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Method in Archaeology: Middle-Range Theory as HermeneuticsAuthor(s): Peter KossoSource: American Antiquity, Vol. 56, No. 4 (Oct., 1991), pp. 621-627Published by: Society for American ArchaeologyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/281540

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2/8

METHOD

IN ARCHAEOLOGY:

MIDDLE-RANGE

THEORY

AS

HERMENEUTICS

Peter Kosso

Disagreements

bout

methodology

n

archaeology

re

often

ocated n terms

of

the

middle-range-theory

pproach

of

Lewis

Binford

and the

hermeneutic,

ontextual

archaeology

f

Ian Hodder.These

positions

are

usually

presented

in

opposition

o

each

other,

but here

they

are

shown to

present

very

much the same

methodological icture

of

archaeology.

This

specificanalysis

s more

generally nformative

f

the

methodological

elationbetween he

natural

and social

sciences.

Desacuerdos

cerca

de

metodologia

en

arqueologia

on

frecuentemente

lanteados

en

terminos

del

enfoque

de

teoriade

rango

medio

de

Lewis

Binford

la

perspectiva

ermeneutica

contextualde Ian Hodder.

Estas

posiciones

son

presentadas

normalmenteen

oposici6n,pero

en el

presente

articulose

demuestra

que

ambas

ofrecen

una

imagen metodol6gicasimilar de la arqueologia.Este analisis resulta mds informativoen terminosgenerales

acercade la

relaci6n

metodolo6gica

ntre las

ciencias

naturales

y

las ciencias

sociales.

On a

map

of the

sciences,

archaeology

would be a

border state

between the natural and

social

sciences. It is

like a

social

science

in

that

the

objects

of

interest are

people,

human

culture,

and

artifacts

created

under the

influence of ideas

and

social norms.

Evidence

in

archaeology

is

often

symbolic,

meaningful,

and

intentional,

and the

archaeologist

must

be sensitive

to

this

unnatural

content.

But

archaeology

is also

like

a

natural science

in

that its

focus

is

on

the material remains

of

people

in

the

past

and on their

relation with

he

natural

environment.

Not o

he

atural

environment.

Not

only

are the artifacts

often

the

products

of

coping

with

nature,

they

are

always

altered

by

natural

processes

of

aging,

material

degradation,

erosion,

and

the

like,

thus

making

aspects

of

natural

sciences

appropriate

resources for

getting

information

about the

past. Even under a mandate of paying attention to ideas

and

symbols,

the

text

from which

this

information is

read is

the

material

record. Linda Patrik

(1985:

34)

notes

thisthis

ual

nature of

archaeology

by

describing

two

ways

of

dealing

with the

archaeological

record:

Because

archaeological

evidence is

presumably

the

product

of

both

natural

processes

and

behavioral

processes,

rather

than the

product

of

either

one of

these

alone,

there

is

disagreement

amongst

archaeologists

over what

kind of

record

archaeological

evidence

forms.

Located at

this

interface,

archaeology

is

especially prone

to

disagreements

over

method. There is

a rich

variety

of

positions

among

archaeologists

regarding

the

appropriate

methods

for their

dis-

cipline,

and the

positions

are

often

presented

in

terms

of

just

how

like a

natural

science or a

social

science

archaeology ought

to

be.

In

wht

follows

here,

two

of

these

positions,

chosen

for

their

high

profile

in

the

profession

and

because

they

are

reference

points

for

the two

ends of

the

spectrum,

will

be

compared.

The

point

I

want to

make is

simple.

Though

these

two

methodological

ap-

proaches-the middle-range-theory concept of Lewis Binford and the model of contextual archae-

ology

advocated

by

Ian

Hodder-are

originally presented

in

strong opposition,

they

are

really

very

similar.

Binford's model

of

good

archaeological

method

(outlined

in

Binford

[1977, 1982a,

and

elsewhere])

has it

that

archaeology

should

be much

like

natural

science. It

deals

in

theories and

evidence

and

carries

out a

regimen

of

testing by

exploiting

the

causal

connections

between

things

in

the

past

and

their

remains

found

in

the

present.

