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Collective Action and Rational Choice: Place, Community, and the Limits to Individual Self-InterestAuthor(s): Byron MillerSource: Economic Geography, Vol. 68, No. 1, Rational Choice, Collective Action, TechnologicalLearning (Jan., 1992), pp. 22-42Published by: Clark UniversityStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/144039

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Collective Action and Rational Choice: Place, Community,and the Limits to Individual Self-Interest*

BYRON MILLER

Department of Geography, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN 55455

Abstract: Despite geographers' increasing concern with place-based politics,the effects of place-based social relations on collective political action remainlargely untheorized. By emphasizing the free rider problem-why a rational,self-interested individual would engage in collective action when his/her impactis negligible and the benefits of collective action are public and* ree-rationalchoice theory correctly problematizes collective action. Its reliance on theessentialist homo economicus model of human nature, however, often leads to

untenable solutions that do not consider nonstrategic forms of rationality,collective identity formation, and the crucial effects of place-specific socialrelations. Habermas's TheTheory of CommunicativeAction, in contrast, providesa broader conception of rationality that recognizes communicative as well asstrategic and instrumental forms of rationality and focuses on social interactionrather than on isolated individuals. Individuals reach common understandings,form communal bonds, and construct collective identities through communica-tive action. The relative importance of communicative versus strategic forms ofaction coordination varies geographically and historically and cannot beunderstood apart from systemic processes. As communicative forms of actioncoordination (based on communicative rationality)are "colonized" by systemicforms of action coordination(based on strategic and instrumental rationality)and

destabilized by capital hypermobility, communal bonds break down. Placesbecome less significantas bases for community and more significant in corporatelocation and investment decisions. These processes, however, engenderresistance. Strong place-based communities mobilize when threatened and newforms of collective identity arise through channels created by time-spacecompression.

Key words: capital hypermobility, collective action, collective identity,communicative rationality, community, politics, Habermas, lifeworld coloniza-tion, place, rational choice theory, strategic rationality.

In recent years, geographers' concernswith economic restructuring have ex-panded to include related issues ofcollective action. Hudson and Sadler(1986), Harvey (1987), Cox and Mair(1988), and Leitner (1990) have examinedrelationships between economic restruc-

* I would like to thank Bruce Baum, StuartCorbridge, Helga Leitner, Roger Miller, EricSheppard, and an anonymous reviewer for

helpful comments on an earlier draft of thispaper. I am, of course, responsible for anyerrors and shortcomings.

turing and local political behavior. Theirwork has stressed the importance of

place-defined interests as well as the

broader economic and social restructuring

processes shaping political behavior. The

role of place-specific relations in the

development of class and territorial soli-

darity has also been a principal concern of

many geographers (e.g., Cox 1989; Cox

and Mair 1988; Harvey 1987; Hudson and

Sadler 1986; Walker 1985). Still others

(Gaston and Kennedy 1987; Savage 1987;

22



COLLECTIVE ACTION 23

Thrift 1983; Thrift and Williams 1987)

have illustrated how everyday place-basedsocial practices shape the consciousnessand identities upon which collective ac-tion is based. All of these authors demon-

strate a sensitivity to the relationshipbetween local and global processes, therecursive relationship between structureand agency, and the crucial roles thatplace and community play in collectiveaction. As Harvey (1987, 281) argues, "aglobal strategy of resistance and transfor-mation has to begin with the realities of

place and community."Nonetheless, the effects of place and

community on the origins and dynamics ofcollective action remain, in large part,untheorized. The existing geographicalliterature focuses primarily on the forma-tion of class and territorial alliances inmovements resisting or adapting to eco-nomic restructuring;that collective actionwill occur at all is simply assumed. Given

the tremendous geographic and temporalvariability in collective action, this as-sumption is untenable.

The problematic nature of collectiveaction has been explicitly recognized inseveral disciplines other than geography.In the past decade, sociology, anthropol-ogy, political science, and history havedeveloped substantial literatures attempt-ing to explain various forms of collectiveaction: voting behavior, protest behavior,state formation, the growth of organiza-tions, even altruism. These literaturesrely heavily on rational choice theory,

which was imported from economicsduring the 1980s.'

The tenets of rational choice theoryare not unfamiliar to geographers. Thoseworking within the spatial science tradi-

tion, and many economic geographers in

1 Adherence to rational choice theory is notrestricted to positivist scholars trained inneoclassical economics. Indeed, some of themost eloquent proponents of rational choicetheory in sociology and political science areMarxist scholars such as Roemer, Elster,Przeworski, and Wright. For a detailed discus-sion, see Barnes and Sheppard (1992).

particular, have long accepted rationalchoice theory's epistemology of method-ological individualism and its homo eco-nomicus model of human nature. Muchlike the spatial science tradition in

geography, rational choice theory positsstrategically rational actors. On this basis,it seeks "to construct a more generalaccount of human behavior in which theconcept of rationality will have a privi-leged but not exclusive role" (Elster1986, 21).

Yet geographers have been slow toembrace rational choice accounts ofcollective action. This may, in large part,stem from a fundamental incompatibilitybetween certain forms of rational choicetheory and the lessons of the pastdecade's geographical debates. The no-tion that (1) a general account of humanbehavior can be constructed rooted in (2)the strategic rationality of (3) individualactors contradicts many of the centralinsights of the structure-agency, realism,and postmodernism debates. Throughthese debates, geographers have become

wary of "grand" or "totalizing" theory,singular motives for human action, andindividualistic conceptions of humanagency.

Accordingly, many geographers haveadopted a more skeptical stance towardmethodological individualism (see Sayer1984) and the homo economicus accountof human nature (Barnes 1988; 1989;Barnes and Sheppard 1992) upon whichrational choice theory rests. The homo

economicus assumption has come underespecially strong criticism for ignoringthe importance of place, space, andinteraction in shaping human behavior.It should be added that the homoeconomicus model is essentialist in itsexclusive focus on strategic rationality.By allowing for only strategic rationality,it portrays human beings as, in essence,manipulative; even collective action isviewed as advancing the individual's

self-interest.The fact remains that rational choice

theory is one of the few approaches thatseriously and rigorously treat collective



24 ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY

action as problematic. In particular, itaddresses the problem of free ridership:why should rational, self-interested indi-viduals participate in collective actionwhen each individual's impact on large-

scale collective action is negligible andthe benefits of collective action arepublic and free? Geographers have notadequately addressed this question.

This paper focuses on the participationof individuals in collective political ac-tion. As will be made clear below, therational choice account is less thansatisfactory. Still, rational choice theoryrepresents perhaps the best startingpoint for considering the collective actionproblem. Identifying the deficiencies inthe rational choice solution to the freerider problem makes apparent the cru-cial roles of place and community incollective action. A richer theorization ofcollective action, as Harvey enjoins, mustbegin with the realities of place andcommunity.2 A broader conception ofrationality-one that recognizes the pro-cess by which understandingsare reached,

communal bonds formed, and collectiveidentities constructed-is also needed tocorrect for deficiencies of models thatassume pure strategic rationality. Haber-mas's theory of communicative action,with its differentiated conception ofrationality, plays a central role in theretheorization of collective action offeredhere. The dynamics of collective action,of course, cannot be understood apartfrom broader systemic considerations.

