medieval goa: a socio-economic history

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Medieval Goa A Socio-Economic History

Teotonio R. de Souza


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i

© By Teotonio R de Souza First edition: 1979

First Portuguese edition: 1994 Second English edition: co-published in May 2009

(This new edition fills the gap caused by the book being out of print for some

time now, and includes additional features such as an updated bibliography that covers the past three decades since its first edition.)

Published by Goa,1556, Sonarbhat, Saligão 403511 Goa, India.

http://goa1556.goa-india.org, [email protected] +91-832-2409490.

Goa,1556 is an alternative publishing venture, named after the year of the accidental arrival of Asia’s first Gutenberg-inspired printing press in Goa.

Today, more than ever, Goa needs a voice to understand itself and articulate its priorities

and

Broadway Book Centre, Ashirwad, 18th June Rd, Panjim 403001.Ph/fax 6647038. http://broadwaybooksgoa.com

Cover design by Bina Nayak http://www.binanayak.com Maps by Valerie Rodrigues. Text layout Frederick Noronha.

Printed and bound in India by Rama Harmalkar, 9326102225 Typeset using L Y X, http://www.lyx.org

Text set in Utopia Roman, 10 point.ISBN 978-81-905682-6-5

Price: Rs. 495 (hardbound) and Rs 395 (paperback) in India.Overseas: US$ 49/Euro 35 (hardbound) and US$ 39/Euro 28


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To my late parents

Maria Julia Fernandes and Luis Caetano de Souza

without whose love and care I would reach neither

Medieval nor Modern nor Contemporary Goa


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Contents

Preface (second edition) v

Foreword ix

Preface (first edition) x

Acknowledgments xiv

Maps and diagram xvi

Abbreviations xvii

1 Rivals and Neighbours 1

I Rural Economy and Corporate Life 26

2 The Goan Rural Heritage 27

3 Agrarian Organisation and Praxis 43

4 Rural Social Life 62

II Urban Economy and Municipal Organisation 76

5 Urban Topography and Demography 77

6 Municipal Organisation and Policies 96

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7 Urban Economic Life 114

8 Overview and Preview 141

Bibliographical Essay 144

III Appendices 166

Glossary 229

Bibliography 234


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Preface (second edition)

W HE N MEDIEVAL GOA first appeared three decades ago, it represented a

significant break in the tradition of Indo-Portuguese historiography,until then markedly Luso-Indian, even when Goan native historians werethe authors.

The colonial culture and the political climate were not helpful for the promo-tion of a critical approach. Several Goans produced excellent works, and wecan think of Filipe Nery Xavier, or more recently of Pandurang Pissurlencar.However, they usually limited their efforts to publish documents.

Filipe Nery Xavier admitted in an introductory note to his Bosquejo Histórico das Communidades (1852) that he did not have sufficient strength to pro-duce a more critical work. P.S.S. Pissurlencar manifested his true nationalistsentiments only when the colonial-political climate was about to change.He then displayed some political courage through his reluctance to collab-orate with the Portuguese Government in the “Right of Passage” case atthe International Court of Justice at The Hague. He is said to have collab-orated discreetly with the Indian historians, providing them documentary information that was decisive to strengthen the legal position of India.

Following the Indian occupation of Goa in 1961, P.S.S. Pissurlencar acceptedan invitation from the University of Poona to deliver a series of lectures inMarathi on the history of Portuguese-Maratha relations. The Portuguesehistorian Alexandre Lobato was preferred by the Portuguese Government togather historical documentation for their “Right of Passage” dispute withIndia. This fact may have been particularly irksome and responsible for Pis-surlencar’s resentment. He felt that his competence in handling old Marathi

records had been ignored and that his political loyalty was doubted. Besidesorganizing the Historical Archives of Goa very competently, Pissurlencarhad published extensive selections of archival documents, including thoserelated to the Agentes da Dimplomacia Portuguesa na India (1952). It wasprobably his way of proving that Hindus and other non-Christians (Muslims,Jews and Parsis) had served the Portuguese imperial interests in India withgreat dedication and competence.

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PREFACE (SECOND EDITION) vi

There were other Goans who were not serving the Portuguese in Goa, butproduced valuable historical works outside Goa and with significant criticalcapacity. D.D. Kosambi, Gerson da Cunha and Braz Fernandes may be citedamong these. All three were able to integrate their research into the widercontext of the history and culture of the Indian subcontinent.

During colonial times, Portuguese studies were concentrated largely on thehistory of navigation and expansion of Christianity by the Portuguese in theEast. They do indeed merit attention and their long-term consequences canhardly be ignored. However, following the end of colonial era, it was neces-sary to restore the historiographic balance and to question the exaggeratedmyths about the “Discoveries” and “Civilizing Mission” of Portugal, and theplaying down of, or ignoring, the harmful consequences that accompaniedand followed those feats and mentality.

Medieval Goa represented an effort to question the biases of the colonialhistoriography, while avoiding to fall prey to equally questionable triumphsof nationalism.

It is with great satisfaction that I should record here my close collabora-tion with the late Fr. John Correia-Afonso, S.J. in initiating the series of Indo-Portuguese history seminars which, during the past three decades,contributed significantly to help restoring the historiographic balance that

Medieval Goa had intended. My manifesto at the first seminar of that seriestook the form of a research paper entitled “Voiceless in Goan Historiogra-phy”. Despite the apparently populist provocation of the title, it was nomore than a call for serious attention to the native sources, to balance thecolonial documentation.

Medieval Goa covers a period which is generally regarded as early Modernperiod in the West. However, we prefer to maintain the earlier designation,in common with the corresponding periodisation of the Indian historiog-raphy. Besides whatever semblance of modernity the Portuguese colonialregime brought to India, Goa had to wait for it until the 18th century oralmost the 19th century, and largely due to the English intervention in theeconomy of Portuguese India through the Anglo-Portuguese treaty, thesetting up of the railway link, and forcing the end of the Inquisition.

This second English edition of Medieval Goa comes out after three decades,because researchers and general public in Goa and elsewhere worldwide

continue finding it relevant and a useful book of reference with extensivearchival documentation from Goa and abroad. Its focus was on the ruralpopulation, away from the bustling urban and metropolitan politics.

For the believers in the role of colonial elites, or any elites, it may be difficultto accept that rural folks could have decided the long-term fate of the colony.

A careful analysis of this fact should suffice to question even two very recentstudies published in Portugal.


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PREFACE (SECOND EDITION) vii

Catarina Madeira Santos chose for a title of her M.Phil thesis (1999) a des-ignation which Afonso de Albuquerque attributed to Goa in his correspon-dence with his king. For the conqueror of Goa, as cited in the concludingchapter of Medieval Goa , it was the key for the whole of India (“Goa é a Chave de toda a Índia ”) in his imperial strategy. He assured his king that he

could thenceforth order in Goa whatever he willed. Unfortunately, it did notturn out to be that easy nor true.

A. Barreto Xavier, author of A Invenção de Goa (2008) believes that Goais an “invention” of varying and changing historical agents, and that thePortuguese imperial hold in Goa during several centuries was not the resultof exclusive imperial hegemonic control, but a result of mutual negotiationsof varying social groups, both White and the natives. Contrary to mostprevailing theories about the determining role of the elites, Medieval Goa substantiates the reality of Goans who protested with their feet, migratingfrom Goa and determining thereby the fate of the colonial masters and theirmore or less subservient native elites.

Few may have engaged in negotiations with colonial power while growing waves of Goan emigrants sought their future away from the colonial domi-nation from the earliest times. No one in India will be easily convinced thatGoans dispersed worldwide to divulge the gains of the Portuguese civilisa-

tion. The Inquisitors in Goa were proposing, at the end of the 17th century as studied here, a series of legislative measures inspired by St. Paul writingto the Romans, when he advised: noli propter escam destruere opus Dei – do not destroy God’s work for the sake of food! It was more importantfor the Inquisitors to put an end to Hindu practices among the converts,rather than to bother about their complaints and difficulties of livelihoodand survival.

The main actors of Medieval Goa are the ordinary people of the city and

the countryside. Their voice had been little heard, if it was heard at all,in the prestigious and magisterial works of the well-known historians of the Portuguese expansion. We need not forget though that the commonpeople also included many ethnic Portuguese who were just as much victimsof the colonial and imperial adventurism of their metropolitan elites andauthorities as the native Indians. Over time I realised that it is wrong toadopt the Orwellian classification of enemies. There is much truth in theold Latin saying “inimici hominis domestici ejus ”, our enemies are from

within our household. In this sense, my research has been for me a processof personal growth and self-liberation.

The concluding chapter of Medieval Goa defined its modest goal, namely to set a research trend and to begin a discussion that may help us to ceaseto remain medieval. It expressed the hope that the (then, at the time of its first publication) forthcoming Goa University would be interested inpromoting wider and deeper analysis into the socio-economic past of Goa


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in order to help the efforts at socio economic reconstruction of liberatedGoa. Interestingly and within very short span of time, I had the opportunity of directing the establishment of the Xavier Centre of Historical Research onbehalf of the Goa Province of the Society of Jesus since 1979 and of having itrecognised as Ph.D. research centre of the then newly set-up Goa University,

which had come up in 1986. The collaboration resulted in various jointprojects and in publication of Goa Through the Ages, II : An Economic History and Essays in Goan History . It is my ardent wish that this collaboration may grow strong.

I had the opportunity to recently publish, in a brochure commemoratingPortuguese cultural week in Goa, an essay entitled “Unwrapping GoanIdentity”. The history of Goan society is complex and made up of many

wrappings. Like while peeling an onion, it can make us at times cry overthe ambiguities and conflicting situations it implies. But it is an ongoingprocess that must help us to come to terms with our past or to disentanglefrom the past and make it a launching pad for the future.

