mexico tha aff - michiganclassic 2013 dw

8/12/2019 Mexico THA Aff - MichiganClassic 2013 DW

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Mexico THA Aff DW


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Notes


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What is the Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement?

USDOS2-20-2012; US Department of State, U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreementhttp://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/02/184235.htm

Elements of the AgreementThe United States and Mexico jointly announced their intention to negotiate a

transboundary hydrocarbons agreementon June 23, 2010, following the Joint Statement adopted byPresidents Obama and Calderon at the conclusion of President Calderons State Visit to Washington on May 19, 2010.

Upon entry into force, the current moratorium on oil exploration and production inthe Western Gap portion of the Gulf of Mexico will end.

The Agreement establishes a cooperative process for managing the maritime

boundary regionthat promotes joint utilization of transboundary reservoirs .

The Agreement provides a legal frameworkfor possible commercial activities at the

maritime boundary and sets clear guidelines for transboundary developments. It

establishes incentives for oil and gas companies to voluntarily enter into

arrangements to jointly develop any transboundary reservoirs. In the event such anarrangement is not achieved, the Agreement establishes a process by which U.S. companies andPEMEX can individually develop the resources on each side of the border while protecting eachnations interests and resources.

The legal certainty created by the Agreement will enable U.S. companies to explore newbusiness opportunities and carry out collaborative projects with PEMEX.

The Agreement also provides for joint inspections teams to ensure compliance with

applicable laws and regulations. Both governments will review all plans for the development ofany transboundary reservoirs.


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US-Mexico Relations Advantage


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1ac cards

First, the plan averts relations disasters from energy disputes in theGulfBBC News2/20/12US and Mexico agree Gulf of Mexico oil cooperationhttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-17108286

The US and Mexico have agreed to work together to develop deep-water oil and gas fields thatstraddle their maritime border in the Gulf of Mexico.The deal was signed at a meeting of the G20 group ofindustrial and developing countries in Los Cabos, Mexico.US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said it would ensure responsibleenergy exploration in the Gulf.Mexican President Felipe Calderon said it would ease Mexican fears that their oil might be

appropriated by the US.The deal,negotiated last year, was signed by Mrs Clinton and the Mexican Foreign Minister PatriciaEspinosa, with President Calderon acting as a witness.It ends a moratorium on oil development near themaritime boundary in the western Gulf and sets up a legal framework for companies to developcross-border fields jointly."These reservoirs could hold considerable reserves that could benefitthe US and Mexico alike, but they don't necessarily stop at our maritime boundary. This could

lead to disputes,"Mrs Clinton said."The agreement we are signing today will helpprevent such disputes ," she added.Mrs Clinton also stressed that it would allow US companies to work

in partnership withthe Mexican state oil company Pemex for the first time. President Calderon said the dealwould boost Mexico's energy security and increase revenues from Pemex,which account for about a thirdof government income."This agreement was negotiated under the invariable principle of respecting the sovereign rights of eachcountry to its natural resources," he said."Mexico's oil wealth belongs and will continue to belong to the Mexicans," he stressed.Both

countries affirmed that the deal would also ensure greater environmentalprotection - a key concern afterthe huge Deepwater Horizon oil spillin the Gulf in 2010. Mexico is a major oil and gas producer but is

well behind the US in developing deep water fields in the Gulf.

Second, it sends a key signal of sustainable cooperation

Martin 5/3/13 (Jeremy Martin, Duncan Wood, U.S. Should Act Quickly on TransboundaryHydrocarbon Agreement With Mexico, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12923/u-s-should-act-quickly-on-transboundary-hydrocarbon-agreement-with-mexico)

On this last issue, it is likely that the Mexican president inquired about thestatus of the TransboundaryHydrocarbons Agreement, signed with much fanfare in Los Cabos in February 2012. The agreement creates a frameworkfor resolving the thorny issue of ownership of oil and gas reserves that exist acrossor rather underneaththe international border

between Mexico and the U.S. in the Gulf of Mexico. Thisproposed frameworkwould put to rest long-standingMexican fearsof the efecto popote, or straw effectthe idea that U.S. companies aim to slurp up Mexicanoilreserves from across the nations maritime border. The2012 agreement marked a major shift by providinglegal certainty for exploration and production activities near the border, and by allowingfor the prospect oflong-prohibited joint development of reservesthat straddle the Gulf waters of both countries. At its core, theagreement seeks toset up legal guidelines for companies to jointly develop so-called transboundary

reservoirs and lift the moratorium on oil and gas exploration and productionfor roughly 1.5 millionacres in the Gulf.Mexico underscored its commitment to the agreement by quickly ratifying it; the Mexican Senate approved thetreaty in April 2012. In the United States, meanwhile, progress stalled for more than a year. But just in time for yesterdays bilateralmeeting, the agreement is again under discussion as legislators revive the dormant ratification process, which is good news for thoseeager to see its approval in the U.S. Indeed, according to the White House, Obama spoke in positive terms yesterday about the recentprogress made on the agreement: Both the House Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs and the House Committee onNatural Resources recently held hearings focused on the challenges and opportunities that approval of the accord would present forthe United States. On April 18, a bill was introduced in the House of Representatives that would make way for the approval andimplementation of the terms of the agreement. These are all positive steps, and their progress will be monitored closely by U.S. and

international observers, especially Mexico. But it bears underscoring that further delay in U.S. adoption of the
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agreement makes little sense. The agreement is not an overly polarizing issue domestically: in fact, quite the opposite.Several lawmakers have described it as awin-win for both Mexico and the U.S.As the U.S.Congress debates the deal, it is worth revisiting the four key reasons the agreement merits an expeditious approval in the coming

weeks. First, approval of the deal in the U.S.would be an important sign of bilateralconcord, particularly at the outset of a new administration in Mexico and a second term for Obama. This is important, as itunderscores the two nations' increasing ability to work together and conclude

complicated agreementsand cooperationon binational issuesunrelated to immigration orcrime and drugs. Second, this agreement makes clear that both nations are keenly aware of the energy potential of the Gulf,particularly along the maritime border. But it also firmly establishes the issue of increased regulation andstandards for drilling in a bilateral agreement. Since the April 2010 Macondo accident, the largest oil spill in U.S.history, the U.S. has been more concerned with drilling safety not just in the U.S. but also in neighboring countries around the Gulf

such as Cuba and Mexico. This agreement formalizes interactionin terms of regulation and anyresponses to incidents along the maritime border. Third, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was correct toemphasize the commercial opportunity and energy security element of the accord when it was first announced. The agreementprovides the possibility for U.S. firms to join with Mexicos national oil company, Pemex, to exploitdeep-water oil resources in the Gulf of Mexico along the countries' maritime boundaries. This could provide importantopportunities for U.S. companies, including exciting joint venture opportunities with Pemexlong thought impossible.


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XT Brink

U.S. Mexico relations strained by border securitys ramping upPublic Radio International 6-26-13 (Repost by Enrique Acedevo on Bostons WBUR, host @Public Radio International, Mexican Journalist Urgest US to Act Cautiously When Beefing Up BorderSecurity, 6-26-13http://www.pri.org/stories/politics-society/government/mexican-journalist-urges-u-s-to-act-cautiously-when-beefing-up-border-security-14211.html)

Some $30 billion would be spent to increase patrols and fencing on the border between theUnitedStates in Mexico fundingthat'sviewed as being key to securing enoughRepublican support for the broader initiative.But Mexican journalist andUnivision news anchor Enrique Acevedoargued in an opinion piece forABC that the U.S.-Mexico border is already one of the most intensely patrolled places onearth, and adding more money for more security, including 700 miles of newfencing,is a bad plan.Acevedo saysincreased spending over the last two decades has led

to migrant deaths steadily increasing, while human trafficking organizations, mostly run byMexican drug cartels,have seen a boom in business. "Rather than viewingborder enforcement as part of a broader strategy, borderenforcement became the only strategy to stop undocumentedimmigrants from coming across the border," he wrote."This security-basedapproach has led to a degradation of the quality of life for once dynamic border communities as

well as grave human rights violations." U.S. Sen. John McCain, R.-Ariz.,speaking to CNN Tuesday morning said this bill would make the U.S.-Mexico border the most militarized frontier since the fall of the BerlinWall. And that's no good, according to Acevedo. Acevedo said the new

plan will provide enough money for40,000 armed border patrol agents, or oneroughly every 250 feet if they lined up together at the same time,willonly suffocate the border "it won't seal it." "Millions of people live in these bordercommunities and ...we're going to have one of the most militarized borders in the history ofmankind, with a friend and a partner like Mexico," he said. "It's bad on many levels. It's bad for

the bilateral relations with Mexico.... It's also going to hurt the environment,many species will be endangered. And finally, it's going to represent achallenge in human rights." Further, Acevedo says,our history of borderpatrols show only limited success, decades gone by and billions of dollars spent,with thebiggest dent in border crossings coming from the 2008 economiccollapse. "That has been the only time in the last 40, 50 years where

