memorandum on appeal
DESCRIPTION
What set of books is traffic court using? Well now... how can this be?actual brief filed with the court in the case number as shown.TRANSCRIPT
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Rik Wayne Munson, sui juris218 Landana StreetAmerican Canyon, California Near 94503 Zip Code exempt DMM 602 - 1.3e707-649-0689
In the Superior Court of California
County of Contra Costa
Appellate Division
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Unknown Plaintiff
v.
RIK WAYNE MUNSON Defendant in Error,
Rik Wayne Munson Real party in interest
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Case No. 080744-6
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of OPENING BRIEF ON APPEAL
I Due Process Requires Notice...................................................................................................3
II What Substantive Body of Law Governs the action?..............................................................4
The legislatures own Joint Rule 8.5 dispels the view of qualification or amendment by
implication...............................................................................................................................6
III Who or what is Plaintiff?..........................................................................................................10
Jurisdiction, Venue and Standing..........................................................................................10
Proper Identification Of Parties To An Action For Purposes Of Standing...........................12
Cases
American Land Co v Zeiss 31 Sup Ct 200 208 219 US 47 71 55 L Ed 82.......................................4
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Arthur v. Fry, 300 F.Supp. 622 (1960................................................................................................14
Borum v. Graham, 4 Cal. 2d. 331, 40 P2d 866................................................................................8
Ohio Bell v. Public Utilities Commission, 301 U.S. 292 (1937).....................................................3
Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Com....................................................................10
People v Battle 50 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1..................................................................................passim
People v Hamilton (1986) 191 Cal.App.3d Supp. 13, 236 Cal.Rptr. 894.......................................4
People v McKay 02 C.D.O.S. 2036.................................................................................................5
People v Sava (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 935, 235 Cal.Rptr. 694.......................................................4
People v. Oppenheimer (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d Supp. 4, [116 Cal.Rptr. 795].....................4, 5, 6, 9
Reno v. Condon , 528 US 141, 120 S Ct 666, (2000) ...................................................................8, 9
Shapell Industries, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1101, 1111...........................10
Tracy v Municipal Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 760, 765......................................................................5
Twining v New Jersey 29 Sup Ct 14 211 US 78 53 L Ed 97............................................................4
Statutes
AB 1118...........................................................................................................................................6
C.C.P. Section 367.........................................................................................................................13
Cal. Rev. and Tax Code §6017 and §60017....................................................................................7
ch 646 §1, 62 stat 869 of the statutes at large.................................................................................7
Penal Code 1042.5 and 19c.............................................................................................................4
Penal Code 689.......................................................................................................................passim
SB 1253...........................................................................................................................................6
SB 471.............................................................................................................................................6
statutes 1915 ch. 188 p. 397-399.....................................................................................................7
statutes of 1913, ch. 326 p. 639-640................................................................................................7
statutes of 1925, Vol. 1 ch 412, p. 833............................................................................................9
statutes of 1955 Vol 2 ch 1905 p. 3515-3516..................................................................................8
statutes of 1957, page 1514 Chapter 482.........................................................................................8
Table of Sections Affected..........................................................................................................6, 7
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Other Authorities
3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3rd ed. 1985) Actions § 44, pp 70-72..................................................10
Articles of Confederation..............................................................................................................11
Magna Carta.....................................................................................................................................3
Ops.Atty.Gen. (2006) 04-1212........................................................................................................9
Public Law 280................................................................................................................................9
Thomas Jefferson: Notes on Virginia Q. XIV, 1782. ME 2:207...................................................13
Rules
Section 8.5 of the Joint Rules of the California Legislature........................................................6, 7
Constitutional Provisions
Amendment IVX US.......................................................................................................................3
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution........................................................................3
... Acquiescence in loss of fundamental rights will not be presumed. Ohio Bell v. Public Utilities Commission, 301 U.S. 292 (1937)
I Due Process Requires Notice
The concept of due process derives from the Magna Carta (1215). Its phrase “law of the land”
was transformed over the years to “due process of law,” a phrase included in 1692 in a
Massachusetts statute. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution (ratified 1791)
requires that the federal government not deprive any person of “life, liberty, or property without
due process of law.” The same language is included in the Amendment IVX US (ratified 1868)
as a constraint on the states. The central aim of due process doctrine is to assure fair procedure
when the government imposes a burden on an individual. The doctrine seeks to prevent arbitrary
government, avoid mistaken deprivations, allow persons to know about and respond to charges
against them, and promote a sense of the legitimacy of official behavior.
