mexico drug cartels negative - hss 2013

8/11/2019 Mexico Drug Cartels Negative - HSS 2013

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/mexico-drug-cartels-negative-hss-2013 1/114

Case



Relations



2. Cooperation now solves.

Stratfor 5/2 (geopolitical intelligence firm that provides strategic analysis and forecasting to

individuals and organizations, 5/2/13, “Evolving U.S.-Mexico Relations and Obama's Visit,”

http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/evolving-us-mexico-relations-and-obamas-visit)//DR. H

When U.S. President Barack Obama travels to Mexico on May 2, he will arrive amid a period of

sweeping transformation in the country. Embroiled in myriad political battles and seeking to implement an extensive

slate of national reforms, Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto's administration has been focused almost solely on

internal affairs. Meanwhile, after years of delay, the U.S. Congress has been debating gun

control and immigration reform -- two issues of serious interest to the Mexican

government.

U.S.-Mexican relations are strategically important to both countries, and Mexico's period of transition has created opportunities for each to

reshape the partnership. And although U.S. media attention has focused primarily on bilateral

security issues ahead of Obama's visit -- namely cooperation in Mexico's drug war -- the

Pena Nieto administration is working with Washington to re-orient the cross-border

conversation to one centered primarily on mutual economic possibility.

3. Security approaches fail – empirics and data.

Brewer 08 (Stephanie Erin, 6/30/08, International Legal Officer at the Miguel Agustín Pro Juárez

Human Rights Center in Mexico City, “Rethinking the Mérida Initiative: Why the U.S. Must Change

Course in its Approach to Mexico’s Drug War,” American University Washington College of Law,

pdf)//DR. H

In addition to these concerns, the consistently ineffective track record of frontal-combat

approaches to reducing drug trafficking leave little doubt that supporting such an

approach now will not end the drug trade, despite any short-term increases in the number of

arrests or amount of drugs seized. Other largescale security operations to fight drug

traffickers at various points over the past few Mexican administrations have resulted in

the arrests of high-profile drug kingpins or shifted drug trafficking routes from one place to another.

They have not shown signs, however, of sustainable progress in

reducing the drug trade as a whole.25



Thus, while effective and professional law enforcement is important at all times, the

experiences and data cited above lead to the conclusion that increased law enforcement

is not the panacea to Mexican drug trafficking. Deterrence in general does not hold

much power over the foot soldiers of Mexico’s drug trafficking organizations; such

individuals already risk a violent death at the hands of rival traffickers or authorities.Tough law enforcement, even if it achieved increased numbers of arrests, would not stop new

drug traffickers from emerging, lured by the promise of economic returns in a social and

economic context that frequently offers few other opportunities to earn a dignified

income.

These points are especially relevant in a context of increasing recognition of the failure

of the regional drug war paradigm. In February 2009, the Latin American Commission on Drugs

and Democracy, composed of leading political figures including former Presidents of Mexico, Colombia,

and Brazil, issued its conclusions on this subject. It strongly criticized as ineffective the U.S.-leddrug war paradigm of the past 30 years and called for a public health approach to drug

policy centered on treatment and demand reduction.26 While it recognized the need for

effective law enforcement against organized crime, the ommission observed, “Colombia is a clear

example of the limitations of the repressive policies romoted globally by the United

States”27 in the drug war. It concluded that the sustainable solution to the drug problem

lay in “demand reduction in the major consumer countries,” notably the United States ,

as well as the European Union.28

Also noteworthy is that a February 2009 telephone survey of Mexican residents, which measuredreactions to the Commission’s report, found that 63% agreed with the statement,

“Strategies to confront drug trafficking exclusively through the police

and military have failed in Latin America.”29 More than half of the participants in

the survey (53%) agreed with the perception that, “It has not been possible to debate openly

the subject of drugs to find new solutions, due to prejudices and the imposition of the

United States, which only wants to use the police and military.”30

4. Econ resilient.

E.I.U. ‘11

(Economist Intelligence Unit – Global Forecasting Service, 11/16/’11

(http://gfs.eiu.com/Article.aspx?articleType=gef&articleId=668596451&secID=7)



The US economy, by any standard, remains weak, and consumer and business sentiment are close to

2009 lows. That said, the economy has been surprisingly resilient in the face of so many shocks. US

real GDP expanded by a relatively robust 2.5% in the third quarter of 2011, twice the rate of the

previous quarter. Consumer spending rose by 2.4%, which is impressive given that real

incomes dropped during the quarter (the savings rate fell, which helps to explain the anomaly.)Historically, US consumers have been willing to spend even in difficult times. Before the

2008-09 slump, personal spending rose in every quarter between 1992 and 2007. That resilience is again

in evidence: retail sales in September were at a seven-month high, and sales at chain stores

have been strong. Business investment has been even more buoyant: it expanded in the third

quarter by an impressive 16.3% at an annual rate, and spending by companies in September on

conventional capital goods (that is, excluding defence and aircraft) grew by the most since

March. This has been made possible, in part, by strong corporate profits. According to data

compiled by Bloomberg, earnings for US companies in the S&P 500 rose by 24% year on year in the third

quarter. All of this has occurred despite a debilitating fiscal debate in Washington, a sovereign debtdowngrade by a major ratings agency and exceptional volatility in capital markets. This reinforces our

view that the US economy, although weak, is not in danger of falling into a recession (absent a

shock from the euro zone). US growth will, however, continue to be held back by a weak labour

market—the unemployment rate has been at or above 9% for 28 of the last 30 months—and by a

moribund housing market.

5. No diversionary theory – it’ll be small scale if it happens.

Harrison ‘11

(Mark, Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Centre for Russian and East European Studies,

University of Birmingham, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University,

“Capitalism at War” Oct 19

http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/academic/harrison/papers/capitalism.pdf)

Diversionary wars In the concept of diversionary wars, political leaders seek and exploit conflict with external

adversaries in order to rally domestic support. The idea is well established in the literature, perhaps because the theoretical case is quite

intuitive, and narrative support is not hard to find. In fact, it may be too easy; as Jack Levy (1989) pointed out, few wars have not been attributed to political leaders’

desire to improve domestic standing. The idea of diversionary wars is directly relevant to a discussion of capitalism

only if it can be shown that capitalist polities are more likely to exploit foreign adventures. One reason might be

advanced from a Marxist perspective: perhaps capitalist societies, being class-divided, are more likely to give rise to wars

intended to divert the workers from the cause of socialism. A longstanding interpretation of the origins of World War I in domestic

German politics conveys exactly this message (Berghahn 1973). This view does not sit well with the equally traditional idea that

a class-divided society is less able to go to war. The official Soviet histories of World War II used to claim



that, under capitalism, divided class interests made the working people reluctant to fight for the nation.

Because of this, the workers could be motivated to take part only by “demagogy, deception, bribery,

and force” (Grechko et al., eds 1982, vol. 12, p. 38; Pospelov et al., eds 1965, vol. 6, pp. 80 -82). Quantitative empirical work has lent little support to the idea

(Levy 1989). Exceptions include studies of the use of force by U.S. and British postwar governments by Morgan and Bickers (1992) and Morgan and Anderson (1999).

They conclude that the use of force is more likely when government approval is high but the government’s

supporting coalition is suffering erosion. They also suggest that force is unlikely to be used at high intensitiesunder such circumstances (because likely costs are high, eroding political support) or when domestic

conflict is high (because conflict would then be polarizing rather than consolidate support). Another line of

research suggests that new or incompletely established democracies are particularly vulnerable to risky adventures in nation-building (Mansfield and Snyder 2005).

One inspiration for this view was the record of the new democracies born out of the former Soviet Union and Yugos lavia. More recently, Georgia seems to have

provided out-of-sample confirmation. Suppose diversionary wars exist. Is capitalism somehow more internally

conflicted than other societies, and so disproportionately likely to externalize conflict? As a comparator, the

case of fascism seems straightforward. Fascism did not produce diversionary wars because, for fascists,

war was not a diversion; it was the Schwerpunkt. The more interesting case is that of communism. Communists

do not seem to have pursued diversionary wars. But the domestic legitimacy of Soviet rule visibly relied

on the image of an external enemy, and thrived on tension short of military conflict. Soviet leaders used

external tension to justify internal controls on movement, culture, and expression, and the associated apparatus of secrecy, censorship, and

surveillance. When they tolerated trends towards détente in the 1970s, they subverted their own controls. An

East German Stasi officer told his boss, repeating it later to Garton Ash (1997, p. 159): “How can you expect me to prevent *defections and revelations+, when we’ve

signed all these international agreements for improved relations with the West, working conditions for journalists, freedom of movement, respect for human

rights?” If Soviet foreign policy was sometimes expansionist, it sought expansion only up to the point where the desired level of tension was assured. Bolsheviks of

the 1917 generation knew well that too much too much conflict abroad encouraged defeatist and counter-revolutionary sentiments at home. Oleg Khlevniuk (1995,

p. 174) noted: “The complex relationship between war and revolution, which had almost seen the tsarist regime toppled in 1905 and which finally brought its

demise in 1917, was a relationship of which Stalin was acutely aware. The lessons of history had to be learnt lest history repeat itself.” Stalin did all he could to avoid

war with Germany in 1941 (Gorodetsky 1999). Postwar Soviet leaders risked war by proxy, but avoided direct conflict with the “main adversary.” Faced with

unfavourable odds, they tended to withdraw (from Cuba) or do nothing (in Poland) or accepted them with great reluctance (in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and

Afghanistan). Diversionary tension must fall short of diversionary war. From this follows an acceptance that

capitalism, because of its tendency to give rise to democratic structures and political competition, has

been more open to diversionary wars than other systems. But the empirical research and analysis that underpin

this conclusion also imply that such wars would generally be small scale and short lived, and the

circumstances that give rise to them would be exceptional or transient. We should place this in the

wider context of the “democratic peace.” As Levy (1988) wrote: “Liberal or democratic states do not fight each

other … This absence of war between democracies comes as close as anything we have to an empirical

law in international relations.” Since all liberal democracies have also been capitalist on any definition, it is

a finding of deep relevance.

6. Decline doesn’t cause war

Barnett ‘ 9

(Thomas P.M Barnett, senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC, contributing editor/online

columnist for Esquire, 8/25/’9 – “The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis,”

Aprodex, Asset Protection Index, http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-

amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx)



When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with

all sorts of scary predictions of , and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun

of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news

brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's

interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first truly

worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security

landscape.¶ None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by

GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new

entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic

crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15

low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in

2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by mostaccounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external

trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-

decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions.¶ Looking over the various

databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies,

and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the

only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one

side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic

trends.¶ And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions

(Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has

been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the

usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it

up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty

much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our

new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces.



XT – Say No

nieto administration is strictly opposed to us intervention in the mexican drug

war

Priest, 13 Dana, national security reporter for the Washington Post whose work focuses on

intelligence and counterterrorism, Washington Post, 4/27,

http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-role-at-a-crossroads-in-mexicos-intelligence-war-

on-the-cartels/2013/04/27/b578b3ba-a3b3-11e2-be47-b44febada3a8_print.html, “U.S. role at a

crossroads in Mexico’s intelligence war on the cartels,” ADM

MEXICO CITY — For the past seven years, Mexico and the United States have put aside their

tension-filled history on security matters to forge an unparalleled alliance against

Mexico’s drug cartels, one based on sharing sensitive intelligence, U.S. training and joint operational

planning. But now, much of that hard-earned cooperation may be in

jeopardy . The December inauguration of President Enrique Peña Nieto brought the nationalistic

Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) back to power after 13 years, and with it a whiff of

resentment over the deep U.S. involvement in Mexico’s fight against narco-

traffickers. The new administration has shifted priorities away from the U.S.-backed

strategy of arresting kingpins, which sparked an unprecedented level of violence among the cartels,

and toward an emphasis on prevention and keeping Mexico’s streets safe and calm,

Mexican authorities said. Some U.S. officials fear the coming of an unofficial truce with cartel leaders.

The Mexicans see it otherwise. “The objective of fighting organized crime is not in conflict with achievingpeace,” said Eduardo Medina Mora, Mexico’s ambassador to the United States. Interviews with more

than four dozen current and former U.S. and Mexican diplomats, law enforcement agents, military

officers and intelligence officials — most of whom agreed to speak about sensitive matters only on

condition of anonymity — paint the most detailed public portrait to date of how the two countries grew

so close after so many years of distance and distrust, and what is at stake should the alliance be scaled

back. U.S. officials got their first inkling that the relationship might change just two weeks

after Peña Nieto assumed office Dec. 1. At the U.S. ambassador’s request, the new president

sent his top five security officials to an unusual meeting at the U.S. Embassy here. In a

crowded conference room, the new attorney general and interior minister sat in silence, not knowing

what to expect, next to the new leaders of the army, navy and Mexican intelligence agency. In front of

them at the Dec. 15 meeting were representatives from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration

(DEA), the CIA, the FBI, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and other U.S. agencies tasked

with helping Mexico destroy the drug cartels that had besieged the country for the past decade. The

Mexicans remained stone-faced as they learned for the first time just how entwined the two

countries had become during the battle against narco-traffickers, and how, in the process, the

http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-role-at-a-crossroads-in-mexicos-intelligence-war-on-the-cartels/2013/04/27/b578b3ba-a3b3-11e2-be47-b44febada3a8_print.html







United States had been given near-complete entree to Mexico’s territory and the secrets of

its citizens, according to several U.S. officials familiar with the meeting.

Interior Minister claims prove

Cave et al 13 (Randal C. Archibold and Damien Cave reported from Mexico City, and Ginger Thompsonfrom New York, 4/30/13, “Mexico’s Curbs on U.S. Role in Drug Fight Spark Friction,”

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/01/world/americas/friction-between-us-and-mexico-threatens-

efforts-on-drugs.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0)//DR. H

But behind the scenes, the Americans are coming to grips with a scaling back of the level

of coordination that existed during the presidency of Felipe Calderón, which included

American drones flying deep into Mexican territory and American spy technology helping

to track high-level suspects.

In an interview, Mexico’s interior minister, Miguel Ángel Osorio Chong, made no apologies. He

defended the moves, including the creation of a “one-stop window” in his department

to screen and handle all intelligence, in the name of efficiency and “a new phase” in

fighting crime.

In a country worn down by tens of thousands of people killed in a drug war, he said Mexico needed to

emphasize smart intelligence over the militarized “combating violence with more violence” approach of

the Calderón years.

But American officials here see the changes as a way to minimize American involvement

and manage the image of the violence, rather than confronting it with clear strategies.

Mexico wants a unilateral perception of resolving drug wars.

Cave et al 13 (Randal C. Archibold and Damien Cave reported from Mexico City, and Ginger Thompson

from New York, 4/30/13, “Mexico’s Curbs on U.S. Role in Drug Fight Spark Friction,”

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/01/world/americas/friction-between-us-and-mexico-threatens-


But there is growing anxiety that the violence has not diminished, with daily killings hovering around 50

since last fall. Some American officials say they are increasingly worried by public and

private signs suggesting that Mr. Peña Nieto, the young face of the Institutional Revolutionary

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/01/world/americas/friction-between-us-and-mexico-threatens-efforts-on-drugs.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0)//DR












Party, which ran Mexico for 71 years, is putting the government’s crime-fighting image above

its actions.

“The cosmetics — that’s what they care about,” one American official said, insisting on

anonymity so as not to worsen already tense relations.

“The impression they seem to want to send is ‘We got this,’ ” one former American official

said, asking for anonymity because he was discussing private conversations. “But it’s clear to us, no,

they don’t. Not yet.”

PEMEX explosion proves.

Cave et al 13 (Randal C. Archibold and Damien Cave reported from Mexico City, and Ginger Thompson

from New York, 4/30/13, “Mexico’s Curbs on U.S. Role in Drug Fight Spark Friction,”http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/01/world/americas/friction-between-us-and-mexico-threatens-


If so, it would represent a step beyond the Mexican discomfort with Americans operating on their turf

that emerged in December, just after Mr. Peña Nieto’s inauguration. It solidified after an explosion

on Jan. 31 at the office complex of the state oil company, Pemex, in which 37 people died and more

than 120 were injured.

Agents with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives were invited to help investigate.

But after they suggested in a preliminary assessment that a bomb might have caused the blast,

the agency’s role in the investigation was cut short, American officials said, adding that

Mexican officials canceled a visit by a team of investigators from the United States.

An administration official said that while American explosives experts were not allowed to

contribute as much as they could have to the investigation, creating a sense that the

Mexicans were rushing to conclude that the blast was an accident.

On Feb. 4, the attorney general of Mexico announced that the cause was an unexplained buildup of gas,possibly methane, that was ignited by a spark in the basement of one of the buildings.

The American ambassador was invited to the news conference on the findings, but a State Department

official said the level of American involvement in the investigation did not warrant the ambassador’s

presence. With the American agents leaving the cooperative center in Monterrey, which was first








reported by The Washington Post on Sunday, and the development of the one-stop intelligence

mechanism, the United States is worried and is seeking more information.

“We’re still figuring out what that means,” a senior administration official said of the new intelligence

arrangement.

But the fear is that it will diminish the access that American law enforcement and

intelligence agencies have established with branches of the Mexican police and military.

Those hard-fought relationships could disintegrate if American agents have to go

through a central office to communicate and share knowledge with their Mexican

counterparts, some American officials say.

Recent reforms prove.




Security Cooperation and Centralization

Pena Nieto's predecessor, the National Action Party's Felipe Calderon, focused heavily on Mexico's security

challenges and oversaw the sustained military offensive against criminal organizations

throughout the country. Pena Nieto has yet to elaborate much on his plans to address thesecurity issues, but he has emphasized the need to combat street violence and kidnappings, while playing down the

importance of combating drug trafficking -- a U.S. priority.

But ahead of Obama's visit, certain details have emerged indicating that the Pena Nieto administration

intends to change the nature of intelligence cooperation between the United States and

Mexico. Until now, the two countries' various law enforcement and intelligence agencies

have been able to interact directly, but Mexico's interior ministry will begin overseeing

all intelligence collaboration.

This centralization effort has not been isolated to cooperation with the United States. The Mexican Interior Ministry has

also taken charge of the federal police, and Pena Nieto intends to eventually create a

national gendarmarie under the interior secretariat in order to fill the role in the drug

wars currently played by the Mexican military with a security body better equipped with

law enforcement training.



XT – Status quo solves

The US and Mexico are intricately linked together – trade, investment,

immigration, environmental cooperation, and cultural relationships

Storrs, 06 K. Larry, Specialist in Latin American Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division,

Congressional Research Service, http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33244_20060118.pdf , “Mexico’s

Importance and Multiple Relationships with the United States” | ADM

Sharing a 2,000-mile border and extensive interconnections through the Gulf of Mexico, the United

States and Mexico are so intricately linked together in an enormous multiplicity of ways that

President George W. Bush and other U.S. officials have stated that no country is more

important to the United States than Mexico. At the same time, Mexican President Vicente Fox

(2000-2006), the first president to be elected from an opposition party in 71 years, has sought to

strengthen the relationship with the United States through what some have called a “grandbargain.” Under this proposed bargain, the United States would regularize the status of

undocumented Mexican workers in the United States and economically assist the less

developed partner in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), while Mexico would be

more cooperative in efforts to control the illegal traffic of drugs, people, and goods into the United

States. The southern neighbor is linked with the United States through

trade and investment, migration and tourism, environment and

health concerns, and family and cultural relationships. It is the second

most important trading partner of the United States, and this trade is critical to many U.S.

industries and border communities. It is a major source of undocumented migrants and illicit drugs and

a possible avenue for the entry of terrorists into the United States. As a result, cooperation with Mexico

is essential to deal effectively with migration, drug trafficking, and border, terrorism, health,

environment, and energy issues. The United States and Mexico have developed a wide

variety of mechanisms for consultation and cooperation on the range of issues in which the

countries interact. These include (1) periodical presidential meetings; (2) annual cabinet-level

Binational Commission meetings with 10 Working Groups on major issues; (3) annual meetings of

congressional delegations in the Mexico-United States Interparliamentary Group Conferences; (4)

NAFTA-related trilateral trade meetings under various groups; (5) regular meetings of the

Attorneys General and the Senior Law Enforcement Plenary to deal with law enforcement and

counter-narcotics matters; (6) a wide variety of bilateral border area cooperation meetings

dealing with environment, health, transportation, and border crossing issues; and (7) trilateral

meetings under the “Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) of North America” launched in Waco,

Texas, in March 2005.

http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33244_20060118.pdf






Sandoval saved the day.

RGJ 7/23 (Reno Gazette-Journal, 7/23/13, “Sandoval's trade mission to Mexico beneficial, timely,”

http://www.rgj.com/article/20130724/OPED01/307240001/Sandoval-s-trade-mission-Mexico-beneficial-timely)//DR. H

At a time when immigration reform is front and center of the national debate and the U.S. seeks to

expand trade abroad, Nevada Gov. Brian Sandoval’s recent trip to Mexico is

significant.

As part of the agreement Sandoval signed with Eruviel Avila, the governor of the state of

Mexico — the most populous state within the United Mexican States — Nevada is pledging to

work with our southern neighbor on such issues as education, tourism, manufacturing

and mining.

“This memorandum of understanding is a step towards building upon

our strong bilateral trade relationship with Mexico,” Sandoval said in a

statement.

The agreement comes at a sensitive time in U.S.-Mexican relations as the issue of immigration reform

continues to dominate discussions in Washington, D.C.

The tone of the immigration debate, and in particular tougher border security in the U.S., has left some

U.S. House members worried that a crackdown will, in the words of The Wall Street Journal, “alienate a

key trading partner.”

The newspaper reports that U.S. Rep. Henry Cuellar, D-Texas, recently returned from a three-day trip to

Mexico, where lawmakers and business officials were astounded by the tone of the border debate.

“The first thing they said was, ‘What are you all up to there in the United States? What are you trying to

do to us?’” he told the Journal.

According to the Office of the U.S. Trade representative, Mexico is the third largest trading partner with

the U.S., ranking only behind only Canada and China.

Less than three months before Sandoval visited Mexico, President Barack Obama was there,

calling for action to expand trade and commerce between the two countries.

“We already buy more of your exports than any country in the world,” Obama said. “We sell more of our

exports to Mexico than we do to Brazil, Russia, India and China combined. Mexican companies are

investing more in the United States, and we’re the largest foreign investor in Mexico — because we

believe in Mexico and want to be a partner in your success.”

Mexico also was the United States’ second-largest goods export market in 2012.



“U.S.-Mexican trade has risen as Mexico becomes an increasingly attractive locale for

U.S. manufacturers that are seeing the cost to produce goods in China go up,” a story in

USA Today reports, noting that trade between Mexico and the USA topped $500 billion in 2012.

Labor reforms.




Labor and education overhauls passed through the legislature relatively easily , and

banking reforms intended to broadly increase access to credit are set to be proposed once the

legislature reconvenes in September. The administration still has an aggressive to-do list remaining, with

planned overhauls ranging from the telecommunications and energy sectors to issues such as taxation.

The majority of the reforms has been structural in nature and driven by economic

imperatives, representing a notable shift in tempo and character from the previous government,

which saw its legislative efforts largely stall for years prior to the 2012 election.

Domestic political factors will determine the success of the pending overhauls. But the labor

reform could improve bilateral commerce and investment with the

United States, as would a successful liberalization of the country's energy sector in the coming

years. Mexico is already the United States' third-largest trading partner, and economic

coordination between the two countries has become a routine matter at the ministerial

level, but there is still a need to ease bureaucratic trade and investment barriers.

Uniq o/w link – too many issues to change relations.

Rozental 13 (Andrés Rozental, former deputy foreign minister of Mexico, works primarily on global

governance issues, U.S.-Mexico relations and international migration, served for many years in Mexico’s

diplomatic corps, 2/1/13, “Have Prospects for U.S.-Mexican Relations Improved?”

http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/02/01-us-mexico-rozental)//DR. H

The Mexico-U.S. relationship won't substantially change; there are too

many ongoing issues to expect any major shift in what has become a very close and cooperative

bilateral partnership in economic, security and social aspects. There will be a change of emphasis

from the Mexican side as far as the security relationship goes, with Peña Nieto's declared



intention to focus much more on the economy and public safety. He has already moved

away from the constant statements made by his predecessor extolling the number of criminals

apprehended and 'successes' in the fight against organized crime. The change of message comes as a

relief to many Mexicans tired of hearing about violence and crime on a daily basis.



XT – Security Approach fails

Anti-drug operations fail – aggravates the drug war, fails to resolve poor

conditions, and can’t .overcome demand

Mercille 2011 (Julien Mercille is a lecturer in the School of Geography, Planning and¶ Environmental

Policy, University College Dublin. He was previously at the¶ University of California-Los Angeles (UCLA).

His forthcoming book, Harvest¶ of Destruction: US Responsibility in the Afghan Drug Trade, will be

published¶ by Pluto Press in 2012, “Violent Narco-Cartels or US¶ Hegemony? The political economy¶ of

the ‘war on drugs’ in Mexico”, http://www.kent.ac.uk/politics/carc/reading%20group/Mercille%20-

%20Narco%20Cartels%20or%20US%20Hegemony_Oct%202011.pdf)

Contrary to conventional analyses that focus almost exclusively on narcocartels, this article has argued

that US policy towards Mexico is shaped by¶ political economic imperatives, rather than

by concerns for drug control. In¶ fact, drug wars have served to justify the

expansion of US hegemony , which¶ itself has increased the size of the drug industry.

