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International Phenomenological Society

Memory and ExternalismAuthor(s): Sven BerneckerSource: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 69, No. 3 (Nov., 2004), pp. 605-632Published by: International Phenomenological SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40040769 .

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Memoryand ExternalismSVEN BERNECKERUniversity of Manchester

Philosophy and Phenomenological ResearchVol. LXIX,No. 3, November 2004

Contentexternalism about memory says that the individuation of memory contentsdepends on relations the subject bears to his past environment. I defend externalismabout memory by arguing that neither philosophicalnor psychological considerationsstand in the way of accepting the context dependency of memory that follows fromexternalism.

This paper develops an indirect argument for content externalism about mem-ory, that is, the view that the individuation of memory contents depends onrelations the subject bears to his past environment.1 My starting point is thememory argument which is adaptedfrom Paul Boghossian's article "Contentand Self-Knowledge". The memory argument attempts to show that external-ism about memory yields the absurd consequence that a subject can know thecontents of his current thoughts only if the environmental conditions deter-mining these contents will not change in the future. Thus future eventsdetermine whether you can know what you are thinking right now. I willargue that the memory argument fails because it mistakenly assumes thatremembering is a form (ratherthan a source) of knowing. This error is cor-rected in a refined memory argument, but a further problem emerges in thatthe refined memory argument rests on an equivocation of the term 'forget-ting'.

Although the original and the refined memory arguments fail, they pointto an apparent problem with externalism about memory. Given externalism,an environmental shift can, by itself, cause memory failure. Prima facie itseems that our ability to remember depends, in the first instance, on our men-tal condition- on factors in the head rather than on conditions of the envi-ronment we live in. If we are unable to remember today what we knew yes-terday this is due to a change within us, not a change of our surroundings; orso a critic of externalism would say. Yet, on closer inspection, it turns outthat worries concerning the externalist thesis that environmental switchingcan cause memory failures are misplaced because there are neither philosophi-1 'Contentexternalism' s also called semanticexternalism'. For brevity I will talk about'externalism'.

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cal nor psychologicalreasons to substantiate hem. The conclusion will bethatnothingstandsin the way of acceptingthe context dependency f mem-ory thatfollows from externalism.

Section 1 sets the stageandexplainsthe memory argument.In sections 2through5 the premisesof the memory argumentareexplainedand discussedcritically. Section 2 concerns the question of whether memory contentssuperveneon past,presentor futureenvironmental onditions. Sections 3 and4 offerexplicationand criticism of two competingexternalistpositions con-cerningthe effects environmental hifts have on our concepts and contents.Section 5 looks into thequestionwhethermemory is merelyretainedknowl-edge. Having argued hat the memory argumentfails, section 6 develops arefinedversionof the memoryargument hat overcomes the problemsof theoriginalone. Section 7 shows that the refinedversion of the memory argu-ment is also invalid.Afteran interimconclusion in section 8, sections 9 and10 dispel some possible remaining worries concerning externalism aboutmemory. Section 9 shows that externalismaboutmemory correspondswithpsychologicaldata andsection 10 suggeststhatit is compatiblewith the psy-chological criterionof personal dentity.

1. The Memory ArgumentHilaryPutnam (1975) andTyler Burge(1998a) developedexternalismusingtwin earththought experiments:magine a possible world that is a duplicateof earth.Theonly differencebetween thetwo worldsis that twin earthdoesn'thave anywater.Instead here s a liquidthatsuperficiallyresembles water butwhich has the chemical formulaXYZ. An individual5, like each one of us,has a duplicateon twin earth. Twin earththought experimentsaremeant toshow that,becausethereferenceof S's 'water'expression s different from thereferenceof his twin earthian ounterpart's*water'expression,the meaningsof these homophonic expressions are distinct. And if the meaning of anexpressionis determinedby the concepts of the speaker,then the conceptexpressedby S's term'water' is different rom the conceptexpressedby twinS's term'water'.To translate heconceptexpressedby the twin earthianword'water' intoEnglishwe have to coin a new word,perhaps twater'.Due to thedifference n concepts,S and twin S expressdifferent houghts when both ofthemutter, orexample, 'Gee, water s wet!'.2

2 This version of the twin earthexampleexploits the fact that in the case of a naturalkindterm such as 'water',the natureof the referentplays an essential role in individuatingtheconcept associated with the word. The advantageof other versions of externalism(suchas Burge' social externalism or Dretske's informational semantics) over Putnam'sessentialist externalism is that they are not limited to natural kind terms. Furthermore,essentialism is highly contentious, for what is it about the chemical composition (asopposedto color, taste,density,or boiling point) that makes it the defining characteristic

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Burge (1998b) expands twin earth thought experiments into slow switch-ing scenarios: suppose that S is unwittingly switched from earth to twinearth and remains there for some time. Given the externalist interpretation ofslow switching scenarios, S's word 'water' eventually comes to express theconcept twater instead of the earthian concept water. So if S used to believeon earth that water is wet, he would now believe that twater is wet. Just as Sis unaware of the environmental shift from earth to twin earth, he is unawareof the consequent alteration of his conceptual repertoire.3

Why is it important that the switching take place slowly! Why wouldn't aquick switch bring about the adoption of new concepts and the loss of oldconcepts? This has to do with the externalist idea that whether an internalstate (e.g., brain state) bears any mental content, and which content it bears,depends on the lawlike connections between it and certain extrinsic facts. AsFodor puts it, "only nomic connections and the subjunctives they licensecount for meaning" (1990, p. 58). Just as laws usually need to be hedgedwith a ceteris paribus clause, the nomic dependence of internal states onenvironmental conditions depends on certain normality standards. Suppose Sis stealthily brought to twin earth, remains there for only a minute, and isthen taken back to earth. If during the brief visit to twin earth S said "Lo, lotsof water here!", he would surely say something false. His statement is falsebecause his usage of 'water' as referring to XYZ is an anomaly.4

Externalists unanimously agree that a conceptual shift caused by an envi-ronmental shift takes time. Only if S remains on twin earth long enough is atwater concept substituted for his water concept. But how long is longenough? That's hard to say. Brueckner (1998, p. 321) expects the substitutionof a twater concept for a water concept to take months and years.Given the possibility of slow switching, Boghossian encourages us toconsider the following case: at th S lives on earth and thinks thoughts

of water? It is possible to develop slow switching experiments that do not presupposeessentialism.Slow switching scenarios and twin earth cases assume a narrow notion of environmentaccordingto which a person'scontent-determiningnvironment s limitedto the planet heresides on. If, however, the notion of an environment is construed broadly, then theenvironment s madeup of everything in the person's universe. Given the broad notion,twin earth belongs to the environment of earth, and vice versa. S's word 'water' thenrefers to both liquids H2Oand XYZ even before he is whisked from earth to twinearth, and a switch between both planets doesn't bring about a conceptual change.Assumingthe broad notion of an environment,a move from earth to twin earth wouldonly bringabout a conceptualshift if the thoughtexperiment is slightlymodified: insteadof earth and twin earthhavingexisted side by side for some time in the past, twin earthonly springsinto existence the very second 5 gets there.The fact thata concept-displacementakes time also explains why Putnam's(1981, ch. 1)famous brain-in-a-vatargumentagainstexternal-worldskepticism only works for brainsthat have been in a vat for a while. A recently envatted brain still has some systematicconnections with the ordinarythingsin the outside world and is therefore capable ofexpressingandthinkingthat t is a brain n a vat.



