miranda vs sandiganbayan

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Miranda vs Sandiganbayan (2005) Jose C. Miranda, petitioner vs Hon. Sandiganbayan, Office of the Ombudsman, Sec. Jose Lina, Jr., in his capacity as Secretary of the DILG, and Faustino Dy, Jr., in his capacity as Governor of the Province of Isabela, respondents Nature: Review of Sandiganbayan decision Summary: Mayor Miranda was placed under preventive suspension but while suspended, he allegedly did official acts. Ombudsman then filed before the Sandiganbayan an Information charging Mayor Miranda of Usurpation of Authority which is punishable under the RPC. Sandiganbayan then ordered a 90-day preventive suspension against Mayor Miranda. Mayor Miranda questioned the length of the preventive suspension and argued that it is repugnant to the 60-day limit imposed by the LGC. Also, he raised the defense that he did official acts in good faith believing that he can already reassume his position. The SC first held that Miranda cannot anymore question the sufficiency of the Information as he is already estopped due to his act of entering his plea. Also, the allegations in the Information are sufficient enough to raise the issue of WON he committed fraud against the government. On the issue of the legality of the 90-day period, the SC upheld its validity as the suspension is based on the Ombudsman Law and not from the LGC. The differences between the said laws were also explained. As to purpose, the limit in the LGC is motivated by the prevention of being influenced by political will; the same is not a concern in the Ombudsman Law since It is a constitutional body. Also, the Ombudsman law provides for more stringent requirements before a public officer may be preventively suspended; the requirements provided in the LGC are more lenient. Accordingly, due to these differences, it cannot be said that the other is repugnant to the other law. Doctrine: Under Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law, the suspension of a public officer by the Sandiganbayan is mandatory after a determination has been made of the validity of the Information. Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, then the Court must issue the order of suspension as a matter of course. There are no ifs and buts about it. The Sandiganbayan properly construed Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 as covering two types of offenses: (1) any offense involving fraud on the government; and (2) any offense involving public funds or property. Nothing limits Section 13 only to acts involving fraud on public funds or property. Also, the difference between suspensions by the Ombudsman and the President, governor and mayor under the LGC are clear. The latter are political personages and so the possibility of extraneous factors influencing their decision to impose preventive suspensions is not remote. The Ombudsman, on the other hand, is given the independence of the office which is protected by the Constitution. The two provisions govern differently. In order to justify the preventive suspension by the Ombudsman, the evidence of guilt should be strong, and (a) the charge against the officer or employee should involve dishonestly, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) that the charges should warrant removal from the service; or

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Miranda vs Sandiganbayan (2005)Jose C. Miranda, petitioner vsHon. Sandiganbayan, Office of the Ombudsman, Sec. Jose Lina, Jr., in his capacity as Secretary of theDIL, and !austino Dy, Jr., in his capacity as overnor of the "rovince of Isabe#a, respondentsNature: $evie% of Sandiganbayan decisionSummary: Mayor Miranda %as p#aced under preventive suspension but %hi#e suspended, he a##eged#y didofficia# acts. Ombudsman then fi#ed before the Sandiganbayan an Information charging Mayor Miranda of&surpation of 'uthority %hich is punishab#eunder the$"C. Sandiganbayan thenordereda()*daypreventivesuspensionagainst