mining and corporate social responsibility: bhp billiton
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9B12M021
MINING AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: BHP BILLITON AND THE TINTAYA DIALOGUE1
David Wesley wrote this case under the supervision of Sheila Puffer solely to provide material for class discussion. The authors do not intend to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a managerial situation. The authors may have disguised certain names and other identifying information to protect confidentiality. Richard Ivey School of Business Foundation is the exclusive representative of the copyright holder and prohibits any form of reproduction, storage or transmission without its written permission. Reproduction of this material is not covered under authorization by any reproduction rights organization. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, contact Ivey Publishing, Richard Ivey School of Business Foundation, c/o Richard Ivey School of Business, The University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada, N6A 3K7; phone (519) 661-3208; fax (519) 661-3882; e-mail [email protected]. Copyright © 2012, Northeastern University, College of Business Administration Version: 2012-02-28
Lucio Rios, deputy manager of the BHP Billiton Tintaya mine, had long viewed non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as foreign agitators who were determined to undermine Peru’s economic development. They organized protests, filed lawsuits and convinced Peru’s uneducated rural residents that mining was making them sick, destroying their land and making them poorer. In 2000, mining protests intensified after Newmont Mining Corporation spilled 151 kilograms of mercury in the town of Choropampa, causing more than 1,000 people to become gravely ill. The spill also focused international attention on alleged abuses by mining companies throughout the country. In late 2000, activists turned their attention to the massive Tintaya Copper Mine, located in the highlands of southern Peru. They presented a list of grievances to Oxfam’s mining ombudsman2 in Australia, including: land sale negotiations and land expropriations that were “conducted unfairly, with inadequate
compensation and a lack of informed consent” “forced evictions and violence by mine security” the loss of “traditional means of livelihoods” water and air contamination that “caused the death or illness” of animals and “poor health” a “lack of employment or business opportunities provided by the mine” the proposed “construction of a new tailings dam.” 3 When Oxfam forwarded these concerns to BHP Billiton for comment, the company denied any wrongdoing. The alleged eviction of local residents “was in fact the relocation of people squatting on BHP
1 This case has been written on the basis of published sources only. Consequently, the interpretation and perspectives presented are not necessarily those of BHP Billiton or any of its employees. 2 Founded in the United Kingdom in 1942, Oxfam was an international confederation of 14 organizations in 99 countries that sought to find lasting solutions to poverty and injustice. See http://www.oxfam.org/en/about/, accessed January 26, 2011. 3 Mining Ombudsman Annual Report 2003, Oxfam Australia.
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land,” the alleged pollution of the water supply was caused by a town “that discharges raw sewage into the river,” and so on.4 Shortly afterward, in a decision unrelated to the events unfolding in Peru, BHP Billiton entered into an agreement with Oxfam to conduct training on sustainability and “the impacts of large-scale infrastructure projects on communities.”5 Executives from the company’s various international business units were selected to participate in the program, which was to be held each year in Orissa, India. Rios was one of the first managers selected to attend. When Rios returned to Peru, he was like a new person. “Everything he did after that was like night and day,” said Paul Warner, a BHP Billiton executive who worked closely with Rios. NGOs were no longer viewed as “agitators, but partners,” and Rios engaged the community in what would become known as the Tintaya Dialogue Table.6 BACKGROUND BHP Billiton7 BHP Billiton, a Melbourne, Australia-based company created in 2001 through the merger of BHP Limited and Billiton Plc, was the world’s largest diversified resources company, with 35,000 employees in 26 countries. It had primary listings on the Australian and London stock exchanges. The company’s main business areas were mining (diamonds, aluminum, coal, copper and various precious metals) and oil and gas exploration and processing. Customers included steelworks, smelters, petroleum refiners, thermal power stations and diamond cutters. BHP Billiton had more than $21 billion in assets and an annual profit of $6.5 billion on $31.8 billion in revenues (see Exhibit 1). In 2004, the company extracted nearly 1 million tons of copper worldwide. The Tintaya Copper Mine The Peruvian government established the Tintaya Copper Mine in 1980 when it expropriated 2,368 hectares of land from indigenous farmers (see Exhibit 2). Over the next two decades, the size of the mine nearly doubled through additional expropriations and land purchases,8 leaving local residents with less than 1 per cent of their original land holdings.9
4 B. Barton, “A Global/Local Approach to Conflict Resolution in the Mining Sector: The Case of the Tintaya Dialogue Table,” Master’s Thesis in Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Boston, 2005. 5 “Working for a Sustainable Future,” BHP Billiton Health Safety Environment and Community Report 2004, http://sustainability.bhpbilliton.com/2004/repository/caseStudies/community26.asp, accessed May 3, 2011. 6 V. Rangan, B. Barton and E. Reffico, “Corporate Responsibility and Community Engagement at the Tintaya Copper Mine (A),” Harvard Business School Publishing, May 20, 2008. 7 Background on BHP Billiton is summarized from “About Us,” BHP Billiton Health Safety Environment and Community Report 2004, http://sustainability.bhpbilliton.com/2004/repository/aboutReport/aboutUs.asp, accessed May 3, 2011. 8 “Dialogue Table Meetings Provide a Forum for Resolving Community Issues at Tintaya,” http://sustainability.bhpbilliton.com/2004/repository/caseStudies/community25.asp, accessed January 26, 2011. 9 Rangan, Barton and Reffico, “Corporate Responsibility and Community Engagement. . . (A).”
