Minority Responses to the Nation-State:

Transylvanian Saxon Ethno-Corporatism, 1919-1933

Sacha Edward Davis

A thesis submitted in fulfilment

of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

School of History University of New South Wales

March 2007

UNSW

LIBRARY

Abstract

The Transylvanian Saxons provide a case study of how small minorities respond to their

lack of statehood and the imposition of an "alien" nation-state upon them. In this thesis, I

will argue that, as with many other minorities unwilling or unable to form a nation-state in

their own right, the Saxons sought collective rights on the basis of self-determination. This

included access to resources, self-administration, an independent education system, the

ability to exclude outgroups and powers by which to ensure social norms within the

community. Their aims did not include territorial autonomy or independence, and for this

reason it is necessary to consider their strivings as distinct from nationalism. I term this

attempt to secure collective self-determination by non-territorial means "ethno-

corporatism". The goals of Saxon ethno-corporatism were influenced by the broader

discussion of minority rights in interwar Europe before and after the First World War. In

this sense, the Saxons were typical of many small communities in interwar Europe.

The Saxons approached the challenges of ethno-corporatism by numerous means. These

included the pursuit of collective legal rights by negotiation with the Romanian state,

positing a broader multi-ethnic Transylvanian polity that would guarantee collective ethnic

rights, pursuing ethno-corporatism under the banner of religious freedoms and seeking to

strengthen ties with other German communities. While a number of these strategies met

with partial success, none fully compensated for the lack of a state, and all fell short of

Saxon expectations. I argue that disappointment with other attempts to achieve ethno-

corporate status led to growing radicalisation of Saxon ethnic identity, and to the eventual

adoption of fascism. In this sense, while influenced by currents from Germany, Saxon

"National Socialism" can paradoxically be seen as stemming from the pursuit of minority

rights.

Acknowledgements

During the long process of writing this thesis, I have become indebted to many people. Max

Harcourt set the undergraduate research question that first drew my attention to the

Transylvanian Saxon community. John Perkins has provided guidance and advice from the

eariiest stages of this project. Gnter Minnerup's timely advice at the latter stages of this

project has, I hope, added a great deal of shape and clarity to my thesis. Shannon

Woodcocks has been kind enough to comment upon my drafts in various states of

completion. Ian Collinson and Johanna Perheentupa proof-read the final drafts and made

many insightful suggestions. Without the input of the above people, this thesis would never

have reached its current standard. All remaining faults and errors are entirely the

responsibility of the author.

This research project would not have been possible without an Australian Postgraduate

Award, which enabled me to undertake this degree in the lively intellectual atmosphere of

the School of History, University of New South Wales. Part of this thesis was researched

and written at the University of Babe-Bolyai. I am grateftil to that institution and for the

Romanian Government Scholarship that made my stay there possible. Other sections were

written as a visiting researcher at the School of Political History, University of Turku, to

which I am indebted for the resources made available to me. Very little of my subject

material has been available in Australia. I am most grateftil to the various archivists and

researchers who have assisted me in the research stage of this work, at the university library

and Library of the Romanian Academy in Cluj-Napoca, the Institut fr

Auslandsbeziehungen in Stuttgart, the Foreign Office Archives in Bonn and the State

Archives in Koblenz. I am especially indebted to the Siebenbrgen Institut of the

University of Heidelberg, and to Harald Roth for his assistance in gaining access to

material in the Romanian State Archive.

I could not have written this thesis without the support of my family. Yvonne, Roger and

Lorna have provided endless support and babysitting. Andrew, David and George have

provided equally endless cups of coffee and the mental space in which to rave about my

work. My wife Jonna has been far more sympathetic and understanding than I have

deserved. Finally, the last two years of my doctoral candidature would not have been half

as enjoyable without my daughter Anna filling my laptop bag with Duplo and illustrating

my drafts. This is for her.

Il l

Table of Contents

ABSTRACT i Acknowledgements ii Table of Contents iv List of Abbreviations ix List of Place Names ix

INTRODUCTION 1 Nationalism and minority ethnic communities 6

Definitions 6 Historicising the nation 10 The convergence of nationalism and ethno-corporatism 13

Interwar minority rights and ethno-corporatism 20 National self-determination and the Paris Peace Settlements 20 Minority Protection 22

Application of the treaties 25 Alternative solutions to the "minority problem " 29

The Germans Abroad 35 Case Study: The Transylvanian Saxons, 1919-1933 40

CHAPTER 1: SAXON COMMUNITY AND ETHNO-CORPORATISM, 45 1121-1914 Pre-modern foundations of the Saxon community 45 Saxon ethnic corporatism 56

Saxon ethno-corporatism and German nationalism 68 Stereotypes of Self and Other 76 Conclusion 85

CHAPTER 2: SAXON NATIONALISM AND THE ROMANIAN STATE 87

First World War and Unity with Romania 87

Saxon aims 89

Romanian integration and minority rights 93

Saxon political representation and parliamentary campaigns 104

Saxon political organisations 104

TheDSVR 104

The Free Saxon Women's Union 107

The League of Germans in Greater Romania 109

The German Party 110

Conclusion 111

Tactics and strategies 111

Representations 117

Political Divisions 125

Social Democrats 128

The "Dissatisfied" and the Saxon Union 131

Conclusion 135

Conclusion 136

CHAPTER 3: TRANSYLVANIANISM 138

The "Klingsor Circle" and Transylvanianism 139

Political Transylvanianism? The Minority Bloc (1927) and coalition with the 144

National Peasants Party (1928)

Transylvanianism 146

Transylvanianism as political theory 157

The limits of Transylvanianism 161

The antithesis of Transylvanianism - the Roma 174

Conclusion 177

CHAPTER 4: THE LUTHERAN CHURCH AND SAXON ETHNO- 180

CORPORATISM

Church and State 182

The ''Volkskirche''

The Church as a Saxon ethnic Church

The Church as a German ethnic Church

Ethnic Church versus World Church

Social mission of the "ethnic Church "

Education

The Youth Movement

The Women's Movement

Social Work

Conclusion

Dissent within the Church

Anxieties about the Saxon working class

The "Dissatisfied"

Saxon ethnicity without Lutheranism?

Conclusion

186

186

188

196

201

202

203

204

208

211

211

218

219

223

226

CHAPTER 5: "HOW FAR ARE WE ON THE WAY TO A GERMAN

ETHNIC COMMUNITY?" SAXON ETHNO-CORPORATISM,

GERMANY AND THE GERMANS ABROAD.

Functions of Germanness

Germanness as a moral principle

Germanness and the civilising myth

Germanness as a unifying principle

Forging a Romanian-German "Nation the Cultural Office

The relationship to the German "Motherland"

Symbolic functions of the connection to Germany

Relationship to Romanian Germans

The Germans of Greater Romania

Strengthening institutional ties

Symbolic function of the relationship with the Germans Abroad

Conclusion

228

229

229

231

232

235

238

242

252

252

256

262

274

CHAPTER 6: KZ/^ ^CiT PESSIMISM AND THE NSDR

Fascism in small minority communities

Vlkisch pessimism: creating space for fascism

The Church

Theology

"Health Care"

Schools

The Women's Movement

The Youth League

The Union of Raiffeisen Co-Opemtive Associations

German-Saxon Self-Help

Conclusion

Mass movement and politicisation

Consolidation

Mass Movement

Politicisation

Aims

Growing Liberal Opposition

Economic divisions

Burzenland Preselection

Episcopal Elections

National Socialist victory in Germany

The Klingsor Circle and the failure of Transylvanianism

The 1933 Congress of the DSVR

How popular was National Socialism? November 1933 elections

Conclusion

276

277

281

284

285

287

294

295

295

300

302

306

308

311

314

317

321

327

330

331

335

337

343

345

347

349

CHAPTER 7 - CONCLUSION 351

APPENDIX 1: FIGURES 359

Vll

APPENDIX 2: TABLES 370

APPENDIX 3: BIOGRAPHICAL DATA 375

BIBLIOGRAPHY 379

vili

List of Abbreviations

See also the list of journal title abbreviations in the Bibliography.]

