military review february 1982

8/13/2019 Military Review February 1982

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Diary of Confede rate Soldier see page 2 ;


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THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL OF THE U ARMYPublished by

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Military eviewVOLUME LXII FEBRUARY 982 NO 2

CONTENTSPAGE 2 THE US ARMY TRAINING SYSTEM AND THE MODERN BATTLEFIELD

by Lieutenant Colonel Franklin Y Hartline US Army12 CIMIC: A FORCE MULTIPLIER FOR THE COMBAT COMMANDER

by Colonel James R Compton US Army Reserve2 DIARY OF A CONFEDERATE SOLDIER

edited by Larry G Bowman and Jack B Scroggs35 BATTALION OPERATIONS FROM ENCIRCLED POSITIONeby Major Michael R Tarantola US Army

4 CONTROLLING DRUG USE: GUIDELINES FOR THE COMMANDERby Lieutenant Colonel Larry H Ingraham US Army

47 THE FUTURE OF STANDARDIZATION IN NATOby Major Laurence R Sadoff US Army55 NEUTRON WEAPONS: SOLUTION TO A SURPRISE ATTACK?-PART II

by Colonel Dantel Gans US Army Reserve Retired74 REVIEWS the best from other Journals79 LETTERS82 NEWS89 BOOKS contemporary reading for the professional

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ilitaryReview 8 Diamond JubileeThis month, Mz litary Review reaches another milestone. Sixdecades ago, its predecessbr, the Instructors Summary ofMilitaryArticles, began providing instructors of the then General ServiceSchools with abstracts of current military writings appearing inother publications, many of them from foreign countries.Since that time, the magazine has seen world upheaval, economicboom as well as depression, periods of wartime fervor and eras ofpacificism and protest. Mz litary Review has endeavored, throughthe years, to provide an important medium for presentation of cur-rent Army doctrine and to serve as a for.llm for the expression ofinformed opinion, as well as the critical analysis and frank evalua-tion that are so essential for progress.Mz litary Review has gained a reputation as one of the world sforemost military journals and enjoys an audience that reachesinto more than 80 countries. This success did not result whollyfrom the efforts of dedicated past and present staff members, but isdue, in large measure, to the hundreds of innovative and forward-looking authors who felt so strongly about a particular topic thatthey took pen in hand and produced an article for publication. It isonly through this sort of interest that a journal such as MilitaryReview can make a worthwhile contribution to its readership andthe entire military community.Looking to the future, we at Military Review are committed tobuilding upon the past in presenting the latest in military thinking.To do this, we need your help both in articles for publication and incomments about how well we are meeting your needs. Let us hearfrom you.


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,, ,A r t ~ : l e s t atch For:;

Strategic o r t c e p t ~ for th.e1980s: Part IColonel William O Staudenniaier; US rmyThe Battle o the German Frontier

Lieut mant Cotonel Barry R McCaffrey. US rmyS k i n ~ P e n e t r a t i n g Incapacitants:A Credible Deterrent?B L Hadis


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2

The US rInYTraining SysteInand theModern attlefieldLieutenant Colonel Franklin Y Hartline US Army

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TR INING SYSTEM

This article examines the training system used by the US Armyand compares it with those used in several other countriesCapabilities of the US Army s system are evaluated in light ofrequirements of the modern battlefield The author suggeststhat another system for training soldiers might better serve theneeds of this natioll

HY does Private Johnson enlistin Buffalo. New York, receiveseven weeks basic combat training atFort Dix. New Jersey. travel to Fort Benning, Georgia. for advanced individualtraining (AIT) and finally reach his unitat Fort Ord, California? r i ~ a t e Johnsonhas entered the US Army individualtraining system. This system uses training centers to teach military skills to individuals who are then shipped as trainedreplacements to units in the field. This article investigates three questions: Howdid this system evolve? Do other majorarmies conduct individual training thisway? How effective is this approach to individual training in the 1980s?

EVOLUTION O THEMOBILIZATION BASED TRAINING SYSTEM

The current Army training system is arelatively unchanged offspring of WorldWar II. Prior to this war. the Army useda regimental training system. The comparatively miniscule prewar Army used adecentralized system in which eachRegular Army regiment trained its ownrecruits. After processing and receivinggeneral military subjects in a regimentalor battalion recruit detachment. the newsoldier completed training in his unitunder the careful tutelage of his own non

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commissioned officers (NCOs) and officers. I n effect, the regimental or bat-talion commander conducted basic training for his units. and the company commanders directed AlT.World War II mobilization changedthis system forever. at least in the USArmy. Although attempts were made toretain unit-based training by formingunits around cadre. the massive imbalance between the prewar and draftforces seemed to require the use of Armytraining centers. The establishment ofmany current Army posts. of course.dates from this period.

The first training centers were estab-lished by branch. Draftees assigned to infantry training centers were trained in infantry and support (cooks. clerks. armorers, and so forth) skills needed in theinfantry regiment. The branches designedtheir own Mobilization Training Programs (MTPs) which varied in length andcontent. Infantry and armor MTPs were13 weeks in 1941 but. by 1943. were extenqed to 7 weeks and changed to include much more field training. This compares to the present average initial training period of 16 weeks.

After World War II, AIT was returnedto the units. Basic training. however, wasretained in the mobilization centers andstandardized as an infantryorientedcourse of eight weeks duration. Thereasons for this important decisjon not to

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MILIT RY REVIEW

return to unit-based individual trainingare unclear. Perhaps a combination ofrapid demobilization, training centers inbeing and apparent cost savings heldsway.

The Korean conflict saw the return ofAIT to the centers. Recruits received acommon basic training followed bycenter-based advanced training beforereporting to units as trained replacements. With few modifications, thismobilization-based training system hasendured to the present day.

The history of Fort Leonard Wood,Missouri, Illustrates this evolution. Itwas carved out of the Ozarks in 1941,and, by 1945, more than 320,000 troopshad been trained there. After a period as aghost camp, maintained by caretaker personnel, Fort Leonard Wood was partiallyreopened in 1950 for the Korean conflict.A Make Fort Wood Permanent Committee was successful in making it a permanent training center in 1956. Its 25th anniversary as a permanent installation wascelebrated last year. Other trainingcenters have similar histories

The Vietnam, conflict had no fundamental impact upon the mobilizationbased training system. Initially, deploying forces went as units and were supplied with individual replacements fromthe training centers in support of a13-month-combat-tour policy. This personnel policy has received much criticism,especially in its effects upon unit cohesion, but most detractors offer no policyof their own. A system of rotating unitsthrough the war zone on, for example, atwo-year basis could have been an option,but this issue requires a study of Its own.Suffice it to say that the basic system ofcenter-trained replacements assigned individually to units in the field had beenthe US Army's training. system sinceWorld War II.

4

After the Vietnam withdrawal and theend of the draft, the Army continued torely upon the mobilization-based trainingsystem. The compa.tibility of this systemwith the All-Volunteer Force and TotalForce concepts was apparently not considered. Operation Steadfast whichorganized a separate US Army Trainingand Doctrine Command, further separated individual training from US Armyunits. How does this system comparewith training systems used by other major armies?

SURVEY O M JORFOREIGN RMY TR INING SYSTEMS

As Emory Upton discovered a centuryago, the study of other armies providesvaluable insight into the solution ofsimilar problems. This is especially truefor individual training since the contrastis striking between the US system andthose of the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Great Britain and theUSSR.Federal Republic of Germany

The West German army is approximately 335,000 strong, half of which isprovided by a 15-month draft program.'Each maneuver battalion has a trainingcompany that conducts two six-weektraining programs per quarter. A drafteereceives six weeks each of common subjects and A IT in this unit before joining aline company in the same battalion. Lessnumerous military specialists report tounits in the same brigade or division.

Each company commander in the German army uses a training skill catalogue(similar to a Soldiers' Manual) that tellshim what basic and advanced skills are re-

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qui red by soldiers at each stage of theirenlistment. The unit commander, therefore, develops individual skills to theneeds of his unit. It is interesting to notethat, unlike the US Army, the Germanswere able to maintain unit training companies throughout most of World War II.According to a classic study by EdwardShils and Morris Janowitz, this unitbased training system was instrumentalin the extraordinary cohesion of Germancombat units during World War II. TheGerman army has been experimentingwith an equipment holding/individualtraining battalion concept to allow rapidaugmentation by reserve units and stillretain a unit-based training system.Every brigade will have such a battalion.France

France has a large army by worldstandards-approximately 320,000. For

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TRAINING SYSTEM

patriotic and economic reasons, Francehas a universal military training system.Draftees incur a one-year obligation andare drafted in two-month incrementsthroughout the year. Each French battalion has an integral training company.Draftees report directly to the battalionwith which they will serve their obligation. The company conducts basic training for six to eight weeks and specializedtraining for four weeks. Collective (crew,platoon, company) training is conductedin the combat companies of the same battalion for the remainder of the-draftee sterm of service. Small training centers areused for specialized collective trainingbut on a short temporary duty basis.