Further, mainstream¶ analysts’ favoured solutions—interdiction and seizure of drug shipments,¶

arrests of drug kingpins, military and police operations—miss the point in at¶ least three ways. First,

in general, since US hegemony over the country has¶ worsened drug problems, more equitable bilateral

relations should therefore be favoured. For example, instead of promoting neoliberal policies that

result¶ in unemployment and harsh living conditions south of the border and thus¶ provide an

abundant pool of labour for drug cartels, policies that support¶ growth and development would

make a positive difference. Better labour¶ standards, working conditions and environmental

regulations would be a¶ good start.¶ Second, Washington should stop directly supporting some important drug¶ actors in Mexico, whether these be the military, police or drug

kingpin as¶ paid informants (if the latter claim is indeed true).¶ Third, in addition to stopping the

flow of firearms south, the findings of ¶ drug policy research should be applied. Whereas mainstream

authors call¶ for overseas drug control operations, interdiction and enforcement to¶ tackle

the narcotics problem, research has consistently found that such¶ methods are

ine

ective, while the most effective methods to reduce drug¶ consumption are

treatment of addicts and prevention. Indeed, a widely¶ cited RAND report calculated

that ‘treatment’ was the most effective¶ method for reducing cocaine consumption in the US and that

targeting¶ ‘source countries’ like Mexico was 23 times less cost-effective, ‘interdiction’¶ 11 times lesscost-effective, and ‘domestic enforcement’ seven times less¶ cost-effective.54 The Latin American

Commission on Drugs and Democracy, conceived by ex-presidents Cardoso of Brazil, Gaviria of

Colombia¶ and Zedillo of Mexico, agrees and stated that: ‘The long-term solution for¶ the drug

problem is to reduce drastically the demand for drugs in the¶ main consumer countries’, the

US and Europe.55 But the US has rejected¶ the consensus on drugs policy, allocating 64 per



cent of the drug control¶ budget to interdiction and to arresting, prosecuting and incarcerating drug¶

offenders, including the arrest of about 750 000 each year for possession¶ of small amounts of

marijuana. Only 36 per cent of the budget is reserved¶ for treatment and other demand reduction

activities. Nonetheless, the US¶ has one of the highest levels of drug use in the world, while

many¶ European countries adopting softer approaches have significantly lower¶ usage

levels. In short, the solutions are known, but have not been fully¶ implemented.

US policy isn’t key – Nieto’s domestic reform plans drive anti-drug effort.

Stewart, 13 Vice president of analysis at Stratfor, a geopolitical intelligence firm that provides

strategic analysis and forecasting to individuals and organizations around the world, 5/16, Forbes,

http://www.forbes.com/sites/stratfor/2013/05/16/u-s-mexico-cooperation-against-cartels-remains-

strong/, “U.S.-Mexico Cooperation Against Cartels Remains Strong” | ADM

Aside from the political struggles, the Mexican government still faces very real challenges on

the streets as it attempts to quell violence, reassert control over lawless areas and gain the trust of the

public. The holistic plan laid out by the Pena Nieto administration sounds good on paper, but it

will still require a great deal of leadership by Pena Nieto and his team to bring

Mexico through the challenges it faces. They will obviously need to cooperate with the United

States to succeed, but it has become clear that this cooperation will need to be

on Mexico’s terms and in accordance with the administration’s new, holistic approach.

http://www.forbes.com/sites/stratfor/2013/05/16/u-s-mexico-cooperation-against-cartels-remains-strong/







XT – Econ Resilient

US-Mexico trade is already huge and trends flow neg

Villareal, 12 M. Angeles, Specialist in International Trade and Finance, Congressional Research Service,

8/9, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32934.pdf , “U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues,and Implications” | ADM

The United States is, by far, Mexico’s leading partner in merchandise trade, while

Mexico is the United States’ third-largest trade partner after China and Canada.

Mexico ranks second among U.S. export markets after Canada, and is the third-leading

supplier of U.S. imports. U.S. trade with Mexico increased rapidly since NAFTA

entered into force in January 1994. U.S. exports to Mexico increased from $54.8 billion in 1994 to

$174.4 billion in 2011, an increase of 218%. Imports from Mexico increased from $51.6 billion in 1994 to

$285.4 billion in 2011, an increase of 453% (see Figure 1). In services, the United States had a surplus of$2.2 billion in 2010 (the most recent available data). U.S. exports in services to Mexico totaled $3.8

billion in 2010, while U.S. imports totaled $1.6 billion.5 Total services trade with Mexico is

approximately equal to 1% of total merchandise trade with Mexico. The trade balance with Mexico

went from a surplus of $3.1 billion in 1994 to a deficit of $99.5 billion in 2011. In 2011, 13% of

total U.S. merchandise exports were destined for Mexico and 12% of U.S. merchandise

imports came from Mexico. After the significant decrease in trade in 2009 that resulted from the

global economic downturn, U.S.-Mexico trade increased considerably in 2010 and

2011. Part of the increase in trade with Mexico may be attributed to the increasing trade

in energy. Crude petroleum oil accounts for 15% of total U.S. imports from Mexico . The valueof U.S. crude oil imports from Mexico increased over 500% since the 1990s, increasing from $6.3 billion

in 1996 to $39.8 billion in 2011. Mexico is the leading destination for U.S. exports in refined oil. The

value of U.S. refined oil exports to Mexico increased by $18.4 billion from 1996 to 2011, from

$1.0 billion to $19.4 billion, approximately an 1800% increase.6 As stated previously, Mexico relies

heavily on the United States as an export market; this reliance has diminished very slightly over

the years. The percentage of Mexico’s total exports going to the United States decreased from 83% in

1996 to 79% in 2011. Mexico’s share of the U.S. market has lost ground since 2002. In 2003, China

surpassed Mexico as the second-leading supplier of U.S. imports. The United States is losing market

share of Mexico’s import market. Between 1996 and 2011, the U.S. share of Mexico’s total importsdecreased from 75% to 50%. China is Mexico’s second-leading source of imports.

FDI is an integral part of the us-mexico economic relationship – trends go neg

Villareal, 12 M. Angeles, Specialist in International Trade and Finance, Congressional Research Service,

8/9, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32934.pdf , “U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues,

and Implications” | ADM

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32934.pdf










Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been an integral part of the economic

relationship between the United States and Mexico since NAFTA implementation. FDI

consists of investments in real estate, manufacturing plants, and retail facilities, in which the

foreign investor owns 10% or more of the entity. The United States is the largest

source of FDI in Mexico. The stock of U.S. FDI increased from $17.0 billion in 1994 to$91.4 billion in 2011, a 440% increase (see Table 4). Mexican FDI in the United States is much lower than

U.S. investment in Mexico, with levels of Mexican FDI fluctuating over the last 10 years. In 2010,

Mexican FDI in the United States totaled $12.6 billion (see Table 4). The sharp rise in U.S. investment

in Mexico since NAFTA is also a result of the liberalization of Mexico’s restrictions on foreign

investment in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Prior to the mid-1980s, Mexico had a very

protective policy that restricted foreign investment and controlled the exchange rate to

encourage domestic growth, affecting the entire industrial sector. Mexico’s trade liberalization

measures and economic reform in the late 1980s represented a sharp shift in policy and

helped bring in a steady increase of FDI flows into Mexico. NAFTA provisions on foreign

investment helped to lock in the reforms and increase investor confidence. Under NAFTA, Mexico gave

U.S. and Canadian investors nondiscriminatory treatment of their investments as well as investor

protection. NAFTA may have encouraged U.S. FDI in Mexico by increasing investor

confidence, but much of the growth may have occurred anyway because Mexico likely would

have continued to liberalize its foreign investment laws with or without the agreement. Nearly half of

total FDI investment in Mexico is in the manufacturing industry , of which the

maquiladora industry forms a major part. (See “Mexico’s Export-Oriented Assembly Plants” below.) In

Mexico, the industry has helped attract investment from countries such as the United

States that have a relatively large amount of capital. For the United States, the industry is

important because U.S. companies are able to locate their labor-intensive operations in Mexico and

lower their labor costs in the overall production process.

US econ resilient.

Johnson ‘13

(Robert , CFA, director of economic analysis with Morningstar, Morningstar.com, “U.S. Economy Not So

Fragile After All” – 1/19 – http://news.morningstar.com/articlenet/article.aspx?id=581616)

No, the U.S. Economy Has Not Been Fragile After All¶ Although most economists got at least

some things right about the U.S. economy over the past two years, the one nearly universal error

was the expectation that the economy was fragile. The U.S. economy has proven to be

anything but fragile.¶ I believe this to be the single biggest error that economists have made over the



last two years. During that time, the U.S. has survived the fallout from a major debt crisis in

Europe, a divisive election, temporarily going over the fiscal cliff , gasoline prices that have

been on a yo-yo, a tsunami in Japan, and Hurricane Sandy, which shut down New York

and even the stock exchanges for a couple of days. These are not signs of a fragile

economy.

Econ resilient – fundamentals growing.

Stewart ‘13

(Hale Stewart spent 5 years as a bond broker in the late 1990s before returning to law school in the early

2000s. He is currently a tax lawyer in Houston, Texas. He has an LLM from the Thomas Jefferson School

of Law in domestic and international taxation where he graduated Magna Cum Laude, seeking alpha, “Is

The U.S. Economy Moving Into A Higher Growth Phase? Part 1 - The Positive” – Feb 5th – http://seekingalpha.com/article/1158011-is-the-u-s-economy-moving-into-a-higher-growth-phase-part-

1-the-positive?source=google_news)

All three of the above sectors -- housing, autos and manufacturing -- are bedrock components of the

economy. If all three are doing fairly well, the worst that can happen is slow

growth. There is simply too much of a multiplier effect of the

combined total for a recession to occur with the above three

expanding. However, this is before we get to the latest and upcoming fiscal follies from the people in Washington. We'll touch on that in Part 2.

Recovery from 2008 proves economy resilient.

Drezner ‘12

(Daniel, Professor International Politics Tufts University, October, “The Irony of Global Economic

Governance: The System Worked” Council on Foreign Relations International Institutions and Global

Governance)

In looking at outcomes, the obvious question is how well the global economy has recovered

from the 2008 crisis. The current literature on economic downturns suggests two factors that impose

significant barriers to a strong recovery from the Great Recession: it was triggered by a financial

crisis and it was global in scope. Whether measuring output, per capita income, or employment,

financial crashes trigger downturns that last longer and have far weaker recoveries than



standard business cycle downturns.10 Furthermore, the global nature of the crisis makes it

extremely difficult for countries to export their way out of the problem . Countries that have

experienced severe banking crises since World War II have usually done so when the global economy

was largely unaffected. That was not the case for the Great Recession. The global economy has

rebounded much better than during the Great Depression. Economists Barry Eichengreen andKevin O’Rourke have compiled data to compare global economic performance from the start of the

crises (see Figures 1 and 2).11 Two facts stand out in their comparisons. First, the percentage drop

in global industrial output and world trade levels at the start of the 2008 financial crisis

was more precipitous than the falloffs following the October 1929 stock market crash.

The drop in industrial output was greater in 2008 nine months into the crisis than it was eighty years

earlier after the same amount of time. The drop in trade flows was more than twice as large. Second,

the post-2008 rebound has been far more robust. Four years after the onset of the Great Recession,

global industrial output is 10 percent higher than when the recession began . In contrast,

four years after the 1929 stock market crash, industrial output was at only two-thirds ofprecrisis levels. A similar story can be told with aggregate economic growth. According to World Bank

figures, global economic output rebounded in 2010 with 2.3 percent growth, followed up in

2011 with 4.2 percent growth. The global growth rate in 2011 was 44 percent higher than the average of

the previous decade. Even more intriguing, the growth continued to be poverty reducing.12 The World

Bank’s latest figures suggest that despite the 2008 financial crisis, extreme poverty continued to decline

across all the major regions of the globe. And the developing world achieved its first Millennium

Development Goal of halving the 1990 levels of extreme poverty.13 An important reason for the quick

return to positive economic growth is that cross-border flows did not dry up after the 2008

crisis. Again, compared to the Great Depression, trade flows have rebounded extremely well.14Four years after the 1929 stock market crash, trade flows were off by 25 percent compared to precrisis

levels. Current trade flows, in contrast, are more than 5 percent higher than in 2008. Even compared to

other postwar recessions, the current period has seen robust crossborder exchange. Indeed, as a report

from CFR’s Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies concluded in May 2012, “The

growth in world trade since the start of the [current] recovery exceeds even the best of

the prior postwar experiences.”15 Other cross-border flows have also rebounded from 2008 –2009

lows. Global foreign direct investment (FDI) has returned to robust levels. FDI inflows rose by 17 percent

in 2011 alone. This put annual FDI levels at $1.5 trillion, surpassing the three-year precrisis average,

though still approximately 25 percent below the 2007 peak. More generally, global foreign investment

assets reached $96 trillion, a 5 percent increase from precrisis highs. Remittances from migrant workers

have become an increasingly important revenue stream to the developing world—and the 2008

financial crisis did not dampen that income stream. Cross-border remittances to developing countries

quickly rebounded to precrisis levels and then rose to an estimated all-time high of $372 billion in 2011,

with growth rates in 2011 that exceeded those in 2010. Total cross-border remittances were more than

$501 billion last year, and are estimated to reach $615 billion by 2014.16 Another salient outcome is

mass public attitudes about the global economy. A general assumption in public opinion research is



that during a downturn, demand for greater economic closure should spike, as

individuals scapegoat foreigners for domestic woes. The global nature of the 2008 crisis,

combined with anxiety about the shifting distribution of power, should have triggered a

fall in support for an open global economy. Somewhat surprisingly, however, the reverse is

true. Pew’s Global Attitudes Project has surveyed a wide spectrum of countries since 2002, askingpeople about their opinions on both international trade and the free market more generally.17 The

results show resilient support for expanding trade and business ties with other

countries. Twenty-four countries were surveyed both in 2007 and at least one year after 2008,

including a majority of the G20 economies. Overall, eighteen of those twenty-four countries showed

equal or greater support for trade in 2009 than two years earlier. By 2011, twenty of twenty-four

countries showed greater or equal support for trade compared to 2007. Indeed, between 2007 and

2012, the unweighted average support for more trade in these countries increased from 78.5 percent to

83.6 percent. Contrary to expectation, there has been no mass public rejection of the open global

economy. Indeed, public support for the open trading system has strengthened, despite softening publicsupport for free-market economics more generally.18 The final outcome addresses a dog that

hasn’t barked: the effect of the Great Recession on crossborder conflict and violence .

During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would

lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power .19 Whether

through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of

great power conflict, there were genuine concerns that the global economic downturn

would lead to an increase in conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South

China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fuel impressions of surge in global public

disorder. The aggregate data suggests otherwise, however. A fundamental conclusion

from a recent report by the Institute for Economics and Peace is that “the average level of

peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007.”20 Interstate violence

in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis—as have military expenditures

in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not

triggered any increase in violent conflict; the secular decline in violence that started

with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed.21



XT – No Diversionary War

Diversionary war theory is false.

Boehmer ‘7

(Charles, political science professor at the University of Texas, Politics & Policy, 35:4, “The Effects of

Economic Crisis, Domestic Discord, and State Efficacy on the Decision to Initiate Interstate Conflict”)

This article examines the contemporaneous effect of low economic growth and domestic instability on

the threat of regime change and/ or involvement in external militarized conflicts. Many studies of

diversionary conflict argue that lower rates of economic growth should heighten the risk of

international conflict. Yet we know that militarized interstate conflicts, and especially wars, are

generally rare events whereas lower rates of growth are not. Additionally, a growing body of literature

shows that regime changes are also associated with lower rates of economic growth. The question then

becomes which event, militarized interstate conflict or regime change, is the most likely to occur with

domestic discord and lower rates of economic growth? Diversionary theory claims that leaders

seek to divert attention away from domestic problems such as a bad economy or political

scandals, or to garner increased support prior to elections. Leaders then supposedly externalize

discontented domestic sentiments onto other nations, sometimes as scapegoats based on the similar in-

group/out-group dynamic found in the research of Coser (1956) and Simmel (1955), where foreign

countries are blamed for domestic problems. This process is said to involve a “rally-round-the-flag”

effect, where a leader can expect a short-term boost in popularity with the threat or use of force

(Blechman, Kaplan, and Hall 1978; Mueller 1973). Scholarship on diversionary conflict has focused most

often on the American case1 but recent studies have sought to identify this possible behavior in other

countries.2 The Falklands War is often a popular example of diversionary conflict (Levy and Vakili 1992).

Argentina was reeling from hyperinflation and rampant unemployment associated with the Latin

American debt crisis. It is plausible that a success in the Falklands War may have helped to rally support

for the governing Galtieri regime, although Argentina lost the war and the ruling regime lost power. How

many other attempts to use diversionary tactics, if they indeed occur, can be seen to generate a similar

outcome? The goal of this article is to provide an assessment of the extent to which diversionary

strategy is a threat to peace. Is this a colorful theory kept alive by academics that has little

bearing upon real events, or is this a real problem that policy makers should be concerned with? If it

is a strategy readily available to leaders, then it is important to know what domestic factors trigger this

gambit. Moreover, to know that requires an understanding of the context in external conflict, whichoccurs relative to regime changes. Theories of diversionary conflict usually emphasize the

potential benefits of diversionary tactics, although few pay equal attention to the

prospective costs associated with such behavior. It is not contentious to claim that leaders typically

seek to remain in office. However, whether they can successfully manipulate public opinion

regularly during periods of domestic unpopularity through their states’ participation in f oreign



militarized conflicts—especially outside of the American case—is a question open for debate.

Furthermore, there appears to be a logical disconnect between diversionary theories and extant studies

of domestic conflict and regime change. Lower rates of economic growth are purported to increase the

risk of both militarized interstate conflicts (and internal conflicts) as well as regime changes (Bloomberg

and Hess 2002). This implies that if leaders do, in fact, undertake diversionary conflicts, many

may still be thrown from the seat of power—especially if the outcome is defeat to a foreign

enemy. Diversionary conflict would thus seem to be a risky gambit (Smith 1996). Scholars such as

MacFie (1938) and Blainey (1988) have nevertheless questioned the validity of the diversionary

thesis. As noted by Levy (1989), this perspective is rarely formulated as a cohesive and

comprehensive theory, and there has been little or no knowledge cumulation. Later analyses do not

necessarily build on past studies and the discrepancies between inquiries are often difficult to unravel.

“Studies have used a variety of research designs, different dependent variables (uses of force,

major uses of force, militarized disputes), different estimation techniques, and different data sets

covering different time periods and different states” (Bennett and Nordstrom 2000, 39). To theseproblems, we should add a lack of theoretical precision and incomplete model specification. By a lack of

theoretical precision, I am referring to the linkages between economic conditions and domestic strife

that remain unclear in some studies (Miller 1995; Russett 1990). Consequently, extant studies are to a

degree incommensurate; they offer a step in the right direction but do not provide robust cross-national

explanations and tests of economic growth and interstate conflict. Yet a few studies have attempted to

provide deductive explanations about when and how diversionary tactics might be employed. Using a

Bayesian updating game, Richards and others (1993) theorize that while the use of force would appear

to offer leaders a means to boost their popularity, a poorly performing economy acts as a signal to a

leader’s constituents about his or her competence. Hence, attempts to use diversion are likely to

fail either because incompetent leaders will likewise fail in foreign policy or people willrecognize the gambit for what it is. Instead, these two models conclude that diversion is likely to

be undertaken particularly by risk-acceptant leaders. This stress on a heightened risk of removal from

office is also apparent in the work of Bueno de Mesquita and others (1999), and Downs and Rocke

(1994), where leaders may “gamble for resurrection,” although the diversionary scenario in the former

study is only a partial extension of their theory on selectorates, winning coalitions, and leader survival.

Again, how often do leaders fail in the process or are removed from positions of power before they can

even initiate diversionary tactics? A few studies focusing on leader tenure have examined the removal of

leaders following war, although almost no study in the diversionary literature has looked at the effects

of domestic problems on the relative risks of regime change, interstate conflict, or both events occurring

in the same year.3



Low growth makes politicians cautious—they don’t want to risk war because

it makes them vulnerable.

Boehmer ‘7

(Charles, political science professor at the University of Texas, Politics & Policy, 35:4, “The Effects ofEconomic Crisis, Domestic Discord, and State Efficacy on the Decision to Initiate Interstate Conflict”)

Economic Growth and Fatal MIDs The theory presented earlier predicts that lower rates of growth

suppress participation in foreign conflicts, particularly concerning conflict initiation and

escalation to combat. To sustain combat, states need to be militarily prepared and not

open up a second front when they are already fighting, or may fear, domestic opposition. A

good example would be when the various Afghani resistance fighters expelled the Soviet Union from

their territory, but the Taliban crumbled when it had to face the combined forces of the United States

and Northern Alliance insurrection. Yet the coefficient for GDP growth and MID initiations was negative

but insignificant. However, considering that there are many reasons why states fight, the

logic presented earlier should hold especially in regard to the risk of participating in

more severe conflicts. Threats to use military force may be safe to make and may be

made with both external and internal actors in mind, but in the end may remain mere

cheap talk that does not risk escalation if there is a chance to back down. Chiozza and Goemans

(2004b) found that secure leaders were more likely to become involved in war than insecure leaders,

supporting the theory and evidence presented here. We should find that leaders who face

domestic opposition and a poorly performing economy shy away from situations that

could escalate to combat if doing so would compromise their ability to retain power .



XT – No War

Economic decline doesn’t cause war.

Jervis,’11

(Robert, Professor PolSci Columbia, December, “Force in Our Times” Survival, Vol 25 No 4, p 403-425)

Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest

were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of

the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps

linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic

difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back

old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to

believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community

to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has

proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally

interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even

if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited,

it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict

leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by

impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe,

but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could

note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist

could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic

down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even

if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable .

Multipolarity makes your arguments untrue—economic decline doesn’t cause

war.

Thirlwell ‘10

—MPhil in economics from Oxford U, postgraduate qualifications in applied finance from Macquarie U, program director in International Economy for the Lowy Institute for International Policy

(Mark, September 2010, “The Return of Geo -economics: Globalisation and National Security”, Lowy Institute for International Policy, google scholar,)

Summing up the evidence, then, I would judge that while empirical support for the Pax Mercatoria is

not conclusive, nevertheless it’s still strongly supportive of the general idea that international

integration is good for peace, all else equal. Since there is also even stronger evidence that peace is

good for trade, this raises the possibility of a nice virtuous circle: globalisation (trade) promotes



peace, which in turn promotes more globalisation. In this kind of world, we should not worry

too much about the big power shifts described in the previous section, since they are taking place

against a backdrop of greater economic integration which should help smooth the whole process. ¶

Instead of ending this section on that optimistic note, however, it’s worth thinking about some reasons

why the Pax Mercatoria might nevertheless turn out to be a poor, or at least overly optimistic,guide to our future.¶ The first is captured by that all important get-out-of-gaol-free card, ‘all else equal’.

It’s quite possible that the peace-promoting effects of international commerce will end up being

swamped by other factors, just as they were in 1914.¶ Second, perhaps the theory itself is wrong.

Certainly, a realist like John Mearsheimer would seem to have little time for the optimistic

consequences of the rise of new powers implied by the theory. Here’s Mearsheimer on how the US

should view China’s economic progress, for example:¶ ‘ . . . the United States has a profound interest in

seeing Chinese economic growth slow considerably in the years ahead . . . A wealthy China would not be

a status quo power but an aggressive state determined to achieve regional hegemony.’ 62¶ Such

pessimistic (or are they tragic?) views of the world would also seem to run the risk of being self-fulfilling

prophecies if they end up guiding actual policy. ¶ Finally, there is the risk that the shift to amultipolar world might indirectly undermine some of the supports needed to deliver

globalisation. Here I am thinking about some simple variant on the idea of hegemonic stability theory

(HST) – the proposition that the global economy needs a leader (or ‘hegemon’) that is both able

and willing to provide the sorts of international public goods that are required for its smooth

functioning: open markets (liberal or ‘free’ trade), a smoothly functioning monetary regime,

liberal capital flows, and a lender of last resort function. 63 Charles Kindleberger argued that ‘the

1929 depression was so wide, so deep, and so long because the international economic

system was rendered unstable by British inability and US unwillingness to assumeresponsibility for stabilizing it’, drawing on the failures of the Great Depression to make the original

case for HST:¶ ‘ . . . the international economic and monetary system needs leadership, a

country that is prepared . . . to set standards of conduct for other countries and to seek to get

others to follow them, to take on an undue share of the burdens of the system, and in particular to

take on its support in adversity...’ 64¶ Kindleberger’s assessment appears to capture a rough empirical

regularity: As Findlay and O’Rourke remind us, ‘periods of sustained expansion in world trade have

tended to coincided with the infrastructure of law and order necessary to keep trade routes open being

provided by a dominant “hegemon” or imperial power’. 65 Thus periods of globalisation have

typically been associated with periods of hegemonic or imperial power, such as the PaxMongolica, the Pax Britannica and, most recently, the Pax Americana (Figure 9).¶ The risk, then, is that

by reducing the economic clout of the United States, it is possible that the shift to a

multipolar world economy might undermine either the willingness or the ability (or both) of

Washington to continue to supply the international public goods needed to sustain a



(relatively) smoothly functioning world economy. 66 That in turn could undermine the potential

virtuous circle identified above.



