DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVYHeadquarters United States Marine Corps

Washington, D.C. 20380-1775

20 May 2004

FOREWORD

Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-24, Assault Support, provides a frame-work for the development and employment of assault support assets in peace, crisis orwar. While this publication covers all aspects of assault support, it focuses on theemployment of vertical lift support for Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) opera-tions. The doctrine applies across the full range of military operations—from support tocivil authorities and/or foreign humanitarian assistance to general war.

Assault support doctrine is based on a common understanding of the nature of war and onour warfighting philosophy as described in Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1,Warfighting. This doctrine provides for fast, flexible, and decisive action in a complex envi-ronment characterized by friction, uncertainty, fluidity, and rapid change.

This publication is for commanders and their staffs as a guide to plan assault support mis-sions. It forms the basis for specific tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) found inMCDPs, assault support aircraft Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standard-ization (NATOPS) manuals, and tactical manuals within the naval warfare publication(NWP) 3-22.5 series.

Reviewed and approved this date.

BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

EDWARD HANLON, JR.Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps

Commanding GeneralMarine Corps Combat Development Command

Publication Control Number: 143 000070 00

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

ASSAULT SUPPORTTABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Chapter 1. Role in the Marine Air-Ground Task Force Types of Assault Support Operations .............................................................. 1-2

Levels of War .................................................................................................. 1-3

Command Relationships.................................................................................. 1-4

Capabilities ...................................................................................................... 1-5

Limitations....................................................................................................... 1-5

Chapter 2. PlanningMarine Corps Planning Process.................................................................... 2-1

MAGTF Air Tasking Cycle......................................................................... 2-2

Effective Employment ................................................................................. 2-3

Mission Classification .................................................................................... 2-5

Support Requirements .................................................................................. 2-6

Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses ...............................................................2-7

Chapter 3. OperationsOffensive ......................................................................................................... 3-1

Defensive ......................................................................................................... 3-2

Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) ............................. 3-4

Chapter 4. Command and Control in Amphibious OperationsNavy Tactical Air Control System .................................................................. 4-1

Marine Air Command and Control System..................................................... 4-2

AppendicesA Aircraft Capabilities Guide .....................................................................A-1

B Assault Support Request Form................................................................B-1

C Glossary...................................................................................................C-1

D References and Related Publications ......................................................D-1

CHAPTER 1ROLE IN THE MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE

Marine aviation is renowned for its close rela-tionship with the ground combat element (GCE).When in support of a MAGTF scheme of maneu-ver, Marine aviation has the ability to providesignificant firepower and mobility. This helps theMAGTF commander to maneuver within the bat-tlespace to engage and destroy the enemy.

The aviation combat element (ACE) providescombat power and operational capability to theMAGTF. Individual aircraft combined and task-organized into an ACE provides a highly capable,responsive, force multiplier to the MAGTF com-mander. The ACE’s unique capabilities comple-ment other MAGTF elements. The ACE is not asubstitute for any MAGTF element. The ACEcontributes to mission accomplishment by pro-viding all or a portion of the six functions ofMarine aviation to the MAGTF commander.

The functions of Marine aviation should not beconfused with capabilities of USMC aircraft. Thesix functions of Marine aviation—antiair warfare(AAW), offensive air support (OAS), electronicwarfare (EW), air reconnaissance, control of air-craft and missiles, and assault support—are broaddescriptions of missions that may be performedby the ACE.

Capabilities are what the aircraft are able to do. AUH-1N can conduct assault support by providingcombat assault support of personnel or control air-craft using organic radios. An AH-1W can con-duct OAS by firing an AGM-114 Hellfire missileat an enemy armored vehicle, and it can provideaerial reconnaissance using the night targetingsystem. The ACE provides multiple mission capa-bility to the MAGTF through air crew trainingand skillful use of its aircraft. See appendix A formore information on aircraft capabilities.

Assault support uses aircraft to provide tacticalmobility and logistical support for the MAGTF. Itmay be used to enhance the rapid buildup ofMAGTF combat power and to facilitate rapidground force maneuver. Assault support’s usesare normally tactical, logistical or administrativein nature. Assault support enhances the MAGTFcommander’s ability to—

! Concentrate strength against the enemy’s selectedweaknesses using speed and surprise.

! Focus combat power at the decisive place andtime and exploit opportunities created duringcombat.

! Sustain combat power.

By conducting assault support operations, thecommander can take full advantage of fleetingopportunities throughout the battlespace.

Speed and focus of effort are essential elementsof maneuver, both of which the MAGTF com-mander can apply using assault support. Assaultsupport provides the MAGTF commander withthe capability to move assets over long distancesquickly. The MAGTF can rapidly bring togetherassault support assets from multiple locations tomass forces in a single focus of effort. This abil-ity to rapidly concentrate forces is a hallmark ofnaval expeditionary power projection.

Mobility and flexibility, gained by extensivelyusing assault support aircraft in tactical opera-tions, are an important part of Marine aviationdoctrine. Helicopters enhance the mobility andsustainability of Marine forces during operationswell removed from their rear areas for extendedperiods of time. Improved aircraft design hasincreased the combat radius and load capacity ofassault support aircraft, providing more flexibilityand fire support to the MAGTF.

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Types of Assault Support Operations

Assault support involves the use of aircraft toprovide tactical mobility and logistical supportfor the MAGTF, the movement of high-prioritycargo and personnel within the immediate area ofoperations, inflight refueling, and the evacuationof personnel and cargo. Assault support opera-tions require detailed, coordinated, and concur-rent planning. Efficient execution of assaultsupport operations requires thorough knowledgeof mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troopsand support available-time available (METT-T).

Combat Assault Support

Combat assault support provides mobility forMAGTF forces. It is used to rapidly deployforces, bypass obstacles or redeploy forces tomeet the enemy threat. The increase in mobility,speed, range, and freedom of action provides theMAGTF commander a variety of diverse options.Combat assault support allows the MAGTF com-mander to effect a rapid force buildup at a spe-cific time and location of his choosing. In thenear future, advanced aircraft designs (such as theMV-22) may further expand these advantages tothe MAGTF commander.

Air Delivery

Air delivery operations transport equipment andsupplies to forward operating bases (FOBs) orremote areas. Airdrops (parachute or free fall)deliver equipment and supplies. Airdrops aredone primarily by fixed-wing transport aircraft.Airdrops are conducted when surface or helicop-ter transport cannot fulfill resupply requirementsdue to range, closed lines of communications,lack of adequate airfields, prohibitive ground tac-tical situation, high tonnage or the need to reduceresponse time. The supported commander selectsthe drop zone (DZ) using the following criteria:

! The DZ should be free of obstacles.! Aircraft approach routes are not over enemy-con-

trolled territory.! The terrain should be flat.! The DZ should be a rectangular area with prevail-

ing wind along the zone’s long axis.! The terrain should have prominent features.

The best DZ is close to an area with ample coverand concealment. This allows materiel recovery,segregation, inventory, and preparation for distri-bution without exposing personnel to enemyobservation or fire.

Aerial Refueling

Currently, Marine KC-130 aircraft serve as air-borne tankers for rotary-wing and fixed-wing air-craft with the probe and drogue system. Aerialrefueling allows Marine aircraft to conduct flight-ferrying operations, extend time on station, andextend mission range.

Air Evacuation

Air evacuation is the transportation of personnel andequipment from FOBs or remote areas. Thisincludes flights from areas of operations (AOs) tosecure rear areas, casualty evacuation (CASEVAC),and extraction of forces. Helicopters and fixed-wingtransport aircraft perform air evacuations.

Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel

Tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel mis-sions facilitate the recovery of personnel andequipment while avoiding additional loss. Thetactical recovery of aircraft and personnel(TRAP) mission is an implied task associatedwith all MAGTF operations. Specially trainedand briefed aircrews, with a task-organized forcefrom the GCE, are assigned to perform TRAPmissions. TRAP missions are conducted onlywhen survivors and their locations are con-firmed. TRAP missions stress—

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! Detailed planning.! Assigned and briefed aircrews. ! Confirmation of survivors and their locations.