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involving the concept water, for instance, the thought that water is wet.Moreover, he knows that he is thinking that water is wet. Some time after ttS unwittingly travels from earth to twin earth. Once his word 'water' comesto express the concept twater instead of the earthian concept water, at t2, Slacks the necessary concepts to recount his earthian water-thought (except bymeans of indexical descriptions such as "the stuff that I thought at f, waswet" or "the stuff I swam in at f;"). He is unable to reproduce the content ofhis thought at tj the very content which he used to know about. How canthis fact be explained? Either S forgot what he used to know or he neverknew. Since straightforward memory failures are irrelevant to the discussion,Boghossian excludes them by stipulation. He concludes that "[t]he onlyexplanation [...] for why S will not know [at t2] what he is said to know [attj]yis [...] that he never knew" (1998, p. 172). Peter Ludlow (1998a, p. 308)parses the argument into the following steps:

(1) If 5 forgets nothing, then what S knew at th S can know at t2.(2) S forgot nothing.(3) S does not know that p at t2.(4) Therefore, S did not know thatp at tj.

'P' stands for a reflexive proposition such as "I think (or thought) that


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Boghossian's argument an also be readas a critiqueof externalism aboutmemorycontent. In this interpretation,he point of the argumentis that,given externalism about memory content, you can know your presentthought contentsonly if, in the future, you will not be subjectedto slowswitching. Future events determinewhetheryou can know what you arethinking rightnow. Obviously, this conclusion is too strangeto be credible.The moral of the argumentis therefore hat the price we have to pay forexternalismaboutmemorycontentis excessively high and thatwe should getridof it.

Whenargument 1) through(4) is understood s a critiqueof externalismaboutmemorycontents,in the way explainedabove, I referto it as the mem-ory argument.The memory argumenthinges on three assumptions: firstly,the thesis that memory contents are fixed by past (rather hanpresent)envi-ronmental onditions;secondly,the ideathat the slow switching of an agentcauses him to adopt new conceptsandto lose the old ones; and, thirdly,theepistemic theoryof memory, according o which rememberings a form ofknowing.Sections 2 to 5 will examine these assumptionsone afterthe other.It will turnout that the first assumption s reasonable, he second assumptionis questionable,andthe thirdassumption s false.

2. Against Temporal ExternalismExternalismhas it thatmemorycontentscruciallydependon systematicrela-tions thatthe individualbears withcertainconditionsof the physical or socialenvironment.Since a personcan move from one environmentalconditiontoanother perhapswithout even noticing the environmental hange),the ques-tion arises whethermemory contentsare determined y the environment helived in at the time he had the original thought, by the environmenthe livesin at the time recollectiontakesplace,or by the environmenthe will inhabitat some point in the future,afterrecollection has taken place. Do memorycontentsand the conceptscontainedin them superveneon past, presentorfutureenvironmentalonditions?According o the standard ersion of externalismabout memory presup-posedby the memoryargument thecontent of a memorystate is fixed, onceand for all, by the environment he subject was in at the time he had theoriginal thought. Once some content is stored n memory it is inert to allsubsequentenvironmental hanges.Therefore, f, by thetimethe subject triesto remembera previouscontent, he has lost some of the relevantconceptsdue to environmental hanges, he will be unable to reactivatethe originalcontent.

knowledge only providesus withknowledgeof what is in ourminds,butnot that we haveminds.



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Temporal externalism about memory contents stands opposed to the viewthat memory contents are fixed by the past environment and remain frozen upto some later moment of recollection. Instead it is claimed that memory con-tents are determined by present and/or future environmental conditions. Tem-poral externalism comes in two flavors: memory contents are determinedeither by the present environment (presentist externalism) or by the presentand the future environment {futurist externalism)? Proponents of presentistexternalism are Baillie (1997, p. 327), Ludlow (1998a; 1998b; 1999a), Tye(1998, p. 81) and my ancestral self (1998, p. 340).7 Futurist externalism isdefended by Jackman (1999), Ludlow (1999b) and, with reservations, Stone-ham (2003).

In either version of temporal externalism, the content of S's memory at tjof event e is distinct from the content of his memory at t2 of e, if the con-tent-determining environmental conditions at tj differ from those at t2. Sowhen a person moves from one environment to another the contents of hismemories shift accordingly. A memory state isn't identified with a singlecontent, but rather with a series of contents at different times. Given that thecontent of a memory state at t3 has to match neither the content of the sametype of memory state at t2 nor the content of the original thought at tj ofwhich it is a memory, a switched subject can remember events from beforethe switch, even though he is unable to reactivate the original contents.Therefore temporal externalism makes the memory argument crumble.For externalists about memory, like myself, temporal externalism has theadvantage of undermining the memory argument. Yet this advantage comes ata heavy price. For, given temporal externalism, memory becomes unable toplay the epistemic role it is supposed to play- it is no longer a reliablesource of knowledge about the past.8To see this, suppose that at tl S comesto form the correct belief that he is drinking a glass of water. Then he isunknowingly brought to twin earth. If, at t2, S recollects that he had a glassof twater at th his memory turns into a falsehood, since at tj S never had anyencounter with twater. So S's memory is no longer able to inform him aboutthe past.96 What I call 'futuristexternalism' Brown (2000) and Stoneham (2003) call 'temporalexternalism'.

I no longerbelieve thatmemorycontents are fixed by presentcircumstances.This objection was developed in an unpublishedmanuscriptby Hofmann. The relevantpassages from Hofmann' paper are cited or paraphrasedby Kraay (2002, pp. 300-1),Ludlow(1998b, p. 315; 1999a,p. 167; 1999b, p. 154) and Nagasawa (2000, pp. 173-4).Kraay and Nagasawa endorse Hofmann' criticism of temporal externalism. Unlikemyself (cf. section 5), Hofmannbelieves thatremembering s a way of knowing.This raises the interestingquestionto whatextent past and present thoughtcontents haveto be alike for the present content to qualify as a memory of the past content. Manyphilosopherspresumethatmemoryis a purely passive device for registering, storing,andreproducing nformation.On this xerox model of memory the content of a memory state

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Ludlow believes that this objection to temporal externalism shouldn't betaken too seriously since in the majority of cases the truth values of thoughtcontents before and after an environmental shift are the same.If I believe at t} that water s wet, then at /2,memorywill deliver a belief that twater is wet. Ifat tj I believed it was possible to drownin water,memorywill delivera t2belief that it is possi-ble to drown in twater and good thing, too! Twater is no less wet or dangerous than water(1999a, p. 167).There are only relatively few instances, Ludlow claims, where, given tempo-ral externalism, a veridical belief will give rise to false 'memory'. One suchcase is when I believe at tj that I fell in some water and then, at t2, I 'remem-ber' having fallen in some twater. Here 'memory' does transform a truth intoa falsehood. However, Ludlow notes, although this 'memory' is literallyfalse, it is not false "in a way that undermines my plans and actions on twinearth. [...] The externalist conception of memory I am advocating deliverstruths that are important, and perhaps delivers some falsehoods that are notimportant" (1999a, p. 167). He concludes that it is not the case that temporalexternalism renders memory an unreliable source of knowledge. On the con-trary, "there is no reason at all why [transient memories] cannot be com-pletely reliable in those environmental conditions in which they occur"(1998b, p. 315).