Objectivity

is

the

methodological

goal. Hodder,

in

explicit

Peter

Kosso,

Department

of

Philosophy,

Northern

Arizona

University,

lagstaff,

AZ

86011

American

Antiquity, 56(4),

1991,

pp.

621-627.

Copyright

? 1991

by

the

Society

for

American

Archaeology

621


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3/8

AMERICAN

ANTIQUITY

opposition

to

this,

claims

that natural

science

is

an

inappropriate

model for

archaeology

in that it

is

incorrigibly

insensitive to ideas. Artifacts can be understood

only

when viewed

in

the context

of

the ideas and norms

during

their manufacture and use. This

suggests

a

method

of

study

that is less

like

natural science and more like

reading

and

interpreting

a

text,

where the connection

between

evidence

and

object

of interest is one

of

signification

rather than of causation.

A

look at the substance behind the

slogans

of these two

positions

will

reveal that there

is little

methodological

difference.

In

showing

this,

the

focus

will

always

be

on

methodology

and not

on

issues of the

proper

aims of

archaeology

nor on the differences between the

objects

studied

by

social

and

natural

sciences. Even

if

the kinds of

objects

are

significantly

different,

this does

not entail

the

need for

significantly

different

methods.

And

granting

the two dissimilar

models

of the

archaeological

record

as

described

by

Patrik

(1985),

it

does

not follow that these demand

two dissimilar

methods

for

exploiting

the information

in

the

record and for

using

it

to

support knowledge

of

the

past.

The

plan

of

presentation

is

to first

briefly

describe Binford's

application

of

middle-range

theories

to

archaeology

and Hodder's

approach

of

reading

the

past.

Once out of their

packages,

these

models

of

archaeology

will be seen as

presenting essentially

the

same

methodological

picture.

The

hope

is

that this focused analysis of archaeological method will be more generally informative of the meth-

odological

relation between the

natural and social

sciences.

MIDDLE-RANGE

THEORIES

This

will

be

a

very

brief account

of

middle-range

theory,

an account

that

ignores

much

variety

of

detail

in

the

concept

but

that is

sufficient for

my

subsequent argument.

The

concept

of middle-

range theory,

as it

is

applied

to

archaeology by

Binford

(1977, 1982a)

and

by

Schiffer

(1988)

is

useful

in

any

science.

In

understanding just

what

the idea is

and how

it

works,

it

will be more

important

to

analyze

the notion

of middle

range

than that

of

theory.

Start

by

asking

what

is

middling

about

a

middle-range

theory.

There

are

differences between

Schiffer

and

Binford

on the details

of

middle-range

theories,

and

in

my

characterization

I

will

try

to honor

the task

set

by

Binford for

middle-range

theories,

with

a

sensitivity

to the

epistemic predicament

of

archaeology.

I will

point

out the crucial

characteristics

for a

middle-range theory

to

function

as

Binford

intends.

In Binford's

(1977:6)

use of

the

concept, middle-range

theories

are

descriptive

claims

that

fall

between

observational

descriptions

of what

the

archaeologists

find

in the

present,

that

is,

site

and

field

reports,

and the

descriptive

reconstructions

of the

past.

The material

remains

that are

found

in

the

present

function

as

evidence

for

the claims

made

about

the

past,

w ther those

claims

are

specific,

as about

the

shape

of a

particular

pot,

or

more

general,

as about

the

emergence

of

civilization.

Middle-range

theories

are

used

to make

the

informational

link between

present

and

past,

and

to

say

of what

the

material

remains

are

evidence.

They

do

this

by

describing

the formation

of

the

archaeological

record as

it

is

today.

This

description

will include

general

theories

about

how

artifacts

are used and

subsequently

deposited by

burial,

neglect,

or

intentional

discard,

and

general

theories

about the alteration of deposited artifacts by both natural and cultural activities. It will also include

specific

claims

about

the

area,

its

propensity

for

erosion,

for

example,

and the

local

people.

