Media Commercialization and Authoritarian Rule in China

Daniela StockmannDepartment of Political Science

Leiden University

Media Marketization in Authoritarian States

• Deregulation

• Commercialization

• Partial Privatization

Guang Niu/Getty Images

The Puzzle

Why does media marketization contribute to political liberalization in some countries, but not in others?

What is the role of the audience in explaining these outcomes?

Media Marketization

Regime StabilityPolitical Liberalization& Regime Instability

A. Theoretical Framework and Research Design

State-Society Relations under Authoritarianism

Authoritarian rulers stay in power by means of:• Repression (Friedrich and Brzezinski, 1965;

Bellin, 2004)• Exchange of economic benefits in return for

political support (Ross, 2001; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2004; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005; Lust-Oskar, 2006)

Compliance not explained with regime support

A.1. Theoretical Framework

The Dictator’s Dilemma (Wintrobe, 1998)

1. The use of repression makes citizens hesitant to state their true opinions

2. The dictator suspects opposition

Distribution of rents as a solution

A.1. Theoretical Framework

Marketized Media as a Solution to the Dictator’s Dilemma

1. Marketized media provide information about citizen beliefs

2. Media marketization makes the state less reliant on coercive measures

Media become more credible Marketized media are attractive propaganda

instruments

But: what happens, if market demands conflict with the official line?

A.1. Theoretical Framework

Regime Type and Media Marketization

Condition for media marketization to work in favor of authoritarian leaders:

• Institutions in charge of editorial control of news content

• Single-party regimes tend to have this institutional capacity

Regime type mitigates the effects of media marketization

A.1. Theoretical Framework

Media as Instruments of Regime Stability

A.2. Hypotheses

In China and Other Single-Party Regimes:

A.3. Research Design

Chongqing

Foshan

Shenyang

Beijing

Wuxi

Research DesignInterviews• Open-ended, semi-structured interviews with 46 media practitioners

Content Analysis• Computer-Aided Content Analysis of news reporting in Chongqing and Beijing

Public Opinion Surveys• Beijing Area Studies of Beijing Residents (BAS)• Survey of Legal Mobilization conducted in Chongqing, Shenyang, Foshan, and

Wuxi (LLM)

Experiments• Natural experiment of media management during the 2005 Anti-Japanese

protests• Experimental vignettes (among citizens in Beijing)

Cross-country Comparison• Collection of macro-level data on authoritarian states in Africa, East Central

Europe, and the Middle East

A.3. Research Design

Evaluations of Labor Law and Sentiment towards the United States

1. Both issues are open, but related to regime stability

Most-difficult test of counter-hypotheses

2. Issues differ in terms of the relationship between the official line of the state and audience demands

Observation of the relationship between institutions and market forces

Labor Law

United States

Official Line

Positive

Positive

(or Less Negative)

Audience Demand

Positive

Negative

A.3. Research Design

Media as Instruments of Regime Stability

A.2. Hypotheses

In China and Other Single-Party Regimes:

B. Evidence from the 2005 Anti-Japanese Protests

in Beijing

Media Management During Crisis

• Nationalism as a source of state legitimacy

• Nationalism poses pressures and constraints on foreign policy towards Japan (and the US)

Media as a tool to “massage” negative sentiment

Except during Crisis

B.1. Background

Timeline Quasi-Experiment

April 9 April 10 April 17 April 27 May 4 Protest Machimura’s

visit

Lian’s visit

Soong’s visit

Loose state control over news reporting (Control Group)

Press Restrictions: News content is synchronized (Treatment Group)

B.2. Empirical Example

Newspaper Types in BeijingS

pac

e fo

r N

ews

Rep

ort

ing

Op

en

Clo

se

d

Degree of Media MarketizationHigh Low

“Commercialized” “Semi-Official” “Official”

B.2. Empirical Example

Treatment

B.2. Empirical Example

Media Credibility

• Official papers are perceived as propaganda organs and mouthpieces of state units.

• Commercialized papers are perceived to publish “real news” from the perspective of “ordinary people.”

B.2. Empirical Example

Newspaper Types in BeijingS

pac

e fo

r N

ews

Rep

ort

ing

Op

en

Clo

se

d

Degree of Media MarketizationHigh Low

“Commercialized” “Semi-Official” “Official”

B.2. Empirical Example

Data AnalysisData:Beijing Area Studies, conducted in the spring of 2005 based on PPS random sampling (response rate: 56.1 %, n= 617)

Statistical Models:

1. Media Selection Model

DV: Newspaper Consumption (dummy variable)

2. Media Effects Model

Assumption: People were at least moderately attentive to news about Japan.