Even if we grant Ludlow that, given the determination of memory con-tents by the current and/or future environment, failures of truth preservationare rare and benign, temporal externalism leads to a problematic conception ofmemory. In this conception of memory, the truth conditions of memoriesdon't refer to the past but the present and/or the future. To drive this pointhome, consider the memory state expressed by the statement "There used tobe a tree in S's garden". Intuitively, this memory is about the past in thesense that the content of the term 'tree' is determined by what used to be inS's garden. The memory claim is true if and only if it is an accurate represen-tation of some past states of affairs. Given temporal externalism, however,the concepts used in memories are determined by the present environment.But if the concepts employed in memories refer to present affairs so do thetruth conditions of memories. And if the truth conditions of memories refer

mustbe a token of the very same type of content as the original thoughtfrom which itcausallyderives. I believe that the xerox model is incomplete. Depending on the context,rememberingrequireseither verbatimreproductionof the encoded informationor allowsfor some degree of reconstruction.Sometimes the content of a memory state doesn'thave to be type-identicalwith the mental content it causally derives from but it sufficesthat the two content-tokens are of similartypes. This then raises the question to whatextent two content-tokensmay differ from one another and one of them still count as amemory of the other. In any case, given externalism, a twater-thoughtand a water-thoughtaretoo dissimilarforone of themto be a memoryof the other.

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to presentaffairs,the memoryclaim in questionwould turn out false if therewere no longera tree in S's garden.But this is surelyabsurd.Temporalexternalistsmight try to defend their account of memory by

maintaininghat,while memorycontents are determinedby thepresentand/orthe future, they somehow referto the past: the direct objects of memo-ries presentand/or utureenvironmental onditions somehow indicatepastenvironmental onditions.Yet I cannot make sense of the reference f presentand/or utureenvironmental onditions to pastones. Thus I concludethat theonly viable form of externalismaboutmemory says that memory contentsare determinedby past environmental onditions.Even thoughI reject the temporalexternalistaccount of memory, I thinkthat it providesan interestingaccount of other types of mental contents.Unfortunately,however, temporal externalism is rarely taken seriously.While presentistexternalismhas at least a small groupof supporters, uturistexternalism is dismissed outright. That future environmental conditionsdeterminepresent houghtcontents strikes many as being as counterintuitiveas, say, the conceptof backwardsausation. On closer inspection, however,the seeming incredibilityof futurist externalism s structurally he same asthe seemingincredibilityof standardxternalism.For if we allow past envi-ronmentalconditions to determinepresentcontents, then,given that the pres-ent is partof the future'spast, presentand futureenvironmentalconditionsshouldalso belong to the content-determiningactors.Moreover,in any ver-sion of externalism,mental content is determinedby factors of which thethinker oranyoneelse) maybe ignorant.Since environmental hanges in thefuturearejust one kind of factor of which we areignorant,futuristexternal-ism isn't any less plausiblethanstandard xternalism.

3. Conceptual Replacement vs. Conceptual AdditionSwitchingscenarios allow for two kinds of interpretations.n the conceptualreplacementview, the slow switching of an agentcauses him to adoptnewconcepts and to eventually lose the old ones. In the conceptual additionview, the slow switchingof an agent only causes him to adoptnew conceptsbutnot to lose the old ones. Even long after the time of switching, the agentpossesses earthianand twin earthianconcepts and contents. Although theconceptualreplacementview represents he standardnterpretationf switch-ing scenarios,only a few philosophersopenly commit themselves to thisposition. Explicit proponentsof the replacementview are Ludlow (1999a,pp. 163-5), Lycan(1996, pp. 129-30), andTye (1998, pp. 83-4). The claimthatswitchingdoesn't involve the loss of old concepts is endorsedby Burge(1998c, p. 359), Falvey (2003, p. 229), Gibbons(1996, p. 295), Heal (1998,p. 108), Kobes (1996, p. 89), andKraay(2002, pp. 305-7).

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The level of the debate between the conceptual replacement view and theconceptual addition view is usually quite low. The defense of the additionview is rarely more than a simple assertion. Take, for example, Heal, whowrites: "For a referring term to take on a new referential relation, as a resultof interaction with a new kind of stuff or individual, is not necessarily for itto lose its original reference."10No elaboration provided. No need for elabora-tion acknowledged. The defense of the replacement theory is equallyungrounded. Tye, for example, notes that the addition view is "very implau-sible" because "after many years on twin earth I surely am not prepared toapply both the concept Water and the concept water to the liquid that comesout of taps, fills lakes, etc. in my current environment" (1998, pp. 83-4). Noargument given.

Ludlow tries to develop an indirect argument for the conceptual replace-ment view of switching scenarios. He accuses the addition view of having theconsequence that apparently sound inferences are transformed into unsoundones.Suppose,for example, thatat t21fall in some twaterandthinka thoughtwhich I express as "Iam thinkingthat water is wet".I then reason out loud as follows: "I am thinkingthat water iswet, and I was thinkingthat water is wet at /,, therefore I have thoughtthat water is wet atleast twice". Here is a case where the contentof the first premise of my reasoning is causallyconnected to my falling into twater at t2, and the content of the second premise is causallyconnected to my falling into water at t,. If those are the contents at workin my inference, thenmy inference is (contrary o appearance)unsound(1999a, p. 165).If Ludlow were right in claiming that the addition view converts sound argu-ments into unsound ones, this would be a good reason to favor the conceptualreplacement view. But Burge (1998c, pp. 364-8) has convincingly arguedthat, contrary to first impression, the inference in question is not sound. Theinference is not sound because the first premise is about twater and the secondpremise is about water.11

Boghossian favors the addition view but he follows the tradition andassumes the replacement view of switching scenarios (1998, p. 159; 1992a,pp. 18-21). Indeed, the conceptual replacement view is an indispensable tenetof the memory argument. For unless switching causes an agent to lose hisold concepts beyond recovery, an environmental shift does not rob him of theability to recount thoughts involving those old concepts. In other words, ifswitching results in the addition of new concepts, but not in the loss of old10 1998,p. 108. Gibbons(1996, pp.299-302) has come up withsomethingthatpurports o bean argument n favor of the conceptualadditionview.11 Brown(2004, pp. 177-8) echos Ludlow's argument.While Ludlow uses the transforma-tion of seemingly sound inferences into unsound ones as an argumentagainst the con-ceptualadditionview, Boghossian(1992a, pp. 21-2) uses the very idea as an argumentagainstexternalism.For a critiqueof Boghossians move, see Burge (1998c, pp. 363-8),Kobes (1996, p. 91), and Schiffer (1992). In (1992b) Boghossianrespondsto Schiffer.