By way of acknowledgment, I have not forgotten the Jesuit sinners to whomthe earlier editions were dedicated. They were part of my onion-peelingexercise and I continue grateful for that vital component of my “medieval”Goa. Had it not been for frequent and varied support I received from the

Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation over the past three decades, includingdistribution worldwide of the first edition of Medieval Goa , much of my research efforts would not have the impact it has had. I wish to record herea special note of gratitude to my new alma mater , the Universidade Lusó-fona in Lisbon, where I found since my settlement in Portugal a congenialambiance for my academic sustenance and fulfillment.

I extend my thanks to my wife Elvira who has accompanied me understand-ingly over the past 15 years in my interests and efforts that were not always

easy to sustain. My grateful thanks to Frederick Noronha, whose interestin producing this edition is part of a bond that has kept us linked with Goabefore and beyond «medieval» concerns.

Finally my gratitude to all who have over the past thirty years appreciatedmy dedication to the cause of Goa’s history, and have contributed their ownefforts to make this a collaborative venture and success. Without wantingto make this book different from what it was, I have only updated relevantbibliography and added some fresh comments in the bibliographical essay.

Teotonio R. de Souza Lisboa, 18th February 2009


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Foreword

THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC HISTORY of Western India is a neglected branch of

research. I am happy that a beginning in this direction has been madeby Dr de Souza.

With his Goan background and disciplined Jesuit training, but an unbiasedmind that may be uncharacteristic of both, Dr. Teotonio R. de Souza hasbegun a commendable work in the field of Indo-Portuguese history. HisMedieval Goa is a result of painstaking research efforts and makes a remark-able contribution to the existing literature on the socio-economic history of Medieval India.

He has consulted a large number of Portuguese documents from the Goa Archives as well as from Lisbon and other places for his study. He hasappended a few of these to his monograph. This has made his study moreauthentic, and valuable for further research in this field.

He has given us quite an interesting analysis of the benefits and evils of Por-tuguese colonialism to the rural economy of Goa, as well as a good pictureof the conflicting interests in the town economy of Goa in a framework of

mercantilist ideology.Dr de Souza’s views have already gained respectful hearing at national andinternational levels and do not need my backing, but it makes me proudto have been association with this promising scholar during his buddingstages.

AR Kulkarni Department of History,

University of Poona,PUNE-411 007 14 June 1979


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PREFACE (FIRST EDITION) xi

and religious policies pursued by them during the course of the previouscentury.

The choice of the seventeenth century also helped in restricting the geo-graphical extent to be covered by this monograph. The Portuguese jurisdic-

tion of Goa during this period was limited to the three talukas or provincesof Bardez, Tiswadi and Salcete. The latter taluka included the present-day Mormuganv taluka as well. This original jurisdiction came to be known laterby the designation of ‘Old Conquests’ in order to distinguish it from the lateraddition of seven more provinces which were called the ‘New Conquests’.

The methodological approach of the present study is indicated by its sub-title, socio-economic history , which goes to show that the emphasis is onsocial and economic aspects of the historical past of Goa. Greater concen-

tration on quantification of data was surely desirable, but our low expertisein the realm of economics warned us against manhandling figures.

However, numbers have not been entirely ignored wherever they did notdemand too expert a touch. Attention is focused on social and economicinstitutions which provided the frame of existence and activity to the ruraland urban population of Goa in the seventeenth century. A survey of thepolitical history has been included by way of the Introduction, to providethe indispensable context in which the socio-economic changes in Goa

were taking place.

This approach pre-supposed our conviction that any significant socio-economic changes at the headquarters of the Portuguese eastern empirehad to be intimately connected with, and need to be assessed in, the widercontext of their overall imperial fortunes. This survey becomes a more inte-grated element in the general structure of the present monograph due toits references to the declining trade fortunes of the Portuguese, includingconsiderations regarding coastal and hinterland exchanges, upon which theGoan population depended not just for luxury goods but even for essentialfood-grains during the major part of the year.

Part One deals with the Rural Economy and Corporate Life and Part Two covers the salient features of the Urban Economy and Municipal Organi-sation. These two parts, consisting of three chapters each, form the mainbody of this study.

Research in this field has still to establish and clarify basic facts and concepts

and this is largely responsible for a pre-dominantly descriptive presentationof data. However, this has not been a bar to critical analysis.

The search for data was guided throughout by a determination to seek answers to a number of problems: What was the prevailing pattern of Goaneconomy? How did the growth of money economy influence the agrarianeconomy? What was the impact of Christianisation upon Goan society andits economy? What was the degree of town development and what was the


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PREFACE (FIRST EDITION) xiii

as such: it lists what may be some of my personal biases which have founddocumentary support, but its main goal is to indicate directions in whichmore investigation and analysis are required. Hence, it does not seek tosummarise what this study has achieved, but what is to be pursued by itsauthor and the readers by way of a follow-up.

Teotonio R. de Souza


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Acknowledgments

E VERY SIGNIFICANT achievement of a person is generally an outcome, in

varying degrees, of the exploitation of a host of other persons. Thisunpleasant feeling is mine on completion of this work. It was consoling,however, to realise in this process much goodness in persons, such as theabundance of generosity I had the opportunity to experience in the courseof my research-oriented efforts.

It is only very inadequately that I can express my gratitude to Prof. A. R.Kulkarni, whose solicitude in more respects than mere academic guidancehas proved to me that the classical Indian guru-sisya relationship is not justpast history.

The generous cooperation of Dr V. T. Gune, Director of the Goa Archives,permitted me to draw the staple of my documentation from this repository of records in the shortest time possible. I am indebted also to his formerassistant, Mr. G. Ghantkar, who first introduced me to the collections of the Goa Archives and helped in gathering information from the old villagecommunity records written in old Kannada script.

I wish to express my thanks to the authorities of the Post-Graduate Centreof Instruction and Research (Panaji) for letting me utilise the Pissurlencarcollection housed there. My sincere thanks also to Mr. Hubli, Curator of theCentral Library, Panaji, and to his well-informed young aide Pia Rodrigues. Iam grateful to B. Manerkar, the young and enthusiastic librarian of AthaideMunicipal Library, Mapusa, and to Mr. Mariano Dias from Mapusa forplacing at my disposal his private collection of books and manuscripts,including the Avelino Soares manuscripts.

My grateful thanks go to J. P. Bacelar e Oliveira, S.J., Rector of the CatholicUniversity of Lisbon, for sponsoring my visit to Portugal. A. da Rego, AlbertoIria, A. Teixeira da Mota, as well as the authorities and staffs of variousarchives and libraries of Lisbon made it possible for me to add to the valueof this work by bringing into it some of the rich and relevant documentary evidence that was available in the archives of Portugal. My vote of thanksalso to the authorities of the Madrid National Library, and of the Jesuit

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xv

Roman Archives. I wish to thank very especially the guidance I receivedfrom Fr. J. Wicki of the Institutum Historicum S.J., Rome.

I am very thankful to J. B. Harrison of S.O.A.S. (London) and Ashin Das Guptaof Shantiniketan (Calcutta) for their critical appreciation and comments

on my original work submitted to the University of Poona for the doctoraldegree. Much of the improvement in the published version was possiblebecause of their criticism and suggestions.

I wish to record my gratitude to U.G.C. for its Junior Research Fellowship,to I.C.H.R. for a publication grant, and to the Gulbenkian Foundation of Lisbon for its financial assistance during my visit to Europe.

I wish to thank Percival Noronha and Alexandre Pereira for supplying the twomaps prepared by the Land Survey Department of Goa, and Eng. UrbanoLobo for preparing the diagram.

Finally, I want to thank Vincent D’Souza, S.J., the Provincial Superior of theOrder who encouraged my entering the field of historical research. I am noless obliged to his successor, Romuald D’Souza, S.J. for sustaining my re-search efforts. Here goes also my grateful salute to all my Jesuit companionsand friends whose critical and appreciative comments and attitudes werean on-going stimulus.

T. R. de Souza


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Maps and diagram

• Goa and its Neighbours: No boundaries have been marked, because

they were constantly changing in the course of the 17th century.

• Old Conquests of Goa: The spelling of place-names has been adjustedto keep it as close as possible to the spelling found in the records con-sulted and in the contemporary maps of Manoel Godinho Heredia.

• Prices of Rice and Wheat in Goa City: It has been drawn with thehelp of information available in the Papers of the Suppressed Con-vents at HAG. The doted links indicate lack of information for the

corresponding period.

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Abbreviations

ACE Assentos do Conselho do Estado , ed, P.S.S. Pissurlencar.

ACF Assentos do Conselho da Fazenda (Minutes of the State Council)

AHSJ Archivum Historicum Societatis Jesu , Roma.

AHU Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino , Lisboa.

AJIC Anais da Junta das Investigações Coloniais , Lisboa.

APF Archives of the Congregation “de Propaganda Fide”, Roma.

APO-BP Arquivo Português Oriental , ed. A.B. de Bragança Pereira. APO-CR Archivo Portuguez-Oriental , de J.H. da Cunha Rivara.

AR Archivo do Relação de Goa , ed. I. de Abranches Garcia.

ARSJ Archivum Romanum Societatis Jesu , Roma.

BG Boletim do Governo , Nova Goa.

BHC Bosquejo Histórico das Communidades , by F. N. Xavier, Nova Goa, 1852.

BHC-JMS Bosquejo Historico das Communidades , 2nd ed., J. M. de Sá, Bas-torá, 1903-7.

BIVG Boletim do Instituto Vasco da Gama , Nova Goa / Bastorá.

