military safeguards: an outlier case · iv semana de engenharia nuclear - agosto 2014 10 ....
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IV Semana de Engenharia Nuclear 11 e 15 de Agosto de 2014
Engenharia Nuclear da Escola Politécnica da UFRJ
Military Safeguards: An Outlier Case
Orpet Peixoto
ABACC - Brazilian Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material
E-mail : [email protected]
1 IV Semana de Engenharia Nuclear - Agosto 2014
Outline
• Nuclear Safeguards in Brazil
• ABACC System
• Military Safeguards
• Special Cases
• Opportunities
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O Regime De Não-proliferação Nuclear
Proteção
Física
Acordos mundiais,
regionais,
bilaterais
Regimes de
controle das
exportações
Salvaguardas
da
AIEA
Fornecimento
de material,
tecnologia
e equipamentos
Nucleares e duais
Proteção contra
apropiação, roubo
e outras atividades
ilícitas
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Agosto 2014
History
• Import of Nuclear material and installations;
• Agreement type INFCIRC /66
• Specified Equipment
• Indigenous Programs
• International Pressure
• Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements
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Agosto 2014
Argentina and Brazil Facts
Argentina and Brazil are, respectively, the 8th and 5th largest countries by landmass in the world (11.3 million square kilometers);
Population of ~240 million inhabitants;
Two thirds of South America's surface, population and Gross National Product (GNP);
Nuclear program – highest development in Latin America – wide technological fuel cycle
Industrial e technological capacity;
Growing and economical situation;
Tension, conflicts and hegemony.
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Agosto 2014
Historic Facts from Argentina and Brazil
• No real tension between the states;
• The culture of non discriminatory
acceptance;
• The international pressure for peaceful use
guarantees;
• The technical community collaboration;
• How to give the international steps
to demonstrate the peaceful use of
nuclear energy.
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INSTALLATIONS SAFEGUARDED BY
ABACC
• 2 Multipurpose reactors (materials tests and radioisotope)
• Isotopic Separation Laboratories
• Small Power reactor
• Land prototype naval reactor
Type of installation Argentina Brazil Total
Conversion and Fuel Fabrication 8 2 10
U-Enrichment Plants 1 3 4
Power Reactors 3 (*) 3 (*) 6
Research Reactors 6 6 12
Others (R&D, Storage, LOF) 24 11 35
Total 42 25 67
(*) Including one Power Reactor under construction in each country.
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ABACC - Foundation and
Purpose
• Binational organization created in July 1991
with the purpose to manage and apply the
Common System of Accounting and Control of
Nuclear Materials (SCCC), established by the
Federative Republic of Brazil and the Republic
of Argentina.
• Its headquarters are located in Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil. ABACC also has an office in Buenos
Aires, Argentina.
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The Common System of
Accounting and Control of Nuclear
Materials - SCCC
• The Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials is a mechanism created in order to verify if Argentina and Brazil utilize their nuclear materials exclusively for peaceful purposes.
• The SCCC consists of the General Procedures and the Application Manuals for each installation.
– The General Procedures contain the directives of the SCCC.
– The Application Manuals are negotiated between the ABACC and the respective country for each facility.
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The Bilateral Agreement In July 1991, the Bilateral Agreement on the Exclusively
Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy was signed.
• Established the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC)
• Created the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC).
The Basic Undertakings of the bilateral Agreement between Argentina and Brazil are:
To use nuclear materials and facilities exclusively for peaceful purposes.
To prohibit in the respective territories:
The testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means of any nuclear weapon; and
The receipt, storage, installation, deployment or any other form of possession of any nuclear weapon.
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ABACC-IAEA relationship
the Quadripartite Agreement
The Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, the ABACC and the
IAEA for the Application of safeguards, called the Quadripartite Agreement, entered into force in March 1994.
The Basic Undertakings of the Quadripartite Agreement are:
– The acceptance by the State Parties of safeguards on all nuclear materials in all nuclear activities within their territories, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other explosive devices.
– The IAEA, in its verification, shall take due account of the technical effectiveness of the SCCC.