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ones, nothing stops a switched agent from reactivating his past thought con-tents.Since the memory argument rests on the replacement view, a critic of the

memory argument only has to adopt the addition view. In fact, the avoidanceof the memory argument is the chief motive for adopting the addition view.Yet the conceptual addition view has problems of its own. To understandthese problems, two versions of the addition view need to be distin-guished- the ambiguity view and the amalgamation view.12In the ambiguity view, ignorant switching causes the agent unknowinglyto take on two concepts (water and twater) for disjointly different sorts ofthings (H2O and XYZ). The switched agent's word 'water' is ambiguous, likeour word 'bank'. Just as 'bank' refers, on different occasions, to an effluvialembankment or a financial institution, the switched person's word 'water'refers, in different contexts, to H2O or XYZ. According to the amalgamationview, switching causes the agent's concept to broaden by applying it to H2Oand XYZ simultaneously. The switched agent's word 'water' ceases to be anaturalkind term. His term 'water' is like our term 'jade', which applies tothe two chemically distinct minerals jadeite and nephrite.To see the problems with the conceptual addition view of switching sce-narios, let's examine each version of it, beginning with the ambiguity view.In the ambiguity view, switching causes 'water' to become ambiguous. Forslow switching not to cause memory failure, a proponent of the ambiguityview has to assume that our mind is somehow equipped with a mechanismthat selects the contextually appropriate meaning of the ambiguous term.This mechanism assures that the term 'water' employed by a switched agentmeans H2O, when it is used in a memory claim, and XYZ otherwise. With-out such a mechanism slow switching would cause memory failure, for thenthe switched agent might use his twater-concept to try to recount a pastwater-thought. The problem is that it is far from clear how we should con-ceive of such a mechanism for filling in the appropriate meaning for ambigu-ous terms.In response to this worry, Burge (1998c) sets forth an account of memorythat is modeled after his inclusion theory of self-knowledge (cf. footnote 5).The inclusion theory of self-knowledge reconciles externalism with privilegedself-knowledge by arguing that the content of a first-orderthought is perforcecontained in the content of the simultaneously entertained second-orderthought and that the contents of both thoughts are determined by the samesystematic relations to environmental conditions. Burge claims that there is a

12 The distinction between the two forms of the addition view goes back to Burge (1998c, p.352). Burge calls the ambiguityview the 'disjointtype case'. This label is unfortunatesince, given the amalgamationview, the post-switch concept expressed by 'water' alsohas a disjunctivereference (H2Oor XYZ).

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type of memory - preservative memorythat also rests on an automaticcontainment process. Suppose a victim of slow switching remembers "Ithought that water is wet". When this is an instance of preservative memory,the embedded content ("water is wet") isn't distinct from the content of thepast thought it is a memory of.The point of preservativememory is to fix the content in present mental acts or states as thesame as the content of those past ones that are connected by causal-memory chains to thepresentones. If the individual relies primarily upon preservative memory, and if the causal-memorychains are intact,the individual's self-attribution s a reactivationof the content of thepastone, held in place by a causalmemorychain linking present to past attributions1998c, p.359, my emphasis).Through causal chains (whose segments consist of memory traces), preserva-tive memory revives past contents, without having to identify them. Memoryis understood in analogy to pronominal back-reference. When using pronounswe don't need to be able to identify the referent of a pronoun in order tosecure its reference. The reference is unfailingly secured by the chains inherentin the discourse. Similarly, the traces of preservative memory perforce con-nect later thoughts to earlier ones. Burge (1998c, p. 359) concludes that "aslong as the causal memory links are in place, preservative memory is authori-tative in something like the way much immediate present-tense self-knowl-edge is."

The first thing to notice about Burge's response to the memory argumentis that it only works for what he calls 'preservative memory'. When, insteadof redeploying some preserved concepts and contents, the subject refers tosome past contents, events, or images, the past mental content isn't con-tained or embedded in the present one. And when there is no causal-preserva-tive link in place, slow switching causes memory failures in the sense thatthe wrong kinds of concepts are used to represent past contents.More importantly, however, Burge's conception of preservative memorycommits us to the classical-computational approach to cognitive psychology.In this approach, mental states- including memory traces are symbolicstructures that have semantically evaluable constituents. The structure of amemory trace is said to correspond to the structure of the mental state it caus-ally derives from and to the structure of the mental state it causally bringsabout (i.e., the state of remembering). This assertion is presupposed by thenotion of preservative memory. For only if the symbolic and semantic struc-ture of a memory trace is the same as that of propositional attitudes, does itmakes sense to claim that traces propagate concepts and contents that areautomatically 'inserted' into memory-states.

When memory traces are viewed connectionistically, however, there are nosyntactically and semantically structuredformulae in an internal code. Mem-ory is not a storehouse for mental contents. Instead information is encoded in



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the weights (or strengths) of connections between the neurons. What is storedin memory is a set of changes in the instructions neurons send each other,affecting what pattern of activation can be constructed from a given input.Remembering occurs when an input 'travels' through an established activa-tion pattern.13

My complaint about the conception of preservative memory is not that itconflicts with connectionism. Since the debate between connectionism andcomputationalism about memory is still ongoing, it could be thatconnectionism about memory will be shown to be flawed.14 Rather, my dis-pute with the notion of preservative memory is that it (implicitly) takes aside in the computationalism/connectionism debate. As long as the debate isundecided, it is prudent not to base the interpretation of slow switching sce-narios on any one of the rival cognitive psychologies.The amalgamation view of switching scenarios isn't any less problematicthan the ambiguity view. The chief problem with the amalgamation view isthat if, by using a concept (e.g., water) to refer to something it wasn'tdesigned to refer to (e.g., XYZ), the reference base of the concept is enlargedto include the new object, pretty soon the concept becomes so broad that itapplies to virtually everything. The amalgamation view therefore doesn'tseem to leave room for the misapplication of concepts.

Finally, neither version of the conceptual addition view is able to accountforKripke's (1980) modal intuitions. To drive this point home, imagine anindividual, 5, who doesn't know that water is H2O. S is unwittingly shuttledfrom earth to twin earth and remains there for some time. Then S is con-fronted with the following story: "Suppose that the substance designated byyour word 'water' is XYZ. Moreover, suppose somewhere in a nearby galaxyexists a planet which contains H2O instead of XYZ. The inhabitants of thisplanet call H2O 'water'. Do you think the substance they designate with'water' is really water?"According to Kripke's modal intuitions the answer tothis question has to be 'no'. But if we assume the amalgamation view and theambiguity view, this answer is false.In light of the problems surrounding the ambiguity view and the amalga-mation view, it would be welcomed if externalists were not compelled toadopt the conceptual addition view so as to be able to repudiate the memory

Tye (1998, p. 93) pointsout thatthe connectionistapproachto memory takes away someof the perplexities of presentist externalism. "Since it is now the case that therepresentationswithsuch contents do not exist untilthe time of recollection, there are nocontents thatattachto the representationsbefore they are retrieved,and hence there canbe no question of the representationsnow having the contents they used to have instorage."It seems to me that the likelihood of this is low. With respect to memory, classicalcomputationalism ndconnectionismshouldn't be viewed as rivals but as complementarytheories.

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atth [he] cannotsay or think what [he] was thinkingthen. But if [he] cannotthinkit, [he] cannot know it" (1996, p. 309).This is not the place to discuss Gibbons'position in detail. I only men-tion it to indicatethat the conceptualadditionview does not guarantee thatrememberings compatiblewith slow switching. When externalism s com-bined with functionalrole semantics,knowledgeableswitching bringsaboutaconceptualshift that preventsus from accessingsome of our past thoughts.The memory argument riumphsonce again.