The trend in the French army is towardeliminating even this low-level. collectivetraining company and having maneuvercompanies train and retain their owndraftees throughout their term of service.Whether these ideas are incorporated or

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not. the French military training systemwill continue to emphasize decentralized.unit-related training. These principles arewell-ingrained in all nonUS armies. butthe Fronch are remarkable in that they attempt very decentralized training in theface of a very short (12-month) draftobligation.Great ritain

The British army is not large (approximately 170.000) but is included in thissurvey because of its similarities to theUS Army: a volunteer force organizedfrom a culturally similar. postindustrialsociety. The British army recruit is conditionally enlisted at the recruiting stationahd sent to a processing station for threedays of orientation and testing. He is freeto leave at any time. This somewhatunique procedure is used to ensure that

6

the soldier selects a job and locationcorresponding to his abilities and desires.

The British army is convinced that thisprocedure pays for itself in reduced dropout rates and malassigned soldiers.Finally approved recruits are. like theother non-US armies discussed. sent to

training units of the regiment in whichthey will serve. Here. in what is called aRegimental Training Depot. officers andNCOs of the regiment conduct a 16weektraining course for new recruits. Theregimental commander is responsible fortraining.

The British army also uses DivisionalTraining Depots for administrativegroupings of regiments of like branches.The British try to negate some of theproblems of this low-level trainingcenter approach by using only regimental officers and NCOs to run the depot.Recruits destined for a particular regiment also wear distinctive insignia ofthat unit-referred to as being badged.Qualified recruits choosing a specialistfield report directly to their branch schoolwhich conducts its own short basictraining as part of the course. This dif-

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fers significantly from the US Army straining system. of course. in which allrecruits receive basic training together atcommon training centers.USSR

The Soviet training system is unique inmany ways. Although a very large army(1.8 million. of which 1 4 million are conscripts). its training is even more decentralized than the non-US armies discussed earlier. The USSR now operatesunder a 1967 Universal Military TrainingLaw that made two major changes in theSoviet draft system. t reduced the termof service from three to two years. and itrequired 140 hours of preinduction training for secondary school children duringthe two years preceding their actual induction at age 18. Some of this training isvery specialized.9It is interesting to note that the USArmy used preinduction training on avoluntary basis to prepare draftees forservice in World War II. The army provided educational literature. visiting instructors. surplus equipment and marksmanship training. After induction. creditwas given toward military occupationalspecialty (MOS) qualification. loSoviet recruits are inducted twice ayear (May-June and November-December) by the r yon (county) and are sent teither a military district processing station or directly to a unit. Here. they entera four-week period during which they aretested. issued clothing and taught thebasic knowledge of military life. includinghow to fire a rifle. The Soviets do not attempt to do more than this commonsubjects training collectively. Recruitsare sent to their units where they aretrained by their own officers and NCOsand where they will stay for their entiretwo years of active duty.

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TRAINING SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESSIN THE 198 S

t is quite clear that the US Army scenter-based training system evolvedfrom the mobilizations of World War IIand Korea. Also apparent is that thissystem is not used by any other majorarmy. draft or volunteer. The four armiessurveyed conduct very decentralized.unit-focused individual training and areconvinced that relinquishing responsibilitY'for individual training to large centersresults in poorly trained soldiers and alack of unit cohesion. While being different is not the same as being wrong.some justification seems to be in order asto how the two approaches to individualtraining compare by cost-effectivenessand. most importantly. the requirementsof modern warfare.

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Cost EffectivenessCost-effectiveness comparisons of

center-based and unit-based trainingsystems are very difficult to make. On thecost side, center-based training wouldseem to have a decided advantage sinceresources are centralized for this veryreason. After all, World War II trainingcenters were established because the exceeaingly small Army did not have thecadre to train a very large force quicklyand fight a global war at the same time. Itis much less clear today, however.An Office of Management and Budget(OMB) study estimated Fiscal Year 1979costs for Army recruit training of $325million, requiring approximately 8,800support personnel and eight recruit training bases for a workload (student manyear) of 18,137. OMS concluded, quitecorrectly in my view, that the Army hasfar too many bases for its workload andshould put some bases in caretakerstatus. Both the Army, and lately theCongressional Budget Office, haveagreed. Unfortunately, political realitieshave been paramount. For the purpose ofthis inquiry, however, the important costconsideration is that the center-basedsystem may not be less costly than a unitbased approach under current conditions.Effectiveness comparisons of centerbased and unit-based traimng graduatesare also difficult to make. Results of the: ; A TO tank gunnery competitions arenot a definitive measure. A US Army program called advanced individual trainingin units (AIU) appears to provide the bestevidence to date. The program trained30,000 soldiers in 14 high-density MOSsin Continental United States (CONUS)combat divisions and separate brigadesduring 1971-73. The AIU project was astopgap method to fill understrengthunits affected by the drawdown from

Vietnam and to meet Unit of Choice enlistment options by sending basic training graduates to their unit of assignmentfor AlT. AIU provides, therefore. aunique contemporary example of a decentralized American training system forevaluation.The AIU project began in November1971 at seven CONUS divisions andseparate brigades. Commanders wereallowed a surprising degree of latitude.They could choose the method of training,select the MOS in which the soldier wasto be trained (subject to enlistment contracts) and award the MOS in the unit.Although space does not allow providingthe details of the program, A I U met itsobjectives extremely well. Some unitswanted to retain AI U after they reachedfull strength. even though supportingpersonnel slots and equipment were notprovided from the training base.Two studies attempted to comparetraining effectiveness of AIT and AIUgraduates. Surveys of unit officers indicated unit-based training was. in mostcases. preferred. A comparison of MOSscores also seemed to indicate a more effective training achieved by AIUalthough low sample size made mostresults statistically invalid. Al U infantrymen, for example. scored 106.54 ontheir MOS test compared with AITgraduates' average score of 91.52.Although the AIU program was conceived as a temporary personnel filler andended after meeting that objective. itmakes unavoidable comparisons betweenthe current US Army training systemand those unit-based systems used byother armies.Individual Training and Modern Warfare

I t is my contention that the nature ofwar and US military strategy have

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changed since World War II. The adventof nuclear weapons changed warfareforever. It is extremely unlikely thatmajor powers will declare war upon oneanother,' mobilize their total war-makingcapability and commence military opera-tions until unconditional surrender isimposed by one side. Indeed. in thenuclear age. wars among major powersmay resemble the limited conflicts of the19th century and before. War objectivesand means employed will both be limited.assuming credible nuclear deterrence.This. in fact. has been the pattern sinceHiroshima. To paraphrase GeneralDouglas MacArthur. there may be manysubstitutes for victory.

Conventional warfare has also changeddramatically. High-technology and excep-tionally destructive weapon systems havemade high-intensity warfare extremelyviolent and of short duration. The brevityof conflict is caused by the inability ofeven highly industrialized nations tosupply war materiel and trained militarypersonnel to the battlefield in responseto devastating rates of loss or expend-iture.

Support for this view is found in thehistory of recent conventional conflicts(India-Pakistan. the various Arab-Israeliwars). as well as the apparent inability ofeven the richest nation on earth to sup-port a conventional war in Europe formore than a few weeks. Although a highintensity war between industrialized na-tions may consist of short campaignspunctuated by negotiation rather than ashort war. the basic nature of modern warremains: high technology. very destructive and short.

US military strategy has also evolvedfrom the World War II mobilizationperiod. assive retaliation a reflection ofUS nuclear superiority, was quicklyproved ineffective by the Korean War and

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TRAINING SYSTEM

the USSR buildup of strategic forces. Thetwin strategies of nuclear parity and flexi-ble response also outlived their usefulnesswith the continuing Soviet buildup andthe failure of US policy in Vietnam.Americans. it turned out. were not willingto bear any burden called for under thisstrategy.

Current strategy may require a catchytitle. but resembles the post-VietnamNixon Doctrine: a US nuclear umbrellaover the free world. assistance. for alli 1sand ready conventional forces to in-tervene in support of vital American in-terests. The training implications of sucha strategy are importaii t- favoring'mobile. cohesive. highly trained forcesover a mobilization potential.

CONCLUSIONS

The US Army's individual trainingsystem is a direct descendent of theWorld War II mobilization t has re-mained basically unchanged over the past40 years despite the evolving nature ofmodern warfare. US military strategy.even cost-effectiveness considerations.No major foreign army uses this system.I t relies upon a concept that individualreplacements can be trained centrally andsent to a unit with little adverse impactupon the unit or. in fact. upon the individ-ual.The unit commander. it is presumed.can concentrate upon unit readiness andunit training-as if the whole is unrelatedto the sum of its parts. As most unit com-manders know-and as an honest ap-praisal of skill qualification test scores in-dicates-individual training is an ongoingchallenge, inseparable from the unit ineither space or time. and integral to theunit's effectiveness.