Due process of law requires that the court which assumes to determine the rights of parties shall have Jurisdiction and that there shall be notice and opportunity for
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hearing given the parties American Land Co v Zeiss 31 Sup Ct 200 208 219 US 47 71 55 L Ed 82 quoting Twining v New Jersey 29 Sup Ct 14 211 US 78 53 L Ed 97
II What Substantive Body of Law Governs the action?
The courts are not so tied down by a uniformity of decisions that they are not at liberty to
entertain this question anew, and to settle the doctrines upon their true principles. The simple fact
is that the limited number of cases on the subject and their indefensible reasoning demand just
such a review. Appellant here invokes it.
The earliest court opinion regarding the substantive nature of traffic infractions is from
the Appellate Division of the Los Angeles Superior Court in People v. Oppenheimer (1974) 42
Cal.App.3d Supp. 4, [116 Cal.Rptr. 795]. The Oppenheimer opinion is relied upon by both
People v Hamilton (1986) 191 Cal.App.3d Supp. 13, 236 Cal.Rptr. 894 and People v Sava
(1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 935, 235 Cal.Rptr. 694, in coming to opposite conclusions. The
Oppenheimer court attempted another theory of explaining away the conflict between Penal
Code 689 (enacted 1872) and the later enacted sections 1042.5 and 19c of the penal code
(enacted 1968). In People v Battle 50 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, the court relied upon it’s earlier
decision in Oppenheimer to support the conclusion that by implication of the later enactments,
Penal Code 1042.5 and 19c of the penal code, the legislature never intended to place infractions
in the realm of crimes or public offenses admitting that if the legislature did intend to place
infractions in the realm of crimes and public offenses it would have created a conflict with PC
689. The Battle court however never went so far as to notice that infractions were placed into
PC 16 by the same bill and in the same year 1042.5 and 19c were enacted.
In People v Hamilton (1986) 191 Cal.App.3d Supp. 13, 236 Cal.Rptr. 894 The Appellate
Division of the Fresno Superior Court rejects the decision in Battle but embraces the
Oppenheimer theory:
“We concur in the language of Oppenheimer with respect to sections 19c and 1042.5 as qualifying section 689.”
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In People v Sava (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 935, 235 Cal.Rptr. 694the Fourth District Court
of Appeal does not analyze the question but cites both Battle and Oppenheimer in the legal
reasoning for its Sava Opinion, saying only “infractions are not crimes”.
In Tracy v Municipal Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 760, 765 The question of the conflict
between 19c, 1042.5 and 689 of the Penal code was not before the court. The California Supreme
court did not analyze or elaborate but merely voiced its impression that reduction from a
misdemeanor to an infraction was a “decriminalization”.
In People v McKay 02 C.D.O.S. 2036, the Supreme Court of California addressing the
legitimacy of a custodial arrest, voiced its impression that infractions have been distinguished as
both civil and criminal, concluding that “In California, however, traffic infractions have not
been decriminalized.” And citing to Tracy v Municipal Court, supra.
FN16. Some jurisdictions have held that the commission of a civil infraction cannot support a custodial arrest. (E.g., Barnett v. United States (D.C.App. 1987) 525 A.2d 197, 198-199 & fns. 2, 5; Thomas v. Florida (Fla. 1993) 614 So.2d 468, 470-471.) In California, however, traffic infractions have not been decriminalized. (See People v. Carlucci (1979) 23 Cal.3d 249, 257-258; Tracy v. Municipal Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 760, 765 & fn. 4; compare § § 40000.1 and 42001 with § § 40200 and 40203.5, subd. (b) [defining parking fines as "civil penalties" ].)
In support of its conclusion that an infraction will support a custodial arrest the McKay court misquotes Tracy. What the Tracy court says is:
The Legislature's first proposed bill, Senate Bill No. 95 (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.) sought to decriminalize the simple possession of three or less ounces of marijuana, other than concentrated cannabis, by classifying the offense as an infraction punishable by a fine of not more than $100
It is clearly the Tracy courts understanding that to reclassify the offense “simple
possession … of marijuana, other than concentrated cannabis”, from a misdemeanor to an
infraction was a decriminalization. Neither the McKay nor the Tracy court had before
them the question addressed in Oppenheimer, Battle and Hamilton, regarding the conflict
between the California Constitution Article 1 section 16, Penal Code 689, U.S. Const.