Alternative Causality Arguments

immigration, border, economic integration, climate change, and security are

alt causes

Barry, 13 Tom, senior policy analyst at the Center for International Policy, where he directs the

TransBorder project. Barry specializes in immigration policy, homeland security, border security and the

outsourcing of national security, 5/7, http://truth-out.org/news/item/16221-changing-perspectives-on-

us-mexico-relations, “Changing Perspectives on US-Mexico Relations” | ADM

It’s unfortunate that the two presidents chose to hold their May 2-3 summit in Mexico City. Both nations

and Presidents Barack Obama and Enrique Peña Nieto would have been better served by a

meeting at the border—where the grim reality of neighborly relations would not be masked by the

pomp and circumstance of the grand presidential residence of Los Pinos. A meeting at the customs

building in Ciudad Juárez—the site of the first Mexico-U.S. presidential meeting in 1909 between Porfirio

Díaz and William Taft—would have likely resulted in a more memorable and productive summit of the

current heads of state, Enrique Peña Nieto and Barack Obama. As it is, this meeting will likely be soon

forgotten—lost in protocol, predictable rhetoric about interdependence, and the photogenic smiles of

the two presidents. A century ago the Rio Grande/Río Bravo clearly marked the divide between El Paso

and Juárez, the border twins that were jointly known as El Paso del Norte—the pass to the north. Today,

however, it’s unlikely that the presidential delegations and the accompanying media would now passes

for a river—really just an alarmingly greenish trickle of pesticides, fertilizer runoff, and human waste.

Instead of news photos from the bilateral meeting depicting two smiling presidents, we would be

witnessing images of the stark divide between the two neighbors: the formidable border

security infrastructure, the smog rising from the long lines of vehicles waiting to cross, thebeggars and street vendors taking advantage of the stalled south-north traffic, the ravages of the drug

wars, the miles of low-slung factories calledmaquiladoras, the sprawling colonias of Mexico’s expanding,

but still largely poor, middle class (those families earning at least $7,500 annually), and still-poorer

squatter settlements that spread out into the Chihuahuan Desert. The lead items of the Los

Pinos meeting are ones that have long dominated U.S.-Mexico presidential meetings:

immigration, border control, economic integration, and drug-related

security . The presidents will achieve some camaraderie chatting about the domestic political

obstacles that complicate their plans for national and international progress. In the pleasant, climate-

controlled setting of Los Pinos, it’s unlikely that Peña Nieto and Obama will address in anydepth, if at all, what will soon become the top agenda item of most binational and multilateral

meetings: the scourge of climate change.

http://truth-out.org/news/item/16221-changing-perspectives-on-us-mexico-relations








alt Causes – gun policy, drugs, Latin American foreign policy, and illegal

immigration

Reyes, 13 Raul, attorney and columnist in New York City, 4/29,

http://nbclatino.com/2013/04/29/opinion-president-obama-has-the-chance-to-improve-usmexico-

relations/, “Opinion: President Obama has the chance to improve US/Mexico relations” | ADM

Obama will arrive in Mexico with good and bad news. On the positive side, he can highlight the progress

his administration has made towards overhauling our immigration system. The border is more secure

than ever, and the Senate has unveiled a proposal that creates new pathways for legal immigration. On

the negative side, Obama bears responsibility for his failure to reform U.S. gun laws.

ThinkProgress reports that the expiration of the assault weapons ban has resulted in the

deaths of hundreds of Mexicans in cartel violence . Even worse, America’s demand for

illegal drugs fuels the growth of these cartels. However, Obama would be wise to recognize that

relations with Mexico should not center on these issues alone . As president-elect, PeñaNieto wrote in The Washington Post that, “It is a mistake to limit our bilateral relationship to drugs and

security concerns. Our mutual interests are too vast and complex to be restricted in this short-sighted

way.” He wants a deeper relationship, one that is defined by shared economic goals. That’s the smart

way forward. Since 2008, Mexico has seen steady economic growth, which has been a net benefit to the

U.S. The U.S. exports more to Mexico than to China and Japan combined, and U.S./Mexico trade hit

almost $500 billion in 2012. Obama should build on these ties to create greater economic integration. If

he and Peña Nieto were to collaborate on ways of matching Mexico’s young labor force with American

technology and training, it would be a recipe for a regional economic boom. Greater U.S. investment in

Mexico will make the country safer, as the cartels generally leave multinational operations alone.

Politically, Obama cannot afford to take Mexico for granted. Consider that Mexico has beenfully engaged with Cuba since the revolution in 1959 (which was launched from Mexico). And

although the U.S. has not recognized Venezuela’s Nicolas Maduro as successor to Hugo

Chavez, Mexico recognized his election on April 19. So Mexico is not an ally that

automatically falls in lockstep with American interests. Perhaps with more

attention from the Obama administration, Peña Nieto could be persuaded to be more supportive of U.S.

policies for the region. True, there are legitimate reasons why Mexico has been viewed

warily by past administrations. Mexico has historically been the largest source of our

undocumented population. Border towns have long feared spillover violence from the drug cartels.

But illegal immigration is at net zero, and the fears of violence on the U.S. side of the border have

proved largely unfounded. Obama should take the lead in encouraging more communication and

cooperation with Mexico. Already, Peña Nieto favors opening Mexico’s energy sector to private

investment, and he may even allow foreign investment in its state oil company.

http://nbclatino.com/2013/04/29/opinion-president-obama-has-the-chance-to-improve-usmexico-relations/







economic issues, rule of law, judicial issues, trafficking, and energy are alt

causes

*also an advantage counterplan card

Miller and deLeon, 09 Stephanie, consultant on U.S.-Latin America relations and was formerly theResearch Associate for the Americas Project on the National Security Team. Born in Venezuela with

family from Colombia, Miller earned her degree from Duke University in International Comparative

Studies with a focus on Latin America. She currently lives in Bogotá, Colombia, and Rudy, Senior Vice

President of National Security and International Policy at American Progress in Washington, DC. He

serves on several non-profit boards and is a parttime college instructor. DeLeon is also a former senior

U.S. Department of Defense official, staff director on Capitol Hill, and retired corporate executive, April,

Center for American Progress, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/04/pdf/mexico.pdf ,

“Transcending the Rio Grande - U.S.-Mexico relations need to reach beyond the border -

Recommendations of our Mexico Working Group” | ADM

The U.S.-Mexico relationship is ready for renewed collaboration on a range of issues that

bind the United States and Mexico together. The global economic crisis and increasing violence

along the U.S.-Mexico border have raised the relationship to the forefront of U.S. national

and economic security concerns. Indeed, within 60 days in office President Obama laid out a new

border security strategy intended to target the ways in which the United States contributes to the

violence raging just south of its border. This is a good first step, but more needs to be done and

the United States needs to think about its relationship with Mexico beyond the Rio Grande.

The policy recommendations included in this report provide the Obama administration

with a blueprint for ways to expand and strengthen U.S.-Mexico relations beyond the issue areas that

have traditionally defined the relationship, as well as reinvigorate the issue areas that have historically

dominated bilateral relations. This report focused on concrete policy recommendations in four

areas: • Improving the rule of law and judicial reform in Mexico.• Stopping the illegal flow

of weapons and money from the United States to Mexico.• Exploring enhanced

cooperation in economic development.• Promoting alternative energy cooperation and

investment. By tackling these issues head on and in a sustained manner, the Obama

administration can begin to build on the important first steps taken on March 24 to begin to

repair and strengthen relations with one of the United States’ most important and

strategic allies in the hemisphere.

http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/04/pdf/mexico.pdf






Soft Power



1NC – Soft Power

1. Alt cause to USAID—cutting Cuba program now

Eaton 4/25— assistant professor of communication at Flagler College (“USAID may slash Cuba

program (updated)”, 2013, Tracey, http://alongthemalecon.blogspot.com/2013/04/usaid-may-slash-cuba-program.html) EL

The U.S. Agency for International Development plans to cut its budget for democracy

programs in Cuba by 25 percent.¶ Sen. Marco Rubio on Wednesday called it "a terrible

precedent, a terrible idea" and urged the agency to reconsider.¶ The planned reduction*

is "way out of proportion...for a program of this small scale ," said Rubio, speaking Wednesday

at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing in Washington, D.C. (See video).¶ Rubio blamed

Secretary of State John Kerry for the cut. He did not mention Kerry by name, but recalled that Kerry, as

senator and chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, once froze funding for democracy

programs in Cuba.¶ Rubio said Kerry and other lawmakers "held up this program with

endless questions about it."¶ Kerry now oversees both the State Department and USAID and is in a

position to adjust the budget for the democracy programs. Said Rubio:¶ I don't think it's a coincidence

that this was reduced. I just hope that this will be reversed. I think it's a terrible precedent. It's a terrible

idea.¶ Rubio also urged that USAID's Cuba money be spent on democracy promotion , "not

the creation of grassroots community organizations that specialize in, you know, better sewage

treatment programs or what have you. This is about democracy."¶ Rubio is a member of the Foreign

Relations Committee, which heard testimony from USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah.¶ Shah told Rubio:¶

On Cuba, your point is well taken.¶ Sen. Bob Menéndez, who chairs the committee, said he didn't

agree with "the totality of cuts" to USAID's budget proposed for fiscal 2014. ¶ Menéndez

said the agency was cutting its Cuba program at a time when arrests of dissidents and

activists are rising on the island. He cited attacks on members of Ladies in White and the

"assassination" of dissident leader Oswaldo Payá. He said:¶ I just don't get it.¶ Ménendez also

complained that the U.S. government doesn't react until there's a major problem in a

region and then "we'll spend a fortune."¶ That's what happened in Central America, the

senator said.¶ It just doesn't make a lot of sense.¶ Shah replied that the agency has had to make "tough

trade-offs in a budget we certainly wish was larger."¶ Ménendez interrupted Shah, telling him that he's

heard the same story before from USAID. He complained that when the agency makes cuts, programs

targeting Latin America and the Caribbean always suffer. The senator said:¶ I just think it's foolish at the

end of the day.¶ * While watching a video of the committee hearing, I didn't hear anyone say how much

money may be cut from the Cuba programs, just that a 25 percent cut was planned.¶ The State

Department's Executive Budget Summary for Function 150 & Other International Programs (see

document) lists $15 million for Cuba programs in fiscal 2014. That is a 25 percent drop over fiscal 2012.

http://alongthemalecon.blogspot.com/2013/04/usaid-may-slash-cuba-program.html








Perhaps that is where Rubio got the 25 percent figure.¶ Cuba program budget figures show $20 million

in fiscal 2012.¶ An asterisk linked to the sequester is shown for fiscal 2013, then $15 million for fiscal

2014.¶ The State Department's fiscal 2014 budget does not list a fiscal 2013 figure for the Cuba

programs. That number is evidently affected by automatic budget cuts, also known as the sequester (for

more on that, see Public Law 112 –175).

2. No spillover—Latin American countries reject USAID

Reuters 5/1—“Bolivia expels U.S. aid agency after Kerry 'backyard' comment”, 2013,

http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-05-01/news/sns-rt-us-bolivia-usaidbre94013v-

20130501_1_president-evo-morales-bolivian-usaid) EL

LA PAZ (Reuters) - Bolivian President Evo Morales expelled a U.S. development agency from his

country on Wednesday, marking the latest confrontation between Washington and a

bloc of left-wing governments in Latin America .¶ Morales said he was kicking out the U.S.

Agency for International Development (USAID) as a "protest" after U.S. Secretary of State John

Kerry recently referred to Latin America as Washington's "backyard ." The term evokes

strong emotions in the region, which experienced several U.S.-backed coups during the

Cold War.¶ Morales announced his decision at a Labor Day rally, an occasion he has used in recent

years as a forum to nationalize businesses and take other steps to rouse his working-class base in South

America's poorest nation.¶ "Today we're only going to nationalize ... the dignity of the

Bolivian people," Morales said. "USAID is leaving Bolivia."¶ He did not say what USAID did to deserve

expulsion, though Bolivian officials have previously accused the agency of destabilizing thegovernment. In 2008, Morales expelled the U.S. ambassador for allegedly aiding the

opposition.¶ Morales is a close ally of Venezuela's left-wing government, which has seen its

already strained relations with the United States deteriorate further in recent weeks. The government of

President Nicolas Maduro, who won a tightly contested election last month to succeed the late Hugo

Chavez, on April 25 detained a U.S. citizen and accused him of destabilizing the country.¶ USAID said in a

statement it has spent nearly $2 billion in Bolivia over the past 50 years on projects in

education, health and food security, among other areas.¶ The U.S. government "deeply

regrets" Bolivia's decision, State Department spokesman Patrick Ventrell told reporters.¶ "Those who

will be most hurt by the Bolivian government's decision are the Bolivian citizens who have benefitedfrom our collaborative work," he said.¶ Ventrell said Bolivia's allegations against USAID were "baseless,"

and said the U.S. government had not yet decided whether to take any action in response.¶ Kerry made

the "backyard" comment at a Senate committee hearing on April 18.¶ When pressed by a senator about

Washington's influence in Latin America, Kerry expressed regret that U.S. aid to the region is

falling victim to budget cuts.¶ "I don't disagree with you about the need to change the dynamic in

http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-05-01/news/sns-rt-us-bolivia-usaidbre94013v-20130501_1_president-evo-morales-bolivian-usaid







the Western Hemisphere," he said. "It has too often been viewed as a second thought. It shouldn't be.

It's our backyard, neighborhood, as you say. I think there are relationships we could improve."

3. Soft power is useless — empirically proven.

Lacey 13 — Jim Lacey, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Marine Corps War College, holds a Ph.D. in Military History from Leeds University, 2013 (“Soft Power, Smart Power,”

National Review Online, April 22nd, Availa ble Online at http://www.nationalreview.com/article/346131/soft-power-smart-power, Accessed 05-27-2013)

During World War II, Stalin’s advisers encouraged him to seek the favor of the pope. He famously replied: “How many divisions does the pope have?” Decades later, the Soviets came to realize

that papal power was not something to cavalierly disregard. Many, in fact, claim that Pope John Paul II’s moral authority was decisive in breaking the Soviet hold on Poland and propelling the

Evil Empire toward its final demise. It was, therefore, a true example of the clout of “soft power.” O f course, one can maintain that view only by discounting the massive U.S. and NATO military

forces that kept Soviet hard power in check for decades.

A few years back, a number of policymakers, jumping on a popular academic trend given its greatest voice by Joseph Nye, began espousing a theory of soft power. In this new and shiny vision,

America could wield its greatest global influence through the power of its example. The world would just look at how good we were, and how great it was to be an American, and clamor to

follow us. Somehow these visionaries neglected to notice that Europe’s almost total unilateral disarmament had failed to tran slate into influence on the global stage. Rather, it had done the

opposite. In a remarkably short time, European opinions on any matter of consequence ceased to matter.

Worse, a large segment of the world took a good look at the American example and was repelled. Some of these people launched the 9/11 attack. At some point, it became clear that those

holding a world vision that included returning to eighth-century barbarism were not finding our example attractive. Our deep-thinking strategists realized they needed a new answer. What

they came up with was even more seductive than soft power. In the future, America would prosper through the employment of “smart power.” One wonders if our policymakers had been

willfully employing “dumb power” for the previous two centuries. In any case, smart-power advocates claimed that a new policy nirvana was attainable, if only we could find the right mix of

soft and hard power.

Well, soft power and smart power were fascinating intellectual exercises that led nowhere. Iran is still

building nuclear weapons, North Korea is threatening to nuke U.S. cities, and China is becoming

militarily more aggressive. It turns out that power is what it has always been — the ability to influence

and control others — and deploying it requires, as it always has, hard instruments. Without superior

military power and the economic strength that underpins it, the U.S. would have no more ability to

influence global events than Costa Rica.

When President Obama made the strategic decision to pivot toward Asia, he did not follow up by sending dance troupes to China , or opening more c ultural centers across the Pacific’s great

expanse. Rather, he ordered the U.S. military to begin shifting assets into the region, so as to show the seriousness of our intent. If North Korea is dissuaded from the ultimate act of stupidity,it will have a lot more to do with our maintenance of ready military forces in the region than with any desire the North Korean regime has for a continuing flow of Hollywood movies.

By now every serious strategist and policymaker understands that if the United States is going to continue

influencing global events it requires hard power — a military — second to none. That is what makes a new report from the well-respected

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute troubling. According to SIPRI, in 2012, China’s real military spending increased by nearly 8 percent, while Russia’s increased by a whopping 16

percent. Worse, SIPRI expects both nations to increase spending by even greater percentages this year.

The United States, on the other hand, decreased real spending by 6 percent last year, with much larger cuts on the way. After a decade of war, much of our military equipment is simply worn

out and in need of immediate replacement. Moreover, technology’s rapid advance continues, threatening much of our current wea pons inventory with obsolescence. As much as

the utopians (soft-power believers) want to deny it, American power is weakening even as the world becomes

progressively less stable and more dangerous.

In a world where too many states are led by men who still believe Mao’s dictum that “Power comes from the barrel of a gun,” weakness is dangerous. Weakness is also a choice. The United

States, despite our current economic woes, can easily afford the cost of recapitalizing and maintaining our military. We are not even close to spending levels that would lead one to worry

about “imperial overstretch.” Rather, our long-term security is being eaten up so as to fund “entitlement overstretch.”

I suppose that one day, if left unchecked, the welfare state will absorb so much spending that the only military we

can afford will be a shadow of what has protected us for the past seven decades. Soft power will then

cease to be one option among many and, instead, become our only choice. We will become as relevant to the rest of the world

as Europe.



I wonder how many people realize just how different their daily lives will become if that day arrives. For a long time, American hard power has cast a

protective shield around the liberal world order. It will not be pretty when that is gone.

4. Hard power is inevitable and more important than soft power

Bremmer 09— an American political scientist specializing in US foreign policy, states in transition, and

global political risk, president and founder of Eurasia Group, a leading global political risk research and

consulting firm, and a professor at Columbia University (“Obama or not, U.S. still needs hard power”,

2/9, Ian, http://eurasia.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/02/09/the_durable_value_of_hard_power) EL

But you don't have to be a hawk to believe that, over the longer term, it's the country's hard

power advantages that will ensure that America remains indispensable for the world's

political and economic stability -- even as its soft power loses some of its appeal relativeto that of other states.¶ The erosion of the U.S. soft power advantage has already begun.

The global financial crisis has inflicted a lot of damage on the American argument that

unfettered capitalism is the best model for steady economic expansion. The rise of "state

capitalism," as practiced in China, Russia, the Persian Gulf states and several other places, has

created an attractive alternative. Breakout growth over the past several years in several

emerging market countries ensures that American brands now share shelf space around

the world with products made in dozens of developing states. The icons of American popular

culture, central to U.S. soft power appeal, now share stage and screen with celebrities from a

growing number of other countries. The Bush administration's unpopularity in much of

the world has merely added momentum to these trends.¶ America's hard power

advantages have their limitations, as well, but their value is less subject to the ebbs and

flows of popular opinion and cultural attraction. The United States now spends more on its

military than every other nation in the world combined. For all the fear in Washington (and

elsewhere) that China's military spending continues to grow and that Russian foreign policy has become

more aggressive, U.S. military spending outpaces China's by almost ten to one and Russia's by about 25

to one. It will be decades before any other state can afford to challenge the balance of

global military power-assuming that any becomes willing to accept the costs and risksthat come with global ambitions.¶ U.S. military strength will remain useful for the next several

decades -- not only for the waging of wars and not just for Americans. Governments around the world

that depend on the import of oil and natural gas to fuel their economies are hard at work crafting plans

for a technological transition toward a more diversified energy mix. But that's a long-term process. For

the next several years, the world's oil and gas will continue to come from unstable (and

potentially unstable) parts of the world -- the Middle East, the Caspian Sea basin, West Africa, etc.

http://eurasia.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/02/09/the_durable_value_of_hard_power






Only the United States has a global naval presence. That's why other countries will continue to

count on Washington to protect the transit of all this oil and gas from threats like terrorist attack

and even piracy. Why should China or India accept the costs and risks that go with

safeguarding the Strait of Hormuz, the world's most important energy bottleneck, when

America will do it for them? That gives U.S. policymakers leverage they wouldn'totherwise have with their counterparts in other governments. ¶ The U.S. provision of global

public goods will also extend to new military challenges. As Iran and others master uranium

enrichment technology, their nuclear clout may provoke neighboring states toward

even greater reliance on Washington as guarantor of regional security and stabi lity. That's

not a bad thing if it helps ease the fears and pressures that might otherwise beget a

nuclear arms race. As several Eastern European governments worry over the implications of Russia's

increasingly belligerent approach toward some of its neighbors -- an anxiety heightened by Europe's

dependence on Russian natural gas, Moscow's demonstrated willingness to turn off the taps, and last

August's war with Georgia -- they'll turn to a U.S.-led NATO to ease their fears.¶ The U.S.

military will also remain an essential weapon in America's soft power arsenal -- by

delivering relief to victims of natural disasters abroad, for example.

5. PRISM is an alt cause to soft power

Arkedis 6/19-- Senior Fellow at the Progressive Policy Institute and was a DOD counter-terrorism

analyst (Jim, 2013, “PRISM Is Bad for American Soft Power”,

http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/06/prism-is-bad-for-american-soft-

power/277015/) EL

Collecting Americans' phone and Internet records must meet the absolute highest bar of

public consent. It's a test the Obama administration is failing.¶ The argument was effective,

argues Caley Robertson of Colby University: segregation was frustrating the United States'

attempts to export democracy during the Cold War. In other words, Jim Crow was

damaging America's soft power, defined by Harvard professor Joseph Nye as a country's ability toachieve its aims through attraction rather than coercion.¶ Which brings us to PRISM, the NSA

program that collects meta-data from Americans' telephone and online

communications.¶ Ideas Report 2013¶ Modest ideas that can change the world. See full coverage¶ I

am a former Department of Defense intelligence analyst. I have never used PRISM, and do not know if it

existed during my tenure. However, I have used NSA databases, and became aware of two ironclad

truths about the agency: First, its data is a critical intelligence tool; and second, that access to databases

http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/06/prism-is-bad-for-american-soft-power/277015/







by non-NSA intelligence analysts is highly controlled. It's like buying drugs (so I'm told): you need "a guy"

on the inside who passes you the goods in the shadows, then disavows any connection to you.¶ In

addition to being useful and tightly controlled, PRISM is, of course, legal by the letter of the law. Its

existence is primarily justified by the "business records" clause in the PATRIOT Act, and President

Obama has argued that the legislation has been authorized by "bipartisan majorities repeatedly," and

that "it's important to understand your duly elected representatives have been consistently informed onexactly what we're doing." Salvation from excessive government snooping would seem to lie at the

ballot box.¶ Fair enough. But in the immediate wake of September 11, Americans questioned

little of what their government would do to keep them safe. Just four months after the

attacks in January 2002, Gallup reported that fully half of Americans would support anti-terrorism

measures even if they violated civil liberties.¶ Times have changed. As soon as August 2003,

Gallup found just 29 percent of Americans were willing to sacrifice civil liberties for

security. By 2009, a CBS poll concluded only 41 percent of Americans had even heard or read about the

PATRIOT Act, and 45 percent of those believed the law endangered their civil liberties. A Washington

Post poll from April 2013--after the Boston marathon attacks but before PRISM's disclosure-- found 48percent of Americans feared the government would go too far in compromising constitutional rights to

investigate terrorism. And following the Edward Snowden leaks, 58 percent were against the

government collecting phone records. Not a total reversal, but certainly trending in one

direction.¶ This shift has existed in a vacuum of public debate. Prior to the PRISM leaks, the last time

domestic government surveillance made headlines was in very late 2005 and early 2006, following

revelations that the Bush administration was wiretapping Americans without a warrant. Despite the

scandal, the PATRIOT Act was quickly reauthorized by March 2006.¶ The Bush administration did

announce the end of warrantless wiretapping in 2007, and he moved the program under jurisdiction of

the FISA court , a panel of Supreme Court-appointed judges who approve domestic surveillancerequests. To call the FISA court a rubber stamp is an understatement. This year, it has rejected a grand

total of 11 warrant requests out of--wait for it--33,996 applications since the Carter administration.¶ The

PATRIOT Act's reauthorization wouldn't come up again until 2009. By then, public uproar over

warrantless wiretapping had long since receded, and the year's debate played out as a relatively quite

inside-baseball scuffle between civil liberties groups and the Hill. When the law came up for its next

presidential signature in 2011, it was done quietly by autopen--a device that imitates Obama's John

Hancock--from France.¶ Shifting attitudes and quiet reauthorization flies in the face of the standard the

president has set for himself. In a 2009 speech at the National Archives, Obama emphasized the

importance of the consent of the governed in security affairs,¶ "I believe with every fiber of my

being that in the long run we cannot keep this country safe unless we enlist the powerof our most fundamental values... My administration will make all information available

to the American people so that they can make informed judgments and hold us

accountable."¶ The president's inability to live up to this ideal is particularly jarring as he

defends PRISM. Following the leaks, he's said he is pushing the intelligence community to release

what it can, and rightly insists that the NSA is not listening in on Americans' phone calls. Those are



helpful steps, but should have been raised during the National Archives speech just months into his

administration, not six months into his second term.¶ Director of National Intelligence James Clapper

continues to argue that disclosure of collection methods will give America's enemies a "'playbook' to

avoid detection." That's thin gruel. First, America's enemies are already aware of the NSA's

extensive electronic surveillance capabilities. That's why Osama Bin Laden and deceased

al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al Zarqawi used a complex network of couriers rather

than electronic communications. It's typical operational security of truly dangerous operatives.

