mexico tha affirmative - jdi 2013

8/12/2019 Mexico THA Affirmative - JDI 2013

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BKS Week 1 Aff File


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1ACNote: you will probably not be able to read all 3 advantages without highlighting

some sections down or taking out an impact scenario. You can also read just 2 of the

3 advantages.


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PlanPlan: The United States federal government should implement sections of H.R. 1613

that constitute economic engagement with Mexico.


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Mexico Advantage

THA is critical to revive Mexicos flagging economy- only way to get PEMEX

reforms to happen- failure to ratify quickly collapses US-Mexican energy relations.

There is no opposition and key Republicans have come out in favor of the billRampton 13Roberta Rampton, Reuters, Apr 29, 2013, UPDATE 1-U.S.-Mexico deal on expanded Gulf oil drilling still in limbo,http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/04/29/usa-mexico-oil-idUKL2N0DG1MR20130429WASHINGTON, April 29 (Reuters) - More than a year after the United States and Mexico signed a much-lauded deal that would remove obstacles to expanding deepwater drilling for oil in the

Gulf of Mexico, the agreement has still not been finalized by the United States. The delay, for which people close to the administration blame Congresswhile Republicans in Congress blame the administrat ion, is certain to be discussed whe n President Barack Obama visits Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto in Mexico City on Thursday.Mexico immediately ratified the pact in April 2012, but the United States has so far been unable to pass a simply worded, one-page law to put the agreement into force. The deal, formally

known as the Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement, provides legal guidelines for deepwater drilling in the 1.5 million acres (600,000 hectares) of the Gulf that straddle the U.S.-

Mexico boundary. It isseen as the key to opening a new era of cooperation on oil productionbetween the two countries. Mexico's st ate-owned

oil company Pemex needstechnology and investment to boost its stagnant production, and U.S. companies are

eager to help . "The U.S. has a real opportunity now to put energy back on the agenda with Mexico in a way

thatit really hasn't been able tobe on the agenda forthe last several years," said Neil Brown, who worked on the issue during the last Congress as lead Republican

international energy aide in the Senate. But the final step of implementing the deal has languished. " I'm not aware of strong

opposition to it . I think it's beena little more inertia," said Jason Bordoff, a top energy o fficial at the White House until January who now runs Co lumbiaUniversity's Center on Global Energy Po licy. In the past several weeks, there have been some signs that the implementing legis lation may move forward, but there also could be new

complications related to disclosure requirements. DEAL COULD OPEN THE DOOR Oil is critical for the Mexicaneconomy , paying for a

third of the government's budget. But production peaked in 2004at 3.4 million barrels per day and has slippedbelow 2.6 million

bpd. PEMEX says it can revive production with deepwater wellsin the Gulf, but needs technical and financial help.

The cross-border agreementwould be the first step toward joint projects for reservoirs that cross the boundary, providing a way for PEMEX and

other oil companies to share production and creating a framework to solve disputesthat could arise. "Without the

agreement, it creates a barrier to investment," said Erik Melito, a director at the American Petroleum Institute, the oil industry's lobby group. The

agreementcould help calmMexico's fears about what is termed the"popote" or drinking-straw effect - fears that U.S. oil companies are

going to drain reservoirsthat extend into Mexico's side of t he border, robbing Mexico of its share, said David Goldwyn, a former State Department offi cial who helped launch

negotiations. "This has been an u rban myth in Mexico for decades," said Goldwyn, now president of Goldwyn Global Strategies, a consulting firm. Pena Nieto is working

toward reforms for PEMEX that would allow for more production and cooperation in projects generally - a

delicate issue in a country where PEMEX and o il are symbols of national pride. "If they can see some success here(with the transboundary

deal), that's going to change the political conversation in Mexico ," Goldwyn said. Failing to implement the

deal , though, would be a major setback for U.S.-Mexico energy relations , former U.S. Senator Richard Lugar warnedin

December, in one of his final reports as the top Republicanon the Senate Foreign Relations Committee before he left Congress.
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/04/29/usa-mexico-oil-idUKL2N0DG1MR20130429http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/04/29/usa-mexico-oil-idUKL2N0DG1MR20130429http://uk.reuters.com/places/mexico?lc=int_mb_1001http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/04/29/usa-mexico-oil-idUKL2N0DG1MR20130429http://uk.reuters.com/finance/economy?lc=int_mb_1001http://uk.reuters.com/finance/economy?lc=int_mb_1001http://uk.reuters.com/finance/economy?lc=int_mb_1001http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/04/29/usa-mexico-oil-idUKL2N0DG1MR20130429http://uk.reuters.com/places/mexico?lc=int_mb_1001http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/04/29/usa-mexico-oil-idUKL2N0DG1MR20130429http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/04/29/usa-mexico-oil-idUKL2N0DG1MR20130429


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Cant delay- slowdowns will tank drilling deals and make future cooperation

impossible

Rampton 13Roberta Rampton, Reuters, Apr 29, 2013, UPDATE 1-U.S.-Mexico deal on expanded Gulf oil drilling still in limbo,http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/04/29/usa-mexico-oil-idUKL2N0DG1MR20130429

Interior and State Department officials did not directly comment on the provision at a hearing last week, saying only that the administration wantsto work with the House on

details of the bill so that the dealcan be in place in time for the next sale of drilling leases for the Gulf,expected to be held inAugust . Bingaman said the exemption "complicates things significantly" for quick passage of the bill. "They've added in some things that are going to make it difficult to pass in that

form," he said, referring to the exemption. Last week, the Senate energy committee quietly filed a one-page bill reflecting the administration's suggested language, word for word, with no

mention of the disclosure exemption. The timing of next steps is unclear. "It would really be unfortunate if that process proved to be a

protracted one," said Michael Bromwich, Obama's former U.S. offshore drilling regulator, who helped negot iate the deal. " There's no purpose that's

served by further delaying ."

Drilling along the border is inevitable- cooperative engagement is critical to

Mexican development

Urdaneta 10 associate at Grau Garcia Hernandez & Monaco (Law Firm) (Karla, TRANSBOUNDARY PETROLEUM RESERVOIRS: A RECOMMENDED APPROACH FOR THE UNITED STATES AND

MEXICO IN THE DEEPWATERS OF THE GULF OF MEXICO, Houston Journal of International Law, Volume 32, Number 2, Spring 2010)In view of this, Mexico is primarily concerned with reservoirs located outside the Western Gap, and more

specifically, those located in the Perdido fold belt. Nonetheless, it is only a matter of time until the Western Gap

is made available for exploitation and production by both countries, which will create the same issues for the

Western Gap faced by other areas of the GOM. The principal challenges that Pemex faces with regard to deep-water production include: (i) human resources;(ii) exploration; (iii) exploitation; (iv) technology; and (v) financing. (85) These challenges will have to be assumed in the short term because Mexico's oil production is decreasing, and Pemex

has estimated that fifty-five percent of the country's 54 billion barrels of equ ivalent oil from prospective resources (86) is located in deep-waters. (87) Currently, Mexico cannot

compete with the United States with regard to the development of the resources in the GOM, for it has not yet

progressed beyond the stage of exploration. In order to strengthen Pemex's financial and technical capacities and provide it with more flexibility for theperformance of its functions, Mexico began reforming its energy legislation. (88) This process ended in November 2008. However, the last legislative reform does not endow Pemex with the

capital and technology necessary to undertake the activities of exploration and production of deep-waters in the GOM. (89) The issue of transboundary reservoirs

has attracted the attention of Mexican lawmakers, politicians, and economists, among others. (90) Most of them

advise taking prompt action to protect Mexico's rights to its resources.(91) Moreover, the exploitation of the

resources located in the GOM will be a way for Mexico to increase its levels of petroleum production.To summarize,in the GOM (i) there are formations, like t he Perdido fold belt, that cross t he maritime boundary of Mexico and t he United States, and that will enable production as early as 2010, (ii)

substantial exploration activity has already been conducted by the United States, (iii) large areas have been

leased by the United States for exploitation, while others are currently being exploited, (iv) Mexico has not

achieved the levels of resource development that the United States has achieved, and (v) both countries need to take advantage of the

production of their hydrocarbons in the short term. (92) In light of these circumstances, with the aim of protecting the rights of both

countries and optimizing the use of resources, it would be appropriate for Mexico and the United States to

cooperate in the development of their transboundary reservoirs. This cooperation will maximize economic

benefits, avoid physical waste, increase energy security, and avoid international disputes likely to arise

if the United States initiates production of the transboundary reservoirs. Cooperation has led to

beneficial results among other countries that have faced similar dilemmas.
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/04/29/usa-mexico-oil-idUKL2N0DG1MR20130429http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/04/29/usa-mexico-oil-idUKL2N0DG1MR20130429http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/04/29/usa-mexico-oil-idUKL2N0DG1MR20130429http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/04/29/usa-mexico-oil-idUKL2N0DG1MR20130429http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/04/29/usa-mexico-oil-idUKL2N0DG1MR20130429