Amend. VII, and the conflicting enactments amending penal code 16 to add infractions
and adding 1042.5 and 19c to the penal code.
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The Sava Court ignores the Hamilton courts rejection of Battle and, recognizing
the theory to be the same, cites both Oppenheimer and Battle for its impression that
“infractions are not crimes”.
The limitation on an accused's right to jury trial of infractions has withstood constitutional attack upon the rationale the Legislature did not intend to classify infractions as crimes. (See People v. Oppenheimer (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d Supp. 4 [116 Cal.Rptr. 795] and People v. Battle, supra, 50 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1.
Both Battle and Hamilton quote Oppenheimer and all three acknowledge the conflict.
“The language in section 689 obviously conflicts with that of Penal Code sections 19c and 1042.5.”
The theory in Hamilton and Oppenheimer are the same theory applied by the court in
Battle simply using different language. The words qualify, affect, amend, limit, expand, alter and
change all have similar and sometimes, dependent upon how they are used, the same meaning.
The notion that one statute or code section can affect the meaning of a separate statute or code
section by implication is identical to the notion that one statute or code section can be said to
qualify a separate statute or code section by implication. Nowhere do we find an express
statement in any enactment that supports this notion. Although each of the above cases claims to
resort to statutory construction they never resort to a single statute, but seem content to attempt
an answer from the codes or from quoting themselves and each other. Here’s a novel idea, lets
look at some actual statutes.
The legislatures own Joint Rule 8.5 dispels the view of qualification or amendment by implication.
Digest of Bills Introduced 8.5. A bill may not be introduced unless… it is accompanied by a digest, prepared and attached to the bill by the Legislative Counsel, showing the changes in the existing law that are proposed by the bill.
The Table of Sections Affected in the 1968 regular session (Exhibit A) shows at page 1376 that
AB 1118, SB 471 and SB 1253 amend PC 16 & 17, and adds amongst others, PC 19c and
1042.5. There is however no mention of any bills affecting PC 689. Therefore, pursuant to Joint
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Rule 8.5 no bill introduced in 1968 can be claimed to qualify, amend, affect, alter or change
Penal Code 689.
As the Oppenheimer court admitted at footnote 2.
“The language in section 689 obviously conflicts with that of Penal Code sections 19c and 1042.5”
Every attempt to explain away this obvious conflict falls away in view of Joint Rule 8.5 and the
absence of PC 689 from the Table of Sections Affected by 1968 legislation. The poignant
question regarding the constitutional infirmity of these later enactments cannot be avoided.
Looking at the vehicle code section charged 27315(d) (1):
“A person may not operate a motor vehicle on a highway unless that person and all passengers 16 years of age or over are properly restrained by a safety belt.”
According to the DMV Website, the secretary of state handled vehicle registrations from
1905 until 1913 and the California Vehicle Act of 1923 revised the heavily amended Act of 1914
and provided the framework for future motor vehicle regulations. In point of fact, there are
statutes of 1913 and 1915 but no statutes were published in 1914. The definitions found in the
statutes of 1913, ch. 326 p. 639-640 are the same as those used in statutes 1915 ch. 188 p. 397-
399. According to the doctrine of expresso unius and the ejusdem generis rule Person (16)
includes limited liability entities but does not include people. See (1) Motor Vehicle (8) Chauffer
(11) Owner (15) Operator (16) Person and (18) Vehicle.
Section 2 of the act excludes “persons” not engaged in the conveyance of passengers or freight,
from the fee’s imposed by the section and prescribes that “the department shall furnish, free of
charge, distinguishing plates for motor vehicles thus exempt.” These early statutes clearly
distinguish between commercial and private use of the highways and requires only Sec. 1 (15)
“operators” and Sec. 1 (8) “chauffeurs” to be licensed. Of troubling note is the definition of (9)
“state” to also include Article IV federal territories and judicial districts raising questions
regarding the definitions found in the present Cal. Rev. and Tax Code §6017 and §60017 when
contrasted with ch 646 §1, 62 stat 869 of the statutes at large showing federal judicial districting
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of the states (1948ver Title 28, p.42). The Evidence Code of California does not share this
definition.
In the statutes of 1955 Vol 2 ch 1905 p. 3515-3516 Revenue and Taxation code 9603
defines Operator to only include persons who transport persons or property for hire and expressly
excludes those not so engaged. (Exhibit B)
Under the heading, "Operator includes:""(a) Any person engaging in the transportation of persons or property for hire or compensation by or upon a motor vehicle upon any public highway in this State, either directly or indirectly."