Accordingly, the final sections of thispaper focus on the political economy ofidentity construction and the role ofplace in political movements resistingshifts from communicative to strategicforms of rationality.

2 This argument supports Giddens's (1984)and Soja's (1989) position that space and timeare integral to the constitution of socialprocesses. Sayer's (1984) relegation of geogra-phy to a nontheoretical realm of the concreteand contingent is, accordingly, rejected.

Rational Choice Theory and theFree Rider Problem

Significant variations exist within ra-tional choice theory.3 A principal distinc-

tion is between "strong" and "weak"rational choice approaches. The strongform views social and institutional con-straints as products of rational action andthemselves amenable to rational choiceanalysis. While it is assumed that all socialand institutional constraints can be sub-sumed within the analytical framework,few have offered explanations of suchconstraints. The weak form takes socialand institutional constraints as a given

framework within which rational actorsmaximize benefits or minimize costs.Constraints may be viewed as distinct andnot necessarily analyzable in terms of auniversal strategic rationality.

Olson's The Logic of Collective Action(1965) is perhaps the most celebratedstrong analysis of collective action. Asidefrom considering the effects of smallgroup size, Olson ignores all social andinstitutional constraints on (and enabling

institutions for) collective action. Olsonconsiders only self-interested individualslacking any social or community bond.Given the assumption of isolated, self-interested economic persons, Olson askswhat conditions are necessary for suchpersons to act collectively. Because anindividual has a negligible impact inlarge-scale collective actions, and becausethe benefits obtained in such actions arepublic and cannot be withheld from thosewho do not participate, Olson argues, therational individual will not participate incollective action. The strategicallyrationalindividual will be a free rider. "Unlessthere is coercion or some other specialdevice to make individuals act in theircommon interest, rational, self-interestedindividuals will not act to achieve theircommon or group interest" (Olson 1965,2).

3 Nicolaides (1988) summarizes the tenets ofneoclassical economics and its homo eco-nomicus model of human nature upon whichrationalchoice theory rests.




Olson's work has been severely criti-cized. From a strictly strategic perspec-tive, DeNardo (1985, 54) observes that"the trouble with this definition of rationalbehavior is that a theory based upon it

appears to predict that no one ever votes,and that strikes, protests, and revolutionsnever occur!" Because the individual'sexpected utility of participation in collec-tive action is essentially zero (becausehe/she can obtain all the benefits ofcollective action through free riding), thecosts and benefits of spending a day in thestreets or going to the polls come to thefore, and they are likely to have a negativenet utility.4

It is precisely this discrepancy betweenthe theoretical implications of rationalchoice theory and radically differing em-pirical observations that drives the nowconsiderable debate around rationalchoice theory.

"Strong" internal solutions (involvingno changes in beliefs and preferences) tothe free rider problem have been pro-posed. DeNardo (1985) identifies two

possibilities: (1) individuals could overes-timate the importance of their participa-tion in collective action such that theexpected utility of their actions becomespositive rather than zero; (2) a sense ofgratification and the opportunity to meetpeople can make the utility of participa-

4 Despite these problems, much of therational choice literature adopts Olson's frame-work in which all aspects of human behavior

are taken to be explicable under the homoeconomicus assumption. Popkin's The RationalPeasant (1979) represents an attack on Scott'sThe Moral Economy of the Peasant (1976).Popkin argues that moral considerations areincompatible with rationality and that the onlyacceptable framework for analysis is that ofrational choice. Such positions are not re-stricted to neoclassicists. Roemer's (1988)ostensibly Marxiananalysisof ideology and theRussian revolution strains to fit all dimensionsof consciousness into the strategic-rationalmold. Roemer asserts that Lenin's commit-ment to the redistribution of resources wasderived from strategic rather than moral/normative considerations.

tion positive regardless of the outcome ofthe action. There is, however, littleevidence to support the first solution and,as both Barry (1970) and DeNardo (1985)note, the second solution ignores the

importance of political issues in motivat-ing participation. DeNardo (1985, 56)explains that:

If taken seriously, the revised theoryimplies that socialists will gladly partic-ipate in fascist demonstrations, and viceversa, if the organizers simply providecoffee and doughnuts to the marchers.After all, why not enjoy the selectiveincentives when it is obvious that one

extraperson will not affect the outcomeof the demonstration?

A third internal solution is proposed byTaylor (1987) and Elster (1989) who arguethat the incorporation of time into theprisoner's dilemma game allows for theevolution of "mutual conditional coopera-tion." Actors engage in "selfishly rational"cooperative behavior pledging "I'll coop-erate if and only if you do." Hector (1990,

241), however, argues that repeatedgames yield "precious little in the way ofsolutions to such collective action prob-lems" because of multiple equilibria andthe assumption that players have perfectinformation.

Various "weak" external solutions aresomewhat more plausible. A central au-thority (e.g., the state or a union), mayprovide selective incentives that rewardthose who participate in collective action

and/or punish those who refuse (Olson1965; Elster 1989). This solution, how-ever, appeals to nonrationalchoice mech-anisms in that it presupposes the creationof the central authority.

Another external solution relies on adecentralized community rather than acentral authority. Michael Taylor (1982;1987; 1988) argues that cooperation isconditional and ultimately derives fromrational self-interest; it is most likely to

succeed when relations between peopleare characterized by community. In Tay-lor's scheme, cooperation is a self-interested response to the community's



26 ECONOMIc GEOGRAPHY

positive and negative sanctions-the lat-ter including gossip, ridicule, and sham-ing (M. Taylor 1990).

Other solutions are not based onself-interest. Some are recognized by

rational choice theorists; Przeworski(1985) and Elster (1989), for instance,acknowledge altruism. Elster (1989, 17),in particular,recognizes that "nonrational[normative] motives . .. enter powerfully

into the decision to cooperate." Critics ofrational choice theory such as Sen (1978)and Jencks (1979) discuss the importanceof sympathy, commitment, empathy, andmorality. Nonetheless, rational choicetheorists ultimately downplay unselfishforms of behavior because they makemodeling too complicated. As Przeworski(1985, 386) puts it, "a realistic descriptionof society, in which selfish, altruistic, andideological individuals coexist at any timemay make any deductive analysis next toimpossible." He suggests we discard such"complications"and construct our expla-nations assuming self-interested strategi-cally rational individuals. But Przeworski's

position is unconvincing. The "complica-tions" inherent in a "realistic descriptionof society" may actually be critical tounderstanding many instances of collec-tive action. Indeed, some of the solutionsto the free rider problem proposed byrational choice theorists strongly suggestnonstrategic forms of rationality and col-lective, as well as individual identityconstructions.