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Production along the Western Gap is key to PEMEX

Iliff 12(Laurence, Pemex Makes Its First Big Oil Find in Deep Gulf, The Wall Street Journal, 8-29-2012,http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444914904577619712736497598.html)

Mexican state-owned oil firm Petroleos Mexicanos, or Pemex, has made its first big crude-oil discovery in the

deep waters of the Gulf of Mexico, near the Mexico-U.S. maritime boundary , President Felipe Calderon said

Wednesday. Mr. Calderon said the initial estimate of a deposit in the Perdido area on Mexico's side of the Gulf wasbetween 250 million and 400 million barrels of light crude, using the industry's broadest measurement of

"proven, probable and possible," or 3P, reserves. The exploratory well was drilled in 2,500 meters (8,250 feet) of water. "We estimate

that this deposit could belong to one of the most important regions of the deep-water Gulf, " he said.

The larger "petroleum system" of additional fields, Mr. Calderon added, "could have from four billion to 10 billion

barrels of crude, which bolsters our reserves and will allow Mexico to maintain and increase petroleum

production in the medium- and long-term." The new well, dubbed "Trion I," was drilled 39 kilometers (24

miles) south of the U.S.-Mexico maritime border , and 180 kilometers east of Gulf state of Tamaulipas, which also borders the U.S. On theU.S. side of the Gulf, Royal Dutch Shell RDSB.LN -0.11% PLC operates its Perdido oil-and-gas platform in the region. The platform has a peak production capacityof 100,000 barrels per day, according to Shell's website. Prior to Pemex's discovery of crude oil at Trion, the oil monopoly had found only natural gas during the

recent increase of its deep-water exploratory efforts. Carlos Morales, head of Pemex's exploration-and-production division, said in a radio interview that Trion I couldbe among the top 10 c rude-oil discoveries on either s ide of the Gulf. He said typically a deposit o f its type would take seven years to get to the prod uction phase, butthat Pemex is going to try to do that in five years. Mr. Morales said Pemex began committing more resources to Gulf oil exploration in 2007 with the construction of

special drilling platforms and said he foresees a Tamaulipas oil port to service Pemex's future operations in the Gulf. Mr. Morales said pushing aggressively

into deep waters could raise Pemex's crude-oil production to four million barrels a day from the current 2.55million barrels a day. The deep waters of the Gulf are seen by analysts as one of Pemex's best bets to

have another surge of oil production after eight years of steady declines . Pemex has traditionally drilled in theshallow waters of the southern Gulf, where the discovery of the supergiant Cantarell complex in the late 1970s launched Mexico as an oil power. Cantarell's output

peaked at more than two million barrels of oil per day in 2004 and is now around 400,000 barrels a day. Mr. Calderon, who hel d up a sample o f crude oil taken fro m

the well, said half of Pemex's petroleum reserves could be in the deep waters of the Gulf. Pemex reported proven hydrocarbon reserves of 13.8 billion barrels of

oil equivalent as of Jan. 1. Its 3P reserves were 43.8 billion barrels of oil equivalent. Unde r current law,

Mexico doesn't allow foreign companies to drill in its territory except under contract to Pemex , with strict rules thatban the sharing of risk or of oil. Oil majors have expressed interest in drilling with Pemex on the Mexican side of the Gulf, but only under shared-risk contracts.

PEMEX is critical to the Mexican economy ---- THA reforms key to solve

Samples and Vittor 12 associate and partners at Hogan Lovells US LLP(Tim R. and Jose Luis, Energy Reform and the Future of Mexicos Oil Industry: The Pemex Bidding Rounds and Integrated Service Contracts, Texas Journalof Oil, Gas, and Energy Law, 6-21-2012, http://tjogel.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Samples-Formatted_Final_June13.pdf)

In recent years, Latin America has seen an uptick in interest as a destination for companies seeking new opportunities in the exploration andproduction of oil and gas.1 From the discovery of massive pre-salt oil fields off the coast of Brazil to unconventional plays in Argentina andColombia, the region is generating renewed interest for the international energy industry. Four countries in particularBrazil,Colombia, Mexico, and Peruare moving forward with bidding rounds for significant exploration and production contractswith hopesof attracting technology, expertise, and capital from the private sector. The case of Petrleos Mexicanos (Pemex) and Mexico is especially

compelling.As a state-controlled monopoly, Pemex is the sole producer of crude oil, natural gas, and refined

products in Mexico. 2 Pemex, the most important company in Mexico, is simultaneously referred to as

the cash cow and a sacred cow of Mexico. 3 As Mexicos cash cow, Pemex provides over a third of the federal governments revenues. 4AsMexicos sacred cow, Pemex has immense and symbolic national importance, which is deeply rooted in

Mexicos sense of sovereignty and independence. 5 Increasingly, these two roles are in tension as Pemex struggles to

remain a cash cow while subject to the legal and political constraints of a sacred national treasure. 6 For most of the

20 th century, Mexico figured among t he worlds largest oil producers and has been a major exporter for much of that time. 7 Currently, however, Mexico is facing the

prospect of becoming a net importer of petroleum within a decade . 8 Pemex has recently undergone

transformations in response to declining production, but reversing the tide will require a dramatic

departure from the norm . 9 Politically sensitive reforms to the energy sector and a major shift in the

traditional Pemex paradigm are needed. 10 Together, Mexico and Pemex are entering unfamiliar territory. 11 While

a restrictive legal framework has barred competition within Mexicos borders, Pemex is subject to rigid

constraints under Mexican law with respect to finance and budgeting, contracting, procurement, and

corporate governance. 12 The collective weight of these restrictions has limited Pemexs ability to address

lagging production.13 In response, under the administration of President Felipe Caldern, legislation designed to modernize Pemex and allow greater private participation in theMexican oil industry was passed in November 2008 (the Energy Reforms). 14\


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Mexican collapse tanks the global economy

Moran 9Michael Moran, vice president and executive editor of Roubini G lobal Economics and RGE's senior expert on geostrategic and political risk. From 2005-2009, Michael served as executive editorof CFR.org,. Six Crises, 2009: A Half-Dozen Ways Geopolitics Could Upset Global Recovery. Roubini Global Economics Monitor. July 31, 2009.http://fbkfinanzwirtschaft.wordpress.com/2009/08/07/six-crises-2009-a-half-dozen-ways-geopolitics-could-upset-global-recovery/

A story receiving more attention in t he American media than Iraq these days is the horrific drug-related violence across the northern states of Mexico, where Felipe Calderon hasdeployed the national army to combat two thriving drug cartels, which have compromised the national police beyond redemption. The tales of carnage are horrific, to be sure: 30people were killed in a 48 hour period last week in Cuidad Juarez alone, a city located directly across the Rio Grande from El Paso, Texas. So far, the impact on the United States andbeyond has been minimal. But there also isnt much sign that the army is winning, either, and that raises a disturbing question: What if Calderon loses? The CIAs worst nightmare

during the Cold War(outside of an administration which forced transparency on it, of course) was the radicalization or collapse of Mexico. The template then was communism,but narco-capitalism doesnt look much better. The prospect of a wholesale collapse that sent millions upon millions of Mexican refugees fleeing across the northern border so farseems remote. But Mexicos army has its own problems with corruption, and a sizeable number of Mexicans regard Calderonsrazor-thin 2006 electoral victory over a left ist rival asillegitimate. With Mexicos economy reeling and the traditional safety valve of illegal immigration to America dwindling,the potential for serious trouble exists. Meanwhile,Mexico ranks with Saudi Arabia and Canada as the three suppliers of oil the United States could not do without. Should things come unglued there and Pemex productionshut down even temporarily, the shock on oil markets could be profound, again, sending its waves throughout the global economy. Long-term, PEMEX production has beensliding anyway, thanks to oil fields well-beyond their peak and restrictions on foreign investment.