BNL Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa (National Library of Lisbon)

BNM Biblioteca Nacional de Madrid (National Library of Madrid).

CEHU Centro de Estudos Históricos Ultramarinos (Centre of Overseas His-

torical Studies, Lisbon).

CEO Conquista Espiritual do Oriente , by Fr. Paulo de Trindade.

CT Collecção de Tratados , ed. J.F.J. Biker.

DGHM Descripção Geral e Histórica das Moedas , by A. C. Teixeira de Aragão.

DI Documenta Indica , ed. J. Wicki, Roma.

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ABBREVIATIONS xviii

DMP Documentação para as Missões do Padroado Português do Oriente: India , ed. A. da Rego, Lisboa.

DRI Documentos Remettidos da India , ed Bulhão Pato / A. Rego, Lisboa.

DSE The Dutch Seaborne Empire , by C. R. Boxer.

DUP Documentação Ultramarina Portuguesa , ed. Rego, Lisbon.

EFI English Factories in India , ed. W. Foster, Oxford.

GLA Glossário Luso-Asiático , by S.R. Dalgado.

HAG Historical Archives of Goa , Panaji.

HD History of Dharmashastra , ed. P.V. Kane.

HJ Hobson-Jobson , by Yule and Burnell.

HMD History of Medieval Deccan , ed. H.K. Sherwani and P.M. Joshi.

JBHS Journal of the Bombay Historical Society , Bombay.

JBMS Journal of the Bombay Mythic Society , Bombay.

JRAS Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society , London.

JRASB Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bomba y, Bombay.

JUB Journal of the University of Bombay , Bombay.

MD Molesworth’s Marathi-English Dictionary .

NCMH New Cambridge Modern History , Cambridge.

NZMW Neue Zeitschrift für Missionswissenschaft, Schweiz .

OC Oriente Conquistado , by Francisco de Souza.

OP O Oriente Português , Nova Goa.PI The Portuguese in India , by F.C. Danvers.

PO Os Portugueses no Oriente , ed. E.A. de Sá Nogueira Balsemão.

PSE The Portuguese Seaborne Empire , by C.R. Boxer.

PST Portuguese Society in the Tropics , by C.R. Boxer.

SG Sebastião Gonçalves, Primeira Parte da História dos Religiosos da Com-

panhia de Jesus , ed. J.Wicki.

TDT Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo (National Archives, Lisbon).

WG Wilson’s Glossary of Judicial and Revenue Term s.


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Chapter 1

Rivals and Neighbours

A FTER A FIRST century of nearly undisputed mastery over the westernIndian ocean, and after a sufficiently long spell of prosperity, misfor-tunes began falling thick and fast upon the Portuguese Empire. In 1580Portugal lost its independence and the crowns of Spain and Portugal wereunited in the person of Philip II of Spain, who assumed the title of Philip

I of Portugal. True, Portuguese administration and trade were left in thehands of Portuguese nationals, but the royal authority in Spain showed littleconcern for the growing difficulties of the Portuguese in the East. Portugalhad no foreign policy of its own and the enemies of Spain were turned intoenemies of Portugal. Despite promises to the contrary, Spain also usedfinancial resources and man-power from Portugal in order to quell Dutchinsurgency against Spanish rule.1

In 1640 the Portuguese regained their independent rule, but it was too late torepair the damage to the national and imperial economy. The century-oldfabric of the Portuguese eastern empire had been torn apart and appro-priated by its North-European rivals. There was also the factor of moraldegeneration at work and we have the following comment about it froma contemporary Jesuit who was very familiar with the prevailing situation:“From the oldest to the youngest, rare are the persons who perform theirduty. Of zeal for the service of the crown there is little. Portuguese exploitsare scarce. Graft in administration has flourished, the martial spirit has

faded; valour is non-existent and cowardice is rampant. All these are rea-sons encouraging our enemies.”2 These reverses had emboldened nativerules of the neighbourhood to flout the trade restrictions of the Portugueseand to exploit the competitive market inaugurated by the arrival of theNorth-Europeans.3

What follows is a short review of a long-drawn conflict which deprivedthe Portuguese of their stronghold over the Asiatic trade. This review is


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CHAPTER 1. RIVALS AND NEIGHBOURS 2

indispensable as an introduction to the present study because the placeof importance to which Goa had risen depended entirely on its being thestrategic base of the Portuguese seaborne trade in the East. Hence, it wouldbe unrealistic to study economic change at Goa merely within the confinesof its geographical boundary.

The Portuguese and their North-European rivals

Neither the English nor the Dutch had been happy with their dependenceupon the Lisbon market for the supplies of eastern spices. It was a humil-iating experience to the masters of the carrying trade of the Baltic and of

the rest of the western Europe.4

The merchant-adventurers of both thesecountries had, from long back planned and carried successful raids uponthe home-bound wealth-laden vessels of the Iberian empires. Rich prizeshad whetted their appetites and tempted them to probe further into the

weakness of their empires. Following the union of the crowns of Spain andPortugal, the latter as the weaker partner drew upon itself the fury of theNorth-Europeans, who fought for spices under the cloak of nationalism andthe banner of Reformation.

The Portuguese and the English Rivals: The English restricted their use of force to the minimum and succeeded in wresting concessions from the Por-tuguese through diplomatic tact. The Anglo-Portuguese relations in Indiareflected very much the pattern of the Anglo-Portuguese relations in Eu-rope. More than once in moments of national crises Portugal had turned toEngland for help against enemies threatening her independence. However,England had exploited all such occasions by offering its alliance to furtherits business interests in the trade-world of Portugal.5 At the dawn of the

seventeenth century, the involvement of the English in the Asiatic trade com-pelled the Portuguese to buy their neutrality with concessions. This enableda concentration of Portuguese forces against the Dutch aggressiveness.

In the ominous situation created by the Dutch, the Portuguese could notprevent the English from exploiting their weakness and from strengtheningtheir foothold in the Surat trade. However, the Portuguese did use whateverlittle force they could and tried diplomatic intrigue at the Mughal court todiscourage English trade ambitions. It was only after Captain Thomas Best

had successfully resisted Portuguese attacks off the coast of Surat in 1612,and after Captain Nicholas Downton had made short work of a Portuguesefleet commanded personally by the Viceroy of Goa in 1615, that the Mughalruler officially sanctioned the trade activities of the English in his lands andaccepted an English ambassador at his court.6

The Thirty Years’ War (1618-48), pitting European countries against eachother largely on the basis of religious differences, was also responsible for


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the English and the Dutch co-religionists joining hands in conquering theEast Indies trade.7 They fought by proxy upholding the grievances of the na-tive princes against the Portuguese. Thus the English assisted the Persiansto drive the Portuguese out of Hurmuz in 1622, thereby depriving the Por-tuguese of an important strategic outpost as well as trading base. The Dutch

did the same in the Indonesian archipelago and in Ceylon. Fortunately forthe Portuguese, the English fell out with the Dutch over the control of theSpice Islands. Coen of the Dutch East India Company had not reconciledhimself to the stipulations of the Dutch agreement with the English in 1619and was of the opinion that Dutch supremacy in the Spice Islands would notbe achieved if conquests were to be undertaken jointly with the English.8

Deteriorating relations culminated with the massacre of some Englishmenat Amboina in 1623. This incident marked a definite end to negotiations for

cooperation in Asia. This factor, plus the lack of interest shown by the early Stuarts in offering protection to the Company merchants seemingly causedthe shifting of the English East India Company’s interest to the west coast of India and to the Persian Gulf. It also brought about a change in the staple of the English trade from spices to textiles.9

As a result of a Portuguese initiative and of the willing response of theEnglish, Anglo-Portuguese relations entered a new phase with the signingof the Goa Accord on January 20, 1635, which marked the cessation of

hostilities and inaugurated a phase of mutual assistance.10 While the long-term effect of the truce was restricted to a benevolent neutrality of theEnglish in favour of the Portuguese, there were immediate benefits derivedby the two signatories. The Portuguese freighted English vessels to supply provisions to the besieged garrison of Malacca and to fetch copper andordnance from Macau to Goa through the straits of Singapore where theDutch were lying in wait for the Portuguese ships.11 In the meantime theEnglish were increasing their profits on the carrying trade, and even a few

coasters were built for them in the Portuguese shipyards of Bassein andDaman.12 Anglo-Portuguese relations turned tense for a while when the

Accord was being violated by some English interlopers who had come todraw the benefits of the truce. They belonged to the so-called Courteen’s

Association. It took the Portuguese some time to be convinced that the Accord violators were not in league with the English East India Company based at Surat. 13

Throughout the rest of the seventeenth century the Portuguese and the

English were kept together by their common hostilities towards the Dutch. While the English fought three wars with the Dutch in Europe, the Por-tuguese and the Dutch continued locked in their grim duel for the Asi-atic trade. The exhaustion of the Portuguese and their inability to containthe Dutch forced them into a marriage treaty with England in 1661. Thetreaty included a secret clause whereby the King of England committedhimself to bring about cessation of hostilities between the Portuguese and


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resumed.32 However in spite of all these precautions and counter-measures,the fury of the Dutch attacks, when these were renewed, was beyond thePortuguese power to contain. By 1658, the Dutch conquered the Portuguesesettlements in coastal Ceylon, and by 1663 they had rounded off their Asianconquests with the capture of Cochin and other Portuguese strongholds on

the Malahar coast.33 The Hague treaty of 1661 put an official end to the Luso-Dutch feud, which the Portuguese had no wish to renew even when the

Anglo-Dutch wars of 1665-7 and 1672-4 presented promising opportunitiesfor regaining some of the losses.34

The effects of the prolonged Luso-Dutch conflict were disastrous and dev-astating for the Portuguese. During the conflict Portuguese India was bled

white, both in terms of manpower and financial resources. At the close of theconflict the gorgeous East was a glory of the Portuguese past. Even thoughonly fragmentary statistical information is available, it suffices as an indica-tor of the magnitude of total Portuguese losses. During one decade betweenthe years 1629-39 the Portuguese lost nearly 6,000 men, 160 ships, andover 75,00,000 xerafins as booty, mostly to the Dutch.35 More serious lossesfollowed in the sieges of Malacca, Colombo and the Kanara and Malabarsettlements.