Communicative Rationality

In his brief discussion of altruism andpreference change, Przeworski(1985)con-siders Offe and Wiesenthal's (1980) notionof preference change through dialogue"particularly nteresting." Other theorists(M. Taylor 1990; Moore 1966) haveemphasized the role that political entre-preneurs can play in solving collective

action problems by changing preferences,attitudes, and beliefs. These changes maysometimes involve strategic manipulation,but they may also represent the discursive

achievement of new understandings with-out strategic ulterior motives.

Many adherents of rational choicetheory acknowledge and discuss notions ofnonstrategic discourse and non-self-inter-

ested behavior, yet none has systemati-cally integrated such notions into theory.Such concerns, where addressed, areusually relegated to a secondary realm of"nonrational"behavior (e.g., Elster 1989).Drawing on communications-theoreticnotions implicit in the works of Deweyand Arendt, Habermas has provided aformally differentiated conception of ra-tionality that allows for both strategic andnonmanipulative forms of social interac-tion.

In The Theory of Communicative Ac-tion (1984), Habermas identifies twoseparate but interdependent sphereswithin society-the system and the life-world. The "system" is the sphere ofmaterial production and reproduction andentails action oriented toward success-including both strategic and instrumentalaction (Figure 1). Action is considered

strategic when it follows the rules ofrationalchoice and aims at influencing thedecisions of a rational opponent. Action isinstrumental when it follows technicalrules and intervenes in material circum-stances and events.5

The "lifeworld" forms a symbolic spaceof collectively shared background convic-tions within which cultural traditions,social integration, and normative struc-tures (values and institutions) are repro-

duced and transformed through an ongo-ing interpretive process of communicativeaction. Communicative action is distin-guished from communication in general inthat it is oriented toward reaching under-standing (rather than strategic manipula-tion) and is rooted in communicativerationality. Communicative action "em-phasizes the interaction in which two ormore subjects seek to reach an under-standing concerning their shared situa-

tion" (Thompson 1983, 279).

5Such action may include the instrumentaluse of human beings.




ActionOrientation Oriented to Success Oriented to Reaching

Action UnderstandingAction \(system)Situation (lifeworld)

Nonsocial Instrumental action

Social Strategic action Communicativeaction

Figure 1. Types of Action. Based on Habermas (1984).

Communicative rationality is based onthe raising of validity claims between twoor more subjects. These claims have arationally motivating force. "A speakercan rationally motivate a hearer to accepthis . . . [statement] because . . . he canassume the warrant for providing, if need

be, convincing grounds which wouldstand up to the hearer's criticism of thevalidity claim" (Habermas 1984, 406).

Speakers implicitly claim that their state-ments are: (1) true (that the existentialpresuppositions are satisfied); (2) correct(in accord with prevailing norms); and (3)sincere (that the subjective experiencesand intentions of the speaker are as he orshe says).

A prominent theme in Habermas's

work is the central role played bycommunicative action in the reproductionand transformation of cultural traditions,values, collective identities, and social

integration. Communicative action also

permits a collective critique of systemicsocial problems by rational-moral actorsdrawing on the normative structures oftheir lifeworld. Habermas's focus on com-municative action and the distinct logic ofcommunicative rationality, then, repre-

sents a shift away from individualistic andself-interested philosophies of conscious-ness-in which rational choice theory is

grounded-and toward a philosophy ac-

knowledging consensus and the collec-tive/cooperative origins of human action.6

Although Habermas does not specifi-cally develop his work along these lines,his differentiated conception of rationalityprovides an opening for a nonessentialistconception of human reason. His commu-

nicative rationality is always relative tolifeworld normative structures that varygeographically and historically. "Whatcounts in a given case as a reason orground . . . depends of course on thebackground cultural knowledge that theparticipants in communication share as

6 Fraser (1987) and Berger (1991) criticizeHabermas for his seemingly categorical dis-tinction between the lifeworld and the system.The distinction between symbolic reproduc-tion, based on action oriented toward under-standing (in the lifeworld), and materialreproduction, based on action oriented towardsuccess (in the system), may be sound on anabstractlevel, but to consider them as separateconcrete spheres of action is untenable. Frasermakes this point particularly clearly withregard to women's unpaid labor. Berger offersa similar critique regarding virtually all socialinstitutions. Habermas (1991) has clarified hisview in his more recent work, arguing thatcommunicative as well as strategic actions areintertwined in complex ways in both lifeworldand system institutions.



28 ECONOMIcGEOGRAPHY

members of a particular lifeworld" (Hab-ermas 1982, 270).

Explicitly discussing collective will for-mation, Habermas observes that all rela-tively stable social formations rely on

reaching understanding as well as strate-gic manipulation to coordinate action:

[I]nteractions are spread over a contin-uum, bordered on the one side byvalue-oriented and on the other byinterest-based actions. In the one case,an intentional coordination of differentplans of action is achieved on the basisof a value consensus, in the other via abalancing of interests (Habermas 1989,

145).Given this continuum of communica-

tive and strategic action coordination, thequestion is why rational choice theoryhas focused exclusively on strategic ac-tion. One obvious answer is that rationalchoice theorists have simply not con-ceived of nonstrategic, non-self-inter-ested action as representing a differentform of rationality. For rational choicetheorists, it has remained an amorphousand messy "complication." More signifi-cantly, communicative rationality doesnot easily lend itself to decontextualizedanalysis. By positing an essentialist self-interested social atom, rational choicetheory ostensibly provides a frameworkfor analysis that can be applied in allplaces at all times. Communicative ration-ality does not permit such a framework.The lifeworld values that actors draw

upon in communicative action vary geo-graphically and temporally.7 These val-ues, moreover, are drawn upon andshaped in interaction with others. There

7 Acknowledgment of a multiplicity of life-worlds implies a recognition of their geo-graphic and temporal differences. Habermas,curiously, has long avoided the implications ofthe geographic and temporal structuring ofsocial processes. He has done so by unrealisti-cally focusing on "the" system and "the"lifeworld. His more recent work on communi-cative ethics, however, shows a greater sensi-tivity to different lifeworlds and their geo-graphic constitution.

is no social atom; individual actions arealways grounded in dynamic social struc-tures.

Rational choice theory has overlookedthe fact that individuals come to interpret

their social situations in communicativeinteraction with others. Not surprisingly,the theory has been severely criticized forits extremely circumscribed, economistictreatment of collective action (Calhoun1988; Cohen 1985; Eder 1985; Melucci1985). Cohen represents the position ofseveral critics when he argues that theOlson-inspired collective action traditionhas:

thrown the baby out with the bathwa-ter by excluding the analysis of values,norms, ideologies, projects, culture,and identity in other than instrumental[and strategic] terms. . . . [I]t isnecessary to analyze those aspects ofexperience that shape the interpreta-tion of interests, individual and collec-tive, and affect the very capacity ofactors to form groups and mobilize

(Cohen 1985, 688).