By using the TRAP concept, the Marine Corpsfulfills the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) require-ment for each Service to be able to performcombat search and rescue (SAR). Using TRAPtechniques, Marine forces are able to performself-supporting SAR operations and some exter-nal SAR support. SAR is a secondary task, andits execution should not detract from primarywarfighting functions. Marine forces currentlylack the organic capability to effectively con-duct searches when the survivor’s location isunknown, particularly in a medium or highthreat environment.

Air Logistical Support

Fixed-wing aircraft perform air logistical supportby providing assault support of Marine groundforces in much the same manner as helicopters.Air logistical support delivers troops, equipment,and supplies to areas beyond helicopter range andlift capability or when surface transportation isslow or unavailable. The Marine Corps’ limitedquantities of transport aircraft restricts their usein amphibious assaults, operations ashore or con-tingency plans. To minimize the effects of thislimitation, MAGTF commanders can employoperational support airlift assets to conduct airlogistical support to benign AOs thereby freeingcritical assault support aircraft to perform theirprimary function. If large-scale, long-range airoperations exceed MAGTF capabilities, addi-tional support should be requested from the jointforce commander (JFC).

Levels of War

The seven types of assault support operations offerthe commander a wide range of options that he canuse to develop operation plans. Assault supportemployment strategy depends on the MAGTF’smission and the enemy’s capabilities. The

MAGTF commander considers assault supportemployment methods during the planning phaseand throughout the operation’s execution. Assaultsupport operations vary in intensity throughout theoperation and may be employed in pursuit of tacti-cal, operational or strategic objectives.

MCDP 1, Warfighting, states that “in war, tacticsfocus on the application of combat power todefeat an enemy force in combat at a particulartime and place.” This explains assault support’smost common use in the levels of war. Duringassault support operations at the tactical level,aviation may be employed with ground or navalforces to—

! Provide mobility to the MAGTF.! Exploit opportunities presented by the enemy or

created by friendly forces.! Rapidly concentrate combat power at the most

advantageous time and place.! Help maintain the tempo of operations and the

momentum of the attack.

The operational level of war is the link betweenthe strategic and tactical levels. The goal of aforce’s actions at the operational level of war isto gain strategic results from tactical efforts. TheMAGTF may be the first force to be committedto a theater of operations. The MAGTF com-mander’s actions at the tactical level will havestrategic implications as they will shape futureoperations in that theater. The commander mustdecide when, where, and how to engage theenemy at a particular place and time to achieve astrategic result. Assault support operations allowthe commander to maintain an advantage inspeed and surprise over the enemy. In this waythe commander can drive the fight in the desireddirection. The commander can shape events usingassault support to create favorable conditions forfuture combat operations. This could mean airlogistical support to sustain tactical operationsover an extended period of time or combat assaultsupport to attack the enemy’s vulnerable flank orrear area. All tactical actions must seek to gainstrategic results.

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The strategic level of war is where national strat-egy—the art and science of using political, eco-nomic, military, and informational power—isfocused to attain national policy objectives.Assault support operations fit within the frame-work of strong military capabilities that canenable the nation to meet its objectives. However,operations based on assault support capabilitiessuch as noncombatant evacuation operations(NEOs) are directly linked to the national policyof safeguarding the lives of American and alliedcitizens. Therefore, assault support operationscan have direct strategic implications.

Command Relationships

The relationship between the MAGTF com-mander and the ACE commander typifies MarineCorps command relationships. The MAGTFcommander provides the ACE commander withthe mission and the commander’s intent. TheACE commander determines the most effectivemethod of employment of ACE assets to accom-plish the mission and meet the commander’s aim.

A helicopterborne assault is one of the most com-mon assault support operations. Refer to MCWP3-11.4, Helicopterborne Operations, for morespecific information on helicopterborne assaults.A look at the helicopterborne force will reveal theimportance of command relationships.

Helicopterborne assaults require task-organiz-ing both ground and aviation assets to accom-plish the MAGTF scheme of maneuver. TheMAGTF commander task-organizes a helicop-terborne force based on mission requirementsand establishes the command relationshipswithin the force to execute the operation. TheMAGTF commander will designate a missioncommander. The mission commander may comefrom the GCE, ACE or combat service supportelement (CSSE). The ACE, GCE, and CSSEcommanders plan the mission together. The

ACE commander is responsible for providingmobility and fire support for the assault. TheGCE commander is responsible for planning theground tactical mission to include maneuver andfire support planning. The CSSE commanderplans how to support both the ground and avia-tion plans.

Unity of command is the most important and fun-damental consideration during these operations.In a combined arms effort, unity of commandpromotes coordinated action toward a commongoal required for mission accomplishment.

The air mission commander (AMC) is responsi-ble for accomplishing the air mission. The AMCdetermines what assets are required, such as thenumber of transport, escort, and support aircraft.He determines the route of flight for the mission.It is important that he considers primary andalternate routes. Changing routes can affect thefire support plan. The authority to change theroute may be delegated to the AMC by the mis-sion commander.

The helicopterborne unit commander (HUC) isresponsible for accomplishing the ground tacticalplan and choosing the required assets. Thebuildup of combat power in the objective area iscritical early on and must be considered carefully.

Landing zone (LZ) selection is critical in theearly phases. The HUC and AMC must agree onprimary and alternate LZs. They must be largeenough to land the helicopterborne force in tacti-cal integrity, be clear of obstacles, and mostimportantly, be covered by fire support assets.The authority to change LZs may be delegated tothe HUC or AMC by the mission commander.Also identified in the early planning phases iswho is supporting whom. By delegating author-i ty and ident ifying supported/support ingrelationships during mission planning, conflictresolution most likely will be resolved beforeexecuting the mission.

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Capabilities

Assault support is an integral part of the totalMAGTF effort because of its many capabilities.The MAGTF performs assault support missionsduring day, night, and adverse weather condi-tions. Reliance on assault support increases whenmovement of personnel and equipment must bedone quickly over long distances or over prohibi-tive terrain. Assault support’s principal advan-tage is its capability to quickly move MAGTFforces and equipment throughout the battlespace.Assault support offers the MAGTF commander awide range of capabilities from improvingfriendly morale to bringing devastating combatpower to bear from any direction to decisivepoints on the battlefield. Other capabilities ofassault support aircraft are varied. The followingareas are not all inclusive.

Observation

Aircrews performing assault support missions canobserve large areas and report enemy activity andmovement in areas hidden from ground observation.

Flexibility

Diverting assault support aircraft from one mis-sion to another allows the MAGTF commanderto exploit fleeting battlefield opportunities. Theability to integrate supporting arms enhances theMAGTF’s combined arms effects. Assault sup-port operations allow the commander to attackfrom any direction, bypass obstacles or enemystrengths, and provide responsive reserves orreinforce committed units. The commander canresupply units in otherwise inaccessible locations.

Employment of aerial refueling or rapid groundrefueling (RGR) provides the means to recover air-craft, equipment, and personnel from hostile areas.Access to fuel increases the combat radius or timeon station of aviation assets. These options avail-able to the commander have a positive effect onfriendly morale and destroy enemy morale. The

MAGTF commander should exploit the psycho-logical effect that aviation has on both friendly andenemy forces.

Limitations

Assault support limitations must be consideredduring planning. Specific assault support limita-tions follow.

Limited VisibilityWhile darkness or limited visibility can be advan-tageous, it can also present limitations to assaultsupport. Problems can occur when aircraftencounter difficulties during rendezvous,approaches, and landings. Troop and cargo load-ing and unloading are also slower and more diffi-cult. Planners should anticipate delays andincrease mission time requirements.

Rotary-wing assault support aircraft currentlyhave no radar capability. Night vision systems areavailable but cannot duplicate daylight condi-tions. Night or limited visibility operationsrequire close attention to planning specific phasesof each mission. Problems can be offset by usingsmaller formations and larger intervals betweenformations to reduce LZ congestion. Route andLZ selection are important for navigation andsafe conduct of takeoffs and landings.

