middle east paper 2 sahaj

Sahaj Sood (N18066978) Politics of the Middle East (POL-UA 9540)

Prof. Hagai Segal

6. “Lebanon’s social and political instability, past and present – and especially its civil war – is primarily a result of incomplete nation-building in the country”. Discuss, with arguments for and against, and with specific reference to historic and contemporary developments in Lebanon.

“A country is not made up of two denials” stated a pessimistic Lebanese observer in

response to the 1943 National Pact, referring to the pact’s stipulation for Maronites to deny any

form of French protection and for Sunnis to deny any notions of rising Arab nationalism1. The

pact essentially institutionalized the confessional system of government in Lebanon; it was a

blatant form of incomplete nation-building which created instability within the country’s social

and political realms as will be demonstrated with evidence in the following sections. Ultimately,

this paper attempts to determine the role of incomplete nation-building in fostering the

instabilities within Lebanon that eventually thrust its seventeen different religious communities2

into a civil war by including analyses of events and conflicts stretching back from the twentieth

century, as a French mandate, to the twenty-first century, under Syrian hegemony.

In the years that followed the establishment of the French mandate in 1920, and the

constitution in 1926, communal tensions flared between the Maronites and the Sunnis. The

French mandate over Mount Lebanon and Ottoman Syria, or “Greater Lebanon,” included about

twice the land area of its predecessor and approximately a 50 percent greater population size3.

French journalist Alain Gresh summarized, in three ways, how this territorial and demographic

1 Gresh, Alain, and Dominique Vidal. "Lebanon: A Festering Sore." The Middle East--war without End? London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1988. N. pag. Print. 2 Milton-Edwards, Beverley. Contemporary Politics in the Middle East. Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2011. Print. 3 Chamie, Joseph. "THE LEBANESE CIVIL WAR: AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE CAUSES." World Affairs 139.3 (n.d.): 171-88. Winter 1976/77. Web.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/20671682>.

expansion widened religion-based communal divides: first, the influx of Muslims (especially

Sunni) from the annexed areas of Syria translated into a narrowing of the Christian majority in

the mandate, bringing them closer together in fear of being usurped by different religious

communities4. Second, the French awarded the Shiites official recognition as a religious

community in an attempt to increase support for the mandate4. Third, Article 95 of the 1926

constitution stipulated that each community would temporarily have ‘equal representation’ in

public sector jobs and ministerial positions4. Article 95, along with the mandate’s decision to

award autonomy to each community in legal and judicial domains relating to personal issues4

were further signs of the development of a confessional government operating in Lebanon4.

The aforementioned differences between the Maronites and the Sunnis arose due to two

reasons: discontent among Sunnis who were now separated from the Syrian interior5 as a result

of the annexation of Muslim-dominated areas of Syria, as well as the nationalist undertone of the

Sunnis’ rejections of the mandate5. Following the downfall of the Ottoman Empire after World

War One, the Sunnis aligned themselves with the rising Arab-nationalist movement that had

been sweeping across parts of the Arab world at that time5. Sentiments towards the French were

especially negative as it was they who unseated Prince Faisal from this throne in Damascus5.

This didn’t sit well with the Maronites as they were not only Christian, but also pro-French5, and

were averse to any ideas of pan-Arabism that had gained momentum after the war. These

differences remained throughout the 1920s and the 1930s when the Sunnis, under the leadership

of the likes of Riad al-Solh, remained steadfast in their demands to “incorporate the territories

4 Gresh, Alain, and Dominique Vidal. "Lebanon: A Festering Sore." The Middle East--war

without End? London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1988. N. pag. Print. 5 Hazin, Farid Al. The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon: 1967 - 1976. London: Tauris, 2000.

Print.

that were attached to Greater Lebanon into Syria.”5 These differences between the Maronite and

Sunni communities were the direct result of the incomplete nation-building efforts of the French

in establishing the mandate. Unfortunately, the National Pact of 1943, the verbal agreement

between the Sunnis and the Maronites to temporarily resolve their differences proved to be the

most blatant form of incomplete nation-building that directly contributed to raising the levels of

instability in Lebanon prior to the breaking out of the Civil War, as discussed below.

