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The Great Game, a phrase used to describe the continental struggle between the British and Russian Empires for control of Central Asia, has continued to permeate all discussions regarding the region, a poignant acknowledgment of the geopolitical machinations played out by native and foreign states alike. When analyzing the complex cycles of conflict and rivalry that beset the continent, understanding and meaning is often more easily derived through a simpler wisdom that encapsulates certain immutable truths pertaining to the region’s history: ‘old chessboard, new players’. The current situation then, is indeed apt; America and China, this age’s hegemons, feint and parry around one another - one of their primary theatres of competition? The focal point tying Western and Asian civilizations together: Afghanistan. Encompassing the historical Central Asian junction that interlinks the Far East, South-East Asia and Western trade routes, Afghanistan serves as a geo-strategic pivot state straddling Central Asia and South Asia. This juxtaposition provides Afghanistan with a unique capacity for facilitating inter-regional nodes of commerce and cooperation. A capacity possessed by whomever controls Afghanistan at the time. Control in this sense should be seen within the larger concept of the balance of power, in which America and China each try to act as determiners of Afghanistan’s future via influencing foreign policy interests. Each superpower has in turn recognised and built connections around the two prime issues at the heart of Afghanistan’s woes: security and economy. As is well known, America has devoted substantial energies to both sectors, but with special emphasis on the former. From a geopolitical perspective, Afghanistan represents a viable, geographic base from which US forces (and their subsequent interests) could preside over the emerging power centers of Central and South Asia. On the other hand, China has approached relations with Afghanistan from a singular economic standpoint: trade-flows instead of bloodflows. However, Chinese policymakers have acknowledged the symbiotic relationship existing between the two issues in much the same manner as the Americans, however their promises of military aid are ancillary to their offer of an economic package - as well as being far more opaque. It is then that the conceptualization of a grand ‘Silk Road’ policy was born, encompassing politico- economic variables that continued the tradition of Great Power politics being played out in Central Asia. These two regional trends will be measured by their implementation of Afghanistan as a conduit for shaping economic integration and interdependence in the region. First: The US Silk Road Conception In 2011, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton delivered a speech defining the US’s Central Asia policy, termed the ‘New Silk Road Initiative’. The US conceived of an international economic and transit network stretching between Central Asia and South Asia, with Afghanistan as the geographic node: “Turkmen gas fields could help meet both Pakistan’s and India’s growing energy needs and provide significant transit revenues for both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Tajik cotton could be turned into Indian linens. Furniture and fruit from Afghanistan could find its way to the markets of Astana or Mumbai and beyond”. Analysts consider this policy initiative as being aimed at pre-emptive neutralization of the Chinese modus operandi for diplomatic engagements: civil infrastructure development and trade deregulation as drivers of regional cooperation and foreign direct investment. US efforts to minimize Chinese monopolization of regional markets can be discerned further in private- public partnerships such as the PamirEnergy hydropower station in southeastern Tajikistan, which provides electricity along the Tajik-Afghan border. The scheme is also thought to strengthen the Pakistan-Afghanistan Transit Trade Agreement, which would improve bilateral dialogue on other disputes, such as water scarcity surrounding access to the Kabul River Basin. The increased US focus on Afghanistan’s cross-border trade linkages has prompted the Asian Development Bank, through the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) program, to fund a project that will establish railway between the Afghan city of Mazar-e-Sharif to Hairatan on the northern border with Uzbekistan.