Using night vision devices (NVDs) allows air-crews to conduct night operations more safely.However, NVD use does not guarantee tacticalsuccess. Effective NVD use requires a full under-standing of each device’s capabilities and limita-tions as they apply to each tactical situation.

Weather

Weather at the LZ is more limiting than weather enroute or at home base. Temperature extremes andwind velocity can seriously affect helicopter perfor-mance. Low ceilings and poor visibility decreaseassault support effectiveness, influence escort tac-tics, and hamper fire support coordination.

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Landing Zone IdentificationLZ identification is one of the most difficult aspectsof assault support missions. Improvements to navi-gation systems with global positioning system(GPS) have helped considerably, but LZs must stillbe identified visually before landing. Proper mapstudy, aerial imagery, aircraft sensors or systems(forward-looking infrared [FLIR], GPS), and accu-rate LZ descriptions will decrease erroneous identi-fication of LZs. Planners should use initial terminalguidance teams or LZ marking whenever possible.

Reduced Radius of ActionFuel on board determines radius of action or timeon station. Increasing an aircraft’s payload beyond acertain point reduces the amount of fuel an aircraftcan carry and reduces its time on station. Refuelingat FOBs reduces this limitation but requires addi-tional planning, resources, and coordination.

CommunicationsCoordination of assault support missions with thecontrolling agencies and fire support assets requiresreliable radio communications. Real-time informa-tion is crucial and cannot be overemphasized. Thor-ough communications planning can provide secure,reliable radio transmissions by employing airborneradio relay capabilities and enhance alternate

means of communications such as message drop orface-to-face liaison.

Enemy Defenses

Enemy defenses affect the conduct of assault sup-port missions. Development of sophisticated airdefense systems deters air support. Local airsuperiority will greatly increase the ability to suc-cessfully conduct assault support missions. Sup-pression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) may berequired both before and during assault supportoperations. Enemy surface-to-air weapons, fight-ers, and small arms fire must be considered whenevaluating risk and determining routes.

Required Escort Support

The purpose of an escort is to destroy, neutralizeor suppress a threat before it is able to influencethe assault support mission. Assault supportassets do not possess self-defense capabilities tocounter a formidable threat. The use of addi-tional assets to ensure the safe arrival of MAGTFforces into the objective area may be required.Most commonly, the assault support mission willincorporate armed escorts to accompany theassault support aircraft en route or clear an objec-tive area prior to arrival of assault support assets.

CHAPTER 2PLANNING

Joint and combined operations require thoroughplanning to ensure success. Planning operationsthat will optimize the MAGTF’s strengths andexploit the enemy’s vulnerabilities is the key tosuccess. Simple, well-thought-out plans ensure thesuccessful completion of operations. Assault sup-port operations are conducted with other support-ing arms. OAS artillery and naval surface firesupport (NSFS) integration require extensive plan-ning and precise execution for effective assaultsupport employment. See MCWP 3-16, Fire Sup-port Coordination, and MCWP 3-16.1, ArtilleryOperations, for more information on indirect firesin support of assault support operations.

MCDP 5, Planning, states “Proper planning putsus in the position to act when necessary or advan-tageous and not merely to react to develop-ments.” Central to an assault support operation’ssuccess is a flexible but simple plan.

Flexibility in execution comes directly from awell-understood, integrated, and coherent plan.A basic plan that is simple and flexible can sur-vive changes. Assault support missions, bytheir nature, have the potential to become verycomplex. Simplicity must be maintained, butplanners should not sacrifice detailed, well-coordinated planning.

Marine Corps Planning Process

The Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP) hasevolved from the 16-step deliberate planningprocess and the rapid planning process. Aviation

planning should follow a similar process orcycle. The only variable is time available to con-duct the planning. The following is a six-step,generic planning progression that can be enteredat any echelon.

Mission Analysis

The purpose of mission analysis is to review andanalyze orders, guidance, and other informationprovided by higher headquarters and to produce aunit mission statement. Mission analysis drivesthe MCPP.

Course of Action Development

During course of action (COA) development,planners use the mission statement, com-mander’s intent, and commander’s planning guid-ance to develop several COAs. Each proposedCOA must be determined suitable, acceptable,and complete with respect to the current andanticipated situation, mission, and the com-mander’s intent. Approved COAs are furtherdeveloped in greater detail.

Course of Action Wargame

Each friendly COA is examined and evaluatedagainst possible enemy COAs. Environmentalfactors are also considered at this point in theprocess. Planners look at strengths, weaknesses,shortfalls, and risks presented by each COA.Potential branches and sequels are identified atthis time. Understanding and improving eachCOA is best done at this step in the process.

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Course of Action Comparison and Decision

In COA comparison and decision, the com-mander evaluates all friendly COAs againstestablished criteria and then against each other.The commander then selects the COA that hefeels most likely will accomplish the mission.

Orders Development

With the commander’s intent, guidance, andCOA decision, the staff develops orders to directthe actions of the unit. Orders serve as the princi-pal means by which the commander communi-cates his decision, intent, and guidance.

Transition

This is the point where an orderly handover of aplan is made to those who will be executing theplan. The unit executing the plan will have thesituational awareness and rationale for makingdecisions required for a coherent shift from planto action.

MAGTF Air Tasking Cycle

The MAGTF air tasking cycle has evolved intosix phases to mirror the joint air tasking cycle. Itis designed to occur over a 36- to 72-hourperiod. The cycle follows the path of commandand aviation guidance (which includes appor-tionment), target/air support mission develop-ment, allocation and allotment, tasking, forceexecution, and combat assessment.

Phase I: Command and Aviation Guidance

The MAGTF commander will provide guidancethrough mission orders by clearly conveying hisintent and by designating the MAGTF maineffort. The commander’s guidance and objec-tives identify target priorities, procedures, fire

support coordination measures, and rules ofengagement (ROE). Apportionment is the deter-mination of the total level of effort that should bededicated to the aviation tasks required to accom-plish the MAGTF’s mission. The ACE com-mander submits a recommendation for theapportionment of the ACE to the MAGTF com-mander for approval.

Phase II: Target/Air Support Mission Development

The specific objectives described by the com-mander are used to focus specific target and airsupport mission development. The end product ofthis phase of the air tasking order (ATO) cycle isa prioritized list of targets and a prioritized list ofair support missions.

Phase III: Allocation and Allotment

Allocation is the translation of the level of effortinto total number of sorties (by aircraft type)available for each task. Allocation includes thesubmission of preplanned air support requests bythe ACE, GCE, and CSSE commanders. Pre-planned requests include joint tactical airstrikerequests, assault support requests (ASRs), andjoint tactical airlift requests.

Allotment of sorties is then decided to supportexecution of the MAGTF mission. For example,30 CH-53E sorties are available for a day duringthe operation. The GCE commander needs toconduct a helicopterborne assault, and the CSSEcommander needs to set up a refueling point tosupport the GCE scheme of maneuver. Each sub-ordinate element is given a percentage of the 30sorties to fulfill its requirements.

Phase IV: Tasking

Tasking is the process of translating allocation andallotment decisions into an ATO. The ACE com-mander passes on the tasks to the units involved.

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The MAGTF ATO assigns missions and missionsupport responsibilities to specific squadrons.

Phase V: Force ExecutionOn receipt of the ATO, an aircraft squadron com-mander assigns individual aircrews specific mis-sions. Each mission commander then plans themission with support from the ACE staff. Task-organized groups of aircraft then execute theassigned missions.

Phase VI: Combat AssessmentCombat assessment is the evaluation of theresults of missions and their effectiveness inaccomplishing the command objectives. Combatassessment should include battle damage assess-ment and reattack recommendations. The ACEstaff assessment is forwarded to the MAGTFcommander for determination of overall missionsuccess and to recommend changes regardingfuture operations.

Although combat assessment marks the end ofthe ATO cycle, it provides input for the next airtasking cycle and subsequent command aviationguidance, target development, allocation, allot-ment, tasking, force execution, and combatassessment. In essence, there can be three simul-taneous ATOs: the ATO in execution, the ATOin production, and the ATO in planning.

Effective Employment

Several conditions are required for effectiveassault support employment. Assault supporteffectiveness increases when—

! Air superiority has been attained and main-tained.

