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Between the Past andthe Future: Has a Shift inItalian–Libyan RelationsOccurred?Karim Mezran & Paola De MaioPublished online: 04 Mar 2011.

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Between the Past and the Future:Has a Shift in Italian–LibyanRelations Occurred?

KARIM MEZRAN & PAOLA DE MAIO

ABSTRACT The present paper discusses the evolution of the relations between Italy and Libya inthe recent past with particular attention focused on the developments in the last decade. The aim is todevelop a framework for examining and understanding the hidden reasons and the vested intereststhat have driven these two countries’ foreign policies within the framework of the widerMediterranean region. The findings discussed here are based on an analysis of the evolution ofItalian foreign policy towards Libya as reported by the press, the main political protagonists andthrough an examination of the unfolding of facts and events. Primary newspapers sources arewidely used in addition to interviews with Italian and Libyan officials and policymakers.

Italian–Libyan relations have oscillated over the years, in accordance with major inter-

national strategic trends. However, despite such oscillations, they have never ceased to

be important and critical for both Italy’s numerous governments, on the one hand, and

Qadhafi’s often enigmatic rule, on the other.

The main purpose of this article, concerning Italian foreign policy towards Libya during

the last half of the twentieth century, is aimed at defining the role these two countries have

played, and could still play, within the Mediterranean region, which both Rome and

Tripoli consider as a pivotal area. This article seeks to underline the main features, the

great contradictions, the elements of continuity and the shifts that have characterised

and moulded Italian–Libyan relations.

In this respect, the great challenge consists in examining and discovering the hidden

reasons and the vested interests that have driven these two countries’ foreign policy,

never forgetting the huge weight of the 1911 occupation, which Qadhafi wants Italy to

recover by compensation. Indeed, the problem of compensations has been the leitmotif

of Italian–Libyan relations, occasionally remerging as a device used in order to loosen

mutual ties.

Professor Karim Mezran is a Professorial Lecturer in International Relations at the Bologna Center of Johns

Hopkins University and Assistant Professor of Political Science at John Cabot University. He is Director of

the Center for American Studies of Rome. He has obtained a Masters in Arab Studies at Georgetown University

and a PhD in International Relations at Johns Hopkins University–SAIS of Washington, DC. He is the author of

Negotiation and Construction of National Identities (Hotei Publishing, 2007) and Negotiating National Identity:

The Case of North Africa (Antonio Pellicani Editore, 2002). Paola De Maio is a Senior Researcher at Globe

Research & Publishing, specialising in North Africa and security studies.

ISSN 1362-9387 print/ISSN 1743-9345 online/07/040439–13 # 2007 Taylor & FrancisDOI: 10.1080/13629380701464984

The Journal of North African Studies Vol. 12, No. 4, December 2007

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For some time now Italy has been used to Colonel Qadhafi’s extravagant behaviour.

The events of the 1980s that characterised Italo-Lybian relations showed a swinging stan-

dard in the relationships between Rome and Tripoli.

Libya’s turning point at the end of the 1990s, with its opening to the West, marked the

beginning of a new era, although no less conflictual. The need to face up to the conse-

quences of the European embargo and US sanctions (as a result of Libyan terrorist activi-

ties culminated with the Lockerbie disaster in 1988) has forced the Colonel to make a rapid

change, this time favourable towards pacification with the West and with ‘neighbouring

Italy’. This turning point, formalised with the renunciation of the development of

nuclear programmes, as well as its acceptance of responsibility for the Lockerbie disaster

accompanied by Tripoli’s formal undertaking to fight terrorism, appeared to open the road

towards a period of peace, thanks to the revocation of economic sanctions.

However, clashes in Benghazi, the unsolved problem of compensation for war damages

due from Italy, unkept promises made by and to the Colonel, not least the tragedy of illegal

immigration, have continued, and still continue to undermine the stability of relations

with Tripoli.

A Glance at the Recent Past

For more than 50 years, the central aim of Italy’s foreign policy has been directed towards

consolidating Rome’s position as a ‘medium-sized regional power’ (Santoro, 1986).

Starting from the late 1970s, Italian foreign policy has had the opportunity to rely on

both a considerable economic development and a reinforced commercial position. Its rel-

evant social and economic transformation has been one of the main reasons in Italy’s

refusal to play a secondary role within the Euro-Mediterranean context. Since the Medi-

terranean could be considered as the basic vehicle of Rome’s relation with not-too-distant

Libya, and a factor of its national security and prosperity, Italy has constantly had a clear

interest in making it an area of stability. During the 1970s, Italy, by expanding and

strengthening its ties with Qadhafi, was becoming an important ‘middle power’ within

NATO, playing the rather uncommon role of both acting as ‘a bridge between Libya

and the West’ and simultaneously counterbalancing a not-too-desired spreading of

Soviet influence within the Arab world.

During those years, Libya also became a country in full economic development,

displaying Africa’s highest per capita income, and, for that reason, profiling itself as an

advantageous opportunity for Italian investments (Aruffo, 2001). In 1972, Italian

‘energy giant’ ENI and Libya’s government created a joint company, projecting both pet-

rochemical and territorial engineering-related installations. Other Italian industrial groups

supplied technologies and war armaments, thus obtaining huge orders and ensuring jobs

for at least some of the Italian immigrants, in an economically difficult period for the

country.