we've had an actual reduction ... of illegal immigration into thiscountry," he said. Acevedo saysthe better way to handle immigration is to look atthe economy in general and U.S. employers specifically to try and make itso immigrants are less interested in risking so much to come here.
http://www.pri.org/stories/politics-society/government/mexican-journalist-urges-u-s-to-act-cautiously-when-beefing-up-border-security-14211.htmlhttp://www.pri.org/stories/politics-society/government/mexican-journalist-urges-u-s-to-act-cautiously-when-beefing-up-border-security-14211.htmlhttp://www.pri.org/stories/politics-society/government/mexican-journalist-urges-u-s-to-act-cautiously-when-beefing-up-border-security-14211.htmlhttp://www.pri.org/stories/politics-society/government/mexican-journalist-urges-u-s-to-act-cautiously-when-beefing-up-border-security-14211.htmlhttp://www.pri.org/stories/politics-society/government/mexican-journalist-urges-u-s-to-act-cautiously-when-beefing-up-border-security-14211.htmlhttp://www.pri.org/stories/politics-society/government/mexican-journalist-urges-u-s-to-act-cautiously-when-beefing-up-border-security-14211.html


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U.S. Mexico relations are one the brinkLaura Carlsen 11(holds a B.A. in Social Thought and Institutions from Stanford Universityand a Masters degree in Latin American Studies, also from Stanford and works for Centerfor International Policy, US Mexico Relations Back on Track in the Wrong Direction,

Americas Program, 4-3-11http://www.cipamericas.org/archives/4068)

The presidential meetingthis weekbetween MexicosFelipe Calderon andBarack Obama lookedfrom theoutsidelike a hastily arranged exercise in damage control. But while most analysts emphasized thetensions between the neighboring nationsgoing into the meeting, the real crisis behind the visit was the failure ofwhat the two leaders most strongly agree on: the war on drugs south of the border. Following a lengthy closed meeting, thepresidents stood before the cameras to reaffirm their mutual commitment to a war that has cost 35,000 Mexican lives since 2007,with the death toll rising by often 50 homicides a day.Obama affirmed the U.S. strategy of increased engagement in the Mexicandrug war, stating We are very mindful that the battle President Calderon is fighting inside of Mexico is not just his battle, its alsoours. He promised to deliver $900 million this year of funds appropriated under the Merida Initiative, a security agreement

launched in 2007 by the George W. Bush administration and extended indefinitely under Obama. The bi-nationalrelationship suffered some serious blowsin the weeks preceding Calderons Washington visit. The release ofthousands of Wiki-leaks cables between the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City and the StateDepartment revealed U.S. officials deep concerns regarding the Mexican governments capacityto carry out its high-risk war on drug cartels and wavering public opinion. Cable 10MEXICO83, forexample, states that the GOMs (Government of Mexicos) inability to halt the escalating numbers of narco-related homicides in

places like Ciudad Juarez and elsewhere has become one of Calderons principal political liabilities asthe general public has grownmore concerned about citizen security. The cable cites official corruption, inter-agency rivalries, dismal prosecution rates and aslow and risk averse Mexican army. Inan interview with El Universal,Calderon responded angrily, calling the statementsexaggerated, the ambassador ignorant and citing a lack of inter-agency coordination within the United States. Continued releasesof the cables by the Mexican daily La Jornada promise more embarrassments for both governments in attempting to portray aconfident and united front in the drug war. Tensions also followed the assassination of Jaime Zapata, a U.S. Immigration andCustoms Enforcement agent in San Luis Potos on Feb. 15. Although the Mexican government has arrested the alleged attackers

members of the Zetas drug cartelthe incident highlighted the risks of the drug war cooperationand the power of thecartels. The Mexican governments contradictory statements on what happened and the armys absurd hypothesis that the assassins

did not know they were attacking U.S. agents (the agents car bore US diplomatic plates) only deepened perceptions of alack of transparency.Within Mexico, the incident heightened fears that the U.S. government would demand more directinvolvement, in particular a lifting of the ban on foreign agents bearing arms within Mexican territory. A recent spate of commentsfrom high-ranking U.S. officials served to fan the flame of distrust of the U.S. government. Sec. of Homeland Security JanetNapolitanos speculated out loud of possible links between Mexican drug cartels and Al Qaeda, and Undersecretary of theArmyJoseph Westphal characterized organized crime in Mexico as an insurgency, while openly raising the specter of US troops being

sent in. Mexican columnists and anti-militarization activists have intensified criticism of U.S.growing involvement in the countrys national security. These tensions arise from thecommitment of both governments to deepen and reinforce a military alliance based on a drug

war that is rapidly losing the support of their populations and proving itself counterproductive.The central concern of the presidential summit wasnt the relatively superficial frictions between the countries, but the desire tobolster the beleaguered drug war. Despite talk of a deteriorating relationship, in fact the Calderon and Obama administrations areoverseeing the birth of historically unprecedented cooperation between the two nations. The problem is that nearly all of thatcooperation centers on the severely flawed approach to confront transnational drug-trafficking. The Mexico City US Embassy hasexpanded into a massive web of Washington-led programs and infrastructure. The controversial Merida Initiative, up for anotherround of funding in Congress, has allocated more than $1.5 billion to help fight Mexicos drug war with devastatingly negative

effects. In addition to the rise in violence, the binational relationship, which should be multi-faceted and focused on peaceful co-existence, has been hijacked by proponents of a war modeltoreduce illicit drug flows to the U.S. market and confront organized crime where it is most powerfulin brutal battle. The Pentagon isthrilled with its open access to the Mexican security apparatus and the Calderon governmententering election modeneeds the

political and economic support for its flagship war policy. But the new relationship forged in war rooms is bad

news for the Mexican people. Polls now show that the majority of the population does not believe its government iswinning the war on drugs and feels the social costs are too high. A new movement called No More Blood has taken hold throughoutthe country and regions like Ciudad Juarez, where militarization has been heaviest and not coincidentally violence has taken thehighest toll, have seen the rise of grassroots movements to defend human rights, call for an end to militarization and put forwardalternative strategies. Among their demands is to re-channel scarce resources away from the attack on cartels to address socialneeds, restore the armed forces to their constitutional mandate of national defense, and end impunity for crime by fixing the judicial

and public security systems and attacking government corruption. Its also bad news for the U.S. public. Opening up awar front in Mexico has not only destabilized our closest neighbor, but also drains resources needed in U.S. communities. Thegovernment-funded contracts granted to Blackwater and Blackhawk to fight Mexicos war could be used for schools in crisis. With anon-going economic crisis and two wars across the ocean, the prospect of long-term involvement south of the border hurts all but theflourishing war economy.
http://www.cipamericas.org/archives/4068http://www.cipamericas.org/archives/4068http://www.cipamericas.org/archives/4068http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20110304/ap_on_re_us/us_obama_mexicohttp://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/746815.htmlhttp://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/746815.htmlhttp://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/home/51207681-76/mexico-westphal-drug-insurgency.html.csphttp://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/home/51207681-76/mexico-westphal-drug-insurgency.html.csphttp://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/home/51207681-76/mexico-westphal-drug-insurgency.html.csphttp://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/home/51207681-76/mexico-westphal-drug-insurgency.html.csphttp://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/home/51207681-76/mexico-westphal-drug-insurgency.html.csphttp://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/746815.htmlhttp://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20110304/ap_on_re_us/us_obama_mexicohttp://www.cipamericas.org/archives/4068


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US-Mexico Relations down

US Mexico Relations are distantSandra DibbleMiami Herald Writer 3/7/11 Former Mexican president sees U.S.-Mexicorelations as cold, distanthttp://www.utsandiego.com/news/2011/Apr/07/former-mexican-president-sees-us-mexico-relations-/

Former Mexican President Vicente Fox spent Thursday on the University of San Diego campus,where he delivered a speech titled, Advancing U.S.-Mexican Relations in the 21st Century. Hespoke about immigration, security, drug trafficking, economic cooperation and the development ofhis Centro Fox research center in his home state of Guanajuato, which also houses his presidential library Mexicosfirst. The following are excerpts from his talk, remarks made at a news conference and a separate interview with TheSan Diego Union-Tribune at the Trans-Border Institute. Fox's visit was sponsored by the Trans-Border Institute and

the Center for Community Service Learning.Q: How do you see the U.S.-Mexico relationship? A: Itscold, its distant, itsbeginning to be conflictive. It never has happened before that a U.S.

ambassador to Mexico resigned, or he was resigned. ...We have a big black cloud on the futureof this relationship.Were not having a vision of the futureand where we should go.

