memory-based dos and deanonymization attacks on tor

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Memory-based DoS and Deanonymization Attacks on Tor DCAPS Seminar October 11 th , 2013 Rob Jansen U.S. Naval Research Laboratory [email protected] *Joint with Aaron Johnson, Florian Tschorsch, Björn Scheuermann

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Memory-based DoS and Deanonymization Attacks on Tor. DCAPS Seminar October 11 th , 2013. Rob Jansen U.S. Naval Research Laboratory [email protected]. *Joint with Aaron Johnson, Florian Tschorsch , Björn Scheuermann. The Tor Anonymity Network. t orproject.org. How Tor Works. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

Memory-based DoS and Deanonymization Attacks on Tor

DCAPS SeminarOctober 11th, 2013

Rob JansenU.S. Naval Research [email protected]

*Joint with Aaron Johnson, Florian Tschorsch, Björn Scheuermann

Page 2: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

The Tor Anonymity Network

torproject.org

Page 3: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

How Tor Works

Page 4: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

How Tor Works

Page 5: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

How Tor Works

Page 6: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

How Tor Works

Page 7: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

How Tor Works

Tor protocol aware

Page 8: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

Tor Flow Control

exitentry

Page 9: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

Tor Flow Control

One TCP Connection Between Each Relay,

Multiple Circuits

exitentry

Page 10: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

Tor Flow Control

One TCP Connection Between Each Relay,

Multiple Circuits

Multiple Application Streams

exitentry

Page 11: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

Tor Flow Control

No end-to-end TCP!

exitentry

Page 12: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

Tor Flow Control

Tor protocol aware

exitentry

Page 13: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

Tor Flow Control

Packaging End

DeliveryEnd

exitentry

Page 14: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

Tor Flow Control

Packaging End

DeliveryEnd

exitentry

Page 15: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

Tor Flow Control

1000 Cell Limit

SENDME Signal Every 100 Cells

exitentry

Page 16: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

Outline

● The Sniper Attack– Low-cost memory consumption attack that disables

arbitrary Tor relays

● Deanonymizing Hidden Services– Using DoS attacks for deanonymization

● Countermeasures

Page 17: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

The Sniper Attack

Start Download

Request

exitentry

Page 18: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

The Sniper Attack

Reply

DATAexitentry

Page 19: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

The Sniper AttackPackage and Relay DATA

DATA

DATAexitentry

Page 20: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

The Sniper Attack

DATA

DATA

Stop Reading from Connection

DATA

Rexitentry

Page 21: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

The Sniper Attack

DATADATADATADATADATADATA

Rexitentry

Flow Window Closed

Page 22: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

The Sniper Attack

DATA

Periodically Send SENDME SENDME

R

DATADATADATADATADATA

exitentry

Page 23: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

The Sniper Attack

DATA

DATA

DATADATADATADATADATADATA

Periodically Send SENDME SENDME

R

DATADATADATADATADATA

exitentry

Flow Window Opened

Page 24: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

The Sniper Attack

DATA

DATA

DATADATADATADATADATADATA

R

DATADATADATADATADATA

exitentry

DATADATADATADATADATADATADATADATADATADATA

Out of Memory, Killed by OS

Page 25: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

The Sniper Attack

DATA

DATA

DATADATADATADATADATADATA

R

DATADATADATADATADATA

exitentry

DATADATADATADATADATADATADATADATADATADATA

Use Tor to Hide

Page 26: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

Memory Consumed over Time

Page 27: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

Mean RAM Consumed, 50 Relays

Page 28: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

Mean BW Consumed, 50 Relays

Page 29: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

Speed of Sniper Attack

Direct AnonymousRelay Groups Select % 1 GiB 8 GiB 1 GiB 8 GiBTop Guard 1.7

Top 5 Guards 6.5

Top 20 Guards 19

Top Exit 3.2

Top 5 Exits 13

Top 20 Exits 35

Path Selection Probability ≈ Network Capacity

Page 30: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

Speed of Sniper Attack

Direct AnonymousRelay Groups Select % 1 GiB 8 GiB 1 GiB 8 GiBTop Guard 1.7 0:01 0:18 0:02 0:14

Top 5 Guards 6.5 0:08 1:03 0:12 1:37

Top 20 Guards 19 0:45 5:58 1:07 8:56

Top Exit 3.2 0:01 0:08 0:01 0:12

Top 5 Exits 13 0:05 0:37 0:07 0:57

Top 20 Exits 35 0:29 3:50 0:44 5:52

Time (hours:minutes) to Consume RAM

Page 31: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

Speed of Sniper Attack

Direct AnonymousRelay Groups Select % 1 GiB 8 GiB 1 GiB 8 GiBTop Guard 1.7 0:01 0:18 0:02 0:14

Top 5 Guards 6.5 0:08 1:03 0:12 1:37

Top 20 Guards 19 0:45 5:58 1:07 8:56

Top Exit 3.2 0:01 0:08 0:01 0:12

Top 5 Exits 13 0:05 0:37 0:07 0:57

Top 20 Exits 35 0:29 3:50 0:44 5:52

Time (hours:minutes) to Consume RAM

Page 32: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

Speed of Sniper Attack

Direct AnonymousRelay Groups Select % 1 GiB 8 GiB 1 GiB 8 GiBTop Guard 1.7 0:01 0:18 0:02 0:14