Second, Obama stated as recently as late May that the threat from al Qaeda's core operatives has

decreased significantly, shifting to less deadly cells scattered throughout the Middle East and North

Africa.¶ The lack of public debate, shifting attitudes towards civil liberties, insufficient

disclosure, and a decreasing terrorist threat demands that collecting Americans' phone

and Internet records must meet the absolute highest bar of public consent. It's a test the

Obama administration is failing.¶ This brings us back to Harry Truman and Jim Crow. Even though PRISM

is technically legal, the lack of recent public debate and support for aggressive domesticcollection is hurting America's soft power.¶ The evidence is rolling in. The China Daily, an

English-language mouthpiece for the Communist Party, is having a field day, pointing out

America's hypocrisy as the Soviet Union did with Jim Crow. Chinese dissident artist Ai Wei Wei

made the link explicitly, saying "In the Soviet Union before, in China today, and even in the U.S.,

officials always think what they do is necessary... but the lesson that people should learn from history is

the need to limit state power."¶ Even America's allies are uneasy, at best. German Chancellor

Angela Merkel grew up in the East German police state and expressed diplomatic

"surprise" at the NSA's activities. She vowed to raise the issue with Obama at this week's G8

meetings. The Italian data protection commissioner said the program would "not belegal" in his country. British Foreign Minister William Hague came under fire in Parliament for

his government's participation.

6. The embargo, drug policy, and trade are alt causes – specifically, military

aid over the drug war undermines us influence

Ben-Ami, 13 Shlomo, former Israeli foreign minister who now serves as Vice President of the Toledo

International Center for Peace, is the author of Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-Arab Tragedy,

6/5, Project Syndicate, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-new-nature-of-us-influence-

in-latin-america-by-shlomo-ben-ami, “Is the US Losing Latin America” | ADM

http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-new-nature-of-us-influence-in-latin-america-by-shlomo-ben-ami








It is true that US attention to Latin America has waned in recent years. President

George W. Bush was more focused on his “global war on terror.” His successor, Barack Obama,

seemed to give the region little thought as well, at least in his first term. Indeed, at the Summit

of the Americas in Cartagena in April 2012, Latin American leaders felt sufficiently confident

and united to challenge US priorities in the region. They urged the US to lift its embargo on Cuba, claiming that it had damaged relations with the rest of the continent, and to do more to

combat drug use on its own turf, through education and social work, rather than

supplying arms to fight the drug lords in Latin America – a battle that all acknowledged has been

an utter failure. It is also true that Latin American countries have pursued a massive

expansion of economic ties beyond America’s sway. China is now Latin America’s second-

largest trading partner and rapidly closing the gap with the US. India is showing keen interest in the

region’s energy industry, and has signed export agreements in the defense sector. Iran has strengthened

its economic and military ties, especially in Venezuela. Similarly, in 2008, Russia’s then-President Dmitri

Medvedev identified the US war on terror as an opportunity to create strategicpartnerships with rising powers such as Brazil, and with the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas

(ALBA), a Venezuelan-inspired bloc opposed to US designs in the region. The energy giant Gazprom and

the country’s military industries have spearheaded the Kremlin’s effort to demonstrate Russia’s ability

to influence America’s neighborhood – a direct response to perceived American meddling in Russia’s

own “near abroad,” particularly Georgia and Ukraine.

7. Soft power collapse inevitable-- debt

Neu 2/8-- B.S. in economics, California Institute of Technology; Ph.D. in economics, Harvard University;

M.A. in economics, Harvard University, Senior Economist at RAND (C. Richard, 2013, “U.S. 'Soft Power'

Abroad Is Losing Its Punch”, http://www.rand.org/blog/2013/02/us-soft-power-abroad-is-losing-its-

punch.html) EL

The way America flexes it economic muscle around the world is changing dramatically —

and not necessarily for the better.¶ In 1997, facing a wave of sovereign debt defaults, the

International Monetary Fund asked its member states to pledge lines of credit to support Fund rescue

efforts. The United States and other nations did as asked. In 2009, the United States responded

again to a call for expanded credit lines. When the Fund sought yet another expansion

of these credit lines last April, 39 countries, including China, Russia, Brazil, Mexico, India,

http://www.rand.org/blog/2013/02/us-soft-power-abroad-is-losing-its-punch.html








Trade Agreement, the Marshall Plan, and so on. These served U.S. interests and made the world

better.¶ But what have we done lately? The Doha round of trade negotiations has stalled. Ditto

efforts at coordinated international action on climate change. Countries of the Arab

Spring need rebuilding. Little progress is apparent on the Transpacific Partnership , a

proposed new free-trade area. And warnings from the U.S. treasury secretary to his Europeancounterparts about the dangers of failing to resolve the fiscal crisis in the eurozone met

with public rebukes: Get your own house in order before you lecture us. Have U.S. fiscal problems

undermined America's self confidence and external credibility to the extent that it can no longer lead?¶

And what about unmet needs at home—healthcare costs, a foundering public education

system, deteriorating infrastructure, and increasing inequality? A strained fiscal situation that

limits resources for action and absorbs so much political energy cannot be helping with any of these

matters. But without progress on such things, what becomes of the social cohesion necessary for unified

action abroad or the moral authority to lead other nations by example?¶ America's fiscal predicament is

serious. The problem has become obvious in the last few years, but it has been building for decades,largely the result of promises of extensive social benefits without a corresponding willingness to pay for

them.¶ Putting U.S. government financing on a sustainable path will require painful adjustments over a

number of years—increased government revenue and painful reductions in government outlays, almost

certainly including outlays for defense and international affairs. During the necessary period of

fiscal adjustment and constrained government resources, U.S. international influence

may decline yet further.¶ But there is no alternative to getting on with the task. The world has not

yet found an acceptable substitute for U.S. leadership.



XT – Alt Cause – USAID

USAID cuts in Central Asia are an alt cause to soft power

CACI Analyst 4/3—Central-Asia Caucasus Institute (Aigul Kasymova, 2013, “U.S. To Cut Aid To Central

Asia”, http://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/field-reports/item/12698-us-to-cut-aid-to-central-asia.html) EL

According to the Congressional Budget Justification by the Department of State (FY2013), the U.S. will

make a cut of 13 percent in aid to the Central Asian region. Assistance from the U.S. will

stress the importance of security programs in the region rather than programs aimed at the

economy, politics, health and/or education. Despite the drop in aid, U.S. policies toward Kyrgyzstan will

continue to support programs aimed at assisting the country’s development.¶ Kyrgyzstan has since its

independence in 1991, similar to its neighboring countries in Central Asia, become a new market for

foreign aid. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has been providing assistance

to Kyrgyzstan since 1992 and is the largest single-country donor organization in the

country. According to USAID, it has provided around US$ 460 million in programs aimed at

supporting the country’s development in various sectors such as health care, the

economy and democratic institutions. In Kyrgyzstan, USAID works in various fields such as

education, economic growth and trade, agriculture and food security, global health, democracy, human

rights and governance, and crisis and conflict management.¶ Over 21 years of assistance from USAID,

Kyrgyzstan has overcome various obstacles as a nation-state. It went from being an authoritarian

regime to having a parliamentary system. With two revolutions in 2005 and 2010 which were

accompanied by violence, Kyrgyzstan is today working towards establishing government accountability

and transparency. The flow of foreign aid greatly assists the government in creating a

favorable environment in this regard. ¶ According to the U.S. Annual Submission to the OECD/DAC

via USAID’s Foreign Assistance Database, Kyrgyzstan received US$ 54.1 million from USAID alone in

2011, and an additional US$ 4.3 million from the U.S. Department of State. The same year, Central Asia

as a region received a total of US$ 28.9 million from both U.S. agencies. Out of all Central Asian

countries, Kyrgyzstan was the largest recipient of USAID assistance in the region in 2011,

whereas Uzbekistan received the smallest amount. The State Department’s aid to the region of Central

Asia in 2013 would amount in total to US$ 118.3 million. Compared to 2012, the overall aid to the region

has been cut by US$ 15.3 million. However, despite the drop in aid, U.S. security assistance to the region

will remain largely unchanged.¶ According to the Department of State’s foreign assistance program, the

main U.S. objective in Kyrgyzstan in 2013 will be “the consolidation of democratic gains

in the country and the development of a more representative government that provides improved

access to justice and better citizen services.” In other words, the U.S. will in 2013 allocate funding

http://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/field-reports/item/12698-us-to-cut-aid-to-central-asia.html








for programs that will focus on supporting democratic processes and building

democratic institutions, respect for human rights and rule of law, and decreasing the level of inter-

ethnic conflict. Like in previous years, the U.S. will continue to support the development of a

parliamentary system and engagement of civil society.

The sequester destroyed USAID

The Hill 3/25—“Sequester cuts hurting US foreign policy”, Thomas Boyatt, Ronald Neumann and

Russell Rumbaugh, 2013, http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/290105-sequester-cuts-

hurting-us-foreign-policy) EL

The mandatory across-the-board federal budget cuts known as sequester are weakening

America’s ability to effectively carry out foreign policy and are also highlighting the

existing flaws in how the U.S. spends foreign affairs dollars.¶ ¶ Because the State Department

and the U.S. Agency for International Development are mischaracterized as non-security agencies under

sequester – despite their central role in U.S. foreign policy – the sequester will cut U.S. international

affairs funding by 5 percent this year.¶ ¶ Five percent is a significant chunk of money – almost $3 billion –

but the State Department and USAID have said the cut will not force them to furlough their employees.

While obviously a good thing, such a policy emphasizes that the bulk of the State Department’s and

USAID’s funding does not go to their most important resource: their people.¶ ¶ We conducted a study

last year that found direct U.S. employee personnel costs made up only 31 percent of the State

Department’s operating budget. USAID non-program funded personnel costs were only 37 percent of its

operating budget. Operating budgets pay for the day-to-day running of the agencies. ¶ ¶

Together, both agencies’ personnel costs are only 8 percent of the total U.S. international affairs

spending. The sequester will not force furloughs because people are such a small part of the spending

on international affairs.¶ ¶ Our study, titled “Diplomacy in a Time of Scarcity,” argued that this spending

on personnel costs flipped the relationship of what was important in conducting international affairs;

that even though they are a small part of the budget, the people who conduct U.S. diplomacy and

development are the most important foreign policy asset.¶ ¶ While our study acknowledged the

growth in personnel at both the State Department and USAID over the last few years, itfound that that growth did not achieve the real needs identified years ago – needs that

have only been complicated by a constantly changing world. And so the report argued that the United

States needs to continue to grow foreign policy personnel numbers even as the budget crisis rages.¶ ¶

Today sequester is not only preventing this growth but reversing it. Although the State

Department and USAID will not furlough employees, the sequester will force them to

http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/290105-sequester-cuts-hurting-us-foreign-policy








slow hiring and leave positions empty, over time eroding the size of America’s existing

diplomatic and development workforce.¶ ¶ Sequester will also affect training, a key

recommendation of the study. Just having more people is not enough. The U.S. needs to give

foreign policy personnel not just basic training but advanced training that makes them

more effective across all areas of foreign policy. As with the number of people, such training issomething the State Department has always needed more of. Sequester both emphasizes how few

resources are dedicated to this problem and exacerbates it by cutting what resources are available.

Jordan

Obeiddat 2/17—reporter for the Jordan Times (“US aid to Jordan at stake due to budget cuts”, Omar,

2013, http://jordantimes.com/us-aid-to-jordan-at-stake-due-to-budget-cuts) EL

AMMAN – Automatic spending cuts set to go into effect in the US early next month may

affect Washington’s military and humanitarian assistance to Jordan. ¶ As across-the-board

cuts in US government spending, set to begin on March 1, would reduce the budget for the State

Department and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) by $2.6 billion, State Secretary

John Kerry has said that an over $300 million cut in foreign military financing could lead to

reductions in military assistance to Israel, Jordan and Egypt. ¶ The reductions, Kerry told

the Congress late last week, would undermine the US’ commitment to the security of the

three countries “at such a volatile time”. ¶ Annual regular US assistance to Jordan includes $300

million in military aid and $360 million in financial and economic support. ¶ The cuts, known as

sequestration, would reduce the State Department’s operations by roughly $850 million and foreign

assistance by approximately $1.7 billion, he wrote in a letter to Senator Barbara Mikulski, chairwoman

of Senate Committee on Appropriations.¶ “Cuts of this magnitude would severely impair our

ability to ensure America’s leadership in global affairs, build relationships with host

governments and promote peaceful democracies. They would limit our ability to

advance peace, security and stability around the world…,” said Kerry, who took over as state

secretary from Hillary Clinton some two weeks ago. ¶ Kerry mentioned in the letter, dated February 11

and posted on the Senate’s website, that sequestration would force the department to cut more than

$200 million from humanitarian assistance accounts. ¶ Detailing the impact of the sequestration on the

State Department and USAID, he noted it would hamper the US’ ability to respond to

humanitarian disasters at a time when the world faces growing needs in Syria and its

neighbouring countries. ¶ Since the start of the Syrian revolution nearly 23 months ago, over

http://jordantimes.com/us-aid-to-jordan-at-stake-due-to-budget-cuts






350,000 Syrians have fled to the Kingdom.¶ According to official figures, until the end of November of

2012, the cost of hosting 230,000 Syrian refugees on Jordan’s economy was estimated at around JD590

million, around $842 million. ¶ Commenting on the issue, Minister of Planning and International

Cooperation Jafar Hassan told The Jordan Times Sunday that cutting military assistance to Jordan and

other countries is one of the scenarios US lawmakers are discussing to address the budget deficit. ¶

However, Hassan, who has recently concluded a visit to Washington, said US officials have stressed their

continuous support for the Kingdom. ¶ The cuts, expected to total about $85 billion this year

across the entire US budget, will take place March 1 unless lawmakers and President

Barack Obama reach an agreement to shelf them.¶ According to Reuters, Democrats in the

Senate on Thursday rallied around a $110 billion tax increase and spending cut plan that would

postpone the sequestration cuts. The proposal is expected to be shot down by Republicans, but some of

its components could be included in future budget negotiations.

Tuberculosis programs

Aziz 5/1— Policy Research Coordinator at Science Speaks (“Legislators to Shah: Really? Cuts to TB, HIV

efforts aren’t a problem?”, Rabita, 2013, http://sciencespeaksblog.org/2013/05/01/legislators-to-shah-

really-cuts-to-tb-hiv-efforts-arent-a-problem/) EL

In the budget-cutting environment that characterizes the current Congress, it is not often you will see

legislators from both parties urging a foreign aid director to voice the need for more funds, but that is

what happened last week.¶

While members of Congress emphasized during hearings last week theimportance of robust U.S. support for global health and expressed concern for proposed funding

cuts to the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and USAID’s global TB

budget, under President Obama’s recently released fiscal year 2014 request, USAID Administrator Raj

Shah assured them they had nothing to worry about.¶ Referring to the $45 million cut to USAID’s TB

program under the FY 2014 budget proposal as “extremely shortsighted,” Rep. Eliot Engel (D-NY) urged

USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah to take into consideration that “we have to sufficiently fund our

efforts to treat and eliminate tuberculosis,” when Shah appeared in front of the House

Committee on Foreign Affairs last week to discuss U.S. foreign assistance priorities and strategies.¶

Engel’s comments echoed Rep. Chris Smith’s concerns about the massive cut to the TBbudget, with $191 million proposed for FY 2014, down 19 percent from the FY 2012

level of $236 million. The Republican from New Jersey pointed to the growing threats posed by

multidrug-resistant and extensively drug-resistant strains of tuberculosis, adding, “there is a cut of $45

million from the budget and hopefully that can be restored and maybe even enhanced since it is so

important.”¶ “There are three foreign assistance accounts that provide our TB support,” Shah

responded, “and while we have limited some of our funding in one account, we are expanding our

http://sciencespeaksblog.org/2013/05/01/legislators-to-shah-really-cuts-to-tb-hiv-efforts-arent-a-problem/








efforts in HIV-related TB and in using the Global Fund to End AIDS, TB, and Malaria to ensure that our

efforts crowd in resources from other donors and allow for more sustainability over time.”¶ But

Administrator Shah’s implication that the cut in TB funding will be compensated through

increased HIV-TB activities through PEPFAR isn’t backed up by reality, as PEPFAR is

seeing a cut of $223 million – a 5.3% reduction from funding for fiscal year 2012 , and noincreased HIV-related TB activities through PEPFAR are anticipated.¶ Although President Obama’s

budget proposal for fiscal year 2014 does increase funding for the Global Fund to $1.65 billion – an

increase of $350 million over FY 2012 levels – TB response advocates have expressed concern that an

increase in funding for the Global Fund won’t translate to enough of an expansion of TB efforts to

counteract the adverse effects of a USAID TB cut. Advocates also have pointed out that due to its new

funding model, the Global Fund may actually distribute less to TB programs, in the short term.¶

Additionally, TB treatment advocates point out that USAID’s TB program provides critical

support to ensure the quality of Global Fund-supported TB programs. Scaling up country

programs without accompanying technical support, advocates say, could lead to an increase of cases of

multidrug resistant and extensively drug resistant tuberculosis. Last year USAID provided technicalassistance to 22 countries for the implementation of their Global Fund grants.

Cuts to malaria, immunization, and food aid

Radia 11—ABC News correspondent (“USAID Administrator: GOP Bill Could Kill 70,000 Kids”, 4/1, Kirit,

http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/usaid-administrator-rajiv-shah-republican-cuts-lead-

child/storynew?id=13275542) EL

At least 70,000 children around the world could die if funding for global health programs

is cut under the Republican budget proposal, USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah warned Congress

Thursday.¶ "What I worry about is that with the H.R. 1 budget [the proposed spending bill], if

that becomes a baseline reality for fiscal year '12, that would be very problematic for

some of our most important programs," Administrator Shah testified before the House

Appropriations State and Foreign Operations subcommittee.¶ "We estimate, and I believe these are very

conservative estimates, that H.R. 1 would lead to 70,000 kids dying," he said.¶ Shah said that 30,000 of

those deaths would come if malaria control programs have to be scaled back, 24,000would die from lack of support for immunizations, and another 16,000 would die at

birth.¶ Shah's comments come as the Obama administration is fighting Congressional Republicans over

how to fund the government this year. The impasse has led to the threat of a government shutdown.¶

Republicans have proposed significant cuts to the international affairs budget, 19 percent below 2010

enacted base levels, as part of an effort to reduce deficit spending.¶ "I believe there are ways to find the

http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/usaid-administrator-rajiv-shah-republican-cuts-lead-child/storynew?id=13275542







efficiencies we're all seeking, through being more businesslike in how we do our work, reining in

contract partners and doing better program oversight. There's a way to do this that does not have to

cost lives," Shah testified.¶ In her testimony before Congress last month, Secretary of State Hillary

Clinton said the cuts, which would also hamper expanded efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and

Pakistan, "would be devastating for our national security."¶ According to the U.S. Global

Leadership Coalition, which lobbies to increase funding for international affairs, the Republican

budget proposal would cut funding for global health programs by 11 percent, including a

reduction in money for the Global fund for HIV/AIDS by 43 percent. The group says that

would mean 5 million children would not receive malaria treatments and about 43,000

would not receive tuberculosis treatments.¶ USAID Chief: Republican Foreign Aid Cuts Could Kill

Children¶ The proposed budget would also decrease food aid programs by 30 percent and

slash U.S. funding for disaster relief by 41 percent.¶ Shah said the disaster relief cut

"would be, really, the most dramatic stepping back away from our humanitarian

responsibilities around the world in decades. We are seeing an increase in the numberof disasters, and we're seeing an increase in the need for American leadership, often to

bring in other donors to do the cost sharing and burden sharing required to successfully see

through a disaster response and a transition."¶ Shah pointed to Darfur, where 1.6 million

people receive food and water through U.S. funding. The proposed cuts would mean

half of those people, 800,000, would no longer receive that aid.¶ Lawmakers were split on

the matter. Rep Kay Granger, the Republican chair of the subcommittee from Texas, said the Obama

administration's budget request for 2012 was "unrealistic in today's budget environment."¶ Rep. Nita

Lowey (D-N.Y.), the ranking member, said the cuts "would risk a great deal in stability and security

around the world which could spawn the kinds of threats that cost this country the lives of men and

women in uniform and billions in treasure."¶ Last month Secretary Clinton warned against cutting

international assistance funding and withdrawing from the world.¶ "There have always been

moments of temptation in our country to resist obligations beyond our borders. But

each time we have shrunk from global leadership, events have summoned us back,

often cruelly, to reality. We saved money in the short term when we walked away from Afghanistan

after the Cold War. But those savings came at an unspeakable cost – one we are still paying, ten years

later, in money and lives," she told the House Foreign Affairs Committee on March 1.



XT – No Spillover

Latin American governments thinking USAID is destabilizing—Bolivia proves

Germanos 5/2—staff writer for Common Dreams (“Bolivia's Booting of USAID 'No Surprise': President

Evo Morales expels USAID from country following years of fomenting opposition”, Andrea, 2013,

https://www.commondreams.org/headline/2013/05/02-7) EL

Following President Evo Morales' expulsion of United States Agency for International

Development (USAID) from Bolivia on Wednesday, some analysts are saying the only

surprising thing about the news is in how long it took.¶ (Photo: ABI)¶ Making the

announcement at a May Day rally in La Paz, Morales accused the U.S. of conspiring against hisgovernment, and said, “Some institutions of the United States Embassy continue to conspire against

this process, against the people and especially against the country.”¶ This is why “We have decided

to expel USAID from Bolivia.”¶ He also called USAID an "instrument that still has a

mentality of domination," La Prensa reports.¶ But USAID's involvement in Bolivia has been

questionable for years.¶ Writing in The Americas Blog, Center for Economic and Policy Research's

Jake Johnston points out that¶ The role of USAID in Bolivia has been a primary point of

contention between the U.S. and Bolivia dating back to at least 2006. State Department

spokesperson Patrick Ventrell characterized Morales’ statement as “baseless allegations.” While State

Department spokespeople and many commentators will characterize USAID's work with oppositional

groups as appropriate, a look at the agency's work over the past decade paints a very

different picture.¶ Documents obtained by investigative journalist Jeremy Bigwood show that as early

as 2002, USAID funded a “Political Party Reform Project,” which sought to “serve as a

counterweight to the radical MAS *Morales’ political party+ or its successors.” Later USAID

began a program “to provide support to fledgling regional governments,” some of which

were pushing for regional autonomy and were involved in the September 2008

destabilization campaign that left some 20 indigenous Bolivians dead. Meanwhile, the U.S. has

continually refused to disclose the recipients of aid funds. As a recent CEPR report on USAIDactivities in Haiti concluded, U.S. aid often goes into a “black box” where it becomes impossible to

determine who the ultimate recipients actually are.¶ Damning information about USAID's role in Bolivia

was also revealed in cables brought to light by WikiLeaks, as Johnston notes:¶ In one cable written by

Ambassador Greenlee from January 2006, just months after Morales’ election, he notes that “U.S.

assistance, the largest of any bilateral donor by a factor of three, is often hidden by our

use of third parties to dispense aid with U.S. funds.” In the same cable, Greenlee acknowledges

https://www.commondreams.org/headline/2013/05/02-7





that “*m]any USAID-administered economic programs run counter to the direction the

GOB *Government of Bolivia+ wishes to move the country.” ¶ The cable goes on to outline a

“carrot and sticks” approach to the new Bolivian government, outlining possible actions to be taken to

pressure the government to take “positive policy actions.” Three areas where the U.S. would focus were

on coca policy, the nationalization of hydrocarbons (which “would have a negative impact on U.S.

investors”) and the forming of the constituent assembly to write a new constitution. Possible sticks

included; using veto authority within the Inter-American Development Bank to oppose loans to Bolivia,

postponing debt cancellation and threatening to suspend trade benefits.¶ Another cable, also written by

Greenlee, reporting on a meeting between U.S. officials and the Morales government notes that the

Ambassador stated in the meeting, “When you think of the IDB, you should think of the U.S….This is not

blackmail, it is simple reality.”¶ Later cables, as reported by Green Left Weekly, show the U.S. role in

fomenting dissent within indigenous groups and other social movements.¶ Given this history, then, the

question may be "not why, but why not sooner":¶ The AP spoke with Kathryn Ledebur of the Andean

Information Network, reporting that she “was not surprised by the expulsion itself but by the fact that

Morales took so long to do it after repeated threats.” Given the amount of evidence indeclassified documents that point to U.S. aid funds going to opposition groups and being

used to bolster opposition to the Morales government, the expulsion indeed comes as

little surprise.