US Mexico Relations are Strained Over DrugsE. EDUARDO CASTILLO, Associated Press 2/22/11Mexico President: US Doesn't HelpEnough in DrugWarhttp://cnsnews.com/news/article/mexico-president-us-doesnt-help-enough-drug-war

Mexican President Felipe Calderon says the U.S. government isn't doing enough to help Mexico in its fight against drug cartels.Healso isn't happy about U.S. diplomatic cables that he contends wrong ly criticizedMexico's anti-drug strategy, saying U.S.-Mexico relations were strainedafter the documents were made public by

WikiLeaks."I have found cooperation on this matter with President (George W.) Bush and with President (Barack) Obama, butobviously institutional cooperation ends upbeing notoriously insufficient," Calderontoldthe Mexican newspaper El Universal in an interview published Tuesday.Calderon said the U.S. government should help by reducingdrug use in the United States, the biggest consumer of illegal drugs in the world, and by stemming the flow of automatic rifles to

Mexican drug gangs."How canAmericans cooperate? By reducing drug use,which they haven'tdone," Calderon said. "And, the flow of weapons hasn't slowed, it has increased."
http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2011/Apr/07/former-mexican-president-sees-us-mexico-relations-/http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2011/Apr/07/former-mexican-president-sees-us-mexico-relations-/http://cnsnews.com/news/article/mexico-president-us-doesnt-help-enough-drug-warhttp://cnsnews.com/news/article/mexico-president-us-doesnt-help-enough-drug-warhttp://cnsnews.com/news/article/mexico-president-us-doesnt-help-enough-drug-warhttp://cnsnews.com/news/article/mexico-president-us-doesnt-help-enough-drug-warhttp://cnsnews.com/news/article/mexico-president-us-doesnt-help-enough-drug-warhttp://www.utsandiego.com/news/2011/Apr/07/former-mexican-president-sees-us-mexico-relations-/http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2011/Apr/07/former-mexican-president-sees-us-mexico-relations-/


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US-Mexico Relations Impacts


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Drug Cartels

US-Mexico relations key to battling drug cartelsTylerKeefe andValentinaPerez 12(authors @ Harvard University Institute of Politics, The War OnMexican Cartels: Options for US and Mexican Policy Makers, September 2012,

http://www.iop.harvard.edu/sites/default/files_new/research-policy-papers/TheWarOnMexicanCartels.pdf)

In combination with law enforcement agencies, the U.S. military and the intelligence community have been playing keyroles in the fight against the cartels. In August 2011, the United States posted small numbers of CIAoperatives and civilian military employees to Mexico to assist with intelligence collection,training, and operational planning.These efforts are being made to get around Mexican laws that prohibit foreignmilitary and police from operating on its soil, and to prevent advanced American surveillance technology from falling under thecontrol of Mexican security agencies with long histories of corruption.89 Despite current effortsby the United States to assist with

the Mexican Drug War, the violence is increasing and the cartels are gaining ground. The United States must reassertits efforts in order to roll back the influence of the cartels and end their reign. We advise a twofront approach to combatting the cartels: reducing the large demand for drugs in the U.S., andcollaborate with the Mexican government to target the cartelsin Mexico.

Good relations are needed to cooperate when dealing with drugcartelsClare RibandoSeelke 13(Specialist in Latin America @Congressional Research Office, Mexicos New

Administration: Priorities and Key Issues in U.S.-Mexican Relations 1/16/13http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42917.pdf)

Upon his inauguration, President Pea Nieto announced a reformist agenda with specific proposalsunder fivebroad pillars: reducing violence; combating poverty; boosting economic growth; reforming education; and fostering socialresponsibility. He then signed a Pact for Mexico agreement with the leaders of the PAN and leftist Party of the DemocraticRevolution (PRD) containing legislative proposals for implementing an agenda that includes energy and fiscal reform. Although the

pact may ease opposition in Mexicos Congress, Pea Nieto could face other constraints such as violence perpetrated byMexicos powerful criminal organizationsand the performance of the U.S. and global economies. Some analystsmaintain that the prospects for reform under this administration are good, while others are more circumspect. U.S.-Mexican relationsgrew closer during the Felipe Caldern Administration (2006-2012) as a result of the MridaInitiative, a bilateral security effort for which Congress has provided $1.9 billion. Some Members ofCongress may be concerned about whether bilateral relations, particularly security cooperation, may suffer now that the party

controlling the presidency has changed.Although the transition from PAN to PRI rule is unlikely to resultin seismic shifts in bilateral relations, a PRI government may emphasize economic issues morethan security matters. President Pea Nieto has vowed to continue U.S.-Mexican securitycooperation, albeit with a stronger emphasis on reducing violent crime in Mexico than oncombating drug trafficking; what that cooperation will look like remains to be seen. He has also expressed support forincreased bilateral and trilateral (with Canada) economic and energy cooperation.

Relations key to US funding, drones, training of police forces against

drug cartelsJorge Dominguez and Rafael Castro 10 (editors of Contemporary US-Latin American Relations:Cooperation or Conflict in the 21stCentury?, Chapter 2, published 2010 by Routledge Taylor & FrancisGroup in New York and London)

President Calderons objective was plain: the state must exercise its monopoly of force. He deployed27,000 troops within eleven Mexican states to achieve this objective instead of continuing to rely on law enforcement agencies.

Calderon ordered Mexican security forces to intensify their cooperation with their UScounterparts.Within the opening months of the new administration, as a result of systematic investigations, 284 FederalPreventative Police and Federal Investigative Agents were dismissed, including all thirty-four regional PFP coordinators; thousands
http://www.iop.harvard.edu/sites/default/files_new/research-policy-papers/TheWarOnMexicanCartels.pdfhttp://www.iop.harvard.edu/sites/default/files_new/research-policy-papers/TheWarOnMexicanCartels.pdfhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42917.pdfhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42917.pdfhttp://www.iop.harvard.edu/sites/default/files_new/research-policy-papers/TheWarOnMexicanCartels.pdfhttp://www.iop.harvard.edu/sites/default/files_new/research-policy-papers/TheWarOnMexicanCartels.pdf


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of other Mexican officials were also dismissed for drug traffic-related corruption. The US government respondedeagerly. Cooperationwith the Mexican Navy increased. US agencies trained thousands of Mexican lawenforcement agents in2007, Calderons first yearin office. As the US Department of State put it in its official reportfor 2007, The Calderon Administrations courage, initiative and success have exceeded all expectations,inparticular celebrating its using the military to re-establish authority and counter the cartels firepower. Bush and Calderon met in

Merida in March 2007. They expanded bilateral and regional counter-narcotics and security

cooperation. US and Mexican officials met behind closed doors over several months to craft Plan Merida. On May 22, 2007,Mexicos full draft proposal called for the exchange of intelligence and focused on US support fortraining Mexicans. Mexico insisted that no US troops would enter Mexican territory, nor would US civilian agents participatein operations in Mexico. On October 22 2007, the two governments issued their first public joint statement, announcing themultiyear Plan Merida to assist Mexico and Central American countries to combat drugtrafficking and other criminal organizations.


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Terorrism

Terrorists are entering through the US Mexico border by way ofhuman smugglingNathanWhitfield 11 (Naval Postrgraduate on US-Mexican Security, TRAVELING THETERROR HIGHWAY: INFILTRATION OF TERROR OPERATIVES ACROSS THE U.S.-MEXICOBORDER, December 2011, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a556477.pdf)

Far more sinister than individuals seeking higher paying jobs or a better quality of life, terroristsseeking to conduct destabilizing attacks on U.S. soil could exploit thesewell-established humantrafficking routes to gain undetected entry into the U.S. With so much attention focused on our endeavors todefeat terrorists in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other foreign countries, we forget that conducting a dramatic attack in the U.S. continuesto be a top operational goal for transnational terrorist organizations.5 In many senses, immigration is theindispensable

asymmetric weapon,making America not only a target for terrorism, but also an ideal staging ground for such attacks.6 Despite

significant successes in border and immigration enforcement, only 1030% of illegal immigrants are detained bythe U.S. Border Patrol (USBP).7 With such a large number of personnel potentially slipping across the border undetected,

there exists the distinct likelihood that terrorist operatives could be successfully smuggled intothe U.S. across the U.S.-Mexico border. Terrorist organizations possess three options fordeveloping terror networks within a country. First, they can legally infiltrate operatives through

visaor asylum programs, who then melt into the host country population. Second, terrorists canillegally infiltrate operatives. Illegal infiltration can be achievedby two methods: utilizing fraudulentdocuments or taking advantage of corrupt authorities to cross at traditional ports of entry.Alternatively,terrorists can illegally cross the border in between traditional ports of entry. The first method carries theinherent risk that fraudulent documents may be detected and the potential operative subsequently detained by law enforcement. Forits part, illegal entry between ports of entry also carries risks, however, it has the advantage of keeping the operative anonymous andhidden from law enforcement. Finally, and in combination with the first two methods, a homegrown terrorist operative can bedeveloped. Homegrown operatives are assimilated citizens who possess rights and often lack any distinguishing features or historythat would identify them to law enforcement. All three options offer distinct advantages and disadvantages. While this thesis willpresent evidence of homegrown terror operatives, its main focus will be to investigate the potential for illegally infiltrating operativesbetween traditional ports of entry as a means to establish terror networks and activities within the U.S.
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a556477.pdfhttp://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a556477.pdf