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The concept of unit cohesion, now beingrediscovered as vital to combat effectiveness, is largely a reflection of an individual's relationship to the unit's effectiveness. This relationship, I contend, iseven more important to the crew-servedbattlefield of the 1980s. To retain acommon-skill, training-center focused,mobilization-based training system fromWorld War II could be, for the reasonsstated, the greatest single institutionalimpediment to fielding an effective fighting force.

POSTS RIPT

One hesitates from ending such apresentation without offering at least theoutline of a recommendation. At the sametime, experience teaches that too detaileda recommendation becomes the bureaucracy's target and subsequent rationale fordoing nothing. As a learned teacher usedto say, Everyone's for progressas long as it doesn't entail change.

With these caveats, it is clear that theUS training system must meet the basicrequirements of modern warfare and USmilitary strategy in the 1980s. Specifically, common-skill training must belimited to essential military requirements(discipline, hygiene, physical fitness) andother training organized to develop thoseindividual skills required by the unit ofassignment. The crew,served battlefield requires soldiers to becomemembers of a crew and crews to becomemembers of a unit as soon as possible intheir enlistment. For these reasons andfor cohesion, the cement in any effectiveunit's foundation, all training should bedone in the uni t of assignment.

The proper level of centralization (battalion, brigade) could be determined by

1

experiment. I prefer the German approach over, say, an AIT train-and-retainconcepti' because iIltegral training unitscan be used to expand the force quicklyduring emergencies. The equipment holding individual training battalion conceptused by the German army also appearsuniquely suited to the US Army's TotalForce concept. This approach allowsrapid expansion of trained, nearly combat'ready units-quite an accomplishment in the age of $2 million tanks andempty reserve units.

The above, therefore, outlines the individual training system necessary for the1980s and beyond. In my opinion, retaining the mobilization-based individualtraining system of World War II has beena significant contributor to the hollowArmy described' today. Separating thetraining base from Army units has helpeddestroy unit cohesion and remove theNCO from his rightful role as the individual trainer of the Army. This Armyof strangers has not served the nation aswell as it could have over this period.Armies are, for reasons good and bad,notoriously resistant to change. Theoretically, armies have a choice betweenpreparing for the last war or the next. Inpractice, major change occurs in increments, usually from external causes (suchas lost wars). An incremental approach is,therefore,. indicated. The concept shouldbe tested, honestly and thoroughly, at aCONUS iIlstaliation before evaluationand possible use. The closing of a traininginstallation or the resumption of conscription may present such an incremental opportunity. Then, with strong leadershipand some luck, an individual trainingsystem for the 1980s may be implemented, Then again, if the US beaches atNormandy had not been on the right, wemight be in a better location for theNATO central battle. C est a guerre

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TRAINING SYSTEM,

NOTES1 See Mark F Brennan, 81 al ,An EXfJ1oratoryStudV of the Army

Tralmng Cenler System, Human Resources Research Office,Washington, 0 C 1969

ment Printing Office, WashIngton. 0 C 1941111 RecruIt Trammg Study, US Oil ce 01 Management andBudget. Washington, D G . 19 September 1977 2 "20 Years at Ft Wood," The Kansas City Star 20 March 1976 12 Reducmg the Federal Budget. CongresSional Budget omee,US Government Printing Office, WaShington, DC February 1981

3 John W Seigle, 'Training In the British Army" MilitarvReVIew November 1973, p 30 13 See Major Franklin V Hartline, The IndiVidual Trammg~ s t e m 01 the uS Army A Critical Evaluation, Research Report,US Army Command and Genera Staff College. Fort leav81worlh,Ks.19764 "The Military Salance, 1980181' An Force Magaz/fl8,December 1980, p 825 Edward A ShtlS and Morns JanOWitz "COheSion and rSlnlegratlOn In the Wehrmacht n World War II, Pub c Opinion Quarferly, Summer 1948, pp 287 886 The Milltar.,. Balance, 1980181 op Clf . P 79

7 l b l d p 7 7

14 Advanced Ind/vldual, Tramlng In Umts. PrOject Study. USArm, TraIning and Doctrine Command Fort Monroe Va 1 Jcl.nuary1974 and Ana/ 1l/ng Trammg EffectIveness, Dratt Stud' . uS ArmyTramlng and Doctrine Comma,-.d Fori Monroe Va. 15 January19758 Ibid, p6B9 See COlonel Bernard Loeflke The SOvl8t Union Perspective

of an Army Attache' Parameters December 1980 p 5415 Colonel Lee 0 lvey Professor of SOCIal SCiences, US

Mllrtary ,l'H.ddemy W e ~ t POint II 'I16 Captain Rodney B Mitchell, EnhanCing Unit CoheSion,"Mli i tani Revlev. Mdy 1981 pp 30430 'Pre-Induction Training US War Department US GOvern

1982

---- '/--,Ll(?utenant Colonel Franklin Y Hartline is amember of the military faculty, Industnal Col-lege of the Armed Forces, National DefenseUniversity, Fort McNair, ~ V a s h i n g t o n D.C Hereceived a B S from the US Mliltary Academy,an MB from the 'harton S c h o o ~ Universityof Pennsylvania, and lS a graduate of th e

USACGSC. He has seTl ed In callalrv UnLts In the101 st Alrborne and 2d Armored DWlsions, In theUS Army Military Personnel Center and as anInstructor at West Pomt

SWEDENGuidelines for Swedish Defense Planning. Sweden's defensewill maintain its operational strength in all essential areasduring the 1980s, according to the recent government guidelines for t ~ e planning that will form the basis of the Riksdag'sdecision on the defense organization for the period 1982-87.Based on the recommendations in the defense committee'srecent report, the guidelines state that expenditures willremain at the present level, Kr. 15,400 million ($3.42 billion) ayear at 1980 prices. An adjustment of Kr. 400 million up ordown is also being studied.General conscription will be maintained. The peacetimedefense organization will be trimmed in staffs, unit trainingand joint authorities.Civil defense planning will be based on an unchanged orsomewhat higher level. Protective masks will be procured for

~ entire population over a 10year period.


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Commanders engaged in combat operations are usually facedwith a host ofproblems im olving the cil,il sector. Civil-MilitaryCooperation ClMlC) is a program aimed at reducing t{le impactofsuch problems, as well as facilitating further unit operations.This article reviews ClMlC planning in US Army Reserve civilaffairs units and relates actiolls takell thus far ill this vitalarea.

I Force Multiplier for the ombat ommanderColonel James R. Compton, US Army Reserve

MERGING amid new combat doc. rine and force modernization concepts in US Army Training and DoctrineCommand (TRADOC) Army 86 studies isan enhanced and significantly more important role for US Army Reserve(USAR) civil affairs CA) forces. CalledCivil-Military Cooperation


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in Department of the Army approval of aDivision 86 organization. Emphasis is onplacing maximum firepower forward incorps and division areas; combat withsmaller, single weapon companies; arming, fueling, fixing and feeding forward;organization for continuous combatoperations; and an increase in leader-toled ratios. Also supported are advancedbattlefield concepts that will incorporatedevelopmental weapons and equipment,and that will take advantage of scarcepersonnel resources.

Army 86 envisions new heavy armoredand mechanized corps and divisions supported by a theater army composed of acombination of area-oriented and functional organizations commonly referredto as echelons above corps.3 Within thisframework, USAR CA elements will besmaller and more mobile than the CAcompanies, groups, brigades and commands that were borne of militarygovernment perspectives in World WarII. These elements will be capable ofdeploying to Europe rapidly. They willthen join up with US, German, Belgian,Luxembourgian or Dutch forces to whichthey will be linked through capstonetrainingoassociations and will stay withthose units as ttIe battle develops. The CIMlC teams will be trained in thelapguage of the area to which deployedand will possess those specialties neededmqst in E ach respective area of operations. For example, teams assigned to thebrigades and diyisions in the forwardcomb It zone will,be able to concentrateon problems of immediate concern tothose. commanders such as labor, legalmatters, transportation, civil supply,civil defense, property control. anddisplaced persons, refugees or evacueesm:atters.