Nuclear war, terrorism, democratic backslidingHarris and Burrows 9 - *PhD in Euro History, **member of the NICs Long Range Analysis UnitMathew, PhD European History @ Cambridge, counselor in t he National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer is a member of the NICs Long Range Analysis Unit Revisiting the Future:Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf

Increased Potential for Global ConflictOf course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed bel ieves the future is likely t o be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many

possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history

may be more instructive than ever . While we continue to believe that the Great Depressionis not likely to be repeated, the lessonsto

be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies(think Central

Europe in 1920s and 1930s) andon the sustainability of multilateral institutions(think League of Nations in the same period). There is noreason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century.For that

reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could growwould seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile

economic environmentas they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation

will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorisms appeal will decline if economic growth

continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced.For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however,

the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place so me of the worlds most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groupsin 2025 willlikely be a combination of descendants of long established groups_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct

sophisticated attacks_and newly emergent collections of t he angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence

of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous

casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence wouldalmost certainly be the

Middle East. Although Irans acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable,worriesabout a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region

to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider

pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship t hat existed between the great powers for most o f the

Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes o f low intensity conflictand terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella couldlead to an unintended escalation and broader conflictif clear red lines between those st ates involved are not well established. The

close proximity of potential nuclear rivalscombined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems

also will produce inherent difficulti esin achieving reliable indications a nd warning of an impending nuclear att ack. The lack of strategic depth in

neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more

focus on preemptionrather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises.36 Types of conflictthat the world continues t o experience,

such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-

mercantilist practices. Perceptionsof renewed energy scarcity will drive count ries to take actions to assure t heir future access to energy supplies. In t he

worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy

resources,for example, to be essential formaintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, willhave important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as Chinas an d Indias development

of blue water naval capabilities. Ifthe fiscal stimulus focus forthese countries indeed turns inward, one of the most

obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regionalnaval capabilities could lead to increased

tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes.

With wateralso becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water

resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog

world.
http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdfhttp://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdfhttp://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf


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PEMEX decline will trigger instability throughout Mexicotimeframe is 10 years

Kohl11-27-12(Keith, Crisis of Consumption,http://www.energyandcapital.com/articles/mexican-oil-crisis/2833)JHOf course, we all know the story behind the Cantarell field's downfall. Once production started to decline, Pemex began injecting nitrogen to boost output. But this strategy was short-lived, and

productionat the field has been dropping sharply sinceroughly 14% each year for the last six years. Cantarell's

decline marked the beginning of the end for Mexican oil production. The country's new finds have also

proven underwhelming .The recent discovery by Pemex in Southern Mexico is a perfect example. According to Pemex, the new field ho lds up to 500 million barrels of

crude oil, a trifle compared to t he billions of barrels Cantarell once held. But these days, Mexico will take whatever it can get... and pray it can

hold off the decline. Crisis of Consumption Mexico's declining oil production means there's less oil available for export.

Those 2.5 million barrels flowing from Pemex's wells daily are crucial to the country's stability. When

almost 40% of your government budget is paid from oil revenue, exporting less oil is not an optionbut that's exactlywhat's happening (click charts to enlarge): During the first eight months of 2012, Mexican oil exports to the United States were slightly above one million barrels per day. Last May oil exports

fell below one million barrels per day for the first time in 27 years. Barring some miracle taking place in Mexico's oil industry, I believe

the country will be a net oil importer within ten years.

Mexican stability is critical to U.S. power

Kaplan 12chief geopolitical analyst at Stratfor(Robert D., With the Focus on Syria, Mexico Burns, Stratfor, 3-28-2012, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/focus-syria-mexico-burns)While the foreign policy elite in Washington focuses on the 8,000 deaths in a conflict in Syria -- half a world away from the United States -- more than 47,000 people have died in drug-related

violence since 2006 in Mexico. A deeply troubled state as well as a demographic and economic giant on the United States' southern border, Mexico will affect America'sdestiny in coming decades more than any state or combination of states in the Middle East. Indeed, Mexico

may constitute the world's seventh-largest economy in the near future.Certainly, while the Mexican violence is largely criminal, Syria is a more clear-cutmoral issue, enhanced by its own strategic consequences. A calcified authoritarian regime in Damascus is stamping out dissent with guns and artillery barrages. Moreover, regime change in Syria, which the rebels demand, coulddeliver a pivotal blow to Iranian influence in the Middle East, an event that would be the best news to U.S. interests in the region in years or even decades. Nevertheless, the Syrian rebels are divided and hold no territory, and thetoppling of pro-Iranian dictator Bashar al Assad might conceivably bring to power an austere Sunni regime equally averse to U.S. interests -- if not lead to sectarian chaos. In other words, all military intervention scenarios in Syria arefraught with extreme risk. Precisely for that reason, that the U.S. foreign policy elite has continued for months to feverishly debate Syria, and in many cases advocate armed intervention, while utterly ignoring the vaster panorama ofviolence next door in Mexico, speaks volumes about Washington's own obsessions and interests, which are not always aligned with the country's geopolitical interests. Syria matters and matters momentously to U.S. interests, but

Mexico ultimately matters more, so one would think that there would be at least some degree of parity in the

amount written on these subjects.I am not demanding a switch in news coverage from one country to the other, just a bit more balance. Of course, it is easy for pundits

to have a fervently interventionist view on Syria precisely because it is so far away, whereas miscalculation in Mexico on America's part would

carry far greater consequences . For example, what if the Mexican drug cartels took revenge on San Diego? Thus,

one might even argue that the very noise in the media about Syria, coupled with the relative silence about Mexico, is proof that it is the

latter issue that actually is too sensitive for loose talk. It may also be that cartel-wracked Mexico -- at some rude subconscious level -- connotes for East Coast elites a southof the border, 7-Eleven store culture, reminiscent of the crime movie "Traffic," that holds no allure to people focused on ancient civilizations across the ocean. The concerns of Europe and the Middle East certainly seem closer to New