All

of

these

claims

are

middle-range

theories

in

that

they

contribute

to

the

description

of

the causal

lineage

of

the

debris

that

is observed

today. Being

of

general

or universal

scope

is

not

a

necessary

feature

of

a

theory

as

it is used

in the

middle-range strategy

to cross

the

epistemic

gap

between

available

data

in

the

present

and

interesting

phenomena

he

resent

and

interesting phenomena

in he

past.

The distinction

of

middle-range

theories

is

in

giving

meaning

to our

contemporary

observations

made

on the

archaeological

record

(Binford

1982b:161),

and to

do

this

by describing

the

formation

process

of

the

archaeological

record

(Binford

1977:7).

The

debris

is

an

archaeological

record

of

something

of

interest

in the

past,

but

we

can

know what

it is

a

record of

only

with

a theoretical

reconstruction

of how

it was

formed,

and

this account

of

the

formation

of the

archaeological

record

is

the burden

of

middle-range

theory,

a

burden

that

will be carried

by

a combination

of

general

and

particular

claims.

Any

theory

could be used in the role of being middle range. Being middle range is not a feature

of the

content

of a

theory

but

of its

use

in

a

particular

instance.

The relevant

middle

in this

sense

is not

meant to

be

of

mid-generality

or

of

mid-empirical

content.

This

disregard

for

generality

or

622

[Vol.

56,

No.

4,

1991




4/8

MIDDLE-RANGETHEORY

AS

HERMENEUTICS

empirical

content

differs

from

chiffere's account of

middle-range

theories,

according

to

which,

any

theory

can function

as

method,

depending

on context

(Schiffer

1988:436),

but

genuinely

middle-

range

theories

are

those

of

mid-comprehensiveness

and

mid-range empirical

content

(Schiffer

1988:

465).

Thus,

for

Schiffer,

middle-range

theories are

distinctive as to their

content.

This

is often

true

in other studies of science

(see,

for

example,

Schaffer

[1980]

about

biological

middle-range

theories

as

theories

of

mid-generality),

where the

terminology

of middle

range

is used

to indicate one

of

these

features

of

content,

but what is

key

to realize Binford's

intent is the role

a

theory

plays

in

processes

of

interpreting

evidence

and

testing

claims

about the

past.

There are no

special

theories

that are

of

use

only

for

testing

other

claims,

nor

should

any

be antecedent

ly

excluded from

use

in

testing.

A

theory

will

in one

context ble

theory,

but in

another

will

be

regarded

as itself

the

interesting,

finished

product,

answerable

to tests

against

the evidence.

In

other

words,

the

observations in

archaeology,

as

in

any

other

interesting

business

of

empirical

knowledge,

are

theory laden,

and

middle-range

theories

are

a

large part

of

the

load.

Insofar

as

observations in

the

present

are

to be relevant

as evidence

for theories about

the

past,

we

must

identify

information

of

the

past

in

the

present

remains.

The

tracking

of

the

flow

of

information

from interesting past to observable present is done by the middle-range theories.

Here

is an

example

of

middle-range

theories

in

action,

taken from

archaeological

studies of

ancient

Greece.

One

thing

ththat

archaeologists

and historians

want to

know about

ancient

Greece

is

the

structure and

genesis

of

socioeconomic

systems.

Part of

the

evidence

for claims

about

such

things

will

come

through

an

understanding

of

cultivated farmland in

ancient

times,

a

picture

of

the

sizes,

locations,

and

changes

of

fields under

cultivation.

But we do

not see the

cultivation.

What the

archaeologist

finds

are remains

of terrace

walls,

sparse

scatterings

of

potsherds,

and

other

indirect

traces of

past

agricultural

activity.

The

light

scatter

of sherds can

be taken

as

evidence of

cultivation

in

light

of

middle-range

theories

that

describe a

pattern

of

rural Greeks

discarding

old

pots

near

their

houses where

the broken

bits

get

inadvertently

mixed

into

the manure of

farm

animals

kept

at the

place

of residence.

The manure

is

spread

as fertilizer

on cultivated

fields and

the mix

of

sherds

is

scattered,

leaving

a

lasting

trace of

the activities

of

cultivation.