DAI Germans-Abroad Institute [Deutsche Ausland-Institut. DSVP German-Saxon People's Party [Deutsch-Schsisches Volkspartei.' DSVR German-Saxon People's Council of Transylvania [Deutsch-Schsische Volksrat

fiir Siebenbrgen.' HAS Hermannstadt General Savings Bank [Hermannstdter Allgemeine Sparkassa.' HB A Hermannstadt Citizens' Association [Hermannstdter Brger abend.' LANC League of National Christian Defence [Liga Aprrii nationale Creatine.' NSDR National Socialist Self-Help Movement of Germans in Romania

[Nationalsozialistische Selbsthilfebewegung der Deutschen in Rumnien.' SAM Self-Help Workers Association [Selbsthilfe-Arbeitsmannschaft.' SKV Transylvanian Carpathians Association [Siebenbrgische Karpathenverein.' SVP Saxon People's Party [Schsisches Volkspartei.' VDA Association for Germans Abroad [Verein fr das Deutschtum im Ausland

List of Place Names

German Romanian Hungarian Arad Arad Arad Benzenz Bintini/Aurel Vlaicu Bencenc Bistritz Bistrita Beszterce Braller Bruiu Brulya Broos Ortie Szszvros Burzenland Tara Brsei Barcasg Czemowitz Cemuti

Diemrich Deva Dva

Discentmarton Tamaveni Discoszentmarton

Elizabethstadt Dumbrveni Erzsbetvros

Groau Cristian Keresztnysziget

Gropold, Apoldu de Sus Nagyapold

Grosswardein Oradea Nagyvrad

Heitau Cisndie Nagydisznd

Hermannstadt Sibiu Nagyszeben

Karlsburg Alba lulia Gyulafehrvr

Kischinew Chiinu

Klausenburg Cluj-Napoca Kolozsvr

Kleinscheuem Sura Mica Kiscsr

Kokel Tmava Kkll

Kronstadt Braov/Orasul Stalin Brass

Langendorf Lancrm Lmkerk

Langenthal Valea Lunga Hosszuasz

Mediasch Media Medgyes

Neppendorf Tumior Kistorony

Nsen Nsud Naszd

Ober Neudorf Cetate Felsszaszujfalu

Reschitza Recita Resicabnya

Reuendrfchen Rusciori Oroszcsr

Sakadat/Szakadat Scdate Oltszakadt

Schburg Sighioara Segesvr

Schelken Jeica Zselyk

Vaj dahunyad/Eisenmarkt Hunedoara Vajdahunyad

Weikirch Albe^tii Bistritei Fehregyhz

Zeiden Codlea Feketehalom

Introduction

On 5 November 1919, the delegates of the German-Saxon People's Council of

Transylvania^ (DSVR) met in the historic Transylvanian town of SchaBburg to formulate a

new programme that would guide their relations with the Greater Romanian state. On 1

December 1918, at the end of the First World War, the representatives of the Romanian

majority in Transylvania meeting at Karlsburg had declared their intention to unify with

Romania. This decision had been accepted by the Romanian crown, and was subsequently

confirmed by the Paris Peace Conference. The Saxon delegates in SchaBburg were tasked

with charting a path through unfamiliar political territory in a new state.

The 240,000 strong German speaking, predominantly Lutheran "Saxon" community of

Transylvania dated back to the twelfth century. In return for settling what was at that time a

dangerous frontier region, the Kings of Hungary had granted the settlers from the Holy

Roman Empire a privileged status. The Saxon estate had preserved its rights despite the

collapse of Hungary in 1526, more than 150 years of Transylvanian autonomy under

Ottoman suzerainty, and Habsburg rule from 1690. Only in 1876, following the triumph of

liberalism and nationalism with the partitioning of the Habsburg Empire into Austria-

Hungary in 1867, was the Saxon estate finally abolished. By that time, the Saxon

community had transformed from a privilege-based corporation into an ethnically defined

community, and the DSVR, founded in 1876, was able to negotiate a generally secure if at

times tense relationship with successive Hungarian governments.

The Saxon community's for the most part stable position was thrown into uncertainty by

unification with Romania. Bowing to political realities, on 8 January 1919 the DSVR had

in the Declaration of Mediasch expressed their support for unification with Romania,

becoming the first minority representatives in Transylvania to do so. But as the Saxon

delegates met in SchaBburg eleven months after the Declaration of Karlsburg, Greater

' Deutsch-Schsische Volksratfr Siebenbrgen. This title was first adopted at the November congress; before then the organisation was known as the Saxon Central Committee [Schsische Zentralausschu] or the Saxon People's Party [Schsische Volkspartei] (see Chapter 1), For simplicity, however, it is referred to as the DSVR throughout.

Romania was still in disarray. Transylvania remained under military occupation, and had

witnessed a campaign of terror directed mainly at the former Hungarian rulers. Romania

was divided into the 'Old Kingdom' and the 'new provinces' of Transylvania, Bessarabia

and Bukovina, each with its separate history and traditions, and operating under different

legal systems and coinage. Romania was facing its first general election since unification,

its first election under universal male suffrage, and following that the daunting task of

producing a new constitution that would forge a coherent whole from the disparate parts.

The Saxon delegates had to decide not only their platform with regards to the state and to

the unfamiliar Romanian parties that would govern it, but also the community's

relationship with the other small German communities scattered through Greater Romania

and for the most part finding themselves in the same state for the first time.

The choice of SchaBburg as the place for the congress of the DSVR was significant for a

number of reasons. Although by no means the most important Saxon town, it was located in

the Greater Kokel Valley, in the heart of the area of Saxon inhabitation in Transylvania,

making it geographically a convenient location for most delegates. Saxons constituted a

larger proportion of the population in the Greater Kokel region than anywhere else in

Transylvania, and formed the majority in numerous local settlements. ^ Although Saxons no

longer constituted an outright majority of SchaBburg's inhabitants, they were the largest

single ethnic community in the town, and dominated the old town centre, with its late

medieval houses and its historic fortified Church.^ Despite the presence of a government

censor at the start of the congress, there were few other places where the Saxon delegates

could feel as secure in their community's future as in SchaBburg.

The tone of events at the congress was for the most part upbeat and optimistic. Numerous

lengthy speeches were given, mostly in Standard German, for the most part by the Lutheran

pastors, lawyers and doctors that comprised the Saxon community's political elite.

^ Zsolt Bottlik, "Ethnische Raumstruktur der schsischen Bevlkerung im ehemaligen Komitat Grokokeln (1850-1992)." Zeitschrift fr siebenbrgische Landeskunde (herein ZL), Vol 5 Nr 2, 2000, 209-217. ^ In the Hungarian census of 1913, of the 11,587 inhabitants in Schburg, 5,486 (47.3%) were German, 3,031 Romanian and 2,687 Hungarian. {A Trtenelmi Magyarorszdg atlasza es Adattdra 1914. [Atlas and gazetter of historic Hungary 1914.] Pecs: Talma Kaido, 2001, 156.) By 1941, there were 5,037 Germans in a population of 14,941 (33.7%). Walter My (ed), Die Siebenbrger Sachsen: Lexikon. Mnchen: Wort & Welt Verlag, 1993, 602. On Schburg's historic town centre, see My (ed), Die Siebenbrger Sachsen, 430-431.

However, reports in the SDT suggest that one of the most popular speeches was given not

by a polished politician, but by a farmer:

Especial approval met the Husbandman Buchholzer from Kleinschem, who

in powerful words in our native dialect gave expression to the thought that

we wish to be loyal citizens of our fatherland, when we are permitted to be

what we are; loyal German Lutheran Saxons."^

Buchholzer's speech had resonance because it highlighted many of the challenges faced by

the Saxons as a small ethnic community living as a minority in a nation-state. At the core of

these was the potential tension between on the one hand loyalty to the state and on the other

loyalty to the ethnic community; Buchholzer asserts that the latter most be permitted so as

to produce the former. Secondly, he highlighted the close relationship between religious

(Lutheranism) and ethnic (Saxon) identities. Finally, reinforced through his use of the

Saxon dialect instead of Standard German, he alluded to the relationship between local

(Saxon) and broader (German) constitutions of ethnic community.

For the Saxons, there were numerous possible answers to these difficult challenges. At

SchaBburg in November 1919, the Saxon delegates elected to pursue engagement with the

state, emphasising the loyalty of the community to Romania while seeking wide-ranging

collective rights. At the same time, the DSVR encouraged closer ties between Saxons and

other German communities in Romania, and more broadly with German communities

throughout Europe. At the same time, Saxons continued to defend their distinctive local

identity: Germanness, Saxonness and Romanian citizenship were not perceived to be

mutually exclusive. The delegates looked to these challenges with hope and optimism.