The conception of action coordinationfound in rational choice theory is funda-mentally flawed. By ignoring the socialcontext in which identities are formed,values learned, and interests interpreted,rational choice theory excludes whatmany would argue are the necessarypreconditions for overcoming the freerider problem. Habermas's work, on the

other hand, points directly to such consid-erations, while retaining the insights intostrategic action that rational choice theoryprovides. Although those working withinthe rational choice paradigm have over-looked Habermas's work, many scholarsanalyzing collective action (from weakrational choice as well as communitarianand feminist perspectives) have turned tothe concept of "community"to overcomethe free rider dilemma. "Community,"at

least as it is employed by communitarianand many feminist theorists, has strongparallels to Habermas's concept of life-world.




Community, Place, andCollective Action

Two diametrically opposed conceptionsof "community" within the collective

action literature stem from the term'srather ambiguous meaning and its confla-tion with "place." Advocates of "weak"versions of rational choice theory ac-knowledge the existence of communalbonds but view them strictly as a back-drop against which individuals determinetheir self-interests. In the weak rationalchoice scheme, community is composedof strategically rational individuals whoparticipate in collective action becausethey wish to avoid sanctions or receiveincentives from the community. Actorsengage in collective action because it is intheir individual self-interest. In this ap-proach, the free rider problem is solvedby bringing community, culture, andsocial norms in through the back doorwhile the strictly self-interested individ-ual remains intact.

Communitarianand many feminist the-

orists, on the other hand, adopt a conceptof community similar to Habermas's"life-world." They argue that collective, com-munal identities are formed throughcommunication. Common understandingsarrived at consensually provide the basisfor a morally valued way of life and theconstruction of collective identities thattranscend the individual. These moralbonds and collective identities can formbases for collective action. Although both

solutions to the free rider problem areplausible, the weak rational choice ap-proach leaves the formation of communalbonds themselves unexplained.

Closer examination of these two con-ceptions of community reveals two differ-ent mechanisms underlying collectiveaction. The work of Michael Taylorperhaps best exemplifies the approach of"weak" rational choice theorists who lookto notions of place-based community

(Calhoun 1988; Elster 1989; M. Taylor1988; 1990) or place-specific social inter-action (Axelrod 1984; Coleman 1990) toovercome free ridership.

Michael Taylor (1988, 64) argues that"peasant collective action in revolutionsand rebellions [is] based on communityand this is mainly why the large numbersof people involved [have been] able to

overcome the free rider problem." "Pre-existing rural community [makes] it ra-tional for the individual peasant to partic-ipate in revolutionary collective action"(M. Taylor 1988, 77). Taylor definescommunity as a group of people (1) whoshare common beliefs and values, (2)whose relations are direct and multiple,and (3) who practice generalized andbalanced reciprocity among members.Attention to Taylor's analysis, however,reveals that the second and third criteriaare emphasized whereas the first criterionis only nominally considered. Taylor isconcerned with community to the extentthat it provides the conditions necessaryfor conditional cooperation. Community isimportant because it means that "individ-ual behavior can more easily be moni-tored" and because "a strong communityhas at its disposal an array of powerful,

positive and negative social sanctionswhich [are]highly effective in maintainingsocial order" (M. Taylor 1988, 67). Indi-viduals always act strategically and "coop-erate" only for reasons of individualself-interest; they engage in what Elster(1989) terms "selfishly rational coopera-tive behavior." Axelrod (1984, 100) elabo-rates: "The basic idea is that an individualmust not be able to get away withdefecting without the other individuals

being able to retaliate effectively. Theresponse requires that the defecting indi-vidual not be lost in a sea of anonymousothers." "Cooperation," in this scheme,requires repeated interactions with thesame individuals as well as the memory ofboth the identity and actions of thoseindividuals (Coleman 1990).

Taylor also stresses the importance ofthe time-space continuity of community.The effectiveness of social sanctions, the

knowledge that others are engaged inconditional cooperation, and the experi-ence of conditional cooperation itself "allderive from the fact that the participants



30 ECONoMicGEOGRAPHY

in the rebellion are members of apre-existing community and will continueto be members of the same communityafter the rebellion" (M. Taylor 1988, 69).When an actor's ontological security is

inextricablybound to a temporally contin-uous, place-specific community, the sanc-tions and surveillance that foster "selfishlyrational cooperation" become extremelyefficacious.

Community, then, is fundamental toTaylor's solution to the free rider prob-lem. But Tayloruses a very specific notionof community. For him, community is notprimarilya moral set of relations rooted incommunicative understanding but rathera collection of people who interact witheach other in a common territory. Tayloruses the term community to emphasizethat the common occupance of a particularplace influences individuals' strategic ac-tions.

Calhoun (1988) also stresses the impor-tance of community in revolutionarymobilizations. Echoing Taylor in severalrespects, Calhoun sees preexisting com-

munal organization and the powerfulselective incentives it can provide ascrucial to overcoming free ridership; healso emphasizes the importance of inter-action in common communal places. Butsimply concentrating people together inplace so that they can apply sanctions andmonitor one another is not sufficient tobring about collective action. A commonconsciousness must be developed.

As Calhoun observes, Marx and Engels

assumed that class consciousness wouldsimply arise from workers' common pro-ductive activity:

The concentration of workers in facto-ries and large towns and the increasingorganization of the workplace itselfwould help to mold the workers to-gether and provide the social basis fortheir activity. . . . Through everyday

interactions based on their commoninterests, and especially through con-tinuous political activity in oppositionto their exploiters, the workers would

develop a class consciousness (Calhoun1988, 134-35).

This process, however, has clearly notbeen sufficient. Collective consciousness

is not simply a function of materialinterests or social interaction. Calhounargues that a shared social existence israrely sufficient to mobilize revolutionarycollective action. Rather, communalbonds are required. They are not thecommunal bonds rooted in self-interest towhich Taylor appeals, but rather ones inwhich "individuals are committed to thelong-term view of their activity which isimplied by the notion of moral responsi-

bility" (Calhoun 1988, 147). These com-munal bonds, moreover, are not simplyhanded down across generations, but arecontinually produced and reproducedthrough consensus in "practical,everydaysocial activity" (Calhoun 1988, 147).

Calhoun'sconception of the productionof community resembles that of manycommunitarian theorists. Williams (1989)grounds community in communication.Bowles and Gintis (1986, 160-61) argue

that "bonding is constitutive of, ratherthan merely instrumental to, social ac-tion" and that "solidarity and commoninterest come into being only throughconcrete communicative and organiza-tional practices." Communication and theformation of communal bonds are clearlyenhanced by propinquity, though increas-ing accessibility make such place-specificinteractions less critical in modern socie-ties. What is central to community in thecommunitarian account are the bondsformed in communicative interaction,whether within or across places.8

8Community is also based, in part, onaffective/aesthetic bonds that cannot be re-duced to communicative action in the linguis-tic sense. The two, however, are not entirelyunrelated. "If aesthetic experience is incorpo-rated into the context of individual life-histories, if it is utilized to illuminate asituation and to throw light on individuallife-problems-if it at all communicates itsimpulses to a collective form of life . . . itreaches into our cognitive interpretations and




Habermas (1989) and Elster (1989)stress a continuum of forms of actioncoordination may guide collective action.They range from narrowly conceivedself-interest conditioned by selective in-

centives or the imposition of sanctions, tounselfish motivations rooted in moralcommitment and collective identity.Where along this continuum specificcollective actions derive their impetus(and if they occur at all) is determined, inlarge part, by the characteristics of com-munity and place. But the importance ofcommunity and place would be betterunderstood if the terms themselves wereclearly defined. As Agnew (1989) notes,and the above examples illustrate, the useof the two terms is by no means consistentand the concepts are often conflated.

