Mental Functioning and the Ontology of Language

Barry SmithGraz, July 21, 2012http://x.co/mGgu

http://ontology.buffalo.edu/smith/book/austrian_philosophy/

Brentano and his students

Brentano

Meinong Ehrenfels Husserl Twardowski

Meinong Alley, Graz

Investigations in Ontology and

Psychology

with support from the Imperial-Royal Minister of Culture and Education in

Vienna, 1904

from 1874 to 1914 Brentano controls Austrian philosophy

BrentanoVienna

MeinongGraz

EhrenfelsPrague

TwardowskiLemberg

Husserl Proßnitz

Brentano revolutionizes psychology

Brentanopublished Psychology

from an Empirical Standpoint, 1874

Meinong Ehrenfelsfounder of Gestalt psychology, 1890

Husserl Twardowski

Wundt first laboratory of

experimental psychology, 1879

Brentanists revolutionize ontology

Brentano

MeinongOn the Theory

of Objects, 1904

EhrenfelsHusserl

first formal mereology, 1902

______

first use of ‘formal ontology’

~1905;

Twardowski

Leśniewskilogical

formalization of mereology,

1916

Brentanists revolutionize our understanding of the relations between psychology and

ontology

Brentano introduces in 1874 the idea of intentional directedness

(aboutness)

Meinong Ehrenfels Husserl Twardowski

how can we think about what does not exist?

Brentanists revolutionize our understanding of the relations between psychology and

ontology

Brentano introduces in 1874 the idea of intentional directedness

(aboutness)

Meinong Ehrenfels Husserl Twardowski

Stefan Schulz famous contributor to

zoology of unicorns

15

the arrow of intentionality

Brentanists introduce the problem of understanding the relation between intentionality and language

Brentano

Meinong Ehrenfels Husserlcategorial

grammar, 1901

Twardowski

Leśniewskifounder of

formal mereology

Tarski invents formal

semantics

“From Intentionality to Formal Semantics”Brentano

Husserl Twardowski

Leśniewskiformal

mereology

Tarski formal

semantics

Joseph Woodger Axiomatic Method in

BiologyPatrick Hayes

“Ontology of Liquids”…

Description Logics, OWL …

The Logicians: Leśniewski, Tarski, Łukasiewicz, Twardowski Main Library of the University of Warsaw

Brentanists revolutionize our understanding of the relations between psychology and language

Brentano

Meinong EhrenfelsHusserl

two kinds of aboutness: relational

Twardowski

MFO Draft

MFO Draft

simple object-presenting acts vs. judgments, evaluations, …

mental process content (putative) target

presenting actcontent of presentation

“apple”object of presentation

judging act

judgment-content

“the apple over there is ripe”

state of affairsObjektive

evaluating actemotional act

appraisal…

“it is good that the apple over there is ripe”

?

mental process content (putative) target

presenting act content of presentation

“apple”object of presentation

targetpresent

targetabsent

• target present = you are in physical contact with target• successful intentionality• with evidence, without evidence

Successful intentionality

mental process content (putative) target

presenting act content of presentation

“apple”object of presentation

object exists

object does not exist

targetpresent

targetabsent

Veridical intentionality

ordinary perception

mental process content (putative) target

presenting act content of presentation

“apple”object of presentation

object exists

object does not exist

targetpresent

targetabsent

Veridical intentionality

veridical thinking about

mental process content (putative) target

presenting act content of presentation

“apple”

object of presentation

targetpresent

targetabsent

object exists

object does not exist

Non-veridical intentionality

non-veridical thinking about (error, hallucination, imagination, …)

mental process content (putative) target

presenting act content of presentation

“apple”object of presentation

object exists

object does not exist

targetpresent

targetabsent

Non-veridical intentionality

error, hallucination = the presenting act is dependent on an underlying false belief

mental process content (putative) target

presenting act content of presentation

“apple”object of presentation

object exists

object does not exist

targetpresent

targetabsent

Non-veridical intentionality

thinking about Macbeth = the presenting act is not dependent on an underlying false belief

mental process content (putative) target

presenting act content of presentation

“apple”object of presentation

object exists

object does not exist

targetpresent

targetabsent

An excluded case

this combination is impossible

mental process content (putative) target

presenting act content of presentation

“apple”object of presentation

object exists

object does not exist

targetpresent

targetabsent

Veridical intentionality

ordinary perceptionevolutionarily most basic case

content matches

“food”

content mismatches

“poison”

39

the primacy of language (Frege, Tarski …):

mental experiences are about objects because words have semantics

meaning

40

the primacy of the intentional (Brentano, Husserl, …):

linguistic expressions have meanings because there are mental experiences which have aboutness

content mismatches

“poison”

dimension of content / belief prior to dimension of language