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Organization of the Secretariat
• Commission
– 2 Argentinean members
– 2 Brazilian members
• Secretariat
– Professional Staff (12)
• 6 areas
– Clerical Staff (9)
– Inspectors (around 90)
• Cross inspection system
• Budget - Aproximate 5 Millions US$
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0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
Ins
pe
cto
r d
ays
Inspection Effort
Argentina Brasil Total
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0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
Nu
mb
er
of
ins
pe
cti
on
s
Total of Inspections
Argentina Brasil Total
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Legal Framework - NPT – INFCIRC 153 NON-APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS TO NUCLEAR MATERIAL TO BE USED lN NON-PEACEFUL
ACTIVITIES
14. The Agreement should provide that if the State intends to exercise its discretion to use nuclear material which is
required to be safeguarded thereunder in a nuclear activity which does not require the application of safeguards
under the Agreement, the following procedures will apply:
(a ) The State shall inform the Agency of the activity, making it clear:
(i) That the use of the nuclear material in a non-proscribed military activity will not be in conflict with an
undertaking the State may have given and in respect of which Agency safeguards apply, that the nuclear
material will be used only in a peaceful nuclear activity; and
(ii) That during the period of non-application of safeguards the nuclear material will not be used for the
production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
(b) The Agency and the State shall make an arrangement so that, only while the nuclear material is in sue h an activity,
the safeguards provided for in the Agreement will not be applied. The arrangement shall identify, to the extent
possible, the period or circumstances during which safeguards will not be applied. In any event, the safeguards
provided for in the Agreement shall again apply as soon as the nuclear material is reintroduced into a peaceful
nuclear activity. The Agency shall be kept informed of the total quantity and composition of such unsafeguarded
nuclear material in the State and of any exports of such material; and
(c ) Each arrangement shall be made in agreement with the Agency.
The Agency's agreement shall be given as promptly as possible; it shall only relate to the temporal and procedural
provisions, reporting arrangements, etc., but shall not involve any approval or classified knowledge of the military
activity or relate to the use of the nuclear material therein.
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Legal Framework - Quadripartite – INFCIRC 435 SPECIAL PROCEDURES
Article 13
If a State Party intends to exercise its discretion to use nuclear material which is required to be safeguarded under this
Agreement for nuclear propulsion or operation of any vehicle, including submarines and prototypes, or in such
other non-proscribed nuclear activity as agreed between the State Party and the Agency, the following procedures
shall apply:
(a) that State Party shall inform the Agency, through ABACC, of the activity, and shall make it clear:
(i) that the use of the nuclear material in such an activity will not be in conflict with any undertaking of the State
Party under agreements concluded with the Agency in connection with Article XI of the Statute of the
Agency or any other agreement concluded with the Agency in connection with INFCIRC/26 (and Add.1) or
INFCIRC/66 (and Rev.1 or 2), as applicable; and
(ii) that during the period of application of the special procedures the nuclear material will not be used for the
production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
(b) the State Party and the Agency shall make an arrangement so that, these special procedures shall apply only while
the nuclear material is used for nuclear propulsion or in the operation of any vehicle, including submarines and
prototypes, or in such other non-proscribed nuclear activity as agreed between the State Party and the Agency. The
arrangement shall identify, to the extent possible, the period or circumstances during which the special procedures
shall be applied. In any event, the other procedures provided for in this Agreement shall apply again as soon as the
nuclear material is reintroduced into a nuclear activity other than the above. The Agency shall be kept informed of
the total quantity and composition of such material in that State Party and of any export of such material; and
(c) each arrangement shall be concluded between the State Party concerned and the Agency as promptly as possible
and shall relate only to such matters as temporal and procedural provisions and reporting arrangements, but shall
not involve any approval or classified knowledge of such activity or relate to the use of the nuclear material
therein .
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Military Installations - Nuclear Process Technology
• Nuclear Conversion Facilities
• Uranium enrichment facilities
• Fuel fabrication facilities
• Uranium Isotopic Separative
Laboratories
• Storage Places
• Nuclear Process Technology
• Land Prototype Nuclear Reactor 17 IV Semana de Engenharia Nuclear - Agosto 2014
Previous Cases • Enrichment Plants
– Special Agreements
– High inspection effort
• Nuclear Weapons States – VOAs
• India
• The case !!!