Areas once

under

cultivation

may

now be scattered with sherds, while areas not cultivated will not be, and insofar as the sherds can

be

dated,

the cultivation

activity

can be

dated. In

this

way

the sherd

scatter

is a

kind of

image

of

the

agricultural

activities.

It

is

certainly

not an

obvious

likeness of

cultivation,

and

the

image

has

been

distorted

through repeated

use of the

land,

erosion,

and

other

natural

and

cultural

forces,

but

such

distortions

can be taken

into account in

the

descriptive

reconstruction

of

the

past.

This

is

by

no means

a certain

or

universally

accepted

inference

from

contemporary

data

(sherd

scatter)

to

past

activities

(manuring

and

cultivation),

but it

does

have

significant

support

(e.g.,

Bintliff

and

Snodgrass

1988:507-508)

and

credible

evidence in its

own

right (Wilkinson

1982).

There

is

reason

to doubt

that

manuring

was a

universal

practice,

characteristic

to all

agricultural

settings

in

the

ancient

Mediterranean

(Cherry

et

al. 1991

:Chapter

3),

but

this

indicates

not

that it

is

inappropriate

as

a

middle-range theory

but

that

extra work

is

called

for to know

the

circumstances,

such

as

availability

of

water,

in

which

the

theory

of

manuring is likely to apply. Where manuring has been

done,

the

link

between

off-site

sherds

and

cultivation

can be

exploited

as

a

middle-range

theory.

Middle-range

theories

of

this

kind are

commonplace

in

the

natural

sciences.

They

are the

imaging

theories

that

describe

the

informational

connection

between

what is

seen

and

its

causal

antecedent

of which

it

is

evidence.

Again,

these are

not a

special

kind of

theory.

It is

simply

a

special

kind

of

use for

ordinary

theories.

Consider,

for

example,

the theoretical

account of

how

an

optical

microscope

works.

General

theories

from

optics,

describing

the

diffraction

and

interference of

light,

the

behavior

of

lenses and

so

on,

are

invoked

to

describe

how

the

image

is

formed

and

to

keep

track

of

any

instrumental

distortions.

This is

the

source of

confidence

that

features

of

the

image

are

reliably

informative

of

features

of

the

specimen,

and

these

are

middle-range

theories,

used

as

they

are

to

describe

the

formation

of the

image

and

thereby

make

it

evidence

of

something

interesting.

Another

example

comes

out in

Shapere's

(1982)

account

of

observing

the

interior

of

the

sun.

Neutrinos

observed on the earth, or more strictly, the detector-clicks caused by beta emissions from radioactive

argon

produced

by

neutrino

interactions,

are

evidence

for

theories

about

solar

processes.

But

the

neutrinos

(or

the

clicks)

are

informative

of the

solar

interior

only

by

way

of

a

theoretical

account

Kosso]

623




5/8

AMERICAN

ANTIQUITY

of

the

causal chain from the sun

to the

clicks,

that

is,

by way

of theoretical neutrino

physics,

radiochemistry,

and

more,

middle-range

theories all.

Thus,

Binford's

application

of

middle-range

theories to

archaeology puts

it

in

close

company

with standard

practice

in natural

science.

CONTEXTUAL

ARCHAEOLOGY

Hodder

(1986:12, 29)

argues

that this

methodological

association with natural science

puts

ar-

chaeology

in

with the

wrong company. Middle-range

theories

and

their natural-science methods are

inappropriate

to the

study

of human culture

because,

he

claims,

as theories

they

make cross-cultural

generalizations. They

are

insensitive,

that

is,

to

peoples'

ideas, intentions,

and

meanings,

and

thereby

they

miss an

important

aspect

of the

past,

an

aspect

which is

essential for

understanding any

part

of

past

human

culture. Since ideas and

norms are

often culture

specific

and

even

individual

specific,

they

will

be

missed

by

a

method that bases its evidence on

cross-cultural

middle-range

theories.

If

there are

any

general

theories

they

must be the result of information from the

evidence,

that

is,

they

must be

proven,

but

they

cannot be assumed and invoked to

support

the

informational content

in

the

evidence.