The meaning of community is espe-cially ambiguous. Its two distinct connota-tions are: (1) "amorallyvalued way of life"and (2) "social relations in a discretegeographical setting" (Agnew 1989, 13).Taylor and many "weak" rational choicetheorists emphasize the second connota-

tion while only nominally considering thefirst.Place also has multiple definitions. It is

most commonly thought of in terms of: (1)a sense of place, affective bonds devel-oped toward a territory through living init and (2) locale or "the settings foreveryday routine social interaction pro-vided in a place" (Agnew and Duncan1989, 2).

The source of confusion over the terms

community and place is clear: the seconddefinitions of both terms are, for allpractical purposes, the same. If, however,we recognize two different forms of socialinteraction based on reaching understand-ing and strategic manipulation, as well asthe fact that social relations are consti-tuted in discrete geographical settings andstretched, increasingly, across space, amore sensible distinction between com-munity and place can be made.

normative expectations and transforms thetotality in which these moments are related toeach other" (Habermas 1985, 202).

Community understood in the sense ofa "morally valued way of life" rooted inmutual understanding strongly parallelsHabermas'sconcept of lifeworld. Commu-nity can be place-specific (in the sense of

being constituted in a discrete geographi-cal setting) or geographically extensive(shared by dispersed populations). Sys-tems rooted in strategic manipulation andinstrumental action can also be place-specific-as in the actions of a local stateor the institutions that reproduce a locallabor pool-but often are more geograph-ically extensive and involve flows ofcommodities or the projection of instru-mental power across space.

The notions of community and placeunder this formulation are analyticallydistinct, which is not to deny that strongcommunities are usually rooted in specificplaces. The characteristics of place andcommunity and the manner in which theyare intertwined have clear implications forthe shaping of consciousness, the forma-tion of bonds among individuals, and thepotential for collective action.

Place, Community, and CollectiveIdentity Construction

Numerous geographers and sociologistshave argued that consciousness and iden-tity are constituted in place (Agnew 1989;Giddens 1984; Gregory 1989; Kirby 1989;Pred 1986; Rustin 1987;Thrift 1983; 1985;Thrift and Williams 1987). As Thrift and

Williams (1987, 16) explain:

Particular practices, encapsulating so-cial relations, are generated by institu-tions which provide people with otherpeople to intermix with through thecourse of their lives; home, work,school, shop and so on. These practicesimpart accounts of the world, drawingupon particular institutional stocks ofknowledge in doing so. Since institu-

tions both produce and are producedby social divides like class it followsthat different persons will be consti-tuted differently by them. There is a



32 ECONOMIcGEOGRAPHY

'political economy of [consciousness]development opportunities.'

Such practices are clearly routinized intime and space. Hagerstrand's well

known conceptualization of daily time-space paths can be viewed as a represen-tation of the material structuring ofconsciousness and identity construction inplace. The coupling of time-space pathssets material preconditions. Individualswho come to share domains of particularplaces must necessarily confront themeaning of such interactions. In eachperson's individual biography, "languageis acquired, personality is developed, a

not always articulated or self-understoodideology evolves and consciousness devel-ops" (Pred 1986, 18). When such time-space bundles are relatively stable andcontinuous, communicatively negotiatedunderstandings, meanings, and valuesmay become deeply ingrained;individualsmay come to see commonalities in theirexperience. They may come to considerthemselves members of a community andview themselves in collective terms.'0 As

Rustin (1987, 34) observes, "collectiveidentities are formed through the com-mon occupancy of space.

Community, which implies collectiveidentity, is "not necessarily an additional

good to be valued beyond other selfishinterests, but in many cases a condition ofcontinuous selfhood for [its] members"(Calhoun 1988, 161). The fact that we mayidentify with people other than ourselvesprovides a basis for unselfish forms ofbehavior; we may "incorporate [others']interests into our subjective welfare func-tion, so that their interests become ourown" (Jencks 1979, 54).

Jencks (1979, 54) terms unselfish be-havior toward other members of a socialgroup "communitarian unselfishness." Itinvolves:

identification with a collectivity ratherthan with specific individuals. Thiscollectivity can take virtually any form,but the most common examples inmodern societies are probably thefamily, the work group, the nation-state, and the species. In each case we

redefine our "selfish"interest so that itincludes our subjective understandingof the interests of a larger collectivity ofwhich we are a part. In large complexsocieties we usually identify at leastpartially with more than one suchcollectivity.

Other communitarian theorists such asUnger (1975), Sandel (1982), Balbus(1983), and Charles Taylor (1989) put

"collective attributes at the core of indi-vidual identity, pointing out that the selfmust always be 'situated' and 'encum-bered,' and that many goods, like lan-guage, are irreducibly social"(Mansbridge1990, 20). Feminist theorists especiallyhave stressed the importance of relation-ships, mutuality, and community (Alison

9 I do not deny the increasing significanceofmass communications, which entails a primar-ily one-way, nondialogic flow of informationfrom a producer to receivers in diverse places.With the global reach and homogenizingtendencies of the media, it can no longer beunequivocally asserted that consciousness isconstructed in place. To greater or lesserdegrees, we are all exposed to a commonpopular culture, politics, and coverage of world

events, regardless of place. Nonetheless, placestill plays a crucial role in structuring dailylives and understandings. It is in the context ofdiscrete geographical settings that informationis received, opportunities for genuine dialoguearise, and interpretations are formed. Forfurther discussion see Calhoun (1986), Kirby(1989), Meyrowitz (1989; 1990), Sack (1988;1990), and Thompson (1990).

10The construction of community and com-mon identity cannot be simply "read off'material co-presence; construction of commonidentities is ultimately an interpretive, com-municative process. Path coupling, moreover,cannot be viewed in voluntarist terms. Dailylife paths are often fraughtwith social relations

of domination, in particular the systemicmanipulation of individuals' labor. Nonethe-less, when people are brought together for anyreason, they may come to see the commonalityof their experience. This perception, in turn,may provide the foundations for a commonidentity and sense of community.




1978; Benhabib 1986; Boyte and Evans1984; Gilligan 1981; Gould 1978; Young1986).

Collective identity has been directlylinked to communicative interaction and

the solving of the free rider problem(Calhoun 1988; Dawes et al. 1990; Kanter1972; Mansbridge 1990). Controlling forcommunication among participants,Dawes et al. (1990) conducted a series ofprisoner's dilemma experiments with over1,100 college students. Subjects in groupswere allowed to talk for up to ten minutesabout the dilemma they faced; the deci-sions of those who were allowed tocommunicate were then compared to thedecisions of those who were not. Dawes etal. (1990, 109) found that:

in discussion, people immediately startdiscussing what 'we' should do, andspend a good deal of time and effortpersuading others in their own group tocooperate (or defect!), even in situa-tions where these others' behavior isirrelevant to the speaker's own payoffs.