The first practical result of such an economic activism between Rome and Tripoli

occurred in 1974, as an Economic and Scientific Co-operation Agreement was signed in

exchange for seven million tons of oil per year. Furthermore, in 1976, Qadhafi’s Libya

acquired 10 per cent of Fiat’s shares, so that it could enter the global market. On the

other hand, Italian public and private capital was granted the possibility to return to

North Africa, despite revolutionary Libya being considered as a factor of instability

dangerously close to NATO’s critical southern side.

440 K. Mezran & P. De Maio

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At the end of 1970s, Italy’s commercial activism in North Africa coupled with Rome’s

Mediterranean policy, aimed at achieving a certain degree of autonomy in its relations

with both NATO and the United States, reached the highest level.

Italy’s geo-strategic position, its dependence on Arab oil markets, its activism in North

Africa and its not complete subordination to American pro-Israel policies, as far as the

Middle Eastern politics did go, made Rome sufficiently ready for a full ‘collaboration’

with Libya’s Rcc (Revolutionary Command Council). That explains Andreotti’s (than

Italian Prime Minister) 1978 visit to Tripoli, in order to soften Libya’s resistance

against the Camp David Peace Accords.1

Since the beginning of the 1980s, the international situation has undergone a critical

mutation. With the new Regan Administration, a period of confrontation started

between Washington and Tripoli. Qadhafi’s Libya was now accused of international

terrorism and included in the so-called list of ‘rogue states’. Indeed, at the end of the

1970s, in the case of Libya as well as within the broader context of North Africa,

western conduct appeared to be internally divided along the lines of two different

approaches: an inclusive one and a coercive one.

The first one, preferred by Italy, was regarded, and still is, as the correct way to frame

Qadhafi, to prevent the regime from feeling frustrated or isolated, and moderate Libya’s

radicalism and unpredictability. The coercive approach, on the other hand, generally

favoured by the US, was mainly based on economic and diplomatic confrontation

which wouldn’t shy away from both sanctions and embargos, and was considered the

most immediate way to deal with Libya.

Italy’s inclination aimed at pursuing its own economic and political interests in nearby

Libya through an open and inclusive policy clearly manifested itself during the late 1970s

and the early 1980s, when Qadhafi severely blamed Italy because of the colonial atrocities

and abuses it committed on Libyan soil during the first half of the twentieth century. Even

in these circumstances, Italy’s government proceeded with its realistic approach, that is,

the adoption of a ‘diplomatic compromise’ aimed at both preserving its economic

collaboration with Qadhafi and avoiding damages to its political dialogue with such an

ambiguous partner (Man, 1980).

In 1984 Andreotti’s great conciliatory effort, aimed at solving the thorny compen-

sations issue, overcame the impasse by leading to the signing of an agreement by

which Rome, as far as compensations were concerned, proposed the realisation of a

symbolic Italian initiative which would consist of both the building of a cardiology hos-

pital in Libya and the offering of training courses for local staff. On the other side, the

Agreement stated that Libya would have paid in oil all the debts it had pending with

Italy’s industries that have performed working contracts and which have not been

paid.2 In the meantime, Andreotti was trying to convince Reagan of Qadhafi’s true will-

ingness to remain neutral vis-a-vis the USSR struggle. Rome’s final aim was to redeem

Libya from both isolation and ostracism, which both resulted from Tripoli’s presumed

engagement with terrorism. Indeed, Italy’s purpose was clearly aimed at relaunching its

commercial and economical relations with Libya which were threatened by the conduct

adopted by both Washington and the UN.

At the same time Rome had to respond to western concerns, which doubted Italy’s

efforts to ensure its national interests regarding Libya would diplomatically coexist with

those related to Europe, the US and NATO. Hence, for example, Italy’s decision in the first

half of the 1980s to let the Reagan Administration install cruise missiles in Comiso

Between the Past and the Future 441

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(Sicily), despite such move, once more jeopardised its relations with its Mediterranean

partner. However, their mutually profitable economic partnership did not suffer that

much.3

Nevertheless, by the mid 1980s, the precarious balance the Italian government was

trying to maintain appeared even more uncertain and unstable. Reagan’s anti-Libyan

obsession did not seem to lose any ground whatsoever. The exasperation of the Arab–

Israeli–Palestinian conflict, adding to the increase of international and Palestinian terrorist

attacks, was progressively transforming the Mediterranean into a highly unstable area,

threatening Italy’s economic interests.

While Washington was determined in pursuing its economic boycott of Libya, Italy’s

new government, led by socialist leader Bettino Craxi, rejected all reprisal-related

options. Nevertheless, the severe terrorist attack which occurred in West Berlin’s La

Belle Nightclub; the American response which culminated in the bombing of both

Benghazi and Tripoli (aimed at destroying Qadhafi’s political regime); the missiles

which Tripoli used in order to attack Italy’s southern island of Lampedusa; the

bombing of the Pan Am flight no. 103 and the subsequent UN sanctions and embargos

trapped Italian strategies within an uncomfortable and complex grip. It was then that

Rome’s uncertain foreign policy conduct, which couldn’t avoid abiding to Washington’s

hardline stance as far as Tripoli was concerned, resulted in a major cooling of Italian–

Libyan relations which also compromised their economic and commercial implications.