Top 5 Guards 6.5 0:08 1:03 0:12 1:37

Top 20 Guards 19 0:45 5:58 1:07 8:56

Top Exit 3.2 0:01 0:08 0:01 0:12

Top 5 Exits 13 0:05 0:37 0:07 0:57

Top 20 Exits 35 0:29 3:50 0:44 5:52

Time (hours:minutes) to Consume RAM

Page 33: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

Outline

● The Sniper Attack– Low-cost memory consumption attack that disables

arbitrary Tor relays

● Deanonymizing Hidden Services– Using DoS attacks for deanonymization

● Countermeasures

Page 34: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

Hidden Services

HS

User wants to hide service

Page 35: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

Hidden Services

entry IP

HS chooses and publishes

introduction point IP

HS

Page 36: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

Hidden Services

entry IP

HS

Learns about HS on web

Page 37: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

entry

Hidden Services

entry IP

HS

Builds Circuit to Chosen Rendezvous

Point RP

RP

Page 38: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

entry

Hidden Services

entry IP

HS

Notifies HS of RP through IP

RP

entry

RP

Page 39: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

entry

Hidden Services

entry IP

HS

RP

RP

Page 40: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

entry

Hidden Services

entry IP

HS

Build New Circuit to

RP

RP

entry

RP

Page 41: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

entry

Hidden Services

entry IP

HS

Communicate!

RP

entry

RP

Page 42: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

entry

Deanonymizing Hidden Services

HS

RP

Page 43: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

entry

Deanonymizing Hidden Services

HS

RP

Also runs a guard relay

Page 44: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

entry

Deanonymizing Hidden Services

entry

HS

RP

RP

Build New Circuit to

RP

Page 45: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

entry

Deanonymizing Hidden Services

entry

HS

RP

RP S&P 2006, S&P 2013

Page 46: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

entry

Deanonymizing Hidden Services

entry

HS

RP

RP S&P 2013

PADDING

Send 50 Padding

Cells

Page 47: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

entry

Deanonymizing Hidden Services

entry

HS

RP

RP

Identify HS entry if cell count = 52

S&P 2013

Page 48: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

entry

Deanonymizing Hidden Services

entry

HS

RP

Sniper Attack,or any other DoS

Page 49: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

entry

Deanonymizing Hidden Services

HS

RP

Choose new Entry Guard

Page 50: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

entry

Deanonymizing Hidden Services

HS

RP

RP

Page 51: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

entry

Deanonymizing Hidden Services

HS

RP

RP S&P 2006, S&P 2013

Page 52: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

entry

Deanonymizing Hidden Services

HS

RP

RP

Send 50 Padding

Cells

S&P 2013

PADDING

Page 53: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

entry

Deanonymizing Hidden Services

HS

RP

RP

Identify HS if cell count = 53

S&P 2013

Page 54: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

Outline

● The Sniper Attack– Low-cost memory consumption attack that disables

arbitrary Tor relays

● Deanonymizing Hidden Services– Using DoS attacks for deanonymization

● Countermeasures

Page 55: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

Countermeasures

● Sniper Attack Defenses– Authenticated SENDMEs– Queue Length Limit– Adaptive Circuit Killer

● Deanonymization Defenses– Entry-guard Rate-limiting– Middle Guards

Page 56: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

Questions?

cs.umn.edu/[email protected]

think like an adversary

Page 57: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

Speed of Deanonymization

Guard BW(MiB/s)

Guard Probability

(%)Average # Rounds

Average # Sniped

Average Time (h)

1 GiB

Average Time (h)

8 GiB8.41 0.48 66 133 46 279

16.65 0.97 39 79 23 149

31.65 1.9 24 48 13 84

66.04 3.8 13 26 6 44

96.61 5.4 9 19 5 31

1 GiB/s Relay Can Deanonymize HS in

about a day

Page 58: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

Circuit Killer Defense

Page 59: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

The Sniper Attack

exitentry

exit entry

Single Adversary

Page 60: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

The Sniper Attack

exitentry

exit entry

Anonymous Tunnel

Page 61: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

The Sniper Attack

exitentry

exit entry

Page 62: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

The Sniper Attack

exitentry

exit entry

DATADATA DATA

DATA

Page 63: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

The Sniper Attack

exitentry

exit entry

DATADATA DATA

DATA

R

Page 64: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

The Sniper Attack

exitentry

exit entry

DATADATA DATA

R

Flow Window Closed

Page 65: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

The Sniper Attack

exitentry

exit entry

DATADATA DATA

R

R

Page 66: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

The Sniper Attack

exitentry

exit entry

DATADATA

R

R

DATADATADATADATA

Page 67: Memory-based  DoS  and  Deanonymization  Attacks on Tor

The Sniper Attack

exitentry

exit entry

DATADATA

R

R

DATADATADATA

Killed by OS

DATA