Cross-training will have been accomplished prior to mobilization. At each

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higher level, the teams will be capable ofdealing with a wider variety of problems.The CIMIC elements supporting theaterarmy, for example, would contain additional specialists ne


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opportunity to Interact with NATO lorces personnel. CIMIC brings US civil all irs reservists Into direct contact with personnel 1 allied nations. Here a civil all irs olllcer left discusses host nation support with a st ll olllcer 1 the GermanTerritorial Southern Command.

hoc arrangements covered by suchagreements, it might be possible to arrange German commercial transportationfor this need.This example' can be extended to amyriad of problems that will undoubtedlyconfront commanders, both US andallied, on the battlefield each day. And actions such as this will provide some of theelasticity' that combat units will needin future engagements.This new emphasis on CIMIC, promulgated since late 1979 by US Army,Europe (USAREURI, in its mutual support program with the 353d Civil AffairsCommand, and supported more recentlyby CACDA and the US Army Institutefor Military Assistance (USAIMA), hadat least a partial origin in the CA unitsthemselves. The 353d, with its sisterunits, the 351st of California and the 352dof Maryland, worked with USAIMA several years ago to formulate a new docu-

4

ment entitled Civil Affairs Support forAll Echelons (CASFAE), which reflectedthe thinking at that time regarding optimum CA operational philosophy.This study did not depict all of the CAdeploYJ,llent and utilization concepts thatare now flowing from the CACDA studiesand from the capstone implementationprogram, nor did it receive USAREUR indorsement. However, it was the beginning of the concept of CIMIC as' a forcemultiplier.' CASFAE .sugges'ted that Active component and Reserve combatorganizations should make use of thevariety of talent 'in the nation s CAforces. CASFAE acknowledged thatsome tailoring of existing CA units wouldbe needed due to NATO s unique requirements.On the basis of CASFAE and ArmyRegulation 11-22, Mutual Support Pro-grams CA units established alliances inthe form of unfunded mutual support pro-

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Realistic training. CIMIC oilers realworld training lor civil allalrs reservists. Here, host nation civiliansand civil alia Irs personnel are shown planning a cooperallve civilian supply program.

Outside Continental United tates tours, as a pari of Ihe CIMIC concepl, oller reallsllc training lor IheArmy's civil affairs Iroops. Here, a group 1 refugees are delalned 1 an assembly polnl and are Inlerrogaled by CIMIC personnel.

1982 15


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MILIT RY REVIEW>.---------------------grams with Active component. USARand Army National Guard organizations.Through this means. Reserve units wereable to demonstrate that they could dealeffectively with the probl-ems associatedwith civil-military operations. Some ofthe mutual support efforts were sealedwith nO more than a handshake on thepart of the commanders concerned. andmany have blossomed into healthy. fullblown working relationships.

CIMIC. including the early deploymentof CA elements. is not a philosophydreamed up in CA units. Neither is it asolution awaiting a problem. It is therecognition by our allies in Europe. andour own troop commanders there. that asizable segment of the US militarycapability was an unprogramed assetthat could help to make the differencebetween defeat or victory.Following presentations of its CASupport in a CIMIC Environment concepts to Army Readiness MobilizationRegion I. First US Army. US ArmyForces Command and the Office of theDeputy Chief of Eitaff for Operations andPlans. the 353d established a mutual sup'port program with USAREUR in whichthe 353d would provide USAREUR witha continuing CIMIC augmentationcapability. The USAREUR HNA staffextended' the relationship through contacts with the GTA and the developmentof the USAREUR CIMIC concept. Thisrecently approved concept calls for theUS Army. through its implementation ofcapstone-designated USA R forcea l i g n m e n t ~ to provide GTA units withUS CIMIC capabilities.

This would be done through assignment of USAR CA teams and detachments down to V K Verteidigungbezirk-kommandol level. The V K region issimilar to our county. The concept alsocalled for USAR CA linkup with US.

6

Belgian. Luxembourgian. Dutch and.eventually. other forces committed toNATO. The provisi


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Southern Command, the Western Command, the Atlantic Command and theRapid Deployment Joint Task Force. Themain diHerences between the USAREURCIMIC concept and the 353d proposal liein numbers of personnel needed at teamlevels and in the exact scope of theirresponsibilities.

The first real test of the CIM IC pro-

FORCE MULTIPLIER

gram occurred when USAREUR askedthe 353d to provide 25 CIl\1It-trainedreservists to participate in WINT X 81Drawing on its own headquarters resources, plus CA units in the northeastFirst US Army area and the Fifth USArmy a ~ a the 353d dispatched theneeded individuals on schedule. Theysubsequent ly were assigned for

Civil Affairs Command (90)

8 19)

148 8)

1982

Civil Affairs Detachment(Area Support)

Civil Affairs Group(Area Support)

Civil Affairs Battalion 1 43 (23),(Brigade Support) :.1

Civil Affairs Detachment 1(Brigade Support) I- 1Legend Numbers without parentheses are

numbers of units recommendedNumbers In parentheses are numbersof personnel per unit

Of the 43 ( IV I; affairs battalions recommended. 19would have four detacnments each dnd 24 would havethree detaChments each

Civil affairs structure recommended by the 353d Civil Affairs Commandfor coalition and rapid deployment warfare. Recommendation provides fora total of 227 units and 3,019 personnel.

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MILIT RY REVIEW

WINTEX play at USAREUR Headquarters (lINA); at I II, V and VII CorpsHeadquarters; at 21st Support Command, GTA Southern Command; and atselected W K Wehrbereichkommando)(similar to our states) and V K Headquarters in the NATO Central ArmyGroup and Northern Army Groupregions.All of the reservists assigned to German units were fluent in the Germanlanguage, and all others had completedthe Defense Language Institute s Headstart German-language program. US personnel assigned to GTA units were completely dependent on the Germans forbilleting, mells, communications, transportation and other exercise support.A 353d team sent to Germany at theconclusion of WINTEX to evaluate thesupport given to liS and GTA forcesfound that the reservists were able to participate fully with minimum orientation.Also, they provided additional realism tothe C I M I C portions of the exercise andcontributed their never-beforeavailableexpertise to the r\ solution of a bevy ofcivil-military problems that confrontedUS and GTA commanders. These findings were confirmed by independentevaluations conducted by the USAREURHNA staff. US G5s, HNA staff personneland GTA commanders supported theutilization of USAR CA personnel in theexercise and recommended further suchaffiliation in the future.'"

The test also revealed that USARCIMIC personnel deployed to Europe willbenefit from further training in corps anddivision operations, in GTA organizationand functions, and in transition-to-warphilosophy. Further, they will be evenmore effective if all are trained to level 3fluency in the German language. The353d is taking steps now to ensure thatits personnel receive the additional train-

8

ing, and it is investigating variousavenues for getting the language capability needed.Also planned is a 'conference with CAunits throughout the country that arelinked to European-oriented Active component and National Guard organizationsby capstone. In meetings of this kind,plus expanded communications, necessary steps will be initiated for enhanceddialogue and cohesive actions aimed atthe development of a first-rate CIMIC.organizational capability.In March 1981, the 353d tested its ability to mobilize and deploy rapidly. Beginning with an assembly one Friday morning at various USAR centers in the NewYork City area, elements of the 353dHeadquarters and several of its subordinate units moved by convoy toMcGuire Air Force Base in New Jersey.Personnel and equipment were loaded onto Air National Guard transports and,within 10 hours of initial assembly, wereairborne en route to North Carolina.Following arrival and debarkation atPope Air Force Base, they convoyed toFort Bragg and spent the weekend training with Active component counterpartunits there. The action was reversed onSunday, and, late that night, the unitsand personnel were back in their NewYork centers. The operation functionedsmoothly, without serious incident, andprovided practical planning and execution experience to the participating personnel.Brigadier General James P. Harley,commander of the 353d, commented:

What the operation demonstrated isthat our organization can, without majoroutside assistance except for air trans-port, mobiliu and deploy on short notice.Once we were aboard the planes, we couldjust as easily have been flown to any partof the world. 1 believe that we put to rest

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any allegation that CA reservists are notready to deploy on a timely basis. And,/ our citizen-soldiers non understand morefully the implications in General Rogers'

statement that our Reserve Componentsmust expect to meet virtually the amehigh quality enemy forces as Activeunits, with little or no time to prepare. '

Although the Army currently lives in acrisis-driven environment, Army 86forces are designed struct.urally to win ona wide range of potential battlefields ofthe 1980s.13 With the concept of deep attack serving as a fundamental basis of

1 MaJor Paul A Blgelman DlvlSlon ar"a Corps 86 ForceDesign for the Future Army June 1981 p 232 Memorandum of agreement between the COl11mander Inehlet, US Army, Europe (USAAEURI and Seventh Arm'1. and thecomr'nandH'g general, 353d Civil Atfalrs Command dated 4February 1980. which calls lor the 353d 10 prOVide coalition war'areC.vII MIlitary Cooperalron ( C I ~ I G ) assistance to USAJ:lEUR ",holea: the same lime, ImprOving the CIMIC capability a'1d readiness otthe 353d3 8rge1man Of) Crt p 244 Lieutenant Colonel Frederick J Manl"lIng ,n hiS ParametersartIcle. September 1979 contendS that cross tla,nlng 1