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Border Cooperation

Relations key to border cooperationSarah M.Shore 11 (@the Foreign Policy Assosciation, Great Decisions 2012 Preview: US and Mexico,11/22/12http://www.fpa.org/features/index.cfm?act=feature&announcement_id=92)

From border security and immigration to trade and investment, Americans see the impactof the U.S.-Mexico relationship on a daily basis.Despite deeply ingrained links between thetwo nations, the relationship has been marked by significantrough patches. A growing fence, patrol agents andviolence along the borderunderline wavering economic and political partnerships. No U.S. president visited Mexico between1979 and 1998. As relations today continue to oscillate, the Mexican-American communitybecomes only moreimportant. At 10% of the U.S. population, Mexican-Americans comprise the majority of the Hispanic community, which at 16%is the largest minority in the country. Economically, Mexican immigrants have been and continue to be a key part of the American

workforce. Today Mexico is in the midst of a dangerous drug war, how will the U.S. aid its neighbor tothe south? What is the future of U.S.-Mexican relations?
http://www.fpa.org/features/index.cfm?act=feature&announcement_id=92http://www.fpa.org/features/index.cfm?act=feature&announcement_id=92


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Latin American Relations

Relations are strategically keyStratfor Global Intelligence 13 (Global Awareness and Guidance program and think-tank based inTexas, Evolving Us-Mexico Relations and Obamas Visit, 5/2/13

http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/evolving-us-mexico-relations-and-obamas-visit)

When U.S. PresidentBarack Obama travels to Mexico on May 2, he will arrive amid a period ofsweeping transformation in the country. Embroiled inmyriad political battles and seeking to implementanextensive slate of national reforms,Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto's administration has beenfocused almost solely on internal affairs.Meanwhile,after years of delay, the U.S. Congress has beendebating gun control and immigration reform -- two issues of serious interest to the Mexicangovernment. U.S.-Mexican relations are strategically important to both countries , andMexico's period of transition has created opportunities for each to reshape the partnership. Andalthough U.S. media attention has focused primarily on bilateral securityissues ahead of Obama's visit --namely cooperation inMexico's drug war -- thePena Nieto administration is working with Washington to re-orient the cross-border conversation to onecentered primarily onmutual economic possibility.

Decisions between US and Mexico affect Latin AmericaMichaelShifter 08(prof @ Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia, US Latin

American Relations: Recommendations for the New Administration, 10/27/08http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=1625)

Regardless of how one comes down on the issues of Cuba, immigration, drugs, and trade, the paternalistic impulse on the part of the United States hasbeen unmistakable. Latin Americans find this tutorial attitude extremely irritating, and their objections have prompted a more collegial tone from theUnited States in certain cases. Unfortunately, it is still manifest in a variety of ways, from the overall diplomatic style to specific policies like drugcooperation decertification or suspending military training for countries that do not sign agreements that exempt US soldiers from prosecution under

the International Criminal Court.While domestic politics is never completely divorced from foreign policy, ithas an inordinate and particularly distorting influence on Latin American policy. Hardliners and liberalsalike rarely consider the effects policies and statements will have on US-Latin American relations or the ultimate impact for US interests . The

decision to build a wall along the US-Mexico border, for example, may have been politically expedient butwas deeply insulting, not only to Mexico, but to the entire region.Close to the top of the list of foreign policypriorities for the next US administration should be addressing the security challenge in Mexico. President Bush was right when he said at the White

House on September 5, 2001 that Mexico was our most important relationship.The reasons forMexicos significance are obvious: the countrys 2,000 mile border with the United States, therobust trade relationship underthe 1994 NorthAmerican Free TradeAgreement, the high levels of tourism and immigration, theenvironment, and an array of other important bilateral issues. These deepening connections are the product of dramaticshifts of technology and capital, reduced trade barriers, and remarkable cultural intermingling. The interplay of global forces and national trends hasshaped two other central traits in Mexico. The first is its increasingly open, competitive and democratic politics. It has been nearly a decade sinceMexico witnessed the alternation in power to the National Action Party (PAN) after seven decades of rule by the Institutional Revolutionary Party(PRI). As in all such situations, the country is a blend of the old and the new, but the overall tendency is toward greater give-and-take and lessauthoritarian control. The second trait is markedly less benign, an example of a far darker side of globalization. Mexico has increasingly become a mainlocus of organized crime, principally fueled by drug trafficking, with deadly consequences. Because of this pernicious phenomenon, there are nownearly 3,000 murders per year in Mexico, more than in Iraq. The rule of law is at serious risk as many towns are being overtaken by mafias thatpenetrate all realms of the state and society. The Mexican government is having difficulty asserting its authority. Sensing growing frustration amid adeterioration of the situation, President Felipe Calderon has turned to the countrys army to address the problem , though this approach involves

considerable risks and has yielded limited results thus far. Fragile and often corrupt institutions like the Mexican police and courts help account for thedire situation. Displacement of the drug trade and the brazen conduct of agile criminal networks also form a large part of the explanation. With its highdemand for drugs and stubborn unwillingness to control the flow of small arms, the United States is hardly an idle bystander in Mexicos security crisis.Through the Mrida Initiative, the United States has offered $1.4 billion in training and equipment over the next three years, which may help mitigatethe deleterious effects and help avert the worst-case scenario. A long-term solution to overcome this profound and pervasive problem, however, willrequire deeper cooperation along with more systematic and imaginative policies. Mexico is being overwhelmed by threats to its democratic governance,but the situation in much of Central America and the Caribbean may be even more combustible. Many states in this vulnerable sub-region have scantcapacity to contend with the organized crime and drug trafficking contributing to enormous insecurity. In Guatemala, CentralAmericas largestcountry, conditions are particularly unsettling, as mafias operate largely unchecked. They are similarly active in much of the Caribbean, wheregovernments are at a great disadvantage compared to well-organized and well-financed criminal gangs. Transnational forces have strengthened inrecent years, thanks to the unencumbered transportation accompanying globalization. Street crime is also rampant in such countries as El Salvador,which registers the highest homicide rate per capita of any country in the world. Indee d, there are an estimated 100,00 0 maras or gang membersoperating in Central America. Making matters worse, Central America and the Caribbean are being battered by the current financial and economiccrisis in the United States, including sharp declines in remittances, tourism and investment. Higher fuel and food costs have also put tremendous strain
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/evolving-us-mexico-relations-and-obamas-visithttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/evolving-us-mexico-relations-and-obamas-visithttp://www.stratfor.com/video/banking-reform-hold-mexicohttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/mexico-telling-reform-packagehttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/mexico-telling-reform-packagehttp://www.stratfor.com/weekly/mexicos-drug-war-balkanization-leads-regional-challengeshttp://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=1625http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=1625http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/mexicos-drug-war-balkanization-leads-regional-challengeshttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/mexico-telling-reform-packagehttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/mexico-telling-reform-packagehttp://www.stratfor.com/video/banking-reform-hold-mexicohttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/evolving-us-mexico-relations-and-obamas-visit


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on already tight fiscal situations, contributing to a perfect storm of economic vulnerability. As a major oil producer, Mex ico is better equipped toabsorb such shocks. The 2005 Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), which also includes the Dominican Republic, opened up markets and

facilitated greater investment flows but also failed to stem mounting economic pressure and social dislocation.As a result, governmentsin the region are seeking to maintain the benefits of ties to the United Stateswhile trying to take advantageof alternative trading arrangements. Nicaragua, a signatory of CAFTA, is also a founding member of the Bolivarian Alternative of the Americas (ALBA),inspired and organized by Venezuela. Honduras decided to join in 2008. Costa Rica, hardly ideologically sympathetic to Venezuela, has become a

member of Petrocaribe, an arrangement in which Venezuela provides discounted oil to some 19 cash-strapped governments. For Mexico, Central

America and much of the Caribbean, the United States remains the central reference point and the dominant actor. The sub-region ishighly sensitive to what happens in the United States, benefiting in good times and suffering during economicdownturns. The United States is the main trading partner, and despite ebbs and flows in remittances and migration, it is doubtful that the shift towardsdeeper economic and cultural integration will be reversed over time. Such underlying, long-term trends, however, do not necessarily translate into

political subordination and control. On the contrary, those countries geographically closest to the UnitedStates are joining the rest of Latin America in increasing their distance and independence fromdecisions made in Washington. Many countries of Central America and the Caribbean arepursuing economic and political relationships with Venezuela, an adversary of the United States.Despite being so inextricably intertwined, Mexico has become an influential globalplayer far more autonomous from the United States.