DV: Feeling Thermometer toward Japan (continuous variable, 1-100)

B.2. Empirical Example

Media Effects

Controlling for national identity, exposure to alternative media sources, travel to Japan, education, generation, and gender.

B.2. Empirical Example

Positive Views of Japan (Feeling Thermometer)

Coefficient (s.e.)

Independent Variables:

Exposure to Commercialized Messages

-14.33**

(7.1)

Exposure to Commercialized Messages *

Post-April 9 Interview

6.33

(10.68)

Post-April 9 Interview

-9.62*

(5.85)

Intercept 50.66***

(13.19)

R-squared 0.11

Valid N 481

p-value * p<0.1; ** p< 0.05; *** p < 0.01;

Media Effects

B.2. Empirical Example

Summary

Despite marketization, newspaper content tends to be uniform.

At the same time, marketization boosts

the credibility of newspapers, thus promoting the ability of the state

to influence public opinion.

Appendix

Quasi-Experiment

Assumption of Quasi-Experiment

Respondent Characteristics by Tre atment Groups

Average (s.d.)

Whole Survey

Pre-Protest Press Restrictions

Years of

Education

11.34 (3.17)

11.43 (2.79)

12.03 (3.04)

Personal Income (RMB)

2,212.28 (5918.01)

2,212.92 (7,266.22)

2,548.68 (4,409.72)

Female

0.43 (0.5)

0.43 (0.5)

0.38 (0.49)

Age

47 (9.78)

48.3 (9.51)

45.21 (9.6)

Valid N

617 385 232

Official Paper Use(Raw Data)

( 5 . M a y - 1 3 . M a y )

S o n g ' s V i s i t

M a r c h 1 7

A p r i l 1 0

M a y 5

A p r i l 2 6

( 1 7 . M a r c h - 9 . A p r i l )

B e f o r e P r e s s R e s t r i c t i o n s

( 1 0 . A p r i l - 1 3 . M a y )

A f t e r P r e s s R e s t r i c t i o n s

( 2 6 . A p r i l - 3 . M a y )

Z h a n ' s V i s i t

0

1 0

2 0

3 0

4 0

5 0

6 0

7 0

8 0

9 0

1 0 0

T i m e

Percentage of Readership of Official Papers

(Weekly Averages Among Readers)

Data AnalysisData:Beijing Area Studies, conducted in the spring of 2005 based on PPS random sampling (response rate: 56.1 %, n= 617)

Statistical Models:

1. Media Selection Model

DV: Newspaper Consumption (dummy variable)

2. Media Effects Model

Assumption: People were at least moderately attentive to news about Japan.

DV: Feeling Thermometer toward Japan (continuous variable, 1-100)

B.2. Empirical Example

Selection Effects

B.3. Selection Effects

Control variables are not displayed in the table.

Use of Official Papers

(Among Readers)

Coefficient (s.e.)

Use of Commercialized Papers

(Among Readers of Non-Official Papers)

Coefficient (s.e.)

Independent Variables:

Press Restrictions

-0.47*** (0.15)

0.1 (0.17)

Official Visits

0.53** (0.27)

-0.68** (0.34)

Intercept

-1.51** (0.62)

1.72** (0.95)

Pseudo R-Squared 0.05 0.05

Valid N 492 314 z-value * z<0.1; ** z< 0.05; *** z < 0.01;

Selection Effects

B.3. Selection Effects

0

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

0.25

0.3

0.35

0.4

0.45

Before PressRestrictions

After PressRestrictions

Lien's Visit Soong's Visit

Likelihood to Read a Newspaper Type

Official Papers Commercialized Papers

(17.March-9.April) (10.April-13.May) (26.April-3.May) (5.May-13.May)

Selection Effects (Controls)

Use of Official Papers

(Among Readers)

Coefficient (s.e.)

Independent Variables:

Press Restrictions

-0.47*** (0.15)

Official Visits

0.53** (0.27)

Control Variables:

Cadre 0.19

(0.21)

Party or State Unit

0.60*** (0.22)

Neighborhood

Committee Worker

0.68* (0.38)

Education

1.07 (0.73)

Personal Income

0.46 (0.31)

Intercept

-1.51** (0.62)

Pseudo R-Squared 0.05

Valid N 492 z-value * z<0.1; ** z< 0.05; *** z < 0.01;

Use of Commercialized Papers

(Among Readers of Non-Official Papers)

Coefficient (s.e.)