York and Washington than does the southwestern United States. Indeed, Latin American bureaus and studies departments simply lack the cachet of Middle East and Asian ones in government and universities. Yet, the fate

of Mexico is the hinge on which the United States' cultural and demographic future rests. U.S. foreign policy

emanatesfrom the domestic conditionof its society, and nothing will affect its society more than thedramatic movement of Latin history northward. By 2050, as much as a third of the American population could be Hispanic. Mexico and Central America constitute a growingdemographic and economic powerhouse with which the United States has an inextricable relationship. In recent years Mexico's economic growth has outpaced that of its northern neighbor. Mexico's population of 111 million plusCentral America's of more than 40 mil lion equates to half the population of the United States. Because of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 85 percent of Mexico's exports go to the United States, even as half of CentralAmerica's trade is with the United States. While the median age of Americans is nearly 37, demonstrating the aging tendency of the U.S. population, the median age in Mexico is 25, and in Central America it is much lower (20 inGuatemala and Honduras, for example). In part because of young workers moving northward, the destiny of the United States could be north-south, rather than th e east-west, sea-to-shining-sea of continental and patriotic myth. (Thiswill be amplified by th e scheduled 2014 widening of the Panama Canal, which will open the Greater Caribbean Basin to megaships from East Asia, leading to the further development of Gulf of Mexico port cities in the United States,from Texas to Florida.) Since 1940, Mexico's population has increased more than five-fold. Between 1970 and 1995 it nearly doubled. Between 1985 and 2000 it rose by m ore than a third. Mexico's population is now more than a thirdthat of the United States and growing at a faster rate. And it is northern Mexico that is crucial. That most of the drug-related homicides in this current wave of violence that so much dwarfs Syria's have occurred in only six of Mexico's

32 states, mostly in the north, is a key indicator of how northern Mexico is being distinguished from the rest of the country (though the violence in the city of Veracruz and the regions of Michoacan and Guerrero is also notable). If

the military-led offensive to crush the drug cartelslaunched by conservative President Felipe Calderon falters, as it seems to be doing, and Mexico City goesback to cutting deals with the cartels, then the capital may in a functional sense lose even further control of the north, with concrete implications for the southwestern United States. One might argue that with massiveborder controls, a functional and vibrantly nationalist United States can coexist with a dysfunctional and somewhat chaotic northern Mexico. But that is mainly true in the short run . Looking deeper into the 21st century,as Arnold Toynbee notes in A Study of History (1946), a border between a highly developed society and a less highly developed one will not attain an equilibrium but will advance in the more backward society's favor . Thus,helping to stabilize Mexico-- as limited as the United States' options may be, given the complexity and sensitivity of the relationship -- is a more urgent national interest than stabilizing societies in the Greater Middle East. IfMexico ever does reach coherent First World status, then it will become less of a threat, and the healthy melding of the two societies will quicke n to the benefit of both. Today, helping to thwart drug cartels in rugged andremote terrain in the vicinity of the Mexican frontier and reaching southward from Ciudad Juarez (across the border from El Paso, Texas) means a limited role for the U.S. military and other agencies -- working, of course, in fullcooperation with the Mexican authorities. (Predator and Global Hawk drones fly deep over Mexico searching for drug production facilities.) But the legal framework for cooperation with Mexico remains problematic in some casesbecause of strict interpretation of 19th century posse comitatus laws on the U.S. side. While the United States has spent hundreds of billions of dollars to affect historical outcomes in Eurasia, its leaders and foreign policy mandarinsare somewhat passive about what is happening to a country with which the United States shares a l ong land border, that verges on partial chaos in some of its northern sections, and whose population is close to double that of Iraq andAfghanistan combined. Mexico,in addition to the obvious challenge of China as a rising great power, will help write the American story in the 21st century. Mexico will partly determine what kind of society America will

become, and what exactly will be its demographic and geographic character, especially in the Southwest. The U.S. relationship with China will matter more than any other individual bilateral

relationship in terms of determining the United States' place in the world, especially in the economically crucial Pacific. If policymakers in Washington calculate

U.S. interests properly regarding those two critical countries, then the U nited States will have power to spare

so that its elites can continue to focus on serious moral questions in places that matter less.
http://www.energyandcapital.com/articles/mexican-oil-crisis/2833http://www.energyandcapital.com/articles/mexican-oil-crisis/2833http://www.energyandcapital.com/articles/mexican-oil-crisis/2833


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Solves global nuclear war

Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth 13(Stephen, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry is the Albert G.Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Will iam C.Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College Dont Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment, International Security, Vol.37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 751)

A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous globalsecurityenvironment. For one thing,

as noted above, theUnited States overseaspresence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from takingprovocative action.Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemonyfrom contemplating

expansionand make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention

that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest

portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the American Pacifier is provided in the works of JohnMearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous

multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional

rivalries, andeven runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount thisbenefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2)prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on acomplex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasias security setting if t he United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of t hese responses isnonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as ot her international relations theories that discount t heconflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of t erritorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array ofpolicies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasias major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without t he American pacifier.Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point tosuch as democratic governance or dense institutionallinkagesare either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is noconsensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European

governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a Europe thatis incapable of

securing itself fromvarious threats that could be destabilizingwithin the region and beyond (e.g ., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars),lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts ofEurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins t o swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by

Washingtonnotably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabiamight take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security

dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the regions prospects without the American pacifieris pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area e xperts

is that Japan and South Korea are likely toobtain a nuclear capacityand increase their military commitments, which could stoke a

destabilizing reaction from China. It is not able that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were onlyconstrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realisms sanguine portrayal is all of the research t hatundermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realismsoptimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particularand highly restrictiveassumption aboutstate preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumptionthat security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external att acks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem

is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and o ffense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the

social and other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption: states have preferencesnot only for security but also for prestige,

status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view ofmany and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly compet itive behavior.

Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimesthe case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To thedegree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a s ignificant deterioration in t he security environment in at least some of the worlds

key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal ofthe America n pacifier

will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear

proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity o f local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely

competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war ). Hence it is unsurprising t hat retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument notedabove: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the worlds core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the retu rn of insecurity and conflictamong Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in t his area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusingon the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of con flict make the

world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would seeoverall higher levels of military spe nding and innovation and a

higher likelihood of competitive regional proxy wars and arming of client states all of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a

faster diffusion of military power away from the United States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South

Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabiaall mightchoose to create nuclear forces. 78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actorswould be the end of t he game: they would li kely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the

security problem. 79 Usuallycarried out in dyadic terms,the debate over the stability of proliferation changes as the numbers go up. Proliferation

optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are

inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the te mptation to preempt before

feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptionsdeclines if the world were to

move from nine totwenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects

of nuclearproliferationincludingthe risk of accidents and the prospects thatsome new nuclearpowers will nothavetruly survivable

forcesseem prone togo up as the number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, the risk of unforeseen crisis dynamics that could spin out of


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control is also higher as t he number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns t he enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of securitycompetition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eu rasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledgingthat U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many support ers of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a powersuch as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offsho re balancing: stay over the horizon and pass the buck to localpowers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great powerappears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century. The problem is that Chinas rise puts the

possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, The United States will have toplay a key role in

countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves. 81 Therefore, unless Chinas risestalls, the United States is likely to act toward China

similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War. 82 It follows that the United States should takeno action that would compromise

its capacity to move to onshorebalancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and

Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and p ivot to Asiajust what the United States is doing. 83 In sum, the argument that U.S. security

commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship , including highly influential realist scholarship. Inaddition, the argument that Eurasian peace is u nnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the pot ential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latentonshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between o ffshore and onshore balancing could well be difcult. Bringing together

the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic ofthe

deep engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers security competitionin the

worlds key regions, thereby preventing the emergence ofa hothouse atmosphere for growingnew military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuadepartners from ramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the Un ited States formidable military machine may deter entry by potentialrivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percent age of GDP are at historical lows, and t hus far other major powers have shied away from seeking t o match top-end U.S. militarycapabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the focused enmity of the United States. 84 All of the worlds most modern militaries are U.S. allies (Americasalliance system of more than sixty countr ies now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap betwe en the U.S. military capability and t hat of potential rivals is bymany measures growing rather than shrinking. 85


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Bilateral Cooperation Advantage

Nieto is trying to reorient the relationship to focus on economic cooperation- now is

critical point in the relationship

Stratfor 13Stratfor, MAY 2, 2013, Evolving U.S.-Mexico Relations and Obama's Visit , http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/evolving-us-mexico-relations-and-obamas-visitWhen U.S. President Barack Obama travels to Mexico on May 2, he will arrive amid a period of sweeping transformation in the

country. Embroiled inmyriad political battles and seeking to implementan extensive slate of nat ional reforms, Mexican PresidentEnrique Pena Nieto's

administration has been focused almost solely on internal affairs . Meanwhile, after years of delay, the U.S. Congress has been debat ing gun

control and immigration reform -- two issues of serious interest to t he Mexican government. U.S.-Mexican relations are strategically important to

both countries, and Mexico's period of transition has created opportunities for each to reshape the

partnership. And although U.S. media attention has focused primarily on bilateral security issuesahead of Obama's visit --

namely cooperation in Mexico's drug war -- the Pena Nieto administration is working with Washington to re-orient thecross-border

conversation to one centered primarily on mutual economic possibility .