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Boundary conditions
Control of Nuclear Material and
Installation an environment of:
• Nuclear Process technology
– Fuel
– Reactor
• Technological Issues
– Special Engineering Solutions (Nuclear and
Naval)
• Military Strategic Data
– Submarine performance (vehicle & warship)
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Parameters for nuclear material control
• Significant Quatity
– Direct Use Material:
• Pu less than de 80% de Pu238 8 kg of Pu total
• HEU (U e ≥ 20%) 25 kg of U235
– Indirect Use:
• U with e < 20%) 75 kg of U235
Note: Nuclear naval reactors few thousand (2 to 10) tons of U / 100 to 500
kgs of Pu per core
LEU more Pu Production
• MATERIAL “TIMELINESS”
– Direct use (non irradiated) 1 month
– Direct Use (irradiated) 3 months
– Direct use < 1 SQ 1 year
– Indirect Use 1 year
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Concepts • Safeguards implementation for a State is
governed by the rights and obligations of the
ABACC/IAEA and the relevant State contained
in the safeguards agreement;
• Safeguards are the technical means for verifying
compliance by the State with their respective
legally binding undertakings set out in the
relevant safeguards agreements
• IAEA and ABACC apply safeguards effectively
and efficiently
• Technical Guarantees of non diversion
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Safeguarding • Bulk Material
• Fuels
– Shape and design (remain for the rest of fuel
cycle)
– Indirect measures
• Challenging instruments
• Transfers
– Loading and Unloading flasks
– Transfers
– Indirect measures
• Unattended monitoring Systems
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Safeguarding • Reactors
– Fueling load (process – integrated load)
– Access to core x Access to the ship
– Containment and Surveillance?
• Type of containment (seal)
• Frequency of verification
• Long time refueling
• Spent Fuel Storage
– Containment and Surveillance
• Pool storage
• Dry storage
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Safeguarding
• Design Information Verification - DIV
– Access
– Strategic Points
• LEU and HEU fuels
– Timeliness
• Plutonium – guarantee of non reprocessing
• Special Procedures
– Exemption (quantity)
–Special rules 24 IV Semana de Engenharia Nuclear - Agosto 2014
Safeguarding
• Challenges
– Access without disclosing sensitive data
• Protection
• Non proliferation
– Access in a timely manner
– Special safeguards tools to perform verification
• Indirect measurement (attended and unattended)
• Sealing
– Findings achieved in very non deterministic
approach
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Initiatives
• Neither IAEA nor ABACC has experience
• ABACC and IAEA are discussing the initial steps
of the land prototype approach (LABGENE)
• IAEA include the issue on the 2012- 2022
Strategic Planning
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Remarks • Rights and obligations shall be followed;
• Brazilian non proliferation credentials is an
important component to allow discussion of
special procedures and to minimize international
concern;
• ABACC and IAEA shall guarantee that the
nuclear material, while in use at submarines will
not be used for production
of nuclear weapons
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Opportunities at Safeguards and
Regulation Area
• National Authority – 20 to 25 persons;
• Operators – 15 to 20 persons;
• AIEA – 15 to 20 persons;
• Analytical Laboratories – 15 to 20 persons;
• ABACC – 6 to 10 persons;
• Experience is required;
• Technology development;
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NDA and DA
• Inter-comparison of DA results;
– Needs to be re-start;
• Standards for NDA calibration;
• Special systems for enrichment plants;
• Swipe sampling results comparison and
analysis
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Destructive Analysis
UF6 sampling methodology with alumina pellets
ABACC Cristallini Method
• IAEA Qualification - Status
• ASTM Qualification – Project
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Surveillance
• Fast PTI surveillance
system;
• Incorporate:
– Authentication;
– Revision
– Containment tools
• Of the shelf items
Test bench for new or
upgraded systems
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Load cell authentication
32
State of health
33
State of health
34
Mund
35
ABACC Inspectorate • Around 45 professionals per country, coming from the
nuclear area.
• Proposed by the country, and approved by the Commission.
• Temporary relationship with ABACC, only for the time of “inspection mission”.
• The Secretariat selects the inspectors, according to special needs.
• The inspectors of each state party perform inspections at the other country's facilities.
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ABACC’s Inspectors
Background
Chemical Engineering/
Industrial Chemistry
28%
Electrical/ Electronic/
Network Engineering
21%
Physical/ Chemical/
Biochemical/
Mathematical/
Geological Sciences
25%
Mechanical/
Metallurgical/ Civil/
Naval Engineering
22%
Chemical/ Electrical/
Electronical/
Mechanical Technician
4%
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ABACC Inspectorate Number of years in the field
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Technical implementation of ABACC
- Safeguards international
inspectorate must have:
- human resources capacity;
- a set of well developed and
useful equipment;
- a trained and knowledgeable
inspectorate body; and
- a good headquarters support.
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Building Competence
• Safeguards studies – Concepts and approaches
• Non Destructive Assay (NDA) and Destructive Assay (DA)
• Swipe sampling
• Containment and Surveillance (C&S)
• Training
• Data management
• Headquarters support
• Special knowledge – Assessment Groups – analysis and suggestion on safeguards
issues
– Special technical meetings;
– Swipe sampling
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Cooperation on Developing a Spent Fuel Gross Defect Detection System at ATUCHA-I
ABACC/LLNL
Action Sheet 22
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THANK YOU
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