Independent Variables:

Press Restrictions

0.1 (0.17)

Official Visits

-0.68** (0.34)

Control Variables:

Having Studied Some English

0.27 (0.17)

Percentage of Life Spent in Beijing

-0.53 (0.42)

Reading the News

Online

0.61*** (0.20)

Education

-1.87* (1.10)

Personal Income

-0.47 (0.95)

Intercept

1.72** (0.95)

Pseudo R-Squared 0.05

Valid N 314 z-value * z<0.1; ** z< 0.05; *** z < 0.01;

Media Effects (Controls)

Positive Views of Japan (Feeling Thermometer)

Coefficient (s.e.)

Independent Variables: Exposure to Commercialized Messages

-14.33** (7.1)

Exposure to Commercialized Messages * Post-April 9 Interview

6.33 (10.68)

Post-April 9 Interview

-9.62* (5.85)

Control Variables:

Watching TV News

-2.65 (3.64)

Reading the News Online

-8.44***

(2.71) National Identity

-12.5***

(3.94) Japan Threat Peceptions

-8.36***

(3.18) Travel to Japan

10.14* (5.94)

Education

3.73

(13.18) Age 38 - 53

5.56*** (2.01)

Female

1.67 (1.99)

Intercept

50.66*** (13.19)

R-squared 0.11 Valid N 481 p-value * p<0.1; ** p< 0.05; *** p < 0.01;

Effects of Exposure to More Commercialized Papers as Reading Additional Papers and Press Restrictions Change

Effects of Reading up Ten Papers as Exposure to Commercialized Papers and Press Restrictions Change

Credibility

Media Labels and Branding

Media branding refers to marketing strategies by media outlets to establish themselves as distinctive players in the media market.

• Advertising “We make a Paper that is close to YOU!” “The Paper that Responsibly talks about everything!”

• Corporate identities• Special columns and famous reporters• Design• Overstepping of boundaries for news reporting

(playing table tennis by the edge)

Beijing Readership Survey, 2002 (I)

Beijing Readership Survey, 2002 (II)

Experimental Vignettes:Official Frame

According to (Beijing Evening News / Beijing Daily), Wang Village Colemin owed Deng Pingjun and others, a group of 20 people, wages of more than 30000 Yuan. Approaching the spring festival the migrant workers wanted to visit home and asked several times for their wages, but the cole mine refused due to lack of money. The migrants had no alternative but to go to Beijing city court, demanding to be compensated for their work. To the benefit of the workers, the court took their case very seriously, speeded up the process, and waived the application fee. Under the hard work of the judges the case was resolved through mediation. The migrants received partial compensation on the same day and they had enough money to travel home for new year’s. According to statistics, since my country’s labor law was passed in 1995 the number of accepted cases in the whole nation was 425726. these dispute’s rightful, timely, and proper application had advantages for protecting the legitimate rights of the large working population. The court guided and shaped the complicated labor relations during the reform process, as well as solved the problems arising during reform and development of enterprises.

据 ( 北京晚报 / 北京日报 ) ，王村煤矿欠郑平均等 20 人劳动报酬 3 万多元。眼看春节将至，民工们想回家过节，多次向煤矿索要所欠工资，煤矿以无钱为由拒绝给付，民工们万般无奈之下诉至北京市门头沟法院，要求王村煤矿给付所欠劳动报酬。

事关民工的切身利益，门头沟法院对此案非常重视，迅速立案，并根据原告的申请，缓收了案件受理费。在法官们的努力下，此案得以调解结案，民工们在结案当天便领到了部分劳动报酬，有了回家过年的路费。

据统计，自 1995 年我国劳动法实施以来，全国法院共受理各类劳动纠纷案件 425726 件。这些纠纷的合法、及时和妥善处理，有力地保护了广大员工的合法权益，各级法院依法引导和规范了改革过程中纷繁复杂的新型劳动关系，及时化解了企业改革和发展中出现的矛盾和问题。

Original source: People’s Daily, 21 March, 2002. “ 为了员工的合法权益 : 人民法院积极处理劳动纠纷案件纪实

Experimental Vignettes:Commercialized Frame

According to (Beijing Evening News / Beijing Daily), Liu Dingwei, Li Demin and Chen Qian belong to a group of 19 farmers in the city of Nancheng in Sizhou. Between July and December 2005 they worked at a construction site of TongXin Company in Chengdu. Throughout the process, the company outsourced to Mr. Zou. After arriving at the construction site, Mr. Zou asked Liu Dingwei and the other 18 to hurry up. Working hours and wages were decided by Mr. Zou. While working at the site Mr. Zou only gave these migrant workers a small sum to pay for living expenses. Each migrant’s wages was delayed to a different extent. In total wages in the amount of 26050 Yuan were not paid. Liu Dingwei and the others asked several times for their wages, but without any result although Mr. Zou said he would inquire about the reasons for the delay. In February the workers asked the provincial legal aid center for help. Together with two lawyers and staff they contacted TongXin Company and after positive coordination and communication eventually received a compensation of 13000 Yuan.