Mayor Miranda. Mayor Miranda+uestionedthe#engthof thepreventivesuspension and argued that it is repugnant to the ,)*day #imit imposed by the LC. '#so, he raised thedefense that he did officia# acts in good faith be#ieving that he can a#ready reassume his position. -he SCfirst he#d that Miranda cannot anymore +uestion the sufficiency of the Information as he is a#ready estoppeddue to his act of entering his p#ea. '#so, the a##egations in the Information are sufficient enough to raise theissue of .O/ he committed fraud against the government. On the issue of the #ega#ity of the ()*day period,the SC uphe#d its va#idity as the suspension is based on the Ombudsman La% and not from the LC. -hedifferences bet%een the said #a%s %ere a#so e0p#ained. 's to purpose, the #imit in the LC is motivated bythe prevention of being inf#uenced by po#itica# %i##1 the same is not a concern in the Ombudsman La% since Itis a constitutiona# body. '#so, the Ombudsman #a% provides for more stringent re+uirements before a pub#icofficer may be preventive#y suspended1 the re+uirements provided in the LC are more #enient. 'ccording#y,due to these differences, it cannot be said that the other is repugnant to the other #a%. Doctrine2 &nder Section 34 of the 'nti*raft and Corrupt "ractices La%, the suspension of a pub#ic officer bytheSandiganbayanismandatoryafter adeterminationhasbeenmadeof theva#idityof theInformation. Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, then the Courtmust issue the order of suspension as a matter of course. -here are no ifs and buts about it. -heSandiganbayanproper#yconstruedSection34of $.'. /o. 4)3(ascoveringt%otypesofoffenses2 536 any offense invo#ving fraud on the government1 and 576 any offense invo#ving pub#icfunds or property. /othing #imits Section 34 on#y to acts invo#ving fraud on pub#ic funds or property. '#so,thedifferencebet%eensuspensionsby theOmbudsman andthe"resident, governor andmayor under theLCarec#ear. -he#atter arepo#itica# personagesandsothepossibi#ityofe0traneous factors inf#uencing their decision to impose preventive suspensions is not remote. -heOmbudsman, on the other hand, is given the independence of the office %hich is protected by theConstitution. -he t%o provisions govern different#y. In order to 8ustify the preventive suspension by theOmbudsman, theevidenceof gui#t shou#dbestrong, and5a6 thechargeagainst theofficer oremp#oyee shou#d invo#ve dishonest#y, oppression or grave misconduct or neg#ect in theperformanceof duty1 5b6 that thechargesshou#d%arrant remova# fromtheservice1 or5c6therespondent9s continued stay in office %ou#d pre8udice the case fi#ed against him. On the other hand, the LC re+uirements for suspension 5at any time after the issues are 8oined6,are that 5a6 there is reasonab#e ground to be#ieve that the respondent has committed the act or actscomp#ained of, 5b6 the evidence of cu#pabi#ity is strong, 5c6 the gravity of the offense so %arrants, or5d6 the continuance in office of the respondent cou#d inf#uence the %itnesses or pose a threat to thesafety and integrity of the records and other evidence.Facts: -he Ombudsman p#aced Mayor Miranda, then mayor of Santiago City, Isabe#a, under preventivesuspensionfor 6montsfor a##egedvio#ations of $',:345Codeof Conduct and;thica#Standards for "ub#ic Officia#s and ;mp#oyees6 Subse+uent#y,thenen of another '#so, the ru#e is that under Sec. 34 of the .nti+/raft and 0orrupt 1ractices 2a"& te suspensionof a pub!ic officer is mandatory after a determination as been made of te va!idity of te%nformation3 o Inthecaseat bar, thereisnodoubt thatteinformationfi!edisva!idandMayorMiranda in fact ac+uiesced to the va#idity of the Information %hen he p#eaded not gui#ty. !urther, the acts a##eged in the Information constitute fraud upon government or pub#ic funds orproperty, as re+uired by #a%. o .hen accused*mayor appointed persons in various positions, he indirect#y dea#t %ith thecity9sfundsas those personsappointed%i##be giventheirrespective