The next Congress of the DSVR was held in Hermannstadt on 1 October 1933, under very

different circumstances, to review the decisions of 1919. While at SchaBburg the delegates

Besonderen Beifall fand der Kleinscheurner Landmann Buchholzer, der in unserer heimischen Mundart in kernigen Worten dem Gedanken Ausdruck gab, da wir treue Brger unseres Vaterlandes sein wollen, wenn man uns das sein lt, was wir sind, treue deutsche evangelische Sachsen. "Volkstag der Sachsen in Schburg." Siebenbrgisch-Deutsches Tagesblatt {herein the SDT) 26 November 1919, 1.

had been relatively united, in 1933 there were strong divisions between the liberals that had

dominated in 1919 and a new grouping of radicals that belonged to the National Socialist

Self-Help Movement of Germans in Romania (NSDR).^

Although the majority of approximately 600 official delegates to the conference were

probably supporters of the old liberal elite in the DVSR, the radicals' hand was

strengthened by the presence of around 4,000 supporters, including many member of the

militant Self-Help Workers Association, (SAM, sometimes abbreviated SA).^ In an

atmosphere charged with tensions, the Congress chairman Karl Ernst Schnell contrasted the

optimism of 1919 with the bitter disappointment felt in 1933:

And today? ... Our political heavens are fiill of dark clouds. Hope and

confidence have turned into ignominy, and of those things that our souls once

felt, only one remains unchanged: our declaration of loyalty to the Romanian

state^

The new programme emphasised self-sufficiency, a policy of aggressive engagement with

the state that amounted to political isolationism, and forging strong ties to Germany. In his

address to the Congress the triumphant Fritz Fabritius, leader of the NSDR, argued that:

this community will become a national socialist one or it will cease to be. ...

Only then can we constitute a power factor in this [Romanian] Fatherland and

only then achieve that spiritual community with the 80 million of our German

Nationalsozialistische Selbsthilfebewegung der Deutschen in Rumnien. 5 ^ Selbsthilfe-Arbeitsmannschaft. ^ Und Heute? ... Unser politischer Himmel hngt voll schwerer Wolken. Hoffnung und Zuversicht sind zu Schanden geworden und von dem, was damals unsere Seelen erfllte, ist nur Eines unverndert geblieben: unser Truebekenntnis zum rumnischen Staat. "Der fnfte Sachsentag." SDT3 October 1933, 1.

mother People,^ which will mould us, to give us its intellectual, political and

economic strength that will also be of benefit to our Fatherland.^

The primary question of this thesis is why, amongst all the possible responses to minority

status, did an understanding of the Saxon community that emphasised the connection with

the German state prove to have the greatest resonance? What did Germanness mean to a

German community living outside of Germany? How did it function? What did it offer that

other forms of identification did not? What alternative understandings of ethnic community

did German minorities consider? Why was German nationalism more persuasive and

pervasive than other forms of minority nationalism? A corollary of this question is, why did

German minority nationalism radicalise by the early 1930s? To what extent were such

radical developments driven by outside forces, and to what extent were both phenomena

responses to the internal logic of nationalism in Eastern Europe, and the circumstances of

German minorities in Eastern Europe?

The Transylvanian Saxons provide a case study of how small minorities reconstitute their

ethnic identities to respond to their lack of statehood and the imposition of an "alien"

nation-state upon them. In this thesis, I will argue that, as with many other minorities

unwilling or unable to form a nation-state in their own right, the Saxons sought collective

rights on the basis of ethnic self-determination. Their aims did not include territorial

autonomy or independence, and for this reason it is necessary to consider their strivings as

distinct from nationalism. I term this attempt to secure collective self-determination by non-

territorial means "ethno-corporatism". The goals of Saxon ethno-corporatism were

influenced by the broader discussion of minority rights in interwar Europe before and after

^ Volk and its related terms (e.g. vlkisch, Volkstum) are notoriously difficult to translate into English, implying in different contexts 'people', ethnos, and nation. Used by the Saxons, it invariably had an ethnic component. For this reason, I have either translated Volk to "People" (in the sense of "We the People"), which best captures its ethnic overtones, or left it in the German where translation would render it cumbersome. Vlkisch has been translated as "ethnic", excepting in regards to where it refers to vlkisch nationalism, the radical, racialised stream of German nationalism that came to exert a strong influence in the interwar period (see Chapter 6). ^ diese Volksgemeinschaft eine nationalsozialistische sein wird oder sie wird nicht sein. ... Nur dann knnen wir einen Machtfaktor in diesem Vaterlande darstellen und nurr dann gelangen wir zu jener geistlichen Gemeinschaft mit den 80 Millionen unseres deutschen Muttervolkes, die uns gestalten wird, seine geistigen, politischen und wirtschaftlichen Krfte auch unserem Vaterlande zugute kommen zu lassen. "Der Sachsentag im Zeichen des Sieges der NSDR." Ostdeutscher Beobachter (herein OB) 1 October 1933, 1.

the First World War. In this sense, the Saxons were typical of many small communities in

interwar Europe.

The Saxons approached the challenges of ethno-corporatism by numerous means. These

included the pursuit of collective legal rights by negotiation with the state, positing a

broader multi-ethnic Transylvanian polity that would guarantee collective ethnic rights,

pursuing ethno-corporatism under the banner of religious freedoms and seeking to

strengthen ties with other German communities. While a number of these strategies met

with partial success, none fully compensated for the lack of a state, and all fell short of

Saxon expectations. I argue that disappointment with other attempts to achieve ethno-

corporate status led to growing radicalisation of Saxon ethnic identity, and to the eventual

adoption of fascism. In this sense, while influenced by currents from Germany, Saxon

"National Socialism" can paradoxically be seen as stemming from the pursuit of minority

rights.

To demonstrate this, it is first necessary to consider the definitions of ethnic community

and nation, and to separate the politicisation of ethnicity from nationalism. This is done

below.

Nationalism and minority ethnic communities

Definitions

Anthony D. Smith defines an ethnic community as having a collective name, a shared

history and myth of common descent, a distinctive shared culture, a sense of association

with a specific territory, and a sense of consciousness and solidarity. ^ ^ Shared culture can

manifest in many different ways, and can include language, religion, customs, institutions,

laws, folklore, architecture, dress, food, music and the arts. Fredrick Barth argues that the

interplay of ethnicity and culture is best understood in terms of boundaries. Ethnic

10 Anthony D. Smith, The ethnic origins of nations. Oxford; New York, N.Y.: B. Blackwell, 1987, 22-30.

communities identify key cultural indicators that mark who is within the ethnic community

and who is without. It is these boundaries, much more than the overall cultural contents of

an ethnicity, which mark the community. Which cultural features become significant is

determined by the nature of interactions between ethnic communities; those features that

are judged by the actors to be most significant will mark ethnic boundaries. Barth focuses

particularly on the significance of cultural indicators in the economic sphere. While the

boundaries of the community remain fairly consistent, the cultural 'contents' and social

structure of an ethnic community may vary greatly over time.^^ Although identification

with an ethnic community is perennial, individual ethnic communities evolve and

transform, are absorbed/assimilated or separate into new communities. The significance

attributed to ethnic identity has varied greatly at different stages and in different places

throughout history. ^ ^ Ethno-symbolists such as Smith build upon Barth but move away

from economic determinism to emphasise the importance of the cultural forms that Barth

discounts. In particular, ethno-symbolists emphasise the role of myths and symbols in

unifying populations and ensuring their continuity. ^ ^ Smith describes this as the "myth-

symbol complex", which lies at the core of all ethnic identities. The shared history and

mythology of an ethnic community provides the legitimisation for the community's self

image, and the source of cultural indicators that are held as significant and mark the

community's borders. For Smith, the solidarity of the ethnic community is the ultimate

decider of ethnicity. ^ ^

Nationalism, by comparison, locates the source of individual identity within a "people",

which is seen as the bearer of sovereignty, the central object of loyalty, and the basis of

collective solidarity. The "people" may be defined in various ways, but they are seen as

basically homogeneous: internal social, economic or other divisions are seen as superficial

by comparison. The principle requirement of nationalism is belief in the idea of the

^^ Fredrik Barth, "Introduction." In Fredrik Barth (ed). Ethnic groups and boundaries: the social organization of cultural difference. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1969, 13-15.

Anthony D. Smith, National identity. London; New York: Penguin, 1991, 23-25. ^^ [Hutchinson, John & Anthony D. Smith]. "Introduction." In John Hutchinson & Anthony D. Smith (ed). Ethnicity. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, 10. ^^ Smith, Ethnic origins of nations, 57-58.

Smith, Ethnic origins of nations, 22-30.

"nation". ^ ^ As Smith argues, "To the nationalist, the world is a world of nations, each with its peculiar and unique power, and all political power comes from the nation alone."^^ At the core of this belief is the principle of national self-determination, the right of nations to determine their own destinies in accordance with their unique properties. In its classic formulation, the right to self-determination entails the right of the nation to form its own

1 X nation-state.

It is the political aspect of nationalism, the demand for a sovereign territory on the basis of forming a community of equal individuals sharing a common culture and values, which gives shape to the nation. Without nationalism, there is no nation. ^ ^ The nation, then, is a human group mobilised and conscious of forming a community, formed by individuals that are seen as equal members regardless of socioeconomic status. Nationalism brings together the concept of the "people" (the masses) with older term "nation" (the elite). All members of the modem nation share in its superior, elite quality, in its bearing of sovereignty.^^ Thus, belonging to the nation "elevated every member of the community which made it sovereign. National identity is, fundamentally, a matter of dignity. It gives people reasons to be proud."^^

The collective status of the members of the nation stems from their perceived shared characteristics. The nation shares a common culture, is attached to a common territory, has a myth of a common past and a common project (albeit contested) for the future, and most importantly claims the right to self-rule on the basis of its existence as a nation.^^ National

^^ Greenfeld, Liah. Nationalism: five roads to modernity. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992, 3-4.