Methodological

sensitivity

to ideas and intentions is

crucial,

Hodder

(1985:12,

1986:3-4) argues,

because all material culture

is

mediated

by

the beliefs of

the makers

and

users

(as

well

as the

finders)

and the

meanings

intended.

All

artifacts reflect either

conscious or unconscious

ideas and

norms.

Everything,

not

just

artistic,

linguistic,

and ceremonial

behavior,

is

symbolic.

The

patterns

of

use

and the

spatial

arrangement

of

everyday

stuff reflect

the

attitudes

and tacit norms

of

thought

of

the

individuals and

their culture. These basic

material

objects

and their

organization

are

indicative

of

ideas

on,

for

example,

the

importance

of

particular

things,

the ro

herthey

play,

relations

between

people

and to the environment.

The

influence

of

ideology

is

in

everything

an

archaeologist

studies.

In

other

words,

the

system,

that

is,

the material

things

and

their

physical organization,

is a

mani-

festation

of

the

structure,

the

nonphysical

factors

such as social norms

and

individuals'

ideas

and

intentions.

Thus,

an

understanding

of structure

is achieved

through

an

understanding

of

system.

But a system cannot be properly understood without knowing something about the structure. Insofar

as the material

objects

are

symbolic they

are

signifiers

of

ideas,

but there

is

no

link

between

signifier

and

signified

without

an

understanding

of

the

ideological

context

and

the intentions

behind

the

meaningful

activities.

We need

some

appreciation

of

the actors'

ideas,

for

example,

to

group

com-

ponents

of

the

system

into kinds

in

a

way

that

is

relevant

to their

worldview.

Given

this

relation

between

system

and

structure,

the

individuals

and

cultures of

the

past

can

only

be

understood,

as

Hodder

says

in

agreement

with

Collingwood's

approach

to

history,

from

inside

(Hodder

1986:30).

The

archaeologist

cannot

get

anywhere

without some

preliminary

knowl-

edge

of

structure,

what

is

going

on inside

the

peoples'

minds

and

inside

society.

There

is

then

a

circularity

in the

process

of

knowing

the

past

in

that

system

is the

source

for

understanding

structure,

and structure

is

the

background

for

understanding

the

system.

It is

a hermeneutic

circle,

hence

the

method

of

reading

the

past.

As Hodder

sees

it,

the method

is unlike

the sort

of linear

inference

back

along

a causal chain as is the approach when middle-range theories are invoked. All aspects

of

archaeological

knowledge

will

require

some

initial

knowledge

of

intentions

and

the

meanings

of

things

as

a

way

to break

into the

hermeneutic

circle.

In

fact,

It

is

only

when

we make

assumptions

about

the

subjective

meanings

in

the

minds

of

people long

dead

that

we can

begin

to do

archaeology

(Hodder

1986:79).

It

is

important

to realize

that these

are

not

wild, irresponsible,

or

irreversible

speculations. They

are

accountable

to a kind of

testing

in that the

assumptions

of

meaning

must

lead to

sensible,

consistent

system

and

structure.

Individual

assumptions

are

evaluated

by

inter-

preting

general

understanding

or

foreknowledge

in

relation

to our

understanding

of

particular

con-

texts

(Hodder

1991:8),

and

are

inadmissible

unless

they

show

coherence

with other

ideas

attributed

to

the

people long

dead,

and

unless

they

provide

correspondence

to

the

evidence

(Hodder

1986:

95),

that

is,

allow an

easy,

rational

link

between

intentions

and

material

behavior.

Hodder's account of archaeological

method

seems

to

have shifted

the

burden

of

proof.

Cross-

cultural

generalizations,

as

would be

found

among

middle-range

theories,

have

to

be

proven,

not

assumed

(Hodder

1986:80), though

he admits

that there

are some

simple

rules

underlying

all

624

[Vol.

56,

No.

4,

1991




6/8

MIDDLE-RANGE

THEORY AS HERMENEUTICS

languages (Hodder 1986:123)

that can be

used to understand

the

past.