5. Remembering Without KnowingThe memoryargumentnotonly restson theconceptualreplacementview butalso on the epistemic theory of memory, i.e., the view that memory is aform of knowledgeas opposedto being a source of it. To remember ome-thing is to know it, where this knowledgewas previously acquired nd pre-served. The dependence f the memory argumenton the epistemic theoryofmemoryis particularly lear in thecase of premise(1), which states that if Sforgets nothing,then whatS knew at th S can know at t2. Unless remember-ing is a way of knowing, it might well be that S remembers hatp withouttherebyknowingthatp or havingknown thatp.Theepistemic theoryhas come to be the standard ontemporaryaccount ofthe natureof memory, drawingsupportfrom a wide varietyof philosophersandonly infrequent riticism.15t is thereforenot surprisingthat the memoryargumentpresupposesthe truth of the epistemic theory. Despite its wide-spreadacceptance, believe that the epistemic theory is mistaken and that,therefore, he memoryargumentdoesn't workas it stands. In my view, whatpasses intomemory may be merelya representationr belief, not knowledge.Knowledge superveneson some but not all cases of remembering.If memory were a form of knowledge(viz., retainedknowledge), then,assumingthatknowledgeisjustifiedtruebelief, S doesn't rememberat t2 thatp (where 'p' is a propositionS hasentertainedat tj) unlessthe following con-ditions aremet:(i) p was true at th (ii) S believed at tj that/?, (iii) S was jus-tified at tj in believing thatp, (iv) p is true at r2,(v) S believes at t2 thatp,and(vi) S is justified at t2in believing thatp. If any one of these conditionsis false or untenable,the epistemic theorist of memory is forcedto concludethat S doesn'trememberat t2 thatp. Elsewhere(2001) I have argued hat Scan remember hatp without believing (eitherat tj or at t2) that p. Here Iwant to suggest thatmemoryis also independentof justification.

Counterexampleso the justificationcondition of memorycan be dividedalong three lines. Firstly, counterexamplesmay challengethe past justifica-

Among the proponentsof the epistemic theory of memory are Dummett(1993, pp. 420-1), Evans (1982, p. 235), Malcolm (1977, pp. 102-8), Shoemaker (1970, p. 282) andWilliamson(2000, pp. 37-8), to mention ust a few.

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tion condition (iii) or the present justification condition (vi). Secondly, arememberer may either not be aware of his being justified in believing p(absent-justification cases) or he may possess positive counter-evidence to pand thus be aware of his not being justified in believing p (defeated-justifica-tion cases). Thirdly, counterexamples may presume either an internalist or anexternalist account of epistemic justification. When the epistemic theory ofmemory is coupled with internalism about justification, S remembers at t2that p iff he has cognitive access at tt and/or at t2 to the factors that justifyhis belief that p. Externalism about justification, on the other hand, is theview that some of the factors needed for your beliefs to be epistemically justi-fied may be external to your cognitive perspective.

Since most advocates of the epistemic theory of memory are epistemicexternalists and since absent-justification cases only work against an internal-ist construal of the epistemic theory of memory there is no point in discuss-ing these cases here.

Defeated-justification cases are concerned with subjects who remember thatp but who have reasons to believe that their belief in p is not justified.Whether such cases pose a threat to an externalist construal of the epistemictheory of memory depends on the assumed version of externalism. Given aus-tere epistemic externalism, the question of whether a belief is justified isquite distinct from the question of whether the subject takes his belief to bejustified. A belief is or isn't justified regardless of what the subject thinksabout the justificatory status of the belief. Yet in response to BonJour's(1985, ch. 3) clairvoyance cases, most epistemic externalists hold that eventhough a subject need not be aware of the factors that justify his belief, hemay not be aware of evidence that undermines his belief. This negative coher-ence condition ensures that for a belief to become knowledge it must not beincoherent with the background information the subject possesses. Given thismitigated version of epistemic externalism, defeated-justification cases pose athreat to the epistemic theory of memory.

First, consider a counterexample (adapted from Shope 1973, pp. 308-9) tothe past justification condition (iii): at tj S irrationally believed that some-thing was occurring, something which he was, in fact, witnessing, but whenhe had good reasons to suppose that he hadjust been given a strong hallu-cinogenic drug. Given mitigated externalism about justification, 5 wasn'tjustified at tj in believing that such a thing was taking place in front of himand thus he didn't know that it was. At t2, S learns that, in spite of his pastevidence, he had not actually been given a hallucinogenic drug. Now the ques-tion is whether S may be said to remember at t2 that the event took place.The answer is 'yes'. The fact that at tx S wasn't justified in believing that pand thus didn't know that p doesn't prevent us from attributing to him at t2memory that p.



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Next,considera counterexampleadapted rom Saunders1965, pp. 282-3)to the present ustification condition(vi): at tj S met his sister and noticedthat she was wearinga blue shirt. Becausehe then knew this fact abouthissister,5 holds at t2the veridicalmemorythat his sister wore a blue shirt. Att3 S is told by all the people who werepresentat tj that his sister wore agreen shirt. Moreover,he is presentedwith convincingbut misleadingevi-denceto the effect thathis sister worea greenshirt. Given mitigatedexternal-ism aboutjustification,S doesn't know at t3that his sister wore a blue shirt,for he is unable to rule out the possibility that she wore a green shirt. Hefails to know that his sister wore a blue shirt, despitethe fact that he stillremembers it. Thus, 5 knows at tx that p, remembersat t3 everythingheknewat th andyet fails to know at t3 thatp- even though he continues tobelieve thatp andp continuesto be true for thereasonthat he isn't justifiedin believing thatp. Premise(1) is plainlyfalse.

Memory, unlike knowledge,doesn't imply justification. Not only is itpossible to remembersomethingat t2 that one didn't ustifiably believe at t}but also one may acquirebetweentt andt2 some misleadingbut reasonableevidencethatdestroysthe statusas knowledgeof the once-genuineknowledgethat one still remembers.Whatpasses into memory may be merelya repre-sentationor belief, notknowledge.

6. The Refined Memory ArgumentGiven the failureof the epistemic theoryof memory, two of the threeprem-ises of the memory argumentmust be rephrased.Premise (1) must bereplacedby the following premise:

(1*)If 5 forgets nothing,then whatS representedat tj, S can representat

Andpremise(3) must be replacedby thispremise:(3*) S cannotrepresent hatp att2.

We arenow in a position to reformulate he memory argument.The refinedmemoryargument ooks like this:

(1*)If 5 forgetsnothing,then whatS representedat th S can representat(2) S forgot nothing.(3*)S cannotrepresent hatp at t2.Since whatpasses into memorymay be nothingbut a subconscious thoughtor a fleetingexperience I call the elements of memory 'representation' rather than 'thought' or'belief.

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(4*)Therefore,S did notrepresent hatpaitj.As in the case of the original memory argument, 'p' stands for a reflexivepropositionsuch as "I think (or thought)that q*\ where V is a first-orderproposition.If an unwittingswitch fromearthto twin earth causes S to lose his waterconcept(conceptual eplacement iew), he is unableto call to mind his pastwater-thoughtpremise(3*)). Given that S forgot nothing (premise(2)), hisinabilityto recount his past water-thoughtndicatesthat he neverentertaineda water-hought(premise(1*)). Thus the moralof the refinedmemory argu-ment is that,to have a thought rightnow, one needs to be able to rememberit later. Past thoughtsconsist only of those thoughtsthatcan be remembered.What cannot be recalleddidn'thappen. The loss of memories makes pastthoughtsvanish.Theconclusionof the original memoryargumentdiffers from that of therefinedmemory argument.Giventheoriginalmemory argument,externalismaboutmemory makes the knowability of one's presentthoughtcontents de-pendon whetherone will be subjected o slow switchingin the future. Giventhe refinedmemory argument, t is the existence of one's present thoughtsthat is affectedby slow switching in the future.The latterconclusion is, ofcourse,no less absurdthan the formerconclusion. So if the refinedmemoryargumentcan be believed, this is reason enough to get rid of externalismaboutmemory.