"Operator does not include any of the following,""(a) Any person transporting his own property in a motor vehicle owned or operated by him unless he makes a specific charge for the transportation. This subdivision does not in any way limit any other exception granted by this section." [emphasis added]
The Supreme Court of California remarked on the nature of the vehicle code as regulatory:
"The vehicle code reflects the legislatures occupation of the field of traffic regulation, and being intended to cover the whole of such subject, any local ordinance on the subject in conflict with its provisions would be void." Borum v. Graham, 4 Cal. 2d. 331, 40 P2d 866. [See: Traffic in Black's 5th, traffic is commerce.
The United States Supreme Court has also commented on this issue.
9) “The activity licensed by state DMVs and in connection with which individuals must submit personal information to the DMV-the operation of motor vehicles - is itself integrally related to interstate commerce”. Reno v. Condon , No. 98-1464, decided January 12, 2000 (The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1a-37a) is reported at 155 F.3d 453. The opinion of the district court (Pet. App. 38a-72a) is reported at 972 F. Supp. 977.)
In Vol 1 of the statutes of 1957, page 1514 Chapter 482, (Exhibit C) the legislature added 69.1
to the Vehicle Code:
"Section 69.1 Drivers License. Drivers license includes both an operators and a chauffeurs license."
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At page 13 of the “Memorandum in Support of Plea in Bar”, appellant cites the statutes of 1925,
Vol. 1 ch 412, p. 833. Section 1(b) clearly excludes appellant from the definition of an operator.
The definitions in the statutes and the licensing of carriers only makes sense in the commercial
regulatory framework. In § 2, of Public Law 280, Congress expressly granted six States,
including California, broad criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians
within all Indian country within the State. In Ops.Atty.Gen. (2006) 04-1212 the California
Attorney General addressed the question of whether California motor vehicle registration and
driver’s license requirements were subject to enforcement against Indian tribal members on roads
within their Indian reservation.
“We believe that sections 4000 and 12500 are civil regulatory laws, not criminal laws, for purposes of Public Law 280. The fact that criminal penalties may be imposed for their violation is not dispositive. (California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 211 [“that an otherwise regulatory law is enforceable by criminal as well as civil means does not necessarily convert it into a criminal law within the meaning of Pub. L. 280”].) What is significant is that under California’s motor vehicle laws, including these two statutes, the driving of a motor vehicle on the roads of the state is generally permitted, subject to various conditions including the two at issue here: (1) the vehicle must be registered and (2) the operator must have a valid driver’s license.”
The United States Supreme Court (Reno v. Condon , 528 US 141, 120 S Ct 666, (2000) ) and the
United States Solicitor General’s Office insist that,
“the activity regulated by the state driver license, the operation of motor vehicles, is integrally related to interstate commerce. . . .”
Where does all of this leave us, civil? Criminal? Civil regulatory? Each of these opens a different
Pandora’s box. Neither the record of the case in point nor any other routinely handled traffic
infraction matter provides evidence as to substantive nature and cause. Without answers the
questions just keep growing exponentially as we examine the world of all possibilities.
Clinging to the first presumption indulged by the Oppenheimer, Battle and Hamilton
courts “that it was not the intent of the Legislature to enact inconsistent statutes” how does one
explain the absence of Penal Code 689 from the table of sections affected by 1968 legislation?
This rule of statutory construction, that statutes that relate to the same subject matter should be read, construed and applied together so that the legislature's
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intention can be gathered from the whole of the enactments, applies only when the particular statute is ambiguous. Kimes v. Bechtold, W.Va., 324 S.E.2d 147, 150." Black's, 6th Edition, "In para materia”. (Cited at page 13 of appellants “Memorandum in Support of Special Plea in Bar”)
This Court may not in all honesty deny that Penal Code section 689 states no exceptions, and
clearly expresses a Constitutional principle. There is no ambiguity here.
No person can be convicted of a public offense unless by verdict of a jury, accepted and recorded by the court, by a finding of the court in a case where a jury has been waived, or by a plea of guilty. (Emphasis mine.) Penal Code section 689
CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTIONARTICLE 1 DECLARATION OF RIGHTSSEC. 16. Trial by jury is an inviolate right and shall be secured to all, but in a civil cause three-fourths of the jury may render a verdict. A jury may be waived in a criminal cause by the consent of both parties expressed in open court by the defendant and the defendant's counsel. In a civil cause a jury may be waived by the consent of the parties expressed as prescribed by statute.