Lack of transparency and economic growth make USAID unnecessary for Latin

American countries

Fortin 5/2— world politics reporter at the International Business Times (“Bolivian President

Morales Shuns USAID: Why He May Not Need The Money”, 2013, Jacey, http://www.ibtimes.com/bolivian-president-

morales-shuns-usaid-why-he-may-not-need-money-1231287) EL

Bolivian President Evo Morales sparked controversy on Wednesday when he called for the U.S. Agency

for International Development, or USAID, to leave his country.¶ The statement came during a May Day rally in La Paz, the

Bolivian seat of government. Morales, who leads the Movimiento al Socialismo, or MAS, has long accused the U.S. government of conspiringagainst his leftist administration.¶ “They might think that they can manipulate us economically and

politically here, but that is no longer the case,” he said to the crowds gathered outside of his presidential palace.¶

“The U.S. is still conspiring -- that is why we have decided to expel USAID of Bolivia .”¶

American State Department officials have denied Morales’ claims, calling them “baseless allegations.” But rumors of clandestine

U.S. efforts to destabilize the Bolivian government have been circulating for years,

http://www.ibtimes.com/bolivian-president-morales-shuns-usaid-why-he-may-not-need-money-1231287








lending some credence to the president’s suspicions .¶ A Falling Out¶ Bolivia and the United States have had a

tense relationship since Morales was first elected in 2006. The American ambassador Philip Goldberg and other officials were expelled from the

country in 2008, and Bolivia’s ambassador Gustavo Guzman was sent home from Washington in retaliation. Full diplomatic ties

have since been restored, but the two ambassadors have yet to be re-exchanged. ¶ At the

heart of ongoing disputes is the coca plant, whose leaves are traditionally chewed by Bolivian indigenous groups; Morales himself once

cultivated the crop as a farmer. But coca is a primary ingredient in cocaine, and U.S. officials have sought to curb production of the stimulant as

part of Washington’s war on drugs.¶ Official assistance from the United States to Bolivia has been on

the decline. In 2011, the last year on record with USAID data, aid disbursements to

Bolivia totaled more than $96 million. That’s down from the $131.1 million disbursed in

2008, the year relations fell apart following the ambassador expulsions.¶ Though he has not made it official by notifying USAID itself,

Morales seems prepared to renounce that assistance on the basis of Washington’s

opposition toward his own administration.¶ “There’s been a number of declassified documents that came out, which

point to a long history of efforts to undermine and limit the influence of the MAS political party,” said Jake Johnston, a research associate with

the Center for Economic and Policy Research. “This dates back to well before Morales was elected.”¶ In 2008, for instance, ABC News published

statements from an American Fulbright scholar in Bolivia who said that U.S. embassy officials had asked him to provide information on any

Venezuelan or Cuban nationals he might come across in Bolivia. Peace Corps volunteers had reportedly received similar requests a year earlier.

American officials deny those claims.¶ Wikileaks cables from 2009 show U.S. antipathy toward the

constitution that was implemented under Morales in 2009, and toward the MAS party, which would go on

to sweep general elections later that year.¶ Another cable from 2006, just after Morales was first elected, reveals then-Ambassador David

Greenlee acknowledging that “many USAID-administered economic programs run counter to the direction the [government] wishes to move

the country.”¶ USAID’s own data are too vague to shed much light on these implications. Official records name the sectors and agencies that

implement American disbursements in Bolivia and other recipient countries, but they do not break the information down further to reveal the

precise recipients of development monies.¶ “This gets to a larger issue with USAID: a lack of transparency

on who’s getting the funding,” Johnston said.¶ Changing Dynamics¶ If Morales follows through on his threat to expel the aid

organization, Bolivia stands to forfeit tens of thousands of dollars of American assistance funding on an annual basis.¶ That could have serious

consequences for one of South America’s poorest countries, where about 26 percent of the population lives below the poverty line.¶ Then

again, Bolivia’s economy has been doing well in recent years. It has enjoyed seven

consecutive years of fiscal surplus, and the administration expects GDP to grow by 5.5

percent in 2013 to hit a record $28.7 billion.¶ This growth is fueled in large part by

growing domestic demand for goods and a shrinking wealth gap. That’s not to say the

administration’s fiscal policies are entirely sound; the country is still vulnerable due to high dependence on

volatile mining and oil revenues, and extreme poverty still affects rural areas. But Bolivia’s ongoing growth is

promising. A loss of USAID assistance would be detrimental, but not insurmountable.¶ In

the end, Morales’ call to cut USAID could be little more than an empty threat -- an effort to get the organization in line with his own objectives.

The president has called for its expulsion once before, in 2011. But given the suspicions surrounding USAID in

Bolivia, combined with shrinking disbursements during a time of unprecedented

economic growth in the South American country, Morales’ ideas about ending the

assistance program aren’t as outlandish as they once were.



Bolivia is just one example— ALBA countries and Russia

Achtenberg 5/11— urban planner and a former NACLA Research Associate with a focus

on Latin American social movements and progressive governments ( Emily, 2013, “Bolivia: USAID Out,

Morales In For Re-Election Bid”, http://nacla.org/blog/2013/5/11/bolivia-usaid-out-morales-re-election-bid) EL

On May 1, President Evo Morales expelled USAID from Bolivia for allegedly fomenting divisions within the country’s social movements in order

to destabilize his government. The announcement came just days after Bolivia’s Constitutional

Tribunal ruled that Morales can run for a third presidential term in 2014. The well-timed

decisions could have important implications for Bolivia's political future.¶ 1767¶ Morales expels USAID.

Credit: La Razón.¶ While USAID has funded health, educational, agricultural, and environmental projects in Bolivia for 50 years, its political

agenda has long been suspect, especially in relation to Morales. As Kathryn Ledebur of Bolivia’s Andean Information Network notes, the

agency’s alternative development programs in the Chapare region during the 1990s required coca growers to eradicate their crops and

abandon their unions before receiving assistance, working to undermine the cocalero movement headed by Morales. In 2002, USAID funded a

political project to counter Morales’s incipient MAS (Movement Toward Socialism) party.¶ After Morales’s election, USAID

funding for “democracy promotion” bolstered pro-autonomy regional governments in

the eastern lowlands that formed the core of the conservative opposition , working to destabilize

the MAS government. These activities prompted Morales to expel the U.S. ambassador to Bolivia in 2008, followed by the DEA (Drug

Enforcement Agency) in 2009. USAID was ousted from the Chapare in 2008. ¶ More recently, MAS government officials have accused USAID of

funding popular organizations that oppose Morales’s policies, including the lowlands indigenous federation that has spearheaded resistance to

the proposed TIPNIS highway. For indigenous groups, these accusations are a tactic to delegitimize social protest activities. Critics note that a

wide range of organizations and programs in Bolivia, including the official Coordinating Unit for the Constituent Assembly (which drafted the

2009 Constitution) have benefitted from USAID funding, while maintaining their political independence. Says ex-Minister of Education Félix

Patzi, “Accusing international organizations is a way of avoiding the conflict between the Bolivian government and social and labororganizations, and shows a lack of political clarity.”¶ While the government has not tied the rupture to any

specific recent incident, it has alluded generally to eight projects, identified in 2011, in

which USAID allegedly conspired to divide social sectors against Morales. For its part, USAID

has denied all accusations of political interference.1769¶ USAID expelled from Chapare, 2008. Credit: Página

Siete.¶ The lack of transparency and accountability in USAID funding has been a long-

standing bone of contention. In November 2011, the United States and Bolivia signed a much-heralded “framework

agreement” restoring diplomatic ties between the two countries and purporting to establish a new collaborative direction for assistance based

on mutual respect for national sovereignty. The status of this agreement is now uncertain. ¶ Given this legacy of mistrust, recent commentators

have suggested that the question is not why Morales expelled USAID, but why he did not do it sooner. The more relevant question for Bolivia is,

why did he do it just now? ¶ For one thing, the timing was propitious internationally . Last June, following thecoup in Paraguay, the ALBA group of nations signed a declaration advocating the

expulsion of USAID by their member governments . In October, Russia ousted USAID for

alleged political interference. Secretary of State John Kerry’s infamous reference to Latin America

as the United States' “backyard” revived a wave of anti-imperialist outrage throughout

the region. ¶ For another, with USAID funding now drastically reduced—from $92 million in 2008 to an

http://nacla.org/blog/2013/5/11/bolivia-usaid-out-morales-re-election-bid






estimated $14 million in 2014 (for both political and economic reasons)—the financial impact of the rupture will be

relatively minimal. Morales has promised to absorb the cost of USAID’s social programs.

Given the current strength of Bolivia’s economy, which has enjoyed seven consecutive

years of fiscal surplus, this commitment seems feasible.

Anti-American political pressures

Achtenberg 5/11— urban planner and a former NACLA Research Associate with a focus

on Latin American social movements and progressive governments ( Emily, 2013, “Bolivia: USAID Out,

Morales In For Re-Election Bid”, http://nacla.org/blog/2013/5/11/bolivia-usaid-out-morales-re-election-bid) EL

1770¶ Credit: La Razón.¶ Most important, now that the Constitutional Tribunal has cleared the way for

Morales to run for a third term in December 2014, Bolivia is in full presidential campaign

mode. Stoking the fires of nationalism against an internationalist threat—real or

imagined—is a time-honored electoral strategy in Bolivia (and elsewhere).¶ Recent charges by a

prominent MAS deputy that USAID is promoting and financing a united opposition bloc

for the 2014 elections are certainly plausible , though no evidence has been offered. Still, as ex-MAS cabinet minister Alejandro Almaraz argues, expelling an agency that is merely a shadow of

its former self may be little more than a show of “symbolic anti-imperialism.” (The Economist

reports that USAID was already planning to close its monumental offices in La Paz and operate through a skeleton staff in the U.S. Embassy.)¶ In

any case, the expulsion of USAID also provides a convenient distraction from the Constitutional Tribunal’s

decision, which itself has been controversial. The court ruled that Morales could seek a third consecutive term, even though the 2009

Constitution allows only two, on the grounds that his first election (in 2004) took place under a previous constitution. The ruling dismissed a

clause in the new Constitution stating that any prior mandate must be taken into account in computing the allowable term. This transitional

provision, the court reasoned, does not apply to Morales because his original mandate did not carry over into the new Constitution (instead,

Morales cut his first term short by one year and was re-elected in 2009 under the new Constitutional regime).







status quo power. Since the Cold War's end, notes Walt (2005: 23), 'The United States has not acted as a "status quo" power: rather, it has used its position of primacy to increase its influence,

to enhance its position vis-a-vis potential rivals, and to deal with specific security threats' (see also Sestanovich 2005).

The claim of soft power proponents that the USA — until the George W. Bush administration — preferred to act multilaterally is a myth — not fact. Although that administration was more

inept diplomatically than many of its predecessors, the substance of its policy was the same: the USA acts multilaterally when it can (i.e. when others support US policies), and unilaterally

when it decides that it must, which is much of the time.18 Following World War II, the USA created a web of security and economic institutions to solidify its hegemony in the non-Soviet world

and promote its grand strategic ambitions. Some scholars — John Ikenberry (2000) is a leading example — depict this as an example of benevolent US soft power, but the USA undertook these

policies to advance its hard power — geopolitical — interests. Specifically, it did so to avail itself of its allies' strategic resources (and keep them from drifting into the Soviet sphere). However,

the USA never intended that it should itself be constrained by these institutions — and it seldom has been.19

All post-1945 US administrations 'have believed that the only way' the USA could attain its most critical grand strategic goals 'was to keep others from having too much influence' on its policies

(Sestanovich 2005: 13). In the Suez, Berlin and Cuban missile crises, and during the Vietnam War, the USA acted unilaterally. Similarly, according to Stephen Sestanovich, it also did during the

Euromissile crisis of the early 1980s and during the negotiations on German reunification.20 And although the US -led NATO interventions in Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999 may have

appeared to be — and certainly were depicted rhetorically by Washington as — multilateral actions, they were not. As Walt (2005: 46) observes, [end page 61] 'America's European allies

complained during both episodes, but could do little to stop the United States from imposing its preferences upon them'. In truth, whenever they felt that US interests required doing so,

preceding administrations acted no less unilaterally than did the Bush administration in deciding (foolishly) to invade Iraq in March 2003.21

There is no compelling reason to believe that multilateralism legitimizes US hegemony. There is a big

gap between the way soft power advocates depict American foreign policy behaviour and the way the

USA actually acts. Other states know that the USA (like all dominant great powers) habitually acts unilaterally when it

feels that its interests require it to do so. Hence, they are unlikely to be reassured that US hegemonic

power is benign. In other words, soft power is not very effective as means of preventing other states from

opposing the policies of a hegemonic USA.



XT – Hard Power Key

Hard power is key to US influence globally

Kaplan 5/22-- Chief Geopolitical Analyst at Stratfor (“The Virtues Of Hard Power”, Robert D., 2013,

http://www.forbes.com/sites/stratfor/2013/05/22/the-virtues-of-hard-power/) EL

Hard power has not been in vogue since the Iraq War turned badly in about 2004. In foreign policy

journals and at elite conferences, the talk for years has been about “soft power,” “the power of

persuasion” and the need to revitalize the U.S. State Department as opposed to the Pentagon: didn’t

you know, it’s about diplomacy, not military might! Except when it isn’t; except when

members of this same elite argue for humanitarian intervention in places like Libya andSyria. Then soft power be damned.¶ The fact is that hard power is supremely necessary in

today’s world, for reasons having nothing to do with humanitarian intervention. Indeed, the Harvard

professor and former government official, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., who, in 2004, actually coined the term

“soft power” in an eponymous book, has always been subtle enough in his own thinking to realize how

relevant hard power remains.¶ As I write, the two areas of the world that are most important in terms of

America’s long-term economic and political interests — Asia and Europe — are undergoing power shifts.

The growth of Chinese air and naval power is beginning to rearrange the correlation of

forces in Asia, while the weakening of the European Union in geopolitical terms – because

of its ongoing fiscal crisis — is providing an opportunity for a new Russian sphere ofinfluence to emerge in Central and Eastern Europe. Of course, both challenges require robust

diplomacy on America’s part. But fundamentally what they really require is a steadfast

commitment of American hard power. And the countries in these two most vital regions are not

bashful about saying so.¶ Security officials in countries as diverse as Japan and Poland,

Vietnam and Romania desperately hope that all this talk about American soft power

overtaking American hard power is merely that — talk. For it is American warships and

ground forces deployments that matter most to these countries and their officials.

Indeed, despite the disappointing conclusions to the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, rarely before has

American hard power been so revered in places that actually matter.¶ Asia is the world’s demographicand economic hub, as well as the region where the great sea lines of communication coalesce. And

unless China undergoes a profound political and economic upheaval — of a degree not yet on the

horizon — the Middle Kingdom will present the United States with its greatest 21st century competitor.

In the face of China’s military rise, Japan is shedding its quasi-pacifistic orientation and adopting a

positive attitude toward military expansion. In a psychological sense, Japan no longer takes the

American air and naval presence in Northeast Asia for granted. It actively courts

http://www.forbes.com/sites/stratfor/2013/05/22/the-virtues-of-hard-power/





American hard power in the face of a territorial dispute with China over islands in the East China

Sea. Japan knows that, ultimately, it is only American hard power that can balance against

China in the region. For South Korea, too, American hard power is critical . Though the

South Korean military can ably defend itself against North Korea’s, again, it is America’s air and

naval presence in the region that provides for a favorable balance of power that defendsSeoul against Pyongyang and its ally in Beijing. As for Taiwan, its very existence as a

state depends on the American military’s Pacific presence.¶ Don’t tell officials in the

Philippines that American hard power is any less relevant than in previous decades. Like Japan, after

years of taking the U.S. Navy and Air Force for granted, Manila is literally desperate for American

military support and presence against China, with which it disputes potentially resource-

rich islands and geographical features in the South China Sea. Like Japan and South Korea,

the Philippines is a formal treaty ally of the United States: that is to say, these countries

matter. As for Taiwan, it is arguably one of the finest examples of a functioning democracy in the world

beyond the West, as well as geopolitically vital because of its position on the main sea lines of

communication. Thus, Taiwan too, matters greatly.¶ Vietnam, for its part, has emerged as a

critical de facto ally of the United States. It is the single most important Southeast Asian

country preventing China’s domination of the strategically crucial South China Sea. And

what is Vietnam doing? It is refitting Cam Ranh Bay as a deep-water harbor, officially to

attract navies from India, Russia and elsewhere; but especially to attract the U.S. Navy.¶

Malaysia plays down its close relationship with the United States, as part of a delicate diplomatic minuet

to get along with both China and the Muslim world. Nevertheless, the number of visits of

American warships to Malaysian ports has jumped from three annually in 2003 to wellover 50. As for Singapore, one of its diplomats told me: “We see American hard power as

benign. The U.S. Navy defends globalization by protecting the sea lanes, which we, more

than any other people, benefit from. To us, there is nothing dark or conspiratorial about the

United States and its vast security apparatus.”¶ In 1998, the Singaporeans built Changi Naval Base solely

to host American nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and submarines. In 2011, there were 150 American

warship visits to Singapore. Then there are the four American littoral combat ships that, it was

announced in 2011, would be stationed in Singapore.¶ At the other end of Eurasia, whatever their public

comments, diplomats from countries in Central and Eastern Europe are worried about any American

shift away from hard power. In the 1990s, the security situation looked benevolent to them. They were

in the process of joining NATO and the European Union, even as Russia was weakened by chaos under

Boris Yeltsin’s undisciplined rule. Following centuries of interminable warfare, they were finally escaping

history, in other words. Now NATO and the European Union — so vigorous and formidable in the

1990s – look fundamentally infirm. Meanwhile, Russia has been, for the moment, revitalized

through a combination of natural gas revenues and Vladimir Putin‘s dynamic authoritarianism-lite.

Russia once again beckons on the doorstep of Europe, and the Poles, Romanians and others are



scared.¶ Forget NATO. With declining defense budgets of almost all European member

states, NATO is to be taken less and less seriously. The Poles, Romanians and so on now

require unilateral U.S. hard power. For years already, the Poles and Romanians have been

participating in U.S. military missions in Afghanistan, Iraq and sub-Saharan Africa. They have been doing

so much less because they actually believe in those missions, but in order to prove their mettle asreliable allies of the United States — so that the United States military will be there for them in any

future hour of need.¶ As for the Middle East, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries

all desperately require U.S. hard power: If not specifically for an attack on Iran’s nuclear

facilities, then certainly in order to promote a balance of power unfavorable to Iran’s

regional hegemony.¶ Soft power became a trendy concept in the immediate wake of America’s

military overextension in Iraq and Afghanistan. But soft power was properly meant as a critical

accompaniment to hard power and as a shift in emphasis away from hard power, not as a replacement

for it. Hard power is best employed not when America invades a country with its ground troops but

when it daily projects military might over vast swaths of the earth, primarily with air and naval assets, in

order to protect U.S. allies, world trade and a liberal maritime order. American hard power, thus, must

never go out of fashion.

Empirics prove hard power is more influential than soft power

Kagan 12-- American historian, author and foreign policy commentator at the Brookings Institution,

co-founder of the Project for the New American Century (Robert, 2/2, “The importance of U.S. military

might shouldn’t be underestimated”, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-02-

02/opinions/35445829_1_soft-power-hard-power-military-power) EL

These days “soft” power and “smart” power are in vogue (who wants to make the case for

“dumb” power?) while American “hard” power is on the chopping block. This is, in part, a symbolic

sacrifice to the fiscal crisis — even though the looming defense cuts are a drop in the bucket compared

with the ballooning entitlement spending that is not being cut. And partly this is the Obama

administration’s election-year strategy of playing to a presumably war-weary nation.¶ But there is a

theory behind all this: The United States has relied too much on hard power for too

long, and to be truly effective in a complex, modern world, the United States needs to

emphasize other tools. It must be an attractive power, capable of persuading rather than

compelling. It must convene and corral both partners and non-partners, using economic, diplomatic and

other means to “leverage” American influence.¶ These are sensible arguments. Power takes many forms,

and it’s smart to make use of all of them. But there is a danger in taking this wisdom too far

http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-02-02/opinions/35445829_1_soft-power-hard-power-military-power








and forgetting just how important U.S. military power has been in building and

sustaining the present liberal international order.¶ That order has rested significantly on

the U.S. ability to provide security in parts of the world , such as Europe and Asia, that had

known endless cycles of warfare before the arrival of the United States. The world’s free-trade,

free-market economy has depended on America’s ability to keep trade routes open,even during times of conflict. And the remarkably wide spread of democracy around the

world owes something to America’s ability to provide support to democratic forces

under siege and to protect peoples from dictators such as Moammar Gaddafi and Slobodan

Milosevic. Some find it absurd that the United States should have a larger military than the next 10

nations combined. But that gap in military power has probably been the greatest factor in

upholding an international system that, in historical terms, is unique — and uniquely

beneficial to Americans.¶ Nor should we forget that this power is part of what makes America

attractive to many other nations. The world has not always loved America. During the

era of Vietnam and Watergate and the ugly last stand of segregationists, America was often

hated. But nations that relied on the United States for security from threatening

neighbors tended to overlook the country’s flaws . In the 1960s, millions of young

Europeans took to the streets to protest American “imperialism,” while their

governments worked to ensure that the alliance with the United States held firm.¶ Soft

power, meanwhile, has its limits. No U.S. president has enjoyed more international

popularity than Woodrow Wilson did when he traveled to Paris to negotiate the treaty ending

World War I. He was a hero to the world, but he found his ability to shape the peace, and

to establish the new League of Nations, severely limited, in no small part by hiscountrymen’s refusal to commit U.S. military power to the defense of the peace. John F.

Kennedy, another globally admired president, found his popularity of no use in his

confrontations with Nikita Khrushchev, who, by Kennedy’s own admission, “beat the hell

out of me” and who may have been convinced by his perception of Kennedy’s weakness

that the United States would tolerate his placing Soviet missiles in Cuba.

¶ The international system is not static. It responds quickly to fluctuations in power. If the United States

were to cut too deeply into its ability to project military power, other nations could be counted on to

respond accordingly. Those nations whose power rises in relative terms would display expanding

ambitions commensurate with their new clout in the international system. They would, as in the past,demand particular spheres of influence. Those whose power declined in relative terms, like the United

States, would have little choice but to cede some influence in those areas. Thus China would lay claim to

its sphere of influence in Asia, Russia in eastern Europe and the Caucasus. And, as in the past, these

burgeoning great-power claims would overlap and conflict: India and China claim the same sphere in the

Indian Ocean; Russia and Europe have overlapping spheres in the region between the Black Sea and the

Baltic. Without the United States to suppress and contain these conflicting ambitions, there would have



to be complex adjustments to establish a new balance. Some of these adjustments could be made

through diplomacy, as they were sometimes in the past. Other adjustments might be made through war

or the threat of war, as also happened in the past.¶ The biggest illusion is to imagine that as American

power declines, the world stays the same.¶ What has been true since the time of Rome remains true

today: There can be no world order without power to preserve it, to shape its norms,

uphold its institutions, defend the sinews of its economic system and keep the peace.

Military power can be abused, wielded unwisely and ineffectively. It can be deployed to answer

problems that it cannot answer or that have no answer. But it is also essential. No nation or

group of nations that renounced power could expect to maintain any kind of world

order. If the United States begins to look like a less reliable defender of the present order, that order

will begin to unravel. People might indeed find Americans very attractive in this weaker

state, but if the United States cannot help them when and where they need help the

most, they will make other arrangements.



XT – Alt Cause – Embargo

Cuban embargo kills soft power—UN vote proves

MacFARQUHAR 09-- United Nations bureau chief of The New York Times (“U.S. Embargo on Cuba

Again Finds Scant Support at U.N.”, Neil, 10/28,http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/29/world/americas/29nations.html?_r=0) EL

UNITED NATIONS — The General Assembly voted overwhelmingly on Wednesday to condemn the

American trade embargo against Cuba, with the speeches by the United States ambassador and Cuba’s

foreign minister reflecting that little has changed despite an expected shift under the Obama

administration. Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez Parilla of Cuba spoke after a United Nations vote

overwhelmingly condemned the embargo. The nonbinding resolution has been an annual ritual for 18

years. The vote this time of 187 in support, 3 opposed and 2 abstaining underlined the utter lack of

support for the 50-year-old American attempt to isolate Cuba. (Israel and Palau joined the United States,

while the Marshall Islands and Micronesia abstained.) The Cuban foreign minister, Bruno Rodríguez

Parilla, noted that while President Obama had taken steps to ease strained relations, many Bush-era

policies remained intact, including barring the export of medical equipment and pursuing fines against

companies all over the world that do business with Havana. The United States has lifted some

restrictions in recent months on Cuban-Americans visiting relatives or sending money, and opened the

path for food and telecommunications companies to trade. But in September Mr. Obama extended the

trade embargo for another year. “The economic blockade has not met, nor will it meet, its purpose of

bending the patriotic determination of the Cuban people,” Mr. Rodríguez said. “But it generates

shortages,” he added. “It is, no doubt, the fundamental obstacle that hinders the economicdevelopment of our country.” Susan E. Rice, the American ambassador to the United Nations, said the

resolution ignored the oppression that she called the real cause of Cubans’ suffering. “The Cuban

government’s airtight restrictions on internationally recognized social, political and economic freedoms

are the main source of deprivation and the primary obstacle to development in Cuba,” she said. Ms. Rice

called it regrettable that Cuba had not made any move to reciprocate the “important steps” taken by

the Obama administration. Analysts said Mr. Obama had not gone nearly as far as some of his

Democratic predecessors in changing the restrictions on Cuba. Under President Bill Clinton there were

extensive academic and artistic exchanges, while President Jimmy Carter lifted the travel ban entirely.

The problem, said Julie E. Sweig of the Council on Foreign Relations, is that the two sides tend to talk

past each other. For the United States, reciprocating would mean implementing greater civil rights inCuba and freeing political prisoners, she said. The Cuban foreign minister noted in his speech that his

country had already responded by proposing ways to improve bilateral ties. Mr. Obama has said that the

embargo will be maintained until Cuba eases its domestic oppression, but that he wants to “recast” the

relationship.’