The Portuguese and the neighbouring rulers

In 1570, the Muslim rulers of the Deccan moved concertedly to drive out thePortuguese who controlled the Indian seaborne trade at gun-point. How-ever, this lone and praise-worthy exception in Indian history ended in afiasco. Their defeat can be attributed largely to the determination of thePortuguese to stay on. It will be no mere figment of the imagination to sup-

pose that in the wake of the extinction of the Hindu kingdom of Vijayanagarat the hands of the same Muslim coalition, the Hindu population of thePortuguese dominions and the neighbourhood intervened to sabotage theMuslim enterprise.36 Sixty years earlier, when the Portuguese captured Goa,the success of the Portuguese was made possible by the native Hindu popu-lation which fought side by side with the Portuguese to defeat their formerMuslim overlords.37

Though the Portuguese emerged unscathed and were successful in reiter-

ating their determination to continue acting as “lords of navigation andcommerce”, they had not failed to learn their lesson. They had narrowly escaped being pushed into the sea by the land forces of the neighbouringprinces. The situation had changed for the Portuguese with the arrival of new European naval forces, whose alliance the native powers were likely to seek to blunt the edge of Portuguese superiority. This realisation madethe Portuguese more cautious and more restrained in enforcing sea control


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and in shaping their course of relationship with their neighbours in theseventeenth century.38

Portuguese-Mughal Relations (1600-1700): The Portuguese came intocontact with the Mughals when Akbar annexed Gujarat to his empire in1673. Akbar then tried to win the friendship of the Portuguese in India by exploiting their proselytizing zeal. His pretensions were so well disguisedthat it took the ‘wise’ Jesuits quite some time to realise that the Mughalemperor was playing a political game. 39 However, Akbar continued to press


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for the presence of the Portuguese Jesuits at his court, left the Portuguese with Daman in his Gujarat subah, promised not to shelter the Malabar pi-rates, and agreed to the condition that he would be entitled to only onepassport-free voyage to the Red Sea once a year.40 The Portuguese on theirside were well aware of Akbar’s might and of the vulnerability of several

of their forts on the western Indian coast. Thus they took pains not to of-fend the Mughals, and the Jesuits were coaxed to continue residing at theMughal court despite their repeated reports expressing the futility of theircontinuing there.41 Portuguese interests in Gujarat formed the backbone of the Portuguese revenue in the East: From their establishments at Bassein,Daman and Diu they issued cartazes (passes) to all ships leaving the portsof Gujarat and collected passport fees. Portuguese coastal fleets from Goavisited the ports of Gujarat every year and carried a large proportion of the

merchandise exported from the province, particularly cloths.42 Indigo alsoformed an important item of trade with Gujarat.43 The importance of thistrade can be gauged from a report sent by the Goa municipal council to theKing of Portugal in 1606: “The disturbances in Gujarat where the nativeshave rebelled against the Mughal have taken a heavy toll of the revenue of this Portuguese State of India, because the vanias (banianes ) were the ones

who patronised most our customs.”44

During the rule of Akbar’s successors Portuguese-Mughal relations were

strained on different occasions. When the Portuguese saw, for instance, thatin spite of the efforts of the Jesuits at the court of Jehangir to dissuade theemperor he was responding favourably to the approaches of the Englishmenand had even granted them permission to have a trading establishment atSurat, the viceroy of Goa ordered the admiral of the Portuguese fleet in thenorthern seas to lie in wait for any ship of the Mughals that might returnfrom Mecca to Surat. A vessel returning from Mecca with large amountof precious cargo was accordingly captured, sacked and set afire.45 The

hostilities that ensued led to the siege of Daman by land, while the Por-tuguese retaliated by bombarding the port towns of Broach, Gogala andSurat. Neither party derived any substantial benefit from the war whichlasted two years until a peace treaty was signed on June 7, 1615. The warhad damaged the economy of both contenders. As reported by the chief revenue comptroller of the Portuguese State of India on December 25, 1614,“the State of India is in a miserable situation because its customs are with-out revenues as a result of hostilities with the Mughal and the consequent

disruption of the trade with Gujarat.”46

Even though the very first clause of the treaty of 1615 required that theMughal emperor should expel the North Europeans from Surat and refuseentry, protection and replenishments to their ships in any port of the Mughalempire, it remained a dead letter. The Mughal emperor accepted that very

year at his court as accredited ambassador of the crown of England theEnglishman Sir Thomas Roe. Jehangir was convinced by the events which


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he had witnessed that the superiority of the English naval power could beeffectively used to check the insolence of the Portuguese.47

The Portuguese were also aware of the fact that the Mughal could causegreat harm to them by utilizing the naval arm of the English or of the Dutch.

Accordingly, they pretended to ignore the demands of the treaty and theirfulfillment on the part of the Mughal. They also adopted a more flexiblepolicy of sea control with regard to the Mughal shipping: Mughal ships

were often allowed to leave the ports of Gujarat without cartazes but sub- ject to paying customs duties on the outgoing and incoming goods at thePortuguese customs house at Daman.48

Soon after Shahjahan took into his hands the reins of the Mughal empirethe Portuguese were subjected to some rough treatment. The emperor had

several grievances against the Portuguese administration in India, as wellas against the Portuguese renegades and adventurers in Bengal. His angertook the form of a campaign against the Portuguese settlement at Hughly in Bengal, which he captured and carried several thousands of Portuguesemen, women and children prisoners to Agra, where he converted many toIslam and reduced others to slavery.49

After Shahjahan annexed the lands of Nizam Shah to his empire in 1636the Portuguese at Daman lived under a permanent threat from the Mughal

forces. A couple of years later the Mughals succeeded in subduing the rulerof Ramnagar, known to the Portuguese as Choutea. The Mughals then de-manded from the Portuguese a contribution (Chauth) which they had beenpaying to the king of Ramnagar. The Portuguese subjects who cultivatedthe lands of Daman were thus required to pay not only the usual 17% of theproduce, which they had been paying to Choutea, but an increased rate of 25%. The Mughals refused to pay any heed to the representations of thePortuguese administration in this matter.50

When Aurangzeb took over the Mughal administration in 1658 the situationin the Deccan took a serious turn and forced the Portuguese to be on theirguard. Aurangzeb was determined to bring to a successful end the plansof this forefathers for the subjugation of the Deccan, and perhaps, of theentire Indian subcontinent. He personally assumed command of the opera-tions and shifted his court from Agra to Daulatabad. However, there was anew element which Aurangzeb’s predecessors had not faced: the Marathas.During the Mughal-Maratha conflict the Portuguese kept themselves at

arm’s length, praised Shivaji’s valour as no other contemporaries had done,and prayed that the duel might last long and save the Portuguese from theambitious designs of both their mighty neighbours.51

Portuguese-Ahmadnagar Relations (1600-1636): Until 1600 there hadbeen constant and serious friction between the Nizam Shahi rulers of Ah-madnagar in the Deccan and the Portuguese, but after this they shared a


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community of interests and considerations of mutual safety against the ag-gressiveness of the Mughals. The Portuguese had their prosperous Provinceof the North, 52 and its safety required the preservation of Ahmadnagar asa buffer State. Time and again the Viceroys in India received instructionsfrom the king of Portugal to make their own the cause of Malik Ambar, the

able Abyssinian minister of the Nizam, who was straining all military anddiplomatic skill to keep the Nizam Shahi alive.53

In 1604 Malik Ambar granted to the Portuguese the right to collect half theland revenue in Chaul in recognition of the aid he was receiving to resist theMughal pressure. In keeping with their tradition, the Portuguese resorted tohigh-handed exactions from the peasants of Chaul. Malik intervened to putan end to these abuses, but the Portuguese could not bear the idea of beingcorrected by a pagan. Both sides resorted to violent hostilities which lastedfor several years until an imminent threat of Mughal forced them to cometo an understanding in 1615 through the mediation of Ibrahim Adil Shahof Bijapur. A tripartite agreement was then concluded at Nauraspur, nearBijapur, in 1615.54

In 1625 the Portuguese resumed hostilities in Chaul and the provocationled to the capture of Dabhol by Malik Ambar. Thereafter some sort of truce

was concluded.55 The following year Malik Ambar died and was succeeded

by his less talented son Fath Khan. The year 1627 saw also the passingaway of Ibrahim Adil Shah II who had been a good friend of Malik Ambar.The Mughal emperor Jehangir died that same year. The fresh arrangementof the political chessboard proved fatal to Ahmadnagar. The new rulersof Ahmadnagar and Bijapur were more divided than ever before, and thisenabled Shahjahan to woo Bijapur and break the backbone of Ahmadnagar’sresistance once and for all.56

Shahji Bhosle, a Maratha general, who at different times had served the

rulers of Ahmadnagar, Bijapur and the Mughals, made a bid to shore up thesinking fortunes of Ahmadnagar. In his total isolation he appealed to thePortuguese for help, but the latter were cautious and did not want to inviteupon themselves the wrath of the combined forces of Shahjahan and AdilShah.57 In 1636 Nizam Shahi rule came to an end. A letter of the Portuguesecrown to the viceroy of India refers to the difficulties that resulted from thisfact to the Portuguese in India. The king instructed his viceroy to seek allmeans of sowing dissensions between the Mughal and the Dutch, and this

is described as the need of the hour in order to prevent the loss of Bassein,Chaul, Daman and Diu, to all of which the Mughal claimed right as the new master of Ahmadnagar.58

Portuguese-Bijapur Relations (1600-1686): The Portuguese relationship with Bijapur is particularly significant because the capital town of the Por-tuguese in India had been wrested from Bijapur in 1510. Also its neighbour-ing provinces of Salcete and Bardez, which formed the jurisdiction of Goa at


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this time, had belonged to Bijapur and passed into the Portuguese hands in1543. Until 1579 Adil Shah rulers made repeated attempts to regain theselost territories. The seventeenth century inaugurated a phase of peacefulrelationship between the Portuguese and Bijapur with the exception of twobreaches in 1654 and 1659.