据 ( 北京晚报 / 北京日报 ) ，刘定伟、李德敏、陈潜、李庆参等 19 人均系四川省南充市嘉陵区的农民。 2005 年 7月 22 日至 12 月 1 日在成都某通信有限公司承建的某网络优化网工地务工，该工程承包方是成都某通信公司。在施工过程中，该通信公司将上述工程承包给自然人邹某，邹某接到工程后，遂请刘定伟等 19 人负责建设施工，工作时间及工资标准由邹某决定，工作过程中邹某只给这些农民工发过一些生活费，每个农民工均不同程度地被拖欠工资，经统计这 19 名农民工共被拖欠工资26050 元。 刘定伟等人曾多次向何某、邹某追索未果，于 2007 年 2 月 12 日到省法律援助中心申请法律援助。工作站刘红、邓冰二位律师及工作人员杜伟数次前往通信公司，与其进行积极协调、沟通，最终于日前达成协议，由通信公司支付劳动报酬 23000 元。

Original source: Chengdu Evening News, 18 September 2007.” 免费为民工维权 律师不必白干了”

Experimental Vignettes (Gibson and Gows, 2003)

Survey Question (asked in all conditions):Source: LLM, 2005.您有没有听说过 《劳动法》 ？总的看来，您认为《劳动法》的贯彻执行对劳动者权利的保护是非常、比较、不太还是完全无效？

“Have you heard about the labor law?” If yes, respondent was asked: “In general, is the implementation of the labor law very effective, somewhat effective, not so effective, or not at all effective in protecting workers’ rights?” Variable was coded one if respondent had heard about the labor law and thought it was somewhat or very effective, otherwise it was coded zero. 1

13 out of 138 participants had never heard about the labor law and were therefore not asked the second question. Among those 4 were sampled into the control group and 9 in treatment groups.

Experimental Vignettes:Results

Independent Variables

Perceived Effectiveness of the Labor Law

(Dummy Var iable)

Coefficient (s.e.)

0.510* Commercialized

Label (0.31)

-0.026 Commercialized Frame (0.307)

0.058 Control Group

(0.331)

0.422* Constant

(0.254)

N 118 Pseudo R2 0.02 z-value * z<0.1; ** z<0.05; *** z<0.01;

Experimental Vignettes:Results

Institutions

Institutional Restrictions

• Sponsoring Institutions• State Publication and Press Agency• Conglomeration• Absence of Media Law• Propaganda Department

Institutions establish boundaries for news reporting

Attitudes toward the United States

News Reporting about the United States

-8

-6

-4

-2

0

2

4

6

8

10

ScienceAcademics

Culture / Society

Sports / EntertainmentUS Domestic Politics

Terrorism

Sino-US Relations

Bush's Visit

EP-3Taiwan

People's Daily

Beijing Youth Daily

Topics

Po

siti

vity

/ N

egat

ivit

y

B.2. News Content

News Reporting about the United States

Dependent Variable:

Tone of US

All Articles

Variables Coefficient

(s.e.)

1.142*** People's Daily

(0.309)

-3.592*** Politics

(0.876)

1.199*** Article on China and the US

(0.238)

0.582** Constant

(0.277) N 2,272 R2 0.06 *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1;

* Control variables are not displayed in the table.

News Reporting about the United States

Sensitivity of News Reporting about the United States

People’s Daily

Average

(s.d.)

Beijing Evening News

Average

(s.d.)

Total N

China and US 0.57 (0.6)

0.47 (0.51)

110 Political Leaders

Only US 0.54

(0.58) 0.31

(0.48) 269

China and US 0.36

(0.68) 0.2

(0.42) 202 No Political

Leaders Only US

0.26 (0.5)

0.18 (0.4)

221

Total N

420 382 802

News Reporting Over Time:Tone

Tone Over Time (Table)

Dependent Variable

Tone of News Reporting about the US

Coefficient (s.e.)