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/29/world/americas/29nations.html?_r=0

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/29/world/americas/29nations.html?_r=0



The embargo is incredibly unpopular even with close US allies- UN proves

Charbonneau 12-- Bureau Chief, United Nations for Reuters (Louis, “U.N. urges end to U.S. Cuba

embargo for 21st year”, 11/13, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/13/us-cuba-embargo-un-idUSBRE8AC11820121113) EL

(Reuters) - Repeating an annual ritual, the U.N. General Assembly called on Tuesday for the United

States to lift its trade embargo against Cuba, whose foreign minister said the blockade against the

communist-run island was tantamount to "genocide." For the 21st year, the assembly's vote was

overwhelming, with 188 nations - including most of Washington's closest allies - supporting the embargo

resolution, a result virtually unchanged from last year. Israel, heavily dependent on U.S. backing in the

Middle East, and the tiny Pacific state of Palau were the only two countries that supported the United

States in opposing the non-binding resolution in the 193-nation assembly. The Pacific states of theMarshall Islands and Micronesia abstained. President Barack Obama further loosened curbs last year on

U.S. travel and remittances to Cuba. He had said he was ready to change Cuba policy but was still

waiting for signals from Havana, such as the release of political prisoners and guarantees of basic human

rights. But Obama has not lifted the five-decade-old trade embargo, and the imprisonment of a U.S.

contractor in Cuba has halted the thaw in Cuban-U.S. relations. Havana's Foreign Minister Bruno

Rodriguez told the assembly that Cuba had high hopes for Obama when he was first elected in 2008 and

welcomed his calls for change. But he said the result had been disappointing. "The reality is that the last

four years have been characterized by the persistent tightening of ... the embargo," he said. 'EXTERNAL

SCAPEGOAT' Rodriguez said the "extraterritoriality" of the blockade measures - the fact that Washington

pressures other countries to adhere to the U.S. embargo - violates international law. He added that the

blockade is not in U.S. interests and harms its credibility. "It leads the U.S. to adopt costly double

standards," he said, adding that the embargo has failed to achieve its objectives of pressuring the

government to introduce economic and political freedoms and comply with international human rights

standards. "There is no legitimate or moral reason to maintain this embargo that is anchored in the Cold

War," he said. He said it qualified as a "act of genocide" against Cuba and was a "massive, flagrant and

systematic violation of the human rights of an entire people." U.S. envoy Ronald Godard rejected the

resolution's call for ending the blockade and Cuba's allegation that the United States was to blame for

Cuban financial difficulties. He added that the government in Havana was putting the brakes on Cuba's

further development, not the United States. "It is the Cuban government that continues to deprive them

of that aspiration," he said, adding that Cuba was seeking an "external scapegoat for the island's

economic problems." Godard said Washington was not punishing the Cuban people. He said $2 billion in

remittances were sent from the United States to Cuba last year, while Washington had authorized over

$1.2 billion in humanitarian assistance. He repeated Washington's calls for Cuba to "immediately release

Mr. (Alan) Gross," a U.S. contractor serving a 15-year sentence in Cuba for setting up Internet networks,

work that a judge said was a crime against the Cuban state. Gross' imprisonment halted efforts by

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/13/us-cuba-embargo-un-idUSBRE8AC11820121113







Obama to improve long-hostile relations between the United States and Cuba. Rodriguez received a

resounding ovation after his speech. No one applauded Godard as the assembly proceeded to the vote.

It’s especially key to influence in Latin America

Goodman 09-- Bloomberg reporter responsible for economic and political coverage in Latin America

(Joshua, 4/13, “Latin America to Push Obama on Cuba Embargo at Summit (Update1)”,

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a0_zyWMi297I&refer=uk) EL

April 13 (Bloomberg) -- When Barack Obama arrives at the fifth Summit of the Americas this week, Cuba

will be at the heart of the U.S. relationship with the rest of the hemisphere, exactly as it has been for

half a century. While Latin American leaders split on many issues, they agree that Obama should lift the

47-year-old U.S. trade embargo on Cuba. From Venezuelan socialist Hugo Chavez to Mexico’s pro-business Felipe Calderon, leaders view a change in policy toward Cuba as a starting point for reviving

U.S. relations with the region, which are at their lowest point in two decades. Obama, born six months

before President John F. Kennedy imposed the embargo, isn’t prepared to support ending it. Instead,

he’ll seek to satisfy the leaders at the April 17-19 summit in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, with less

ambitious steps disclosed by the administration today -- repealing restrictions on family visits and

remittances imposed by former President George W. Bush. That would mesh with his stated goal of

changing the perception of “U.S. arrogance” that he attributed to his predecessor in his sole policy

speech on the region last May. “All of Latin America and the Caribbean are awaiting a change in policy

toward Cuba,” Jose Miguel Insulza, Secretary General of the Washington-based Organization of

American States, said in an interview. “They value what Obama has promised, but they want more.” Thepolicy changes unveiled today also include an expanded list of items that can be shipped to the island,

and a plan to allow U.S. telecommunications companies to apply for licenses in Cuba. Symbolically

Important Cuba, the only country in the hemisphere excluded from the 34-nation summit, is

symbolically important to the region’s leaders, many of whom entered politics under military regimes

and looked to Cuba and its longtime leader Fidel Castro, 82, for inspiration and support. Even though

most countries shun the communist policies of Castro and his brother, now-President Raul Castro, the

U.S. alone in the hemisphere rejects diplomatic and trade relations with the island. “Cuba represents a

50-year policy failure in Latin America and that’s why it’s so important for Obama to address it now,”

says Wayne Smith, a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy in Washington, who headed the

State Department’s Cuba interest section in Havana from 1979-1982. “Unless Obama wants to be booedoff the stage, he better come with fresh ideas.” The U.S. president, 47, thinks it would be “unfortunate”

if Cuba is the principal theme at the summit and would prefer the session focus instead on the economy,

poverty and the environment, says Jeffrey Davidow, the White House’s top adviser for the meeting.

Obama also understands that he can’t control the discussion and intends to deal with the other leaders

as partners, Davidow told reporters on April 6. Past Protests That should be enough to avoid a repeat of

the circus atmosphere surrounding the previous summit, held in 2005 in Argentina, when 30,000

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a0_zyWMi297I&refer=uk

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a0_zyWMi297I&refer=uk



protesters led by Chavez and Argentine soccer legend Diego Maradona burned an effigy of Bush. Obama

will also benefit from the U.S.’s decision to take off the table its earlier proposal for a free-trade area

spanning the Americas, an issue that divided countries at the four previous summits starting in 1994.

Still, Obama’s meeting with Chavez, who last month called the U.S. president an “ignoramus” when it

comes to Latin America, has the potential to generate a few sparks. To defuse the tension, Obama may

say the U.S. is seeking good relations with governments across the political spectrum, says Peter Hakim,president of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington-based research group. Chavez, 54, joined

Bolivian President Evo Morales, an ally, in expelling the U.S. ambassadors to their countries in

September for alleged interference in domestic politics. ‘Unpredictable’ Chavez “The main concern at

this point for the U.S. is the unpredictability of Chavez,” Hakim says. U.S. influence in Latin America

waned under Bush as the war on terror diverted attention to the Middle East while the region expanded

economic and diplomatic ties with Russia, China and other outside-the-hemisphere powers. In

December, Brazil hosted the first-ever, region-wide summit of Latin American and Caribbean nations

that excluded the U.S. The summit reinforced other initiatives such as the Union of South American

Nations, which was formed by 12 countries to mediate regional conflicts, bypassing the OAS. Taking the

“minor step” of easing travel restrictions to Cuba, a campaign pledge Obama made almost a year ago,

may not satisfy the region’s increasingly assertive leaders, Julia Sweig, director of the Latin America

program at the Council on Foreign Relations, said in an interview from Washington. ‘A Lot on the Table’

“The Cubans are putting a lot on the table,” says Sweig, the author of two books on Cuba, including the

forthcoming “Cuba: What Everyone Needs to Know.” “The U.S. should test their intentions.” From

Havana to the halls of Congress, momentum for a detente is building. Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana,

the senior Republican on the Foreign Relations Committee, urged Obama last month to begin direct

talks with the Cuban government and end U.S. opposition to its membership in the OAS. Other bills

would lift travel restrictions for all U.S. citizens.



XT – Debt Key

Effectively managing debt is key to promote US soft power

Geewax 12—senior editor, assigning and editing business radio stories, national economics

correspondent for the NPR web site (Marilyn, “Can U.S. Still Lead In Economic And 'Soft' Power?”, 10/22,http://m.npr.org/news/Business/163387838) EL

At Monday night's foreign policy debate, the first round of questions for the presidential candidates will

involve "America's role in the world."¶ The answers from President Obama and former Gov. Mitt

Romney likely will focus on military readiness and anti-terrorism efforts. That's what most Americans

would expect to hear, given that their country has been involved continuously in overseas combat since

the terrorist attacks of 2001.¶ But the U.S. role in the world is shaped by much more than just

its ability to project military might. Leadership also is defined by economic power, aswell as "soft" power — for example, the country's ability to attract and persuade people to adopt

American values, according to Joseph Nye, a Harvard professor.¶ In the early 1990s, Nye's book Bound to

Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power got people talking about the need to further develop

economic and soft power. His ideas got traction because — with the Berlin Wall coming down in 1989 —

many Americans were eager to explore new ways to lead in a post-Cold War era.¶ But after terrorists

slammed airplanes into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on Sept. 11, 2001, the conversation

turned back to military strength. Drones and Humvees seemed far more important than the attractive

powers of Hollywood movies or mobile phones.¶ A Shift Back To Economic Leadership?¶ Now, with the

Iraq War over and U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan winding down, Nye says the focus may be

shifting back to those other two pillars — economic and cultural leadership.¶ "In the 21st century,

the Iraq War caused a big drop in American soft power," Nye said. That's because many

people in other countries saw the United States as being too aggressive, he said.¶ And then

in 2008, when the subprime mortgage crisis hit, U.S. economic power declined too.

Before the financial crisis, "there was the idea that Americans really knew how to run an

economic system," he said. After the crisis, not so much.¶ But now, the wheel is turning again

because both China and Europe are struggling with economic growth.¶ "If you compare us with Europe's

economic system, we're doing pretty well," Nye said. "The dollar is still the safe haven."¶ And U.S college

campuses are bolstering American soft power. "Most Chinese leaders have a kid at a university in the

United States," Nye said. At this point, America is again the soft-power global leader "in everything from

Hollywood to Harvard," he added.¶ Nariman Behravesh, chief economist of the forecasting firm IHS

Global Insight and author of Spin-Free Economics: A No-Nonsense, Nonpartisan Guide to Today's Global

Economic Debates, agreed with Nye that U.S. economic and soft power are coming back.¶ "We still have

the largest economy in the world; we are still the No. 1 export destination; we still have lots of

innovative companies, like Apple; we have the world's reserve currency; we have a dynamic economy,

with oil and gas production increasing," Behravesh said.¶ "We have a lot going for us," he said "We've

http://m.npr.org/news/Business/163387838





got our problems, but others have problems that are as bad or worse, and I include China in that. They

have had a huge deceleration in their growth."¶ Dealing With The Debt¶ But going forward,

America's role in the world will be largely shaped by how well Congress handles the

budget deficit problems in coming months, he said. As other countries, especially in

Europe, grapple with the problem of too much government debt, people around theworld are looking to the United States for moral leadership, he said.¶ If the United States

shows that it's possible for democracies to discipline themselves and control their debts,

then its economic and soft power may surge , Behravesh said.¶ As part of overall U.S.

foreign strategy, "we need to tackle our domestic deficit problem," he said.¶ "If we deal with

it in a constructive way, people will view us favorably," Behravesh said. "It's a manageable problem. We

can do this.



Add-Ons



Bioterror

Empirically denied – 2001 anthrax attacks and Syria dispersion should’ve

spread globally.

No internal link – other routes of bioterrorism can occur – even if they want to

attack the US – dispersion can occur in Mexican soil and spread quote on quote

globally.

No impact to bioweapons.

Leitenberg 05 (Milton, Senior research scholar at the University of Maryland, Trained as a Scientist and Moved into

the Field of Arms Control in 1966, First American Recruited to Work at the Stockholm International Peace Research

Institute, Affiliated with the Swedish Institute of International Affairs and the Center for International Studies PeaceProgram at Cornell University, Senior Fellow at CISSM, ASSESSING THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND BIOTERRORISM

THREAT, http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/assessing_bw_threat.pdf)

The conclusions from these independent studies were uniform and mutually

reinforcing. There is an extremely low incidence of real biological (or chemical)

events, in contrast to the number of hoaxes, the latter spawned by administration and media hype

since 1996 concerning the prospective likelihood and dangers of such events. A massive second wave of

hoaxes followed the anthrax incidents in the United States in October-November 2001, running into

global totals of tens of thousands. It is also extremely important that analysts producing tables

of “biological” events not count hoaxes. A hoax is not a “biological” event, nor is the

word “anthrax” written on a slip of paper the same thing as anthrax, or a pathogen, or a

“demonstration of threat”—all of which various analysts and even government advisory

groups have counted hoaxes as being on one occasion or another .79 Those events that

were real, and were actual examples of use, were overwhelmingly chemical, and even in

that category, involved the use of easily available, off-the-shelf, nonsynthesized

industrial products. Many of these were instances of personal murder, and not

attempts at mass casualty use. The Sands/Monterey compilation indicated that exactlyone person was killed in the United States in the 100 years between 1900 and

2000 as a result of an act of biological or chemical terrorism. Excluding the preparation of

ricin, a plant toxin that is relatively easier to prepare, there are only a few recorded instances in

the years 1900 to 2000 of the preparation or attempted preparation of pathogens in a

private laboratory by a nonstate actor. The significant events to date are : • 1984, the



Democracy

Not key to global democracy – internal link is about local stability – doesn’t

spillover.

No democracy impact.

Rosato, 03 Sebastian, Ph.D. candidate, Political Science Department, UChicago, American Political Science Review, November,

http://journals.cambridge.org/download.php?file=%2FPSR%2FPSR97_04%2FS0003055403000893a.pdf&code=97d5513385df289000

828a47df480146, “The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory,” ADM

Democratic peace theory is probably the most powerful liberal contribution to the debate on the causes

of war and peace. In this paper I examine the causal logics that underpin the theory to determine

whether they offer compelling explanations for the finding of mutual democratic pacifism. I find that

they do not. Democracies do not reliably externalize their domestic norms of conflict resolution and do

not trust or respect one another when their interests clash. Moreover, elected leaders are not especiallyaccountable to peace loving publics or pacific interest groups, democracies are not particularly slow to

mobilize or incapable of surprise attack, and open political competition does not guarantee that a

democracy will reveal private information about its level of resolve thereby avoidingconflict. Since the

evidence suggests that the logics do not operate as stipulated by the theory’s proponents, there are

good reasons to believe that while there is certainly peace among democracies, it may not be caused by

the democratic nature of those states. Democratic peace theory—the claim that democracies rarely

fight one another because they share common norms of live-and-let-live and domestic institutions that

constrain the recourse to war—is probably the most powerful liberal contribution to the debate on the

causes of war and peace.1 If the theory is correct, it has important implications for both the study and

the practice of international politics. Within the academy it undermines both the realist claim that states

are condemned to exist in a constant state of security competition and its assertion that the structure of

the international system, rather than state type, should be central to our understanding of state

behavior. In practical terms democratic peace theory provides the intellectual justification for the belief

that spreading democracy abroad will perform the dual task of enhancing American national security

and promoting world peace. In this article I offer an assessment of democratic peace theory. Specifically,

I examine the causal logics that underpin the theory to determine whether they offer compelling

explanations for why democracies do not fight one another. A theory is comprised of a hypothesis

stipulating an association between an independent and a dependent variable and a causal logic that

explains the connection between those two variables. To test a theory fully, we should determine

whether there is support for the hypothesis, that is, whether there is a correlation between the

independent and the dependent variables and whether there is a causal relationship between them.2

An evaluation of democratic peace theory, then, rests on answering two questions. First, do the data

support the claim that democracies rarely fight each other? Second, is there a compelling explanation

for why this should be the case? Democratic peace theorists have discovered a powerful empirical

generalization: Democracies rarely go to war or engage in militarized disputes with one another.

Although there have been several attempts to challenge these findings (e.g., Farber and Gowa 1997;



Layne 1994; Spiro 1994), the correlations remain robust (e.g., Maoz 1998; Oneal and Russett 1999; Ray

1995; Russett 1993; Weart 1998). Nevertheless, some scholars argue that while there is certainly peace

among democracies, it may be caused by factors other than the democratic nature of those states

(Farber and Gowa 1997; Gartzke 1998; Layne 1994). Farber and Gowa (1997), for example, suggest that

the Cold War largely explains the democratic peace finding. In essence, they are raising doubts about

whether there is a convincing causal logic that explains how democracies interact with each other inways that lead to peace. To resolve this debate, we must take the next step in the testing process:

determining the persuasiveness of the various causal logics offered by democratic peace theorists.

Peace theories not true.

Ostrowski 02, (James Ostrowski is a lawyer and a libertarian author. “The Myth of Democratic

Peace.” http://www.lewrockwell.com/1970/01/james-ostrowski/the-myth-of-democratic-peace/)

We are led to believe that democracy and peace are inextricably linked; that democracy

leads to and causes peace; and that peace cannot be achieved in the absence of

democracy. Woodrow Wilson was one of the earliest and strongest proponents of this view. He said in his "war message" on April 2, 1917: A s teadfast

concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith within it or

observe its covenants. It must be a league of honour, a partnership of opinion. Intrigue would eat its vitals away; the plottings of inner circles who cou ld plan what

they would and render account to no one would be a corruption seated at its very heart. Only free peoples can hold their purpose and their honour steady to a

common end and prefer the interests of mankind to any narrow interest of their own. Spencer R. Weart alleges that democracies rarely if ever go to war with each

other. Even if this is true, it distorts reality and makes people far too sanguine about

democracy’s ability to deliver the world’s greatest need today — peace. In reality, the

main threat to world peace today is not war between two nation-states, but (1) nuclear

arms proliferation; (2) terrorism; and (3) ethnic and religious conflict within states. As this

paper was being written, India, the world’s largest democracy, appeared to be itching to start a war with Pakistan, bringing the world closer to nuclear war than it

has been for many years. The United States, the world’s leading democracy, is waging war in

Afghanistan, which war relates to the second and third threats noted above — terrorism

and ethnic/religious conflict. If the terrorists are to be believed — and why would they

lie?─they struck at the United States on September 11th because of its democratically-

induced interventions into ethnic/religious disputes in their parts of the world. As I shall argue

below, democracy is implicated in all three major threats to world peace and others as well.

The vaunted political machinery of democracy has failed to deliver on its promises. The

United States, the quintessential democracy, was directly or indirectly involved in most

of the major wars in the 20th Century . On September 11, 2001, the 350-year experiment with the modern nation-state ended in

failure. A radical re-thinking of the relationship between the individual and the collective, society and state is urgently required. Our lives depend on it. We

must seriously question whether the primitive and ungainly political technology of



democracy can possibly keep the peace in tomorrow’s world. Thus, a thorough

reconsideration of the relationship between democracy and peace is essential. This

paper makes a beginning in that direction.



Off-Case



Mexican Politics Disad



1NC – Mexican Politics DA

Nieto’s reform agenda will pass but it’s not a done deal – continued Nieto credibility’s

key – solves the economy.

PRS 7/29 (The PRS Group, premier source for global business and economic news, analysis, trends,

forecasts, strategies, and editorials, 7/29/13, “Mexican Energy, Labor and Tax Reforms Could Have

Major Impact,” http://www.manzellareport.com/index.php/economy/714-mexican-energy-labor-and-

tax-reforms-could-have-major-impact)//DR. H

President Enrique Peña Nieto has managed to enlist the backing of both the conservative

PAN and the left-leaning PRD for the reform agenda of his PRI administration. The

unprecedented tripartite alliance, dubbed the “Pact for Mexico,” has agreed to steer a

total of 95 reform initiatives through the 500-member Chamber of Deputies , and has

already delivered in the areas of education, labor-market rules, and telecommunications.

The survival of the partnership is far from assured. Following recent state-level

and municipal elections that were marred by violence and allegations of fraud, the leaders of both

the PAN and the PRD warned that their continued support for Peña Nieto’s agenda

depended on action by the administration to guard against similar problems during

future elections.

However, despite chronic tensions, the reform effort has not lost momentum . The Congress isplanning to hold two special summer sessions to clear the agenda for key tax and energy-

sector reforms that will be presented to lawmakers during the regular fall session.

Approval of the reforms would go a long way toward establishing a solid foundation for long-

term fiscal stability.

The main focus of tax reform will be stemming the losses to the Treasury caused by

loopholes and exemptions, and creating incentives that encourage workers operating in

the informal sector—estimated at 60 percent of the active labor force—to join the formal (and

tax-paying) economy. According to some experts, the government could achieve its target of

boosting the tax take by 6 percent of GDP by focusing its efforts entirely on those two tasks.



Obama-Nieto coop is low now – that’s key to Nieto’s legitimacy, agenda, and Mexican

stability.

LaFranchi 5/2 (Howard, Staff Writer, 5/2/13, “Why Obama won't talk so much about drug war on

Mexico trip,” http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Foreign-Policy/2013/0502/Why-Obama-won-t-talk-so-

much-about-drug-war-on-Mexico-trip-video)//DR. H

President Obama travels to Mexico Thursday with a bilateral agenda that no longer

screams “drug war” as its No. 1 item.

But if narcotrafficking and security issues seem to have given way to trade, Western Hemisphere energy

development, and regional prosperity on the list of items Mr. Obama and his Mexican counterpart,

Enrique Peña Nieto, will discuss Thursday, that doesn’t mean the drug war is a thing of the past, experts

say.

It just means the two countries agree it’s time to talk about drugs and drug trade-related

violence less.

Instead, experts add, the lower profile the two leaders give to drug trafficking and

Mexico’s related violence reflects Mr. Peña Nieto’s effort to downplay his nation’s battle

with drug cartels in favor of his reform agenda – and Obama’s own desires to change the

narrative of the bilateral relationship.

“Peña Nieto has been putting the emphasis on economic issues and his reforms, and notso much on narcotrafficking, levels of violence, and the security agenda,” says Jorge

Chabat, an expert in US-Mexico security issues at CIDE, a social sciences research and teaching

institution in Mexico City.

“The US is still very interested in Mexican stability, but basically Obama has decided that not talking

about the violence and talking more about economic progress will help legitimize Peña

Nieto, and will help Mexican stability,” Mr. Chabat says. “Both countries are still very interested

in what continues to be a very big problem,” he adds, “they’ve just agreed to talk about it less.”

In discussing Obama’s trip, White House officials concur that the president sees his three days of travelto Mexico and Costa Rica as an opportunity to shift the focus of the US-Mexico – and indeed the US-

Americas – relationships beyond security and drug-trade issues.

“We very much want to broaden the focus of the relationship beyond security to encompass the

economic potential,” says Ben Rhodes, White House deputy national security adviser for strategic

communications. Noting Mexico’s “tremendous economic growth in recent years,” he says both



presidents want to put their emphasis on enhancing that growth “to create jobs and economic

opportunity on both sides of the border.”

One reason Obama is making this trip now, Mr. Rhodes says, is that the president saw the moment –

Obama beginning a second term, Peña Nieto having just taken office in December – as an opportunity to

recast and deepen US relations with Mexico and other southern neighbors.

Peña Nieto replaced President Felipe Calderon, who launched a ferocious fight with Mexico’s powerful

drug cartels shortly after taking office in December 2006. Mr. Calderon’s war challenged the cartels and

netted some top traffickers – but at the cost of tremendous violence that resulted in more than 70,000

deaths.

Peña Nieto came into office pledging to reduce the violence, and to put more emphasis on reforms to

improve Mexico’s judicial system, reduce legendary police corruption, and streamline the anti-drug

trafficking fight through better coordination among the country’s various security forces.

Some of the announced changes have caused ripples of concern north of the border – Peña Nieto hasdecided that all cooperation with US law enforcement agencies should be channeled through Mexico’s

Interior Ministry, which is responsible for all internal security issues.

Some Drug Enforcement Agency officials have said privately they worry that order could disrupt their

work with their Mexican counterparts. But Obama says that, while he wants to hear from Peña

Nieto what he intends from such changes, his initial understanding is that the Mexican

leader is primarily aiming for better coordinated and more efficient domestic security

efforts.

“Some of the issues that he’s talking about really had to do with refinements and improvements interms of how Mexican authorities work with each other, how they coordinate more effectively, and it

has less to do with how they’re dealing with us,” Obama said at a press conference Tuesday.

The new Mexican leader’s “streamlining” of law enforcement efforts has a lot to do with

domestic considerations and very little to do with cooperation with the US , CIDE’s Chabat

says. Already under President Calderon US-Mexico counternarcotics cooperation had shifted from the

provision of antitrafficking vehicles and related supplies to “institution-building,” he says.

What is different, Chabat adds, is that for political reasons Peña Nieto will be less public than

his two predecessors about US-Mexico security cooperation.

<insert impact scenario>



2NC Uniqueness

support for Pemex reform, but it’s close

Mallen, 13 Patricia Rey, covers Latin America for the International Business Times, 7/29, IBT,

http://www.ibtimes.com/mexico-gets-ready-pemex-reform-amid-fear-demonstrations-opposition-asks-public-referendum-1363347, “Mexico Gets Ready For Pemex Reform Amid Fear Of Demonstrations;

Opposition Asks For Public Referendum,” ADM

Spanish newspaper El País reported that in the next weeks, the ruling Partido Revolucionario

Institucional will shape its reform proposal beyond the decision to open Pemex to private

investment. That plan should also clarify the vague allusions to "constitutional reforms." The PRI

does not currently have the majority of Congress, so to pass whatever reforms they propose,

it needs to win over the conservative opposition Partido Acción Nacional, which has not

spoken out against the plan to date. PRI Sen. Emilio Gamboa Patrón told Mexican newspaper ElUniversal that the reform could not be postponed "under any circumstance."