Cooperative behavior does occur withoutdiscussion and group identity, but, "withno discussion, egoistic motives explaincooperation; with discussion, group iden-tity . . . explains its dramatic increase."The experiments of Dawes and his col-leagues lead to the conclusion that "coop-eration rates can be radically affected byone factor in particular,which is indepen-dent of the consequences for the choosingindividual. That factor is group identity"

(Dawes et al. 1990, 109, 99) 11The construction of collective identi-

ties, then, is a crucial moment in manyforms of collective action. When the self isviewed as fundamentally grounded in acollectivity, collective interest becomesself-interest and the free rider problem

"Regarding "theorists who have beenconcerned with speculating about what leadsto sociality-usually in the form of someindividual incentives for becoming social,"Dawes et al. (1990, 109) "point out that therehave been no findings indicating that humansever were not social."

disappears (Cohen 1985; Jencks 1979;Mansbridge 1990). Questions remain,however, about which collectivities indi-viduals will identify with and what theinterests of those collectivities will be.

Place-based communal bonds haveprovided the basis for solidarity innumerous social movements. MichaelTaylor (1988) and Calhoun (1988) discussthe central role of communal bonds in18th and 19th century revolutionarymovements in France and England.Kornblum (1974) stresses the central roleof working-class community in union andethnic politics in South Chicago. Hudsonand Sadler (1986) discuss working-classcampaigns "grounded in the spatiallydefined routine of everyday life" aimedat keeping open factories and mines inthe workers' own spatially delimitedcommunities and places. Epstein ob-serves that "[t]he labor movement of thethirties and the civil rights movement ofthe early sixties grew out of existingcommunities that became deeply politi-cized in the course of the struggles of

those periods; this gave those move-ments a great deal of resilience" (1990,47). But communally based movementsare not necessarily progressive. The roleof place-based communalbonds in NIMBY(Not In My Back Yard) and antibusingmovements is well established.

Communal ties are generally, thoughnot necessarily, strongest when the op-portunity exists for local interaction.Larger-scale interactions hinder commu-

nication with others as well as obscureothers' actions and experiences. Smaller-scale interactions make the formation ofdense community relations more likely.

Communities have long been consid-ered a normal base for solidarity andcollective action, yet in this centuryplace-based communities have undergonerelative decline as bases for collectiveaction (Agnew 1989; Tilly 1973; Webber1964; Wellman 1979). This decline can be

traced, in large measure, to changes inplace-based social relations-relationsthat cannot be comprehended apart fromthe larger systems in which they are



34 ECONoMicGEOGRAPHY

imbedded.12 Not surprisingly, as thecharacteristics of place-based social rela-tions change, daily life-paths, opportuni-ties for communicative interaction, andthe formation of collective identities also

change, affecting in turn, actors' propen-sity to act collectively.

Lifeworld Colonization, CapitalHypermobility, and the PoliticalEconomy of Collective IdentityConstruction

Disentangling the causes of the declineof collective action rooted in place-based

communities is a difficult task compli-cated, again, by confusion over thenotions of community and place. Giddens(1990, 108), for instance, argues that "[t]heprimacy of place in pre-modern settingshas been largely destroyed by disembed-ding and time-space distanciation."Read-ing further, however, one discovers thathis notion of place actually refers tocommunity.

Somewhat paradoxically, several geog-

raphers argue that place is becomingincreasingly important (Harvey 1989;1990; Swyngedouw 1989; Leitner 1990).Their arguments, however, are concernedwith why the characteristics of place areincreasingly critical to capital accumula-tion; their analyses focus on systemicconsiderations rather than place-basedcommunities. It seems, though, that thedecline of place-based communities asbases for collective action and the increas-

ing significance of places as sites of capitalaccumulation are closely intertwined.

I argue that two distinct but interre-lated processes are leading to the declineof place-based community: colonization of

12I do not argue that all changes incollective action can be traced to systemicprocesses. Variations in the structure ofpolitical opportunities and the ability oforganizations to mobilize resources are alsoimportant. But the observation of a general,century-long decline in collective actionrooted in place-based communities stronglyindicates macrolevel systemic change.

the lifeworld and capital hypermobility.Both derive from the expansionary logic ofcapitalism and represent an increase inthe relative importance of strategic andinstrumental forms of action coordination.

Expansion of systemic forms of rationalityand the destabilization of communicativeinteraction entail a significant change inthe political economy of identity construc-tion. If social interaction is increasinglybased on monetary exchange and statecoercion, if place-based communities be-come increasingly unstable because ofincreasing capital mobility, and if socialcontact becomes increasingly ephemeralas individuals follow the imperatives ofever-accelerating systemic processes, op-portunities are diminished for reachingunderstanding and forming collectiveidentities through communicative pro-cesses.

While all forms of action coordinationmust ultimately be rooted in lifeworld(community) norms and values, theirrelationships are not static. Habermasuses the term "the colonization of the

lifeworld" to describe the expansion ofsystemic forms of rationality into realmspreviously coordinated through communi-cative action. Through the "media" ofmoney and power, the scope of strategicand instrumental rationality expands andmore and more aspects of daily lifebecome commodified and bureaucratized.While Habermas does not view rational-ization processes per se as problematic,systemic steering crises and lifeworld

pathologies can arise when the media ofthe system-money and power-expandbeyond acceptable levels. When commu-nicative rationalityis replaced by systemicrationality, decision making "can nolonger be brought into the intersubjectivecontext of relevance of subjectively mean-ingful action" (Habermas 1987a, 311). Inthe realm of culture, the result can be theloss of meaning; on the personal level, avariety of psychopathologies. Moreover,

the solidarity of members of the lifeworld(or lifeworlds) can be threatened byalienation, anomie, and the unsettling ofcollective identity (Habermas 1987b).




Harvey provides a clear illustration ofthe colonization process in his discussionof the "impoverishment and informaliza-tion" of the lives of the urban poor underflexible accumulation. At the same time

that wage labor is expanding into thehomes of the poor, traditional systems ofmutual aid are increasingly becomingcommodified. "Baby-sitting, laundering,cleaning, fixing up, and odd jobs, whichused to be swapped more as favours arenow bought and sold, sometimes on anentrepreneurialbasis" (Harvey 1987, 273).

Such processes are at least as clear inthe lives of the middle and upper classes.Sack (1988, 646, 660), for instance, docu-ments the ways in which mass producedcommodities have become a primarycultural mechanism for defining "'self'from 'others' and 'we' from 'they."' Themeanings with which they are imbuedthrough advertising are idealizations thatpromise to create a social context. Incertain respects they succeed, but thesemeanings, including the meanings ofplaces they refer to, "are becoming more

generic, more superficial or 'inauthen-tic."' Bourdieu (1977, 188) similarly ar-gues that "symboliccapital"as a marker ofcultivated taste serves to define, withoutwords, the identity of the self. It asks "nomore than complicitous silence." Debord(1983, 68) states the impact of commodifi-cation on communication most strongly:

The abundant commodity stands forthe total breach in the organic develop-ment of social needs. Its mechanicalaccumulation liberates unlimited artifi-ciality, in the face of which living desireis helpless. The cumulative power ofindependent artificiality sows every-where the falsificationof social life.