Independent Variables:

Among All Articles People’s

Daily Beijing

Evening News

0.257*** People's Daily (0.088)

-- -- --

0.067 People's Daily*2003 (0.103)

-- -- --

-0.139** -0.197*** -0.308*** -0.171* 2003

(0.066) (0.074) (0.117) (0.096)

0.451*** 0.374*** 0.139 0.484*** China and the US (0.053) (0.075) (0.118) (0.099)

0.157 0.398** 0.061 China and the US * 2003

-- (0.102) (0.156) (0.135)

Control Variables:

-1.381*** -1.192*** -1.101*** -1.530*** Politics

(0.189) (0.185) (0.275) (0.26)

-0.896*** -0.321* -1.090*** -0.626* Sensitivity Over Time (0.222) (0.179) (0.279) (0.355)

1.070* 1.074* 1.241* 0.778 Length

(0.569) (0.57) (0.727) (0.892)

0.404*** 0.398*** 0.806*** 0.410*** Constant

(0.069) (0.071) (0.145) (0.092) N 2,272 2,272 945 1,327 R2 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 p-value * p<0.1; ** p< 0.05; *** p< 0.01;

Data Analysis

Data:

Beijing Area Studies, conducted in the spring of 2005 based on PPS random sampling

Statistical Model:

Attitudes = Attention + AttentionSquared + Exposure + Attention*Exposure + AttentionSquared*Exposure + Controls + u

DV: Feeling Thermometer toward the United States

B.3. Media Effects

Media Effects: Theory

(Exposure +) Attention + Susceptibility = Effect

Attention

Att

itu

de

Ch

ang

e

Liberal

Conservative

B.3. Media Effects

Positivi ty toward the Unite d State s

(Fee ling Ther mom ete r)

Var iables

Coefficie nt (s.e.)

Coefficie nt (s.e.)

Coefficie nt (s.e.)

-0.1 23 Pe ople’s Daily

(10. 935) -- -- -38. 950** -43. 303* -35. 013**

Attention (15. 726) (23. 749) (16. 767) 43. 749*** 47. 507** 40. 509***

Attention2 (14. 919) (23. 896) (15. 552) 29. 319

Pe ople’s Daily *Attent ion (44. 185) -- -- -38. 681

Pe ople’s Daily *Attent ion 2 (40. 273) -- --

3.4 49 Beijing Eve ning Ne ws

-- (6.8 96) -- 12. 115

Beijing Eve ning Ne ws*Attention -- (30. 072) --

-13. 981 Beijing Eve ning Ne ws*Attention2

-- (29. 27) -- 2.5 72

Official P apers -- -- (7.8 11)

13. 07 Official P apers*Atte ntion

-- -- (34. 887) -24. 933

Official P apers*Atte ntion2 -- -- (34. 463)

-15. 534*** -14. 946*** -15. 211*** National Identity (4.1 34) (4.1 35) (4.1 48)

32. 251*** 34. 170*** 33. 386*** Per s onal C ontact

(11. 865) (11. 817) (11. 91) 15.6 16. 255 15. 149 Educati on

(logge d) (12. 992) (12. 96) (13. 024) 4.5 30** 4.1 12* 4.2 98**

Ge ne ration (2.1 31) (2.1 39) (2.1 36)

38. 375*** 35. 596*** 37. 695*** Interc e pt

(11. 955) (12. 173) (12. 177) N

487

487

485

R s qua red

0.08

0.09

0.08

p-va lue *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1

B.3. Media Effects

Beijing Evening News

B.3. Media Effects

People’s Daily

B.3. Media Effects

B.3. Media Effects

Positivity Toward the US

Coefficient

(s.e.) Independent Variables

-92.676** Attention

(38.978)

106.965*** Attention Squared

(38.31)

-10.54 Exposure to Official Messages

(15.992)

127.604* Exposure to Official Message * Attention (71.822)

-153.769** Exposure to Official Message*Attention Squared (72.429)

-17.751*** National Identity

(4.127)

34.129*** Personal Contact

(11.718)

4.269** Generation

(2.101)

16.942 Education (logged)

(13.692)

-9.119*** Tension

(2.144)

47.394*** Constant

(14.866)

N 482 R2 0.12 *** p-value < 0.01; ** p-value < 0.05; * p-value<0.1;