In the summer of 1943, a series of meetings between Maronite Bechara al-Khoury – who

became the first post-independence president – and Sunni Riyad al-Sulh – who became the first

post-independence prime minister led to the verbal agreement of the National Pact6, which called

on the Maronites to renounce the French mandate and French protection and on the Sunnis to

turn a blind eye and a deaf ear to any Arab nationalist notion of Arab unity, particularly with

Syria7. The pact also formalized the confessional system of government as public sector jobs and

state positions were distributed along religious lines7. The terms of the National Pact dictated a

6:5 ratio split in the number of seats in the parliament between Christians and Muslims. The pact

also called for the president and army chief of staff to be Maronite, the prime minister to be

Sunni, and the President of Parliament to be Shi’a7. Gresh points out that the “presidential nature

of the regime has accentuated the large hegemony of Maronites. The country has thus been

divided into virtually homogenous cantons, each cozily withdrawn into its own communal

solidarity,”7 calling into question what it really meant to be ‘Lebanese’ when most of the

inhabitants of Lebanon better identified with their religious communities instead of their

6 Chamie, Joseph. "THE LEBANESE CIVIL WAR: AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE CAUSES." World Affairs 139.3 (n.d.): 171-88. Winter 1976/77. Web.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/20671682>. 7 Gresh, Alain, and Dominique Vidal. "Lebanon: A Festering Sore." The Middle East--war

without End? London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1988. N. pag. Print.

nationality, reinforcing the earlier statement that the National Pact was a blatant form of

incomplete nation-building.

The ambiguity associated with the national pact is evident from the language used in the

agreement, shown below:

“Lebanon is an independent Arab country with ties to the West but which

cooperates with other Arab states while remaining neutral.”

The use of the phrase ‘Arab country’ contradicts the Sunni Muslims’ promise to distance

themselves away from any pan-Arab notions of Arab unity, whilst “ties with the west”

contradicts the Christians’ promise to distance themselves away from the mandate and French

protection. Despite its flaws, the agreement was key in establishing Lebanese independence,

officially declared on November 22, 1943. Initially, the pact appeared to have calmed

instabilities in the country by resolving the Sunni-Maronite dispute. A more microscopic

examination and future events reveal that it only managed to establish a “fragile social and

religious equilibrium”8 because, as the aforementioned pessimistic Lebanese observer noted, ‘a

country is not made up of two denials.’8 Their pessimism proved to be justified by the crisis of

1958.

The fragility of the National Pact came to light in 1958 when, during the Chamoun

presidency, both Christians and Muslims accused the other of violating the agreement9.

Chamoun became fearful of a potential realignment of the Lebanese Sunni Muslims with the

rising tide of Nasserism that swept through the Arab world during the 1950s and 60s9. On the


without End? London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1988. N. pag. Print. 9 Gasiorowski, Mark J. "Republic of Lebanon." The Government and Politics of the Middle East

and North Africa. N.p.: n.p., n.d. N. pag. Print.

other hand, Chamoun’s desire to extend his presidential term infuriated not only Muslims but

Christian rivals too10. Hostilities between the Sunnis and Maronites resumed and reached boiling

point after the formal announcement of the union of Egypt and Syria under the banner of the

United Arab Republic (UAR)10. This led some Sunni leaders to also call for unity under the UAR

framework11. Tensions flared and fighting ensued between pro- and anti- Chamoun forces10. The

social and political instabilities that contributed to this crisis appear to have more to do with

exogenous factors such as the rising tide of Arab nationalism and the formation of the UAR than

any forms of incomplete nation-building. Ultimately, the crisis was averted when Chamoun

resigned at the end of his term10; Fuad Shihab was his successor.

During his term, Shihab sought to stabilize Lebanon by increasing the role of the state12.