To borrow a theory from People v Battle, had the Legislature intended an exception, it would have worded the constitution differently, for example, “Trial by jury is an inviolate right and shall be secured to all except in those classes of cases where there is no such right at English common law at the time this Constitution is adopted.”
.
III Who or what is Plaintiff?
Jurisdiction, Venue and Standing
Standing requires an actual justiciable controversy.“Standing is a threshold issue, in that without it, no justiciable controversy exists.” Shapell Industries, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1101, 1111. “Without standing, there is no actual or justiciable controversy, and courts will not entertain such cases. 3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3rd ed. 1985) Actions § 44, pp 70-72.
Standing requires the violation of a legal right that causes damage. “As a general principle, standing to invoke the judicial process requires anactual justiciable controversy as to which the complainant has a real interestin the ultimate adjudication because he or she has either suffered or is aboutto suffer an injury . . .” Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Com.
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(1982) 33 Cal.3d 158, 169-172, [188 Cal.Rptr. 104, 655 P.2d 306]
The number and variety of corporate interests acting under color of state authority have
been increasing at an alarming rate to the point that due process protections for their victims are,
in many instances, non-existent. Among the most disturbing of the erosions of due process
protections is the failure of the proper identification of parties to legal and administrative
initiatives, with the worst offenders being the courts themselves, when refusing to enforce due
process requirements for response to pleadings challenging the standing of plaintiffs.
In the absence of a claim of loss or injury, there is substantial question as to whether or
not there is a legitimate claim of right. Without a right there can be no corresponding obligation
or duty. Without a duty there can be no breach.
These very issues were at the center of the war for American Independence from the
Crown and its corporations. The former colonies were transformed from franchises operating at
the King's pleasure to independent constitutional states, each with their own government. In that
process the American states were conceived as sovereign bodies politic effecting self
government by way of republican constitutions which defined and thus limited the powers
delegated to legal corporations designed to administer to specified public interests and prohibited
by law from committing the injuries that had been suffered under the Crown's greed and avarice.
The several sovereign nation-states united under The Articles of Confederation were
understood to be republican in structure, thus constraining the powers conferred upon their
corporate offices and officers by the separation of powers doctrine. The separation of powers
became the principal means conceived to limit and control delegated power and authority which
was further constrained by prohibitions articulated in provisions which specified those rights
intended to remain forever beyond the reach of government interference or encroachment.
Legal corporations were conceived as subordinate to sovereign bodies politic in the same
way that military power was expressly subordinated to civil authority. Sovereignty is thus
unavailable to legal corporate fictions created by operation of law, whether such corporate
fictions are of a governmental or a non-governmental character. For this reason corporations are
without the capacity to enjoy either joint tenancy or survivorship, and are limited in their
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operations to corporation law. Corporation law is none other than the law of contract, and when
entered into by government corporations are sometimes called compacts or treaties.
The Constitution for The United States of America, designed in accordance with the law
of corporations, has, since the Civil War, been increasingly displaced by Lex Mercatoria,
resulting in an international corporate schema of commercial interests that have transmogrified
our republican governments into mere units of a global administrative super state. By stealthy
encroachment and interposition, law is replaced by policy, due process is subordinated to
administrative efficiency, autonomy and self government is made an anachronism, and abstract
fictions are given more validity and protection than the real sentient men who conceived them
and act to bring their purposes into effect.
Government, once conceived as an instrument of the state, eventually consumed the state,
and is now itself consumed by the very corporate interests it was created to restrain. The 21st
century United States of America is so entangled with its corporate fictions that government has
all but been submerged, making the task of discerning between governmental versus non-
governmental interests difficult, if not impossible, even for jurists. For this reason Appellant
demands no less than a verifiable answer to the question as to the proper identification of
plaintiff in the original action, a full accounting on the record of their standing to bring said
action, and full disclosure of the principal party in interest on who's behalf plaintiff acts.
Proper Identification Of Parties To An Action For Purposes Of Standing
One essential element of standing is the proper identification of the parties. Being an essential
element of standing, the proper identification of plaintiff, when challenged by an accused, must
be established on the record, absence of which evidence eviscerates any assertion of a court's
jurisdiction.