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  • The Great Game, a phrase used to describe the continental struggle between the British and Russian Empires for control of Central Asia, has continued to permeate all discussions regarding the region, a poignant acknowledgment of the geopolitical machinations played out by native and foreign states alike. When analyzing the complex cycles of conflict and rivalry that beset the continent, understanding and meaning is often more easily derived through a simpler wisdom that encapsulates certain immutable truths pertaining to the regions history: old chessboard, new players. The current situation then, is indeed apt; America and China, this ages hegemons, feint and parry around one another - one of their primary theatres of competition? The focal point tying Western and Asian civilizations together: Afghanistan. Encompassing the historical Central Asian junction that interlinks the Far East, South-East Asia and Western trade routes, Afghanistan serves as a geo-strategic pivot state straddling Central Asia and South Asia. This juxtaposition provides Afghanistan with a unique capacity for facilitating inter-regional nodes of commerce and cooperation. A capacity possessed by whomever controls Afghanistan at the time. Control in this sense should be seen within the larger concept of the balance of power, in which America and China each try to act as determiners of Afghanistans future via influencing foreign policy interests. Each superpower has in turn recognised and built connections around the two prime issues at the heart of Afghanistans woes: security and economy. As is well known, America has devoted substantial energies to both sectors, but with special emphasis on the former. From a geopolitical perspective, Afghanistan represents a viable, geographic base from which US forces (and their subsequent interests) could preside over the emerging power centers of Central and South Asia. On the other hand, China has approached relations with Afghanistan from a singular economic standpoint: trade-flows instead of bloodflows. However, Chinese policymakers have acknowledged the symbiotic relationship existing between the two issues in much the same manner as the Americans, however their promises of military aid are ancillary to their offer of an economic package - as well as being far more opaque. It is then that the conceptualization of a grand Silk Road policy was born, encompassing politico-economic variables that continued the tradition of Great Power politics being played out in Central Asia. These two regional trends will be measured by their implementation of Afghanistan as a conduit for shaping economic integration and interdependence in the region. First: The US Silk Road Conception In 2011, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton delivered a speech defining the USs Central Asia policy, termed the New Silk Road Initiative. The US conceived of an international economic and transit network stretching between Central Asia and South Asia, with Afghanistan as the geographic node: Turkmen gas fields could help meet both Pakistans and Indias growing energy needs and provide significant transit revenues for both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Tajik cotton could be turned into Indian linens. Furniture and fruit from Afghanistan could find its way to the markets of Astana or Mumbai and beyond. Analysts consider this policy initiative as being aimed at pre-emptive neutralization of the Chinese modus operandi for diplomatic engagements: civil infrastructure development and trade deregulation as drivers of regional cooperation and foreign direct investment. US efforts to minimize Chinese monopolization of regional markets can be discerned further in private-public partnerships such as the PamirEnergy hydropower station in southeastern Tajikistan, which provides electricity along the Tajik-Afghan border. The scheme is also thought to strengthen the Pakistan-Afghanistan Transit Trade Agreement, which would improve bilateral dialogue on other disputes, such as water scarcity surrounding access to the Kabul River Basin. The increased US focus on Afghanistans cross-border trade linkages has prompted the Asian Development Bank, through the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) program, to fund a project that will establish railway between the Afghan city of Mazar-e-Sharif to Hairatan on the northern border with Uzbekistan.

    Nicholas Mclean

    Nicholas McleanText

  • Second: The Chinese Silk Road Conception In 2013, faced with a dilution of their economic monopoly by the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), President Xi Jinping announced Chinas own interpretation of what constitutes a Silk Road: an economic belt extending across Central Asia into Europe. The Chinese government will focus on strengthening regional avenues of commerce in order to countermine the US global posture strategy aimed at containing China. Chinese investment of $3.5B into Afghanistans Aynak Mines project and development of the surrounding area, demonstrates Chinas desire for regional economic integration. With recent estimates having identified $1T worth of mineral deposits, Afghanistan will be at the forefront of a Central Asian framework that could anchor Chinese interest, with initiatives such as the Turkmenistan Pakistan Afghanistan India (TAPI) Pipline and the Heart of Asia Process, which is aimed at reviving the spirit of the Silk Route with special focus on trade, transit, energy and communication routes. This differentiates from the US conception in significant geographic fashion; instead of a north-southeast direction, China seeks to shift the integration of Central Asia along an east-northwest trajectory. There are two immediate consequences of such an initiative; first, operating in Afghanistan would allow China to access Iran and the Caucasus, breaking US attempts at containment and piercing the arc of instability, an area of volatility identified by US foreign policymakers that runs from the eastern Atlantic Ocean through the south of Europe, into the Middle East and up to the Caucasus. Second, Chinas focus on the import-export capacity of developing countries throughout Central Asia, emphasizing the need to lower regulatory burdens and strengthen trade-enabling services, would create a unified, intra-regional market plunging China into a new wave of hyper-capitalism and justify US fears. This Silk Road would begin in Chinas Xinjiang province, with a two-fold model for economic engagement in Eastern Europe and Central Asia respectively. Firstly, the establishment of international railway networks with European nations, which set up economic zones along transport corridors, the most prominent of which is the Chongqing-Xinjiang-Duisburg cargo rail route. The resulting economic growth would be detrimental to the European Union; nations such as Turkey who do not meet the EUs strict requirements for admittance would turn to the lucrative trade prospects with China, as would states that seek foreign direct investment as a means to compensate for unattractive positions in local markets, such as Greece. The second phase of Chinas economic model would be the integration of regional energy sectors, particularly Turkmenistans Galkynsh gas field and Kazakhstans Kashagan oil field. Afghanistan would be utilised as the locus point for these projects; with the establishment of a Special Economic Zone in Kashgar in Western China, investment flows will extend out via Afghanistans Wakhan Corridor and directly stimulate economic development in Tajikistan, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan an international market with a 1.3 Billion population, which in itself will have ripple-on effects. These policy initiatives serve to pose a crucial question: If the goal is to impede each others reach in this particular geopolitical space, what will be the result when whomever emerges as the disadvantaged opponent takes the opportunity to occupy another theatre ignored by the victor, who in their efforts to reign supreme in Central Asia, has neglected other sectors of importance? The simple answer is that a new theatre will be chosen, with Central Asias importance dimming in foreign policy calculi. However, this is not to say that either state will abandon its regional interests; America cannot afford to allow former satellite states to be swayed solely by Russian and Chinese influences, whilst Chinas Middle Kingdom philosophy requires tribute from the Outer Kingdoms of Asia. As this Great Game transitions through its nascent stages of confrontation, the most prudent course of speculation on the topic seems to follow that most overused of cliques: only time will tell.