sa#aries,benefitsandothermonetaryconsideration%hich%i## bepaid%ho##yormain#yout of thecity9sfunds.o 'dditiona##y, %hen he performed acts pertaining to the Office of the Mayor, i.e.F,G approva#of vouchers, andpayment of other e0penses%hichissub8ect toproof, he#i>e%iseindirect#y dea#t %ith the funds of the city. Ho%ever,thedissentingopinionpresentsanothervie%onthisissueandho#dsthat there%asactua##y no fraud. o -he dissent ho#ds that2 it %ou#dbefraudof pub#icfundsif thesepub#icofficia#s8ust co##ectedtheirsa#aries%ithout rendering service to the government. that Hfraud upon governmentH must be read so as to re+uire that ma#versation offunds %as committed.o In ans%ering the dissent, SC said that adopting the dissenting opinion9s #ine of reasoning%ou#d render superf#uous the phrase Hfraud upon governmentH as ma#versation issubsumed by Hany offense invo#ving pub#ic funds or property.H Moreover,te S0 is not convinced tat Mayor Miranda reassumed office under an onestbe!ief tat e "as no !onger under preventive suspension3 o In Mayor Miranda?s affidavit, he admitted that he refused to #eave his position despite thememorandum of &ndersecretary Sanche= and #eft on#y a fe% days after recceipt thereofdue to the coercion of the "/". -his contradicts his assrtion that he immediate#y comp#ied%ith the memorandum of &ndersecretary Sanche=. o 's the SC said in various cases, if petitioner 5and his counse#6 had an iota of respect forthe ru#e of #a%, they shou#d have assai#ed the va#idity of the order of suspension in courtinstead of ta>ing the #a% into their o%n hands.%ssue ) 2: .O/ the suspension is proper 5yes6'atio ) 2: Itshou#dbestressed thatpetitioner%assuspended by the Sandiganbayan.&nderSec.34$'4)3(& tis suspension is mandatory if te %nformation is sufficient. On the other hand, the dissent argues that the Information is insufficient rendering the suspensioninva#id.o -he SC pointed out the fact that Mayor Miranda entered his p#ea and that it is a basic ru#ethat entering a p#ea %aives any ob8ection the petitioner may have to the va#idity oftheinformation un#ess the case fa##s under the e0ceptions. o '#so, indeterminingthesufficiencyof theinformation, thetest is%hetherthecrimeisdescribedininte##igib#eterms%ithsuchparticu#arityastoapprisetheaccused, %ithreasonab#e certainty, of the offense charged. -he Information in the case at bar satisfiedthis test especia##y %hen it is stated therein the specific acts %hich constitute usurpation ofofficia# functions. If the purpose of te preventive suspension %as to enab#e the investigating authority to gatherdocuments %ithout intervention from petitioner, then, from respondents9submission, %e can on#yconc#udethat thispurpose%asa#readyachieved, duringthenear#ymonth*#ongsuspensionofpetitioner. rantingthat no%theevidenceagainst petitioner is a#ready strong, even%ithoutconceding that initia##y it %as %ea>, it is c#ear to us that the ma0imum si0*month period is e0cessiveanddefinite#y#onger thannecessaryfor theOmbudsmantoma>eits#egitimatecaseagainstpetitioner.%ssue ) 4: 5#N suspension issued in tis case vio!ated te 60+day !imit imposed by te 2/0 (No)'atio ) 4:In the case at bar, the SC e0press#y stated that its decision %as rendered %ithout subscribing to thepetitioner?s c#aim that the LC as been vio#ated. -he Court on#y ru#ed that the Ombudsman acted%ith grave abuse of discretion in imposing a ,*month preventive suspension since it %as admittedthat the documents re+uired %ere a#ready obtained by 3( Ju#y 3((( or 7I days after the impositionof the preventive suspension. -herefore, the purpose for %hich the suspension %as imposed %asa#ready served. -he dissent a#so cited the $ios case. -he SC ans%ered that said case is not app#icab#e in the caseat bar sincethepo%ersof theSandiganbayan%ereat issueinthat case, not thoseof theOmbudsman as in this case. o It is a#so %orth noting that $ios cited Sec. ,4 LC as its #ega# basis %herein it is c#ear fromthe provision that it is on#y meant as a cap on the discretionary po%er of the "resident,governor and mayor to impose e0cessive#y #ong preventive suspensions.6e#mbudsman& onteoter and& isnot sub7ect topo!itica! pressuregiventeindependence of te office "ic is protected by no !ess tat te 0onstitution3 LC vs Ombudsman La%2 Difference in te re8uirements for suspension to be va#id 5from Hagadcase6Ombudsman La% LC$e+uirementsto 8ustifypreventivesuspension ofa pub#ic officia# theevidenceof gui#t shou#dbestrong, and the charge against the officer oremp#oyee shou#d invo#vedishonest#y, oppression or gravemisconduct or neg#ect in theperformance of duty1 that thechargesshou#d%arrantremova# from the service1 or therespondent9scontinuedstayin office %ou#d pre8udice the casefi#ed against him there is reasonab#e ground tobe#ieve that the respondent hascommitted the act or actscomp#ained of the evidence of cu#pabi#ity is strong the gravity of the offense so%arrants, or the continuance in office of therespondent cou#d inf#uence the%itnessesor poseathreat tothesafetyandintegrityof therecordsand other evidence -hepreventivesuspensionsa!! continueunti! tecaseisterminatedbyte#fficeof te#mbudsman but not more tan si9 monts, %ithout pay, e0cept %hen the de#ay in the disposition ofthe case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fau#t, neg#igence or petition of the respondent, in%hich case the period of such de#ay sha## not be counted in computing the period of suspension hereinprovided. 6e si9+mont period of preventive suspension imposed by te #mbudsman "as indubitab!y"itin te !imit provided by its enab!ing !a"3 6is enab!ing !a" as not been modified by te!egis!ature3 In ans%ering the dissent that the difference bet%een the t%o #a%s vio#ates the e+ua# protection c#ause,SC ho#ds that there is substantia# distinction to 8ustify it. o -he Constitution has endo%ed the Ombudsman %ith uni+ue safeguards to ensure immunityfrompo#itica# pressure.'mongthesestatutory protections arefisca# autonomy,fi0edtermofoffice and c#assification as an impeachab#e officer.Disposition: Sandiganbayan decision affirmed1 Mayor Miranda suspended for () daysDissenting #pinion2 J. Carpio Summary:In sum, the offense of usurpation of authority or officia# functions under 'rtic#e 3:: ofthe $evised "ena# Code fi#ed against Miranda in the present case does not invo#ve @fraud upongovernment or pub#ic funds or propertyA under Section 34 of $' 4)3(. -hus, the Sandiganbayancommittedgraveabuseof discretion%henit ru#edthat thechargeagainst Mirandafa##s%ithinSection 34 of $'4)3( re+uiring the mandatory preventive suspension of Miranda by theSandiganbayan. In addition, the ma0imum period of a sing#e preventive suspension of #oca# e#ectivepub#ic officia#s #i>e Miranda cannot e0ceed ,) days in accordance %ith Section ,45b6 of the Loca#overnment Code. .hether Sec. 34 $' 4)3( app#ies on#y to fraud invo#ving pub#ic funds or propertyo -he provision c#ear#y sho%s that the e0istence of a va#id information is not enough. -hecrime must be for2 ' vio#ation of $' 4)3( 'n offense contained in -it#e :, Eoo> II, $"C .ny offense invo!vin fraud upon government or pub!ic funds or propertyo -he charge of usurpation of authority or officia# functions is not a vio#ation of $' 4)3(./either is it a vio#ation of any offense in -it#e :, Eoo> II of the $"C. -hus, theSandiganbayancanimposethemandatorypreventivesuspensiononMirandaunderSection 34 of $' 4)3( on#y if the charge of usurpation of authority or officia#functionsagainst Miranda invo#ves @fraud upon government or pub#ic funds or property.Ao /othing in $' 4)3( evinces any #egis#ative intent to #imit Section 34 on#y to acts invo#vingfraud on pub#ic funds or property. -o #imit the use of @governmentA as an ad8ective that+ua#ifies @fundsA is not mere#y base#ess, it is a#so superf#uous. -he %ord @pub#icA a#readyprecedes @funds,A hence c#ear#y distinguishing the funds from private funds.o IndistinguishinginSection 34bet%een@any offenseinvo#vingfraud upon governmentAand @any offense invo#ving 000 pub#ic funds or property,A the #a% c#ear#y intends to createt%o types of offenses. -o #imit the app#icabi#ity