Cross-cultural

generalities

cannot

be assumed but

subjective

meanings

can.

This

apparently

differential treatment is a

feature of the

advertising

of

the

methodological position

that does

not

accurately

reflect the

product.

The distinction between

assumption

and

proof

works

only

to

confuse both

Binford's and Hodder's

models of

archaeological knowledge

since

in

both

models,

what

may

be

initially

assumed is

accountable to

subsequent

proof.

Whether it is of a

cross-

cultural

generalization

or of a

subjective meaning,

an

assumption

is

tentative and

revisable. It is

a

hypothesis

in

need of

justification.

In

the

methodological

scheme of

things, middle-range

theories

function

as do claims

about

ideas,

hypothetical

in

activities of

discovery,

and

in

need of

proof

in

activities of

justification.

A

look

at how these

things

are

justified

will

reveal

greater similarity

between

middle-range

theories

and claims

ndclaims about

structure,

and between the two

archaeological

methods in

which

they

function.

The

suggestion

at this

point

is that

instead of

opposing

Binford's and

Hodder's

methodological

models

by saying

that

contextual

structuring

ring

ciples

intervene

(Hodder

1986:116), meaning

that the

structuring

principles replace

middle-range

theories,

it is more

accurate to

regard

the

structural principles as part of the theories. Recall that the operative notion of a middle-range theory

places

no

restrictions

on the

content or

degree

of

generality

of

the

claim,

only

on

its use for

making

sense

of

(finding

information

in)

the

evidence.

MIDDLE-RANGE

THEORY AS

CONTEXTUAL

METHOD

The

distinctive

feature

of

Hodder's

contextual

method is

its

affinity

to

hermeneutics

in

the

relation

of

mutual

support

between

evidential

claims about

system

and

claims about

structure.

A

description

of

the

confirmation of

middle-range

theories

will

show

that

Binford's

methodological

account shares

this

affinity.

Middle-range theories, recall,

are

just

ordinary

theories.

They

are

tested and

justified

like

any

other

theory,

including

the

ones

whose

observational

evidence

they

laden.

Middle-range

theories

are tested and justified by comparison to evidence, that is, to observations. There is then a kind of

circularity.

Theories

in

general

(including

theories

used as

middle-range theories)

are

confirmed and

understood

through

an

appeal

to

observations,

and

observations

in

general

are understood and

verified with

the

support

of

theories.

This

second

half of the

cycle,

the

theory

ladenness of

obser-

vation,

represents

a

blurring

of

the

distinction

between

fact and

theory, exactly

as Hodder

advocates.

Observations

are

theoretically

influenced

claims about

local

and

specific situations,

closely

linked

to

perception.

They

are

similar

to

claims

about

the

meanings

of

specific

passages

in

an

unfamiliar

text,

claims

motivated from

specific

marks on

the

page.

Theories are

observationally

influenced

claims

about

more

global

processes

that

are not

directly

linked to

particular perceptions.

They

are

the

developing

account of the

plot

of

the

story.

Just

as

individual

passages

of

text are

interpreted

by

their

context

in

the

larger message

of

a book

while the

larger

message

is itself

put

together

from

an

understanding

of

the

parts,

so

too are

individual

observations

interpreted

by

appeal

to

theories

that are themselves put together and supported by observations. That is, the content and justification

of

theories

are

strongly

influenced

by observations,

and

in

turn

the

informational

content

and

justification

of

observations are

influenced

by

theories.

This is

exactly

the

structure of the

herme-

neutic

circle.

And

middle-range

theories

participate

on both

sides of this

dialogue

between

theory

and

observation.

Middle-range

theories

are

hermeneutic

tools.

This is

not

to

say

that

the

objects

of

study

that

Binford

advocates as

important

for

archaeology

are

the

same as

those

stressed

by

Hodder

and

contextualist

archaeologists.

To

point

out

that the

methodological

structure

of

middle-range theorizing

is

similar

to the

hermeneutics of

contextual

archaeology

is not

to

force

the

former

into a

study

of

the

mental

component

of

the

archaeological

record.