Media Effects e More Paper: Medium Attention

0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1

Average Exposure

Marginal Effect of Reading One More Paper

95% Confidence Interval

Dependent Variable: Amity

Effect of Reading One More Paper on Amity When Paying Medium Attention

B.3. Media Effects

One More Paper: High Attention

0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1

Average Exposure

Marginal Effect of Reading One More Paper

95% Confidence Interval

Dependent Variable: Amity

Effect of Reading One More Paper on Amity When Paying Much Attention

B.3. Media Effects

Official Papers

Views of the Labor Law

Labor Law and Labor Disputes

• Labor protests have been increasing in recent years

• Legal Reform: Building a Rule of Law- Increase its legitimacy

- Channel worker grievances into legal institutions

- Improve Implementation

“Use the law as a weapon!”

(用法律武器 !)

A.3. Issue Selection

Newspapers in ChongqingO

pen

Sp

ace

for

New

s R

epo

rtin

g

C

lose

d

Commercialized Papers Official Papers

The Official Line: Labor Law Protects Workers

"The central government is very clear: Wen Jiabao said that migrant workers should get their salary on time. Those kind

of problems are labor disputes. If the employer is from a private corporation,

they should give salary on time; if the employer is from a state-owned enterprise,

then he should even more do so."

(Interview # 7)

News Reporting on Labor Law: Tone

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

Government Labor Law Employee Employer

Negativity - Positivity (Words)

Official Papers

Chongqing Times

News Reporting on Labor Law:Selection

“… This year in May Lao Du happily took the labor compensation.”

(People’s Daily, 2005)

"Filing a lawsuit is too exhausting, I no longer believe in legal channels. Chinese people do not have human rights. Zhu Rongji has really sacrificed our generation, especially since the beginning of the reform period. Justice in China is not real."(Interview with Lao Du by Mary E. Gallagher, University of Michigan)

“Happy endings:”

Articles do not address the problem of implementation

Media Effects: Theory

(Exposure +) Attention + Susceptibility = Effect

Attention

Att

itu

de

Ch

ang

e

Liberal

Conservative

B.3. Media Effects

Attentiveness and Views of the Labor Law

(among media users)

* Forthcoming in Comparative Political Studies, 2011

Media Effects of Official and Non-Official Papers on Views about the Labor Law

Perceived Effectiveness of the Labor Law

Coefficient

(s.e.)

Independent Variables 0.393**

Official Papers (0.19)

0.784*** Attention

(0.196)

-0.704** Official Papers * Attention (0.299)

0.103 Foshan

(0.085)

0.390*** Wuxi

(0.07)

0.181** Shenyang

(0.071)

-1.812*** Cut 1

(0.296)

-0.278 Cut 2

(0.293)

1.464*** Cut 3

(0.294)

N 2,049 Pseudo R2 0.02 z-value * z <0.1; ** z < 0.05; *** z < 0.01;

* Parallel regression assumption holds; Control variables not displayed in the Table

Media Effects of Official and Non-Official Papers on Views about the Labor Law

Effect of Reading One More Newspaper at Moderate Levels of Attention

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1

1 2

Number of Newspapers

Reading Only Commercialized Papers

Reading Only Official Papers

Lik

eli

ho

od

to

Per

cei

ve

the

Law

as

Eff

ecti

ve /

Co

effi

cien

t

Effect of Reading One More Newspaper at High Levels of Attention

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1

1 2

Number of Newspapers

Reading Only Commercialized Papers

Reading Only Official Papers

Lik

eli

ho

od

to

Per

cei

ve

the

Law

as

Eff

ecti

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Co

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Applicability to Other Media Types

Newspaper Use (Raw Data)

( 5 . M a y - 1 3 . M a y )

S o n g ' s V i s i t

( 2 6 . A p r i l - 3 . M a y )

Z h a n ' s V i s i t

( 1 0 . A p r i l - 1 3 . M a y )

A f t e r P r e s s R e s t r i c t i o n s

( 1 7 . M a r c h - 9 . A p r i l )

B e f o r e P r e s s R e s t r i c t i o n s

A p r i l 2 6

M a y 5

A p r i l 1 0M a r c h 1 7

0

1 0

2 0

3 0

4 0

5 0

6 0

7 0

8 0

9 0

1 0 0

T i m e

Percentage of Newspaper Readership

(Weekly Averages)

Newspaper Use

Treatment Effects on Newspaper Use of Committed and Average Beijingers

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1

Pre-Protest Press Restrictions Zhan's visit Song's Visit

Likelihood to Read a Newspaper

Average Beijinger

Committed Beijinger

Newspapers and News WebsitesDependent

Variable

Independent Variable

Newspaper Consumption

Coefficient

(s.e.)