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Nuclear Proliferation

Relations with Mexico is key to denuclearization agendaMichaelHamel-Green 12, ("Regions That Say No: Precedents and Precursors for DenuclearizingNortheast Asia", Nautilus Institute for Security and Stability, NAPSNet Special Reports, June 05, 2012,

http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/regions-that-say-no-precedents-and-precursors-for-denuclearizing-northeast-asia/)

In Latin America, the relevant body is the Agency for the Prohibition of NuclearWeapons in Latin Americabased in Mexico. In Southeast Asia, the Southeast Asian NWFZ Commission iscoordinated through the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta, Indonesia. In Africa, the recently established organization is the AfricanCommission on Nuclear Energy (ACONE) based in Pretoria, South Africa. In practice, some of the most successful zones in terms ofcurrent universal adherence and universal recognition and ratification by nuclear weapon states did not, in fact, attract initial

adherence by all parties. The Latin American Tlatelolco Treaty, for example, has secured universaladherence from all Latin American states and universal ratification of its negative securityprotocols by the five recognized nuclear weapon states. However, at the time of negotiations,1963-67, the political conditions did not make it feasible to expect all regional states toimmediately ratify the zone.Whilefive Latin American states, Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Bolivia and Ecuador initially

proposed negotiations on the zone in 1963, following the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, other states were not soenthusiastic. As Redick notes,Argentina arguedat the time that such a treaty might freeze Latin Americanstates into a permanent state of inferiority,and, as itself a country seeking to develop the entire nuclear fuel cycle,might adversely affects its own options for developing nuclear weapon capability. The zone looked even less likely to be successfullyestablished when a military coup in early 1964 replaced the civilian government in one of the main and most influential proponentsof the zone, Brazil. The new Brazilian military regime of General Castelo Branco was much more ambivalent about the zone, andmoved towards a closer alignment with the United States while expressing reservations about aspects of the proposed zones,including the question of peaceful nuclear explosions. When the negotiations for the treaty concluded in 1967, both Brazil andArgentina (both now under military regimes following the 1966 Argentina military coup) declined to bring the treaty into force fortheir countries, and were not to do so for over two decades. Following a lengthy process of confidence-building on nuclear issues thatwas facilitated by the Tlatelolco Treaty framework, and by bilateral discussions that culminated in the 1991 Brazilian-ArgentineAgency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) agreement, both Brazil and Argentina finally brought the treaty

into force for their territories in early 1994. Cuba was to be an even longer hold-out state, not bringing thetreaty into force for its territory until 2002. In the case of the Treaty protocols, there wassimilarly no immediate ratification of the protocols by the relevant nuclear weapon states. Britainwas the first to ratify these in 1969, the US followed in 1971, China and France in 1974, and Russia in 1979. In all it took over adecade to achieve universal recognition for the protocols, and over three decades to achieve universal adherence amongst all zonal

states. There are some relevant parallels here for the Northeast Asian region. Nuclear weapon proliferation hadalready occurred prior to the NWFZ negotiations in the form of the 1961-62 Soviet deploymentof short and intermediate range nuclear weapons in Cuba. Following the 1964 and 1966 militarycoups in Brazil and Argentina respectively, potential horizontal nuclear proliferation was also a

very real possibility given the emerging nuclear capabilities in both countries and their militaryregime aspirationsto keep nuclear weapon options open. In Northeast Asia, nuclear weapon proliferation has alreadyoccurred in the form of North Koreas testing of two nuclear weapons, and acquisition of enrichment facilities that could lead toproduction of over 100 nuclear warheads. Other countries in the region, such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan have nuclearindustries that could provide future capacity for nuclear weapon production, with two, South Korea and Taiwan, already having inthe past conducted nuclear weapons related research. As in the case of Brazil, Argentina, and Cuba, one could expect North Koreaninitial reluctance to join a nuclear free zone now that the North Korean regime has demonstrably acquired nuclear weaponcapabilities; but equally, North Korea may well be encouraged to join such an arrangement through the initial establishment of such

a zone and comparable Tlatelolco-style mechanisms for subsequently bringing the treaty into force. In the case of Braziland Argentina, it is noteworthy thatfellow regional states, led particularly by Mexico,did not abandon or despair of the NWFZ conceptbut engaged closely with theBrazilian and Argentinian military regimes, integratedsome of their specificconcerns into the Tlatelolco Treaty, and developed an innovative entry-into-forcemechanism(Article 28 under the original treaty, Article 29 under the current amended treaty) that permitted eachregional state to join at a later date.


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Organized crime

Relations key to steer new approach to solve organized crimeStratfor 13Stratfor, Works For Forbes, U.S.-Mexico Cooperation Against Cartels Remains Strong,5/16/2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/stratfor/2013/05/16/u-s-mexico-cooperation-against-cartels-remains-strong/Aside from the political struggles, the Mexican government still faces very real challengeson the

streets as it attempts to quell violence, reassert control over lawless areas and gain the trust of the

public. The holistic plan laid out by the Pena Nieto administrationsounds good on paper, but it willstill

require a great deal of leadershipby Pena Nieto and his team to bring Mexico through the challenges it

faces. They will obviously need to cooperate with the UnitedStates to succeed, but it has become

clear that this cooperation will need to be on Mexicos terms and in accordance with the

administrations new, holistic approach .

US-Mexico cooperation is critical to solve organized crime and border security

unilateral U.S. efforts are doomed to fail.Mares and Cnovas 10David R. Mares, University of California, San Diego, and Gustavo Vega Cnovas, El Colegio deMxico. The U.S.-Mexico Relationship: Towards a New Era?. The project is co-sponsored bythe Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson Center, ElColegio de la Frontera Norte, and El Colegio de Mxico. January 1, 2010.http://usmex.ucsd.edu/assets/024/11646.pdfIn other words, the US and Mexico are in this struggle against crime together. The public in both countries demand

that the border be better secured in both directions against the drugs, money, weapons and individuals feeding this crime.Despite the

frustrations many on the US side feel as they read sensationalist press accounts, there is no way of

fixing the border that can provide security for the US without also providing it for Mexico. The

expectation by some that the US can seal the border against illicit entry of goods and individuals issimply impossible. Even making significant progress toward it would impose economic and social costs

on Mexico that would create an even more desperate situation south of the border, thereby

producing even greater threats to US national security. The two countries can either address these demands for securityin a more effective manner (and that means doing many things differently) or divert significant human and capital resources from meeting the

economic challenges of globalization into an ineffective search for security from crime.Although the levels of violence have

declined in 2009 their continuation at historically high levels indicates that the level of trans-national

cooperation between the Mexican and the UnitedStatesgovernments is not optimal in this area.
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Failed States

Relations are key to prevent Mexico from becoming a failed stateDresser 9Denise Dresser, LA Times, a contributing writer to Opinion, is a columnist for the newspaperReforma, Reality check for U.S.-Mexico relations, January 15, 2009,http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jan/15/opinion/oe-dresser15On Monday, President-elect BarackObama and Mexican President FelipeCalderonengagedin a time-honored tradition: At the

outset of a new U.S. administration, the American president meets the Mexican head of state before all others.Obama and Calderon

got the chance tolook into each other's eyes andspeak about the importance of U.S.-Mexico relations -- the

diplomatic equivalent of new neighbors meeting over a cupof tea. Now it's time to move beyond etiquette and face

hard facts.Mexico is becoming a lawless country. More people died here in drug- related violence last

year than were killed in Iraq. The government has been infiltrated by the mafias and drug cartels that

it has vowed to combat. Although many believe that Obama's greatest foreign policy challenges lie in

Afghanistan or Iran or the Middle East, they may in fact be found south of the border. Mexico may not

be a failed state yet, but it desperately needs to wage a more effective war against organized crime,

and it must have the right kind of American help and incentives to succeed. Over the last decade, the surge indrug trafficking and Calderon's failed efforts to contain it have been symptomatic of what doesn't work in Mexico's dysfunctional democracy. In

2007, violence related to the drug trade resulted in more than 2,000 murders in Mexico, and in 2008, the toll was more than 5,000.Only a

few months ago, top-level officials in the Public Security Ministry were arrested and charged with

protecting members of Mexico's main drug cartels. Calderon's promises to "clean up the house" have

not gone far enough. As George Orwell wrote, "People denounce the war while preserving the type of society that makes it inevitable."

The Mexican president, whois seeking a stronger "strategic" relationship with the United States, surelytold Obama on Monday that the heightened level of violence was a result of government efficiency in combating drug cartels. In that view, the

rise in street "executions" is evidence of a firm hand, not an ineffectual one.