! Enemy air defenses have been suppressed, neu-tralized or destroyed.

! Missions are planned so as to use terrain andenvironmental conditions to gain maximumadvantage.

! Missions are planned with flexibility as part ofthe command and control (C2) plan.

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace

Due to the vulnerability of assault support assets,intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB)is extremely important in assault support opera-tions. IPB is the analysis of the environment andthe threat in a specific geographic area. It isdesigned to support the commander and his staffin making estimates of the situation and develop-ing COAs. IPB helps the commander to selec-tively apply and maximize combat power atcritical points in time and space. IPB determinesthe threat’s likely COA and describes the envi-ronment in which the MAGTF is operating andhow the environment may affect the MAGTF’splans. More specific information on applying IPBto assault support operations can be found inArmy Field Manual (FM) 34-130, IntelligencePreparation of the Battlefield.

Threat Levels

Threat levels determine assault support feasibil-ity. There are three general threat levels: low,medium, and high. There is no clear divisionbetween these threat levels. Air defense systemsthat present a low or medium threat level for oneaircraft type may present a high threat level foranother aircraft type. A medium threat level dur-ing daylight hours may be a low threat level atnight. Threat level determination allows an air-crew to tailor tactics to a particular situation andenvironment. Threat level planning is based ontype, quantity, and quality of individual weaponsand weapons systems. Control and communica-tions systems used to integrate weapon systemsassist threat level planning. The skill level pos-sessed by the system operator is equally impor-tant to this process.

A low threat level allows assault support opera-tions to proceed without prohibitive interfer-ence. Aircrews are free to select tactics thatensure effective use of aircraft capabilities. Alow threat environment includes small arms andmedium antiaircraft weapons. Limited opticalacquisition antiaircraft artillery (AAA) with no

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integrated fire control systems also characterizea low threat environment.

A medium threat level allows acceptable expo-sure time of friendly aircraft to enemy airdefenses. This threat level can restrict assaultsupport flexibility in the immediate target orobjective area. A medium threat environmentincludes limited radar or electro-optic acquisitioncapability not supported by fully integrated firecontrol systems. A fully integrated fire controlsystem that is degraded because of terrain,weather or other factors indicates a mediumthreat environment.

A high threat level exists when the enemy has anair defense system that includes integrated firecontrol systems and EW capabilities. The ability toconduct assault support operations is severelyaffected in a high threat environment. A highthreat environment includes effective communica-tions and control systems, tactical or strategic sur-face-to-air missiles (SAMs), early warning radars,EW, integrated AAA fire control systems, andinterceptor aircraft.

The decision by the MAGTF commander toemploy assault support assets must be carefullyweighed against the risk involved. Assault sup-port aircraft are a finite resource, subject to multi-ple requirements from subordinate elementcommanders with tactical and logistical needs.

An estimate of the situation based on METT-T isa useful tool in determining those planning con-siderations that will affect assault support mis-sion planning. The analysis of METT-T iscrucial also to determining the commander’sestimate. The MAGTF commander’s analysisusing the mission and the GCE commander’sestimate of the tactical situation determine inlarge part the ACE commander’s strategy to sup-port the mission. The ACE commander’s esti-mate of supportability summarizes aspects thatinfluence any proposed COA. Planners mustanalyze the impact of aviation factors upon theparticular situations and then determine howassault support assets can be best employed in

support of the MAGTF commander’s concept ofoperations and the ground scheme of maneuver.

More specific considerations for employment ofassault support during the planning process fol-low. In addition, more detailed information onmission planning can be found in MCWP 5-11.1,MAGTF Aviation Planning.

Availability

The quantity, type, operational status, and capa-bility of aircraft assigned determine assault sup-port availability. The proximity of FOBs to theAO also affects availability.

Aircraft Capability

Although specific aircraft are best suited to per-form certain missions, each squadron’s tasksrequire similar capabilities across the board. Ver-satile, multiple mission capable aircraft are essen-tial in MAGTF operations and are the foundationof Marine Corps aviation doctrine. The CH-53E(primarily an assault helicopter) can perform air-borne control and coordination for assault supportoperations, while a UH-1N (primarily a utilityhelicopter) can provide combat assault support oftroops, supplies, and equipment. The versatilityof assault support aircraft gives the MAGTFcommander many options when considering mis-sion execution.

Aircrew Currency/Proficiency

Aircrew training and experience levels are impor-tant considerations that mission planners oftenoverlook. Aircrews must be properly trained forthe mission to be performed. Marine Corps Order(MCO) P3500.16C, Aviation Training and Readi-ness Manual, Volume 3, Tactical Helicopter (Vol-ume 2 for the KC-130) provides a syllabus thatwill ensure aircrews are current in missions thatthey may be tasked to fly. Aircrew proficiency isdetermined by many factors such as number offlight hours a crew member has, number of timessimilar missions have been flown by the crew

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members, and length of time elapsed since the lasttime that similar mission has been flown.

Air Defense

Air defense considerations affect the MAGTFcommander’s COA. The air defense threat andthe type of assault support requested determinethe degree that the threat must be reduced. If theMAGTF commander determines that assaultsupport employment is essential to accomplishthe mission, the commander assigns high targetpriority to enemy air defense weapons. Thisensures continuous employment of integratedsupporting arms to destroy or neutralize the airdefense threat.

Mission Classification

The ACE executes assault support missions aseither preplanned or immediate missions. TheACE executes both types of support in responseto specific requests. To request assault support,units use the ASR or the joint tactical airliftrequest. The type of request determines the typeof support. See appendix B for more informationon the ASR.

Preplanned Missions

Preplanned missions are performed according tospecific tasking and time availability. Planningshould be done far enough in advance to permitdetailed mission coordination. Preplanned mis-sions allow the ACE commander to manage airassets more effectively. Preplanned missions areeither scheduled or on call. Mission requests arecompleted at the requesting unit and forwardedup the chain of command to the senior fire sup-port coordination center (FSCC). The requestsare then passed to the ACE where they areincluded in the appropriate ATO.

Scheduled Missions

Scheduled missions are executed at a specifictime. Aircrews are assigned a mission executiontime. Scheduled missions provide effective coor-dination and economical aircraft use and requireapproval from each intermediate command level.

On-Call Missions

On-call mission aircraft are configured for a par-ticular mission and placed in an appropriateground or air alert readiness condition. The sup-ported unit specifies the required support period.

Typically, detailed mission planning and aircrewbriefing of all mission-essential information isnot possible. Scheduled air support requires thatthe requesting commander identify his require-ments and set a specific mission time well inadvance. This is often impossible on a fluid,dynamic battlefield. On-call missions allow therequesting commander to identify specificrequirements without setting a specific time.

Immediate Missions

Immediate missions meet requests that arise dur-ing battle. They are not normally identified farenough in advance to permit detailed missioncoordination and planning. Response time or theaction cycle begins with the request and endswith execution. Response time is a prime consid-eration. An example of an immediate missionmay be diverting aircraft from a preplanned mis-sion to fill an immediate assault support request.While the diverted aircraft may not be the propertype or configuration, swift execution can exploitan unexpected enemy weakness or maintain theattack momentum.

The Marine air command and control system(MACCS) handles immediate mission requests.See MCWP 3-25, Control of Aircraft and Missiles,and MCWP 3-25.3, Marine Air Command and

2-6 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-24

Control System Handbook, for more discussion onthe MACCS. Appropriate C2 agencies monitorand approve the request. Mission details are coor-dinated and issued while aircraft are assigned andmoved toward the area. Immediate air supportrequires extensive use of electronic communica-tions for effective coordination. This communica-tion may be difficult in a high-intensity jammingenvironment.

Support Requirements

During the planning process, specified andimplied tasks will indicate the type of support themission will require. Range, enemy defenses, andsize of the helicopterborne force will dictate thesupport requirements needed to ensure missionaccomplishment. Logistics, communications, andsupporting arms integration are all areas wheresupport will be required.