Social bonds become replaced by depth-less commodified images-spectacles-that unify society while foreclosing genu-ine communication (Debord 1983).

Habermas'sconcept of the colonization

of the lifeworld can be viewed as thedeepening of capitalist commodificationand bureaucratizationin place. It helps to

clarify one of the central processes by

which communities, collective identities,and the communicative processes onwhich they are based are undermined.But because his work is aspatial, Haber-mas overlooks a second process producing

similar effects: capitalism's spatial dynam-ics.

The increasing spatial mobility of capi-tal does not, in itself, represent anexpansion of systemic rationality; capital-ist decision making has always been basedon strategic and instrumental rationality.But changes in the nature of productionprocesses and financing have allowedcapital to relocate more readily. Thisrelocation, in turn, can destabilize ordestroy the lifeworld institutions thatdepend upon capital.'3

Since the breakdown of the Fordistregime of accumulation in the early 1970s,capital has increasingly turned to spatialfixes to counteract declining rates of profit(Harvey 1982; 1989; Swyngedouw 1989).The relative spatial stability of Fordismhas been replaced by accelerated spatialrestructuringas firms search the globe for

places favorable to capital accumulation.Diminished transportation costs, im-proved communications technology, andthe dominance of highly mobile financecapital have facilitated this search.

The hypermobility of capital, however,has not been matched by a hypermobilityof people. As Cox and Mair (1988, 312)argue, people are more locally dependent:

[P]ractices tend to get routinized, andfor very good reasons. Once settled,they not only facilitate realization ofindividual ends, but in addition theycreate a world of predictability andconfidence. There is then resistance tochange, including spatio-temporalchange. Regardless of the precise socialrelationships at issue, therefore, thereis a material basis for people to belocally dependent.

13 Lifeworld institutions, though a commu-nicative realm of symbolic reproduction, de-pend on systemic institutions for their materialreproduction.



36 ECONOMICGEOGRAPHY

As evidenced by the frequent conflation ofthe terms "community" and "place,"communities are often founded upon suchlocally routinized practices. It is notsurprising, then, that communities can be

destroyed by capital hypermobility. Dein-dustrialization, lack of capital investment,and declining governmental funding candestroy many of the institutions of every-day social interaction, produce or accentu-ate conflicts among community members,force people to move elsewhere in searchof a livelihood, and otherwise break downor preclude the formation of collectiveidentities. The increasing spatial fluidityof the economy also forces local states toforge entrepreneurial development strate-gies (Cox and Mair 1988; Leitner 1990),frequently at the expense of working-classand minority communities located withinthem. Local states' accentuated needsimply to maintaina stable economic baseoften raises systemic considerations aboveall others.

The hypermobility of capital and thecolonization of the lifeworld destabilize or

displace lifeworld forms of action coordi-nation rooted in communicative rational-ity. Though the expansion of systemicforms of action coordination need notnecessarily involve spatial restructuring,under post-Fordist accumulation the twoprocesses are tightly intertwined. Castells(1985, 33) speaks to this point when heobserves the ominous implications ofeconomic and technical restructuring pro-cesses "substituting a space of flows,

whose meaning is largely determined bytheir position in a network of exchanges,"for a "space of places."14 The conse-quences could be "the destruction ofhuman experience, therefore of communi-cation, and therefore of society" (Castells1983, 4).

It would, however, be a gross oversim-plification to portray this process asgeographically ubiquitous. In their workon flexible production complexes, Storper

and Scott (1989, 33-34) stress the signifi-

14 Castells's "place" can be equated with theterm 'place-based communities" used here.

cance of geographic differences in therelationship between production systemsand communities. They argue that, inresponse to the demands of productionsystems, a spatial "sorting out" of commu-

nities occurs "according to the differenti-ated social norms, individual characteris-tics, and economic capabilities of variousoccupational groups and social strata."Indifferent ways in different place-basedproduction complexes, "community life. . . takes on a significant logic of its own,and it in turn begins to feed back uponand to re-structure the development ofthe production system." Their argumentcorresponds to that of Piore and Sabel(1984), who identify four types of flexiblespecialization: regional conglomerations,federated enterprises, "solar"firms, andworkshop factories. Of them, regionalconglomerations-specialized industrialdistricts composed of relatively smallenterprises that both compete and coop-erate with each other-actually requirecommunity ties (ethnic, political, and/orreligious) to stabilize wages and working

conditions and ensure production stan-dards. At the other extreme, "solar" irmsand workshop factories-which outwardlyresemble mass production firms-exhibitlittle imbedding in community relationsand tend to be paternalistically organized.The preservation of certain lifeworld(community)forms may be instrumentallyrational for some firms in particular typesof production complexes; indeed, life-world forms may influence industrial

development. But this point should not beoverstated. The significance of communalrelations may be important in someproduction complexes and relatively un-important in others. Moreover, much ofthe discussion of "community" in theflexible production literature refers to a"culture" of firms and other institutionsthat bears no necessary relation to thecommunal bonds among individuals. It isthe communal bonds among individuals

that may provide a basis for overcomingthe free rider problem and lead tocollective political action.

Radical changes in place-based social




relations brought about by the coloniza-

tion of lifeworld institutions and spatialrestructuring have clear implications forthe viability of place-based communitiesand the construction of collective identi-

ties. As Entrikin (1991, 64) observes:

the [modern] attachment to placeseems less an unselfconscious associa-tion of habitual action and local ways oflife, and more a strategy for resisting

the alienation and isolation of modern

life through the self-conscious creationof meaning. Such strategies have beencharacterizedby their inherent individ-

ualism.

Such individualism unavoidably affectscollective action. But the implicationsmay not be as severe as they first appear.The expansion of systemic forms of actioncoordination is met with resistance, andwhile the system rests upon an expansion-ary logic, such expansion is by no meansassured.

Place and Resistance Movements

Place-based communities are increas-

ingly undermined through colonizationand capital hypermobility. Castells's pes-simistic view-of the end of communica-

tion and the end of society-would seem

to imply the elimination of social move-ments rooted in a sense of community.Yet such an extreme scenario is highly

unlikely. While modernity has clearlybrought an expansion of systemic forms of

action coordination, it has also entailed anexpansion of communicative action; many

aspects of daily life that were previouslyunspeakable-such as patriarchal socialrelations and religious doctrine-are now

discussed, questioned, and challenged.Societies do not remain fixed along thecontinuum of value-oriented and interest-

based forms of action coordination. More-

over, colonization processes can never

completely overtake the lifeworld bases of

societies. "Cultural tradition, social inte-gration, and socialization . . . can be-fulfilledonly via the medium of communi-

cative action and not via the steering

media of money and power: meaning canneither be bought nor coerced" (Haber-mas 1991, 259).