The

point

is

rather

that

the

two

different

concerns

and different

objects

of

study

are in a

similar

epistemic

predicament

that

calls for

a

shared

method.

The

point

is

relevant

beyond archaeology. Natural science in general, role model for middle-range

theorizing,

includes a

hermeneutic

component

in

the

dialectic

between

theory

and

evidence. The

hermeneutic

structure

shown

above

for

Binford's

middle-range theories,

the

reciprocating

influence

Kosso]

625




7/8

AMERICAN ANTIQUITY

between theories about the whole

and observations of the

parts,

would

apply

as

well to

the astro-

physics example

discussed above. This indicates that

differences

between for-science and

against-

science

approaches

to

archaeology

have been

based

in

part

on an

incomplete

and inaccurate

image

of

science

in

general.

Science must read nature

just

as Hodder

points

out

archaeology

must read

the

past.

The

unity

of the two

approaches

then comes in

realizing

that

doing archaeology

in a

scientific,

middle-range-theory way

is

doing

it

in

a

contextual,

hermeneutic

way.

Some

assumptions

need to be made to break into

the circular

association between

theory

and

observation. There

will

be neither

meaningful

evidence nor theoretical

understanding

without initial

hypotheses

and

preliminary

middle-range

theories.

All

of these

assumptions

are revisable. That

is

exactly

the sort of

epistemic

responsibility

we demand of science.

They

are revisable

against

the

standards of

coherence

with other

theories,

that

is,

an internal

plausibility

in the

context

of other

theories,

and

correspondence

with

the

data,

that

is,

with

the

evidential

claims

aden with

other

theories. The

revisions

are answerable

to,

as Alison

Wylie (1982:42)

puts

it,

two sets

of con-

straints ...

plausibility

considerations

... and

empirical

constraints.

The

requirement

that evidential claims

should be

influenced

by

heories

hould be influenceotherdhaby

the

one for

which they are evidence is important and it is the foundation of Binford's idea of objectivity. He

advocates

a

view

of'objectivity'

developed

within the

sciences. That

was the view that

it was

not

the status

of

the observer

that

yielded objectivity

but the

status

of logical

or intellectual

independence

between the ideas

being

evaluated,

on the one

hand,

and the intellectual

tools

employed

in the evaluated

investigations,

on the other

(Binford

1982a:128, emphasis

in

original).

Furthermore,

this

require-

ment of

independence

between

object theory

and

middle-range theory

can

be used to

answer

ob-

jections

of

circularity

in

the

testing

of

theory against

theory-laden

evidence,

as

put

by

contextualists

such as Shanks

and

Tilley,

who

say,

If

all observation

is

to

a

certain

extent

theoretical,

..

.

it

is

illogical

to maintain

that

theories can be

independently

tested

against

observation

(Shanks

and

Tilley

1987:40-41).

While

the antecedent

of this

is

true

(all

observation

is

theoretical),

the

consequent

is not

(theories

can be tested

against

independently

secured

evidence),

and it

is the insistence

on

independence

that breaks

any

problematic, self-serving circularity

of

theory

and

evidence.

Obser-

vations can serve as objective evidence for theories even though observations are indelibly theo-

retical.

In

general

then,

the

acceptability

of

middle-range

theories

and

the evidential

and

theoretical

claims

they

support

is

governed

by

a

requirement

of

consistency

and coherence

and a constraint

of

independence

in

the

accounting

for evidential

claims.

No

claims,

whether

preliminary

assumptions

of

meaning

or

middle-range

theories,

are

acceptable

if

they

lead to

contradiction.

We assume

that

the book

makes

sense,

hence

an

interpretation

that

introduces

contradiction

must

be

mistaken.

Interestingly,

independence

is

also

the answer

to

objections

of

circularity

and

unverifiability

directed

against

the

contextual,

hermeneutic

approach

(Binford 1989).