Once again though, it was Andreotti who ‘saved the day’ by opting for a more conci-

liatory strategy (Aruffo, 2001). Distancing Rome from Washington, he underlined that:

‘the “cannon era” against Mediterranean Sultans is finished . . .’ (quoted in Il Corriere

della Sera, 16 February 1986).4

At the same time, Qadhafi was facing remarkable problems in dealing with Libya’s

internal opposition, and after his military failure in Ciad,5 the Colonel was somehow

forced to tone down the controversy. Although not giving up on his country’s right to

war compensations, a renewed dialogue with Rome, given the relevant degree of inter-

national isolation Libya was confronted with, seemed the only alternative in order to

make sure Tripoli could re-enter the international community. At the same time, Rome

confirmed its readiness to act as reconciliation actor between Libya and the West.

Indeed, the Italian government, in order to restore its vital relation with Tripoli, did not

shy away from evidently declaring its willingness to meet all the obligations it had

assumed under the 1956 Agreement, which, first and foremost, stated Italy was to partici-

pate in Libya’s economic reconstruction. That was the first sign of a clear improvement, as

far as Italian–Libyan relations were concerned. Tripoli, in fact, was eager to break out of

the no longer tolerable degree of international isolation it was confined into, whereas

Rome firmly intended to close an old, colonial era-related chapter which was turning

into an increasingly unbearable obstacle, if Italy was to fully pursue its national interests.

The Swing

As we have seen, until the end of the 1990s, Qadhafi’s actual or presumed involvement in

some of the worst terrorist attacks had seriously hardened bilateral relations between

Rome and Tripoli. Additionally, as several experts stressed, Italian–Libyan relations

have always been politically conditioned by a persistent anti-Italian argument, caused

by Rome’s colonial heritage.

442 K. Mezran & P. De Maio

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The 1990s, despite tensions arising from Italy’s 1911–42/43 colonial past in Libya,

were to mark a positive shift as far as Italian–Libyan relations were concerned. Among

the main factors which pushed for such a change, there were Tripoli’s progressive

acknowledgement of Israel’s inevitable existence and the failure of a large-scale revolu-

tionary strategy which, in turn, could also be deemed as responsible for Qadhafi’s

defeat in the fight against imperialism. The severe burden Tripoli had to deal with

because of both UN sanctions and US embargos played the greatest role in Libya’s

opening to the West (De Maio, 2006).6

Regarding the embargo the common strategy was that Europe, led by Italy, was to

provide the carrots, whereas Washington was to supply the sticks, and that such a combi-

nation could potentially exercise a constructive pressure on Libya (Takeyh, 2001).

The far-reaching consequences of the sanctions Libya had to deal with and the increas-

ing pressure the opposition was putting on the Colonel led Qadhafi to the conclusion that

he had to choose the only possible alternative if he was to fix, at least partially, both his

country’s precarious domestic situation and its relation with the West. This explains

why, in 1993, Libya offered a decisive contribution to North Africa’s regional stability

against an emerging Islamist radicalism in Maghreb (Deeb, 1991).

Italy’s prolonged diplomatic endeavour towards Tripoli symbolised ‘the last and

hardest step of Europe’s challenge aimed at ending Libya’s isolation, after years

during which it had been considered as a terrorist state’ (The New York Times, 2 December

1999).

Libya’s progressive opening to the West started at the end of 1990s, backed by Italy’s

diplomatic and political co-operation. Rome’s diplomacy helped a country that was

struggling to overcome its isolation. It was then that Italy embodied its role of ‘bridge

between Libya and Europe’.7

During these years, Italy acted as a forerunner. In 1996, Italian Foreign Minister

Lamberto Dini, during the Ulivo government, received his Libyan colleague, Omar

Al-Muntasser, in Rome. This meeting paved the way for a Joint Declaration signed in

Tripoli on 9 July 1998 (personal interview of Karim Mezran with Minister Omar

Al-Muntasser, spring 1998). This declaration was the outcome of a deep and prolonged

diplomatic activity which had started in 1993 despite international sanctions and embar-

gos. Those efforts were aimed at making Libya re-enter the international diplomatic

and economic scenario (Torchia, 2002).

With the Joint Declaration, Italy acknowledged its colonial responsibilities and its duty

to search for the Libyan victims of its colonial administration, to take care of them and of

their families, to help Libyan authorities clear their territory of Italy’s Second World War

mines. With this same Declaration, the two governments agreed to set up a Joint Italian–

Libyan Company, owned by Libyan and Italian firms and aimed at undertaking joint

development projects in Libya, with part of its incomes destined to finance de-mining

operations (Del Boca, 1998). The Joint Company was established on 30 May 1999. The

Declaration sounded as a clear challenge to the imposed embargo, not to respect the econ-

omic restrictions becoming evident with the opening of a direct ferry-line between Tripoli

and Catania (Baldinetti, 2003).

In relation to the complex issue of compensations, Tripoli agreed upon what had

previously been settled under King Idris.8 The 1999 summit between the two leaders

also resulted in a delayed and long-due Italian recognition of all the sufferings Rome

caused during its occupation.