He brought calm into Lebanese politics by improving relations with Egypt and the Arab world

without interfering with Lebanese independence12 and by moving away from Western alignment

towards a neutralist position12. He aimed to make the system less confessional and to redistribute

wealth more equally – especially towards less privileged communities like the Shi’as – by

establishing a central bank, a central planning organization, and increasing investment in

roadbuilding, education, and hospitals10. Inevitably, this increased the level of bureaucracy in

government12. Since ministerial posts and public sector jobs were distributed along communal

lines, setting up more state institutions proved contradictory to his aim of making the

government less confessional12 and so the Maronites and Sunnis maintained their societal and

10 Gasiorowski, Mark J. "Republic of Lebanon." The Government and Politics of the Middle East

and North Africa. N.p.: n.p., n.d. N. pag. Print. 11 Hazin, Farid Al. The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon: 1967 - 1976. London: Tauris, 2000.

Print. 12 Yapp, Malcolm. The Near East since the First World War: A History to 1995. London:

Longman, 1996. Print.

political hegemony. Furthermore, Shi’a migration away from rural areas into the booming

metropolis of Beirut widened Lebanon’s income disparities, evoking hostility towards the Sunni

and Christian bourgeoisie even while many Shi’as experienced increasing incomes13 The

consequence of brewing Shi’a discontent was their radicalization and entry into politics under

the leadership of Musa Sadr13. In conclusion, Shihab’s efforts at nation-building backfired and

added Shiite discontent to the growing list of instabilities in Lebanon14.

Defeat of the Arab states in the Arab-Israeli war of 1948 brought an influx of Palestinian

refugees to Lebanon13. For 20 years, the refugees trusted the Arab states to fight their war against

Israel while they remained passive13. The situation changed after the defeat of the Arab states in

the 1967 Arab-Israeli war as it awoke the Palestinian refugees from their state of dormancy and

into guerilla conflict with Lebanon along the Israeli border and along the coast13. This also

incited more Shi’a migration into Beirut from Southern Lebanon, stirring up further discontent

within their community13. The late 1960s and 1970s then saw Palestinian radicalization gain

momentum after Sunni and Druze activists, most famously Druze leader Kamal Jumblat, aligned

themselves with the Palestine cause “not just as an affirmation of Arabism but also as a weapon

to compel the Maronites to accept new political arrangements reflecting Muslim numbers”13.

When prominent Sunni leaders, including the prime minister, chose against denouncing the

alignment of the Palestinians with the Lebanese left, it paralyzed the Lebanese state, meant the

Lebanese army could not uphold state sovereignty, and railroaded the Lebanese regime into the

1969 Cairo Accord, giving Palestinian freedom fighters operational freedom in parts of


and North Africa. N.p.: n.p., n.d. N. pag. Print. 14 Yapp, Malcolm. The Near East since the First World War: A History to 1995. London:

Longman, 1996. Print.

Lebanon”15. Disillusioned with the ineffectiveness of the Lebanese army’s efforts in holding

back the Palestinian-Left alignment, the Phalange and the Chamounists built up private

arsenals15. Israel’s crackdown on the Palestinian base in Jordan in 1970-71 destabilized Lebanon

further15, leaving it as the only country for a new Palestinian operational base15. The perception

of the ‘Palestinian dimension’ as an exogenous contributor to Lebanon’s instability was

reinforced by Hafiz al-Assad’s successful takeover of Syria and “stabilization of the Syrian

Ba’athist State [which] inaugurated prolonged Syrian interference in Lebanese politics”15.

However, it can also be argued that incomplete nation-building indirectly accentuated the

instability created by the Palestinian factor. After all, Jumblat’s desire to align with the

Palestinian cause to “compel the Maronites to accept new political arrangements reflecting

Muslim numbers”15 is a reflection of the Maronite hegemony determined by the confessional

system formalized by the National Pact of 1943, whose terms were based on a consensus that

dated as far back as 1932!16 Furthermore, it was President Franjiyah’s unsuccessful attack on the

Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in May 1973 that deepened the existing divisions in

the country by strengthening the Palestinian-Left alliance and spurring the Phalangists and their

allies into mobilization16. Ultimately, it was a President’s reckless policies that brought the

country to the brink of civil war.