Mexican state failure triggers escalating warsdraws in the USDebusmann 9senior World Affairs columnist

Bernd, Among top U.S. fears: A failed Mexican state New York Times, January 9 2009,http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/09/world/americas/09iht-letter.1.19217792.html

What do Pakistan andMexicohave in common? Theyfigure in the nightmares of U.S. military planners trying to

peer into the future and identify the next big threats.The two countries are mentioned in the same breath in a just-

published study bythe United States Joint Forces Command, whose jobs include providing an annuallook into the

future to prevent the U.S. military from being caught off guard by unexpected developments. "In

terms of worst-case scenarios for the Joint Force andindeedthe world, two large and important states

bear consideration fora rapid and sudden collapse: Pakistan and Mexico," says the study - called Joint Operating

Environment 2008 - in a chapter on "weak and failing states." Such states, it says, usually pose chronic, long-term problems that

can be managed over time. But the little-studied phenomenon of "rapid collapse," according to the study,"usually comes as a

surprise, has a rapid onset, and poses acute problems." ThinkYugoslavia and itsdisintegrationin 1990into a

chaotic tangle of warring nationalities and bloodshed on a horrific scale. Nuclear-armed Pakistan, where AlQaeda has established safe havens in the rugged regions bordering Afghanistan, is a regular feature in dire warnings. Thomas Fingar, who

retired as the chief U.S. intelligence analyst in December, termed Pakistan "one of the s ingle most challenging places on the planet." This is

fairly routine language for Pakistan, but not for Mexico, which shares a 2,000-mile, or 3,200-kilometer, border with the UnitedStates.

Mexico's mentionbeside Pakistan in a study by an organization as weighty as the Joint Forces Command, which controls almost all

conventional forces based in the continental United States, speaks volumes about growing concern over what is

happening south of the U.S. border. It added: "Any descent by Mexico into chaos would demand an

American response based on the serious implications for homeland securityalone."
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Latin American Stability

Relations solve Latin American instability and warsBaeza and Langevin 9Gonzalo Baeza and Mark Langevin, Ph.D, The Convergence We Need? March 31, 2009,

http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2009/0103/comm/baezalangevin_convergence.htmlAside from the structure of consultations and coordination, all the documents under review advocate special attention to Mexico and Brazil.

The Inter-American Dialogue predicts thatMexico poses the toughest challenges and greatest opportunities for

productive cooperation in the hemisphere, while the CFR report observes thatSecurity cooperation is becoming

increasingly central to U.S.-Mexico relations. The CFR report,WOLA, the Brookings commission, and the Dialogue all confirm that

Mexico is pivotal for resolving the immigration debacle, confronting the rising problems of drugs and violence in

the region, and pushing forward economic development initiatives.

Latin American wars go global even absent escalation, they collapse hegemonyand encourage counterbalancingRochin, Professor of Political Science, 94

James, Professor of Political Science at Okanagan University College, Discovering the Americas:the evolution of Canadian foreign policy towards Latin America, pp. 130-131While there were economic motivations for Canadian policy in Central America, security considerations were perhaps moreimportant. Canada possessed an interest in promoting stability in the face of a potential decline of U.S. hegemony in the Americas.

Perceptions of declining U.S. influence in the region which had some credibility in 1979-1984 dueto the wildly inequitable divisions of wealth in some U.S. client states in Latin America, in addition to political repression, under-development, mounting external debt, anti-American sentiment produced by decades of subjugation to U.S. strategic and economic

interests, and so on were linked to the prospect of explosive events occurring in thehemisphere. Hence, the Central American imbrogliowas viewed as a fuse which could ignite acataclysmic process throughout the region. Analysts at the time worried that in a

worst-case scenario, instability created by a regional war, beginning in CentralAmerica and spreading elsewhere in Latin America, might preoccupy Washingtonto the extent that the United States would be unable to perform adequately its

important hegemonic role in the international arenaa concern expressed by the director ofresearch for Canadas Standing Committee Report on Central America. It was feared that such a predicament

could generate increased global instability and perhaps even a hegemonic war . Thisis one of the motivations which led Canada to become involved in efforts at regional conflict resolution, such as Contadora, as will bediscussed in the next chapter.


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Drug Trafficking

Cooperation is crucial to stop drug traffickingBowman 10Laurel Bowman, VOA News, July 20, 2010, Experts Say US and Mexico Must Work Together toBattle Mexican Drug Cartels,http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/americas/Experts-Say-US-and-Mexico-Must-Work-Together-to-Battle-Mexican-Drug-Cartels-98880554.html"Unfortunately, these drug cartels, they have enormous amount of resources at theirdisposal," said P.J. Crowley. "They can buy any kind of capability they want. But we aredetermined, working with Mexico, to do everything in our power to reduce this

violence." In Washington Tuesday, experts gathered to discuss steps the United States and Mexico should take movingforward. Matt Bennett is Vice President of Third Way, a self-described moderate think tank. It hosted the event. "It is not

just a Mexican problem," said Matt Bennett. "Guns and money are flowing fromthe United States south and fueling this problem and drugs are traveling north""It's a mutual responsibility between the U.S. and Mexico ," said Henry Cuellar. "We cannotlet Mexico fail."

US- Mexico key to fighting drugsCFR 11 (Council on Foreign Relations, independent nonpartisan membership organization think tank andpublisher, 3-29-11, http://www.cfr.org/mexico/us-mexico-must-increase-cooperation-confront-drug-war-argues-cfr-report/p24514)

Mexico is in the midst of a worsening security crisis, warns David A. Shirk, director of the Trans-Border Institute at the University

of San Diego in a new Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Special Report. Explosive clashes and territorial disputesamong powerful drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) have killed more than thirty-fivethousand people sincePresident Felipe Caldern took office in December 2006. Estimates place the profits from the drugindustry at $30 billion per yearabout 3 to 4 percent of Mexico's GDP.Shirk stresses that the United States is not immunefrom the effects of this drug trade.The February 2011 killing of a U.S. immigration and customs agent signals that U.S.

law enforcement officials are now in the crosshairs. Tensions between Washington and Mexico City flared up in the wake of therecent Wikileaks scandals. Cables criticizing Mexico's handling of the drug cartels resulted in Carlos Pascual, U.S. ambassador,

resigning. However, the United States remains the world's largest consumer of illegal drugs. It is also theworld's largest supplier of weapons, which fuel the drug war in a more direct way.Shirk notes thatdespite the most dismal assessments, the Mexican state has not failed, nor has it confronted a growing insurgent movement. Inaddition, Mexico has made impressive efforts to improve the transparency and credibility of elections,protect the rights ofindigenous people, strengthen judicial independence, and even investigate past government abuses.In The Drug War in Mexico:Confronting a Shared Threat, Shirk points out that the United States has much to gain by helping strengthen its southern neighborand even more to lose if it does not for the following reasons.- The weaker the Mexican state, the greater difficulty the UnitedStates will have in controlling the nearly two-thousand-mile border. As the dominant wholesale distributors of illegal drugs to U.S.consumers, Mexican traffickers are also the single greatest domestic organized crime threat within the United States.-Economically, Mexico is an important ally for the United States. It is the third-largest trade partner, the third-largest source of U.S.imports, and the second-largest exporter of U.S. goods and services. Trade with Mexico benefits the U.S. economy, and the marketcollapse that would likely accompany a deteriorated security situation could hamper U.S. economic recovery.- Mexican stabilityserves as an anchor for the region. Given the fragility of some Central American and Caribbean states, expansion of DTO operationsand violence into the region would have a gravely destabilizing effect.- If the security conditions in Mexico were to worsen, a

humanitarian emergency might lead to an unmanageable flow of people into the United States. It would also adversely affect themany U.S. citizens living in Mexico.Shirk recommends a three-pronged approach for U.S. policy that canhelp Mexico overcome its security crisis. - Enhance and consolidate the mechanisms for

bilateral and multilateral security cooperation in Mexico and Central America. - Focus on U.S.drug demand, firearms, and money laundering at home, and direct greater assistance forinstitutional and economic development, such as educational and judicial reform. - Worktoward drug policy adaptation that includes alternative approaches to reducing the harmscaused by drugs.
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US needs to work with Mexico to control escalating drug violenceCNN 10 (CNN, 10-16-12, Clinton: US can do more to help Mexico fight drug cartels,http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/10/16/clinton.drug.cartels/index.html)

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said the U.S. can do more to help Mexico battle drug cartelsthat have startedoperating more like terrorists and insurgent groups."It is one of my highest priorities," Clinton said Friday during a speech in San

Francisco at the nonpartisan Commonwealth Club. "This is one of the most difficult fights that any country faces today. We saw itover the last couple of decades in Colombia.""We are watching drug traffickers undermine and corruptgovernments in Central America, and we are watching the brutality and barbarity of theirassaults on governors and mayors, the press, as well as each other, in Mexico,"she added.Clinton saidthe U.S. can do more than sending the Blackhawk helicopters it promised Mexico.She said the U.S.is helping Mexico create an anonymous tipline to report drug cartels. However, she said, it can also help Mexico rebuild its criminal

system and train its police force.She likened recent drug cartel violence to terror groups."For the first time, they areusing car bombings," Clinton said. "You see them being much more organized in a kind ofparamilitary way."Clinton's remarks come the same week she discussed the U.S. effort to find David Hartley, an Americanbelieved to have been shot by drug bandits on the border of Mexico and Texas.