Between the Past and the Future 443

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Additionally, Qadhafi showed his appraisal to the Ulivo government by officially

admitting that: ‘. . . without the center-left coalition, first with Prodi and now with

D’Alema, it was our intention to include Italy in “a black list” of countries we do not

want to deal with. Those to boycott’.

On the other hand, the day after the Joint Declaration, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs

Lamberto Dini underlined how far-reaching such diplomatic success was:

. . . the recovering of Italian–Libyan relations is the essential requirement for a total

re-integration of Tripoli within the international community. This means a decrease

of tensions around the Mediterranean area and represents the prerequisite for the

re-building of good neighbourhood relations and respective trust in order to avoid

hostilities, to prevent terrorist attacks or direct aggression . . . Thus, the Declaration

provides for a common effort aimed at fighting terrorism, preventing the prolifer-

ation of chemical weapons and ensuring the respect of Human Rights . . .9

The practical evidence of Libya’s good intentions came in 1998, when Libya officially

became the first country to issue an Interpol arrest warrant against Bin Laden, claiming

that Al Qaeda had collaborated with local radicals. In addition, on 5 April 1999,

Libya’s decision to hand over the two suspects in the Lockerbie affair brought about

both the suspension of sanctions and the implementation of normalisation policies

within a renewed inclusive perspective which also included other European States

(Martinez, 2000).

Italian–Libyan relations got rapidly upgraded soon after the sanctions were lifted and

suspended. In April and December 1999, respectively, Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini

and Prime Minister Massimo D’Alema visited Tripoli, showing that bilateral relations

were flourishing (Stanley, 1999).

The strategic shift as far as Tripoli’s foreign policy conduct was concerned led to a

re-improvement of economic relations between these two countries. It was now time

for Italy to relaunch its essential role as the ‘political bridge’ connecting Europe, Africa

and the Middle East. As D’Alema told reporters: ‘. . . we look at Libya as a connection

between Europe, Africa and the Arab World . . . Libya will become Italy’s bridge to

Africa, and Italy will be Libya’s door to Europe.’ In the light of such events,

D’Alema’s visit to Tripoli was first aimed at forging a more effective collaboration.

The approach which Rome undertook was dictated by an economic strategy which was

clearly conceived in order to tie Italy to those ‘petroleum-producing countries’ of both

North Africa and the Middle East.

The revival of Libya’s economy after the suspension of sanctions transformed this

country into a magnet of international investments, making it the most attractive area

for oil exportation activities. Hence, Europe’s energy giants, led by Italy’s ENI, had

once more resumed their activities related to Libya’s oil and natural gas industries. The

diplomatic and economic gamble pursued by Italy’s centre-left governments was

centred on the political stabilisation of the traditional North African oil route, instead of

choosing the more recent and risky Caucasian one, preferred by Washington. Italy’s

ENI Group had constantly been given the task of strengthening Rome’s economic interests

in Libya and, after years of prohibitions, it was finally allowed to start with its colossal

project aimed at the construction of a submarine gas/oil pipe to function as an energy

bridge between Tripoli and Rome. The potential extraction of relevant quantities of gas

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was envisaged. The transfer was to be secured by a methane pipeline whose realisation

costs were estimated at around $5.5 billion. That showed how, despite past tensions, the

two countries had, and still have, strong trade ties. By the end of 1999, one-fourth of

Italy’s petroleum needs were met by Libya, the cheapest source available given its

geographical proximity. Italy was becoming Libya’s largest partner, buying 43 per cent

of its exports, mostly oil and gas (Luzi, 1999a).10

The main purpose of Italy’s diplomatic conduct towards Tripoli was the creation of a

‘privileged partnership’ with this country. ‘An increased development of our partner

economy would bring a new dynamism to trades, thus creating new balances and stability’,

Italy’s Foreign Trade Minister, Piero Fassino, said at a trade conference in Rome in

December 1999.

Since the end of the 1990s, after D’Alema’s visit to Tripoli, Italy has became Tripoli’s

privileged partner, as far as both mutual trade and Qadhafi’s political relations with the

West are concerned. As D’Alema said once returned to Italy: ‘. . . our country is a

friend of Libya, we are at its complete disposal in order to increase Libyan–European

relations. Italy has never interrupted its dialogue with its North African partner. We

believe the language of diplomacy to be the most effective way to reinforce our friendship

and to communicate also with the other African and Arab Countries of the Mediterranean

region . . .’ (quoted in Luzi, 1999b).

Within such normalisation-oriented framework, Italy has constantly sought to

strengthen its international role, also through special energy and economic relations

with Libya, in order to achieve a greater degree of authority within the international com-

munity. In other words, Italy’s foreign policy conduct towards Libya, although aimed at

reshaping western security attitudes, has always been nationally-oriented.

In the meantime, as such renovated political scenario bringing along a new detente

between Libya and the West was unfolding, a new centre-right government got elected

in Italy. It was the time of the second Berlusconi administration.