During the first quarter of the seventeenth century the Portuguese-Bijapurrelations were conspicuously cordial; some minor frictions did not leadto any serious conflict. The good services of Ibrahim Adil Shah were evensought by the Portuguese to act as intermediary between them and theNizam Shahi Sultan in 1615. As the first quarter of the century was comingto its end, the relations entered a phase of a long drawn tension resultingfrom provocation and retaliation from either side. Already in 1623 the Bi-

japuris had approached the English seeking a pact with them to expel thePortuguese, but this request was not taken up by the English with enthu-siasm because of Roe’s “go slow” policy with regard to getting involved inhostilities in India.59

The ruler of Bijapur began expressing his grievances openly when the Por-tuguese captured two vessels belonging to him in the Persian Gulf and killedtheir crew in cold blood in 1629. Adil Shah retaliated by detaining a Por-tuguese vessel with the Portuguese revenue comptroller of Muscat on boardin the port of Rajapur, where the vessel had sought shelter in a tempest afterobtaining permission of the Bijapuri authorities to ender.60 The Portugueseadded more fuel to the flame by seizing yet another vessel of Bijapur.61 Tothis the Bijapuris reacted very sharply by withdrawing their ambassadorfrom Goa, by closing all the ports in Adil Shah’s territory to Purtuguese ship-ping, by stopping the easy flow of food supplies to Goa, and by threateningto invade the provinces of Bardez and Salcete.62

The Portuguese sensed the gravity of the developments and that they could

ill afford a war with Adil Shah. Unexpected circumstances played intotheir hands and provided them with the required opportunity to defuse thetension.

This happened when the joint forces of the Mughals and Ahmadnagar be-sieged Bijapur in April 1632 and the Portuguese received a frantic call from

Adil Shah to help him with gunners, powder and ammunition. The Por-tuguese not only acceded to the request, by even offered to manufacturegunpowder and ammunition for Adil Shah in Goa if he would care to send

the necessary materials.63

The aid was sent with the utmost secrecy, and while ostensibly it was in-terpreted as a favour done to Adil Shah, the Portuguese knew better thata defeat of Bijapur at the hands of the Mughal would be damaging to thesafety of the Portuguese in the heart of their empire.64

After a short interval of respite there followed another bout of tense relations, which culminated in the large scale invasion of Bardez and Salcete in 1654


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and another minor incursion of the same provinces five years later. Therenewal of tension was caused by the facilities granted by Adhil Shah to theEnglish and to the Dutch at Dabhol, Karwar, Rajapur and Vingurla.

The Portuguese felt particularly aggrieved by the concessions made to the

Dutch, whose attacks on Portuguese shipping and whose blockades of theGoa port had become more intense and regular after they had obtained basefacilities at Vingurla.65 The Dutch had also been instigating Adil Shah toattack Goa by land while they would intensify their attacks by sea. Adil Shahappears to have been taken up by the idea, and even the mode of sharingthe booty was apparently settled.

However, more pressing engagements of Adil Shah in Kanara saved the Por-tuguese at Goa.66 However, in 1654 Adil Shah did not resist the temptation

of capturing the Portuguese territories of Bardez and Salcete. Apparently, the invasion was effected at the request of a Goan native Brah-min Bishop, Matheus de Castro Mahale, who was residing in the Bijapuritown of Bicholim. The Bishop had developed a hatred for the Portuguesecolonial rule in his native land and had been instigating the Goans to shakeoff the Portuguese yoke.67 The Bijapuris also sought to exploit the admin-istrative confusion that prevailed at Goa following the deposition of theviceroy Count of Obidos by a rebel group. But the invasion ended in a fiasco,

because the Portuguese had already smelled the subversive plans of theBishop and had taken defensive measures against an internal rising, whilethe war needs of Bijapur elsewhere demanded immediate withdrawal of itstroops from Goa.68

After 1656, when the Bijapuris had to grapple with both the Mughals andthe Marathas, they had no energy to spare for further conflict with thePortuguese. However, the latter were not free from embroilment in thepolitics of these powers since many of the provincial officials, the desais, hadrevolted against their masters and sought frequent refuge in the Portugueseterritory. The Portuguese secretly favoured the guerilla movements of thesedesais to keep the powers concerned distracted with campaigns to bringthe rebels to book.69

On the whole Portuguese-Bijapur relations were more cordial than the rela-tions of the Portuguese with any other neighbour of theirs in Western India.This was a necessity, because the Portuguese in Goa depended heavily on

Bijapur (Balaghat) for their food supplies and many other daily necessities.Portuguese Goa-based trade depended on Bijapur for the cloth supplies.Precious stones, which constituted the second most important trade item,

were brought from Golkonda mines in Bijapur.70 Saltpetre for the gunpow-der manufactory of Goa was obtained from Bijapur, and so were the sailors

who manned the coastal fleets of the Portuguese.71 All these considerationscompelled the Portuguese to grant a most-favoured treatment to the rulersof Bijapur. According to the terms of a treaty signed with Bijapur in 1571,


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and which remained substantially in force throughout the seventeenth cen-tury, Adil Shah received annually six free cartazes ; was allowed to importduty-free twenty-five horses every year; could import from Goa duty-freegoods worth 6,000 gold pardaus every year; and was promised half shareof the booty whenever the Portuguese captured any ships in the ports of

Bijapur for not carrying Portuguese cartazes .72

Portuguese-Kanara Relations (1600-1700): The capture of Goa in 1510 was affected by Afonso de Albuquerque on the advice and with the activecollaboration of Timaya, a naval chief of Honavar, a principality of Kanara.73

Thereafter, Goa and most of the scattered settlements of the Portuguesein Asia were sustained with rice supplies from Kanara, while the peppercargoes from Kanara justified the pains taken by the Portuguese in foundingan empire in the East Indies.74 Kanara was also the main supplier of teak timber for the Goa shipyard.75

Kanara had been a mosaic of petty principalities which enjoyed a largedegree of autonomy, earlier under Vijayanagar until 1565, and later underBijapur. The Portuguese dealt with them directly and had treaty agreements

with their rulers. By these treaties these chiefs were to supply to the Por-tuguese a definite number of rice bales by way of tribute (pareas ). They werealso compelled by the terms of the treaties to provide pepper cargoes to the

Portuguese ships of the Carreira at moderate rates. This exploitation by thePortuguese went unchecked during most of the sixteenth century.76

At the dawn of the seventeenth century, along with other troubles fromdifferent quarters, the Portuguese began facing difficulties in Kanara as well.The Nayaks of the Keladi ruling family had begun showing expansionistdesires of their own. The sixth ruler of that family, Venkatappa Nayak (1592-1629), had succeeded in annexing the territory of the queen of Gersoppa,called the “queen of pepper” by the Portuguese; he soon turned his attention

towards the lands belonging to the chiefs of Bangher and Mangalore, wherethe Portuguese had their settlements and trading posts. The Portuguesecould easily foresee the harm which this unification bid of the Nayak wouldbring to their trade interests and the problems it would cause to the Por-tuguese presence in the East. This is clear from the instructions that wereaddressed by the Portuguese crown to its Indian administration, which wasinstructed to frustrate the designs of the Nayaks by setting Adil Shah againsthim and by welding the other chiefs of Kanara into a confederacy against

Venkatappa Nayak.77

The Portuguese had too many difficulties of their own to be able to provideany effective assistance to the petty chiefs of Kanara, who were seeking Por-tuguese protection against Venkatappa’s imperialist ambitions. They wereabsorbed one by one until Venkatappa extended his kingdom to include allthe territories between the rivers Mirjan and Chandragiri. The Portuguese

were left untouched in their forts at Basrur, Honavar, and Mangalore; but


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their dictates were no longer going to be tolerated. Venkatappa had madehis estimates of the power and wealth of the Portuguese. He made over-tures to the English regarding the sale of pepper to them.78 The military operations against Bangher were also directed against the Portuguese atMangalore. The Portuguese saw the new line of attack and chose to disown

the cause of the chief of Bangher. In January 1620 the Portuguese came toa treaty agreement with the Nayak. It was the first in the series of treaties

which the Nayaks of Ikkeri would dictate to the Portuguese.