New administration means now is key to establish cooperation and credibility of

bilateral agreements- the THA solves

Martin and Wood 13Jeremy Martin, director of the Energy Program at theInstitute of the Americas at the University of California, San Diego, Duncan Wood, director of the Mexico Institute at the Woodrow WilsonInternational Center for Scholars and professor for 17 years in Mexico and previously was director of the Int ernational Relations Program at the Inst ituto Tecnolgico Autnomo de Mxico,U.S. Should Act Quickly on Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreement With Mexico, 03 May 2013, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12923/u-s-should-act-quickly-on-transboundary-hydrocarbon-agreement-with-mexico

As the U.S. Congress debates the deal, it is worth revisiting the four key reasons the agreement merits an expeditious approval in the coming

weeks. First, approvalof the deal in the U.S. would be an important sign of bilateral concord, particularly at the

outset of a new administration in Mexico and a second term for Obama. Thisis important, as it underscores the

two nations' increasing ability to work together and conclude complicated agreementsand cooperationon

binational issues unrelated to immigration or crimeand drugs.

Closer bilateral cooperation is critical to combat organized crime- ability to close

new bilateral agreements is paramount

Wilson 12Eric L. Olson, Wilson Center Mexico Institute, Considering New Strategies for Confronting Organized Crime in Mexico, March 2012http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/considering-new-strategies-for-confronting-organized-crime-mexico

Mexico has experienced an unprecedented rise in crime and violenceover the past five years with over 47,000 people killed in crime relatedviolence during this period. For some, the increase in violence is a t ragic by-product of President Calderns full frontal assault on criminal organizations. For others, the governments actions,

while well intended, have only marginally impacted trafficking while exacerbating the violence. Whatever the reasons, both Mexico and the United States are

entering a critical period where decisions about the future of security cooperation and crime fightingstrategies

come more sharply into focus. Both countries will hold presidential and congressional electionsin 2012 giving policy- makersand the public an

opportunity to take stock of the bi-national security strategiespursued thus far, anddebate the best strategies going

forward. While it is unlikely that the framework of shared responsibility and close bilateral collaboration will be upended, regardless of the election results, 2012 represents

an important opportunity to assess the strategies to date and refine our understandingof thesecurity threats

posed by organized crime, violence, illegal drug use and traffickingin both Mexico and the United States. To this end, the Mexico

Institutebrought together a number of leading scholars and experts to discuss and analyze the nature of security threats the U.S. and Mexico face from organized crime. The result has beenthe compilation herein of cutting edge analysis and innovative approaches reflecting some of the latest research and information available about drug t rafficking, organized crime and violence in

Mexico. Together these ideas challenge much of the conventional wisdom and commonly held assumptions about Mexico. They suggest important new strategic

directions for both countries that build on what has already been tried, while redirecting current strategies to

prioritizereducingthe violence associated with t rafficking and organized crime.
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/evolving-us-mexico-relations-and-obamas-visithttp://www.stratfor.com/video/banking-reform-hold-mexicohttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/mexico-telling-reform-packagehttp://www.stratfor.com/weekly/mexicos-drug-war-balkanization-leads-regional-challengeshttp://www.iamericas.org/http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/considering-new-strategies-for-confronting-organized-crime-mexicohttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/considering-new-strategies-for-confronting-organized-crime-mexicohttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/considering-new-strategies-for-confronting-organized-crime-mexicohttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/considering-new-strategies-for-confronting-organized-crime-mexicohttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/considering-new-strategies-for-confronting-organized-crime-mexicohttp://www.iamericas.org/http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/mexicos-drug-war-balkanization-leads-regional-challengeshttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/mexico-telling-reform-packagehttp://www.stratfor.com/video/banking-reform-hold-mexicohttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/evolving-us-mexico-relations-and-obamas-visit


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Organized crime leads to global instability

UNODC 9February, Preventing organized crime from spoiling peace, Commission on Narcotic Drugs, htt p://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/preventing-organized-crime-from-spoiling-peace.html

Look at almost any conflictzone in the world, and you'll find spoilers with links to criminal groups .Conflict createscover for illicit enrichment - whether it be drugs, natural resources, or the trafficking o f weapons and people. It also creates profitable new markets for smuggled goods. In the absence

of the rule of law and licit competition, criminal groups fill a lucrative vacuum. Since they profit from instability they have few incentives

for peace. Organized crime istherefore a major threat to keeping and building peace, and - because of

its transnational nature - has an impact on regional security. As a result, conflictswhich may seem t ractable dragon for years. "Peacekeepers, peacemakers, and peace-builders are starting to wake up to t he impact of crime on conflict, and UNODC has a unique skill set t hat can addressthis urgent problem", says UNODC Spokesman Walter Kemp, "The establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission, an ever-expanding number of peacekeeping operations thatinclude a rule of law component, an increased emphasis on conflict prevention, and greater attention t o the political economy of conflict all demonstrate the need for expertise indealing with organized crime in fragile situations", says Mark Shaw, Chief of UNODC's Integrated Programming Unit. Yet expertise is relatively limited. As the Executive Directorof UNODC, Antonio Maria Costa has po inted out, "we need more specialists to fight organized crime. Under the UN flag, there a re more than 130,000 soldiers and 10, 000 police.Yet, the UN has less than a dozen experts on organized crime. How can we answer the calls for help when we have few people to send?" UNODC is taking steps to rectify thisproblem, both within the UN system and among Member States. "UNODC is well-positioned to play a key role in this area since we are the guardian of the UN Convention againstTransnational Organized Crime and the developer of a number of ke y tools to strengthen criminal just ice in post-conflict settings", says UNODC Director of Operations FrancisMaertens. One such tool was launched in New York on 11 February - Model Codes for Post-Conflict Criminal Justice which was produced in partnership with the Office of the HighCommissioner for Human Rights, the US Institute for Peace, and the Irish Centre for Human Rights. "Blue helmets get most of the attention when people think about building peace

and security", said Mr. Costa at t he launch, "but long-term security depends first and foremost on the creation or

restoration of the rule of law, and that is what this Model Code is for".

This violence escalates

Bosco 6David, sr. editor @ FP magazine, July 23, pg. http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/sunday/commentary/la-op-bosco23jul23,0,6188365.story?coll=la-sunday-commentary

IT WAS LATE JUNE in Sarajevo when Gavrilo Princip shot Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife. After emptying his revolver, the young Serb nationalist jumped into the shallowriver that runs through the city and was quickly seized. But the events he set in motion could not be so easily restrained. Two months later, Europe was at war. The understanding that

small but violent acts can spark global conflagration is etched into the world's consciousness. The

reverberations from Princip's shots in the summer of 1914 ultimately took the lives of more than 10

million people, shattered four empires and dragged more than two dozen countries into war. This hot summer,as the world watches the violence in the Middle East, the awareness o f peace's fragility is particularly acute. The bloodshed in Lebanon appears to be part of a broader upsurge inunrest.Iraq is suffering through one of its bloodiest months since the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. T aliban militants are burning schools and attacking villages in southern Afghanistan as the United State s and NATO struggle to defend that country's fragile government.Nuclear-armed India is still cleaning up the wreckage from a large terrorist attack in which it suspects militants from rival Pakistan. The world is awash in weapons, North Korea and Iran are developing nuclear capabilities, and long-range missile technology is spreading like

avirus. Some see the start of a global conflict. "We're in the early stages of what I would describe as the

Third World War,"former House Speaker Newt Gingrich said last week. Certain religious websites are abuzz with t alk of Armageddon. There may be as muchhyperbole as prophecy in the forecasts for world war. But it's not hard to conjure ways that today's hot spots could ignite.