US coop needed for effective Mexican drug policyForbes 13 (Forbes, 5-6-13, U.S.-Mexico Cooperation Against Cartels Remains Strong,http://www.forbes.com/sites/stratfor/2013/05/16/u-s-mexico-cooperation-against-cartels-remains-strong/)

Certainly the U.S. government was very involved in the Calderon administrations kinetic approach to the cartel problem, as shownby the very heavy collaboration between the two governments. The collaboration was so heavy, in fact, that some incoming PenaNieto administration figures were shocked by how integrated the Americans had become. The U.S. officials who told Dana Priestthey were uncomfortable with the new Mexican governments approach to cartel violence were undoubtedly among those deeplyinvolved in this process perhaps so deeply involved that they could not recognize that in the big picture, their approach was failing

to reduce the violence in Mexico. Indeed, from the Mexican perspective, the U.S. efforts have been focused onreducing the flow of narcotics into the United States regardless of the impact of those efforts onMexicos security environment.However, as seen by the May 1 arrest of Coronel, which a Mexican official described as aclassic joint operation involving the U.S Drug Enforcement Administration and Mexican Federal Police, the Mexican authorities do

intend to continue to work very closely with their American counterparts. But that cooperation must occur within thenew framework established for the anti-cartel efforts. That means that plans for cooperationmust be presented through the Mexican Interior Ministry so that the efforts can be centrallycoordinated.Much of the current peer-to-peer cooperation can continue, but within that structure.As in the United States, thelaw enforcement and intelligence agencies in Mexico have terrible problems with coordination and information sharing. The currentadministration is attempting to correct this by centralizing the anti-cartel efforts at the federal level and by creating coordinationcenters to oversee operations in the various regions. These regional centers will collect information at the state and regional leveland send it up to the national center. However, one huge factor inhibiting information sharing in Mexico and between theAmericans and Mexicans is the longstanding problem of corruption in the Mexican government. In the past, drug czars, seniorpolice officials and very senior politicians have been accused of being on cartel payrolls. This makes trust critical, and lack of trusthas caused some Mexican and most American agencies to restrict the sharing of intelligence to only select, trusted contacts.

Centralizing coordination will interfere with this selective information flow in the short term,and it is going to take time for this new coordination effort to earn the trust of both Mexican and

American agencies. There remains fear that consolidation will also centralize corruption and

make it easier for the cartels to gather intelligence.Another attempt at command control and coordination is inthe Pena Nieto administrations current efforts to implement police consolidation at the state level.While corruption hasreached into all levels of the Mexican government, it is unquestionably the most pervasive at themunicipal level, and in past government operations entire municipal police departments have

been fired for corruption. The idea is that if all police were brought under a unified statecommand, called Mando Unico in Spanish, the police would be better screened, trained andpaid and therefore the force would be more professional.This concept of police consolidation at the state levelis not a new idea; indeed, Calderon sought to do so under his administration, but it appears that Pena Nieto might have the politicalcapital to make this happen, along with some other changes that Calderon wanted to implement but could not quite pull off. To date,


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Pena Nieto has had a great deal of success in garnering political support for his proposals, but the establishment of Mando Unico ineach of Mexicos 31 states may perhaps be the toughest political struggle he has faced yet. If realized, Mando Unico will be animportant step but only one step in the long process of institution building for the police at the state level.Aside from the

political struggles, the Mexican government still faces very real challenges on the streets as itattempts to quell violence, reassert control over lawless areas and gain the trust of the public. Theholistic plan laid out by the Pena Nieto administration sounds good on paper, but it will still require a great deal of leadership by

Pena Nieto and his team to bring Mexico through the challenges it faces. They will obviously need to cooperate with

the United States to succeed, but it has become clear that this cooperation will need to be onMexicos terms and in accordance with the administrations new, holistic approach.


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Iran Influence

US losing Latin America to Iran

Berman 12(Ilan Berman, Vice President of the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, Middle EastQuarterly, Iran Courts Latin America, http://www.meforum.org/3297/iran-latin-america)

Outreach to Latin America is seen by the Iranian regime first and foremost as a means to lessenits deepening international isolation. Since 2003, when its previously clandestine nuclear program became a pressinginternational issue, Tehran has sought to mitigate the mounting political and economic restrictionslevied against it by the United States and its allies through intensified diplomatic outreachabroad.Due to its favorable geopolitical climatetypified by vast ungoverned areas and

widespread anti-AmericanismLatin America has become an important focus of this effort.Overthe past decade, the regime has nearly doubled the number of embassies in the region (from six in 2005 to ten in 2010) and hasdevoted considerable energy to forging economic bonds with sympathetic regional governments.[2]Far and away the mostprominent such partnership has been with Venezuela. Since Hugo Chavez became president in 1999, alignment with Tehran hasemerged as a cardinal tenet of Caracas's foreign policy. The subsequent election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the Iranian presidencyin 2005 kicked cooperation into high gear with dramatic results. Today, the two countries enjoy an extensive and vibrant strategic

partnership. Venezuela has emerged as an important source of material assistance for Tehran's sprawling nuclear program as well asa vocal diplomatic backer of its right to atomic power.[3] The Chavez regime also has become a safe haven and source of financialsupport for Hezbollah, Iran's most powerful terrorist proxy.[4] In turn, Tehran's feared Revolutionary Guard has become involved in

training Venezuela's secret services and police.[5] Economic contacts between Caracas and Tehran likewisehave explodedexpanding from virtually nil in the early 2000s to more than $20 billion in totaltrade and cooperation agreements today.[6]Just as significantly, Venezuela has served as Iran'sgateway for further economic and diplomatic expansion into the region. Aided by its partnership

with Caracas and bolstered by a shared anti-American outlook, Tehran has succeeded in forging significantstrategic, economic, and political links with the regime of Evo Morales in Bolivia and Rafael Correa in Ecuador. Even Iran's relationswith Argentina, where Iranian-supported terrorists carried out major bombings in 1992 and 1994, have improved in recent times, asthe government of President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner has hewed a more conciliatory line toward Tehran.[7]It would be a

mistake, however, to view these contacts as simply pragmaticor strictly defensive. The Iranian regime's sustainedsystematic outreach to regional states suggests that it sees the Western Hemisphere as a crucialstrategic theater for expanding its own influence and reducing that of the United States. Indeed, a2009 dossier prepared by Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted that "since Ahmadinejad's rise to power, Tehran has beenpromoting an aggressive policy aimed at bolstering its ties with Latin American countries withthe declared goal of 'bringing America to its knees.'"[8] This view is increasingly shared by the U.S. military: In its2010 report on Iranian military power, the Office of the Secretary of Defense noted that "Iran seeks to increase its stature bycountering U.S. influence and expanding ties with regional actors" in Latin America.[9]To this end, Tehran is ramping up itsstrategic messaging to the region. In late January, on the heels of Ahmadinejad's very public four-country tour of Latin America, theIranian regime formally launched HispanTV, a Spanish-language analogue to its English-language Press TV channel.[10] Thetelevision outlet has been depicted by Ahmadinejad as part of his government's efforts to "limit the ground for supremacy ofdominance seekers"a thinly-veiled reference to U.S. influence in the Western Hemisphere.[11]As Ahmadinejad's statementindicates, Tehran is pursuing a strategy that promotes its own ideology and influence in Latin America at Washington's expense. Inthis endeavor, it has been greatly aided by Chavez, who himself has worked diligently to diminish U.S. political and economicpresence in the region under the banner of a new "Bolivarian" revolution.Since the start of the international crisis over Iran'snuclear ambitions nearly nine years ago, it has become an accepted belief that Tehran's atomic program is now largely self-sufficientand that its progress is, therefore, largely inexorable. This, however, is far from the truth; in fact, the Iranian regime currently runs aconsiderable, and growing, deficit of uranium ore, the critical raw material needed to fuel its atomic effort.According tononproliferation experts, Tehran's indigenous uranium ore reserves are known to be both "limited and mostly of poor quality."[12]When Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi mapped out an ambitious national plan for nuclear power in the 1970s, his government wasforced to procure significant quantities of the mineral from South Africa. Nearly four decades later, this aging stockpile hasreportedly been mostly depleted.[13] As a result, in recent years, Tehran has embarked on a widening quest to acquire uranium orefrom abroad. In 2009, for example, it is known to have attempted to purchase more than 1,000 tons of uranium ore from the CentralAsian republic of Kazakhstan at a cost of nearly half-a-billion dollars.[14] In that particular case, deft diplomacy on the part ofWashington and its European allies helped stymie Tehran's effortsat least for the time being.The Iranian quest, however, has not

abated. In February 2011, an intelligence summary from a member state of the InternationalAtomic Energy Agency reaffirmed the Islamic regime's continued search for new and stablesources of uranium to fuel its nuclear program.[15] This effort has recently focused on two principal geographicareas. The first is Africa where Tehran has made concerted efforts to engage a number of uranium producers such as Zimbabwe,