Following the death of Venkatappa in November 1629 the Portuguese triedto exploit the situation caused by the contest for succession in Bidnur. ThePortuguese were inclined to consider Virappa as the rightful heir because heshowed himself more amenable to Portuguese pretensions.79 However, thePortuguese gains were short-lived as Virappa died a few months after signingan agreement with the Portuguese, and Virabhadra Nayak rose to power asthe uncontested ruler of Kanara. The new ruler could not immediately winthe submission of the many petty chieftains who had been subjugated by his Kelady predecessors. The Portuguese aided the rebel chieftains and atthe same time approached Virabhadra with the proposal of their readinessto mediate between him and the rebels. The proposal was quickly rejectedby Virabhadra, whose campaign to subdue the chieftains was coming to asuccessful end. On the contrary, in order to punish the meddlers, Virabhadra

imposed a ban on the purchase of rice by the Portuguese in Basrur.80 Asa result, the Portuguese who could not afford to do without Kanara riceagreed to come to terms: The Portuguese would retain their position inBasrur, but they would not fortify the peninsula of Gangolly as they wishedto do. Thus the status quo was maintained regarding the issue which hadbecome a bone of contention between the Portuguese and the Nayak.81

There were other clauses on which concessions were made by either side:The Portuguese could take all the timber they wished for the Goa shipyard,

and timber for twenty-four masts would be cut and delivered to them by the Nayak at the mouth of the Gersoppa and Sangari rivers. The Portugueseagreed to buy 500 khandis of pepper from Kanara immediately, and another350 khandis every subsequent year at the rate of 22 pagodas per khandi.The Nayak was also given right to import twelve horses every year withoutpaying customs duty to the Portuguese, and to have two duty-free passesfor his ships.82

A year had hardly passed after signing the treaty when Virabhadra required

that the Portuguese to pay him 28 pagodas for a khandi of pepper, claimingthat the English were willing to offer 30 pagodas. He threatened a new banon rice purchases if the Portuguese refused to yield to his demand. The Por-tuguese did refuse the terms and their ship of the Carreira left for Portugalin 1636 with only 600 to 700 quintal of pepper stocked prior to the block-ade. To punish the intransigence of Virabhadra they intensified their navalcontrol of the Kanara coast to prevent any pepper or rice from being taken


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out. This tough action brought Virabhadra to his senses and he realisedthat supplies of pepper and rice to the Portuguese alone were bringing tohis treasury an average of 500,000 pagodas every year.83 The Portuguesereciprocated the improved behaviour of Virabhadra by supplying him guns,powder and ammunition to withstand the attacks of Adil Shah, who had

already captured a number of Kanara forts.84

Shivappa Nayak, who began his rule in 1645, was determined to bring tocompletion his expansionist plans initiated by his predecessors. Within adecade from his coming to power he deprived the Portuguese of all theirestablishments in Kanara.85 Shivappa’s success was due largely to the time-liness of his operations against the Portuguese: The Portuguese were lockedin a desperate campaign with the Dutch in Ceylon, and in Goa preparations

were afoot to resist an impending invasion by Adil Shah. Economically alsothe Portuguese faced a hopeless situation: every possible source was tappedto finance the defence efforts. It was in such a context that Shivappa was

willing to raise the siege of Honavar if the Portuguese would buy from him1000 khandis of pepper immediately and 500 khandis every subsequent year at a fixed rate of 28 pagodas.86 The Portuguese were in no position tobuy even 300 khandis for the quoted price.87They were left with no other al-ternative but to order the garrison of the Honavar fort, which was survivingon a diet of rats and cats, to quit the place.88

Following their expulsion from Kanara the Portuguese tried to give ventto their rage by scouring the coast of Kanara with whatever naval powerthey could still command. However, rice supplies from the NorthernProvince could never be sufficient and fresh attacks by the neighboursof that province could not be ruled out. This consideration forced the Por-tuguese to be restrained in the expression of their rage in Kanara.89

After Shivappa died in 1660, his son Somashker Nayak sent an ambassador to

Goa inviting the Portuguse to re-establish their factories at Basrur, Honavarand Mangalore. The negotiations ended with a treaty signed on April 30,1671.90 The treaty remained a dead letter and the Portuguese could notre-enter Kanara because of the threats of the Dutch, who sent their fleets topressurise the ruler of Kanara to give up the idea of taking the Portugueseback.91 The Portuguese in the meantime continued their favourite pastimeof patrolling the coast.

Somashker Nayak was assassinated in December 1671. An infant grandson,

Basava Nayak, was placed on the throne, but the power was in the handsof the queen mother and her favourite, Timmaya Nayak.92 The Portuguesedid not like the attitude of the new rulers, who were favouring trade withthe Arabs of Muscat and had granted them permission to have a factory inKanara. The purchase of the Kanara rice by the Arabs had led to a sharp risein the price of rice from less than eight pagodas to fourteen pagodas for ascore of rice bales.93 The Portuguese, who had re-established factories in


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Kanara, now closed them down and resorted to gunboat diplomacy onceagain. A new feud of succession raised the hopes of the Portuguese for atime, but it was ultimately with the queen and the prince that the Portuguesesigned a new agreement on December 15, 1678, whereby the Portugueseobtained a factory in Mangalore and the promise that the Arabs would

not be allowed access to Kanara ports.94 The Arabs, however, continued tofrequent Kanara ports and they even set afire a Portuguese ship-convoy inMangalore waters in 1695. The Portuguese wished to withdraw from Kanaraand resume hostilities, but on second thoughts they only expressed theirdispleasure to the queen.95

Portuguese-Maratha Relations (1636-1700): Portuguese-Maratha rela-tions are particularly significant to a student of the history of the Goanpeople considering the fact that long before Shivaji laid the foundationsof the Maratha State, Goa shared the cultural life of the Maratha regionaround it. There is undeniable evidence to prove that the varkari panth ,96

which first gave shape to Marathi literature and brought about a culturalunification of the Marathas, had its devotees in Goa. The Jesuit chronicler,Sebastião Gonçalves, writing in 1565 described some Hindus of Goa singinginvocations of god Vithal of Pandharpur.97The Marathas, as an ethnic group,

were also an important segment of the Goan population. Apparently, afterconversion they gave rise to the Chardo caste, which vied with the Brahmins

for social equality.98 The ascendancy of the Marathas in the social status inGoa is attributed to the rule of the Silaharas in this region around seventhcentury A.D.99 In addition to the Maratha race and the varkari sect, there

was the Marathi language, which had gained a firm foothold in Goa, as canbe gathered from extant epigraphs and documentary evidence.100 Althoughthe Portuguese discouraged the development of vernacular language andliterature, recordings of the proceedings of village councils continued to bedone in Marathi until the very end of the second decade of the seventeenth

century.101 It is against this background that the study of the Portuguese-Maratha relations becomes more meaningful and significant.

The first contact between the Portuguese and the Marathas on the politicallevel is recorded in a letter addressed by Shivaji’s father, Shahji Bhosle, to thePortuguese captain of Chaul on September 26, 1636. Finding it impossibleto rouse Nizam Shahi against the joint aggressiveness of the Mughal and

Adil Shah, Shahji appealed to the Portuguese for help and requested shelterfor his wife and children. The Portuguese refused military assistance, but

they were willing to offer refuge to his family.102

The earliest reference to Shivaji as Shahji’s son occurs in a Portuguese recordof 1657.103 By and large, the Portuguese looked favourably upon the riseof Maratha power under Shivaji’s leadership. In the context of the growingmight of the Mughal, the rise of the Marathas was a godsend to the Por-tuguese, promising to them a more stable balance of power. But as long asShivaji’s activity was confined to the Deccan the Portuguese could safely en-


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tertain feelings of genuine appreciation of his achievements. During 1657-9Shivaji added most of the North Konkan to his dominions, thereby makingthe Portuguese feel that he meant serious business. Shivaji’s friction withthe Siddi of Danda, and Shivaji’s plans to express his sovereignty by build-ing a navy, made the Portuguese intensely aware of his vicinity.104 It was

then that the Portuguese adopted a policy of open friendliness and silentobstructionism. The policy of obstructionism was aimed at frustrating theambitious plans of Shivaji to build maritime forts and a strong fleet. Amongthe reasons put forth by the State councillors to justify this policy we readthat “if Shivaji succeeded in capturing some Portuguese vessels, the tastefor booty would encourage him to intensify such harmful adventures, andthe Portuguese friendship with him was not firm enough to check such adevelopment. Besides, Shivaji had proved himself to be a good pay-master

and with his ready cash he had been alluring not only natives but evenPortuguese renegades into his service.”105

However, the Portuguese were so deeply involved in their struggle with theDutch and with the rulers of Kanara that there was neither the will not themeans to face yet another contender closer at home. Hence, the Portuguesefailed to check the cherished goal of Shivaji: when he raided Basrur andreturned with immense booty, he had 85 vessels, big and small, which took part in the operations.106 According to a report of the Portuguese viceroy of

India in 1667: “I am worried with his growing might in the sea, because hehas built coastal forts, which should have been prevented at the start, andhe has a large number of vessels, although none of them are big”.107

The Portuguese kept themselves well informed about the movements of Shivaji and they were quite impressed by his guerilla tactics marked by lightning operations against his enemies and collection of fabulous sums of gold. With their long experience of dealing with the Indian rulers the Por-tuguese had rightly assessed Shivaji’s might. Aware of his capacity to causethem harm, the Portuguese kept the Siddi supplied with food provisions,money and fighting material, thereby keeping Shivaji distracted as long aspossible.108 The Portuguese also armed and provided asylum to the desaisof Kudal, Pernem and Bicholim along the northern boundary of Goa duringtheir fight against Shivaji.109 The Portuguese had also given in to the threatsof Mirza Raja Jai Singh, who had been sent by Aurangzeb against Shivaji,and they had supplied him with some ordnance pieces.110 Shivaji replied tothe mischief-playing Portuguese by invading Bardez in November 1667 and

by looting the region for a couple of days.111

After Shivaji’s open campaign against the Portuguese in Bardez, he alsotried to capture the very town of Goa by infiltrating his men. This ruse

was detected by the Portuguese in time and his bid to capture Goa wasfrustrated.112 In 1679-80 Shivaji had planned an all out war with the Por-tuguese, who were stubbornly continuing their aid to the Siddi of Janjira andrefusing to satisfy Shivaji’s demands about the payment of chauth.113 How-