Independently, plan sets a precedent -- solves resilient US-Mexico energy

cooperation

Wood 12 senior associate in the Americas program at CSIS(Duncan, also director of the international relations program at Mexicos Autonomous Institute of Technology, Global Insider: U.S.-Mexico Energy Deal Sets Important Precedent, WorldPolitics Review, 4-24-2012, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/11880/global-insider-u-s-mexico-energy-deal-sets-important-precedent)

WPR: What is the history of energy cooperation between the U.S. and Mexico? Duncan Wood: Since the nationalization of Mexican

oil in 1938, the relationship between the two countries in energy matters has been sensitive, to put it mildly. Whereas Mexico has been

one of the United States largest crude oil suppliers, and the U.S. in turn is far and away Mexico's largest

market for oil, open collaboration between the NAFTA partners beyond exports has been restricted. This islargely due to Mexican sensitivities over sovereignty, the contentious history of U.S. oil firms' involvement in

Mexico prior to nationalization and the constitutionally mandated monopoly in oil production in Mexico

granted to the state-owned energy company Pemex. Any public statement by a United States government

official or oil executive has traditionally been greeted with charges of foreign interference by Mexican leftists and nationalists. There have,however, been a number of examples of cooperation over the years. In the 1990s, Pemex and Shell went into business together in the United States, sharing the ownership and operation of a refinery in Deer Park, Texas. This boosted Pemex's refining capacity and enabled it to collaboratewith a large international oil company (IOC) outside of Mexican territory. Within Mexico, Pemex has long used important contractors such as Halliburton and Schlumberger to help discover and extract oil without surrendering ownership. In gas, Mexico is a n important supplier of natural gasto the United States through crossborder pipelines. In the 1990s and 2000s, close cooperation among the U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. research labs and the Mexican government led to progress in renewable energy development in Mexico, and there is currently a bilateralworking group negotiating the question of crossborder electricity transmission. During the existence of the Security and Prosperity Partnership, Mexico, the United States and Canada discussed energy issues in the North American Energy Working Group, but this initiative fizzled out with thedemise of the partnership. WPR: What brought about the recent agreement between the U.S. and Mexico to cooperate on energy exploration in the Gulf of Mexico? Wood: The history of this agreement goes back to the 1970s. After negotiations in the United Nations over the InternationalLaw of the Sea, the two countries came together to determine ownership of resources found in the border region of the Gulf of Mexico that were beyond their respective 200-mile exclusion zones but entirely surrounded by them (thereby not qualifying as international waters). In the late-1990s the two countries agreed to a 10-year moratorium on exploration and drilling in order to allow the negotiation of a settlement. Mexico's 2008 energy reform legislation called on the Calderon administration to seek a solution to the issue, and when the 10-year deal expired in 2009 thetwo governments agreed to work toward a binding deal. In the first year of the talks, the parties engaged in a process of information exchange, discussing standards, emergency-management procedures and existing seismic data. This data exchange, it is vital to recognize, was not aimed at

establishing what resources might exist in the region, but rather what geological structures might exist, thereby giving clues to potential oil fields. In 2010, Presidents Barack Obama and FelipeCalderon committed to a negotiated transboundary agreement, and both sides agreed on an extension of the

1999 moratorium for four more years. Official negotiations were concluded in December, and the treaty was

signed on Feb. 20, 2012.WPR: What is the likely political and economic impact of increased U.S.-Mexico energy

cooperation? Wood: The transboundary agreement is an exciting new departure for Pemex and for

U.S.-Mexico cooperation . First, it gives Pemex access to much-needed oil reserves in the border region that

were previously restricted. These reserves are estimated to be upward of 9 billion barrels. Second, it allows

Pemex to work directly in partnership with the private sector, foreign firms and particularly IOCs to extract

the oil-- arrangements prohibited to date. Third, the agreement sets a precedent for further transboundary talks with Cuba


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in the eastern section of the gulf, where Mexico again shares potential reserves. For U.S.-Mexico cooperation,

the deal is highly significant, less for the oil involved than for the precedent it sets . Rather than rivals ,

in this area the United States and Mexico are partners in oil exploration and production. The lack of

political opposition to the deal within Mexico demonstrates that the traditionally inflammatorynationalistic rhetoric of political forces on the Mexican left has diminished in recent years, as a consensus

emerges over the pressing need to reform the oil sector.

Thats key to move U.S. companies away from corn ethanolto Mexican biofuels

Wood 10senior associate in the Americas program at CSIS(Duncan, also director of the international relations program at Mexicos Autonomous Institute of Technology, Environment, Development and Growth: U.S.-Mexico Cooperation in RenewableEnergies, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, December 2010, htt p://wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Renewable%20Energy%20report.pdf)

To date, however, there has been only minor cooperation between the United States and Mexico at the governmental

level. The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) has worked with SAGARPA on a number of technical issues, and prepared a report on the Mexican biofuels se ctor in 2009 thatpointed to the potential for growth in the market and to the changing regulatory landscape for biofuels in Mexico. This report highlighted the prospect of higher levels of demand for biodiesel

thanks to the setting of a national goal to introduce at least 5 percent of biodiesel in the transportation sector by 2012. But the main interest has come from the U.S.

private sector, which is looking to invest in biofuels production in Mexico with an eye to exporting the

product either back to the United States or to Europe. With small-scale projects popping up across the country, U.S. firms have begun

to evaluate the potential for large-scale production of biofuels.Global Clean Energy (GCE), a Los Angeles-based firm that specializes in

feedstocks for the production of biofuels, has recently invested in two jatropha farms in Mexico and one in Belize. Jatropha, a hardy shrub that produces a nut

with very high oil content that can be processed into biodiesel, is seen by many as a perfect biofuel feedstockfor Mexico. Native to the Mesoamerican region, the plant grows on marginal land, is not edible either for humans or animals,

and thus does not generate a foodvs.-fuel controversy, and can be planted on land that is also used for grazing

goats or sheep.In addition to being a feedstock for biofuels, the harvest can be used as a source of biomass for producing energy

and the nuts themselves can be detoxified and processed for animal feed after their oil has been expressed . GCEhas 5,000 acres under cultivation in Yucatan, and has adopted a sustainable business model that has resulted in jobs, fair wages and community development in the local area. 52 This is one of

the dimensions of the biofuels industry that is only infrequently mentioned but that is important to note. It is increasingly common for businesses focusing

on biofuels production to develop a model that emphasizes both profitability and sustainable development.

Pioneer Global Renewables, a U.S. firmfrom San Francisco that has already invest ed in jatropha plantations in the Dominican Republic, is also looking to expand

into Mexicoand has a similar model to GCE, focusing on local community development, fair prices for harvests, and minimal negative impact on t he environment. Jatropha,

however, is only one of a multitude of biofuels that has potential in Mexico. Sugar,a long depressed industry in t he country,

could receive a significant boost if large scale ethanol production were contemplated. A large number of

sugar mills are currently lying dormant, and could be retrofitted relatively cheaply to produce ethanol.For

example: According to the Mexican Sugarcane Producers Association, only two mills have the capability of producing ethanol with the

technical requirements specified by PEMEX, equating to about 10 million liters per year. If these millsupgraded their facilities and operated at full capacity and efficiency, it is calculated that total production

capacity for ethanol could reach 170 million liters per year. 53 The sugarcane-to-ethanol industry will a lso have to overcome labor and taxationissues if it is to become commercially viable in Mexico. At present ethanol is subject to a luxury t ax of 50 percent, which makes the production of ethanol for fuel uncompetitive at the moment.

