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Event:Type of event: Intervie~"" . . . II~FBIWashington Field Office LanguageSupervisor)Date: August 6, 2003Special Access Issues: NonePrepared by: Michael Jacobson,Team Number: 6

/~,/9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy

Location: FBI Washington Field OfficeParticipants - Non-Commission: fB'! Assistant General Counsel Sean O'Neill

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Participants - Commission: Lance Cole and Mike Jacobson.,." ,',I

://Bad{groundI lb~gan working at the JBI straight out of high school. She went to

college while working at the FBI, .and graduated from the University of Maryland. She isnow working on a MAlPhD in th e psychology of terrorism. When she first joined theFBI, she worked in the mail rOQ.tTI.nd/she then transferred to the security office. Shewent to New Agents class, but/did not/become an agent, and came back to WFO as anintelligence analyst instead. She was/an Intelligence Research Specialist on anInternational Terrorist squad: from 1~96 until approximately a month ago. At that time,she was assigned to the ne~ly created Intelligence Squad, and became an IntelligenceOperations Specialist. I ,/ ~tated that all of the analysts at WFO have now beenassigned to this squad, and that all of the analysts are now considered "IntelligenceOperations Specialists:~?'Working on the JOlnt InteUigence Task Force &Analytic and Intelligence Reforms

I Ih as a p end ing p ro je c t on the ove ra l l unde rs t and ing of al-Qa'ida, byanalyzing the Infonnation on the al-Qa'ida subjects ofWFO. She used to do primarycase support, working at the direction of the agents on her squad. Generally, leads wouldcome in that supervisors needed covered, and some of these leads would be assigned toher. Her current squad is DT -4, and is a "Joint Intelligence Task Force." She was. originally on IT -3, which was also called NS-14, and CT -4 in the past. Her "old" squadwas responsible for Barnas, PIJ, and Hizbollah, and al-Qa'ida. Although they wereresponsible for al-Qa'ida prior to 9/11, it has become more of a focus. They were theonly squad at WFO with any responsibility for al-Qa'ida prior to 9/11. After 9/11, theybecame the PENTTBOM squad, which still included Hamas, Hizbollah, etc.

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As far as career development. they are supposed to be hiring GS-I3 analyticsupervisors. The field office will Iose analysts if they don't get on the bandwagon interms of promotional opportunities. Currently, the opportunities at the field office arelimited; analysts can only be promoted to a . . . .S-12. They are planning to bring in ReportsOfficers and Intelligence Analysis, who will.be eligible for promotion to a GS-13. Shehas heard that all of this hiring i $ on hold, but . ..he doesn't know why. She might considergoing to HQ at some point. I ! /' lImowS--..yeryittle and has heard very little aboutthe Office of Intelligence. / "

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ACC~~S to databases and int~~UgenceproductsAs far as access t~ da~bases and tecbnolog;;1 !Said that WFO has

ICON, RAID, Intelink, and analysts' notebook. She's not accessing any databases withshared information. She has! an Intelink password, but has never used it. She doesn'tknow about other analysts' lise of Intelink. She's not working on IntelligenceInformation Reports; another analyst is working on those. She uses ACS, and says thatthis is always the first: place you look for information. She doesn't know what otheranalysts are doing. Reports Officers may be assigned to her squad, but she has been toldthat is on hold. ; ,

I Jdoes not really see intelligence products. She also does not have a lotof interaction with the HQ analysts. She doesn't know whether CIA or NSA analysts willbe assigned to her squad/ and she does not have daily contact with the NSA or CIApeople at WFO. She didnote that a lot is changing though. She has never tasked othersfor analytic products, 3 .Q idhasn't really initiated analytic products. Until now, it'sprimarily just been case' support.

Knowledge of other squads' casesIt's difficult to/know what other squads are working on. People don't typically go

around comparing cases, There is more willingness now (after 9/11) to go help othersquads, but the only formal mechanism for sharing information is through the supervisor.The intelligence squad (her squad) is trying to get people to understand that they need toshare this information. She doesn't know what plan is in place to try and make this work,however.

HO centralizationI , h a s not heard much about HQ centralization efforts. She doesn't think

that HQ is going to become the office of origin on al-Qa'ida cases. Investigations arestill field office drive, but a lot is directed from HQ. As to whether or not this is achange, she said that it could just be more obvious now. Since 9/11, everyone has hadmore of a focus.

John Walker Lindh investigation

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//9.(11 Law Enforcement Privacy

~_~_ ....c~ent supkrvisor i~1 I The squad used to be thecriminal intelligence squad, where all of the criminal analysts were assigned. .He r squadis responsible for intelligence relating to FeI, IT, DT, and criminal matters. The analystsare all still focusing on the same matters that they have in the past. The currentarrangement has been confusi",ng, because a lot of people are reporting to her onesupervisor.

Her assignments have typically come through the supervisor and are based on theneeds of the squad. She is still awaiting approval for her al-Qa'ida overview project. Sheworked on the John Walker/Lindh case (discussed in greater detail below). She is tryingto keep it 50-50, in terms of long-term strategic assignments versus case support. So far,though it's been more likej90% case support, and 10% "other." She is not sure whetherwhat she is doing is representative of other analysts. She's not sure what they areworking on. She is regularly called to help staff the command post at WFO, and isusually one of the first ones called when there is a crisis.

The plan for her new squad is to have half the analysts do case support, and havehalf do strategic analysis. She's not aware that anyone is doing strategic analysis at thispoint. Once again, she/emphasized that she will be doing the al-Qa'ida overview in thefuture. ./

In terms of the' "big picture" at WFO, the new squad will help put the focus on, intelligence and will eentralize the intelligence efforts onto one squad. The hope is thatthey will use analysts more for intelligence analysis than the cover leads. There havesome changes; she doesn't think that prior to 9/11 she would have been involved in theLindh case. Prior they were just covering leads, and at least now they arebecoming more involved incase support.

I I~ticipates that the strategic analysts at WFO will have similar roles tothose of the strategic analysts at HQ. There will be much more communication betweenthese field and HQ analysts, though she's not exactly sure as to what the HQ analysts willbe doing. A lot of responsibility for making this work 'will fall to her supervisor. Thesupervisor will be responsible for about 45-50 people (30 analysts and 15 agents). Theagents on the squad will focus on liaison and on reviewing what information WFO has inits possession.

Her squad will be involved in asset validation. They will be looking through assetinformation, and through files for their assessments. She anticipates some push backwhen she wants access to the source information, but thinks she will be backed up byhigher level people in the office, so she will get access to what she needs. Normally,source information just goes to the case file. She is hoping that the analysts andintelligence personnel will begin to drive the investigations, but is not sure how soon thatwill happen. There hasn't been much of a reaction to this point by case agents about thisconcept, but it's just the beginning. She doesn't think that the agents will be happy aboutthis.