Pemex reform has bipartisan support – Nieto is key to maintain momentum

Martin & Rodriguez, 7/3 Eric, Bloomberg in Mexico City, and Carlos Manuel, in Mexico

City, 7/3/13, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-03/pemex-overhaul-

harder-as-pri-misses-mexican-congress-majority.html, “Pemex Reform Harder as

PRI Misses Majority in Congress” | ADM

“I’m convinced we’ll achieve an accord “I’m convinced we’ll achieve an accord with otherpolitical forces” on a Pemex bill, Pena Nieto said in a meeting with reporters yesterday. At a later

time “we’ll decide if eventually the company will float shares on the stock exchange,” he said. Pena

Nieto has said he may present the constitutional changes after the new congress begins

work on Sept. 1 and before he takes office on Dec. 1. In a November interview, he said overhauling

Pemex in the mold of Brazil’s Petroleo Brasileiro SA would be the “signature” issue of his presidency.

The PRI-led coalition will get at most 249 out of 500 seats in the lower house and 61 out of 128 seats in

the Senate, according to projections by polling company Consulta Mitofsky. The National Action Party,

or PAN, of outgoing President Felipe Calderon will get at most 135, while the Democratic Revolution

Party, which opposes any attempt to weaken Pemex’s monopoly, may garner 148, according to

Mitofsky. The electoral institute says final results may not be available until this weekend. PAN Support

PAN Senator Ruben Camarillo said yesterday that his party favors opening the energy

industry and will support reforms that benefit the country , regardless of who proposes them.

The party will call for greater transparency and accountability in exchange for its support,

Camarillo, a member of the Senate energy commission who is poised to win a seat in the lower house,

said in a phone interview. A survey of 1,000 registered voters taken June 22-24 by Mexico City-based

http://www.ibtimes.com/mexico-gets-ready-pemex-reform-amid-fear-demonstrations-opposition-asks-public-referendum-1363347



http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-03/pemex-overhaul-harder-as-pri-misses-mexican-congress-majority.html










Mitofsky had forecast that the PRI-Green Party coalition would win at least 274 seats in the lower house.

The poll had a 3.1 percentage point margin of error. “ We’re going to pass those reforms

the country needs,” said Javier Lozano, former labor minister and a senator-elect with PAN.

“We’re going to be a truly responsible opposition,” he said in an interview with Milenio TV yesterday.

Pena Nieto may have gone some way to building consensus for the constitutional

changes within his party by consulting with Pemex’s powerful oil workers’ union and other

labor groups that have traditionally supported the PRI.

Mexico has found the medicine for political gridlock – political compromise makes

reforms likely

the economist, 7/13/13, the economist, 7/13, http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21581730-

successful-cross-party-pact-has-broken-congressional-gridlock-it-must-not-become-obstacle, “Choose

Pemex over the pact,” ADM

PLENTY of Americans must have cast a jealous eye south of the border this year and noticed

that Mexico appears to have found the medicine for political gridlock . It is a

cross-party alliance called the Pact for Mexico, and in the seven months since President Enrique

Peña Nieto took office it has been a model of political compromise. It has made

possible reforms aimed at weakening the power of entrenched interests in education,

telecoms and television that Mexico has needed for decades. It has survived the violent run-up to

local elections in almost half the country on July 7th, in which many candidates were intimidated and

some were murdered (see article).

http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21581730-successful-cross-party-pact-has-broken-congressional-gridlock-it-must-not-become-obstacle







2NC Top of Docket

energy reform is the top priority – nieto’s efforts are key

afp, 8/1/13 agence france presse, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hIe-

b2hbPzuosjiXGHAPDtLV1p5g?docId=CNG.03e14ce32d06933545ef0845464205f0.421, “Mexican

government to present energy reform next week” | ADM

Mexico's president said Thursday his government will present a reform plan for energy giant

Pemex next week, setting the stage for a major debate over the state monopoly's future. Overhauling

Petroleos de Mexico, know by its acronym Pemex, is one of the most politically

sensitive reforms being pushed by President Enrique Pena Nieto since he took office eight

months ago. "The government will present in the coming days, I expect next week, my initiative on this

issue," Pena Nieto told Radio Formula from a hospital room, a day after he underwent a successful

surgery to remove a benign thyroid nodule. Pena Nieto did not provide details, but he said the reformaims to "increase productivity and competitiveness, generate jobs and

secure cheaper energy " for Mexicans and companies. Critics say Pena Nieto aims to privatize

Pemex, which was founded when the oil industry was nationalized 75 years ago, but the Mexican leader

insists it will remain a state-run company. Pena Nieto's Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which

ruled Mexico for most of the 20th century and returned to the presidency in December, has struck a

landmark pact with the leftist and conservative opposition to enact structural reforms. The conservative

National Action Party (PAN) proposed its own energy reform on Wednesday, aiming to open the door to

more private investment in the oil sector in Latin America's second biggest economy. The so-called

Pact for Mexico has led to major reforms in education and telecommunications. Pena Nieto said

he intends to push a tax reform this year too.

http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hIe-b2hbPzuosjiXGHAPDtLV1p5g?docId=CNG.03e14ce32d06933545ef0845464205f0.421







2NC PC High

nieto is in an extended honeymoon – he has public approval and political support

GPS, 13 Global Public Square, CNN, 7/20, http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2013/07/20/is-

pena-nietos-honeymoon-over-in-mexico/, “Is Peña Nieto's honeymoon over in Mexico?” | ADM

Elected leaders around the world are struggling. They're down in the polls, their economies are

stagnant, their people are protesting, and their oppositions are betting on their failure. There is,

however, one leader who has seemingly bucked that trend – and it's not by jailing his opposition

or shutting down the press. He's the president of a free, democratic, capitalist country. Is this person

Superman? I'm talking about the young and highly successful president of Mexico: Enrique Peña

Nieto. Just compare him with our president. Obama's approval ratings recently hit their

lowest since 2011 – 45 percent. Seven months into the job, Peña Nieto is sitting pretty at 57

percent. And it's not just average Mexicans who have given their president an extendedhoneymoon…the opposition has, as well. Two major rival parties joined Peña

Nieto to form what they called a "Pact for Mexico." Together, they put through a

groundbreaking set of reforms in labor, education, telecoms, and TV. Just this week, the

government announced an infrastructure deal worth $316 billion to build roads and railways.

Imagine that happening in Washington, where we spend months deciding whether or not we should

have filibusters! Drug-related homicides are down in Mexico 18 percent during Peña Nieto's term. This

week, local authorities brought down the leader of the deadly Zeta cartel. It's been an

extraordinary start to a presidency . And it comes at a time when experts are hailing

Mexico's rise. The New York Times columnist Tom Friedman says that Mexico could be one of the 21st

century's big economic successes. Of course on Global Public Square, we have been championing

Mexico's prospects for the last two years. And yet, there are signs emerging that – perhaps – Peña

Nieto's honeymoon is coming to an end.

Let’s explain.

http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2013/07/20/is-pena-nietos-honeymoon-over-in-mexico/







2NC Security Coop Link

US involvement is uniquely controversial

Archibold et. al. 4/30 (Randal C., Damien Cave, Ginger Thompson, New York Times, April 30, 2013, “Mexico’s Curbs on U.S. Role

in Drug Fight Spark Friction,” http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/01/world/americas/friction-between-us-and-mexico-threatens-efforts-on-drugs.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, alp)

But shortly after Mexico’s new president, Enrique Peña Nieto, took office in December, American

agents got a clear message that the dynamics, with Washington holding the clear upper

hand, were about to change. In another clash, American security officials were recently asked

to leave an important intelligence center in Monterrey, where they had worked side by side with

an array of Mexican military and police commanders collecting and analyzing tips and intelligence on

drug gangs. The Mexicans, scoffing at the notion of Americans’ having so much contact with different

agencies, questioned the value of the center and made clear that they would put tighter

reins on the sharing of drug intelligence. There have long been political sensitivities in

Mexico over allowing too much American involvement. But the recent policy changes have

rattled American officials used to far fewer restrictions than they have faced in years.

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/01/world/americas/friction-between-us-and-mexico-threatens-efforts-on-drugs.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0








2NC PC Key

nieto’s pc is key to passing Pemex reform – independently, his agenda’s success is key

to mexico’s economy

Rathbone, 7/17 John Paul, Financial Times, 7/17/13, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e4d99f60-

d767-11e2-8279-00144feab7de.html, “Peña Nieto pledges transformational reform of Pemex,” ADM

Mr Peña Nieto said the need to liberalise Pemex was already agreed under the so-called Pact

for Mexico, a coalition between the country’s three main political parties, and that a more detailed

proposal would be forthcoming within “two to three months.” “There are different options on what

the reform should be, but I am confident

.

.

.

It will be transformational,” he told the

Financial Times. Mr Peña Nieto added the reform would include “the constitutional changes

needed to give private investors certainty”. Oil majors such as ExxonMobil and Royal Dutch

Shell, which have been shut out by Mexico’s protectionist energy policies, have said they are readyto invest if Congress passes the measure, a keystone of Mr Peña Nieto’s ambitious reform

agenda. Pemex, with annual sales of more than $100bn, is the world’s seventh-largest oil producer but

the government’s high tax take has left it struggling to fund investment. Since taking office in December,

Mr Peña Nieto has already pushed through education, competition and labour reforms .

But liberalising Pemex and possibly allowing for profit-sharing with international companies

would be the most politically charged change of all, given that the industry’s

nationalisation in 1938 remains a point of national pride for many in Latin America’s second-

biggest economy. “Democracy is about respecting the majority, it’s not about unanimity,” Mr Peña

Nieto said, commenting on potential opposition to the measure. “Although the pact does not include

everybody, it includes the most important parties. And there will always be dissident voices – as

happens in any country that is liberal and free.” The importance of “inclusiveness” is often

repeated by Mr Peña Nieto, 46, a former state governor with the looks and easy charm of a matinee

idol. On a visit to the Financial Times – although accompanied by a phalanx of dark-suited ministers and

aides – he spoke fluently and candidly without notes. State elections set for July 7, “have caused

political tensions,” Mr Peña Nieto admitted, tacitly acknowledging a recent scandal about the misuse

of federal funds by members of his Institutional Revolutionary party (PRI) in Veracruz state. “But we *in

the pact] have also agreed that occasional differences should not jeopardise the reforms we

have agreed to work on.” Meanwhile, faster economic growth was a central

priority he said, “as that is the best way to address poverty and inequality”. The central purpose of a

financial reform bill, he added, “is to generate more and cheaper credit for all”. Tougher competition

policy is about generating a “more democratic economy.” Ever tactful, though, he said a fiscal reform

expected this summer “is still being worked out: I don’t want to put it at risk by discussing particular

variables”. Mr Peña Nieto’s reform success has lately made Mexico an investors’ favourite –

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e4d99f60-d767-11e2-8279-00144feab7de.html







although the prospect of higher US interest rates has walloped the peso this month. The economy grew

just 0.8 per cent in the first quarter, but Mr Peña Nieto said the slowdown was partly due to his

new government coming to grips with budget execution . “The drop in public spending will be

temporary. We expect growth of 3.1 per cent this year,” he said.



2NC Econ Uniqueness

Mexican economy declining now – losing revenue sources

The Economist 5/25 (The Economist, May 25, 2013, “Reality bites: Lacklustre growth shows the need for reform,”

http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21578440-lacklustre-growth-shows-need-reform-reality-bites, alp)

INVESTORS who were starry eyed about Mexico’s economic potential at the start of the

year are now having misgivings. From a record high then, the stockmarket fell to an eight-

month low on May 21st. Just to rub it in, stocks in Brazil, which Mexico views as its main regional

rival, have recently been performing much better. The immediate catalyst for the change of

mood is the economy. In December, just as President Enrique Peña Nieto came to power promising

to increase Mexico’s growth potential, the country’s strong recovery from the 2008-09 global

financial crisis hit the skids. In the first quarter of 2013 sluggish sales to the United States,

by far Mexico’s largest export market, helped reduce growth to a modest 0.8% compared

with the same period in 2012. A fall in public spending as a new party took power

contributed to the dip. Other economic data in recent days have added to the worries.

Foreign direct investment last year plunged to $12.7 billion, from an average of around $23

billion during the past decade, according to CEPAL, a UN-linked research organisation. It said

the figure was affected by one-offs, such as a decision by Spain’s Banco Santander to list its Mexican

subsidiary, raising $4 billion. That counted as an outflow of foreign investment. Some economistspointed to concerns that high levels of drug-related crime may also be taking a toll on

investment, notably in tourism. Last year Mexico slipped out of the top ten of global

tourist destinations.

http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21578440-lacklustre-growth-shows-need-reform-reality-bites







2NC Turns Case

Turns and solves their PEMEX good impact

Schtulmann and Broholm 2/18 (Alejandro and Sergio, EconoMonitor, February 18, 2013, “Mexico’s Tax Reform in the

Works: Preview and Initial Considerations,” http://www.economonitor.com/blog/2013/02/mexicos-tax-reform-in-the-works-preview-and-initial-considerations/, alp)

The goals of comprehensive tax reform are to strengthen the government’s revenues

and tax base, while creating a fairer tax system. According to the Finance Ministry, the

Mexican government collected 9.8% of GDP in taxes in 2012 and is expected to collect

9.7% of GDP in 2013. Even including revenue from Pemex and other government-run

companies, Mexico collects a smaller percentage of its GDP in taxes than any other country

in the OECD (19.7% in 2011). The average OECD country collects a third of its GDP in public revenue.

For the Mexican government to meaningfully reduce its dependence on Pemex, it must

increase its non-oil tax revenue by at least 6% of GDP.

http://www.economonitor.com/blog/2013/02/mexicos-tax-reform-in-the-works-preview-and-initial-considerations/








2NC Education/Poverty D-Rules

Tax reform is key to poverty reduction, health care, and education

Cotis No date (Jean Philippe, senior official and French economist, former Director General of the National Institute of Statistics and

Economic Studies, former professor of economic policy at the University of Paris, OECD, no date, “WHAT ARE THE OECD’S VIEWS ABOUT THE

MEXICAN TAX REFORM,” http://www.oecd.org/mexico/22425199.pdf , alp)

A well designed tax system can bring about the additional public revenues which are

needed to finance extra spending on strategic areas such as education and

infrastructures. Importantly, it can do so with minimal economic distortions and in ways that better

insulate the tax base from the vagaries of the business cycle and oil price fluctuations. Having a larger

and more stable tax base is indeed crucial to secure the higher level of taxes and public

spending that Mexico currently requires to boost its potential growth. All in all a well

designed tax system can support growth, via higher and more predictable spending on

infrastructure, human capital development, basic health programmes and targeted

poverty relief, provided the overall size of the government is not excessive. In Mexico, the tax/GDP

ratio is very low and because of weaknesses in the tax design the associated economic

distortions are unnecessarily large (Figure 1). This has imposed constraints on public

spending. As mentioned before, the areas where more and better public spending would be

conducive to faster economic development are: The education and training system, which

is a case on its own. Additional resources could be used to address some of the shortcomings, includinga backlog in investment, but as importantly, efforts should focus on using more effectively the resources

that are being channeled to the system. Spending on physical infrastructure should be at a higher

level; and the financing should not be subject to stop and go behaviour. Although effective in meeting

budget targets “cyclical cuts”, caused by volatile financing, almost certainly affect programmes which

are essential for Mexico’s development, thus jeopardizing the effectiveness of expenditure. Additional

spending on basic health care would also contribute to improving human capital. And preserving

social programmes, including targeted poverty relief (known as PROGRESA/Oportunidades), from

drastic cuts is also important.

Preserving education is a d-rule

UNESCO No date (UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, “The

Right to Education,” no date, http://www.unesco.org/new/en/education/themes/leading-the-

international-agenda/right-to-education/, alp)

http://www.oecd.org/mexico/22425199.pdf



http://www.unesco.org/new/en/education/themes/leading-the-international-agenda/right-to-education/









Education is a fundamental human right and essential for the exercise of all other human rights. It

promotes individual freedom and empowerment and yields important development benefits. Yet

millions of children and adults remain deprived of educational opportunities, many as a result of

poverty. Normative instruments of the United Nations and UNESCO lay down international legalobligations for the right to education. These instruments promote and develop the right of every person

to enjoy access to education of good quality, without discrimination or exclusion. These instruments

bear witness to the great importance that Member States and the international community attach to

normative action for realizing the right to education. It is for governments to fulfil their obligations both

legal and political in regard to providing education for all of good quality and to implement and monitor

more effectively education strategies. Education is a powerful tool by which economically and socially

marginalized adults and children can lift themselves out of poverty and participate fully as citizens.

Poverty prevention is a d-rule – outweighs the aff

Bissio 12 (Roberto, executive director of the Third World Institute, journalist, SocialWatch, September 6, 2012, “ERADICATING POVERTY:

FROM MORAL DUTY TO LEGAL OBLIGATION,” http://www.socialwatch.org/node/15326, alp)

Before signing international trade or investment treaties or designing fiscal

policies, governments should ensure the compatibility of these policies with their human

rights obligations, while avoiding measures “that create, sustain or increase poverty ,

domestically or extraterritorially”. This is necessary to conciliate the human rights international

regulations with the reality of poverty in which most part of the world population lives. The World

Bank has a monetary definition of poverty and has set the poverty line on income below one-

dollar a day (now adjusted to one dollar and twenty-five cents). According to the human rights

approach, poverty is, in turn, “a human condition characterised by the sustained or chronic

deprivation of resources, capabilities, choices, security and power”. Poverty, says the

preface to the “principles” which have been declared final by Sepúlveda, is “both a cause and a

consequence of human rights violations”. Poor people “experience many interrelated and

mutually reinforcing deprivations –including dangerous work conditions, unsafe housing, lack ofnutritious food, unequal access to justice, lack of political power and limited access to health care – that

prevent them from realizing their rights and perpetuate their poverty”. Thus, the first principle

proposed is that of human dignity, together with “the indivisibility, interrelatedness and

interdependece of all rights”. The other principles are equality against all discrimination, which

“includes the right to be protected from the negative stigma attached to conditions of poverty”, equality

between men and women, the rights of the child, the agency and autonomy of persons living in extreme

http://www.socialwatch.org/node/15326






poverty, participation and empowerment, transparency and access to information and accountability.

Based on these principles, States should adopt national strategies to reduce poverty and

achieve social integration, with clear reference points and deadlines, and well-defined plans of

action. Public policies should give “due priority” to poor people and the “facilities, goods

and services required for the enjoyment of human rights” should be “accessible,available, adaptable, affordable and of good quality”. States have the already mentioned

obligation to be coherent, request international assistance when their efforts are not

sufficient and provide assistance if they are in a position to do so, being accountable for

their interventions. “In a world characterised by an unprecedented level of economic

development, technological means and financial resources, that millions of persons are living in

extreme poverty is a moral outrage”, reads the preface of the paper. When it becomes approved,

eradicating extreme poverty shall not only be a moral duty but also a legal obligation.



2NC Failed States

Economic collapse causes poverty and social revolutions – leads to a failed

state

Friedman 8/21 (George, STRATFOR, August 21, 2012, “Mexico's Strategy,” http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/mexicos-

strategy, alp)

Discussion of national strategy normally begins with the question of national security. But a

discussion of Mexico's strategy must begin with economics. This is because Mexico's neighbor

is the United States, whose military power in North America denies Mexico military options that other

nations might have. But proximity to the United States does not deny Mexico economic

options. Indeed, while the United States overwhelms Mexico from a national security standpoint, it

offers possibilities for economic growth. Mexico is now the world's 14th-largest economy, just

above South Korea and just below Australia. Its gross domestic product was $1.16 trillion in 2011. It

grew by 3.8 percent in 2011 and 5.5 percent in 2010. Before a major contraction of 6.9 percent in 2009

following the 2008 crisis, Mexico's GDP grew by an average of 3.3 percent in the five years

between 2004 and 2008. When looked at in terms of purchasing power parity, a measure of

GDP in terms of actual purchasing power, Mexico is the 11th-largest economy in the world, just

behind France and Italy. It is also forecast to grow at just below 4 percent again this year,

despite slowing global economic trends, thanks in part to rising U.S. consumption. Total economic

size and growth is extremely important to total national power. But Mexico has a singleprofound economic problem: According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and

Development, Mexico has the second-highest level of inequality among member nations.

More than 50 percent of Mexico's population lives in poverty, and some 14.9 percent of its

people live in intense poverty, meaning they have difficulty securing the necessities of life. At the same

time, Mexico is home to the richest man in the world, telecommunications mogul Carlos Slim.

The primary strategic problem for Mexico is the potential for internal instability driven

by inequality. Northern and central Mexico have the highest human development index, nearly on the

European level, while the mountainous, southernmost states are well below that level. Mexican

inequality is geographically defined, though even the wealthiest regions have significant pockets ofinequality. We must remember that this is not Western-style gradient inequality, but cliff

inequality where the poor live utterly different lives from even the middle class.

http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/mexicos-strategy








2NC Economy/Stability

Energy reform is necessary to stave off economic collapse and energy insecurity in

Mexico

Webber, 7/26/13 Jude, joined the Financial Times in 2007 as correspondent for Argentina, Chile,

Uruguay and Paraguay after 15 years working for Reuters in UK, Spain, Ireland, Italy and Peru,

http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2013/07/26/pemex-q2-the-case-for-reform-grows/, “Pemex Q2: the

case for reform grows,” ADM

One of the most widely watched – and significant – of Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto’s

reforms is that of the energy sector. It’s on the agenda when Congress resumes after the

summer break in September – and is attracting a lot of international attention in the energy

sector. But with disappointing results out from state oil company Pemex out, it’s now looking

even more important than before. Pemex’s loss in the second quarter was, in fact, itssteepest since late 2011 – and though the company is still officially sticking to its target of lifting

production slightly this year, there must be lots of doubters out there. There were some bright spots in

the results. While lower crude export prices and a weaker peso hit earnings, Pemex’s crude output in

June was the highest since February, and an increase of 0.4 per cent since May. So reform time? It

looks increasingly important, But the good news is that we won’t have to wait long. Pemex said

the package should be ready in a month or so. London-based analysts Capital Economics

count that plan as one of the potential reasons to be cheerful about the Mexican

economy , whose performance has disappointed so far this year. As Javier Treviño Nieto, an

expert on energy in Congress from the ruling PRI party told Reuters recently, Mexico can’t

afford to get it wrong: The world is not going to wait for us if we don’t do an energy

reform that guarantees the country’s energy security . Pemex, Mexico and Peña Nieto

have a lot riding on the reform proposal. Can they pull it off? Watch this space.

http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2013/07/26/pemex-q2-the-case-for-reform-grows/





T-Military



1NC — Topicality “Economic Engagement”

Interpretation –

Economic engagement is distinct from political and military engagement –

prefer policy focus.

Sloan 85 (Stanley, founding Director of the Atlantic Community Initiative, PhD from American

University’s School of International Service, employed by the Congressional Research Service of the

Library of Congress in a variety of analytical and research management positions from 1975-1999,

including head of the Office of Senior Specialists, In December 2007, Stan served as a Fulbright Senior

Specialist Fellow at the Estonian School of Diplomacy, In 2002, Stan was selected as a Woodrow Wilson

Foundation Visiting Fellow , “Nato’s Future: Toward a New Transatlantic Bargain,” pg 158)

A new conceptual framework should have a dynamic outlook to maximize political

effectiveness and flow from a concept of Western interests, rather than from a simple

reaction to Eastern capabilities and politices. Any new approach should reflect the reality of conflict

within the East-West relationship as well as the potential for cooperation. A new Western

policy of active engagement with the East–military engagement,

political engagement, and economic engagement– would meet those

requirements. A primary purpose of such a policy would be to convince the Soviet Union and its

allies they can gain no decisive power advantage over the West and, equally, to assure the Warsaw Pact

nations that the NATO nations also seek no such advantage.

B. Violation – their Relations advantage is based off of military facilitation.

C. That kills limits which is a voter for fairness and education – undermines

clash – the neg can’t predict what the aff will say.

D. Prefer the most limiting interpretation – good isn’t good enough – justifies

judge intervention and is arbitrary.



AT: We MEet

DOD is a part of the drug war.

Longmire 12 (Sylvia, a [medically] retired Air Force captain and former Special Agent with the Air

Force Office of Special Investigation, Former senior intelligence analyst for the California state fusioncenter and the California Emergency Management Agency's Situational Awareness Unit, focusing almost

exclusively on Mexican drug trafficking organizations and southwest border violence issues, egularly

lectured on terrorism in Latin America at the Air Force Special Operations School's Dynamics of

International Terrorism course, Masters in Latin American and Carribean studies, 1/13/12, “Is The US

Military’s Involvement In Border Security Too Expensive?”

http://www.hstoday.us/briefings/correspondents-watch/single-article/is-the-us-militarys-involvement-

in-border-security-too-expensive/c7963abc47990eee4cbb12900e9e9533.html)//DR. H

DoD has also increased their role in the drug war, both by providing military equipment

to law enforcement agencies along the border - helping them do their jobs more

effectively - and providing training and guidance to agencies on the Mexican side of the

border. By executive order, because DoD also has a mandate to assist in the national counterdrug

mission, how the drug war progresses is very important to the Pentagon.

Here’s a chart specific to Merida

http://www.hstoday.us/briefings/correspondents-watch/single-article/is-the-us-militarys-involvement-in-border-security-too-expensive/c7963abc47990eee4cbb12900e9e9533.html)/DR







Kerry CP



1NC Kerry Counterplan

Secretary of State John Kerry should incorporate into the Mérida Initiative

strategy outcome performance measures that indicate progress towards goals

and develop more comprehensive timelines for future program deliveries.