Another option exists in the incipient algae to ethanol industry, which is receiving considerable att ention because of the potential for using algae

cultivations as a way to capture carbon dioxide, and can be located in almost any climate. U.S. firms that possess the technology to increase efficiency

in this field, such as Phyco2, a California-based firm, are already looking into the possibility of bringing their product to market in Mexico. 54 Biofuels innovations

indigenous to Mexico will also be of interest to U.S. firms. Recent research into the potential of succulents

and, in particular, agave show enormous promise.The agave plant has very high concentrations of sugar and produces more sugar per acre planted thansugarcane. A research team working at the Universidad Autonoma de Chapingo has esti mated that the variety Agave tequilana weber can yield up to 2,000 gallons of distilled ethanol per acre

per year and from 12,000-18,000 gallons per acre per year if their cellulose is included, whereas: Corn ethanol, for example, has an energy balance

ratio of 1.3and produces approximately 300-400 gallons of ethanol per acre. Soybean biodiesel, with an e nergy balance of 2.5, typically can yield 60 gallons of biodiese l per acre while

an acre of sugarcane can produce 600-800 gallons of ethanol with an energy balance of 8.0.An acre of poplar trees can yieldmore than 1,500 gallons of cellulosic ethanol with an energy balance of 12.0, according to a National Geographic study published in October 2007. 55 In addition to the impressive potential forproducing ethanol, agave is an attractive crop as it can grow in harsh environments, requires relatively little water, can be used to produce a wide variety of products, such as paper, textiles, and

rope, and is common across Mexico.

Biofuel production using corn is the largest cause of global food price increases

Boston Herald 8(UN expert faults US, EU biofuel use in food crisis http://www.bostonherald.com/news/international/europe/view.bg?articleid=1118150)A United Nations expert saidWednesday that recent studies indicate that U.S. and European Union targets for biofuel productionby their grain farmers have been the biggest causeof the world food crisis . Olivier de Schutter, a Belgian professor, also said an international monitor may be needed to supervise the production of energy sources such as ethanol, whichmay end up being less beneficial to the environment than expected, even as they cause global food prices to rise. Citing various reports, he said biofuel productiontargets outlined bythe United Statesand European Union have led to increased speculation on agricultural land and commodities, and diverted cropland and feed away from food production . Hesaid the International Monetary Fund estimated that 70 percent of the rise in corn prices was due to biofuels , with 40 percent for soybeans. The World Bank, de Schutter added,concluded that biofuels from grains and oilseed in the U.S. and EU were responsible for up to 75 percent of changes in commodity prices . "There is a consensus that theseinitiatives have had a significant impact," said de Schutter, who reports to the 47-nation U.N. Human Rights Council . His message to Washington and Brussels: "They shouldwithout further delay revise their policies."


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That causes extinction

Trudell 5(Robert H., Fall, Trudell, J.D. Candidate 2006, Food Security Emergencies And The Power Of Eminent Domain: A Domestic Legal Tool To Treat A Global Problem, 33Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. 277, Lexis)2. But, Is It Really an Emergency? In his study on environmental change and security, J.R. McNeill dismisses the scenario where environmental degradation destabilizes an area so much that"security problems and ... resource scarcity may lead to war." 101 McNeill finds such a proposition to be a weak on e, largely because history has shown soc iety is always able to sta y ahead of

widespread calamity due, in part, to t he slow pace of any major environmental change. 102 This may be so . However, as the event s in Rwanda illustrated, theenvironment can breakdown quite rapidly - almost before one's eyes - whenfood insecurity drives people to overextend their

cropland and to use outmoded agricultural practices. 103 Furthermore, as Andre and Platteau documented in their study of Rwandan society,

overpopulation and land scarcity can contribute to a breakdown of society itself. 104 Mr. McNeill's assertion closely resemblesthose of many critics of Malthus. 105 The general argument is: whatever issue we face (e.g., environmental change or overpopulation), it will be introduced at such a pace that we can face theproblem long before any calamity sets in. 106 This wait-and-see view relies on many factors, not least of which are a functioning society and innovations in agricultural productivity. But, today,

with up to 300,000 child soldiers fighting in conflicts or wars, and perpetrating terrorist acts, the very fabric of society is under increasing world-wide

pressure. 107 Genocide, anarchy, dictatorships, and war are endemic throughout Africa; it is a troubled continentwhose problems

threaten global security and challenge all of humanity . 108 As [*292] Juan Somavia, secretary general of the World Social Summit, said: "We've replaced

the threat of the nuclear bomb with the threat of a social bomb." 109 Food insecurity is part ofthe fuse burningto set

that bomb off. It is an emergency and we must put that fuse out before it is too late.


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Spills Advantage

Gulfs ecosystems on the brinkplan key to solve another accident

Craig 11 Attorneys Title Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Environmental Programs at Florida State University(Robin Kundis, Legal Remedies for Deep Marine Oil Spills and Long-Term Ecological Resilience: A Match Made in Hell, Brigham Young University Law Review, 2011,

http://lawreview.byu.edu/articles/1326405133_03craig.fin.pdf)These results suggest that we should be very concerned for the Gulf ecosystems affected by the Macondo well blowout. First, and as this Article has emphasized throughout, unlike the ExxonValdez spill, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill occurred at great depth, and the oil behaved unusually compared to oil released on the surface. Second, considerably more toxic dispersants wereused in connection with the Gulf oil spill than the Alaska oil spill. 164 Third, humans could intervene almost immediately to begin cleaning the rocky substrate in Prince William Sound, buthuman intervention for many of the important affected Gulf ecosystems, especially the deepwater ones (but even for shallower coral reefs), remains impossible. Finally, and perhaps mostimportantly, the Prince William Sound was and remains a far less stressed ecosystem than the Gulf of Mexico. In 2008, for example, NOAA stated that [d]espite the remaining impacts of the[still then] largest oil spill in U.S. history, Prince William Sound remains a relatively pristine, productive and biologically rich ecosystem. 165 To be sure, the Sound was not completelyunstressed, and [w]hen the Exxon Valdez spill occurred in March 1989, the Prince William Sound ecosystem was also responding to at least three notable events in its past: an unusually cold

winter in 198889; growing populations of reintroduced sea otters; and a 1964 eart hquake. 166 Nevertheless,the Gulf of Mexico is besieged by environmental stressors at another

order of magnitude (or two), reducing its resilience to disasters like the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. As the Deepwater HorizonCommission detailed at length, the Gulf faces an array of long-term threats, from the loss of protective and productive wetlands along the coast to hurricanes to a growing dead zone (hypoxiczone) to sediment starvation to sealevel rise to damaging channeling to continual (if smaller) oil releases from the thousands of drilling operations. 167 In the face of this plethora of stressors,even the Commission championed a kind of resilience thinking, recognizing that responding to the oil spill alone was not enough . It equated restoration of the Gulf to restored resilience,arguing that it represents an effort to sustain these diverse, interdependent activities [fisheries, energy, and tourism] and the environment on which they depend for future gen erations. 168 Anumber of commentators have catalogued the failure of the legal and regulatory systems governing the Deepwater Horizon platform and the Macondo well operations. 169 The DeepwaterHorizon Commission similarly noted that the Deepwater Horizons demise signals the conflicted evolutionand severe shortcomingsof federal regulation of offshore oil drilling in theUnited States. 170 In its opinion, [t]he Deepwater Horizon blowout, explosion, and oil spill did not have to happen. 171 The Commissions overall conclusion was two-fold. First, [t]he

record showsthat without effective government oversight, the offshore oil and gas industry will not adequately reduce the risk of accidents, nor prepare effectively to respond inemergencies. 172 Second, government oversight, alone, cannot reduce those risks to the full extent possible. Government oversight . . . must be accompanied by the oil and gas industrys

internal reinvention: sweeping reforms that accomplish no less t han a fundamental transformationof its safety culture.173