7. Critique of the Refined Memory ArgumentTherearenumerousdifferent orms of forgetting.HereI want to distinguishbetween two aspectsof the commonsensicalnotion of forgettingthat I willcall the wide and thenarrow notion of forgetting.The wide notionof forget-ting refers to any kind of memoryfailureregardlessof whether t is causedbythe breachof an epistemic duty or by an event beyondthe subject's control.Thus, according o the wide notion, 'forgetting'also includes memory fail-ures due to slow switching. The narrow notion of forgetting, on the otherhand,designatesonly thosememoryfailuresfor which the subject is himselfresponsible,which would have been within his power to avoid. Given thenarrownotion, memory failurescausedby switching don't count as forget-ting.1717 Butler declares that "[t]he ability to remember what one was thinking may not beinfallible, but there is no reason (at least no reason independent of externalism) to

supposethat ts fallibilityhas anythingat all to do with a change in environments"(1997,p. 791). Butler does not explain why he is reluctant to call memory failures due toconceptualshifts 'forgetting' Probablyhe tacitly assumes that forgettingimplies that thefactorscausingthe memoryfailure are withinthe agent's control.This at least is Kraay'sreason for claiming that "the memory failure broughtabout by conceptual shift [due to

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The refined memory argument is incoherent because it rests on a confu-sion of the two notions of forgetting. Premise (1*) presupposes the widenotion of forgetting, whereas premise (2) assumes the narrow notion. Thereis no single notion of forgetting which renders both premises of the memoryargument true. And since the notion of forgetting is the same in premise (1*)as in premise (1), this critique also applies to the original memory argument.Let's start with premise (1*): if S forgets nothing, then what S representedat th S can represent at t2. This premise has the form of an implication. Forthe consequent of the implication to be true, the antecedent has to rule outnot only some but all memory failures. It has to exclude not only memoryfailures for which the subject is himself responsible but also memory failuresfor which he is not responsible. Therefore, the term 'forgetting' used in theantecedent of premise (1*) has to be understood in the wide sense. Premise(1*) may be rephrased as follows: given the absence of any memory failures,what S represented at th he can represent at t2.

Next, consider premise (2): S forgot nothing. Boghossian motivates thispremise by claiming that "in discussing the epistemology of relationallyindividuated content, we ought to be able to exclude memory failure by stipu-lation" (1998, p. 172). But is this really the case? Given the conceptualreplacement view which Boghossian takes for granted, a conceptual shift dueto unwitting slow switching does cause memory failure. And if we assumethe wide notion of forgetting, it follows that switching causes forgetting.18Therefore the only way for Boghossian to reconcile the conceptual replace-ment view with the truth of (2) is to read this premise as implying the nar-row notion of forgetting. On the narrow reading, premise (2) only makes surethat S does not forget due to the violation of an epistemic duty. He may,however, forget due to other factors such as unwitting switching. In sum, therefined memory argument rests on an equivocation of the term 'forgetting'.19

switching] is a paradigmaticinstance of the kind of memory failure that does notconstituteforgetting" 2002, pp. 303-4).This point has been made beforeby Brueckner 1998, pp. 326-7), Burge(1998c, pp. 368-9)andTye(1998, p. 89).After having completed this paper I learned that Nagasawa (2002) also criticizes thememoryargument or equivocatingon the notion of forgetting. Like myself, Nagasawadistinguishesbetween a narrowand a wide notion of forgetting.What distinguishesthesetwo forms of forgetting according to him is that narrow forgetting is "a kind ofneurophysiologicalevent"while wide forgetting"is not a neurophysiologicalevent in S'sbrain,but merely a shift of memory content caused by slow-switching" (p. 338). I findthis way of drawing the distinctionbetween the two notions of forgetting unfortunate.Firstly,thewide notion of forgettingmakes it seem as if externalism were incompatiblewith a physicalist conception of memory. Secondly, since information is storedeverywherein the brain rather hananywherein particularand since quite independentof slow switching a person's neurophysiologicalconditionchangesacross time, none of5's post-switch brain states will match any of his pre-switch brain states. But then anyinstance of wide forgetting is also a case of narrow forgetting and the proposeddistinctioncollapses.

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8. Interim ConclusionWe have seen that the memory argument ails. Given the conceptualadditionview, the memory argument simply dissolves. Grantedthe conceptualreplacementview, the memory argument s neither sound nor valid. Theoriginalmemory argumentis unsuccessful because it erroneouslyassumesthat rememberings a form of knowing. Both the original and the refinedmemoryargumentail becausethey rest on an equivocationof the term 'for-getting'.What are we to conclude from this? Is the critic of externalismsilencedforever?I thinkthe debatewith him is notplayedout yet. A critic could stillworry about the compatibility of content externalism with our ordinarynotion of memory.Externalismhas it that an environmental hift may rob usof the abilityto access some of our past thoughts. More precisely, given theconceptualreplacementview and the supervenienceof memory content onpastenvironmentalaffairs,slow switchingmakes us forget some of our pastthoughtcontents.But how is it possible, a critic of externalismmight won-der,thatenvironmental hangescanaffect ourmemory?Doesn't the ability torememberdependon our mentalcondition on factorsinside the head ratherthanon the physical or social environmentwe live in? Content externalismfails to countenance he autonomyof memory.The memory argumentcomesdown to this worry,once it is freed of all the backgroundnoise.

A critic of externalism couldtry to come up with philosophicalandpsy-chological considerationsn favor of the autonomy of memory and againstthe contextdependencyof memory.The goal of the following two sections isto show that neither of these lines of reasoningagainstexternalism is con-vincing.I will arguethatdoubtsconcerningthe externalistthesis that unwit-ting switchingcan bring aboutmemory failuresdon't have to be takenseri-ously, because thereare neitherpsychologicalnorphilosophical arguments osubstantiate hem.

9. Externalism and PsychologyAre there psychological reasons for rejectingthe externalist thesis that anenvironmental hift can bring aboutmemory failures?Quite the reverse: ithas been knownfor a long time thatrememberings highly dependent n thephysical context. John Locke cites a number of instances of the contextdependencyof memory, ncluding heanecdoteabouta youngmanwho having learned to Dance, and that to great Perfection, there happened to stand an oldTrunk n the Room where he learnt.The Idea of this remarkablepiece of Household-stuff,hadso mixed it self withthe turnsandsteps of all his Dances, thatthough n thatChamber he couldDance excellently well, yet it was only whilst thatTrunkwas there,nor could he perform wellin any other place, unless that, or some other such Trunk had its due position in the Room(1975, p. 399).