Resistance movements frequently arisein response to the colonization and

disruption of social life in particularplaces. Harvey (1990, 18), for instance,asserts that:

the increasing penetration of techno-logical rationality, of commodificationand market values, and capital accumu-lation into social life (or into what manywriters, including Habermas, call 'thelifeworld') together with time-spacecompression, will likely provoke in-

creasing resistances that focus on alter-native constructions of place (under-stood in the broadest sense of thatword). The search for an authenticsense of community and of an authenticrelation to nature among many radicaland ecological movements is the cut-ting edge of exactly such a sensibility.

Strong communities clearly do mobilizeand resist when threatened. Indeed, the

extensive literature on "new social move-ments"-the antinuclear, peace, environ-mental, women's, gay and lesbian, andcivil rights movements-documents theimportance of shared identity, culture,and community in movements aiming topreserve or create new social spaces forgroups threatened by the instrumentaland strategic actions of the system. Suchmovements are widespread and havebeen effective when organizationally

linked.The globalization of the mass media

contains contradictions that may alsoprovide openings for resistance move-ments. While the separation of socialinteraction from discrete places hindersdialogue, it implies a level of globalvisibility never before possible. Globalcommunication and scrutiny may allowindividuals to form empathic bonds, albeitweak ones, with distant others, and even

to act for them (Thompson 1990). Haber-mas (1987b, 197) finds that the "mediapublics hierarchize and at the same timeremove restrictions on the horizon of



38 ECONOMic GEOGRAPHY

possible communication. The one aspectcannot be separated from the other-andtherein lies their ambivalent potential."

But resistance to systemic expansionand restructuring clearly cannot be sepa-

rated from the lives people live in place.Lefebvre (1979, 241) emphasizes that:

[t]he essential spatial contradiction ofsociety is the confrontation betweenabstract space, or the externalization ofeconomic and political practices origi-nating with the capitalist class and thestate, and social space, or the space ofuse values produced by the complexinteraction of all classes in the pursuit

of everyday life.'5Reliance on place-based relations,

nonetheless, has been problematic formovements seeking large-scale socialchange. Local mobilization to addresslocal issues may be highly desirable, butin an increasingly global capitalist system,"community life is not a microcosm of thewhole but a compartment" (Calhoun1988, 172). Large-scale formal organiza-

tions extending beyond the boundaries oflocal communities are needed to addressthe issues of modem capitalist societies.Many radical populist movements havebeen ineffective because they failed tobuild organizations addressing issues atthe appropriate scale. "[W]hen peoplefind themselves unable to control theworld, they simply shrink the world to thesize of their community. Thus, urbanmovements do address the real issues of

our time, although neither on the scalenor terms that are adequate to the task"(Castells 1984, 331). While local commu-nity and collective identity may be helpfulor necessary in mobilizing for collectiveaction, communities need to be linked tolarger-scale organizations that can actstrategically and effectively to achieve

15 Drawing on Lefebvre, Gottdiener (1985,127) observes that, "[i]n modern society,

abstract space-a homogeneous, fragmented,hierarchical space-has come to dominatesocial space, or the integrated space of socialcommunion.

community goals. Such a strategy impliesthe building of nonexclusionary and geo-graphically extensive communities basedin mutual understanding.

An important cautionary note is in

order regarding place-based, identity-oriented collective action. Although suchmovements have often been progressiveand highly effective, they can also bereactionary and exclusionary . (Harvey1989; Young 1990). Harvey (1989, 273)warns that the "links between place andthe social sense of personal and communalidentity . . . [can] entail the aestheticiza-tion of local, regional, or national politics."Nationalist and fascist movements, as wellas NIMBY movements, have traditionallybeen grounded in a place-based sense ofcommunity. Young (1990) is especiallycritical of identity-based community poli-tics, drawing strong parallels between thesocial boundaries of community and theexclusionary practices of racism and sex-ism. Instead of a politics of community,she calls for a politics of difference rootedin the notions ofjustice and respect for all.

Both Harvey and Young would appear tobe calling for what Jencks (1979, 55) terms"moralistic unselfishness [involving] thesubordination of self to . . . principle."They make it clear that while collectiveidentity may be a powerful basis forcollective action, it does not automaticallylead to progressive politics.

Conclusion

In most of the social sciences, collectiveaction has come to be treated as aproblem of rationalchoice. Relying on thehomo economicus assumption, "strong"rational choice theory allows for therigorous modeling of exclusively self-interested individuals who are unaffectedby place-specific social relations. Suchmodels, however, are unpersuasive."Weak"rational choice models have been

developed that incorporate communityand place-specific social relations. Thesemodels, nonetheless, still emphasize stra-tegic rationality and relegate nonstrategic




action to an inexplicable secondary realm

of "nonrationality."

Clearly, not all human action can be

considered rational. Yet we need not fall

into either-or conceptions ofrationalityand nonrationality (or irrationality). Hab-

ermas provides a differentiated concep-

tion of rationality that serves to clarify

much of what has been subsumed under

the rather vague term "community"

Habermas's theory of communicative ac-

tion clarifies the rationality of action

oriented toward understanding. The

grounding of communicative action in

lifeworld values also points toward anonessentialist conception of rationality

sensitive to differences among lifeworlds.

In light of Habermas's work, it seems

that a realistic theory of collective actionwould recognize the unselfish as well as

the selfish motivations of human beings,

communicative as well as strategic ration-

ality, and actors' collective, as well asindividual, identities. Of equal impor-

tance, it would recognize the central roleof place-specific social relations in shapingactors' conceptions of what constitutes

strategicallyrationalbehavior, actors' abil-

ity to reach understandings, and the

construction of collective identities, whichoften prefigure collective action.

But collective action cannot be under-

stood apart from the dynamics of the

system. The colonization of the lifeworld

and capital's search for spatial fixes can

have adverse consequences for collectiveaction. It is perhaps no coincidence that

place-based communities have declined

historically as bases for collective actionwhile the characteristics of places have

become significantly more important in

corporate location and investment deci-sions. Yet by no means have collectiveaction or struggles over social space come

to an end. New social movements, espe-

cially, are defined by attempts to defendor claim new lifeworld spaces.

If, however, we wish to overcome what

Corbridge calls the "distance decay func-

tion of morality,"16we must find ways toseparate the understandings and bonds ofcommunity-which are not necessarilyplace-specific-from the sometimes paro-chial and exclusionary concerns of dis-

crete places. The bonds and concerns ofcommunity, as Jencks shows, need not betotalizing and exclusionary. Indeed, mostof us belong to, and identify with, amultiplicity of communities and collectiv-ities rangingfrom our partners and friendsto, perhaps, the human species. It is thesebonds with distant others-both literallyand metaphorically-that need to bedeveloped and strengthened, while al-ways recognizing and respecting differ-ence. The time-space compression ofmodernity has created new avenues ofcommunication that present new, thoughby no means unproblematic, opportuni-ties for understanding.

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