Online News Consumption

Coefficient

(s.e.)

Press Restrictions 0.657 (0.459)

0.497 (0.520)

Negativity toward Japan

0.742** (0.335)

0.875** (0.401)

Press Restrictions*Negativity

-1.063* (0.608)

-0.627 (0.673)

Cadre 1.053** (0.438)

-0.038 (0.236)

Travel -0.558* (0.291)

0.953*** (0.274)

English -1.462 (1.166)

7.552*** (1.422)

English Squared 2.177 (2.028)

-9.505*** (2.999)

Years of Education 3.101*** (0.673)

3.898*** (1.132)

Income 0.376 (0.275)

0.918** (0.382)

Constant -2.316*** (0.601)

-6.054*** (1.015)

N 603 597 Pseudo R2 0.09 0.27 *** z<0.01; ** z<0.05; * z<0.1;

* Forthcoming in Susan Shirk, Changing Media, Changing China, 2010

Newspapers and News Websites

* Forthcoming in Susan Shirk, Changing Media, Changing China, 2010

Media Sources, Attentiveness, and Views of the Labor Law

(among frequent media users)

Perceived Effectiveness of the Labor Law

Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.)

0.136 0.242 -0.175 0.441*** 0.456*** 0.479*** 0.460*** Attention (0.207) (0.261) (0.431) (0.169) (0.161) (0.172) (0.175)

-0.335* Frequently Watching Legal TV Shows (0.2) -- -- -- -- -- --

0.867*** Frequently Watching Legal TV Shows * Attention (0.321) -- -- -- -- -- --

-0.229 Frequently Reading Newspapers -- (0.205) -- -- -- -- --

0.42 Frequently Reading Newspapers * Attention -- (0.327) -- -- -- -- --

-0.441 Frequently Watching TV -- -- (0.293) -- -- -- --

0.788* Frequently Watching TV * Attention -- -- (0.463) -- -- -- --

-0.415 Frequently Listening to Radio* -- -- -- (0.297) -- -- --

0.554 Frequently Listening to Radio * Attention -- -- -- (0.472) -- -- --

-0.809 Frequently Listening to Legal Radio Show -- -- -- -- (0.517) -- --

1.575* Frequently Listening to Legal Radio Sh ow * Attention -- -- -- -- (0.884) -- --

-0.005 Frequently Reading Magazines* -- -- -- -- -- (0.279) --

0.188 Frequently Reading Magazines * Attention -- -- -- -- -- (0.441) --

-0.064 Frequently Surfing News Websites* -- -- -- -- -- -- (0.264)

0.258 Frequently Surfing News Websites * Attention -- -- -- -- -- -- (0.411)

0.835** 0.874*** 1.100*** 0.767** 0.752** 0.756** 0.804** Constant (0.327) (0.339) (0.412) (0.32) (0.319) (0.32) (0.324)

N 2,309 2,309 2,309 2,309 2,309 2,309 2,309 Pseudo R2 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03

*** z<0.01; ** z<0.05; * z<0.1;

* Forthcoming in Comparative Political Studies, 2011

Generalizability

China

Regional Advertising Income in China

24 Chinese Provinces and Municipalities

No data on dependent variable available for Jilin, Tianjin, Neimenggu,Sichuan, Xizang, Gansu, Qinghai, Hong Kong, Macao.

Province/Municipality Advertising Income Internet usersBeijing Shi 3455746 46.6Shanghai Shi 2989505 45.8Guangdong Sheng 2567197 35.9Jiangsu Sheng 1305384 23.3Zhejiang Sheng 1246676 30.3Shandong Sheng 689559 13.5Fujian Sheng 497410 24.3Liaoning Sheng 399644 18.3Hunan Sheng 333113 10.9Anhui Sheng 310609 9.6Chongqing Shi 293442 12.7Hubei Sheng 287132 12.4Henan Sheng 241404 10.2Jiangxi Sheng 212998 11.8Heilongjiang Sheng 192535 12.5Shanxi Sheng 186263 15.9Yunnan Sheng 164465 6.8Xinjiangweiwu'erzu Zizhiqu 134244 17.7Hebei Sheng 127454 11.1Guangxizhuangzu Zizhiqu 100000 11.9Guizhou Sheng 76419 6Shaanxi Sheng 38566 13.9Hainan Sheng 33156 17.2Ningxiahuizu Zizhiqu 27193 10.1

Media Marketization and Media Credibility in China

Newspaper Credibility

Television Credibility

Coefficient (s.e.)