The New Libya and the Berlusconi Government

The overall framework of international relations has been undergoing drastic changes, at

both bilateral and multilateral levels. Libya no longer appeared in the so-called ‘list of

rogue states’ (De Maio, 2006)11 drawn up by Washington’s State Department during

the Reagan Administration. The huge weight of the 1980 sanctions and the increasing

pressure of the opposition led Qadhafi in the 1990s to choose the only possible alternative

that would have partially recovered the precarious situation: the opening to the West. The

rapprochement was the result of Qadhafi’s firm commitment to improve and recover his

relations with the United States in order to end the previously imposed international

sanctions. This, as pointed out above, explains why in 1998 Libya became the first

country to issue an Interpol arrest warrant for Bin Laden, charging that Al Qaeda had col-

laborated with domestic radicals (Silverstein, 2005). During the same year, the Italian

Foreign Minister, Lamberto Dini (Del Boca, 1998),12 signed in Tripoli the so-called

Joint Declaration. In addition, on 5 April 1999 Libya decided to surrender the two indicted

agents charged with the bombing of Pan Am flight no. 103 and the French UTA flight no.

772. The US had positively welcomed Tripoli’s numerous signals that revealed Libya’s

willingness to achieve a complete reintegration within the international community.13

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The same day, the United Nations suspended, but did not drop, the sanctions against Libya

(Clyde, 2003).

Moreover, Qadhafi’s mediation role in the release of hostages who had been kidnapped

by Islamist guerrillas in the Philippines, coupled with Tripoli’s decision to subscribe to the

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of

Chemical Weapons, had obviously favoured the reintegration process. The shift appeared

clear soon after 9/11. The attacks of 9/11 offered Tripoli’s leader the possibility to prove

the good nature of his intention to support the West in the international battle against ter-

rorism. Libya’s regime tried to show the United States its willingness to negotiate its come-

back in the international community. The day after 9/11, Qadhafi firmly condemned the

terrorist violence and atrocities, assured all his support to the United States, even recognis-

ing its right to revenge and offering them the services of the Libyan intelligence network.

This new international backdrop favoured a foreign policy based on bilateral relations.

Therefore, the Berlusconi government was determined to strengthen its international col-

laborations, first within countries of the Mediterranean region. At the same time, Libya

had the greatest interest in remaining Italy’s preferential partner, not only as far as econ-

omic interaction was concerned but politically as well.

The assessment of Italy’s foreign policy trends towards Libya shows a sort of continuity

in pursuing inclusive policies towards such an historical partner (Albergoni et al., 1975).14

Every Italian government, both left- and right-leaning, has expressed the same willingness

to preserve and fortify its strategic, political and economic co-operation with Libya. Every

Italian Foreign Minister, even though with different tools and different means, has shown a

similar willingness to back and improve a ‘Mediterranean Partnership’, considering this

the only way to make sure the national and international interests of both countries

would meet. Even though Italy’s and Libya’s centres of geopolitical gravity are located

outside the Mediterranean, in Europe and in the Arab-African world, respectively,

because of their proximity, their political security and their economic stability are affected

by their involvement in the politics of the Mediterranean region. Whatever their policies

towards the Mediterranean—whether bilateral or multilateral—and its relative importance

as far as respective foreign policies are concerned, Italy and Libya cannot be indifferent to

this area’s security conditions (Aliboni, 2002).

Therefore, at the dawn of the twenty-first century, Rome’s centre-right government

seemed absolutely intent on inheriting the consolidated inclusive policy which had

already been adopted by the previous centre-left administrations. Berlusconi’s govern-

ment seemed clearly convinced that all the necessary conditions were there to definitively

end the seesaw policy that had previously prevented an integral and comprehensive paci-

fication between Italy and Libya (Silverstein, 2005).

On 21 February 2002, in a letter sent to ‘Your Excellency, The Great Al-Fatah Revolu-

tion Leader’, Italian premier Silvio Berlusconi announced his intention to undertake ‘a

major project’, as real evidence of the ‘impeccable relations’ between Rome and Tripoli.

In other words, Italy’s Prime Minister was offering the Colonel the ‘clear signal’ the

latter had persistently been waiting for.

For more than 30 years, despite a precarious geopolitical balance, Qadhafi never totally

gave up his idea of receiving from Rome a ‘symbolic effort’, as far as Italian ‘war com-

pensation’ was concerned. He was not totally satisfied with the US$100 million which, in

1998, had been allocated to his country by Lamberto Dini, at that time Italy’s Foreign

Minister, as part of the above mentioned Common Declaration.

446 K. Mezran & P. De Maio

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Despite the Italian allocation of such resources, in order to keep its promises, the

Colonel did not think that was enough. During 2002, Berlusconi decided once more to

try to satisfy Qadhafi’s requests and, in one of his letters to the Colonel, wrote: ‘. . . the

realization of a special project that could facilitate and encourage a new period of collab-

oration is now needed. Italy and Libya are finally ready to transform their friendship into a

real partnership . . . When I started to consider a potential “special project”, I suddenly

imagined a “great work” that could symbolize our flawless relation’ (quoted in ‘L’Italia

risarcisce (di nascosto) la Libia di Gheddafi’, Libero, 4 April 2002). He was referring to

a monumental work. An infrastructure that would fulfil Libya’s ‘desire for justice’ and

finally end the compensation chapter.

In October 2002, a long face-to-face meeting between the Colonel and Italy’s Prime

Minister took place. Many described such a meeting as the beginning of a new era of bilat-

eral relations, as Berlusconi suggested that the donation of a top-level hospital, worth EUR

50 million, could represent the long-awaited signal.14

While Libya never rejected the offer, it never really accepted it. In fact, still today the

Libyan issue does not appear to have been solved.