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One hundred tnessee Wenig gears .e n e r ~ l Was captured b oago this month Fosoldier a ~ S s e ~ S. Gr/fnf. ~ e ; a l .forces u ~ d e : ~ e o n e I 8 o n , Ten_Moore8 PriSoner durin t e S the diary of command ofWar s O I , i ~ u r l l a l describes ~ hat .battle in Febru a Confederaters. e grim condit ary 1862 J. C.IOns faced bY CivilDiary ofonfederate SoldierEdited by Larry G Bowman and Jack B Scroggs

V-,.,- ., -vv - f P ~ A ' . . < ~~ z: \~ ~~ ~~


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CONFEDER TE SOLDIER

Josephus C Moore was born on 24 May 1842 in Bedford County, Tennessee. He enlistedin the 18th Tennessee Regiment on 20 May 1861 and was taken captive when FortDonelson fell to the Union Army in 1862. Moore was transferred to Camp Butler, a Unionprison near Springfield, Illinois, where he spent six months as a prisoner of war. In earlySeptember 1862, Moore signed an oath of allegiance to the United States of America, and,after a brief stay in Illinois, he returned to his father s home in Bedford County, Tennessee. On 30 June 1865, at the age of 23, Josephus C Moore died. The following material ,presented as it appeared in the original. is Moore s personal record of his brief service inthe Civil War.1861May 20 InIisted in the Service of Tennessee at Fosterville Depot. The Co (com-pany) I joined had previously organized electing their officers as follows

B. F. Webb Capt J. A Nichols 3 SergA Norris 1st Lieut C T. Wells 4 SergJ. M Gilmore 2nd Lieut H. C Naylor 1st CorpWm. Dozier 3rd Lieut N Gilmore 2F. G Nichols 1st Serg A. Smith 3W. J. Oakley 2nd Serg A W. Kaey 423 West to Murfreesboro and was sworn in by Capt. Palmer.27 Left Fosterville for Nashville by R.R. Camped that night at the fair

grounds where we received the most of our camp equipage. Cooking utensils etc.28 Started in the evening from the fair ground and went up through the Cityand across the river into Edgefield where we remained until night Olndthen took a train to camp. Trousdale at Richland station on the Louisvilleand Nashville R.R. 15 or 20 miles north of Gallatin where we arrivedabout 2 A.M.29 Struck camp in the woods a few hundred yards East of the station.

June First sunday in camp which receives but poor attention. Dr Webb left forhome. Some of the boys geting home sick. I n the evening John Mcabe gotseverely stabbed by a Mr. Pilkerton of Woods Co5 Had regimental drill by Edwards before Gen. Zollicoffer.July Lay in the tent with the measles until the 6th of July when I was moved

out to Mr. Dorrisses by G.W. Nimmo where I stayed all night. I shallnever forget the kindness with which I was treated by Mr. Dorris andFamily. Aunt Serena was there.7 Started for Trammel in the morning and had a long rough ugly trip of itthe road being very rough for a buggy. Landed safe at Trammel in the.evening with a furlow for Ten days in my pockett but I do not expect tospend it all here.

>*J. C. Moore s manuscript Journal of his experiences n the Civil Wa r is located in the HIstOriCal Collection.North Texas tate University, Denton. Texas.

2


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MILIT RY REVIEW

August

8 A pleasant morning. Gran talks of going to Gallatin with some of the millmachinery.9 Went with Gran in the buggy to Gallatin where .found all well.10 Stayed at AT [Aunt Nancies all day and had a fine time of it.

11 Started Soon for Trammel where we landed about noon after breaking asingletree.12 Stayed at Trammel all day.13 Went to a little muster and when I got back found Elvira and AuntN ancie there.14 Aunt Nancie went home, Elvira and I stayed all night with Colly.16 Rainy damp day. Learned from a Volunteer that Col Hattons Reg regi-ment) had left Camp Trousdale for East Tennessee.17 Elvira Lucy and Colly started for camp. G.W. and I went fishing in theevening.18 Went fishing in the evening and when we got back we found the folks at

home from the camp with news of the death of Abb Tucker and JohnLamb privates of our Co.20 Came to Aunt Nancies in the evening.21 Was in town this morning. Troops are passing through. Was at Mr.

Dodds in the evening.23 Went on a visit to the two Jo Wallaces. Went from there to town andfrom reports got uneasy about my Reg leaving me so I fixed up and leftGallatin on the cars about 7 P.M. and arrived at camp about 9 P.M. foundthe Co healthy but small. Col Battles 20th Tennessee Reg got marchingorders and left that night leaving the old 18th by herself.26 Col Browns 3rd Tennessee Reg arrived here from Camp Chitham.

28 Capt Woodards Cavalry Co arrived here.30 Elvira and Mrs. Key in camp and stayed all night.31 Elvira. T.C. Wade and I walked out to Mr. Dorris's where we had a splen-

did dinner. Came back and had an artist to make two trials for our pic-tures but failed to get a good one. The Voters all start home tonight tovote for Governor. 2

23479

12

Elvira. Add and Sallie Dorris came in and stayed until late.Voters did not return.The Co returned last night or at least the most of them.J ,C. Burge. A. T. Ott and I spent the day very pleasantly together lookingfor Company. We are looking for the 23rd and 24th Tenn. Regs fromCamp Anderson.Burge started home with a furlow for 4 days. Elvira Aunt Nilla LauraStewart Jane and John Austin in camp today.Elvira and Addaline came to camp today and as I was not very well Iwent out with them.Not much better yet of my colick. Would like a furlow but hardly knowwhether I will get i t or not. Nothing can surpass the kindness with whichI am treated here.

February


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14

1516

17232829

September5689

1014516

17

18

192

25

2627

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CONFEDERATE SOLDIER

Received my furlow from camp today and came out to Abram Bradleysnear the station to be ready to start with the train in the mQrning. Ad-daline Nimmo is going as far as Gallatin with us. Took the cars soon for Gallatin. Stayed that night at Aunt Nancies.Started by R.R. to Murfreesboro. Met Col Martins 23rd Tenn R lg at theNashV and Chatanooga Depot on there way to Trousdale. Stayed thatnight at Cosbys.Got to Fosterville 2 A.M. Found My Father and sister waiting for uswith horses.J.E. Wallace and I went down to Marshall County and sawall the Connection who were all well. Came back through the rain on the 26th.Still raining.Went to see Tarpley and other boys from the' camp.

I left home and made the trip safe to camp in one day finding all the boyswei and in good spirits.Acted as corporal of the guard at the station and had a fine time of it.Saw Kimmons at his quarters.J K Marshall arrived safe last nightG.W. Nimmo Adaline and her sister were to see me today. Slipped theguard line and went out to try my gun which [ms. ill.l perfect.A cool day for the time of the year.My guard day Porters Co of Artillery came to camp today fromNashville.Allen and John Austin were in camp todayPulled up stakes and moved to a new camp at Old Michelville Mitchellvillee. A hard days work.We worked hard arranging things at our new camp until about 10 A Mwhen we pulled up again and moved to Michelville station where we arecooking provisions for 48 hours.Took the cars about 2 A.M. for Bowling Green where we arrived at about12 M. We then went out on the banks of Barren river and lay there allnight.Unwell today and went to the Hospital.Left the Hospital this morning an,d found our tents near the ~ bridgebut the Co left yesterday in company with about 1700 other men startingout West. Stayed at the camp waiting on the sick boys until 24th whenthe rest of the Reg received marching orders.Took the train for Russellville at daybreak where we arrived about 12 andrested until 4 P M when we started in a Westerly direction marched 10miles to Mud creek and slept badly.Started early and marched hard all day and left the Reg before night andwent to Rochester where we found our Co. 27 miles today.Stayed all day at Rochester. The Kentuckeans spent the day in tearingout the lower gate of the lock at this place.

23


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October

4

winter camp of the Civil War with log huts and corduroy walkway

28 Was roused at 3 A M and cooked until day when we started in a southwesterly direction which we kept until 12 M when we halted at a meetinghouse a few minutes for dinner And from there for wood to within 1 mileof Greenville where we camped all night. There was some frost for thefirst we had seen29 After passing through the town we took a right hand road and eat all wecould get at Reynolds Mills on Pond River then we took a road that ledup a ridge and we arrived at the top of it about night then we had to get tothe bottom on the other side before we could get water which took us until after :\lidnight. We slept there the rest of the night without anythingto eat.30 Joined our regt early in the morning then eat an enormous breakfast andwent ahead on our journey toward Hopkinsville Marched slow butsteady until we arrived within about 2 miles of town where we halted forthe night: Our Advanced guard Capt Woodards Cavalry had some littleskirmishing with union men today had one man killed and killed 8 andtook several prisoners.