These supporting elements allow assault supportaircrews to concentrate on mission accomplish-ment. Supporting elements degrade the enemy’sair defense capability and reduce the number ofaircraft exposed to enemy weapons, whilestrengthening the commander’s plan with logisti-cal and communications support.

Escort Operations

Escort aircraft provide protection for assault sup-port missions. Attack helicopters and fixed-wingfighter and attack aircraft can escort assaultforces. Escorts are responsible to the AMC forthe following:

! Protection from rotary-wing threat aircraft.! Protection from fixed-wing threat aircraft.! Protection from enemy ground fire.! Route reconnaissance.! LZ clearing by fire if necessary.! Downed aircraft support.! Observation and adjustment of fires.

Employing escort aircraft depends on many fac-tors. Planners should review recent intelligenceand determine the current air defense and groundthreat. If enemy tactics show that assault supportaircraft are the main target, deceptive measurescan be used to simulate a helicopterborne forceand draw the enemy aircraft into contact. Escortaircraft should be positioned where they can pro-vide the greatest protection to the helicopter-borne force.

Assault Force Self-Defense Capability

There may be a reduced need for attached escortif the assault force has a self-defense capability.Aircraft performance, onboard weapons, aircrewtraining, and low altitude tactics can provide lim-ited self-defense capability. Careful consider-ation must be given to the vulnerability of assaultsupport aircraft in an unescorted mission.

Enemy Surveillance Capability

The enemy’s ability to detect aircraft will affectthe size, routing, and escort tactics of the assaultsupport mission. Smaller, more maneuverableformations may be used if the enemy has sophis-ticated surveillance equipment. The enemy’s sur-veillance capability will determine the type ofescort used. For example, a detached escort mightbe more useful than an attached escort becauseattached escort aircraft increase the formation’ssize, therefore increasing the chance of detection.

Enemy Air Defenses

Known enemy air defense assets may be dealtwith in different ways. Navigation around theSAM sites, preemptive strikes or SEAD duringthe assault support mission are options availableto the commander. All will affect mission plan-ning and escort tactics.

Ordnance Loads

Escort ordnance loads depend on the threat andavailable aircraft. Whenever feasible, escort

Assault Support _________________________________________________________________________________________________ 2-7

ordnance loads need to be tailored to the mis-sion and the enemy.

Attached Escort TechniqueAttached escort techniques provide visual weap-ons coverage and responsive fires for threatengagement during medium to high threat condi-tions. Attached escort aircraft maintain closecontact with the assault force. This close contactcan reduce the attached escort’s speed and free-dom of action. Attached escort aircrews may findthemselves in a defensive or reactive posture atthe start of an engagement. If the escorts are in adefensive posture, the entire assault supportpackage may be in this posture also. Conse-quently, the assault support package and attachedescort may be limited in maneuverability andtactics selection.

Detached Escort TechniqueDetached escort techniques provide reconnais-sance and selected coverage at predeterminedsites en route in low to medium threat levels.Detached escort aircraft provide protection byclearing a path for the assault force. Detachedescort aircraft try to prevent the enemy from clos-ing with the assault force. Detached escort allowsescort aircrews to retain the initiative. Detachedescort also allows the escort platforms moreoptions in tactics selection and engagementparameters due to greater flexibility in employ-ing all onboard weapons systems. However, theassault force may suffer serious losses if attackedby enemy forces that evade the detached escort.This is especially true if assault support aircrafthave a limited self-defense capability.

Combined Escort TechniqueAttached and detached escort techniques combinedprovides a defense in-depth, horizontally and verti-cally, and around the assault support aircraft.Although providing the best all-around protectionfor the assault support flight in all threat levels,combined escort is costly because it requires moreassets than the other escort techniques.

Electronic WarfareEW aircraft protect assault support aircraft throughelectronic attack, electronic support, and elec-tronic protection. Electronic attack can be used todeceive the enemy by sending misleading informa-tion about assault forces’ speed, altitude, direc-tion, and size. EW planners can recommend to themission commander EW tactics that will providethe greatest assault force protection. The assaultforce mission commander and the EW plannershould consider the following:

! Initial jammer activation requires careful plan-ning to prevent early detection of the assaultforce.

! Preemptive or reactive jammer assignments aresuperior to threat-specific, reactive jammerassignments.

! The length of time EW support is necessary toprotect assault support aircraft.

! EW aircraft are vulnerable to enemy fighters,since they maintain a constant position andperform little maneuvering. Fighter coverageimproves EW aircraft survivability.

! EW aircraft integration with the assault forceand other MAGTF EW assets is critical.

! The effectiveness of enemy electronic counter-measures against our attackers.

! Unanticipated threats and responses should beidentified.

! Electronic deception capabilities of both friendlyand enemy forces must be known.

Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

SEAD reduces assault support aircraft attrition bydegrading enemy air defense system effectiveness.SEAD uses supporting arms (i.e., artillery, NSFS,and aircraft) and other available means to deter,suppress or destroy the enemy’s air defense capa-bility. SEAD should be integrated not only withassault support aircraft but with other supportingaircraft. Detection of SEAD aircraft alone maychange the enemy’s normal operating procedures.High-speed antiradiation missiles (HARMs) or

2-8 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-24

antiradiation missiles (ARMs) can suppress ordestroy radar sites. Because SEAD effects areshort-lived, these missions should be timed to givemaximum protection to the assault force. Missionplanners should—

! Determine SEAD requirements.! Determine assets available for SEAD.! Study the assault force’s route of flight.! Determine which enemy systems pose major

threats.! Determine number of SEAD aircraft required.! Coordinate HARM/ARM timing to provide

maximum assault force protection.! Determine placement of SEAD aircraft in rela-

tion to the assault force and the threat.! Determine the need for fighter aircraft to pro-

tect SEAD elements during ingress and egress.! Set and understand sector responsibilities and

priorities if there are more threats than avail-able assets can cover.

! Review HARM/ARM delivery envelopes andlaunch procedures.

! Determine who will initiate SEAD fires.! Keep the mission commander informed of

SEAD capabilities.

Deception Operations

Deception operat ions are those measuresdesigned to mislead the enemy by manipulation,distortion or falsification of evidence. The goal isto induce the enemy to react in a manner againsthis interests. Deception operations may be aimedat the individual who is most influential onenemy operations in the MAGTF zone. Decep-tion operations are planned to elicit a specificaction from the enemy, such as committing forceselsewhere or maintaining strength in an area theMAGTF intends to avoid.

Operations Security

Operations security (OPSEC) assists in denyingthe enemy’s ability to use collection assets tolocate friendly forces and determine their inten-tions. The less information the enemy has concern-ing assault support operations, the easier it is toconduct a successful operation. Planners mustcarefully analyze enemy capabilities to determineif OPSEC measures are adequate for the plannedmission. OPSEC for assault support missions maybe accidentally compromised by using—! The same ingress and egress routes.! The same frequencies, code words, and authen-

tication procedures.! Flight profiles that place assault support air-

craft in enemy search or early warning radarcoverage areas.

! Radios, radars, radar altimeters or other emis-sions.

! Radio transmissions on uncovered nets.

Base of Operations

Operational deployment of assault forcesinvolves the relocation of forces to desired AOs.Critical deployment factors include the selectedtransportation and the availability of operationaland support facilities. The decision to deployforces is based on the assets involved, assignedtasks, supportability of the deployed force, andnational defense needs.

Because of the ACE’s self-deployment capabil-ity, its units may be the first MAGTF forces toarrive in the AO. During the deployment phase,the MAGTF commander may designate theACE as the main effort. This is especially truewhen ACE assets are the primary source oftransportation to the theater for the force.Because of the Marine Corps expeditionary

Assault Support _________________________________________________________________________________________________ 2-9

nature, operations can be conducted fromaustere sites. Operations from these sites requirecareful planning to be effective.

Forward Operating Base The MAGTF’s capability to project power is basedon its ability to move to and operate from any area.The ACE contributes to this capability by stayingclose to the AO to increase responsiveness duringall operational phases. FOBs, whether they areexpeditionary airfields, enhanced local airfields orforward arming and refueling points (FARPs) arethe means by which Marine aviation provide thisrapid response capability.