The

assumptions

about

subjective

meanings (Hodder

1986:79)

that

influence

our observations

of the

material record

are

themselves

accountable

to other

evidence

that

is

influenced

by

other

independent

hypotheses

of

subjective meaning. This contextual method need not be problematically circular

or left to

unsub-

stantiated

speculation

as

long

as

one insists

on a coherence

among

independently

arrived at

claims

about the

past.

It is no coincidence

that the

key

to

objectivity

is the

same

in the

middle-range

theory

and

hermeneutic

approaches.

It is

the result

of their

common

structure

and

the fact

that

they

are

fundamentally

the same

method.

CONCLUSION

The

original

presentation

of

Binford's

and

Hodder's

models

of

archaeological

method cast

them

as

being

in

opposition.

Archaeology by

Hodder's

contextual

account

is

as

reading

a

book

written

in an unfamiliar

language.

It

involves

a

hermeneutic

circle

of

analysis

that

requires

some

initial

assumptions

to

break

in

and

get

started.

Binford's

middle-rangetheory

account

portrays

archaeology

as

being methodologically

like

the

natural

sciences.

Responsible

archaeology

demands

observational

evidence

as tests

for

theories

about

the

past,

and

informative

observation

requires

theories

that

describe

the formation

of

the

evidence.

626

[Vol.

56,

No.

4,

1991




8/8

MIDDLE-RANGEHEORY

S HERMENEUTICS

They

are both

right.

It is not that

archaeology

is a

rigid

and

segregated

system

of theories

and

observations in

which brute facts are used

to test theories. It is rather

that the methods of

natural

science,

and those advocated

by

Binford for

archaeology,

are more like the

contextual,

hermeneutic,

back-and-forth

model

than Hodder's

original

opposition

seemed to

recognize.

The

argument

for

this

similarity

is

in

the

display

of the nature of claims about the

past

and claims

of

evidence,

and

the

structure of confirmation

as advocated

by

each

approach.

It is not the content

of claims that

is

shared

but

the

method

of

justification

and the standard of

objectivity.

It is

important

to

display

this

point

of

similarity

between

the

processualist

and contextualist

views

of

archaeology

to show that the

opposition

between the

two cannot be located

on basic issues

of

method.

Methodological

complaints

such as

circularity

and

speculativeness,

made from one

position

about

the

other,

are seen as

pointing

out

potential

weakness

that

both have and both must

cover

with the insistence

on coherence

under

the constraint of

independence

among

claims.

Hermeneutics,

as

a method of

acquiring knowledge

beyond

the most

manifest is

seen to be

appropriate

for

more

than

just uncovering

meanings, ideas,

and intentions. It

is

the

method as well of natural

science.

Acknowledgements.I am gratefulto CynthiaKosso for help with the facts and to the National Science

Foundation

for

support

(DIR

89-17989)

during part

of

my

work

on this

project.

REFERENCES

CITED

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L.

1977

General

Introduction.

In

For

Theory Building

in

Archaeology,

edited

by

L.

Binford, pp.

1-10.

Academic

Press,

New

York.

1982a

Objectivity-Explanation-Archaeology

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In

Theory

and

Explanation

in

Archaeology,

edited

by

C.

Renfrew,

M.

Rowlands,

and B.

Seagraves,

pp.

125-138.

Academic

Press,

New

York.

1982b

Meaning,

Inference

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Resource

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edited

by

C.

Renfrew

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Shennan,

pp. 160-163.

Cambridge

University Press,

Cambridge.

1989

Review of

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the

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by

Ian

Hodder.

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Bintliff,

J.,

and

A.

Snodgrass

1988 Off-Site Pottery Distributions: A Regional and Interregional Perspective. Current Anthropology 29:

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J.

Davis,

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Mantzourani

1991

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Hodder,

I.

1985

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In

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Archaeological

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edited

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Patrik,

L.

1985

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K.

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M.

B.

1988

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M.,

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Tilley

1987

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Shapere,

D.

1982

The

Concept

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Wilkinson,

T.

1982

The

Definition

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Ancient

Manured

Zones

by

Means

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Extensive

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Techniques.

Journal

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Wylie,

M.

A.

1982

Epistemological

Issues

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1990;

accepted

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28,

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Kosso]

627

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