In February 2006, disappointing all expectations, Colonel Qadhafi sent once again

another request for compensation. In his speech during the meeting of governmental repre-

sentatives in Sirte, Qadhafi focused his attention on the anti-West demonstration that had

taken place in the same month in Benghazi, describing it essentially as the expression of

the Libyans’ hatred towards Italy.15

Once more, the bone of contention is the humiliation and suffering that the Libyan

people were subjected to during the colonial period, starting in 1911, for which the

Italian governmental leaders obstinately refuse adequate compensation. Underlining the

right to indemnification for damage suffered, the Colonel did not forget to intimate that

new attacks against Italian interests or citizens are possible.

Qadhafi and the Prodi Government: A New Beginning?

Less than a year after the birth of the new centre-left Italian government led by Prodi,

relations with Libya appear to swing back and forth. This is ground for new challenges

or perhaps only old and unsolved challenges. Although the change in government in

Italy, bringing Massimo D’Alema back to the seat of Foreign Minister, appeared at first

to offer a certain prospect for the improvement of Italo-Lybian relations, last November

the Colonel returned to centre stage to call his people to revolt against western exploitation

for a fair redistribution of economic resources, energy first and foremost.16 On this same

occasion, he also expressed his closeness to Sudan, underlining the absolute necessity of

avoiding any western or international intervention, which, in his opinion, would be motiv-

ated solely by the desire to deprive the territory and its population of its natural riches.

Hostility of Libyan leadership towards its ‘neighbouring Italy’, but above all and more

generally towards the West, has therefore been rekindled.

The first and most immediate obstacle that the new centre-left government inherited,

among the usual aspects that have always characterised relations between Rome and

Tripoli, is illegal immigration.

However, until now Qadhafi has never shown himself flexible towards the prospect of

collaboration with the Italian forces. Libya had never given in to the idea of joint patrols

along its coast and frontiers, since this would have meant clear renunciation of a slice of

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national sovereignty. At the same time, and because of the European embargo, Italy had

not been authorised since 2004 to supply Tripoli with the means necessary for the

execution of such operations of control.

Migratory issues have always been of particular importance for Italo-Libyan relations.

Rome has generally been in favour of an integrated approach, which means both stopping

and preventing illegal immigration and encouraging regular flows and promoting local

development. The Italian governments have long worked to build a model of co-operative

security in the Mediterranean area, trying to promote collaboration between naval forces

and other competent bodies for rescue operations and joint patrols in the fight against

organised crime and illegal migratory flows.

Today, because of enormous increase in the number of illegal landings from the Libyan

coasts, a suspicion in Italy has risen that in fact Libyan authorities might have a hand in

this situation. Qadhafi would not be the first African leader to see in illegal immigration

an opportunity to exert leverage on rich European States.

To compensate for Italy’s wartime occupation of his country, for years Qadhafi has been

asking for Italian financial assistance in building a 1,000 mile pan-Libyan highway which

will link Egypt and Tunisia. Italy has, on the other hand, asked him to stem the flood of

African immigrants from Libyan ports to the Italian island of Lampedusa. But Qadhafi,

who is known for his stubbornness, has refused to help unless Italy commits properly to

the construction programme (‘Gaddafi Uses Libyan Migrants to Bargain with Italy for

New Motorway’, The Sunday Telegraph, 27 August 2006).

Having previously deployed both terrorism and an attempted atomic weapons pro-

gramme—abandoned in 2003—to pursue his foreign policy goals, his newest tactic of

using African migrants as bargaining chips has caused little surprise to diplomats.

Many experts argued that the Colonel is using Libyan migrants to negotiate with Italy

for the new motorway.

The £2 billion motorway would link the Libyan Mediterranean towns of Tobruk and

Benghazi near Egypt with Sirte and the capital Tripoli on the western side of Libya. It

would follow the route of the ancient Roman Via Balbia that was also used by Mussolini

during the Italian wartime occupation.

Italy’s former Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, flew to Libya more than once to seek

an understanding with Mr Qadhafi, but no deal was reached on Libya’s claim to compen-

sation for losses suffered as an Italian colony. Mr Qadhafi may hope for more success with

Mr Berlusconi’s successor, Romano Prodi.

Even if the current Italian government is keen to co-operate with Libya in efforts to

prevent illegal immigrants, the Italian Transport Minister Alessandro Bianchi said the

government will not barter with Libya on the immigration issue. ‘Libya’s requests?

There’s absolutely no way we’ll negotiate over desperate people forced to cross the sea

on rickety vessels’, he said. ‘We’ll try to convince Libya that issues as dramatic as

these cannot be at the center of give-and-take negotiations’ (‘Italy Keen to Cooperate

with Libya to Tackle Illegal Immigration’, Xinhua News Agency, 22 August 2006).

Nevertheless, the huge immigration wave continues. In Italy all hope seems to lie in the

results of the forthcoming meeting of Frontex, the European Union body responsible for

co-ordinating border controls.

Once again, last August, Tripoli’s leaders expressed their disapproval for joint

patrols that would also require the use of forces from Malta as well as from Italy. The

preferences of Tripoli continued to be, as the only short-term solution, a programme for

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technical-logistic and financial aid. ‘We need resources, machinery, technology and

vehicles’, said the Libyan Ambassador to Malta, Saad El Shlamani, at the end of last

summer (‘Illegal Immigration to Italy’, The Economist, 24 August 2006).