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While this may be a somewhat extreme case, there is no doubt that physicalfeatures of the context serve as potent retrieval cues. Goddon and Baddeley(1975), for example, conducted an experiment in which scuba divers heard alist of 36 words in one of two different environments- under water and onland and were later tested for recall in the same context in which the list hadbeen studied and in another context. It did not greatly matter whether thedivers were learning on land or under water. But if they learned in one contextand recalled in the other, they remembered about 40% less than if learning andrecall occurred in the same environment. So recall is better if the environmentat test is the same as the environment at study.

Smith, Glenberg and Bjork (1978) performed another experiment demon-strating the importance of the physical context in memory. In their experi-ment, subjects had to study 80 common words in a distinctive basementroom on the first day, and then attempt to recall them on a second day ineither the same room, or in a fifth-floor room with very different furnishings.Subjects who recalled in the original basement room tended to rememberabout 18 words, significantly more than those who remembered in the differ-ent upstairs room, who recalled only about 12 words. Psychologists takethese experiments to show that remembering requires cognitive resourcesnormally used to represent the immediate environment.20Given that cognitive psychologists emphasize the dependence of memoryon the physical environment, one could try to turn the tables: instead of wor-rying that externalism about memory conflicts with psychological findings,why not use psychological findings to establish externalism about memory!Unfortunately, this doesn't work. The reason is that there is a crucial differ-ence between psychological experiments and slow switching scenarios. In theabove mentioned psychological experiments, the subjects noticed whether andwhen they underwent an environmental shift. The whole point of unwittingswitching, however, is that subjects don't notice the change of environments.For psychological data to back up the externalist account of memory, onewould have to establish that environmental shifts can affect the ability toremember even when subjects are not aware that a shift took place. Unfortu-nately, there are no psychological studies examining the effects on memoryof unnoticed changes in physical environmental contexts.How would one go about setting up an experiment examining the effectson memory of unnoticed changes in environmental contexts? One possibility

For a helpful surveyof environmentalcontext effects see Smithand Vela (2001). Someexperiments ndicate that the stabilityof contextual factorsdoesn't always have a positiveeffect on remembering. Thompson,et al. (1982) found that eyewitnesses in court areexcessively influenced by the clothing worn by the criminal, leading to occasions onwhich misidentificationoccurs on this basis. On several occasions, when the defenselawyer arranged for someone other than the defendant to be wearing the clothesdescribedby the witness, the witness mistookthis personfor the criminal.

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is to use two adjacent rooms on the same corridor of a building that look thesame. After learning and before being tested the subjects could be returned tothe same room or to the adjacent room. Another possibility is to very gradu-ally change a background dimension, so as not to be noticeable. Such dimen-sions might include temperature, background noise or sound, lighting, odors,other people in the room, or visual displays.Even though there are no experiments examining the effects on memoryof unnoticed changes in physical context, there is one experiment that pro-vides at least correlational data. Our memory is not only dependent on thephysical environment but also on the internal environment, namely thepharmacological state. Psychologists call this kind of dependency statedependency. By and large, people show better memory if their pharmacol-ogical states match at study and test. A classical example for the state depend-ency effect is that, when alcoholic subjects hide money and alcohol whiledrunk, they are often unable to find it when sober, but recall the hiding placeswhen on their next binge (cf. Goodwin 1969). Now Eich and Birnbaum(1988) have shown that people don't necessarily have to become drunk toremember what they learned while they were drunk; they also show statedependent effects if they only think they are again drunk while in fact they aresober. Thus, for the state dependency effect to work, it is sufficient that sub-jects believe they occupy the same pharmacological state they occupied at thetime of learning.21As was said before, Eich's and Birnbaum's findings onlyprovide correlational data for the point in question. It is one thing to misrep-resent an environmental change and it is another to be completely obliviousof the fact that an environmental change took place.

Suppose psychologists could show that even unnoticed changes in thephysical environment can affect memory. Would this result back up theexternalist thesis that unwitting switching to twin earth can cause memoryfailure? No! The reason is that, in the case of unwitting switching, not onlydoes the subject not notice the environmental change but he is also unawareof the fact that he forgot something. A victim of stealthy switching is con-vinced that he remembers everything and, what is more, it is fully rational for21 Reconsider the above mentioned room-experiment by Smith, at al. In addition to thegroup of subjects who recalled the words in the same basement room where they hadpreviouslylearnedthem and the groupof subjects who recalled the words in a different

upstairsroom, there was a thirdgroup of subjects. These subjects learned the words inthe basementroomand were tested in the upstairsroom. But they were instructed o try torecollect as much as possible of the original learning environment before starting torecall. Interestingly, hey rememberedabout the same number of words (17.2) as thosesubjectswho hadphysicallyreturned o the learningenvironment(18). This suggests thatfor the context dependency effect to work one doesn't have to physically return to theenvironmentof information-encodingbut that it is sufficient to 'mentally return' to theoriginal environment before trying to recall the encoded information. The negativeimpact on memory of an environmentalchange can be compensated for merely bythinkingof theoriginalenvironment.



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him to have this conviction. I see no way of setting up a real-lifeexperimentwheresubjectsare unawareof environmentalhangesand of theirown mem-ory failures. Thus it is unreasonable o count on psychology to back upexternalismaboutmemory.But it is equallyunreasonable o worrythat psy-chologicaldataconflictwith externalismaboutmemory.

10. Externalism and Personal IdentityAfterhavingdiscussedpsychological reasons for rejectingexternalismaboutmemory content, we need to examine whether there are any philosophicalreasons.The only philosophicalreason that comes to my mind is an apparenttensionbetween externalismaboutmemoryandthepsychologicalcriterionofpersonal dentity.

Theproblemof personalidentityis the problemof what makes a personat two differenttimes one and the same person.As is well known, the major-ity of philosophersbelieve in some version of a psychological criterionofpersonal dentity.In a nutshell,the idea is thatperson-stageX attl belongs tothesamepersonas person-stageY at t2 if andonly if (a) X and Y arerelatedby overlappingchains of psychologicalconnections,and (b) no otherperson-stage Z at t2 exists who has equalor strongerpsychological continuity withX. The paradigmcase of a psychological connection is that between pastexperiencesandpresentmemories hereof.

Advocates of thepsychologicalcriterionof personal identitydon't, to myknowledge,concernthemselves with the issue of mental content. Yet it isreasonable o assume that they hold that, for a state of recall to qualify as(autobiographical)memory,its contenthas to be the same as, or sufficientlysimilar to, the content of the original experiencefrom which it causallyderives.For how else shouldone drawthe line between genuine memoriesand false 'memories'?Now, given this interpretation f the psychologicalcriterion,personal identitydepends(in part)on the continuity of memory,whichin turndependson the identity,or similarity, of mental content acrosstime.Assuming that personal identity primarilyconsists in the continuity ofmemory, and furthermore ssuming that a past experience and a memorythereof have to have the same, or sufficiently similar, contents, a critic ofexternalismcould come up with the following argument:given externalismabout memory content (andgiven the conceptual replacementview), slowswitchingcauses forgetting.The forgettingbrings abouta psychologicaldis-continuity which in turn destroys personal identity. After having beenswitched to twin earth, 5 isn't the same person he was before the switchoccurred.Since this conclusion is pretty strange,the critic concludes that weshould get rid of externalism and should adopt internalism instead. For,