of Section 34 of $' 4)3( on#y to offensesinvo#ving pub#ic funds or property %i## e0c#ude other offenses of fraud against thegovernment not invo#ving pub#ic funds or property. .hether usurpation of authority automatica##y triggers app#ication of Sec. 34 $' 4)3( 5/o6o one may be #iab#e for usurpation of authority or of officia# functions %ithout defrauding thegovernment -he essence of usurpation of authority under 'rtic#e 3:: of the $"C is fa#se andma#icious representation. -he @gravamen of the offense of usurpation of authorityisthefa#serepresentation, ma#icious#ymade, that oneisanofficer,agent orrepresentative of the "hi#ippine overnment or any foreign government.A !raudon the government is not an essentia# e#ement of the offense. -he mere act ofma>ing a fa#se and ma#icious representation that one is a government officer issufficient to constitute the offense, %hether or not the act defrauds thegovernment. On the other hand, the gravamen of @fraud upon governmentA in Section 34 of $'4)3( is the pub#ic officer?s act of defrauding the government. It is necessary thatthe act shou#d defraud the government. &surpation of authority, %hi#e invo#vingfraudu#ent means,doesnot necessari#yinvo#vefraudonthegovernment.-hefraud may be committed on#y against private parties and not against thegovernment.o Mirandadidnotreassumeoffice to defraudthegovernment. Eeforereassuming office,Miranda%rotetheOmbudsmananda## concerned#oca# andnationa# DILofficia#sinforming them of his stand and the #ega# basis for his reassumption of office. .hen theDIL informed him that he remained suspended, Miranda immediate#y vacated his office.Miranda?s actions do not sho% any attempt to defraud the government. Miranda?s acts ofreassumingofficeandperforminghis officia# functions revea# anhonest intentiontoperform his duties as the du#y e#ected Mayor.o -hepo%erof theSandiganbayantosuspendpreventive#yapub#icofficerrestsonthesufficiency and va#idity of the information. Carpio finds the Information insufficient because the acts a##eged therein doesnot constitute fraud against the government. . Hence, Miranda cannot besuspended.o Section ,45b6 of the Loca# overnment Code prohibits any sing#e preventive suspensionof a #oca# e#ective pub#ic officia# to #ast for more than ,) days. Carpio says that %hen Miranda assumed office, he had a#ready served ,) daysof preventive suspension. Hence, there %as no #onger any #ega# impediment tohis resumption of office. the Ombudsman must e0ercise the po%er to preventive#y suspend pub#ic officersinconformity%ithSection,45b6 of theLoca# overnment Code, a#ater #a%.Section ,45b6 of the Loca# overnment Code governs specifica##y the duration ofasing#epreventivesuspensionof #oca# e#ectivepub#ic officia#s. Incontrast,Section 7I of $' ,::), imposing a ma0imum suspension of si0 months, governsa## other pub#ic officia#s, %hether appointive or e#ective. the period of preventive suspension cannot e0ceed ,) days regard#ess of %ho isimposing the preventive suspension. -here is no #anguage in the Loca#overnment Code e0empting the Ombudsman fromthe ,)day preventivesuspension cap. .here the #a%does not distinguish, %e shou#d a#so notdistinguish.o -he Ombudsman?s po%er to suspend preventive#y a #oca# e#ective officia# for si0 months isrepugnant to the Loca# overnment Code, %hich #imits the preventive suspension to on#y,) days. &nder Section ,,5b6 of the Loca# overnment Code, the ma0imum suspension ofsi0 months is a#ready a pena#ty. -he po%er given by $' ,::) to the Ombudsman is #imitedto the imposition of a preventive suspension %hi#e the Ombudsman investigates the caseof an e#ective officia#. ' preventive suspension is not a pena#ty. ' person under preventivesuspension, especia##y in a crimina# action, is sti## entit#ed to the presumption of innocence.Eyupho#dingthepo%erof theOmbudsmantoimposeapreventivesuspensionof si0months on a #oca# e#ective officia#, the Ombudsman is in effect a#ready pena#i=ing the #oca#e#ective officia# even before the Ombudsman?s investigation has begun.