Negotiations have proceeded with uncertainty, following the usual seesaw manner. If,

on one hand, Qadhafi seems aware of the fact that ‘immigration is a real problem’ and that

the Frontex project for joint Italo-Libyan patrols of the coasts today is the only road to be

taken, he reaffirms and reminds us that ‘immigration should be managed, not stopped . . . A

natural right exists for which the land, and therefore also Europe, belongs to no-one.

Peoples therefore have the right to move’ (‘Qadhafi: L’immigrazione va governata’,

Corriere della Sera, 23 November 2006).

On occasion of the recent summit of the European Union and African Union (EU–AU)

on immigration and development, Libya added two conditions to the European proposals:

the Frontex project activity of control in the desert on behalf of the EU should commence,

and this should be entrusted to Malta and Italy with the collaboration of Libya.

Furthermore, at the margins of the conference held in Tripoli, the Colonel had a per-

sonal meeting with Giuliano Amato, Minister of the Interior and with Massimo

D’Alema, the Foreign Minister, who, on their return, expressed their greatest satisfaction,

declaring it was ‘an excellent meeting’ (personal interview of Karim Mezran and Paola De

Maio with Minister of Interior Giuliano Amato, December 2006). Qadhafi’s undertaking

to challenge Islamic fundamentalism corresponds to a similar willingness by Italy, in the

attempt to find a solution to the contention about colonial compensation between Rome

and Tripoli, and relaunch relationships between the two countries. On the same occasion

the Colonel mentioned the question of the building of a hospital which should produce

artificial limbs for those mutilated by Italian mines in Libya.

It remains to be seen how the delicate issue of marine patrolling of the frontiers of the

country will be carried out. As far as a solution for the compensation for war damage is

concerned, Minister D’Alema has declared that negotiations are underway; Amato con-

firmed Italy’s undertaking and agreed with the Foreign Minister, Massimo D’Alema,

saying: ‘. . . the situation has commenced satisfactorily’ (‘D’Alema e Amato da Gheddafi

Passi avanti sull’immigrazione’, La Repubblica, 23 November 2006).

Notes

1. The Camp David Accords were signed by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister

Menachem Begin on 17 September 1978, following 12 days of secret negotiations at Camp David.

The two agreements were signed at the White House, and were witnessed by United States President

Jimmy Carter. Sadat also said he wanted them to be called the Carter Accords.

2. The Italian efforts were aimed, on the one hand, to recover the serious violations of Italian industrial

interests (around 400 million Euros of unpaid Libyan debts) and, on the other, settled a series of politi-

cal-legislative measures, already starting from July 1970, aimed at trying to make sure Libya would be

granted some sort of compensation for the colonial hardship it had to endure. As far as such measures did

go, one cannot help mentioning the confiscation of Italian-owned assets (worth around 200 million

Euros) ‘in order for Libyans to be given back the riches of both their sons and ancestors that had

been usurped by the colonial oppressors’.

3. In 1981, the Italian government, at that time led by Giovanni Spadolini, authorised the installation of

cruise missiles in the military base of Comiso (Sicily), stressing how such an option was not supposed

to include a NATO threat against any Mediterranean country whatsoever. Libya’s government, however,

perceived this Italian decision as the confirmation of Rome’s subordination to Washington’ directives,

which, in turn, were considered to be undoubtedly dangerous.

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4. During an interview he gave as he was serving as Italy’s Foreign Minister, Andreotti declared: ‘The Libyan

issue can not be solved through a military action. We in particular, as Italians, are more than others

involved and interested in avoiding a military intervention. Since some American naval bases are

located in Italy, we would inevitably be the target of a potential reaction. On the other hand though, I

don’t want to be considered as Libya’s lawyer and have no intention to be the main supporter of Qaddafi’s

beatification. Surely, I believe that a diplomatic dialogue with the Colonel won’t be harmful for anyone.’

5. Libya’s involvement in Chad dates to the early 1970s, when Qadhafi began supporting the anti-government

rebels of the Front for the National Liberation of Chad (FROLINAT). In 1975 Libya occupied and sub-

sequently annexed the Aouzou Strip, a 70,000 square-kilometre area of northern Chad adjacent to the

southern Libyan border. Qadhafi’s move was motivated by personal and territorial ambitions, tribal

and ethnic affinities between the people of northern Chad and those of southern Libya, and, most import-

ant, the presence in the area of uranium deposits needed for atomic energy development. Libyan claims

to the area were based on a 1935 border dispute and settlement between France (which then controlled

Chad) and Italy (which then controlled Libya). The French parliament never ratified the settlement,

however, and both France and Chad recognised the boundary that was proclaimed upon Chadian inde-

pendence. Libyan intervention has resulted in de facto control over the northern part of the country and

three phases of open hostilities—in 1980–1, 1983, and late 1986—when incursions were launched to the

south of Chad. The subsequent intervention of 3,000 French troops ended the Libyan successes and led to

a de facto division of the country, with Libya maintaining control of all the territory north of the 16th

parallel. Under an agreement for mutual withdrawal from Chad, French troops withdrew by early

November 1984, but the Libyans secretly dispersed and hid their units. The stalemate in Chad ended

in early 1987 when the Habre forces inflicted a series of military defeats on the Libyans and their

Chadian allies, at Fada, Ouadi Doum and Faya Largeau. The press engaged in considerable speculation

on the repercussions of these humiliations on Qadhafi and his regime. It was reported that Goukouni was

being kept forcibly in Tripoli, and that, as a result of some disagreements with the Libyan leader, he was

wounded by a Libyan soldier. Qadhafi’s position had clearly been weakened by these developments, and

the long-term fighting in Chad aroused discontent in the Libyan army as well.