Left our camp in the swamp in the eavening and went through town Wecamped for the night 1 mile N E of town2 Traveled about 6 miles to a little town called Salubria where we had a din-ner presented to us by citizens then about 6 miles futher to within 2 milesof Trenton and encamped.3 Was on the road early and at the end of 13 miles found ourselves at TaitsStation on the Memphis RR which we took in the eavening and got toBowling Green at daybreak on the 4th We have traveled no less than 125miles on foot and none of our Co gave out except J.C. Burge. We foundwhen we arrived at camp that Lynch of our Co had died

ebruary


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1862January

February

1982

78

12

13

CONFEDER TE SOLDIER

We drew what Tenn owed us in good Tenn money. My share was 271/2.Pulled up and moved 1 2 mile up the river. Kaey Oakley and Morrisarrived in camll with plenty of news and some bed clothes for me.I was detailed with others to work on Bakers hill fortifications which ison the opposite side of the river. There is works of this kind going on onseven other hills around this place.Sunday. Had a general review on the field with our knap sacks.

J.E. Wallace arrived here this morning with plenty of news.Wallace left for home.from the 11 th to the 20th we remained quietly at camp with moderateduty and but little drilling. I went down in the bend of the river the otherday to cut down timber. The object in cutting down the timber is to pre-vent the enemy from crossing the river at that point it being out of therange of our guns.

21 We received marching orders about 12 M Pulled up and sent the bagageto the RR and now 4 PM we are ready to start at a minutes warning hav-ing received orders preparitory for a march but we wil go part of the wayby R.R. Yet we do not know in what direction we wilstart. We took the

22

23

26

2728293012678

train at dark for Russellville where we arrived before midnight.Wednesday. We remained in the cars until morning when we lit campfires near the Depot. Saw Ruben Billington and nocked about over townuntil eavening when we set stakes about 1 2 mile North of the depot.A fair day for the first in sometime. Our wagons came up about 3 P.M.Troops are stil coming from Bowling Green. There is about 8 Reg s hereand three Co s Artillerry.There was a general review at 10 A.M. before Generals Buckner Floydand Brown. t is thpught among the privates that we came here becausehorse feed was so scarce at Bowling Green.;A wet bad day. Nothing of importance this morning.Stil another bad day.J.E. Hoskins arrived here in the eavening.Snowed and rained all day.Another very bad day.Went to the fairground to see Billington but he was sick in the country.We Bob Work and I then took over the hills and back to camp.We received orders to cook 3 days rations before we slept. Which wedone.We cooked 2 days rations more and then fixed ready to start by 8 P.M. tis snowing and raining now about 10 P.M.Took the train about 1 1 2 A M and started for Clarksville whete wearrived at 7 A M and are at present 10 A M. We wil most probably leavehere sometime today for Ft Donelson. Ft Henry was surrendere d day

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MILIT RY REVIEW

9

10

12

13

6

before yesterday by Gen Tilman. We got off on a boat (Gen Anderson)about 1 P M and got to Ft Donelson 1 mile before Dover a little town onthe left hand side of Cumberland River where we are likely to have a badnights rest.Sunday. Very poor accommodation here for a soldier without tents. Therewas considerable Pickett fighting today within hearing of here in whichour men were outnumbered and whipped. Our 1st Lt Norris got into aSkirmish and made a narrow escape bringing off a wounded man. Wemoved out in the eavening to some outside rifle pitts behind whichsequartered ourselves. \Rested but little last night as we had to do what sleeping we did do on thefrozen ground. We commenced work on our rifle pitts which is to be con-tinued night and day.Worked in the ditch from 1 until 3 A M Our bagage came in about mid-night and we carried it up this morning distant 1 mile and 1/2 We re-mained in the same place all day without pitching our tents in any order.Another skirmish today within hearing of our fires the consequence ofwhich we can learn but little. .Our Picketts were driven in about 1 P.M. after a running fight of an hourslength. The Gunboats fired a few shells at the fort but without effect. Weformed behind our works and soon all things became quiet. The boyshave become as quiet as if nothing was on hands Co 18th Tenn was onpiCkett they have been driven in without any loss. We are closed in en-masse by division and we are on the right of the line of battle. One fromeach mess are cooking 3 days rations. Sundown. Nothing done yet. Theenemy are cooking too I guess from the smoke they have raised.The sun is not quite up yet. No material change has taken place. Our gunsthrew a few shells at the enemys centre so we may consider the ball open.Our Tents are all thrown flat to be out of the way. Gen Buckner com-mands the right wing Floyd the left and Pillow the whole. 1 1/2 hours bysun the gunboats are nearly in sight and there has been several shellsthrown at us but they have done no damage yet. We are getting impa-tient. 10 A M The enemy have made one attack on the right and havebeen repulsed and it is thought they are coming again. The Gunboatshave been silenced once but it is thought they are coming back. ColBuckner of the Gen's Staff says we are shipping them like hell Therewas two more charges made on the right with the same effect of the other.I think the enemys loss is considerable as they were exposed to a crossfire from Capt Porters Batterry.' Our loss is small. We have to keepbelow our works on acount of the enemys sharpshooters who would justas leave shoot a hole in a mans head as not. 3 P.M. The enemy have madeseveral desperate efforts Lo take our works on the centre and left but wererepulsed in all cases. The Gunboats fired a few rounds by way of Signalfor the land forces and retired out of range. We are expecting an attack onthe right wing every minute. Dark. There has been no more fighting ofconsequence. The Sharpshooters kept up a constant fire on us until dark.

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They have killed and wounded several of Porters Artillery men14 The most miserable night I have ever spent Snowed all night and weworked on our breastworks good part of the night then lay down in the

snow and when I tried to rise thlS morning I found my hair frozen to theground and my boots froze hard on my feet The Sharp shooters com-menced again We moved to the extreme right to protect Capt Jacksonsbatterry which landed here last night The enemy are landing troops justbelow the bend and the Siege guns are throwing a occasional shell over atthem Floyd captured one batterry last night on the left The Gunboatscame up and opened on the fort at : 1/2 P M and the most severe engage-ment took place that I ever herd or expect to hear I t was one continualboom and roar of the guns and bursting of shells in every direction for onehour when the boats retired They advanced to within 400 yards of thebatterry There was heavy fighting all eavening on the left wing but allbecame quiet at dark We need reinforcements and must have them15 We remained in the rear of Jackson until an hour or two before day whenI took the hardest kind of a chill and the Reg mov2d to the left where theyfought from day until 1 P M without stopping a minute then they came

982 27


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28

Photos opposlt (clockwise Irom top): General Ulysses S Grant (center background)with troops at Fort Donelson, Tennessee; General Grant; General Simon B Buckner;captured Conlederate soldiers awaiting transportation to Northern prisons; and cooking In camp

back and stacked there arms and commenced getting something to eat aswe had not had time to eat anything for nearly 24 hours. But just as wewere getting a good start the enemy made a desperate rush on the works.Just to the right of us and took them. We then fell into line at a doublequick and started across a hollow to help our men on the right as wethought but in going down the hill 4 of our co fell in less than twentypaces so we learned that our men had been driven from the works. So togo ahead with 30 or 40 men was foolishness and to go back up the hill wasdangerous as our men were fireing from the top so the most of the boysconcealed themselves unti the fireing partially ceased. For my part Itook down a hollow toward the river and concealed myself among somelogs from where I fired 15 rounds then retreated up the hill stopping andfireing occasionally and the enemy fireing at me all the time until I gotout of the hollow. I then fell into line which was on top of the ridgewithout any breast works and fired 20 rounds more when we were orderedto cease fireing. We had 4 ~ wounded in this engagement George Kin-son mortally, W.W. Puckett, G.D. Horton and J.P. Ross Severely. Ourreg was then ordered to the centre to protect Graves Batterry where weare likely to stay all night.

16 We were roused from our beds of snow and before day and we went totown and back without knowing what the intention of the movement wasbut when we got back we found a white flag flying in the works we thenknew the intention of the morning movement was to retreat but therewas no chance and then for the first time we learned that we werePrisoners of War. Pillow and Floyd are gone but Buckner is here yet. TheFederals came in about 11 A.M. and took possession.'"17 We have not been moved yet and there is no telling when we wi be. Wewere moved to the bank of the river on which we lay all night in mud kneedeep.