The plan solves ------ the THA leads to safety coordination between the U.S. and

MexicoBroder and Krauss 12business correspondents at the New York Times(John M. and Clifford, U.S. in Accord With Mexico on Drilling, The New York Times, 2-20-2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/21/world/americas/mexico-and-us-agree-on-oil-and-gas-development-in-gulf.html?_r=1&ref=americas)

WASHINGTONThe United States and Mexico reached agreement on Monday on regulating oil and gas development along their maritime border in the Gulf of Mexico, ending years ofnegotiations and potentially opening more than a million acres to deepwater drilling. The agreement, if ratified by Mexican and American lawmakers, would for the first time provide for joint

inspection of the two countries rigs in the gulf.Until now, neither was authorized to oversee the environmental and

safety practices of the other, even though oil spills do not respect international borders. Each of the nations

will maintain sovereignty and their own regulatory systems,Ken Salazar, the interior secretary, said from Los Cabos, Mexico, where

the agreement was completed. But what this signifies, and what may be the most significant part of the

agreement, is that were moving forward jointly with Mexico to ensure we have a common set of safetyprotocols. As the Mexicans move into deepwater development, Mr. Salazar said, we want to make sure its done in a way that

protects the environment and is as safe as possible. The Transboundary Agreement, as it is called, will make up to 1.5 million acres of offshore territoryclaimed by the United States available for leasing as early as June, though the leases will not become active until a pact is ratified. The Interior Department estimates that the area contains asmuch as 172 million barrels of oil and 300 billion cubic feet of natural gas, relatively modest amounts by the oil- rich gulfs standards. Mexicos oil production has been a major source for theUnited States for more than 25 years, and it is the single most important revenue-raiser for the Mexican government. But its output has been in sharp decline in the last decade, as energy demandby its growing middle class has risen, forcing a decline in export s and raising the possibility that Mexico could become a ne t oil importer by the end of the decade. In response, Mexicos nationaloil company, Petrleos Mexicanos, known as Pemex, has started a deepwater drilling program in recent years despite concerns that it is not sufficiently experienced for the task. Under the

Mexican Constitution, Pemex cannot bring in a foreign partner like Royal Dutch Shell or Exxon Mobil to develop the gulf reserves, even though those companies have much

more expertise in drilling in challenging waters. Pemex has drilled more than a dozen exploratory deepwater wells since 2002,

but the results have been mixed. It plans to drill six more wells this year, including two at depths of more

than 6,000 feet, where well pressure is customarily high and the possibility of a blowout is greater thanin shallower wells. The program has been controversial in Mexico , especially after the BP accident two years ago. Juan Carlos

Zepeda, Mexicos chief oil regulator, has warned that Pemex is not prepared to control a possible leak from the two deepest wells it is

planning this year and that the National Hydrocarbons Commission, the three-year-old agency Mr. Zepeda oversees, may be

overmatched when it comes to regulating deepwater drilling. With a staff of 60, little logistical capability and a budget of only $7 million, it hashad minimal say in how Pemex operates. In 1979, a blowout a t one of Pemexs s hallow-water wells called Ixtoc I in the Bay of Campeche resulted in the largest oil spill ever in the gulf until theBP Deepwater Horizon disaster in 2010. The issue of sharing oil and gas reserves in gulf border waters dates from the 1970s. The two countries negotiated a treaty that would define theirexploratory rights in border zones, but the United States Senate declined to ratify it in 1980. Presidents Obama and Felipe Caldern agreed to extend a drilling moratorium in the area until they

could negotiate a final accord. The zones are near areas being drilled successfully, but they are in water depths reaching 10,000 feet and are considered vulnerable to hurricanes. Mexico

doesnt have the resourcesto combat a major oil spill, and the United States does,said Jorge Pion, a former president of

Amoco Oil Latin America and a current research fellow at the University of Texas. Coordination and sharing communications,

training, personnel, equipment and technology are essential for safe and productive drilling.Gasoline pricesare on the rise, and Republicans have blamed the administration for being slow to approve more domestic drilling. With the new agreement, coming at a time whenthe White House is moving closer to approving drilling in Alaskan Arctic waters, Mr. Obama was expected to argue that his policies have led to a surge in domestic

production.


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Joint inspection solves oversight --- key to safety even if theres no Western Gap

development

Padilla 12 managing director at IPD Latin America(John D. Padilla, Q&A: Is Mexico Prepared for Deepwater Drilling in the Gulf?, Inter-American Dialogues Latin American Energy Advisor, 2/20/2012,http://repository.unm.edu/bitstream/handle/1928/20477/Is%20Mexico%20Prepared%20for%20Deepwater%20Drilling%20in%20the%20Gulf.pdf?sequence=1)

"The plan at issue is Pemex's intent to drill in the Perdido Foldbelt area, which abuts the U.S.- Mexico maritime border. Although the bulk of Pemex's offshore infrastructure is located in thesouthern Gulf of Mexico (i.e. near Cantarell and Ku-Maloob-Zaap), Perdido represents the company's most promising near-term commercial crude oil prospect. The 18 other deepwater wellsPemex has drilled have either been principally natural gas or heavy oil; those that will be brought online still await commercialization. Complicating the equation, Pemex is saddled with fourlatest- generation semisubmersible rigs that cost $500,000 per day. Because the company has been unable to drill in Perdido's ultra-deepwater, the rigs have been relegated to drilling in shallower

waterwork that less sophisticated technology could accomplish. Ongoing concerns over deepwater drilling in the wake of the Macondo

incident, combined with memories of Pemex's less-than-aggressive response to its 1979 Ixtoc spill, have given

authorities on both sides of the U.S.Mexico border pause. An archaic constitutional ban that prevents the company from providing the proper

balance o f risk-reward incentives, coupled w ith declining production, leave Pemex few large-scale, near-term alternativesother than forging into Perdido on its own. The accord

signed by U.S. and Mexican authorities on Monday offers an elegant way to calm fears on both sides of the

border. Whether joint ventures materialize or not, the accord would permit joint inspection teams the right

to ensure compliance with safety and environmental laws. Will Mexico's Senate approve the accord?"

Plan spills over past the border to environmental standardization in the entire Gulf

of Mexico

Velarde 12attorney and counselor-at-law(Rogelio Lopez, held various positions at Pemex during 1988-1993, including that of Financial Advisor to the Finance Department, In-House Counsel in Houston, Texas, In-House Counsel inNew York, and Head of the International Legal Department of Pemex. He was honored with the Most Distinguished Attorney Award of Pemex for the period 1990-1991, former Chairman ofthe Energy Committee of the Mexican Bar Association, and currently he is the President for the Latin America Chapter of the Association of the International Petroleum Negot iators (AIPN), asVisiting Professor of Judicial Process on the Mexican Legal Studies Program at the University of Houston Law Center, and he i s currently the director of t he Energy Law Seminar organizedbetween the Universidad Iberoamericana and the Mexican Bar Association. US-Mexican treaty on Gulf of Mexico t ransboundary reservoirs, International Law Office, 3-19-2012,http://www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/Detail.aspx?g=b9326bf8-f27f-43ff-b45a-1b2b70ccb217&redir=1)

Pemex has indicated that it has no information to confirm the existence of a transboundary field. However, it is

unlikely that both countries would take the step of concluding such a treaty without having geological

information to suggest the existence of such a field. One of the covenants included in the treaty is particularly

significant in this context. It requires the two federal governments to adopt common norms and standards

concerning safety and environmental protection for the "activity contemplated under this agreement".Effectively,

this means

mexico tha affirmative - jdi 2013

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