Smith, Ethnic origins of nations, 129-130. ^^ For example, see John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1862. Project Gutenberg EBook, 2004, http://onlinebooks.library.upenn.edu/webbin^ook/lookupid?key=olbp23760, [10 November 2006], Chapter XVI "Of Nationality, as connected with Representative Government", and Giuseppe Mazzini, The duties of man and other essays. London: Dent, 1968, especially "The duties of man." ^^ Brian Jenkins & Gnter Minnerup. Citizens and comrades: socialism in a world of nation states. London: Pluto Press, 1984, 50-51.

Greenfeld, Nationalism, 6-7. Greenfeld, Nationalism, 487, emphasis in original.

^^ Montserrat Guibemau, "National identity and modernity." In Alain Dieckhoff & Gutirrez, Natividad (ed). Modern Roots: studies of national identity. Aldershot; Burlington USA; Singapore; Sydney: Ashgate Publishing, 2001, 74, and Smith, Ethnic origins of nations, 135-137, 170-171.

identity is the identification of the individual with the nation?^ The state, as defined by

Weber, is a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use

of force within a given territory The nation-state seeks its legitimacy as the expression of

national self-determination. It aims to unite its population, made of citizens equal before the

law, by creating a common culture, symbols and values. In short, the nation-state seeks to

transform its population into a nation.^^

Nationalists construct a selective unifying history from the past, to both teach and inspire

the nation and to legitimise the nation-building project. Nationalism is naturalised by being

projected upon the landscape, creating a claim to territory. The myth-symbol complex so

produced shapes the nation to be.^^ The myth-symbol complex creates a strong sense of

national identity, and legitimises claims to national autonomy.^^ Ethnicity is used to

legitimise claims to national self-determination by demonstrating the continuity of the * 2 8

(national) community. Cultural diversity and the right to develop one's own specific

national identity become moral arguments utilised by minorities claiming from the state the OQ

right to national self-determination. Indeed, partisans of opposing nationalisms very often

compete over their claims to the same pre-national myths, symbols, heroes and

landscapes.^^ However, nationalism is also the subject of claims internal to the nation, by

interest groups competing for access to the resources of the nation-state. This is not to

dismiss the genuine and deep attachments that most nationalists feel to the nation.

However, it is also insightful to consider the importance of material factors in the attraction

of nationalism. Material interests help shape nationalists' visions of the nation and

^^ Greenfeld, Nationalism, 1. Gutirrez, Natividad. "The study of national identity." In Dieckhoff & Gutirrez (eds), Modem Roots, 1. ^^ Cited in Montserrat Guibemau, Nations without states: political communities in a global age. Cambridge: Polity, 1999, 13. ^^ Guibemau, "National identity and modernity", 74-75, and Smith, Ethnic origins of nations, 135-137. ^^ Smith, Ethnic origins of nations, 177-208. ^^ Smith, National identity, 74-77. ^^ Guibemau, Montserrat. "Anthony D. Smith on nations and national identity: a critical assessment." In Montserrat Guibemau & John Hutchinson, History and national destiny: ethnosymbolism and its critics. Oxford: Blackwell, 2004, 126. ^^ Guibemau, Nations without states, 103-106.

The overlapping nature of national symbolisms is nicely demonstrated in George White's analysis of nationalism in South East Europe. George W. White, Nationalism and territory: constructing group identity in southeastern Europe. Lanham; Boulder; New York; Oxford: Rouman & Littlefield, 2000.

contribute to a contested national discourse.^^ For this reason, the nation's myth-symbol

complex is not fixed but is shaped by the nation as much as it shapes the nation.

Historicising the nation

While ethnicity appears to be a perennial characteristic of human communities, nationalism

is the product of a specific historical period and specific historic forces, and first appeared

little before the end of the eighteenth century.^^ Nationalism movements can be divided into

two broad streams: civic and ethnic nationalisms. In practice, pure civic or ethnic nations

are rare, but the variations between the mixtures of the two differ sufficiently to justify their

use as analytical terms.^^ The first wave of nationalism, the 'civic' nationalisms of Western

Europe and the Americas, had its origins in the modernisation of economics, the creation of

the centralised bureaucratic state and transformations in education and communications.

Gellner emphasises industrialisation, resulting in increasing division of labour and the

creation of the centralised bureaucratic state, both requiring a broad, standardised culture

produced by a broad and standardised education system.^ "^ By comparison. Smith sees the

growth of the bureaucratic state, inculcating a formerly elite culture into ever widening

segments of society, as laying the foundations for nationalism.^^ Anderson highlights the

role of print media in the vernacular tongue in producing a sense of shared community.^^

Ethnosymbolists such as Smith also highlight the shared cultural symbols and ideals that

make up the contents of the nation, flowing from the state's common laws and legal

institutions, its common rights and responsibilities of citizenship.^^ Civic nationalism.

Guibemau, Nations without states, 91-92, and Katherine Verdery, "Introduction." In Ivo Banac & Katherine Verdery (ed), National Character and National Ideology in Interwar Eastern Europe. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995. ^^ Ernest Gellner, Nationalism. London: Phoenix, 1997, 12-13, and E. J. Hobesbawm, Nations and nationalism since 1870. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006 [1990], 9-10 and Guibemau, "Anthony D Smith on nations and national identity", 138-140. C.f. Smith, National Identity, 43-51. ^^ GvQQnQd, Nationalism, 11-12.

Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983, 35-50. ^^ Smith, National Identity, 60-62. ^^ Benedict Anderson, Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism. London; New York: Verso, 1991, 37-65. ^^ Smith, Ethnic origins of nations, 134-135.

flowing from these developments, emphasises the rights and equality of the individual

within the state, and the sovereignty of the nation as a whole.

The economic changes described above did not in themselves produce nationalism, and

nationalism is by no means the only possible response to these changes. Indeed, the only

necessary aspect of nationalism is the idea of the nation.^^ This can be seen in the "ethnic"

nationalisms of Eastern Europe. The later wave of ethnic nationalism was a response to the

emergence of civic nation-states. In Eastern Europe, rulers of dynastic, multiethnic states

responded to the emergence of the centralised state in Western Europe and Russia by

attempting to centralise and modernise their own states."^^ The standardisation of the state's

culture, coupled with the undermining of traditional privileges, provoked resistance from

some members of minority ethnic communities, who responded by fostering alternative

nationalisms. Both Hroch and Gellner emphasise the co-incidence of social conflict and

ethnic identity in producing ethno-nationalist movements. However, Hroch argues that

increased communication (through literacy, schools and market relations) and social

mobility, rather than industrialism itself, which permits the development of nationalism as a

mass movement."^^ Here, rather than the state producing a national community through the

fostering of common citizenship, nationalists attempted to mobilise ethnic communities as

the basis of new nat ions .Such nationalisms often preceded modernisation and

industrialisation in the populations in question."^^ However, ethnic nationalisms in pre-

modem communities seek to replicate the legal institutions and citizenship models of civic

n

Greenfeld, Nationalism, 487. Greenfeld offers the example of Prussia, which experienced many aspects of economic and social modernisation without abandoning its traditional privilege-based understanding of society, until the Napoleonic Wars brought the German states into direct conflict with a nation-state and disseminated the ideal of nationalism. Greenfeld, Nationalism, Chapter 4. ^^ Greenfeld, Nationalism, 3-4. ^^ Anderson, Imagined communities, 77-78, 84-88.

Miroslav Hroch, "From national movement to the fully-formed nation: the nation-building process in Europe." In Balakrishnan Gopal (ed). Mapping the Nation. London; New York: Verso & New Left Review, 2000, 85-88. Gellner, Nations and nationalism, 58-62. Gellner emphasises the role of industrialisation in this, but aggrieved minority nationalists were often drawn from the petty nobility or the impoverished rural gentry. Anderson, Imagined communities, 78-79, 88-90, 101-105. See also Smith, National Identity, 99-100. ^^ Smith, Ethnic origins of nations, 135-138. See also Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992, 184-189.

Irina Livezeanu, Cultural politics in Greater Romania: regionalism, nation building and ethnic struggle, 1918-1930. Ithica; London: Cornell University Press, 1995, 5-6.

nationalism, as well as the process of economic modernisation.'^'^ These components

become necessary for the dissemination and institutionalisation of nationalism.