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In 1994, the government sold the mine to Arizona-based Magma Copper Company for $214 million as part of a World Bank-supported effort to stabilize the country’s finances.10 Two years later, Magma sold it to BHP Billiton.11 By the late 1990s, the Tintaya mine extracted 85 million tons of ore and produced approximately 120,000 tons of copper annually. In 2005, the mine generated revenues of $389 million, resulting in net earnings of $196 million.12 The Peruvian Mining Sector Peru enjoyed one of the fastest growing economies in Latin America, consistently outpacing neighboring countries with average annual growth of between 5 and 10 per cent. Much of the growth was driven by a surge in demand for Peru’s vast natural resources from commodity-hungry countries such as China and India. A U.S. Geological Survey report identified Peru as Latin America’s leading producer of gold, zinc, lead and tin (see Exhibit 3). It was also a major exporter of oil and other minerals. In 2007, mining accounted for 62 per cent of the country’s $24 billion in total export revenue.13 Peru’s mineral wealth helped reduce the overall poverty rate by half to approximately 34 per cent of the total population. However, for the most part, the economic benefits from exports remained confined to major cities. Rural regions, where most mining was undertaken, saw only modest benefits. Moreover, “government corruption, unequal redistribution of revenues, mismanagement of funds and a general lack of governing capacity” hampered social progress and left Peru overly susceptible to commodity price fluctuations.14 Peru also suffered from some of world’s worst environmental damage, ranging from toxic emissions from copper smelters that often exceeded the total emissions of many developed countries15 to the dumping of tons of elemental mercury into streams and rivers.16 Corporate Community Leadership In 2002, BHP Billiton became the first company to join Oxfam’s Corporate Community Leadership Program (CCLP) in Orissa, India. Deanna Kemp, a facilitator for Oxfam Community Aid Abroad (CAA)17 described the genesis of the CCLP as follows:
For Oxfam CAA, conducting the CCLP is part of an explicit agenda to achieve change within the resources industry more broadly. The organization has campaigned against BHP in the past, so collaboration was not necessarily a “natural” fit for either
10 “Magma Copper Company Announces Final Purchase of Tintaya,” Business Wire, November 30, 1994, http://www.allbusiness.com/company-activities-management/company-structures-ownership/7077984-1.html, accessed January 26, 2011. 11 BHP Billiton, the world’s largest diversified natural resources company, posted 2009 profits of $10.7 billion on revenues of $50.2 billion. “BHP Billiton Is The World's Largest Diversified Natural Resources Company, About Us,” http://www.bhpbilliton.com/bb/aboutUs/companyOverview/ourProfile.jsp, accessed January 26, 2011. 12 Xstrata Capital Corporation, http://www.xstrata.com/assets/pdf/x_convertible_bond_20061012.en.pdf, accessed June 22, 2011. 13 A. Gurmendi, “The Mineral Industry of Peru,” 2007 Minerals Yearbook, U.S. Geological Survey, United States Department of the Interior, Washington, DC, May 2010. 14 T. Johnson, “Peru’s Mineral Wealth and Woes,” The Council on Foreign Relations, February 10, 2010, http://www.cfr.org/peru/peru’s-mineral-wealth-woes/p21408, accessed February 27, 2012. 15 S. Carn, A. Krueger, N. Krotkov, K. Yang, and P. Levelt, “Sulfur Dioxide Emissions from Peruvian Copper Smelters Detected by the Ozone Monitoring Instrument,” Geophysical Research Letters 34, 2007, L09801. 16 Johnson, “Peru’s Mineral Wealth and Woes.” 17 Oxfam CAA was an “Australian, independent, not-for-profit, secular, community-based aid and development organization” affiliated with Oxfam International. CAA had operations in 31 countries. See http://www.cafaustralia.org.au/oxfam.php, accessed June 20, 2011.
