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    Social Security in Chile

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    Demographics Chile

    15,980,912 people

    0-14 years: 25.2% 15-64 years: 66.7%

    65 and up: 8%

    Population Growth

    Rate: 0.97%

    Birth Rate: 2.02

    USA

    295,734,134 people

    0-14 years: 20.6% 15-64 years: 67%

    65 and up: 12.4%

    Population Growth

    Rate: 0.92%

    Birth Rate: 2.08

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    Economic Performance Chile

    GDP (PPP) $170

    Billion Real GDP growth:

    6.06 %

    GDP per Capita

    (PPP) $10,630.97 GDP per Capita

    growth: 4.85 %

    United States

    GDP (PPP) $12.37

    Trillion Real GDP growth:

    3.5%

    GDP per Capita

    (PPP) $41,800 GDP per Capita

    growth: 3%

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    GDP per CapitaGDP per Capita

    0

    5000

    10000

    15000

    20000

    25000

    30000

    35000

    40000

    197

    5

    197

    7

    197

    9

    198

    1

    198

    3

    198

    5

    198

    7

    198

    9

    199

    1

    199

    3

    199

    5

    199

    7

    199

    9

    200

    1

    200

    3

    Time (years)

    GDPperCap

    ita(PPPadjusted,constant20

    00$us)

    Chile GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2000international $)

    Latin America & Caribbean GDP per capita, PPP(constant 2000 international $)

    United States GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2000international $)

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    GDP Growth

    GDP Growth

    -15

    -10

    -5

    0

    5

    10

    15

    1975

    1977

    1979

    1981

    1983

    1985

    1987

    1989

    1991

    1993

    1995

    1997

    1999

    2001

    2003

    Time (years)

    G

    DPGrowth(annual%)

    Chile GDP growth (annual %)

    Latin America & Caribbean GDP growth (annual %)

    United States GDP growth (annual %)

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    Origins of Social Security Social Security is a system by which living

    wages are paid to those who are retired. It is

    designed to enable the elderly and disabledto retire, but to still earn monthly incomes.

    In 1898, Chile was one of the first AmericanNations to implement a Social Security

    program.

    The United States did not adopt SocialSecurity until 1935.

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    Origins of Social Security 1924: Government of Chile established a

    national social insurance system for workers.

    A response to pressure exerted by the growingnumber of worker organizations and strikes.

    Originally called Caja, the program was modeledafter system pioneered by Otto Von Bismarck in

    the German Empire. Employee and Employer contributions to a state

    run fund.

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    Origins of Social Security 1952: Government of Chile reorganized

    the The Workers' Security Fund.

    Created a Social Insurance Service.

    This system lasted until after1973, when Salvador Allende

    was overthrown in a militarycoup by Augosto Pinochet.

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    Social Security and the Military Coup The new military government eliminated the

    traditional pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system.

    This system was similar to the system still used bythe United States, involving mandatory tax basedcontributions.

    Laid the groundwork for the current

    privatized social security system, whichinvolves mandatory contributions, with fixedexceptions.

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    Pay-as-you-go The government takes a percent of

    workers monthly salaries and deposits

    it into a general social security fund. This fund directly finances social security

    benefits paid to those currently retired:

    A PAYG type system relies entirely onthe willingness of younger generationsto work.

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    How it Works The General Social Security Account, which is not

    an investment in the economy, is merely aholding place to keep the money until it is paidout in benefits. Any surplus that is in this general social security

    account, the government lends to itself. However,there are no funds earmarked to repay this debt,

    meaning when it comes due, the government mustincur new debt or raise taxes.

    Various estimates from government actuariespredict the bankruptcy of the US Social Security

    system by 2030.

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    Fixing Social SecurityAlthough predicted bankruptcy is not

    for another 25 years, the problem

    needs to be resolved. Two main options arise to fix the

    solvency problem:

    Changing the tax structure.

    Privatization.

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    Four Types of Tax Systems Progressive tax systems are those in which,

    as income rises, the tax percent increases.

    Regressive tax systems are those in which, asincome rises, the tax percent decreases.

    Fixed percent systems are characterized byeveryone paying the same percent,

    regardless of income. Lump sum tax systems demand a required

    payment, regardless of income and percents:everyone pays the exact same amount.

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    Four Types of Tax Systems

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    Chiles New System Chiles private social security system was

    implemented in 1981 due to non-solvency of theold system, in part from differential treatmentamongst various retirees.