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assuming interaalism about memory content, slow switching doesn't under-mine the diachronic numerical identity of the switched person.Contrary to a first impression, however, the externalist interpretation of

slow switching scenarios does not endanger the identity of the switched per-son.As long as earthian English and twin earthian English differ only with

respect to one notion- namely the notion of water the alteration of one'sconceptual repertoire caused by slow switching isn't sufficiently extensive todestroy personal identity. But even when earthian English differs from twinearthian English with respect to many words, we are not committed to sayingthat slow switching undermines personal identity. For the numerical identityof the switched person S is in jeopardy only if he tries to recount thoughtsinvolving concepts which he lost as a result of the switching. Let's supposethat S does attempt to recount thoughts involving notions he was robbed ofby the environmental shift. Whenever he tries to recall events and thoughtsfrom before the switch, he does so by using concepts he acquiredafter theswitch. Is he numerically the same person he was before the switch? Is hispersonal identity undermined as a result of the switching?In the scenario at hand, there are no direct memory connections betweenS's twin earthian thoughts and their earthian counterparts. But most propo-nents of the psychological criterion hold that personal identity only requiresindirect memory connections.22 So the crucial question is whether, after thesemantic changeover has been completed, S's mental states are indirectlycontinuous with his mental states before the environmental shift occurred. Aswas explained in sections 1 and 3, externalists suggest that earth impartssome semantic impetus to S's mind, allowing him to withstand the absenceof earth itself, and permit his words to continue to keep their old meaning, atleast for a time. What we need to examine now is what happens after Sarrives on twin earth and before he completely loses his earthian concepts.Whether or not slow switching ensures that S's personal identity is main-tained crucially depends on how the process of semantic transition is inter-preted.2322 The idea thatperson-stagesdoesn't need to be directlycontinuousbut that it is enough ifthey are indirectlycontinuouswas developedin responseto Thomas Reid's famous braveofficer paradox: suppose that as a boy S was flogged for stealing apples; this heremembers later while performing a brave deed as an officer; this brave deed herememberseven later,as a general.Butby thenhe has forgottenthe flogging. If personalidentitywereconstitutedonly by direct memory connections, we would have to say thatthe brave officer is the boy, and the generalis the braveofficer, but the generalis not theboy. Yet thiscontradicts hetransitivityof identity.Baillie thinks thatwheneverswitchingtakesplace slowly it doesn't endanger the identityof the switchedperson.He writes: if we assume that it takes a slow rather than a quickswitch to bringabout a conceptual shift, then "so long as the learning period governingthe semantic changeover is gradual enough to ensure that psychological continuity ismaintained, ...] problemsof personal dentitywould be averted" (1997, p. 327). This is

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How should we conceive of the gradual changeover of concepts and con-tents that is triggered by an environmental shift and culminates in the loss ofthe old concepts? Two ways of interpreting this 'gray' stage suggest them-selves: the flip-flop view and the piecemeal view.2* My thesis is that eitherview renders slow switching compatible with the persistence of personal iden-tity.

In theflip-flop view, when S arrives on twin earth, his word 'water' ceasesto express the concept water and starts to express the disjunctive concept'water or twater'. Throughout the period of semantic changeover, S possessesthis disjunctive concept. When the semantic transition is coming to an end,his word 'water' no longer refers to H2O or XYZ but to XYZ only. In otherwords, S's word 'water' flip-flops back and forth from expressing a univocalconcept to expressing an ambiguous one.Given the flip-flop view, slow switching doesn't undermine personal iden-tity. For although twater-thoughts cannot count as memories of water-thoughts, twater-thoughts can count as memories of water-or-twater-thoughtsand water-or-twater-thoughts can count as memories of water-thoughts.Assuming that our mind is equipped with a mechanism for selecting theappropriate part of a disjunctive concept 'water or twater', there are indirectmemory connections linking twater-thoughts and water-thoughts.Another interpretation of the semantic changeover triggered by an envi-ronmental shift is the piecemeal view: upon S's arrival on twin earth, hisword 'water' ceases to be a natural kind term, for it ceases to refer exclusivelyto H2O. Instead of referring 100% to H2O, it refers 99% to H2O and 1% toXYZ. As time goes by, S's post-switch 'water' utterance refers less and lessto H2O and more and more to XYZ. So he starts out with a concept thatrefers 99% to H2O and 1% to XYZ and he ends up with a concept that refers1% to H2O and 99% to XYZ. When the semantic changeover is completed,his word 'water' refers exclusively to XYZ and is once again a natural kindterm.25

Like the flip-flop view, the piecemeal view renders slow switching com-patible with the persistence of personal identity. The reason is, once again,that although there are no direct memory connections between twater-thoughts and water-thoughts, there are indirect memory connections. A

too simplistic. The slowness of the switch, by itself, doesn't guarantee that personalidentity s maintained hrough witching.The flip-flop view is a close relative of the ambiguityview and the piecemeal view is aclose relative of the amalgamationview. The ambiguityview and the amalgamationvieware versions of the conceptualaddition view. Cf. section 3.25 The piecemeal view raises a whole host of questionsabout indeterminacyand vaguenessof concepts and truth values. Suppose a concept refers 90% to XYZ and 10% to H2O.When this concept is used to represent a past thought nvolving a concept thatreferred100% to H2O, s the memorystate 10% trueand 90% false?

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thought nvolvinga conceptreferring99%to H2Oand 1%to XYZ may qual-ify as a memoryof a thought nvolving a concept referring100% to H2O,forbothconcepts aresufficientlysimilar. Likewise, a thought involving a con-cept referring 8% to H2Oand 2% to XYZ may qualify as a memory of athought involving a concept referring99% to H2Oand 1%to XYZ; and soon.

Let's sum up. I have suggested readinga certainargumentby Boghossianas a critiqueof externalismaboutmemory content. WhatI have labeled thememoryargumentstatesthat,given externalismabout memory content, youcan only know your presentthoughts if you will not be subjectedto slowswitchingin the future.One way to rebut the memory argument s to claimthatslow switchingcauses an agentto adoptnew conceptsbut not to lose oldones. Anotherway is to arguethat the memory argumenterrs in assumingthat memory is a form of knowledge.When the identificationof memorywith knowledgeis given up, the memory argumenttakes on a new character.The refinedmemoryargumentstates thatto have a current hought you needto be able to remembert later. This argument ails because it rests on anequivocation of the term 'forgetting'. Finally, a critic of externalismcan independentlyof the memory arguments question the thesis thatunwittingswitchingcan bring aboutmemory failures. This worry,however,need not be takenseriously, for there are neitherpsychologicalnor philoso-phical arguments o substantiate t. Thus nothing stands in the way of anexternalistaccountof memory.26

Earlierversions of this paper were presented at the Universities of Gottingen,Leipzig,Munich,MinnesotaandNottinghamas well as at the 4thEuropeanCongress for AnalyticPhilosophy n Lund,Sweden in June2002 and the5thCongressof the German Society forAnalytic Philosophyin Bielefeld in September 2003. I owe gratitude to John Bargh,RobertBjork,EricEich,and Steven M. Smithwho have helpedme with the psychologicalaspectsof this paper.Forphilosophicalcomments I am gratefulto PeterBaumann,RobertBlack, Scott Campbell,WilliamChild,Je'romeDokic, JUrgenEngfer, Frank Hofmann,ChristophJSger,VerenaMayer,Olaf MUller,Paul Noordhof, WilliamS. Robinson,SvenRosenkranz,Wade Savage and an anonymousreviewer for thisjournal.

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