Coefficient (s.e.)

Independent Variables

0.602*** 0.591*** Commercial Liberalization Index (0.159) (0.164)

0.647 0.545 Ratio of Rural Population

(0.44) (0.456)

0.005 -0.042 Level of Economic Development (0.214) (0.222)

0.195 0.205 Ratio of Han Chinese

(0.129) (0.134)

-0.196** -0.222** Municipality

(0.086) (0.089)

-0.564 -0.473 Constant

(0.334) (0.346)

N 24 24 R-Squared 0.53 0.51 *** p-value < 0.01; ** p-value < 0.05; * p-value<0.1;

Generalizability:

Single-Party States

37 Countries / 137 Cases

Cases were included if coded as partly free or not free according to FH or as authoritarian according to Polity

Country Year Regime Type Single Party Irex_Media Marketization Freedom House Polity 2Armenia 2008 4 1 1.31 4.5 5Ethiopia 2007 5 1 1.64 5 1Georgia 2008 4 1 1.77 4 7Kenya 2007 5 1 2.59 3 7Mozambique 2007 5 1 2.01 3 6Tanzania 2007 5 1 1.97 3.5 1Tunisia 2005 5 1 1.3 5.5 -4Zambia 2007 4 1 1.95 3.5 5Zimbabwe 2007 5 1 1.94 6.5 -4Azerbaijan 2008 3 0 1.54 5.5 -7Bahrain 2007 3 0 1.99 5 -7Belarus 2008 3 0 0.82 6.5 -7Burkina Faso 2007 3 0 1.34 4 0Burundi 2007 2 0 1.35 4.5 6Cameroon 2007 3 0 1.29 6 -4Chad 2007 3 0 1.03 5.5 -2Egypt 2005 6 0 1.87 5.5 -3Guinea 2007 3 0 2.09 5.5 -1Jordan 2007 3 0 1.8 4.5 -3Kazakhstan 2008 3 0 1.39 5.5 -6Kuwait 2007 3 0 2.71 4.5 -7Libya 2005 3 0 0.09 7 -7Mauritania 2007 2 0 0.86 4.5 9Morocco 2007 3 0 1.76 4.5 -6Oman 2007 3 0 1.75 5.5 -8Qatar 2007 3 0 2.27 5.5 -10Russia 2008 3 0 1.99 5.5 5Rwanda 2007 1 0 2.01 5.5 -3Saudi Arabia 2007 3 0 1.67 6.5 -10Sudan 2007 2 0 1.34 7 -4Syria 2007 6 0 1.27 6.5 -7Tajikistan 2008 3 0 1.57 5.5 -3Togo 2007 3 0 0.84 5.5 -4Uganda 2007 3 0 2.12 4.5 -1United Arab Emirates 2007 3 0 2.5 6 -8Uzbekistan 2008 3 0 0.42 7 -9Yemen 2007 3 0 0.98 5 -2

OLS Regression Results of Media Marketization on Diversity of Information

as Regime Type Changes

Diversity of Information

Freedom House Press Rating

Coefficient

(s.e.) Coefficient

(s.e.) Independent Variables

3.780*** -43.588*** Commercial Liberalization

(0.365) (8.116)

0.882** -22.074*** Single Party Regime

(0.35) (7.781)

-2.129*** 31.741* Commercial Liberalization*Single Party Regime (0.797) (17.741)

-0.178*** 0.561 Level of Economic Development

(0.053) (1.18)

0.478 -17.354*** Length

(0.298) (6.635)

-0.419** 8.915** Middle East/North Africa

(0.183) (4.078)

-0.037 -2.281 Sub-Saharan Africa

(0.132) (2.929)

1.625*** 89.578*** Constant

(0.42) (9.351)

N 137 137 R-Squared 0.55 0.46 *** p-value < 0.01; ** p-value < 0.05; * p-value<0.1;

Partial Regression Plots

OLS Regression Results of Media Marketization on Media Credibility

Media Credibility

Coefficient

(s.e.) Independent Variables

1.862** Commercial Liberalization

(0.294)

-0.346** Single Party Regime

(0.058)

-0.184** Level of Economic Development (0.031)

-0.004 Length

(0.03)

0.874** Constant

(0.14)

N 7 R2 0.95 *** p-value < 0.01; ** p-value < 0.05; * p-value<0.1;

Partial Regression Plot