    The new system privatized social security intopublicly mandated but privately administeredpersonal accounts. In the formal sector, 10% of workers monthly

    earnings are deposited into their private account.

    There are a variety of private companies from whichto choose, who invest the monthly deposits.

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    How the New System Works Each worker deposits 10% of monthly

    earnings, which the investment firms take

    and reinvest into stocks and bonds. This is similar to the idea of a mutual fund.

    Preferential tax treatment:

    The money deposited each month is done so

    without paying taxes on said earnings.

    Withdrawals are subject to government taxes.

    Retirement age: Men: 65, Women: 60.

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    How it Works Money goes into the accounts and is

    not-touchable until retirement.

    Upon withdrawal in retirement, funds aresubject to fees and taxes.

    New policy additions have createdvoluntary savings accounts, withpreferential tax-treatment, which canonly be accessed a total of four timesper year.

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    Workers in Transition During the transition process, the

    government bore all of the costs, and paid

    out benefits from the general budget. Workers who contributed to the PAYG system,

    received recognition bonds, which guaranteed 4%annual, inflation adjusted yields.

    These bonds were put into private savings accounts. This process was expensive, reaching upwards of

    5% of total GDP in 1983.

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    Requirements The managing firms are required by law to

    pay no less that 70% of the monthly salary

    earned by each client. If they have not earned sufficient revenue on

    investments and cannot pay the allotted monthlyamount, the firm must cover it out of their own

    reserves. If the firm cannot cover the payments, the

    government, which insures the system, must stepin to pay.

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    The Macroeconomic Model Y = C + I + G + NX

    National Savings:

    YCG = I + NX Savings = (YTC) + (TG)

    Savings = Private + Public

    In a PAYG system, social security contributions

    appear in taxes and government spending, but donot factor into savings, since they are not saved.

    In Chiles privatized system, required deposits areare accounted for in private savings.

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    A New Model Create a model in which savings is a

    function of time, reform, and GDP per

    Capita: S = f( time, reform, GDP per Capita)

    Predictions:

    Given what we know about private socialsecurity systems, this model ideallypredicts a discontinuous best fit line, withthe break in the year of initial reform.

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    A New Model

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    A New Model Best fit lines cannot be discontinuous.

    Knowing this, the data based line should

    be more steeply upward sloping.

    Specific data taken from regression results:

    Y-int: -1.32 x 10^12 Slope: 4.48 x 10^8

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    A new model

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    Results of the New Model It is visible in the regression data

    results that this model produces a very

    accurate prediction: It explains over 96% of the relationship.

    There is a .05 % probability that the

    relationship occurs by chance alone.

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    The Reality of Private Systems Since the first generation to work and live

    under this private system are currently

    retiring, the actual effectiveness of thesystem is becoming visible.

    What has actually happened?

    Change in incentive structure: Moral Hazard.

    Some informal sector workers contributed only enoughmoney to be guaranteed the minimum retirementbenefits, meaning the investment firms or governmentwould have to cover the difference.

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    The Reality of Private Systems There is a large dissatisfaction in Chile with the

    private system: Hidden withdrawal fees eat away final value of

    savings. Some of these fees go to pay the costs of the investment

    firms.

    In the USA, 99% of investment goes towards benefits and1% towards overhead.

    In Chile, overhead is about 20 times as large.

    There is a large underground economy in Chile. This,coupled with seasonal and self-employed workers,means roughly that only 60% of all workers are

    actually covered by the private system.

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    The Reality of Private Systems The private system is required to pay at least

    $140 per month per worker. However,frequently the investment firms cannot meetthese payments. Investment firms use up their reserves, and then

    need the government to step in and bail them out.

    The government of Chile is still spending large

    amounts of money to support the social safetynet, which should ideally have been providedentirely from the private pension system. This is to support the people who do not have large

    enough lifetime earnings to support their retirement.

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    Poverty Cohorts

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    Why? There are a variety of reasons why

    the privatization of social security

    could be beneficial: Reduction in government spending.

    Reduction in government debt.

    Increase private savings.

    Increased standard of living during retirement.

    (Re-)Investment in the economy promotes highergrowth and many other things.

    Source: Poverty and Income Distribution in a High Growth Economy, 1987-98, World Bank.

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    Final Thoughts Both PAYG and private social security

    systems have their perks and pitfalls,

    and the solvency of each is debatable. What will the future be of each type of

    system?

    Which system would be easiest to reformto more adequately support the retiredpopulation?