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organization. The two had been adversaries on high profile issues, such as Ok Tedi,18 rather than collaborators. However, Oxfam believed that BHP Billiton, as one of the world’s largest resource companies, could provide an avenue for achieving broader industry change . . . The program was conducted over a two-week period, under the guidance of Oxfam CAA facilitators and an educator from the University of Queensland. The focus of the program was on a participatory and rights-based approach to development. In educational terms the CCLP is an exposure program, designed to sensitize participants and enhance awareness to community issues relevant to the resources industry. The program had three key components: 1) field exposures; 2) de-briefing sessions; and 3) input sessions. The CCLP relied on Oxfam’s extensive web of local knowledge in India to gain access to local people and organizations for the field exposures. During the exposures, BHP Billiton participants interacted with people’s organizations and community-based organizations to hear local “stories” and see firsthand how development, from large-scale infrastructure through to small-scale projects, impact on rights and livelihoods — both positively and negatively. Structured de-briefing sessions allowed participants to share their experiences and learnings, while input sessions covered key theoretical frameworks of community development in order to provide a deeper understanding of development issues.19
Managers who attended the course were “exposed to best practice examples of community development, effective community dialogue methodologies and the negative impact that poorly managed minerals operations can have on impoverished communities.” According to BHP Billiton, “participants achieved a greater appreciation of the community development process, including: the importance of earning respect and building relationships with community members to allow robust
dialogue to occur prior to implementation of programs the need to understand local issues from the local source rather than through a third party’s
interpretation of those issues the time it takes for a community to reach consensus about a preferred community development
strategy the need to involve people with expertise in community development techniques and methodologies if
the program is to be sustainable.”20 One of the company’s first CCLP participants was Lucio Rios, deputy manager of the Tintaya mine. Rios was a mining engineer with more than 30 years of experience in mining operations, planning and administration. In 1993, he completed the Advanced Management Program at the Universidad de Piura, an elite Catholic university.
18 “Ok Tedi Mining Limited (OTML) [was] a large-scale, cost-competitive producer of copper concentrate in Papua New Guinea,” Ok Tedi Mining: Quick Facts, http://www.oktedi.com/, accessed June 20, 2011. In the 1990s, the mine was implicated in river discharges that caused major environmental damage. See B. Burton, “BHP Admits Ok Tedi Mine is Environmental Disaster,” Asia Times, August 13, 1999, http://www.atimes.com/oceania/AH13Ah01.html, accessed June 20, 2011. 19 D. Kemp, “Discovering Participatory Development through Corporate-NGO Collaboration: A Mining Industry Case Study,” Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining, University of Queensland, June 3, 2003, http://www.csrm.uq.edu.au/docs/Paper2DKemp.pdf Accessed June 20, 2011. 20 BHP Billiton HSEC Summary Report 2004, http://www.bhpbilliton.com/bbContentRepository/Reports/bhpb_summary_hsec_report_04.pdf, accessed January 26, 2011.