The Civil War officially began on 13 April 1975 when a Palestinian bus was fired upon

while passing through the Phalangist-controlled Ail el Remmaneh district in Beirut16. Between

1975 and 1990, the war would go through a number of stages, each characterized by conflict


and North Africa. N.p.: n.p., n.d. N. pag. Print. 16 Gresh, Alain, and Dominique Vidal. "Lebanon: A Festering Sore." The Middle East--war


between different parties17. The conflict between 1975 and 1977 had a distinctly Lebanese

character to it, with the Lebanese Front (LF) and the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) the

two main belligerents17. The PLO entered the war not long after17. 1976 marked the arrival of the

Syrians whose troops remained on Lebanese soil until 200517, when accusations of involvement

in former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri’s assassination were leveled at them18. Israel’s

invasion of Lebanon until Beirut in June 1982 culminated in the expulsion of Yasir Arafat’s PLO

and the waning of Palestinian influence in Lebanon18. To this day, Israeli forces occupy the

Shiite-dominated southern parts of the country17. The American forces in the country during the

war were allies of Israel17; they withdrew from Beirut in 1982 after Israel’s successful removal

of the PLO from the country17. American withdrawal from the rest of the country only took place

in 1983 following an attack on US service personnel by a suicide bomber, killing hundreds17.

However, the Americans didn’t leave prior to giving Assad the green light to overthrow General

Amoun, in exchange for support18. On October 13 1990, the Syrians overran the Ba’abda

presidential palace, signaling the beginning of Syrian Ba’athist hegemony in Lebanon18.

The end of the civil war has only brought about a very fragile peace17 as instability still

plagues the country. While the aim of the 1989 Ta’if Accords was to solve the Lebanese crisis by

abolishing sectarianism, it failed to do so19. It did, however, alter the balance of power between

the communities as determined in the National Pact19. The previous 6:5 ratio split in favor of

Christians in the distribution of seats in parliament was modified to a 6:6 ratio19. The number of

seats was also increased to 12819. Significantly, the balance of power between the president, the

17 Milton-Edwards, Beverley. Contemporary Politics in the Middle East. Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2011. Print. 18 Gasiorowski, Mark J. "Republic of Lebanon." The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa. N.p.: n.p., n.d. N. pag. Print. 19 Ṭarābulsī, Fawwāz. A History of Modern Lebanon. London: Pluto, 2007. Print.

prime minister, the cabinet, the parliament and its speaker was shifted away from the president

towards the other positions, costing the president many of his executive powers20. The result was

an unstable distribution of power in government. As conflicts between the president, prime

minister and the cabinet became frequent20, it became evident that the accords had essentially

legitimized another system prone to discord and disagreement20. It also formalized Lebanon’s

dependence on Syria’s al-Asad to resolve these conflicts. Fawwaz Traboulsi qualifies this by

writing that “what we now call ‘conflict resolution’20, became in itself a potent layer of Syrian

power over Lebanon and the Lebanese.”20 It could be argued, therefore, that the Tai’f Accords,

which signaled the beginning of Syrian hegemony in Lebanon, is an example of incomplete

nation-building.

Another destabilizing post-Civil War development in Lebanon was the frosty relationship

between Rafik Hariri, elected Prime Minister in 1992, and the Syrian government. It can be

traced back to the late-1990s when Hafiz al-Asad promoted Emile Lahoud from army command

to the presidency21, entrusting him with the development of a Syrian-style security machine as

repression set the tone for Lahoud’s first term as president22. Lahoud used this security machine

to restrict the scope of Hariri’s influence21, who returned as the Lebanese Prime Minister in

200021. Damascus suspected him because during the first two years of Lahoud’s term as

president, Hariri was part of the opposition22. Hafiz al-Asad’s successor Bashar Al-Asad further

magnified any feelings of suspicion, and suspicion turned into hostility when, in 2004, Hariri and

Druze leader Walid Jumblat, with the backing of the United States and France21, refused to give