Additionally, a presumption as to the true and proper identification of an accused, when
challenged by affidavit of negative averment, as in the original Plea in Bar, herein incorporated
as if fully restated, bars any discretion of the court to relieve the plaintiff of the obligation to
place admissible evidence of such identity on the record.
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The Court is here directed to facts alleged in the original Plea in Bar by negative
averment as to the legitimacy and veracity of the standing of original plaintiff, and thus to take
Administrative and Judicial Notice of the published Rules regarding the necessity for the proper
identification of Parties to an action in the interests of preserving the constitutionally protected
right to confront one's accuser. See Rule 2 et. seq. California Rules of Court, and the Code of
Civil Procedure on the rules of pleading .
C.C.P. Section 367. Every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, except as otherwise provided by statute.
A review of the original appeal shows, inter alia, two fundamental issues raised; (1) the
failure of a proper identification of parties, and (2) the absence of a declaration of the true nature
and cause of the action. That appeal then goes on to discuss the behavior of the municipal court
in its' several violations of constitutional prohibitions, each ultra vires the required oath of office,
and thus beyond the reach of bondable acts authorized to courts of limited jurisdiction, where we
find no evidence of pleadings, no evidence of a complaining party, no evidence of agency, no
evidence of an attorney of record in appearance, no evidence that the court is a court of the
republic state of California, no evidence of a contract, and no evidence of law.
The original action giving rise to the matter before this court appears to have been
initiated by a presumed government interest against one of We The People, a representative
member of the State, and from which government derives as a legal moiety. In as much as
government can only act by and through law, the failure or refusal of plaintiff to declare its
identity and cause on the record is ultra vires the lawful right and authority it may claim to
possess. Such act by the government in its corporate legal person, when attacking a member of
the political body corporate, positions itself in defiance of the law in which it has its being, and
by which its limited delegations of authority are properly exercised.
"In every government on earth is some trace of human weakness, some germ of corruption and degeneracy, which cunning will discover, and wickedness insensibly open, cultivate and improve." Thomas Jefferson: Notes on Virginia Q. XIV, 1782. ME 2:207.
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This case comes to the court as a direct result of the appellant’s effort to participate in
legitimate governance, having been unjustifiably frustrated by the municipal court denial to hear
issues raised in the Plea in Bar, challenging the standing of the moving party. Said court
proceeded against the unchallenged Plea in Bar, which brought the absence of an actual
complaining party, and the undeclared nature of the action into focus. The Accused was left to
wonder whether the plaintiff was there in appearance by implication, since there was no
prosecutor in attendance, or whether the complaining Party, by some unknown means, was
present in its corporate capacity, or represented by the court itself. The record shows no
evidence for either possibility, leaving the first required element for Standing, (the proper
identification of parties), non-existent, thus the alleged cause of action rendered null and void.
The rights to trial by jury thus far have only been considered in relation to the rights of an
accused but the people have an interest in justice equal to that of any accused and most assuredly
where, as here, government actors themselves are the interdictors, complainants, prosecutors,
judges and ultimate benefactors. Appellant does not assert nor argue as to a particular position
regarding the substantive nature of traffic infraction but only identifies the problem for this
courts review. Any judgment, order, statute, rule or other commandment in terms so vague that
ordinary men must argue as to it’s meaning and differ as to its’ application violates the first
fundamental of due process. I think it’s safe to say Appellant has shown that to be the case here.
The Appellate Division of the Superior Court of Contra Costa County is here legally
Noticed that there is in this amended brief on appeal, as well as in the original opening brief and
settled statement on appeal, no waiver of protected rights, nor forfeiture of remedy by tort action,
or any commercial remedy available to appellant, nor as to impeachment proceedings against all
officers found to be in violation of their oaths of office.
“Sovereign immunity does not apply where (as here) government is a lawbreaker or jurisdiction is the issue.” Arthur v. Fry, 300 F.Supp. 622 (1960).
The acts of all de facto officers are herein challenged and commanded to recuse as any act by
men or women not properly holding public office of a civil character and meeting all the
requirements prescribed by law, are acts committed in their individual capacity not clothed in
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judicial, qualitative or good faith immunities and thus their actions are not bondable and they are
liable to suit in their individual capacity.
Below named Appellant/claimant declares and states, under penalty of perjury pursuant
to the laws of California state republic (1849); that to the best of appellants knowledge and
understanding the above statements are true and correct and the authorities cited are the current
state of the published law.
"I expressly reserve the right to amend or supplement as I see necessary."
______________________________Rik Wayne Munson, Real Party in Interest
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