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In his 12 years at BHP Billiton, Rios specialized in security, community relations, environmental remediation and sustainable development. In addition, he had recently served as president of the Institute for Mine Security (ISEM) and was a member of the Committee for Industrial Security (SNMPE). He also served as an adjunct faculty member at Peru’s Graduate School of Business Administration, where he taught courses in mining business and administration.21 Those who knew Rios said that the CCLP experience transformed him. “That trip was extraordinary,” said one participant, who continued:
We saw poor communities. How poor! We were on the other side of the road, we put ourselves in the communities’ shoes, we lived in tents, and there was a lack of water to wash ourselves.22
The Tintaya Dialogue Table Upon his return to Peru, Rios and several other BHP Billiton executives worked with NGOs to develop what became known as the Tintaya Dialogue Table. “The dialogue table set up four commissions to resolve specific problems: land, human rights, environment and sustainable development. On December 21, 2004, after nearly three years of talks, the communities and the company signed an agreement in which the company committed to give the communities land equivalent to the amount of territory that was expropriated by the state and acquired by BHP Billiton, as well as an additional 25 to 50 per cent more land, depending on the quality.”23 In addition, the company would provide “technical assistance for land use (for example, training in animal health and provision of tools),” a community development fund and a commitment “to advance solutions with regard to human rights issues, and environmental and social problems.”24 Although the Tintaya Dialogue only covered the concerns of residents who had been displaced by the original expropriation, the company developed a “framework agreement” with local government officials and approximately 30 development agencies to promote poverty alleviation and rural development for the wider community. For his role in facilitating the agreement, Rios was awarded the BHP Billiton community merit award by Sir Ninian Stephen, former Governor General of Australia.25 The success of the Tintaya Dialogue Table depended largely on the exclusion of the Peruvian government, which had a reputation for corruption dating back to the colonial period.26 Rural Peruvians not only blamed 21 Conference on Management of Community Relations and Socio-environmental Conflicts, Society for Mining, Exploration, and Metallurgy, March 30, 2011, http://www.bsgrupo.com/Dos.aspx?id=336&idp=Gestion_de_Relaciones_Comunitarias_Y_Gestion_de_los_Conflictos_Socio_Ambientales_%28Modalidad_On_Line%29#, accessed June 20, 2011. 22 L.A. Camacho, and F. Lossio, “La Mesa de Dialogo de la Provincia de Espinar: Solucionando conflictos entre sociedad civil local y empresa minera sin presencia del Estado,” Pontificia Universidad Catolica (Peru), Lima, 2005; cited in L.M. Jimenez, “Community Right to Participate in Mining Policies with Reference to Tintaya and Rio Blanco Mining Conflicts in Peru,” Masters Thesis, Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus University, 2008. 23 Andres Mego, Experiences with Dialogue, Latinamerican Press, February 3, 2005, http://www.lapress.org/articles.asp?art=4115, accessed January 26, 2011. 24 Lisa Vettori, Shanta Martin and Sara Bice, “Mining Ombudsman Case Updates 2005,” Oxfam Australia, August 2006, http://www.oxfam.org.au/resources/filestore/originals/OAus-MiningOmbudsmanCaseUpdate-0806.pdf, accessed March 2, 2011. 25 The award included a $1,500 gift toward a charity of his choice. BHP Billiton Health Safety Environment and Community Report 2004, http://sustainability.bhpbilliton.com/2004/repository/recognition/employeeHSECAwards.asp, accessed March 2, 2011. 26 C. Vizcarra, “Corrupt Circles: A History of Unbound Graft in Peru,” Journal of Economic History 70, November 22, 2010, 1008–09.
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the central government for expropriating their land but also for systematically neglecting to invest in rural communities. “We worked on issues such as land, sustainable development and the environment, issues that are not in the laws or part of the state’s policies,” explained Miguel Palacin of the National Coordinating Committee of Communities Affected by Mining (CONACAMI), a local NGO that participated in the dialogue.27 Although neither side expected the agreement to resolve every community grievance, many viewed BHP Billiton’s actions as the most progressive of any mining company in Peru. Under the agreement, BHP Billiton agreed to contribute 3.75 per cent of its after tax mining earnings to a community development fund. In its first ten months, “the Fund approved 178 [community development] projects — worth a total of $42.7 million.”28 However, many nearby residents who had not been forcibly relocated, and therefore were excluded from the BHP Billiton compensation agreement, remained frustrated “by the failure of the National Government to follow through its promises to build a hospital in the Province and to construct a much-anticipated road.”29 In May 2005, approximately 500 rural residents manifested their anger over the lack of progress by storming the Tintaya mine, setting fire to administrative offices and forcing managers to evacuate by helicopter. Rios hoped that the situation could be resolved “without serious consequences,” but the situation on the ground proved highly volatile. “We don’t know exactly what’s happening,” he said at the time. “We can’t get in; the situation is chaotic.”30 Shortly afterward, community members who had participated in the Tintaya Dialogue Table arrived at the mine to demonstrate their support for the company. The company also “received expressions of support from a broad range of parties, including the local and international NGOs who have been either directly involved in, or have been observing, the dialogue process.”31 Media coverage further “vindicated the mine and increased popular support for the company at both the national and local level.”32 A favorable editorial appeared in the country’s main newspaper and “was signed by 51 prominent individuals from Peruvian civil society, government and industry,” as well as Oxfam International.33 The outpouring of support convinced protesters to end their occupation of the mine. In a goodwill gesture, the mine agreed to allocate development funds to construct a new hospital and convinced the Peruvian government to assume ongoing operating costs.