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ever, unexpected news of Shivaji’s death brought relief to the Portuguese, who were tense with expectation of his attack.114

Portuguese-Maratha relations were seriously disturbed during the short ruleof Shivaji’s son Sambhaji. Anticipating Sambhaji’s plans to fortify the Anjidiv

island, the Portuguese foiled his bid by quickly taking possession of theisland, a measure which the Portuguese considered vital to safeguard thegrain-carrying vessels plying between Kanara and Goa.115 The Portuguesehad also allowed the Mughal troops to cross the Portuguese province of theNorth in their advance against Sambhaji’s positions.116

Sambhaji reacted strongly by mounting a massive attack on Goa in 1683, which he was pressing more strongly still against Chaul in the North. Thisclever diversionary tactic would have left Goa into Sambhaji’s hands had

not the Mughal forces of Shah Alam forced Sambhaji to withdraw from Goain haste. Incidentally, at that time the helpless Portuguese officials had gath-ered round the relics of St. Francis Xavier seeking his protection.117 Peacebetween the Portuguese and Marathas was restored. Sambhaji could nottrouble the Portuguese thereafter, deeply engaged as he was with the Mughalforces until his pitiable death at their hands in 1689. Following the death of Sambhaji, his younger brother Rajaram sought refuge in Ginji; his generalscontinued a guerilla war against the Mughal forces which had occupied

almost the entire Maratha territory. Placed in this situation the Portugueseresorted to a renversement of policy, whereby they began favouring theMaratha chieftains in their fight against the Mughals.118

Shah Alam’s demand for a huge fee for having saved Goa from falling intoSambhaji’s hands, as well as his plot to seize Goa by treachery had convincedthe Portuguese that it was more convenient for them to have weak Marathasas their neighbours than a powerful Mughal.119

The Portuguese-Maratha relations had their repercussions upon the localeconomy of Goa, as well as upon the Portuguese Goa-based seaborne trade.The local economy depended on the mainland for the supply of a variety of essential commodities, such as the ones listed along with the import dutiesin a standing order (regimento ) issued to Salcete Customs in 1619, and

which were exchanged for copra, palm sugar, arecanuts and salt producedin Goa.120 When Shivaji established a salt monopoly in his lands and createdsalt depots at Manneri and Fatorpa in the neighbourhood of the Portugueseterritory of Goa, it became difficult to find an outlet for the salt which was

the main exchange commodity of the Goan traders.121 By way of retaliationthe Portuguese authorities began compelling the fisherfolk of the Marathaterritory who came to fish in the rivers of Chapora or Aldona to buy all thesalt they required to salt the fish they caught.122

As regards the coastal and the seaborne trade of the Portuguese the navy of Shivaji never turned out to be a serious menace to the Portuguese navalsuperiority; however it became a source of constant irritation because of


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11. HAG: MS 1416 (Livro de Segredo ), fls. 6-1; 11, 66-7, ACF, IV, fls. 16v-161, V,fls. 59, 59-59v, 60, 63v-64, 65v, 86v, 98-98v, 131-131v, 145, VI, fls. 11, 103v;Pissurlencar, ACE, II, 171-2, 248, 250, 252-3, 279, 287.

12. EFI (1632-36), xi, xvii-xviii, 226; Bal Krishna, Commercial Relations

between India and England , 65, 83.13. AHU: India, Caixa 13, doc. 15 (8.1.1638); TdT: DRI-37, 429; DRI-38, 74-5;Bal Krishna, op. cit ., 65-6, 68, 74, 234.

14. Danvers, PI, II, 329-34.

15. Ibid ., 331-2; Clauses XI & XII.

16. AR, II, pp. 530-6; Saldanha, Resumo da História de Goa , 293-303; Khan,S.A., Anglo-Portuguese Negotiations Relating to Bombay , 442 ff.; David, M.D.,History of Bombay , 30 ff; Prestage, The Diplomatic Relations of Portugal ,156-62.

17. HAG: Monções 42, fls. 136-200; AHU: India, Caixa 28, doc. 79, Caixa 39,doc. 34; Pissurlencar, op. cit ., IV, 280-8; Baião, A Inquisição de Goa , I, 408.

18. Pissurlencar, op. cit , 245, 247, 320-3; EFI (1670-77), x; Danvers, op. cit .,360-61.

19. HAG: Monções 47, fl. 246; Pissurlencar, op. cit ., 245, 320-23, 390-92,404-5; Danvers, op. cit ., 362.

20. Moreland, op. cit ., 98 ff.; Bal Krishna, op. cit., 86.

21. Moreland, op. cit ., 39-40.

22. HAG: MS 1501 (Ordens Régias ), fls. 10-11.

23. Boxer, DSE, 312-3; Meilink-Roelofsz, op. cit ., 177 ff.; Harrison, op. cit .,660; Boxer, PSE, 110-12.

24. Harrison, “International Rivalries Outside Europe: Asia and Africa”,NCMH, III, 556-8.

25. Boxer, The Great Ship from Amacon , 173-333; Boxer, Fidalgos in the Far East , 4-8, 15-16; HAG: ACF, IV, 95v-108, V, 24-5, 53, 206-7, 217v-18, VI, 6v;Pissurlencar, ACE, II, 204-27; APPO-BP, BK IV, Vol. II, P.1: 285-7; TdT DRI-38,468v, 471v; AHU: India, Caixa 20, doc. 53 (14-10-1648), Caixa 22, doc. 54(5-11-1653).

26. Harrison, “Europe and Asia”, 665; Pissurlencar, op. cit ., 117 ff. The Car-reira da India was the round voyage between Portugal and India. Cf. Boder,PSE, 207-22; “The Carreira da India (ships, men, cargoes, voyages)”, apudCentro de Estudos Historicos Ultramarinos e as Comemorações Henriquinas ,33-82.

27. Pissurlencar, ACE, III, 27.


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28. HAG: ACF, IX (1653-60), 6v-7, 61, 77v, 160v-62, 247v-48v, 250v-51, X (1660-66), 9-9v, 33v-34, 49v, 55, 256-67; Pissurlencar, ACE, IV, 353. Gujaratimerchants helped in the transference of bullion that arrived in the NorthernProvince by charging 3% to take it to Goa.

29. Boxer, “Portuguese and Dutch Colonial Rivalry”, 16-22; Prestage, op. cit .,173 ff.

30. Boxer, The Dutch in Brazil , 176ff., 191 ff., 220-1, 224-5, 228-39; Boxer,PSE, 115.

31. Danvers, op. cit ., 300; Meilink-Roelofsz, op. cit ., 164, 207.

32. Livermore, op. cit., 176-84.

33. Poonen, A Survey of the Dutch Power in Malabar , 91-113; EFI (1655-60):45, 54-5, 83, 90; Queiroz, Conquista Temporal e Espiritual de Ceylão , 806-14;Balsemão, PO, II, 44 ff.

34. Boxer, “Portuguese and Dutch Colonial Rivalry”, 41-2.

35. Ibid ., 13 ff.

36. Couto, Décadas da Asia , V, p.1, 278ff.

37. Pissurlencar, “Colaboradores Hindus de Afonso de Albuquerque”, 2-42;

Bragança Pereira, “Historia Administrativa da India Portuguesa”, OP., nn.15-17 (Bastora, 1937): 124-8.

38. DRI, I, 144. The king of Portugal instructed the viceroy of India on 10-10-1607: “It is convenient for the well-being of our State that the neighbouringrulers be divided among themselves and this should be achieved subtly by employing all possible means.” Cf. Subrahmanyam, “O ’inimigo Encoberto’:a expansão mogol no Decão e o Estado da Índia”, Povos e Culturas , n. 5(Lisboa, 1996), pp. 115-197. This study reveals how the Portuguese did notshy away from resorting to assassinations when required.

39. Wicki, DI, XII, 379, 475, 625, 660.

40. Couto, Dec. IX, cap. 13, 82-4.

41. Maclagan, The Jesuits and the Great Mogul , 36, 48, 56, 82; Camps, Jerome Xavier S.J. and the Muslims of the Mogul Empire, 4-5.

42. Pyrard, Viagem, II, 183-7; De Souza, T.R., “Goa-based Portuguese

Seaborne Trade in the Early Seventeenth Century”, 439; Pearson, Merchants and Rulers in Gujarat , 97.

43. AHU: India, Caixa 2, doc. 71 (20-12-1612); Moreland, op. cit ., 93.

44. APO-CR, I, P.2: 172.

45. Bocarro, Dec, XIII, P.1: 189-92.


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46. AHU: India, Caixa 2, doc. 145 (25-12-1614): “Achei este Estado miserávele sem rendimento das alfandegas por causa do Mogor tolher o comérciode Cambaia e outras guerras do Norte”. Cf. AHU, India, Caixa 3, doc. 46(5-2-1615).

47. HAG: Monções 14, fls. 363-4; Biker, CT, I, 237: Pissurlencar, ACE, I, 291 ff.48. Moreland, op. cit ., 35-7; Foster, Early Travels in India , 65-6; Roe, Embassy to the Court of the Great Mogul , passim.

49. Maclagan, op. cit ., 99-105; Campos, History of the Portuguese in Bengal ,128-40; Pissurlencar, op. cit ., 462-69; Manucci, Storia do Mogor , IV, 421.

50. AHU: India, Caixa 16, doc. 39 (17-2-1644).

51. Sarkar, J.N., A Short History of Aurangzeb , 165-8; HAG: Monções 55-B, fls.424-5.

52. Boxer, PSE, 136; “The province of the North comprised the Portuguesesettlements along the sixty-mile stretch of the coast between Bombay andDaman. It extended for some twenty or thirty miles inland in some districtsand it was the most productive part of what Indian territory was left to thePortuguese after their disastrous wars with the Dutch and the Omani.” Cf..Mare Liberum (Lisboa, CNCDP) n.9, Julho 1995, contains Proceedings of the

VII International Seminar on Indo-Portuguese History, Goa, January 1994.The main theme of the seminar was the Portuguese Province of the North.