18 Took the stock boat Alec Scott and started down the river in the morninggot to Paduca [Paducah] just before dark.

19 Found ourselves at Cairo run all day without seeing anything worthy ofnote.20 Passed Cape Jererdeau [Girardeau] before midnight.21 Landed at St Louis about 2 A.M. and are sti here at 11 A M We left StLouis in the eavening and got to Alton Just before dark. Our officers

came with us to this place and then stopped or rather took some othercourse. We then took a train toward Springfield and found ourselves atCamp Butler 6 miles from Springfield on the morning of the 22nd. Wequartered ourselves tolerably comfortably in barracks.25 We just lie here without Seeing or hearing anything worthy of note.There is a great deal of sickness among the prisoners and there has beensome deaths already since we have been here although we left all that wassick when we passed St Louis there in the Hospitals.28 I feel some better of my cold and am almost the only one in the Co that is


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MILIT RY REVIEW

March

April

able to help bury the dead.2 Sunday. We wrote out and signed a petition to be allowed to take the

oath of allegiance to the U.S. and return to our homes. This petition wassigned by nearly every man inside on the 3 of March and sent to GenHalleck at St Louis and if approved by him we wil most probably get off

141617

2027311216

before a great while.Nothing has been herd from the petition. t is most probably a failure.Just one month out and no prospect of being released on any tearmsEach of us sent up a paper according to order giving our residence andage. These were to assist in filling up the bonds as they pretended but Ibelieve it was done through mear curiosity to khow how many would takethe oath. At any rate this is the last we ever herd of them.Burton has been very sick for several days and I am somewhat fearful hewil not get over his illness without quite a spell. Weather changeable.Burton still no better. John Flemming is bad off. The rest doing tolerablywell. 'Burlf1n still worse.The Island No 10 Prisoners arrived here today. They amount accordingto count to 1015.For' a week or two we have had a great deal of rain and there is but littleprospect of spring yet judging by appearances. t is something very dif-ficult to describe ones feelings shut up in prison as we are. My thoughtsfor the first few days were of home and the anxiety that would be felt forme there. But that soon wore off to some extent and then my thoughtswere turned to the prospect % some time getting out of the infernaldplace. My thoughts were for a time of making my escape which I could dobut whether this would better my condition or not was the question. As Ihave no money I have concluded to wait for some fair means of gettingout of this supposing that such will certainly come soon. Then mythoughts were turned to the condition of the country and now more thanever I feel that I have a deep interest in the consequence of this war,

May 13 John Flemming died today, He was the smallest person in the Co and if

D

not the youngest the most boyish. f I ever am so unlucky as to joinanother Co I want to join a Co of men not boys. John though not a badboy at least was always a pest to the Co and the same I might say ofothers. One day in this infernal place is so much like another that a diaryis rendered almost useless. However since Major Fonda took charge of usas Police Officer we have had more privalidges than we had before. Weare now allowed to go to the river to wash ourselves and clothes.16 J S Shannon died today, Jim was one of my original mess and was a goodfree hearted fellow but he like all the rest of us had his falts. His was indrinking to much when he could get it and that led indirect ly to his leav-ing our mess. Not withstanding he was a brave boy and a good soldier.

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June

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He died suddenly having been sick but a few days.21 One not acquainted with prison life would suppose this was anything buta Solitary life and it is in one sence of the word but in another it is one of

the most solitary and loathsome lives a man can live at least s it appearsto me without having tried a great many ways of living. One day with usis just like another while the outside world is moveing on with its everyday changes of which we can learn little or nothing let alone see or enjoyany of them and our time is rendered sti mOre lonesome in every sense ofthe word by the sight of four or five ded bodies being transported to thedead house every morning and also by the occasion at sight of a graveyard with the rise of three hundred new graves all filled within the shortspace of three months. One thing which makes us all feel so lonesome isthe knowledge of the fact that in a place like this it is every man forhimself and I might add the devi for all. .

24 A fine day. Nothing new. Just 20 years old today according to the best ofmy recollection.

27 Just 12 months ago today we left home and went into camp. And anothertwelve months may find us all in hell or the southern army or possiblyneither. There was some Malitia arrived here last night for the purpose ofguarding us as tne 12th Cavalry (which has been our guard ever since wearrived at this place) is ordered to Virginia. The Authorities refused usany papers Yesterday or today. But we got one by way of a Slant fromwhich we learned something of a severe fight between McClelland andLee before Richmond in which it appears that :\1cClelland got the worseof it. But we make no demonstration as we want to get more news in thesame way.Sunday. There is and has been curious thoughts in my head several daysabout the probability of getting away from here and it has struck me thatto make my escape is the surest plan although I know even that is a badone. My intention now is to make my escape soon and my conclusion isthat my condition cannot be worsted.6 Owing to bad weather I have not carried my intentions through but I wasnever better resolved on anything in my life.7 J.A. Nichols J.T. Wells of our Co and T.C. Wade and T.T. Ott of Co Cmade there exit this eavening. Such exits are quite common. Some 15 or16 of Co A have left in this way. I have now made my arrangements andwil not be here many days unless something happens. I have a tolerablemap of the country from here home and some good friends that wi gowith me.

II Bad rainy wether for several days. The Col has driven in all the parolledmen today. There has been various letters and papers received here whichall go to prove that there is a fair prospect of a general exchange ofprisoners some time soon which if so as it appears to be it wi please mevery weI. At any rate it has had the effect to delay my exit for a few daysat least.

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July

August

3

18 Had a severe chill last night consequently I am rather under the wethertoday. But as I am taking quinine by the fist full I guess I wi have nomore chills.21 C.F. Crocker died today in the hospital: He was ~ rude boy but a goodsoldier.23 Major Fonda assumed entire command of this post today. Col P Morrison being defunct. He (Morrison) leaves today despized by both sides of

the line. The Papers still speak of the exchange of prisoners as certain.25 The 12th Ill. Cavalry are to leave here on the 27th and Max Gering talksof going part of the way with them. He is a german and joined our mess

about the time Shannon left it. He has since been connected with PortersBattery as workman in which position he was taken prisoner. He wasrather cross and easily made mad but is a good fellow and if I have afriend in the world Max is one of them.27 The 12 III Cav left today and Max went with them. He intended to go asfar as Indianapolis where he was sure he could get work. There is heavyfighting going on before Richmond and has been for several days.

2 Nothing new today so far. There has been some desperate fighting beforeRichmond in which Lee has gained some ground.15 The talk of an exchange has broken out afresh in which I place some confidence but this is the last time I am going to be fooled if I am fooled thistime.25 The fact has become evident that there wi be a chance to get away fromhere before long. I received a letter from My Brother C.B. Moore yester

day at Jerseyville in this state the last I had heard from him he was inArk. So taking all things together I have concluded to wait for some,chance to get away that is sure if not quick.C.B. Moore arrived here today direct from Jerseyville III and I was permitted to see him for an hour or two. He left Ark shortly after writing tome and came here via Wite and Jersey Cty's Illinois. He left T.S. Wallacein White Cty. I was treated respectfully by the officers at head quartersand I must say I have no right to complain at them as individuals.On the 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 7th C.B. was in to see me and each day I waspermitted to see him. But the Col now talks of not allowing any morevisitors within the enclosure.

28 It is now evident that' there wi be an exchange of prisoners also all Tennesseeans will be allowed to take the oath of allegiallce who may desire todo so. I have the matter under consideration now as to the best course topursue with a decided tendency toward the latter expediency. My timefor which I enlisted is out and two or three months over so I am notbound to report myself to Jeff Davis or anyone else. The oath I took onenlistment .was substantially this That I wi bear true faith andallegiance to the State of Tennessee and wi do as Tennessee may directfor the period of 12 months unless Sooner discharged. The oath to pro-

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September

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CONFEDERATE SOLDIER

tect and obey my officers was concluded in the same way. ,There fore Icontend that this oath has nothing to do with me now so 1 wil act as 1please'l alone being responsible for what I do. To some this change mayseem sudden but 1 could inform such persons that it is not altogether sosudden as they might suppose. Hither too 1 have had no opinion of myown but simply followed some leaders who 1 know had better chances ofknowing the true condition of things never once dreaming that theredesigns might partake of anything like a selfish nature. Now whether Itake the oath of allegiance or not 1 intend to follow no man. f 1 cannotform an opinion of my own 1 wi keep silent unti 1 can.Monday. W.B. Campbell Commissioner from Andrew Johnson arrivedhere this A.M. and has occupied the most of the day in signing bonds.17He administered the following oaths to me and a similar one to aboutthree hundred others this P.M. I J C Moore Co F 18th Tennessee Regtof Bedford Cty Tennessee do solomnly swear that 1 will support protectand defend the Constitution and Government of the United Statesagainst all enemies whether domestic or foreign; that I wil bear true faithallegiance and loyalty to the same. any ordinance. resolution or laws ofany States Convention or Legislature to the contrary notwithstanding;and futher. that I will well and faithfully perform all the duties whichmay be required of me by the laws of the United States; and I take thisoath freely and voluntarily. without any mental reservation or evasionwhatsoever. J.C. Moore (Seal)Subscribed and sworn to in duplicate before me this 1st day of SeptA.D . 1862 By authority of Brig. Gen Andrew Johnson Military Gov ofTenn. W B CampbellCommissioner

Some of the prisoners are very much inclined to interfere with us in tak-ing the oath. Whilst others take a more sensible view of the thing and saythat we have a perfect right to do as we please in this matter as they the(Prisoners) are allowed to do. 1 would like very much to go home now butdo not think it safe so 1 wil most probably go to Jerseyville where 1 cando something to pay for my board and can watch the course of things un-til the proper time comes to go home which 1 hope wi not be long.2 Tuesday. C.B. starts to Jerseyville today on horseback. Some of thereleased men have already started home and we wil all leave here thisP.M. We broke up camp and bid fare well to my first prison (and 1 hopemy last) and took the train stoped in Springfield a few minutes and offagain on the Chicago and Alton road arrived at a station called Shipmanwhere 1 got off and bid myoid companions in misery farewell. Put up atthe Shipman House where 1 came near suffocating with heat in a closeroom.