6. As a consequence of Libya’s bombing of both Pan Am flight no. 103 in 1988, over Lockerbie, Scotland,

and UTA flight no. 772 in 1989, the United Nations imposed severe international sanctions on Tripoli

and the United States declared an air and arms embargo, blocking every Libya-bound delivery of any

sort of equipment which was judged to have any kind of potential military value. Among sanctioned

practices, the following are included: transferring conventional weapons or chemical products that

could be used in order to manufacture chemical weapons; providing direct or indirect foreign aid or

support to international organisations that might benefit Libya; importing crude or refined Libyan oil

and exporting US oil production or refining equipment; engaging in trade, contracts, credits, loans,

export–import bank transactions or third country transactions with Libya; liquidating or transferring

Libyan property in the United States. Some of these sanctions were modified over the years with, for

example, classes of US aircraft machines added to the list of banned exports.

7. Italian Prime Minister visits Libya, Libya News List, December 1 1999.

8. Within the framework of a bilateral agreement, which its parliament ratified in 1956, Italy ceded to Libya

all its state property and—with a ‘una tantum/one off’ formula—added a 5 million pound compensation.

9. The Joint Declaration was the last effort of a Joint Italian–Libyan Commission that had previously given

way to several political, economic and cultural agreements. Among these, the opening of the Italian Cul-

tural Institute in Tripoli and the opening of the Libyan Academy in Rome.

10. In 1998, Italy imported $3.24 billion in Libyan products, whereas Libya bought $1.01 billion in Italian

goods.

11. Since the beginning of the 1980s, the international relation and balances have known a critical mutation.

With the new Reagan Administration, a period of confrontation started between Washington and Tripoli.

Qadhafi’s Libya was now accused of international terrorism and included in the so-called list of ‘rogue

states’.

12. During the Ulivo centre-left government, whose Prime Minister was Romano Prodi.

13. It has always been the approach preferred by Italy. It was regarded, and still is, as the correct way to

frame Qadhafi, prevent the regime from feeling frustrated or isolated, moderate Libya’s radicalism

and unpredictability. The coercive approach, on the other hand, generally favoured by the US, was

mainly based on economic and diplomatic confrontation which wouldn’t shy away from both sanctions

and embargoes, and was considered the most immediate way to deal with Libya.

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14. Sabatini, G. (2002) Italia-Libia, dopo i fallimenti di D’Alema e Dini il viaggio di Berlusconi ha riallac-

ciato i rapporti, Secolo d’Italia, 30 October.

15. On 17 February 2006 a violent manifestation was held in Benghazi against the publication of the known

satirical cartoons. The demonstrators were heading towards the Italian Consulate, the sole representation

of a western country in the city, when they were halted by the police which energetically repressed the

manifestation and prevented it from reaching the seat of the Consulate.

16. ‘This revolution might lead to the burning of their property to avenge inequality and unfair distribution of

wealth . . . I am still holding the safety valve containing the explosion of a revolution of the poor who feel

oppressed as a result of the unequal sharing of oil riches . . . They have the right to share in the oil wealth,

the only wealth in Libya in which all people must have an equal share.’

References

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Aruffo, A. (2001) Muhammar Gheddafi e La Nuova Libia, Rome, Data News.

Baldinetti, A. (Ed.) (2003) Modern and Contemporary Libya. Sources and Historiographies, Rome, Instituto

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Clyde, R. M. (2003) CRS Issue Brief for Congress, Libya, 10 October.

Deeb, M. J. (1991) Libya’s Foreign Policy in North Africa, Westview Special Studies on the Middle East,

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Del Boca, A. (1998) Gheddafi una Sfida dal Deserto, Rome, Editori Laterza.

De Maio, P. (2006) From Soldiers to Policemen: Qadhafi’s Army in the New Century, Journal of Middle Eastern

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Italian Prime Minister Visits Libya, Libya News List, 1 December 1999.

Luzi, G. (1999a) D’Alema offre a Gheddafi un ponte per l’Europa, La Repubblica, 2 December.

Luzi, G. (1999b) D’Alema Sdogana il Colonnello, La Repubblica, 3 December.

Man, I. (1980) Libia: un arsenale in mezzo al mediterraneo, Mondo Operaio 9, September.

Martinez, L. (2000) Libye: la fin du purgatorie, Politique Internationale 89, pp. 307–20.

Santoro, C. M. (1986) L’Italia come ‘Media Potenza’, La Politica Estera e Il Modello Di Difesa, Bologna,

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Silverstein, K. (2005) How Kadafi Went from Foe to Ally, Common Cause against Islamic Radical Has Woven

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Stanley, A. (1999) D’Alema is First Western Leader to Call on Gadhafi in 8 Years, New York Times Service, 2

December.

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