While in the civic states ethnicity was initially taken for granted, and not a key point in the

formation of national identity, internal disputes and external challenges led to ethnicisation

of these nations."^^ Thus, the distinction between civic and ethnic nation-states should not be

overstressed. Both civic and ethnic nationalisms require a community sharing common

values and customs, communicating through common symbols. Key components in the

myth-symbol complex that forms the core of nationalism are a myth of common origin, a

sense of shared historical progression, and identification with a common national

landscape."^^

The extent to which nationalist symbolism is really drawn from pre-existing ethnic

symbolism is a subject of dispute. Smith emphasises the ethnic origins of national

symbology. This corresponds with Earth's assertion of ethnic communities that although

the cultural practices of a community change, and with them the symbols and practices that

mark a community's boundary, the community itself often continues undisturbed."^^ By

comparison, Hobsbawm emphasises the invented nature of "national traditions". While he

recognises that many traditions draw on historical practices, he argues that their

formalisation and ritualisation changes their meaning entirely. He also argues convincingly

that many traditions are entirely novel."^ ^ It is, however, interesting to note how many of

Hobsbawm's examples are of reworked past practices rather than of complete fabrication.

Smith suggests that national traditions are less 'invented' than 'constructed', that

'invention' must be understood in the sense of "a novel recombination of existing

elements"."^^ Thus, as Gutirrez argues, the nation, as imagined by its members, is a

Smith, Ethnic origins of nations, 149. See also Gellner, Nations and nationalism, 61-62. Smith, Ethnic origins of nations, 149. On the ethnocisation of 'civic' national states, see Corinne Delmas,

"Recreating the French nation: the teaching of history and the cole Libre des Sciences Politiques at the end of the nineteenth century." In Diekhoff & Gutirrez (eds). Modern roots, 151-173. ^^ Smith, Ethnic origins of nations, 174-208. ^^ Barth, "Introduction", 14.

Eric Hobsbawm, "Introduction: Inventing traditions" In Eric Hobsbawm & Terrence Ranger (eds). The invention of tradition. Cambridge, London, New York, New Rochelle, Melbourne, Sydney: Cambridge University Press, 1983, 1-14.

Anthony D. Smith, "Nationalism and the Historians" in Balakrishnan (ed). Mapping the Nation, 69-72.

conjunction of contradictory and conflicting elements of myth and historical fact, tradition

and modem practice, regionalism and cosmopolitanism.^^ One point that Hobsbawm's

examples highlight is that many of the past practices that form the basis of national myths

were not of significance in the marking of ethnic boundaries in the past, even though they

are later reinterpreted in an ethno-nationalist light. The example considered in this thesis

lends itself to the conclusion that a great deal of the myth-symbol complex is pre-national

in source, although most frequently greatly reinterpreted, and it can rarely be demonstrated

to represent a direct continuation of past practices. The example of the Saxons also suggests

that many such past practices were primarily understood in terms of social status (estate) or

religion, rather than ethnicity itself.

The convergence of nationalism and ethno-corporatism

At the same time as nationalism has become increasingly ethnic, ethnic groups have

increasingly adopted key elements of nationalism. While nationalism was not the only

possible response to modernisation, once it was adopted, nationalism accelerated the

process of change, channelled it, limited the possibilities for further development, and

became a major factor in it.^ ^ Both civic and ethnic nationalisms tend to treat nationalism

(loyalty to the state) as identical to loyalty to ethnic community. Where the dominant ethnic

community in a state (the Staatsvolk) adopt a strongly ethnic nationalism, this has the effect

of marginalising and alienating other ethnic communities within the state (so-called ethnic

or "national" minorities).^^ The conflation of nation with state means that while the

recognition of a community as a nation grants legitimacy to the state that claims to

represent the nation, where the community does not have a state of its own national status

implicitly acknowledges the community's right to a measure of self-rule, be it autonomy or

fiill independence.^^

Gutirrez, "The study of national identity", 10-11. ^^ Greenfeld, Nationalism, 487. 52 In this context, "minority" refers to a non-dominant ethnic community within a nation-state, rather than being an indicator of numerical status. Gellner, Ernest. "The coming of nationalism and its interpretation: the myths of nation and class." In Balakrishnan (ed), Mapping the Nation, 135-136. ^^ Guibemau, Nations without states, 13.

Even where ethnic nationalism does not trigger counter nationahsms and claims for its own state (either autonomous or independent), or a reapportion of political authority in a federal structure on ethnic lines, the pressure to compete within a nationalist political system forces those ethnic groups with no desire to form their own state to adopt some of the qualities of nationalism so as to defend their access to state resources. These include politicising the ethnic community's myth-symbol complex and mobilising all members of the community, in a form that is not formal citizenship (due to the absence of a state), but is not dissimilar in its significance to the community. As self-sufficiency is a key goal of such ethnic movements, and as territory is viewed necessary for self-sufficiency, these movements also sometimes (although not always) become associated with a particular homeland (where one exists within the state; territorialisation is less likely to occur in a recent migrant ethnic community). As a result, the boundaries of nationalism are frequently hard to draw.^ "^

Thus, inspired by nationalist projects, many minority ethnic communities have consciously attempted to pursue a path modelled on nationalism. Their challenge has been to adapt the nation-building project to their circumstances as minorities. The key question for many small ethnic communities has been by what means self-determination might be achieved other than separate statehood. These questions have been answered in different ways by different minorities at different times. In doing so, minorities have adapted their 'myth-symbol complex' to reflect and reinforce their desired and perceived relationships with the state.

However, while a great deal of scholarly attention has been devoted to nation-building projects that aimed, in the long term, for a territorial state of some kind, much less attention to nation-building projects where statehood not desired/considered achievable. The exception has been in context of international law and human rights, rather than in terms of theories of nationalism.^^ The lack of scholarly interest is reflected in the absence of a clear

^^ Smith, Ethnic origins of nations, 154-169. ^^ This point has been made by Yael Tamir, "The right to national self determination." Social Research Vol 58 Nr 3, Fall 1991, 565. His work and a number of others that form an exception to this rule are discussed below. Examples of studies of minority rights and national self-determination from a legal perspective include Igor Primoratz & Aleksandar Pavkovip (ed), Identity, self-determination, and secession. Aldershot, Hants,

term for ethnic movements that are politicised on the basis of ethnicity but that do not seek

a nation-state of their own. Ethnic identity is insufficient because not all ethnic identities

are politicised. Ethnic politicisation is insufficient because ethnicity is often politicised as

an indicator of social status, class, religion and so on in conflicts that are not driven by

ethnicity. The phenomenon I seek to describe is different in that legitimacy stems from

ethnic status itself The term "ethnocentrism" has taken on negative connotations from

anthropology, where it is used to indicate judging other cultures on the basis of one's own

cultural values. "Ethnic particularism" also has negative connotations and has come to

signify the opposite of cosmopolitanism. Smith offers the term "communalism" to describe

the pursuit of "communal control over communal affairs in those geographical areas where

the ethnic community forms a majority".^^ Communalism as described by Smith is an

important minority strategy. However, there is nothing inherent in minority responses to

nationalism that they should seek collective rights only in those areas where they form a

majority. Furthermore, communalism lacks the recognition of collective legal status that

lies at the heart of many small minority movements. I also disagree with Smith's assertion

that Communalism is a form of nationalism, because it fails to pursue a territorial state.^^ I

shall use "ethno-corporatism" to indicate the belief that political legitimacy stems from

membership of an ethnic community, and that such communities are entitled to collective

legal status and self-determination. Although ethnic nationalism is one form of ethno-

corporatism, "self-determination" does not necessarily indicate the formation of an

independent (or autonomous) nation-state. However, because nationalism has been the

model for ethno-corporatism, the self-determination sought by non-nationalist ethno-

corporatists tends to attempt to compensate for the lack of a nation-state.

In part, the lack of interest in ethno-corporatism is because many minority ethnic

communities, especially in Europe, are not ethnicities without nation-states as such, but

England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006, Thomas D. Musgrave, Self-determination and national minorities. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, Hurst Hannum, Autonomy, sovereignty, and self-determination: the accommodation of conflicting rights. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990, Robert McCorquodale (ed), Self-determination in international law. Aldershot: Ashgate/Dartmouth, 2000, Markku Suksi (ed), Autonomy: applications and implications. The Hague; Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1998, and Umozurike Oji Umozurike, Self-determination in international law. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1972. ^^ Anthony D. Smith, The ethnic revival. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981, 16. ^^ Smith, The Ethnic Revival, 18.

ethnie eommunities living outside of the nation-state in which their co-ethnics are the

Staatsvolk. At times, some ethnic communities have included large "diasporas" that

through migration or the arbitrary setting of state boundaries live outside of the nation-state,

and which in some circumstances identify with the national 'homeland'. Amongst the most

numerous and politically significant have been Germans, Hungarians and Ukrainians in the

interwar period, and Russians and Serbs in the post-communist period.^^

The automatic treatment of such groups as "diasporas" is problematic. A diaspora is "a

minority ethnic group of migrant origin which maintains sentimental or material links with

its land of origin".^^ There is a tendency in the literature to treat the ethno-corporatism of

minorities as identical to the nationalism of the 'homeland' nation-state. Rogers Brubaker

highlights the fact that while minority "nationalisms" are often closely aligned to homeland

nationalism, this is not always the case, and warns of the need to treat the sentiments of

minority communities separately.^^ (One problem caused by the conflation of minority with

diaspora is that it tends to lead to locally driven demands for autonomy or secession being

misrepresented as irredentism, which is generally a product of inter-state r i v a l r y . I n his

own treatment of nationalism, Brubaker does not examine minority nationalism in detail.^^

However, Brubaker's observation has providing a launching point for research into

minority 'nationalisms', especially with regards to ethnic Germans outside of Germany, the

"Germans Abroad".^^

58 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism reframed: nationhood and the national question in the New Europe.

Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 6-7. ^^ Milton J. Esman, "Diasporas and international relations." In Gabi Sheffer (ed), Modem diasporas in

international politics. London; Sydney: Croom Helm, 1986, 333-339. Esman explicitly excludes from this ethnic groups that have become minorities by conquest or boundary

change, which would exclude many of the most significant minority groups in Europe (for example Germans in Silesia, Russians in the Baltic states) would be automatically excluded. However, this has not prevented them being treated as such in scholarly literature. For the purpose of this study, the key feature of a diaspora is the continuing sense of connection to the homeland. Pieter Judson, "When is a diaspora not a diaspora?" In K. Molly O'Donnell, Renate Bridenthal & Nancy Reagin (ed), The Heimat Abroad: The Boundaries of Germanness. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005, 219-220.

Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed, 6. Guibemau, Nations without states, 27.

^^ Interestingly, while recognising in Nationalism Reframed that homeland and minority nationalisms are not always aligned Brubaker devotes a chapter each to nationalising and homeland nationalisms, but does not enter into a similar analysis of minority nationalism. ^^ Auslandsdeutschtum. For example, see the collection of essays in O'Donnell et al (ed). The Heimat Abroad.

While Smith sees ethno-corporatism as adopting increasing elements of nationalism, and Brubaker distinguishes between minority sentiments and the nationalism of states, neither consider how such movements respond to those components of nationalism that are provided only by a state (or a stake in a state). One scholar who does consider minority rights from a theoretical perspective is Yael Tamir. Tamir has argued for the necessity in theories of nationalism of separating national self-determination from statehood, arguing that national self-determination is first and foremost a cultural matter. Tamir holds that although statehood is a means of securing national self-determination, it is not the only means by which to do so.^ "^ Tamir's approach builds upon the work of Karl Renner and Otto Bauer, discussed below, and has the value of distinguishing between territorial nationalism and ethno-corporatism (referred to by Tamir as "cultural nationalism"). However, it is not at all clear that self-determination can be satisfied by cultural means alone. Certainly, most nationalist movements without states also demand political, administrative and economic as well as cultural autonomy.^^

A further area of rich analysis may be found in the study of the wealth of nationalist movements that have come to prominence mainly in Western democracies since the Second World War and that have for the most part sought something less than full independence. The key theoretician to examine minority nationalism has been Montserrat Guibemau. Guibenau argues for the classification of these communities (such as the Catalonians and Basques in Spain, the Scots and Welsh in Britain, the Qubcois in Canada and the Kurds in Iraq) as "nations without states".^^ He defines these as cultural communities that despite sharing a common past, an attachment to a clearly demarcated territory and a wish to decide their own political future, nonetheless lack a state of their own. Such communities are included in one or more states that they regard as alien, and assert a right to self-determination, sometimes as autonomy within the state and sometimes as the right to full secession. Most fi'equently, such communities trace their consciousness as a community to now lost, fi-equently pre-national political institutions.^^ The distinction between "nations

^^ Tamir, "The right to national self determination", 565-590. ^^ Guibemau, Nations without states, 36-66. ^^ Guibemau, Nations without states. ^^ Guibemau, Nations without states, 1-2, 16-17. The idea of nations without states is also posited by Smith, Ethnic origins of nations, 154.

without states" and non-national ethnic communities seeking ethno-corporatism lay in their

different territorial and political demands. National self-determination presupposes a right

to exercise sovereignty over a given territory to the exclusion of others, be that through full

independence or partial autonomy. Non-national ethno-corporatist communities are either

unwilling or unable to lay claim to the right to dominate a given territory and exercise self-

determination there, either due to their few numbers, their lack of historical connection to

the territory, or their sense of attachment to the state. In turn, unwillingness or inability to

form a state shapes their political consciousness and their self-image as a community.

Guibemau considers a number of different possible positions that states adopt with regards

to minority nationalisms, including denial and repression, cultural recognition, political

autonomy and federalism. He also considers forms of resistance to the state, both non-

violent (including symbolic actions, interference, elite networks and demonstrations of

solidarity) and violent (political terrorism, total war). Thus, Guibemau does consider

minorities in states that refuse to recognise them. Nonetheless, first and foremost,

Guibemau explores how nations without states can achieve territorial autonomy, either

within existing states or through full independence. This is not always the aim of

minorities, especially small minorities not living in contiguous settlements. Furthermore,

while paying careful attention to the historical background of his case studies, Guibemau's

work focuses on the contemporary period and is predicated upon the continuing devolution

of state authority to on one hand supranational institutions such as the EU and NAFTA, and 68

on the other hand to sub-national institutions as implied in the "Europe of the regions". In

such circumstances, and especially in the democracies of Europe and North America,

national self-determination in one form or another is frequently possible for sufficiently

determined communities. This is a relatively new state of affairs. Moreover is it unclear that

Guibemau's model is applicable outside the West. Even today, as Will Kymlicka has

argued, although in the Westem democracies minority nationalist movements have come to

be judged primarily in terms of justice and equality, in Eastem Europe they continue to be

considered primarily in terms of state security. For this reason. East European regimes

continue to be for the most part hostile to minority autonomy. Where such rights have been

Guibemau, Nations and states, 175-186.

granted it has generally been due to military action or the threat of such action, and even then only where the state has little hope of winning the conflict.^^

The question for many ethnic minorities has been and continues to be how to compensate for the lack of the functions of state where no reasonable hope of achieving partial or complete statehood remains. The main functions of the state are having the power to confer rights and duties on its citizens, provision of basic needs, maintenance of social order, setting economic policies, seeing to the defence of the state, the control of immigration and foreign policy, the provision of education and overseeing networks of communications and transport/^ A number of these functions can be more or less replicated by means of private institutions. For example, religious, moral and economic pressures can ensure that members of a community meet their duties and benefit from communal privileges.^^ Semi-criminal or paramilitary ethnic organisations may perhaps also provide an example of maintaining rights and duties. Similarly, private institutions, especially Churches, may provide elements

'TO

of social services, as well as education. Co-operatives may carry out some economic functions, and privately owned media can provide for communications. However, these functions depend on both resources and upon a state that is either tolerant of private minority ethnic endeavours or too weak to prevent them. Furthermore, it is extremely difficult for minorities to replace by private means certain key functions of the state: direct control over territory, a fully independent economic policy (insofar as states are economically sovereign), the ability to exclude "foreigners" and the power of physical coercion. These functions form the most important areas of study in understanding minority responses to the lack of statehood.

^^ Will Kymlicka, "Justice and security in the accommodation of minority nationalism." In Stephen May, Tariq Modood, & Judith Squires (eds), Ethnicity, nationalism, and minority rights. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004, 144-175. As successful examples of autonomy, Kymlicka lists TransDnesiter, Abkhazia, Krajina, the Crimea and Ngomo-Kanabakh. He recognizes Russia as an exception, but suggests that most Russian politicians view the ethnic autonomy model there with hostility. (148-149) ^^ Guibemau, Nations without states, 17. ^^ Abner Cohen, Two-dimensional man: an essay on the anthropology of power and symbolism in complex society. London: Routledge & Kegen Paul, 1974. ^^ C.f. Gellner, Nations and nationalism, 38.

Interwar minority rights and ethno-corporatism

National self-determination and the Paris Peace Settlements

The interwar era was (to date) the most innovative period with regards to minority rights.

Not surprisingly, it also forms the locus classicus of the tensions between nation states and

national minorities'^ Although all four of the empires of Central and East Europe

(Germany, Russia, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire) had embarked upon the path

of nationalism by the late nineteenth or early twentieth centuries, this process remained

incomplete in all four states at the outbreak of the First Worid War. Germany most

resembled a nation-state, although with large minorities, and even amongst German

speakers the nation remained fractured, as shall be discussed below. Despite efforts at

Turkification, Russification and Magyarisation, the Ottoman Empire, Russia and Austria-

Hungary continued to be multi-ethnic dynastic states. The collapse after the War of all four

and the emergence of numerous successor states organised on supposedly nationalist lines

marks the peak in legitimacy of national self-determination as a principle for the ordering

of states, if not for the actual application of this principle, as discussed below. The period

was also marked by on the one hand rapid economic change and modernisation, and on the

other a worldwide Depression, conditions that greatly intensified intergroup rivalries.