The future of MAGTF operations is movingtowards the concepts of operational maneuverfrom the sea (OMFTS) and ship-to-objectivemaneuver (STOM). These concepts will keepmost of the support assets on ship, reducing therequirement for building up large supply areasashore. This will affect response time dependingon the location of the objective area. Assault sup-port planners will have to factor in transit time ofaircraft to the objective and allow for multiplerefueling options. STOM will aid in the logisti-cal support of aviation units and increase forceprotection of both aviation and combat servicesupport units since they will be ship-based andless accessible to the enemy.

CHAPTER 3OPERATIONS

Marine aviation operates as an integral part ofthe MAGTF. The MAGTF conducts operationsusing the principles of maneuver warfare toobtain maximum force capability and versatility.

Assault support, either fixed-wing or rotary-wingaircraft, can influence offensive and defensiveoperations by providing tactical mobility andlogistical support at the decisive time and place.Helicopterborne assaults offer speed, surprise,and flexibility so the commander can react rap-idly to a changing tactical situation. The helicop-ter’s capabilities along with fixed-wing lift andrange capabilities allow the MAGTF to strikeover extended distances and terrain barriers. Thisallows the MAGTF to attack when and where theenemy is most vulnerable. Assault support air-craft are primarily movers of personnel, equip-ment, and supplies. Because of the helicopter’svertical lift capability, its use in assault support isdominant. It is a primary provider of combatassault support, air evacuation, and TRAP. Fixed-wing aircraft provide significant contributions tothe assault support function through air logisticalsupport, aerial delivery, aerial refueling, and bat-tlefield illumination.

Offensive

Offensive operations are the means to decisivevictory; however, victory is rarely the outcome ofany one battle, offensive operation or offensivemaneuver. The commander’s use of tools deter-mines an operation’s victory or defeat. A com-mander who gains and maintains a superiortempo, sustains the momentum of the offensive,and employs his force with the principles of warand the concept of maneuver warfare in mind ismore likely to achieve victory. Aviation function-ality, because it is inherently offensive, is useful

in offensive or defensive operations in exactly thesame way.

The ACE commander must be concerned withmaintaining tempo, sustaining operationalmomentum, and effectively applying the sixfunctions of aviation in the execution of theoffensive. Economy of force is a major factor inthe ACE’s choice of options in executing offen-sive operations.

The helicopterborne assault is the most basic typeof offensive operation conducted by assault sup-port forces. It is the insertion or extraction ofcombat forces. Insertion is the movement of anassault force into an objective area, and extrac-tion is movement of an assault force out of theobjective area. When augmented with KC-130s,the helicopterborne force can conduct a variety ofoffensive operations over long distances.

Attack

An attack is a fast, violent, and coordinatedmaneuver supported by fire conducted to defeat,destroy, neutralize or capture the enemy. A heli-copterborne attack capitalizes on speed and flexi-bil i ty to gain maximum surprise. Assaulttransport helicopters support an attack by insert-ing the helicopterborne force on or near theobjective. Fixed-wing aerial refueling and trans-port add significant continuity to the attack capa-bility. A helicopterborne force can conduct ahasty or deliberate attack based on the degree ofplanning, preparation, and coordination involvedprior to execution.

The hasty attack trades preparation time for speedto exploit an opportunity. A hasty attack takesaudacity and relies on speed and surprise toachieve the commander’s objectives before theenemy can effectively respond. There is little

3-2 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-24

time to plan; orders must be brief. Assault sup-port planners rely heavily on training and stand-ing operating procedures to make a successfulhasty attack.

The helicopterborne force, as part of a largeroperation, may conduct a deliberate attack. Adeliberate attack is a preplanned offensive actioncharacterized by maneuver and firepower to closewith and destroy the enemy. Assault support canplay a key role in the rapid massing of forces toconduct a deliberate attack. Mission plannersmust have enough time to develop a detailedplan. Planners collect detailed information aboutthe terrain to select appropriate pickup zones(PZs), LZs, DZs, and flight routes. Unlike hastyattacks on more familiar terrain and with recentlyacquired intelligence, deliberate attacks deep inthe enemy’s rear areas often do not allow air-crews to perform a visual reconnaissance of theflight routes or objective area. Planners must relyon detailed map studies, photographs, and otherimagery to formulate their plans.

Exploitation

Exploitation is an offensive operation undertakento follow up success in the attack. During theexploitation phase, assault support aircraft maybe used to maintain constant pressure on theenemy by providing mobility and logistical sup-port to the exploitation force, allowing it to seizekey terrain or engage high-payoff targets such ascommand posts or support units deep in theenemy’s rear area. Two chief characteristics ofexploitation are speed and violence.

Pursuit

A pursuit is an operation to catch or cut off a hos-tile force attempting to escape, in order to destroyit. Pursuit forces trap and destroy the retreatingenemy with coordinated maneuver and fire.Assault support aircraft can be used to bypassresistance and to deliver forces to seize objectivesthat are chokepoints for the retreating enemy. Ahelicopterborne force can cut off the enemy and

delay its retreat so that coordinated fires fromcombined arms can destroy it.

One of the best examples of assault support air-craft use during offensive operations is Opera-tion Dewey Canyon, conducted during theVietnam war in the upper A Shau Valley andsouthern Da Krong Valley from 22 Januarythrough 14 March 1969. This was a multi-battal-ion operation involving the 9th Marine Regimentand two battalions of the 1st South VietnameseArmy Division.

On D-day, 22 January 1969, initial LZs were pre-pared by fixed-wing air strikes. The first land-ings occurred at 0800. In the rapid buildup thatfollowed, CH-46s, under a protective umbrella ofgunships and observation aircraft, brought 1,544Marines and 46 tons of cargo into two LZs. Bythe evening of 24 January, a battery of 105 milli-meter (mm) howitzers were in place.

Over the next two months, the Marines conducteda series of leap-frogging maneuvers with helicop-ters to establish multiple fire support bases in theA Shau Valley. During Dewey Canyon, Marinehelicopters flew 14,893 sorties for 5,050 flighthours, moved 3,515 tons of cargo, and lifted21,841 troops.

During the March 1969 withdrawal from theA Shau, more than 350 tons of cargo and 1,400Marines were transported out of two fire baseswithout a casualty. Perhaps the most notable itemof the operation was that only one helicopter waslost in spite of adverse weather and a determinedenemy.

Defensive

Defensive operations are often less decisive thanoffensive operations. The defense is a force’scoordinated effort to defeat an attacker and pre-vent the attacker from achieving their objectives.An effective defense is never passive. Command-ers may assume the defense in one area in order

Assault Support _________________________________________________________________________________________________ 3-3

to mass forces in another area. Commanders con-duct the defense only until they can resume theoffensive. The ACE’s role in defensive opera-tions requires that the inherently offensive func-tional capabilities of Marine aviation focus onoperations and maneuvers that benefit from anaircraft’s speed, mobility, and flexibility. TheACE is no less dynamic in defensive operationsthan in the offense and continuously seeks to cre-ate and exploit opportunities to defeat the enemy.

During defensive operations, the commanderorganizes the battlespace into three areas in whichthe defending force performs specific functions.See figure 3-1. These areas can be further dividedinto sectors. A defensive sector is an area assignedto a subordinate commander. In the commander’ssector, the subordinate commander is providedmaximum latitude to accomplish his defensiveoperations. The three sectors are the security area,the main battle area (MBA), and the rear area. Ahelicopterborne force can defend against an infan-try-heavy threat by using the helicopter’s mobil-ity to achieve a maneuver advantage over theenemy. This allows the helicopterborne force tooperate in the security area, MBA or rear area.Fixed-wing assault support functions in thedefense are typically aerial refueling, air evacua-tion, and air logistical support.

Security Area Actions in the security area are designed todeceive the enemy on the location of the MBA,cause the enemy to deploy early into attack for-mations, and make the enemy vulnerable to theeffects of combined arms. Assault support air-craft can move engineers and equipment into andout of the securi ty area in support of theMAGTF’s barrier plan. They can provide mobil-ity for reconnaissance teams or fire support teamsplaced in front of the MBA. Battlefield illumina-tion employed in the security area can expose anenemy entering the security area.