20 Ṭarābulsī, Fawwāz. A History of Modern Lebanon. London: Pluto, 2007. Print. 21 Gasiorowski, Mark J. "Republic of Lebanon." The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa. N.p.: n.p., n.d. N. pag. Print. 22 "Bashar Al-Assad's Lebanon Gamble." Middle East Forum. N.p., n.d. Web. 19 Apr. 2016.

in to Bashar’s demands for a three-year extension to Lahoud’s presidential term21. In response,

the United States and France brought the issue to the UN Security Council23. This led to the

passing of Resolution 1559 which called for the removal of the Syrian army from Lebanon and

the dissolution of the Hizballah militant group23. Tensions were high as Hariri tried to assemble a

Lebanese majority against Syria in the May 2005 Parliamentary elections23. Hariri’s untimely

death on 14th March 2005 along with twenty-two others in an explosion in Beirut destabilized the

nation and raised questions about the Syrian government23. On March 14th, one million people

across the various different religious communities in Lebanon gathered to commemorate Hariri

and denounce Syria23. Sustained pressure from the international community upon Bashar al-Asad

finally told in April 2015, when Syria formally withdrew, prematurely terminating Syria’s

hegemony over Lebanon23. The instability which grappled with the country following the

Syrians’ exit stems from a feud characterized by personal suspicions, and not much to do with

any failed incomplete nation-building.

Overall, after analyzing events and conflicts that occurred over a period of time that

stretched between the days of the French mandate up to the 21st century, we see that a majority

of the causes of Lebanon’s social and political destabilization stemmed from incomplete nation-

building policies. For instance, the 1943 National Pact, which formalized the confessional

system of government with its terms, accentuated the communal divides along religious lines24

that had already existed at the time of its agreement. It divided the country into what Gresh

described as “virtually homogenous cantons, each cozily withdrawn into its own communal


and North Africa. N.p.: n.p., n.d. N. pag. Print. 24 Gresh, Alain, and Dominique Vidal. "Lebanon: A Festering Sore." The Middle East--war


solidarity.”25 In Lebanon’s case, the confessional system of government made it easier for its

people to identify with their respective religious communities rather than their nationality, in turn

making the country prone to inter-communal hostilities as proven by the 1958 crisis. Even

exogenous factors such as the Palestinian dimension has its roots in the country’s incomplete

nation-building, as one of Jumblat’s principal reasons for aligning with the Palestinians was to

“to compel the Maronites to accept new political arrangements reflecting Muslim numbers.”26


without End? London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1988. N. pag. Print. 26 Gasiorowski, Mark J. "Republic of Lebanon." The Government and Politics of the Middle East

and North Africa. N.p.: n.p., n.d. N. pag. Print.

Works Cited

1. Gresh, Alain, and Dominique Vidal. "Lebanon: A Festering Sore." The Middle East--

war without End? London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1988. N. pag. Print.

2. Milton-Edwards, Beverley. Contemporary Politics in the Middle East. Cambridge,

UK: Polity, 2011. Print.

3. Chamie, Joseph. "THE LEBANESE CIVIL WAR: AN INVESTIGATION INTO

THE CAUSES." World Affairs 139.3 (n.d.): 171-88. Winter 1976/77. Web.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/20671682>.

4. Hazin, Farid Al. The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon: 1967 - 1976. London:

Tauris, 2000. Print.

5. Gasiorowski, Mark J. "Republic of Lebanon." The Government and Politics of the

Middle East and North Africa. N.p.: n.p., n.d. N. pag. Print.

6. Yapp, Malcolm. The Near East since the First World War: A History to 1995.

London: Longman, 1996. Print.

7. Ṭarābulsī, Fawwāz. A History of Modern Lebanon. London: Pluto, 2007. Print.

8. "Bashar Al-Assad's Lebanon Gamble." Middle East Forum. N.p., n.d. Web. 19 Apr.

2016.

EXACT WORD COUNT (EXCLUDING NAME, FOOTNOTES, ETC.) = 2759

middle east paper 2 sahaj

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