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Senegal, Nigeria, and the Democratic People's Republic of Congo.[16] The second is Latin America where Tehran nowis exploring and developing a series of significant resource partnerships.The best known of thesepartnerships is with Venezuela; cooperation on strategic resources has emerged as a defining feature of the alliance between theIslamic Republic and the Chavez regime. The Iranian regime is currently known to be mining in the Roraima Basin, adjacent toVenezuela's border with Guyana. Significantly, that geological area is believed to be analogous to Canada's Athabasca Basin, theworld's largest deposit of uranium.[17]Bolivia, too, is fast becoming a significant source of strategic resources for the Iranianregime. With the sanction of the Morales government, Tehran is now believed to be extracting uranium from as many as elevendifferent sites in Bolivia's east, proximate to the country's industrial capital of Santa Cruz.[18] Not coincidentally, it is rumored thatthe now-infamous Tehran-Caracas air route operated jointly by Conviasa, Venezuela's national airline, and Iran's state carrier, IranAir, will be extended in the near future to Santa Cruz.[19] Additionally, a series of cooperation agreements concluded in 2010between La Paz and Tehran have made Iran a "partner" in the mining and exploitation of Bolivia's lithium, a key strategic mineralwith applications for nuclear weapons development.[20]Iran even appears to be eyeing Ecuador's uranium deposits. A $30 millionjoint mining deal concluded between Tehran and Quito back in 2009 has positioned the Correa regime to eventually become asupplier for the Islamic Republic.[21]Regional experts note that Iran's mining and extraction efforts in Latin America are stillcomparatively modest in nature, constrained by competition from larger countries such as Canada and China and by Tehran's own

available resources and know-how.[22] However, the region is unquestionably viewed as a target ofopportunity in Iran's widening quest for strategic resourcesboth because of its favorablepolitical operating environmentand because states there (especially Bolivia) represent unknown quantities in terms ofresource wealth. This raises the possibility that Latin America could emerge in the near future as a significant provider of strategicresources for the Iranian regime and a key source of sustenance for Iran's expanding nuclear program.Tehran's formal political andeconomic contacts with regional states are reinforced by a broad web of asymmetric activities throughout the Americas. Illicitfinancial transactions figure prominently in this regard. Over the past several years, Tehran's economic ties with Caracas havehelped it skirt the sanctions being levied by the international community as well as to continue to operate in an increasingly

inhospitable global financial system. It has done so through the establishment of joint companies and financial entities as well as theformation of wholly Iranian-owned financial entities in Venezuela and the entrenchment of Iranian commercial banks there.[23]Experts note that this financial activity exploits an existing loophole in the current sanctions regime against Tehranone thatleverages the freedom of action of Venezuelan banks to provide the Islamic Republic with "an ancillary avenue through which it canaccess the international financial system despite Western pressure."[24]Tehran is also known to be active in the region'subiquitous gray and black markets as well as its free trade areasoperating both directly and via its terrorist proxy Hezbollah.[25]Most notoriously, these include the so-called "Triple Frontier" at the crossroads of Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil as well as

Venezuela's Margarita Island.The Iranians also boast an increasingly robust paramilitary presence inthe region. The Pentagon, in its 2010 report to Congress on Iran's military power, noted that the Qods Force, the RevolutionaryGuard's elite paramilitary unit, is now deeply involved in the Americas, stationing "operatives in foreign embassies, charities andreligious/cultural institutions to foster relationships with people, often building on existing socioeconomic ties with the well-established Shia Diaspora" and even carrying out "paramilitary operations to support extremists and destabilize unfriendlyregimes."[26]This presence is most pronounced in Bolivia. Tehran has been intimately involved in the activities of the BolivarianAlliance for the Americas (ALBA) since the formation of that Cuban- and Venezuelan-led geopolitical blocwhich also encompassesEcuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and a number of other nationsin the early 2000s. As part of that relationship, Tehran reportedlyprovided at least some of the seed money for the establishment of the bloc's regional defense school situated outside Santa Cruz.

Iranian defense minister Ahmad Vahidi reportedly presided over the school's inauguration in May 2011, and Iranan ALBAobserver nationis now said to be playing a role in training and indoctrination at the facility.[27] Regional officials currentlyestimate between fifty and three hundred Iranian trainers to be present in Bolivia.[28] Notably, however, a personal vis it to thefacility by this author in January 2012 found it to be largely unattended.


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Mexican Econ Advantage


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1ac Mexican Economy

TBA will lead to US advancing Mexican oil developmentSmart Energy Universe 12 (Smart Energy Universe, Civilian Group of Scientists, 2012,http://www.smartenergyuniverse.com/regulatory-update/13077-u-s-mexico-transboundary-hydrocarbons-agreement)

PEMEX leaders plan to raise production to 2.7 mbd in 2013 and 3 mbd by 2017, requiring up to $38 billion annually in investment.Near term growth is expected to come primarily from Chicontopec, a highly complex unconventional onshore project that is subjectof great hope and scorn. Despite years of development and reportedly $5 billion in investment, the project is well behindexpectations and currently only 70,000 barrels per day are produced, which puts claims of near-term growth in serious doubt. Overthe longer-term PEMEX has set a goal to increase production to 3.3 mbd by 2024.Achieving that goal will require significantlymore new production than the difference between the 3.3 mbd goal and todays 2.6 mbd given expected large declines in KMZ. Fielddecline emphasizes the urgent need for Mexico to have several new projects in the pipeline in order to maintain and boostproduction. Skepticism of PEMEXs ability to compensate for declining fields has led to some dire forecasts. The U.S. EnergyInformation Administration has estimated that Mexico will be a net importer of oil by 2020,4 thus also raising concerns aboutimpacts on its balance of trade.Dealing with this challenge is complicated by the fact that PEMEX is as much a bureau of thegovernment as it is a company. In defiance of conventional business sense (of both private companies and state oil companies),multiple Ministries and a politically appointed Board of Directors make key decisions, including deciding the amount and directionof investment in exploration and development of future production.While oil provides vital government revenue, lack of naturalgas development threatens to stunt Mexican industry. It is reported that parts of Mexico could face natural gas shortages in thecoming year. Meanwhile, Mexico sits on a sea of unconventional natural gas reserve.The United States government estimates thatMexico has one of the largest shale gas reserves in the world at more than 680 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of technically recoverablereserves, although Mexico itself uses estimates as low as 140 tcf. Much of that shale gas is thought to be contained in an extension ofthe Eagle Ford formation that is already producing in Texas. PEMEX reportedly has drilled just a handful of exploratory wells, andwith prices being held down by the United States gas boom, it has little economic incentive to invest heavily in shale in its own right,let alone the opportunity cost of that capital compared to much more lucrative oil. Absent natural gas pricing reform, it is unlikely

that PEMEX will choose to invest heavily into shale gas.Developing Mexicos shale gas reserves, as withtechnologically challenging new oil frontiers, will requireenergy reform to galvanize privateinvestment, technology, and expertise. At the same time, an additional level of governmentcapacity building will be useful to aid official understanding in the geology, economics, andenvironmental protections necessary for shale production.TheTransboundary Agreement (TBA)provides a bilateral basis upon which both countries can develop the legal framework necessaryfor joint production of oil and natural gas reserves that extend across our national maritime

borders in the Gulf of Mexico.Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs PatriciaEspinosa Cantellano signed theTransboundary Agreement (TBA), officially called the Agreement between the United States ofAmerica and the United Mexican States Concerning Transboundary Hydrocarbon Reservoirs in the Gulf of Mexico, on February 20,2012, at Los Cabos, Mexico.It is widely acknowledged in both capitals that the TBA negotiations moved quickly in order to becompleted in time for the ratification in Mexico prior to 2012 Congressional elections. Both PAN and PRI political leaders used theirinfluence to gain support for the TBA, which the Mexican Senate ratified.In the United States, the TBA stalled within the Obamaadministration despite support by key officials in the Departments of State and Interior. Prior to completing the agreement, theDepartments of State

mexico tha aff - michiganclassic 2013 dw

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