Main Battle Area

The MBA is where the MAGTF fights the deci-sive battle. It extends rearward from the forwardedge of the battle area (FEBA) to the sectorsgiven to the unit’s subordinate elements. Thehelicopterborne force’s superior mobility allowsthe commander to defend in greater scope. Itfights a series of battles in depth, attacking fromthe front, flanks, and rear while using minimalforces to maintain surveillance over the rest ofthe assigned sector. Battle positions throughoutthe MBA should be selected and prepared alonglikely avenues of approach. Primary and alter-nate LZs and PZs should be selected for each bat-tle position, in order to facilitate the rapid verticalmovement of forces and supplies wherever andwhenever they are required.

XXX

Security Area

Main Battle Area

Rear Area

FEBA FEBA

Figure 3-1. Organization of the Battlespace.

3-4 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-24

Rear Area

The rear area extends forward from a com-mander’s rear boundary to the rear MBA ofresponsibility of the commander’s subordinateunits. The rear area is provided primarily for theperformance of combat service support functions.Assault support aircraft are normally employed totransport supplies and sustain operations of theMAGTF. Other functions of assault support air-craft in the rear area are transport of quick reac-t ion or reserve forces, sensor insert , andreconnaissance of potential infiltration points.

Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)

The post-Cold War world is a world in crisis. TheMarine Corps provides the Marine expeditionaryunit (special operations capable) (MEU[SOC]) toreact properly to these events. This MAGTF iscontinuously forward deployed to react quickly tocrises. The MEU(SOC) possesses specific mari-time capabilities based on its expeditionary andamphibious nature. These capabilities are arefinement of the traditional capabilities ofMarine forces afloat. These capabilities makethem far more useful as forward-deployed forcescapable of dealing with a wider range of contin-gency and crisis response situations.

The mission of the MEU(SOC) is to provide thegeographic combatant commanders the capabil-ity to conduct conventional amphibious andselected maritime special operations at night, dur-ing adverse weather, from over the horizon,under emission control (EMCON) conditions,from the sea, and by surface or air. Due to theirunique training and focus, MEU(SOC) forces arecapable of commencing mission execution within6 hours of notification. Assault support plays animportant role in these missions and providesdirect action support or intelligence gathering forthe MAGTF. The ACE, especially in MEU(SOC)operations, brings a significant amount of fire-

power to the baseline MAGTF. Inherently lightand expeditionary in nature, the MEU(SOC)gains from the ACE the mobility and responsivefire support necessary in small-scale, rapidly exe-cuted evolutions. Within most MEU(SOC) mis-sions, assault support plays a significant role indeployment and sustainment of the force.

The MEU(SOC) ACE is built around a Marinemedium helicopter squadron (HMM), rein-forced with utility, attack, heavy-lift assault sup-port helicopters, and fixed-wing attack aircraft.It often includes additional fixed-wing assaultsupporting transport aircraft (shore based). TheMEU(SOC) ACE is normally task-organized toprovide assault support, OAS, limited antiairwarfare, control of aircraft and missiles, EW,and aerial reconnaissance.

The inherent capabilities of a forward-deployedMEU(SOC) are divided into four broad catego-ries: amphibious operations, direct action opera-t ions, mil i tary operat ions other than war(MOOTW), and supporting operations. MarineCorps Order (MCO) 3120.9B, Policy for MarineExpeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capa-ble) ([MEU[SOC]), for more information.

Amphibious Operations

Amphibious operations include amphibiousassaults, raids, demonstrations, and withdrawals.They can be conducted on short notice, at night,under EMCON conditions via helicopter and/orsurface means over extended ranges. Amphibi-ous operations are discussed in greater detail inchapter 4.

Limited Scale Raids

Limited scale raids (LSRs) are the capability toconduct short-duration strikes and small-scaleoffensive action. TRAP is an example of themany operations that make up this category. Pre-cision raids, ambushes, and direct assault usingclose-quarter battle skills are all tactics used dur-ing LSR.

Assault Support _________________________________________________________________________________________________ 3-5

TRAP is a LSR that satisfies the JCS require-ment that each branch of the armed forces main-tain its own SAR capability. SAR is defined as aspecialized task performed by rescue forces toeffect the recovery of isolated personnel from ahostile environment during wartime or contin-gency operations. Recognizing the unique envi-r o n m e n t s o f m a r i t i m e a n d a m p h i b i o u soperations, the Marine Corps fulfi l ls thisrequirement with TRAP.

TRAP is part of the assault support planningchecklist and is usually planned as part of a heli-copterborne assault. Aircraft and crew are usu-ally earmarked for TRAP as either dedicated oras on call to be flown by an aircraft conductingthe combat assault support.

A TRAP is a LSR that relies on specific and flex-ible force packaging designed to defeat the threat,protect the force, and successfully recover iso-lated personnel without any loss to the package.

Military Operations Other Than War

Included in MOOTW are NEOs, foreign humani-tarian assistance (FHA), and disaster relief. Theseoperations focus on deterring war, resolving con-flict, promoting peace, and supporting civilauthorities in response to domestic crises. TheACE can provide air logistical support by movingsupplies and personnel throughout the operationsarea.

MOOTW include many situations that challengea commander. Assault support operations pro-vide the commander with many options in meet-ing these challenges.

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

NEOs are characterized by uncertainty. Noncom-batants may include United States (US) citizens,US military personnel, citizens of countriesfriendly to the US or third country nationals(TCNs). The Department of State plans for evac-uations of US citizens and TCN. The Depart-ment of State also determines when that plan willbe executed.

NEOs require the commander to consider thingsnot usually associated with offensive or amphibi-ous operations. A NEO is similar to a raid. Thereis a rapid insertion followed by a planned with-drawal. The use of minimal forces to providesecurity for the evacuation forces and evacuees isimportant. Diplomatic considerations signifi-cantly influence the execution of a NEO. Situa-tions may change as the NEO is conducted,depending on the political situation within thecountry and the threat. A NEO may take place ina permissive, uncertain or hostile environment.

Permissive environments are characterized by lit-tle or no resistance from the host nation or itsarmed forces. ACE participation is minimal in apermissive environment, and noncombatants maydepart the country via civil airline traffic. Mili-tary assistance, in the form of security forces,may be the primary focus of the NEO.

The degree of danger to the noncombatants isthe concern in an uncertain environment. Thehost nation’s military forces may be supportiveof, neutral to or opposed to the NEO. Assaultsupport operations may be the only ACE partic-ipation due to political sensitivities. Innovativeplanning is necessary to ensure that fire sup-port assets can support the NEO should the situ-ation deteriorate.

A hostile environment can be characterized bycivil unrest or full scale war. ACE participationcan be expected to be at a maximum to insertcombat forces, conduct convoy escort, and pro-vide fire support.

Typically, MEU(SOC) units have conductedNEOs. The example of Operation FrequentWind illustrates that NEOs may require a largerforce to accomplish the mission.

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance OperationsAssault support is especially important in FHAoperations. A force larger than a MEU(SOC) maybe involved in FHA operations. Usually, a jointtask force (JTF) will be tasked with the execution

3-6 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-24

of the relief effort. In a disaster, transportationinfrastructures (roads, bridges or railways) maybe damaged or destroyed. This will hinder evacu-ating and assisting the affected population.

The MAGTF uses assault support assets to movehomeless or injured evacuees to safe areas and todeliver food, medicine, and other vital supplies.The following factors should be considered whenplanning a disaster relief operation:

Language problems.Coordination with local authorities.Special medical requirements of evacuees.Environmental conditions.

Supporting Operations Supporting operations may include tacticaldeception operations, JTF enabling force opera-tions, and port and airfield seizures. All of theseoperations are in support of larger operations.

CHAPTER 4COMMAND AND CONTROL IN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

An amphibious operation is a military operationlaunched from the sea by an amphibious forceembarked in ships and craft with the primary pur-pose of introducing the landing force ashore toaccomplish the assigned mission. Amphibiousoperations may include assaults, raids, demon-strations, and withdrawals. Refer to Joint Publica-tion (JP) 3-02, Joint Doctrine for AmphibiousOperations, for more information.