The term self-determination has come, since 1945, to have a very broad meaning. It now

refers to the ability of a group to make choices free from the bounds of the institutional

framework within which they live. As such, it can be expressed culturally, socially,

economically and politically.^^ Even within the political context, self-determination is now

understood to encompass a wide range of options short of ftill secession.^^ In addition, after

the Second World War the concept of self-determination was shaped by the process of

^^ Brubaker makes this point regarding tensions between nation-states over national minorities. Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed, 6-7. ^^ Carole Fink, Defending the rights of others: the Great Powers, the Jews and international minority protection, 1878-1938. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, 359-360. ^^ See for example the International Human Rights Covenants of 1966. [McCorquodale, Robert], "Introduction." In McCorquodale (ed), Self-determination in international law, xi-xv. ^^ Paul H. Brietzke, "Self-determination or jurisprudential confusion: exacerbating political conflict." Wisconsin International Law Journal, Vol 14, 1995, 122-123.

decolonisation and has come to refer primarily to territorially defined rather than ethnic "peoples"/^ However, this was not the primary understanding of self-determination before the Second World War, and especially in the interwar period. National self-determination primarily referred to the claimed right of an ethnically defined nation to form a state reflecting its particular national character

None of the combatants at the beginning of the First World War had amongst their aims the promotion of national self-determination as a guiding principle in the ordering of the European states. However, as the war progressed, both the Entente and the Central Powers appealed to the nationalist aspirations of the smaller European states to gamer allies and undermine the war effort of their opponents. By the end of the War, the principle of national self-determination had come to be associated with ideas of Liberalism and freedom from oppression, and was represented, especially by American President Woodrow Wilson, as a central plank in the establishment of a just and lasting peace. Victors and vanquished, emerging nations and small ethnic minorities all utilised the rhetoric of national self-determination to legitimise their visions of the new Europe.^^

The principles by which the Peace Settlement was to be shaped were outlined in two speeches delivered in Joint Session by Wilson in early 1919. On 8 January 1918, 'Wilson's Fourteen Points' speech advanced "the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities, and their right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak." Also of importance was Point 10: "The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place amongst nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity to autonomous development." However, Wilson stopped short of specifically endorsing the principle of national self-determination. He went further on 11 February 1918, in his 'Four Principles' speech. Of particular importance was Principle 4: "that all well defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and

^^ Rupert Emerson, ''SQlf-dQtermination'' American Journal of International Law. Vol 65, 1971, 459-475. ^^ Umozurike, Self-determination in international law, 3. ^^ C. A. Macartney, National states and national minorities. New York: Russell & Russell, 1968 [1934], 179-192, and Guyora Binder, "The case for self-determination." Stanford Journal of International Law Vol 29, 1993,226-228.

antagonism that would be likely in time to break the peace of Europe and consequently of

the world." Also of great significance was Principle One: "that each part of the final

settlement be based upon the essential justice of that particular case and upon such

adjustments as are most likely to bring a peace that will be permanent."^^

Paradoxically, national self-determination had only limited bearing on the final shape of the

Peace Treaties. Although Central and Eastern Europe were divided into nation-states, the

boundaries of these states were for the most part set according to secret treaties made by the

Entente during the war, in reflection of territories already seized by nationalist movements,

or for economic and/or strategic reasons, rather than according to the 'optimal ethnographic

line'. The victor states, known at the time as the "Principal Allied and Associated 9981

Powers" frequently invoked the principle of a just and lasting peace settlement to justify

their decisions to ignore the principle of national self-determination. Nor did national self-

determination become a principle in international law. The League of Nations Covenant did

not explicitly enshrine national self-determination, which was held to be less significant

than the sovereignty of the state.^^ Nevertheless, such was the strength of legitimacy of the

concept that the majority of interwar supporters and critics of the peace settlements utilised

the rhetoric of national self-determination to support their arguments for the new Europe.

Minority Protection

Almost entirely absent fi-om any discussion of national self-determination by the Great

Powers during the War was any consideration of the fate of the inevitable minority

populations that would be found in any nation-state system. Preoccupied with securing

support for the War effort, the "Principal Allied and Associated Powers" paid little

"8 January 1918: President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points." The World War I Document Archive, 15 October 1999. www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1918/14points.html, [28 February 2005]. and "11 February 1918: President Wilson's address to Congress, analyzing German and Austrian peace utterances." The World War I Document Archive, 12 July 1997. www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1918/wilpeace.html [30 November 2006]. See also Macartney, National states and national minorities, 189-192. ^^ Pablo de Azcarate, (trans. Eileen E. Brooke) League of Nations and national minorities: an experiment. Washington: Carnegie Foundation for International Peace, 1945, 57. ^^ Macartney, National states and national minorities, 193-208, and Hurst Hannum, "Rethinking self-determination." Virginia Journal of International Law Vol 34, 1993, 4-11.

attention to how national self-determination was to be achieved.^^ No division of Europe

could hope to produce homogenous nation-states, and the difficulties were exacerbated by

frequent deviations of boundaries from the optimal ethnic line, as discussed above. In 1919

an estimated 22 million people in Eastern Europe found themselves to be ethnic, religious

and/or linguistic minorities, mostly in the new or expanded nation-states.^"^ Furthermore, as

was recognised by Wilson's critics at the time, the lack of an objective definition of a

"people" meant that the states of Europe could theoretically be divided into smaller units ad

infinitum, undermining the principle of state sovereignty and creating chaos and o r

instability. At the same time, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers were concerned

that the presence of significant ethnic minorities in the new or newly expanded states would

exacerbate tensions between the states and lead to future wars.

The responses of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to the problem of minorities

was driven therefore primarily by the need to put the genie of nationalism back into the

bottle, and only secondarily by the desire to protect the rights of minorities. The Principal

Powers imposed Minorities Treaties upon the new nation-states, the successor states to the

defeated Central Powers, and the Baltic states emerging from the ruins of the Russian

Empire.

The idea of protection for minorities through international treaties was not new. One of the

earliest such attempts was the Vienna Peace Treaty (1606) between Transylvania and

Austria, which included provisions for the protection of Protestant minorities in Royal

Hungary.^^ One of the most significant precedents for the Minorities Treaties was the

Treaty of Berlin (1878), which obligated the four states emerging from Turkey in Europe

(Serbia, Romania, Montenegro and Bulgaria) to treat their citizens equally regardless of

^^ Macartney, National states and national minorities, 212-213. Joost Herman, "The League of Nations and its Minority Protection Programme in Eastern Europe:

revolutionary, unequalled and underestimated." In The League of Nations 1920-1946: Organization and accomplishments. A retrospective of the first international organization for the establishment of world peace. New York; Geneva: United Nations, 1996, 49. ^^ For example, Theodore S. Woolsey, "Self-administration." journal of international law, Vol 13, 1919, 302-305. See also Binder, "The case for self-determination," 229. ^^ Musgrave, Self determination and national minorities, 37-41.

religion. However, the protection offered to minorities was of limited scope, and the Great

Powers made few efforts to enforce it.^ ^

Nevertheless, the 1919 Minorities Treaties represented a revolutionary and as of yet

unequalled attempt to supervise minority rights.^^ They were also deeply flawed. The

Treaties were formed on an ad hoc basis reflecting first and foremost the desire of the

Principal Allied and Associated Powers to minimise the likelihood of future conflicts, and

only secondarily humanitarian concerns. The Principal Powers were conscious of the

difficulty of integrating minority rights with liberal democracy. Classic liberalism

privileges individual representation and autonomy above all other rights. As national

autonomy is a collective demand, it is often seen as clashing with the basic liberal belief

about the strict political equality of all individual citizens.^^ Furthermore, the legitimacy of

the nation-state was and is particularly vulnerable to the claim of distinct sovereignty of a

"people" that the state is unable or unwilling to represent. The treaties referred to "members

of national minorities" rather than to the "minorities" themselves. This phrasing was

designed to prevent the creation of a "state within a state" and thus avoid undermining the

sovereignty of the state, which was seen as a necessary component of peace and stability in

Europe. ^ ^

The insistence of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on preserving unchallenged

the sovereignty of the state and the rights of the majority, coupled with the emphasis on

individual rights in the French-style constitutions of the new or newly expanded states of

Eastern Europe, were significant limitations on the ability of the treaties to afford minority

protection.^^ The treaties did not confer any right to self-determination, and minorities were

obliged to remain loyal to the states in which they found themselves. In return, they were

guaranteed certain basic rights that in theory would enable them to continue their separate

^^ Fink, Defending the rights of others, 3-65. ^^ Herman, "The League of Nations and its Minority Protection Programme", 49. ^^ Ephraim Nimni, "Introduction: the national cultural autonomy model revisited" In Ephraim Nimni (ed), National cultural autonomy and its contemporary critics. London & New York: Routledge, 2005, 7.