53. Radhey Shyam, Life and Times of Malik Ambar , 68-98; Nayeem, External Relations of the Bijapur Kingdom , 94-95; Tamaskar, “Malik Ambar and thePortuguese”, 39 ff.

54. Nayeem, op. cit., 94-5; Bocarro, op. cit ., 17-24, 48-77, 85-92, 106-112,218-222, 251-59, 266-72, 281-91, 303-308, 340-41; Joshi, P.M. (ed.), HMD, I,265-6.

55. Radhey Shyam, op. cit., 125-26.

56. Nayeem, op. cit., 95-6; Pissurlencar, “A India em 1629”, BIVG, n. 7 (1930):52-61.

57. Pissurlencar, “A Extinção do Reino de Nizam Shahi”, BIVG, n. 27 (1935):122-3; ACE, II, 113-5.

58. HAG: Monções 21-A, fls. 54; Pissurlencar, ACE, I, 237.

59. Villiers, The Indian Ocean , 158: Quotes Roes’s maxim in his negotiationsin the East: “Trade that comes by compulsion is not profitable and only arouses the hate and opposition of the natives”.

60. TdT: DRI-37, fls. 485-85v; Pissurlencar, ACE, I, 237.

61. Pissurlencar, op. cit ., 238 ff.

62. Loc. cit .


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63. Ibid ., 414-16.

64. Loc. cit .

65. Nayeem, op. cit ., 240-1, 252-3; Joshi, op. cit ., 369-70.

66. Pissurlencar, ACE, II, 313, 318.67. HAG: MS 7701 (Registos Gerais do Senado ), fls. 239-9v; ARSJ: Goa 34, fls.305-6; De Souza, T.R., “Matheus de Castro Mahale: An Unsung Hero”, Goa Today (Jan. 1975): 18, 28; Metzler, “Der Brahmenspiegel des Matheus deCastro”, in NZMW, n. 4 (Schweiz, 1967): 252-65.

68. Heras, “Some Unknown Dealings between Bijapur and Goa”, Proceedings of the Indian Historical Records Commission (Lahore, 1925): Pissurlencar,

ACE, III, 366-7, 371-6, 382-3; Biker, CT, II, 232-9.

69. Pissurlencar, ACE, IV, 140, 491-2.

70. APO-BP, Bk. IV, Vol. II, P. 1 : 289: Crooke (ed.), Travels in India by Jean-Baptiste Tavernier , II, 41-62; Pissurlencar, ACE, IV, 197-8.

71. HAG: Monções 14, fl. 207v; Monções 19A, fl. 128; Pissurlencar, ACE, 1,117-9, 179.

72. HAG: MS 2596 (Cartas e Ordens da Fazenda ) fls. 82v-83v; APO-CR, V,

825-31.

73. Cf. supra n. 37.

74. Rego (ed.), DUP, III, 295-353; Azevedo, Epocas de Portugal Económico ,89-163; Godinho, Os Descobrimentos e a Economia Mundial , II, 48 ff. Cf.Queiroz, História da vida do venerável Irmão Pedro de Basto , 279; Pissurlen-car, ACE, I, 257, 426, 567, II, 12-3; III, 396-8; IV, 10-12, 32-3, 278-9.

75. Pissurlencar, ACE, I, 537, 570, Monções 13A, fls. 263-6; AHU: India, Caixa 31, doc. 21.

76. BG, XV, P.2: 110, 114; Felber, Subsídios , 246-8.

77. Bulhão Pato, DRI, II, docs. 232, 303, 331; III, doc. 517.

78. TdT: DRI-38, fl. 292; Wheeler, European Travellers in India , 19.

79. Pissurlencar, ACE, I, 536-41 (includes the text in Kanada).

80. Ibid ., 252.81. Ibid., 569; HAG: Ordens Régias , n. 2, fl. 20.

82. Pissurlencar, op. cit., 670. The correspondence of Ikkeri gold currency and Goa gold currency is given as 100 pagodas to 102 santomes.

83. Ibid ., II, 12-3, 55-6.

84. Pissurlencar, ACE, II, 203.


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85. Heras, “The decay of the Portuguese power in India”, JBHS, I, 1928; 36;Pissurlencar, op. cit ., III, passim.

86. Pissurlecar, op. cit ., 219-21, 319-24.

87. HAG: ACF, IX (1653-60), fls. 99v, 146v, 175-5v, 186, 194-4v.

88. Pissurlencar, op. cit ., 356-60.

89. Ibid., 396-8.

90. Biker, CT, IV, 189-97; Pissurlencar, ACE, IV, 216-7.

91. HAG: Monções 31, fls. 78-9v, 80-1v, 106-7, 128-9.

92. EFI (1661-64), 343 n. 3; Pissurlencar, op. cit ., 226-7.

93. Pissurlencar, op. cit ., 278-9.94. Biker, CT, IV, 205-15, cl. 5.

95. Pissurlencar, op. cit ., 486-99.

96. Deleury, The cult of Vithoba , pp. 1-21.

97. Rego, DMP, IX, 475-6: “... zari upazoni sansarim ekavella dekasi pand-hari Vithala rayachi nagari .”

98. Pissurlencar, “O Elemento Hindu da Casta Chardo” OP, n. 12-13 (1936):203-32; Bragança Pereira, “Os Ranes, os quetris, os oixos, os chardos, e osbramanes de Goa”, OP, n. 7-8 (1919): 320-36.

99. Valavlikar, Goemkaranchi Goembhaili Vasnnuka , 46.

100. Pissurlencar, Goa Pré-Portuguesa através dos Escritores Lusitanos, 59;“Inscrições Pré-Portuguesas de Goa”, OP, n. 22 (1938): 441-7, 451-5; Gune,“Meaning of Maratha Houni”, Proceedings of the Maratha History Seminar ,1970, 1-5.

101. Ghantkar, An Introduction to Goan Marathi Records in Halakanada Script , 1-2.

102. Pissurlencar, ACE, II, 113-5; “A Extinção do Reino de Nizam Shah”, BIVG,n. 27 (1935): 122-3.

103. Pissurlencar, Portuguez-Marathe Sambhandh , 41.

104. Pagadi, Chhatrapati Shivaji , 83-4, 87-8, 104-7; Sarkar, Shivaji and his

times , pp. 54-8, 351-2.105. Pissurlencar, ACE, 5-6.

106. Apte, A History of the Maratha Navy and Mechantships, 71.

107. AHU: India, Caixa 27, doc. 87.

108. AHU: India, Caixa , 27, doc. 99; Pissurlencar, ACE, IV, 5, 608, 214-5,225-6.


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109. Pissurlencar, op. cit ., 50, 188-91, 242; Portuguez-Marathe Sambandh ,35-6.

110. Pissurlencar, ACE, IV, 146; Manucci, op. cit., II, 120-5, 132-7.

111. Pagadi, op. cit ., 194-6; Sarkar, op. cit., 352.

112. Pissurlencar, Portuguez-Marathe Sambandh , p. 190, n. 1.

113. Sen, Military System of the Marathas , 28-53; Kulkarni, Maharashtra in the Age of Shivaji , 131-2; Saletore, “The Significance of Chautai in MarathaHistory”, JUB, VII, p.1: 94-107.

114. AHU: India, Caixa 30, doc. 47.

115. HAG: Monções 47, letter n. 4; Pissurlencar, The Portuguese and the

Marathas , 64.

116. Sarkar, History of Aurangzib , V, 116.

117. Pissurlencar, op. cit., 126-7.

118. Ibid ., 159, 163.

119. Pissurlencar, ACE, IV, 296-7; Sarkar, History of Aurangzib , IV, 347-9.

120. HAG: ACF, II (1621-25): fls. 145-151v.

121. Kulkarni, op. cit ., 223; HAG; MS 1127 (Petições Despachadas do Censelho da Fazenda ), I, fls. 49-51.

122. HAG: MS 1127, fls. 9, 21v-22.

123. HAG: MS 970 (Reis Vizinhos , n. 2), fls. 36v-7, 73v-77; MS 971 (Reis Vizinhos , n.3), fls. 8v-11v, 12v-14v, 29-29v; MS 972 (Reis Vizinhos , n.4), fls.12, 29v.

124. Pissurlencar, ACE, IV, 296-7.125. Rego, DUP, IV, 34-5.

126. Pissurlencar, The Portuguese and the Marathas , 26; HAG: MS 1127(Petições Desp. do Conselho da Fazenda ), fls. 146v-147, 154-54v, 223-23v.Indicates 5th May as the date when hostilities began and 8th of Decemberas the day Sambhaji effected the invasion. Villages were depopulated andpeasants suffered from scarcity of seed and ploughs. Cf. ACE. IV, 571-

4: Inland trade was disrupted and led to shortages and high cost of foodprovisions in Goa.


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Chapter 2

The Goan Rural Heritage

Land, resources and people

THE ‘OLD CONQUESTS’ region of Goa consists of three provinces, namely Bardez, Tisvadi and Salcete, and it lies almost at the centre of the westcoast of India c. 250 miles SSE of Bombay. The three provinces are dividedand separated from each other by rivers descending from the western Ghats.Bardez has Chapora river to its north and Mandovi river to its south; Tisvadiis an agglomeration of islands formed by the turnings of the Mandovi andZuari rivers; and Salcete is separated from Tisvadi b

medieval goa: a socio-economic history

Documents