Solvency advocate – their ev is all based off of this article.

GAO 10 (July 2010, Report to Congressional Requesters, “MÉRIDA INITIATIVE: The United States Has

Provided Counternarcotics and Anticrime Support but Needs Better Performance Highlights of GAO-10-

837, a report to Measures,” pdf)//DR. H

We recommend that the Secretary of State incorporate into the strategy for the Mérida

Initiative outcome performance measures that indicate progress toward strategic goals

and develop more comprehensive timelines for future program deliveries.

http://www.gao.gov/assets/310/307523.pdf)/DR






2NC Counterplan

Solves the case and doesn’t link to politics.

GAO 10 (July 2010, Report to Congressional Requesters, “MÉRIDA INITIATIVE: The United States Has

Provided Counternarcotics and Anticrime Support but Needs Better Performance Highlights of GAO-10-837, a report to Measures,” pdf)//DR. H

The United States has made some progress delivering equipment and training to Mexico and

Central America under the Mérida Initiative and supported efforts to combat crime and narcotics

trafficking. Nevertheless, violence continues to grow and needs are changing across the region as

criminals adjust their activities in reaction to increased law enforcement efforts. This year, State

revised its strategy and defined new goals, but left out key elements that would

facilitate management and accountability. State generally lacks outcome-based measures that

define success in the short term and the long term, making it difficult to determine effectiveness and

leaving unclear when the Initiative’s goals will be met. Establishing better performance

measures could provide Congress and other stakeholders with valuable information on

outcomes, enabling them to make more informed decisions on whether or not

policies and approaches might need to be revised and in what ways. Regarding program

implementation, there are no timelines for future deliveries of some equipment and

training, particularly for a range of capacity building programs that will take on a large role going

forward. Provision of time frames for the commencement and completion of programswould set expectations for stakeholders, including the Mexican government, which has

expressed concerns about the pace of delivery. It would also facilitate coordination and

planning for all organizations involved in implementation.







Legalize USA CP



1NC Legalize USA CP

Text: The United States federal government should end its Merida efforts. The

United States federal government should legalize marijuana, cocaine, heroin

and methamphetamine.

CP solves – US drug demands are key.


Human Rights Center in Mexico City, “Rethinking the Mérida Initiative: Why the U.S. Must Change

Course in its Approach to Mexico’s Drug War,” American University Washington College of Law,

pdf)//DR. H

The engine driving Mexican drug trafficking is demand for drugs in the United States,where wholesale illicit drug proceeds reach tens of billions of dollars each year.31 As long as this

level of demand exists, drugs will continue to flow north regardless of the level of

deterrence that the security forces deploy.32 In this regard, it is likely that the most

efficient use of hundreds of millions of dollars annually is to keep most of this money in

the United States and direct it to demand reduction through public health services and

programs to reduce drug use, such as improved access to treatment for addiction.

Another major reason for the United States to focus attention north of the border is

that the military-style assault weapons that fuel Mexican drug violence (such as AK-47s)come from the United States. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) estimates that

90 –95% of Mexican cartels’ weapons enter Mexico from the southern United States,where individual buyers, benefiting from gaping loopholes in U.S. gun laws, purchase multiple military

weapons from gun sellers and then pass the weapons to drug cartels.33

There are signs that actors in Congress and the current administration recognize the

need to step up efforts to address these domestic problems. The administration of U.S.

President Barack Obama recently announced a border security plan that will target the arms trade by

deploying hundreds more ATF and other agents to the southwest U.S. border. The plan also

contemplates measures to reduce drug demand, such as improving drug treatment within national

healthcare systems.34 Also noteworthy is a letter to the President signed by more than 50 members of

Congress asking for enforcement of the U.S. ban on imported assault weapons.35 While this measure

alone will not correct underlying loopholes in U.S. gun laws, it would be a step in the right direction.

Indeed, from its inception the Mérida Initiative has been billed by both governments as the embodiment

of U.S. recognition of its “shared responsibility” to combat drug trafficking.36



Only recently, however, have U.S. officials begun to acknowledge clearly the need to

address the factors within U.S. territory that generate drug-related violence in Mexico.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s recent visit to Mexico marked an important acknowledgement that,

in Clinton’s words, “Our insatiable demand for illegal drugs [in the U.S.]

fuels the drug trade.”37 Despite this recognition of the need to reduce U.S. drug demand, the visit was also accompanied by a

pledge from the administration to seek $80 million from Congress to purchase Blackhawk helicopters to

support Mexico’s drug war38—an indicator of continuing U.S. emphasis on law enforcement battles

with drug traffickers as a primary drug-fighting strategy. It is worth noting that the Mérida

Initiative itself did not introduce any new, concrete commitments in the areas of

demand reduction or reduction of arms smuggling in the United States. A change in the

design of this high-profile Initiative, coupled with a decisive shift away from directing

other foreign aid to Mexico’s military, would thus ensure that the administration’s

recent statements regarding shared U.S. responsibility for drug trafficking truly signify a

new level of commitment by the U.S. to address efficiently the particular ways in which

it perpetuates the drug trade.

Legalization solves demand – most qualified evidence.

Miron and Spiegal 13 (Jeffrey, Senior Lecturer and Director of Undergraduate Studies in the

Department of Economics at Harvard University, as well as a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, “Harvard

Economist: Legalizing Drugs Suits Ideal of American Freedom,”

http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/harvard-economist-jeffrey-miron-on-why-drugs-should-be-legalized-a-886289.html)//DR. H

SPIEGEL: Mr. Miron, why should heroin, cocaine and marijuana be legal?

Miron: The prohibition of drugs is the worst solution for preventing abuse. Firstly, it brings

about a black market that is corrupt and costs human lives. Secondly, it constrains people

who wouldn't abuse drugs. Thirdly, prohibiting drugs is expensive.

SPIEGEL: How expensive?

Miron: If it legalized drugs, the United States could save $85 billion to $90 billion per year. Roughly half that is spent on the current drugs policy and half that is lost in taxes that the state could

have levied on legal drugs.

SPIEGEL: On the other side of the equation, there are many people who would become addicted to

drugs.



Miron: Let us assume that the consumption of drugs would increase as a result of legalization. Would

that be a bad thing? If we apply the standards of economics, that is (at least partially) a good thing. Any

policy that prevents me from doing what I'd like to do impairs my happiness.

SPIEGEL: Drugs lead to addiction. They impair people's happiness.

Miron: Addiction isn't the problem. Many people are addicted to caffeine and nobody worries about

that. Many people are addicted to sports, beer or food. That doesn't bother the state either.

SPIEGEL: Should the state treat sports and cocaine equally?

Miron: The effects of cocaine are described in a highly exaggerated way. There are Wall

Street bankers who snort coke; they have high incomes, access to a good healthcare system, are married

and have a stable life situation. Many of them subsequently stop taking cocaine. I get the impression

that these people enjoy consuming it. Then there are people who smoke crack cocaine and lead lives

that are very different from those of stockbrokers; they are people with low incomes, no jobs and poor

health. Many of these people come to a sorry end. But cocaine's not to blame for that. Those people'slousy lives are to blame.

SPIEGEL: Are you trying to say that crack is harmless?

Miron: Can you consume crack for a long time and then give it up? Absolutely, and that's

supported by the data. The prohibition lobby exaggerates substantially to help it achieve

its goals. Drugs are far less dangerous than people think. It's not clear that consuming

marijuana or cocaine has significant negative effects if the product is affordable, if we don't have to risk

our lives to get it, and if the product hasn't been diluted secretly with rat poison.

SPIEGEL: Are you trying to say it's not dangerous to shoot heroin?

Miron: Injecting it is so widespread because, under prohibition, heroin is expensive and

injecting makes users high for less money. If drugs were much less expensive, most

people would probably smoke heroin rather than injecting it.

SPIEGEL: One more time: do you think it would be good if legalization led to an increased consumption

of drugs?

Miron: If you believe in anything that the Americans claim to believe in -- freedom, individuality,

personal responsibility -- you have to legalize drugs. The maxim should be that you're allowed to do it if

you're not harming anyone else. There is an assumption that you're harming someone when

you take drugs, but the scientific data doesn't support this hypothesis.

SPIEGEL: Cocaine makes people aggressive.



Miron: The scientific evidence for that is very thin. Most of the evidence that points to a connection

between violence and drugs relates to alcohol. Does that mean that alcohol should be banned? In fact,

the legalization of all drugs would sharply reduce the amount of violence in the US.

SPIEGEL: How?

Miron: Prohibition leads to violence. By making a black market inevitable, you generate

violence because the conflicts between the parties involved in the drug trade can't be

solved by legal means within the judicial system. They are forced into a twilight world in

which they have to shoot each other instead of hiring lawyers and taking the matter to

court.

SPIEGEL: So the state should just let the cartels get on with it?

Miron: There are studies that show the level of violence is reduced when the state leaves the

drug trade alone, the reason being that the drug dealers have fewer disputes. The latestevidence from Mexico confirms that. Of course there has been drug-related violence there for

a long time. But the violence didn't escalate and increase sharply in scale until the president,

Felipe Calderón, declared the big war on drugs in 2006. We have calculated that the

murder rate in the US could fall by around 25 percent if drugs were legal.

SPIEGEL: How would drug prices change as a result of legalization?

Miron: Marijuana prices would hardly change. If we compare the black-market prices with prices in

places where marijuana is virtually legal today, for example the Netherlands, they are very similar. The

prices paid for cocaine could fall substantially.

SPIEGEL: Then the whole country would snort coke.

Miron: Consumption of the more harmless drugs would probably increase. And there would be a larger

number of people who occasionally take a drug. But when single malt whiskey became legal again after

the prohibition of alcohol in the US ended, the whole country didn't become addicted to single malt.

SPIEGEL: Don't we as a democracy have an obligation to protect the people from themselves?

Miron: I think that people who harm themselves with drugs will do it anyway, regardless of whether or

not they're legal.

SPIEGEL: Don't we have a moral obligation?

Miron: If a friend of yours does something that's stupid, do you think about whether it would make the

situation better or worse if you intervened? Maybe putting your friend in prison and forcing him to

undergo therapy isn't the best solution. Maybe it's better to talk to your friend in a calm and collected

way.



SPIEGEL: Is talking the solution to the drug problem?

Miron: Prohibition certainly isn't the solution.

SPIEGEL: Why are drugs prohibited at all?

Miron: Naive people believe that if something's illegal, people won't do it any more. That

clearly isn't true. Others think that if you make it illegal, the price will rise and fewer people will take

the drug. But for some people the price isn't a factor.

SPIEGEL: What would a world in which drugs were legal be like?

Miron: Like Portugal. There, consumption has been legal for several years and there has been hardly any

change in the amount of drug use. Legalization wouldn't greatly increase the rates of use. And if people

started to smoke more marijuana, that would be okay too. It's their business.

SPIEGEL: Do you seriously want drugs to be sold in supermarkets?

Miron: Yes.

SPIEGEL: Would prescribing the drugs be a possibility?

Miron: A very lax prescription law like the one in California doesn't do any harm, because everyone gets

a prescription. But if that's the case, what good does it do? If you have a very strict prescription law,

you'll have a black market again.

SPIEGEL: What would happen to the black market if drugs were legalized?

Miron: You'd have the choice. You could buy your cocaine in a supermarket or from a

mysterious Mexican dealer at a street corner who might shoot you. That would drain

the black market.

SPIEGEL: What would happen to the drug cartels?

Miron: If drugs were legalized, many of the big cartels in Mexico would try to use the

benefits of their experience by setting up a legal company right away. They'd want to be

the first and they've got good products and a good distribution network. It's still highly

uncertain whether the drug cartels want legalization. El Chapo Guzmán, the most powerful cartel boss inthe world, has a natural advantage because he's a very skilled criminal -- that's why he's so rich. If there

was no longer a black market for drugs, Guzmán would lose his advantage.



2NC Merida Solvency

Empirics and consensus prove the CPs the best option.


Human Rights Center in Mexico City, “Rethinking the Mérida Initiative: Why the U.S. Must ChangeCourse in its Approach to Mexico’s Drug War,” American University Washington College of Law,

pdf)//DR. H

The U.S. must instead prioritize domestic demand reduction and halt the flow of assault

weapons over the border if it is to cease exporting both the motive and the means for

violent drug trafficking to Mexico. As consensus grows in the region regarding the need to

move beyond the inefficient and damaging anti-drug strategies of the last decade, it is

crucial that the U.S. government follows through and expands upon recent declarations

recognizing the need for domestic action. While an important step forward, these should

constitute only the beginning of a profound paradigm shift in this regard in U.S. anti-drug strategies. A

failure by the United States to change course fully now will mean not only that it finds

itself working largely on the wrong side of the border, but also on the wrong side of

history.



2NC Legalization Solvency

US demand drives drug violence in mexico – only domestic drug policy reform

can solve.

Abu-Hamdeh, 11 Sabrina, Pepperdine University, 1/1, Pepperdine Policy Review, Vol. 4,

http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&context=ppr&sei-

redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fscholar.google.com%2Fscholar%3Fq%3Dmerida%2Binitiative%2Bsucc

ess%26hl%3Den%26as_sdt%3D0%26as_vis%3D1%26oi%3Dscholart%26sa%3DX%26ei%3D1XD6UYihGse

SyAG-rIHgDA%26ved%3D0CC0QgQMwAA#search=%22merida%20initiative%20success%22, “The

Merida Initiative: An Effective Way of Reducing Violence in Mexico?” | ADM

A Carnevale Associates study of US drug policy found that consumption from 2002 to 2008 had

not changed and remains at eight percent of Americans aged twelve and older.25 It also showed that,

though consumption has remained the same, federal spending for supply reduction rose by

sixty-four percent whereas spending on demand reduction only rose by nine percent . In

light of these bleak statistics, the Obama administration needs to assess its drug policy and

decide the future of the Merida Initiative. Various policy alternatives exist for the Merida Initiative at

this juncture. This paper will address the three most plausible options in turn, and review the

effectiveness of each policy within the established criteria. The first option is to abandon the program by

allowing funding to expire, as it was originally allocated through FY 2010 and has been extended until FY

2011. The second option is to continue with the Obama administration’s approach to the Merida

Initiative, called “Beyond Merida.” This policy embodies the Merida Initiative’s original goals, but

integrates a “shared responsibility” approach to drug control and a larger focus on institution building

rather than military spending. The third option is a new approach that integrates aspects of President

Obama’s “Beyond Merida” approach, but focuses more on domestic drug and weapons policy as

means of lessening demand, and institution building and government support as means of

lessening the supply. The criteria used to determine the best policy incorporates the basic economic

princples of supply and demand. The theory of supply and demand is fundamental in

explaining market economies and most societal outcomes. The problem of drug violence in

Mexico can be attributed to heightened demand that has fueled a larger supply. A

successful policy would lessen supply through decreased drug production and cross border trafficking.

For this to happen, there must be decreased demand—notably, within the United

States. The desired outcome is a reduction in violence in Mexico from drug-related

activities and a lessened supply of illegal drugs

Only domestic drug policy reform solves – drives drug violence in Mexico.



http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&context=ppr&sei-redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fscholar.google.com%2Fscholar%3Fq%3Dmerida%2Binitiative%2Bsuccess%26hl%3Den%26as_sdt%3D0%26as_vis%3D1%26oi%3Dscholart%26sa%3DX%26ei%3D1XD6UYihGseSyAG-rIHgDA%26ved%3D0CC0QgQMwAA#search=%22merida%20initiative%20success%22

















A Carnevale Associates study of US drug policy found that consumption from 2002 to 2008 hadnot changed and remains at eight percent of Americans aged twelve and older.25 It also showed that,

though consumption has remained the same, federal spending for supply reduction rose by

sixty-four percent whereas spending on demand reduction only rose by nine percent . In

light of these bleak statistics, the Obama administration needs to assess its drug policy and

decide the future of the Merida Initiative. Various policy alternatives exist for the Merida Initiative at

this juncture. This paper will address the three most plausible options in turn, and review the

effectiveness of each policy within the established criteria. The first option is to abandon the program by

allowing funding to expire, as it was originally allocated through FY 2010 and has been extended until FY

2011. The second option is to continue with the Obama administration’s approach to the MeridaInitiative, called “Beyond Merida.” This policy embodies the Merida Initiative’s original goals, but

integrates a “shared responsibility” approach to drug control and a larger focus on institution building

rather than military spending. The third option is a new approach that integrates aspects of President

Obama’s “Beyond Merida” approach, but focuses more on domestic drug and weapons policy as

means of lessening demand, and institution building and government support as means of

lessening the supply. The criteria used to determine the best policy incorporates the basic economic

princples of supply and demand. The theory of supply and demand is fundamental in

explaining market economies and most societal outcomes. The problem of drug violence in

Mexico can be attributed to heightened demand that has fueled a larger supply. Asuccessful policy would lessen supply through decreased drug production and cross border trafficking.

For this to happen, there must be decreased demand—notably, within the United

States. The desired outcome is a reduction in violence in Mexico from drug-related

activities and a lessened supply of illegal drugs

Combating demand is key – direct causal relationship.







Thomas Cole argues that the killings in Mexico and movements in the US market for drugs

are correlated.47 Drug policy analyst Mark Kleiman agrees that Mexico’s position as the primary



















transit point for illegal drugs entering the United States is directly linked to US

demand. If demand rises, drug violence will rise as well. Kleiman notes that the heaviest

drug users are responsible for the largest portion of demand and says that, “taking away the

drug dealers’ best customers will reduce their earnings.”48Effective intervention targeted at these

drug users is necessary to affect the illegal drug economy. The prevention of futuresubstance abuse could also help shrink the illicit drug market, thereby reducing the stakes for

DTO profits that motivates violence.49 Another option to consider is the legalization of

certain drugs, something that has been advocated for by the United Nation’s Committee for

Crime and Drugs and many political leaders.

Only legalization solves drug violence – expert consensus.







Lastly, many economists and knowledgeable leaders suggest that legalizing certain drugs

would be a means of driving their prices down. Without the high price tags attached to illicit

drugs, the high-stakes drug wars would most certainly diminish. Simple economic

theory explains that high prices stimulate highly competitive markets, but low prices are less

attractive and lessen suppliers. Drug legalization is hotly contested and conflicting information suggeststhat legalizing drugs, such as marijuana, will produce few changes in Mexico’s illicit drug trade and

related violence.42 Klimer suggests that marijuana sales make up only part of drug trafficking profits

with estimates of between $1.5 and $2 billion in annual gross revenue.43 However, while Klimer also

maintains that it is unknown whether reductions in Mexican DTOs’ revenues from exporting marijuana

would lead to corresponding decreases in violence, other analysts have suggested that large

reductions in revenues could increase violence in the short run but decrease it in the

long run.44 Therefore, the legalization of certain drugs and the establishment of

government price controls could diminish the surges of violence in Mexico and would

satisfy, in part, all three of the criteria established

Legalizing destroys profits which fund crime.

Grillo 12 (Ioan, 11/1/12, “Hit Mexico’s Cartels With Legalization,” http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/02/opinion/hit-mexicos-cartels-

with-legalization.html)//DR. H












The painful truth is that the monster of Mexican cartels has been pumped up by decades of

Americans buying illegal drugs under the policies of prohibition. No one knows exactly how

much money Mexican traffickers make, but reasonable estimates find they pocket $30 billion

every year selling cocaine, marijuana, heroin and crystal meth to American users. Since1980, the cumulative jackpot could be close to $1 trillion. Under the law of the jungle, this

money goes to the most violent and sadistic players, so the cartels have spent their dollars on building

increasingly ferocious death squads.

There have been a tragic 60,000 killings under President Felipe Calderón that are described as drug-

related. But even this description can be misleading. Most cartel assassins do not carry out these

brutal acts because they are high on drugs. Their motive is to capture the

profits that are so high because in the black market you can buy drugs for a

nickel and sell them for a dollar. How many others would love to be in abusiness with a markup of more than 2,000 percent?

Marijuana is just one of the drugs that the cartels traffic. Chemicals such as crystal meth may

be too venomous to ever be legalized. But cannabis is a cash crop that provides huge profits to criminal

armies, paying for assassins and guns south of the Rio Grande. The scale of the Mexican marijuana

business was illustrated by a mammoth 120-hectare plantation busted last year in Baja California. It had

a sophisticated irrigation system, sleeping quarters for 60 workers and could produce 120 metric tons of

cannabis per harvest.

Again, nobody knows exactly how much the whole Mexico-U.S. marijuana trade is worth, with estimatesranging from $2 billion to $20 billion annually. But even if you believe the lowest numbers, legal

marijuana would take billions of dollars a year away from organized crime. This would

inflict more financial damage than soldiers or drug agents have managed in years and

substantially weaken cartels.

It is also argued that Mexican gangsters have expanded to a portfolio of crimes that includes kidnapping,

extortion, human smuggling and theft from oil pipelines. This is a terrifying truth. But this does not take

away from the fact that the marijuana trade provides the crime groups with major

resources. That they are committing crimes such as kidnapping, which have a horrific effect on

innocent people, makes cutting off their financing all the more urgent.

Legalization solves – cuts off revenue.

Grillo 12 (Ioan, 11/1/12, “Hit Mexico’s Cartels With Legalization,” http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/02/opinion/hit-mexicos-cartels-

with-legalization.html)//DR. H



All these tasks will be easier if the flow of money to the cartels is dramatically slowed

down. Do we really want to hand them another trillion dollars over the next three

decades?

It is always hard to deal with these global issues in a world where all politics is local. Mexico was not

even featured in the presidential debate on foreign policy, despite that fact that the United States has

supported Calderón’s war on drugs with more than $1.3 billion worth of hardware, including Black Hawk

helicopters, and that cartels have attacked and killed U.S. agents.

Of course, residents of Colorado and Washington will have many valid local reasons to make their

choices. But on the issue of organized crime, the underlying fact should be clear: Legal marijuana will

take away dollars that pay for assassins and redirect them to small businesses and

government coffers.

If voters do choose to legalize marijuana it would be a historic decision, but it would also

open up a can of worms. The U.S. federal government and even the United Nations

would be forced to react to a state’s resolution to break from the path. This could be a

good thing.



AT: Links to Politics

CP doesn’t link to politics – prefer recency.

Seitz-Wald 13 (Alex, 2/8/13, “Why Congress might legalize marijuana (this time),”

http://www.salon.com/2013/02/08/why_congress_might_legalize_marijuana_this_time/)//DR. H

“I think we are in a position now to have a group of members of Congress who are able

to spend a little more time and energy in a focused way on this. I think we’ve got a little

bit more running room; I think our coalition is broader, and we’ve got people who have

not normally been involved in this,” he added, pointing to more conservative members

from Colorado who now care about marijuana after the state legalized it in the fall.

Bipartisan support

DC 13 (The Daily Chronic, 3/21/13, “Federal Bill to Legalize Marijuana Gains Support in Congress,” The

Marijuana Policy Project, http://www.thedailychronic.net/2013/16466/federal-bill-to-legalize-

marijuana-gains-support-in-congress/)//DR. H

This week, Maine Congresswoman Chellie Pingree (D-District 1) joined the effort to end marijuana prohibition

and start regulating marijuana like alcohol at the federal level. Rep. Pingree, as well as Rep. Eric

Swalwell (D-CA), signed on to co-sponsor H.R. 499, the Ending Federal Marijuana Prohibition Act of 2013, on Monday, joining a bipartisan group of supporters in the House.

There are currently 14 co-sponsors of the bill.

Rep. Jared Polis (D-CO) introduced the Ending Federal Marijuana Prohibition Act of 2013 on

February 5, which would remove marijuana from Schedule I of the Controlled Substances Act

and establish a system in which marijuana is regulated similarly to alcohol at the federal

level.

It would also remove marijuana from the jurisdiction of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and place it in the jurisdiction of a renamed

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Marijuana, Firearms, and Explosives.

“It is a very positive sign to see federal lawmakers finally coming

around on this issue and supporting rational marijuana ref orms,” said

David Boyer, Maine policy director for the Marijuana Policy Project.

“This comes at an important time, as the Maine Legislature will soon be considering taxing and regulating marijuana in a manner similar to

alcohol. We are grateful to Rep. Pingree, as well as the rest of the congressional bill



sponsors, who have expressed support for the rights of individual states to determine

their own marijuana policies.”



AT: Mexico Aid Key

Mexico Aid still occurs – just not in relation to the drug war.


Human Rights Center in Mexico City, “Rethinking the Mérida Initiative: Why the U.S. Must ChangeCourse in its Approach to Mexico’s Drug War,” American University Washington College of Law,

pdf)//DR. H

This is not to exclude the possibility of U.S. aid to Mexico. Of great relevance would be

policies and programs that create viable alternatives to illicit economic activities for

Mexicans living in poverty. In terms of public security aid packages, the Mérida

Initiative itself signals areas such as funding to support training of drug treatment counselors andsharing of best practices in the realm of judicial reform, both of which are potentially fruitful areas of

cooperation. In particular, effective sharing of technical expertise to support Mexico’s

transition to an adversarial judicial system characterized by oral criminal trials and

support for the establishment of police oversight mechanisms and community policing

models would provide more sustainable contributions to public security in both

countries than, for example, funding the Mexican armed forces. A rethinking of foreign aid to

Mexico, emphasizing such institution-building and preventive activities while eliminating

military aid, would additionally send a clear message that the U.S. will not fund entities

that continue to commit systematic human rights violations.