Brietzke, "Self-determination or jurisprudential confusion," 79. ^^ Cornelius Zach, "Der Vlkerbund und der Minderheitenschutz in Rumnien 1920-1939." Siebenbrgische Semesterbltter (herein the SSbll) Vol 5 Nr 1, 1991, 41-42.

cultural and religious development.^^ Most of the rights conferred were civic, political and

religious. Rights of language use and education were secondary.^^

Largely absent were principles of autonomy and of collective rights as communities. Two

regions - Ruthenia and Aland - were granted far-reaching self-autonomy. Autonomy;

however, was a substitute for, not the recognition of, the right to self-determination of the

Ruthenes (who wished to unify with the Ukraine or to form a separate state with the

Ukrainians of Galicia) and the Alanders (who wished to join Sweden). Similar conclusions

can be drawn from two other autonomous regions recognised by the League separately

from the Minorities Treaties: the Free City of Danzig and Memel in Lithuania.^ "^ In several

cases, minorities that were not granted full autonomy were granted limited self-

administration on communal lines. These included the Saxons and Szeklers in

Transylvania.^^ Here again, however, it is difficult to draw a clear principle of collective

rights.^^ Nor were the limited rights guaranteed by the Minorities Treaties established as

universal rights. The Great Powers declined to include universal rights of race and religion

(proposed by the Japanese) because of the implications for the racially segregated United

States and for colonial relations in the British and French Empires.^^

Application of the treaties

The signing of the Minorities Treaties raised high expectations on the part of the minorities

they protected, while generating resentment on the part of the states whose activities they Q O ^ ^

monitored. Their application by the Minorities Committee of the League of Nations

92 Macartney, National states and national minorities, 273-283.

^^ Macartney, National states and national minorities, 280-283. This was made most explicit in League's deliberations over Aland. Hannum, "Rethinking self-

determination", 7-11, Kjell Ake Nordquist, "Autonomy as a conflict-solving mechanism - an overview." In Suksi (ed), Autonomy, 75-77, Patrick Thomberry, "Images of autonomy and individual and collective rights in international instruments on the rights of minorities." In Suksi (ed), Autonomy, 102-103, and Musgrave, Self-determination and national minorities, 26-37. ^^ Macartney, National states and national minorities, 244-247. ^^ Macartney, National states and national minorities, 413-415. ^^ Macartney, National states and national minorities, 219-220, and Musgrave, Self-determination and national minorities, 26-37. ^^ Fink, Defending the rights of others, 274.

satisfied none of the parties. On one hand, the subject states resented the fact that minority

protection was not universal. They viewed appeals to the League as acts of disloyalty by

minorities that wanted a special status within the state and were prepared to attack the state

in the international arena to achieve this. They suspected minorities of operating at the

behest of neighbouring revisionist governments.^^ The failure to introduce universal

minority rights made the treaties particularly hard to justify to the subject states. The failure

of the guarantor states to work concertedly to enforce the treaties was also a significant

factor in undermining their legitimacy. ^ ^^ For their part, the protected minorities resented

the fact that they had not been consulted on the Treaties. They objected to frequent

violations of the Treaties that were ignored by the League, and complained of the

unreasonable demands for "loyalty" made of them by the states. ^ ^^

The bureaucrats of the Minorities Committee were mindful of their duty in pursuing peace

and stability above other goals. Although they attempted to achieve this by fostering the

principles of equality, in practice they were hampered by obstructionism from the

signatory states and the unwillingness of the non-partisan members of the League to expend

energy enforcing the Treaties.^^^ The Great Powers structured the complaints process so as

to exclude as many complaints as possible, allegedly so as to prevent "abuse" of the

system by revisionist states; the result was that it became increasingly difficult for

legitimate complaints to get a hearing.^^^ As a result, only 16 of 950 petitions received by

the League between 1920 and 1939 reached the Council through formal channels.^^^ Where

the League member states did step in, it was rarely motivated by concern for the

minorities. ^ ^^ The misuse of the treaties by irredentist states in the alleged defence of their

^^ Macartney, National states and national minorities, 370-372. Fink, Defending the rights of others, 360.

^^^ Macartney, National states and national minorities, 381-382. ^^ ^ Azcarate, League of Nations and National Minorities, vii-viii, 57-58.

Macartney, National states and national minorities, 375-376. George Cipianu & Gheorghe lancu, "Die Minderheiten im Rumnien der Zwischenkriegzeit und der

Vlkerbund." In Sorin Mitu & Florin Gogltan (ed), Interethnische- und Zivilisationsbeziehungen im Siebenbrgischen Raum: historische Studien, (trans. Edit Szegedi & Ligia Ruscu.) Cluj/Klausenburg/Kolozsvr: Verein der Historiker aus Siebenbrgen und dem Banat, "Babe-Bolyai" Universitt, 1996, 282-283.

Macartney, National states and national minorities, 373. Herman, "The League of Nations and its Minority Protection Programme", 51. Macartney, National states and national minorities, 390-391.

"diasporas" was also of significance. ^ ^^ The ability of the League of Nations to protect

minorities was limited without the co-operation of the governments of the subject states,

which was often hard to gain/^^

However, from 1922 the Minority Section of the League carried out informal, closed door

investigations of some 758 of the minority petitions the League received (the remaining

192 were rejected as matters inappropriate to be brought before the League), and entered

into negotiations with the governments in question over many of them. The Minorities

Section was seen by the signatory states as a neutral, impartial body.^^^ As a resuh, it was

able to negotiate the "correction" of most of the breaches identified by the League.^ ^ ^

However, the League frequently "corrected" breaches by seeking compromises that, while

of benefit to the minorities, were often short of the obligations imposed on the states by the 112

treaties. This reflects the comparative weakness of the Minorities Section, whose only

form of coercion was to threaten to embarrass state governments by beginning formal

procedures in the League Council.^ ^ ^ Furthermore, the 'closed door' nature of the

negotiations, and the failure of the League to enforce the ftill rights outlined in the

Minorities Treaties, undermined the legitimacy of the process in the eyes of the

minorities.^

The petitions to the League varied in nature. Breaches of minority rights by central

governments (that is, acts of terrorism or legislated discrimination) were comparatively

rare. Macartney attributed this to the watchful eye produced by the Treaties system.^^^

However, when they did occur they were difficult to deal with. Far more frequent were

attempts by local authorities to obstruct minority life, either through direct action or covert

108 Fink, Defending the rights of others, 361. Azcarate, League of Nations and National Minorities, 44-45. Herman, "League of Nations and its Minority Protection Programme", 52-54. Azcarate, League of Nations and National Minorities, 66. Macartney, National states and national minorities, 370-371. See also Zach, "Der Vlkerbund und der

Minderheitenschutz in Rumnien 1920-1939", 43. Herman, "League of Nations and its Minority Protection Programme", 53-54. Ognyana Hrissimova, "The League of Nations and the problems of minorities in the Balkans after the end

of the First World War." In The League of Nations 1920-1946, 47-48. Cadile Aylmer Macartney was secretary to the Minorities Committee of the Union from 1928 to 1936.

Macartney, National states and national minorities, 392.

discrimination. ^ ^^ Often, the role of discriminating majority and marginalised minority was

a direct reversal of the power structures before the War, and an element of revenge was

present in many cases/^^

A great many petitions to the League were generated by complaints over agrarian reforms,

which minorities frequently interpreted as ethnically motivated. In the most cases, the

League refused to recognise these, seeing them as class issues and therefore out of their

jurisdiction.^^^ This was criticised by Macartney, who considered that the processes of

expropriation, redistribution and compensation were often managed in an uneven fashion

that discriminated against minorities.^^^

However, the most frequent complaints regarded the right of use of mother tongue,

especially in regards to cultural organisations such as Churches and schools.^^^ Azcarate

considered the rights of private schools to be highly contentious. Certainly, it was easy for

governments to misuse their power of oversight over the education system to obstruct

minority education, especially as only language rights and not the contents of curricula

were protected by the treaties. It was possible, however, for minorities to misrepresent

almost any education policy they disliked as nationally motivated maltreatment. The 10 1 League often found its ability to act in these matters to be limited. Language rights in

public schools were by comparison less contentious because most minorities preferred to 122

maintain their own private schools, with greater opportunities for minority control.

Breaches of minorities' linguistic rights in administrative matters generated fewer petitions,

but mainly because language rights were only protected with regards to the courts, and not

in other arms of the bureaucracy. ^ ^^ Particularly problematic was the legislated deman