CD needs to press

ahead to address this issue despite anticipated political difficulties. In addition, any effort should be undertaken in a

manner that facilitates linkages with COPUOS on debris mitigation and space traffic control.93

Finally, Hichins suggests that a longer term possibility might be a Treaty on Debris Creating Weapons as this is a concern

for all space faring nations and is something that the US is already taking seriously. Perhaps then this is a possible way

out of the Treaty nightmare as military and commercial interests of all countries seem to go hand in hand.

5. Conclusion

War in space is undesirable for a number of reasons – not least of which are the problems associated with space debris

and the possibility of space based weapons aimed at earth – and nations appear to be united in wishing to prevent

weapons being stationed in space. However, the US is determined not to give up its superiority and dominance in space

technology and has consistently prevented progress in treaty negotiations and has in fact lead space weapons

development through missile defence and other programmes claiming them to be defensive rather than offensive.

93 “Future Security in Space: Charting a Cooperative Course" by Theresa Hitchins, Center for Defense Information, September 2004.

However, offense is often in the eyes of the beholder and other technologically capable (or near capable) states are

concerned about the dominance and aggressive stance of the US in this area.

A major question often asked is what is the force behind the US drive to space dominance? How do major projects get

huge amounts of funding when eminent scientists can show that they are not technically feasible? Are concerns about

national security and a national faith in technological solutions to national and global problems too strong in the US? Does

the drive come from a desire for world domination and control? Perhaps it is a mixture of many things. Certainly the

aerospace and defence industry is a major beneficiary in the effort to achieve “full spectrum dominance” have been at the

forefront of the development of a philosophy of security through strength and a role for the US as a global police force

through technological superiority. This also fits well with some US right wing political views concerning the destiny of

America to police the world the American people’s trust in technology to eventually find solutions to seemingly insoluble

problems.

A contributing factor may be the continuing decline in non-military public support for science and engineering programmes

and training. The increasing reliance on industry to support military activities has meant that high technology projects in

Universities are often linked to military programmes. Students and groups such as the Scientists for Global Responsibility

in the UK 94 and the Union of Concerned Scientists in the US 95 actively campaign on issues such as the ethical use of

science and engineering and continue to lobby politicians but there has been little positive response from Government.

Therefore, there is little choice for those wanting to follow a career in engineering or science but to become an integral

part of the ‘military industrial complex’ and contribute to the development of lucrative military projects. Now must be the

time for scientists, engineers and politicians to seriously consider what might constitute a workable ethical policy on

space. Although fears are that it is already too late.

At a time when satellite and missile related technologies are growing rapidly, an international space weapons race cannot

be the path to follow. Many nations and NGO groups agree on a number of issues, including the desirability of the ethical

and sustainable use of space. A truly secure future can only be guaranteed if space remains weapon free and the

increasing development of military related space systems is limited (or ideally reversed) and rigorously monitored and

controlled. There is a significant role for the technologically able nations here. The world is seeing the warnings and

suffering the consequences of ill-planned technological growth. Global warming is beginning to be taken seriously by the

major energy and resource consumers. Urgent action is needed to prevent global disaster. Technological growth that

ignores environmental consequences usually results in human misery and suffering and the leading nations must take the

lead even if personal or national pride has to be sacrificed to guarantee future global survival.

A significant step for humanity would be made if the nations of the world could develop a collective dream and trust each

other enough to make an international agreement on the Prevention of the Weaponisation of Space - to care enough to

make a space environment free of war a reality.

94 See: http://www.sgr.org.uk/ 95 See: http://www.ucsusa.org