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Josephus C Moore s diary ends with the 2 September 1862 entry. There is no known recordof hzs actwities from this time until his death at age 23 on 30 June 1865. Edltor.

1 Bngadler General Fela K Zollicoiter was appointedbrigadier general In 1861 AI NaShville on 26 July 1862 he wasordered to Knoxville to a5sume command of ihe East TennesseeDistrict John Trotwood Moore and Austm Foster Tennessee TheVolunteer Stale 17691923 Nashville Tenn 1923 VOlume I. P 473,and War of the Rebellion OffICial Records of the Unton and Confederate Armies US Government Pnnlmg Office Washington18801901. Series 1 Volume IV, P 3742 In 1861 William H Poll


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Battalion OperationsFro:mEncircled Positions

982

Major Michael R. Tarantola US Army

n the fluid battlefield the d n t of units becoming sur-rounded is ever present. t is imperative that everyone know howto react in such situations. This article cites historical examplesof success by surrounded units nd discusses factors to be con-sidered by unit commanders.

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HE nature of the next war may findbattalions cut off from friendlyforces and forced to conduct operationsfrom encircled positions. Soviet inten

tions toward such force groupings arequite clear: Advancing troops. in allcases. must take measures to discoverand destroy them.' Aware of this. whatcan the battalion expect. and what will beexpected of the battalion? To examinethese questions more closely. let usreview the Soviet threat and our currentdoctrine.

Combat with separated and by-passedenemy subunits is an integrated maneuver of Soviet offensive doctrine. In WorldWar II. maneuver was directed at encircling forces for subsequent destruction.' Y Novikov and F. Sverdlov, intheir exceptional treatise Manoeuver inModern [.and Warfare, specifically pointout that:

Defense toda> cunsists of a system ofstrung points and center. of resistance,used n combznation uith counterattackslaunched from the depths by reser[ es orsecond echelons Characteristicallv thereare gaps b e t u ~ e n these strong -pUlnt,through uhich a fast movlllg attacker,u ith strong fire pou er, particularly tanks,can dril e and cume out un the flank or inthe rmr of the defenders.

This concept is substantially rem forcedby conclusions of the Defense NuclearAgency's Study of Breakthrough Operations. The study examines the potentialforce ratio for successful breakthroughsand the use of nuclear weapons.

Soviet capabilities for offensive actionand conditions of the modern battlefield.mentioned by Novikov and Sverdlov. indicate that the possibility of force groupIngs remaining in isolated positions willbe even greater in the next war. The concept of the Soviet offense is continuousmomentum toward an objective. Maneu-

6

vering rapidly. Soviets an ticipate theability to attack in numerous directions.further creating the possibility of isolat-ing our units.' .

The Soviets realize that isolated forcescan disrupt advancing troops by firinginto the flanks and rear of those units.Soviet doctrine recognizes that encirclement for destruction requires considerable force and means which can lead totime delays.'

The consideration given to the type ofisolated force groupings will determinethe means of force application necessaryto reduce the resistance. In Soviet doctrine, the primary means of destroyingforces that appear on the flanks or in therear of attacking forces is the nuclearweapon Along with this, an important role will be played by aircraft and artillery,' The battalion may. therefore. expect to operate at some poin t forunknown periods as an isolated force.

This is not and should not be considered an alarming situation. History isreplete with examples of units at allechelons in every war that have operatedfrom encircled positions. Study of thesesituations provides many important insights.

The Battle of Lodz during World War Idemonstrated the importance of timingand breakout actions. The JOIst AirborneDivision encirclement at Bastogne inWorld War II illustrated the relevance ofexfiltration and relief operations. TheKorean War showed the importance ofoutside support for the 2d Marine Division at the Chosin Reservoir. Theselessons are significant in the evolution ofour doctrine for encircled forces.

Present doctrine in Field Manual (FM)100-5, Operations (Coordinating Draft).identifies three alternatives for operations of encircled forces: breakout. defendand ex filtration. The battalion How to

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Fight manual, FM 71-2 The Tank andMechanized Infantry attalion TaskForce concentrates on breakout operations. In either case the options providedsuggest greater scrutiny.

In any scenario a central issue is determination of when and by what force theunit is encircled. Obviously guidelinespresented are subject to interpretive application to the specifics of the situation.A common interpretation of a unit encirclement is the blockade physically or byfire of all routes of egress. Time is important. The moment the unit is determinedto be encircled the decision must be madewhether or not to break ou t. History haspoignantly demonstrated this to be thecrucial decision. Vacillation or delay maycause any action to be futile.Deciding to break out the battalionmust establish its operational planquickly. The operation will usually consist of a preparation, organization and execution phase. To be successful effortsmust be made to deceive the enemy. concentrate maximum force at a weak pointand establish security at the flanks andthe rear.

In the preparation phase considerationof time location of attack. speed. security. and the evacuation of the woundedand equipment or supplies is vital. Theforce is then organized into a ruptureforce. reserve force. support force andrear guard. The execution phase is thatcrucial time for conduct of the plan. Having carefully prepared and organized. theforce attacks toward friendly lines ormore tenable positions.'

The World War action of the German2d Battalion. 464th Infantry Regiment.isolated in the Stalingrad pocket inNovember 1942. exemplifies breakoutconcepts. I n the first phase of the Russian counteroffensive west of Stalingradduring November 1942. both German and

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B TT LION OPER TIONS

Russian headquarters lost contact oftenwith their subordinate units. Caught inthe tidal wave of Russian forces converging from the northwest. individualGerman units were launching localcounterattacks and seeking tenableground. They were ignorant of the factthat the enemy ha:d driven past them andthat they had been cut off.

The Russians. on the other hand. wereequally ignorant of the general situationand advanced in a generally northerndirection in massed columns' withoutsecurity or reconnaissance. Apparently.they were under the impression they werecrossing territory that had already beencleared of enemy forces. .

Early.on 20 November. the 2d Battalion. 464th Infantry Regiment. with asister battalion. attacked a large Russianforce moving northwest on the road fromPlatonov. The attack stunned and confused the Russians. giving the Germanforce an hour of respite in which it movedto and occupied the town of VerchnajaBuzinovka. The Russians. after recovering from the surprise attack. assembledfor an attack on the town.

In the early afternoon. supported by artillery fire. wave upon wave of Russian infantry attacked the outskirts of the smalltown. The German commander realizedthe town could not be held for very long.He also realized that a daylight breakoutwould result in heavy casualties since theroute chosen to the southeast wentthrQugh several miles of wide-open terrain. There was no choice but to hold thetown until nightfall. For the remainder ofthe afternoon. the defending force reopulsed the Soviet thrusts.While the fighting raged. the forcemade preparations for its breakout. TheGerman commander also initiated a ruse.On the premise that Russian soldierswere usually underfed. ,hungry and

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greedy, German cooks were ordered toprepare lentil and pea soup from stocks oflegumes left in the buildings. Thelegumes were emptied into pots set overopen fires near the firsthouses the Russians would reach upon entering thetown. Then, mail sacks containingpackages were emptied onto the streets.

By twilight, the situation had becomeso critical that the Russians were expected at any moment. The German battalion began withdrawing. Platoon byplatoon, company by company, the forcedisengaged from the enemy. The selfpropelled assault guns and artillerypieces continued to fire point-blank anddid not move until just before the lastrifleman. They then drove straight to thesoutheast edge of town where the forcehad assembled.

At that point, the ruse proved effective.The Russian soldiers, who at first fol-lowed close behind the withdrawing German detachments, hesitated when theysmelled the soup and saw the packages.The rush for the unexpected treat was -companied by total confusion. Theresulting delay permitted the Germanbattalion to attack to the southeast andescape without being subjected to enemypursuit.This example provides insights to thekey elements for breakout operations.The German commander was totallyaware of the importance of firepower, intelligence, mobility, support and deception. Concentration of his firepower unthe last possible moment was essential tomaintaining the position until the forcewas ready to break out. Intelligence was amatter of analysis of the situation, but,more so, knowledge of the enemy and hisanticipated reactions were vital components in the ruse.Application of resources to the needs ofthe unit for the breakout ensured mobil-

8

ity of equipment and personnel. The rusewas obviously the central aspect of theGerman plan. Though not on a grandscale, it did provide the necessary timefor the battalion to break out to moretenable positions.

military review february 1982

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