27 Ibid. 28 “Contributing to Poverty Relief in Rural Peru,” BHP Billiton, 2009, http://www.bhpbilliton.com/bb/sustainableDevelopment/caseStudies/2009/contributingToPovertyReliefInRuralPeru.jsp, accessed March 2, 2011. 29 Vettori, Martin, and Bice, “Mining Ombudsman Case Updates 2005.” 30 “Peru’s Tintaya in ‘Chaos’ After Break-in,” Reuters, May 24, 2005, http://www.minesandcommunities.org/article.php?a=4802, accessed March 2, 2011. 31 “Tintaya Committed to Restoring Dialogue,” Community Case Studies, BHP Billiton, 2005, http://hsecreport.bhpbilliton.com/2005/docs/repository/caseStudies/CaseStudies25.pdf, accessed May 3, 2011 32 V. Rangan, B. Barton and E. Reffico, “Corporate Responsibility and Community Engagement at the Tintaya Copper Mine (B),” Harvard Business School Publishing, May 20, 2008. 33 Ibid.
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Exhibit 1
SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION FOR THE BHP BILLITON GROUP US$MILLION (Year ending 30 June 2005)
2004/05 2003/04 2002/03 2001/02Turnover 1 31,804 24,943 17,506 15,228EBIT 1 2 3 9,330 5,488 3,481 3,102Earnings before tax 1 2 8,909 4,986 2,944 2,866Attributable profit 1 2 6,512 3,510 1,920 1,866Net operating assets 1 29 581 20,656 20,711 20,160Taxation paid (net of refunds) 1,695 1,337 1,002 515Government royalties paid or payable 629 421 352 294Dividends paid or payable 1,695 1,617 900 784R&D expenditure 33 19 40 30EBITDA to interest cover (times) 1 2 3 4 34.7 21.1 13.3 11.2Debt to equity or gearing ratio 5 35.7% 25.7% 31.7% 35.0%Profit and loss account at end of year 6 13,798 10,461 8,580 7,475
1. From continuing operations, including the group's share of joint ventures and associates. 2. Excluding exceptional items. 3. EBIT is earnings before interest and tax. EBITDA is EBIT before depreciation, impairments and amortization of both
group companies and joint ventures and associates. 4. For this purpose, net interest includes capitalized interest and excludes the effect of discounting on provisions and
exchange differences arising from net debt. 5. Gearing as at June 30, 2002 includes the group's steel business which was demerged in July 2002. 6. Movement in retained earnings is represented by movement in cumulative profit and loss accounts.
Source: BHP Billiton, Sustainability Report 2005, http://sustainability.bhpbilliton.com/2005/repository/socioEconomic/ourPerformance/economicContributions.asp, accessed June 22, 2011.
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Exhibit 2
AERIAL PHOTOGRAPH OF THE TINTAYA COPPER MINE
Photo by Juan C. Vasquez, used with permission.
1 km
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Exhibit 3
PERU: RESERVES OF MAJOR MINERALS IN 2005
(Thousand metric tons unless otherwise specified)1
Commodity Reserves Coal, all types 1,100,000 Copper 57,900 Gold metric tons 3,000 2
Iron ore 861,000 Lead 5,200 Molybdenum 450 e Natural gas billion cubic meters 250 Petroleum crude million barrels 900 Phosphate Rock 820 Salt 100,000 e Silver metric tons 43,800 Sulfur 150,000 e Tin 700 Uranium 100 3
Zinc 18,200
e Estimated; estimated data are rounded to no more than three significant digits; may not add to totals shown.
1 2005 and 2006 "Anuario de la Minería del Perú" Ministerio de Energía y Minas except for natural gas and petroleum crude; U.S. Geological Survey's Mineral Commodity Summaries 2006; U.S. Energy Information Administration 2006. 2 Excludes metal in placer deposits. 3 Recoverable at prices of $100 or less per kilogram of uranium.
Source: U.S. Geological Survey, Department of the Interior, http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/2005/pemyb05.xls, accessed June 22, 2011.
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