Assault support provides the landing force withthe ability to rapidly focus and project decisivecombat power ashore, and provides the MAGTFthe speed, mobility, and flexibility necessary toaccomplish the mission.

Assault support transport helicopters used in theship-to-shore movement are subordinate land-ing force elements. The ACE executes the ship-to-shore movement according to the landingplan. The plan includes arrangements for shift-ing control of aviation operations to the com-mander, landing force (CLF) when the situationashore permits.

Navy Tactical Air Control System

During the ship-to-shore movement, the com-mander, amphibious task force (CATF) coordi-nates and controls air operations through theNavy tactical air control center (TACC). Withinthe Navy TACC, the helicopter coordination sec-tion (HCS) coordinates helicopter operations. Seefigure 4-1.

The HCS decentralizes control of the helicoptership-to-shore movement to the helicopter direc-tion center (HDC). The HDC is aboard shipscapable of handling helicopter operations. TheHDC coordinates all assault support helicopter

operations through the TACC. The HDC main-tains continuous radar surveillance of aircraftoperating in its assigned control area.

The plan for ship-to-shore movement is verydetailed and jointly developed. It requires precisecoordination and timing. MCWP 3-31.5, Ship-to-Shore Movement, covers this information ingreater detail.

As soon as practical, the CLF establishes air con-trol facilities ashore. This extends the amphibi-ous force’s aviat ion control capabil i t ies ,increases surveillance, and accelerates response.Initially, air control agencies ashore operate in astandby status and monitor all air control cir-cuits. The CATF and CLF decide when to trans-fer control from agencies afloat to agenciesashore. The transfer may be sequential as func-tions of the MACCS become operational. Con-t ro l agencies af loa t cont inue to moni torcommunications circuits and are capable ofresuming control, if required.

CATF

TACC

HDC

ATCS HCS ASCS AAWS PSS

LEGEND:

AAWS = Antiair Warfare Section

ASCS = Air Support Control Section

ATCS = Air Traffic Control Section

HCS = Helicopter Coordination Section

HDC = Helicopter Direction Center

PSS = Preplanned Support Section

Figure 4-1. Navy Tactical Air Control System.

4-2 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-24

Marine Air Command and Control System

The Navy TACC controls all aviation assets,while afloat, in support of CLF. Once control ispassed from CATF to CLF, the Marine tacticalair command center (TACC) and its other subor-dinate agencies manage MAGTF aviation assets.The Marine TACC is the senior MACCS agencyand provides centralized command and directionof subordinate activities. See figure 4-2. TheNavy TACC then becomes a tactical air directioncenter (TADC) and assumes a monitoring status.Other aviation control agencies follow.

Tactical Air Direction Center

During the buildup of landing force combatpower ashore, the CLF establishes a MarineTADC to act as a coordinating agency betweenthe other MACCS agencies and the Navy TACCafloat. The TADC is identical in organization,capabilities, and facilities to the Marine TACC.The TADC remains subordinate to the NavyTACC until control of aviation has been passedashore. The Navy TACC afloat then becomes aTADC subordinate to the Marine TACC.

Tactical Air Operations Center

The tactical air operations center (TAOC) isunder the operational control of the MarineTACC. The sector air defense facility (SADF) isan extension of the TAOC. The TAOC is the pri-mary AAW agency of the MACCS. It detects,identifies, and controls the intercept of hostile air-craft and missiles and provides airspace manage-ment and operational assistance. The TAOC canperform limited TACC functions.

Direct Air Support Center

The direct air support center (DASC) is the aircontrol agency of the MACCS primarily respon-sible for the direction and procedural control ofair operations directly supporting the MAGTF’sGCE. It processes and coordinates requests forimmediate air support and coordinates air mis-sions requiring integration with ground forcesand other supporting arms. The DASC is usuallythe first principal MACCS agency ashore. Itfunctions in a decentralized mode of operation,but is directly supervised by the TACC.

The DASC is established by the Marine air supportsquadron (MASS) and processes immediaterequests for air support, coordinates aircraftemployment with other supporting arms, managesterminal control assets such as forward air control-ler (airborne) (FAC[A]) and assault support coor-dinator (airborne) (ASC[A]) supporting groundforces, and provides procedural control of assigned

ACE

Commander

TACC

TAOC/

SADFMATCD MMT

EW/C

For

Base

Defense

LAAD Units

Other Air Defense Units

DASC

DASC(A) ASE

FAC(A) TAC(A)

ASC(A) TACP

HSTCoordination

Command

LEGEND:

ASC(A) = assault support coordination (airborne)

ASE = air support element

DASC = direct air support center

DASC(A) = direct air support center (airborne)

EW/C = early warning/control

FAC(A) = forward air controller (airborne)

HST = helicopter support team

MATCD = Marine air traffic control detachment

TACP = tactical air control party

TAOC = tactical air operations center/sector air

defense facility

Figure 4-2. Marine Air Command and Control System.

Assault Support _________________________________________________________________________________________________ 4-3

aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), anditinerant aircraft transiting through its assignedarea. The DASC can employ a DASC (airborne)(DASC[A]) aboard a KC-130 and provideextended line of sight communications with lowflying aircraft. The DASC will normally be collo-cated or electronically linked with the senior firesupport coordination agency ashore.

In a Marine expeditionary force (MEF) operationwith multiple maneuver elements (divisions)within the GCE, the DASC may be located withthe MAGTF force fires coordination center(FFCC). This location will centralize the manage-ment of close air support (CAS) and assault sup-port aircraft between the GCE maneuver element,and meet the commander’s intent for maneuverand fire support.

The DASC will usually deploy air support ele-ments (ASEs) to each major maneuver elementFSCC, to provide it with the necessary links tothe MACCS, in order to request and coordinatedirect air support (DAS). The ASE size and com-position will vary and can be expanded orreduced as the current situation requires (consis-tent with the assets available). The DASC onlyhas the capability to provide “procedural con-trol” for aircraft operating in its area. In amphibi-ous operations, the DASC will normally land inthe same scheduled or on-call wave as the seniorfire support coordination agency phased ashore.

Several employment options are available forthe DASC, including an airborne configurationin a KC-130. MASS assets are tailored to pro-vide support based on the mission. A MEFcould require a task organization that uses theassets of more than one MASS. At the MEUlevel, a MASS detachment is task-organized asan ASE, and its capability is reduced due to itssize. The size and capability of the MEF DASCdepend on the number of units that request airsupport and the number of aircraft that executeair support missions.

The DASC maintains communications connectivitywith the other MACCS agencies, the FSCC, FFCC,

aircraft under its control, UAV squadron(s), andjoint and other Service air support organizations.The DASC also requires connectivity with for-ward-based air assets to request launch in supportof ground forces. See MCWP 3-25.5, Direct AirSupport Center Handbook, for more information.The DASC operates through the following air con-trol organizations.

Tactical Air Control Party A tactical air control party (TACP) is a subordi-nate operational component of a tactical air con-trol system designed to provide air liaison to landforces and for the control of aircraft. (JP 1-02) Itis located within the GCE and provides groundcommanders with the means to access DAS. Inthe Marine Corps, TACPs are organic to infantrydivisions, regiments, battalions, and other com-bat arms units. TACPs establish and maintainfacilities for liaison and communications betweenparent units and airspace control agencies, informand advise the ground unit commander on theemployment of supporting aircraft, and requestand control air support. The TACP is a MACCSagency, but administratively it is not part of theMarine air control group.

Tactical Air Coordinator (Airborne)A tactical air coordinator is an officer who coor-dinates, from an aircraft, the actions of other air-craft engaged in air support of ground or seaforces. (JP 1-02) Within the MACCS, the tacticalair coordinator (airborne) (TAC[A]) is a navalaviator or naval flight officer and the senior aircoordinator having air authority over aircraftoperating in the assigned area. The primary mis-sion of the TAC(A) is to act as an airborne exten-sion of the DASC, TACC or FSCC, and tocontribute to coordination among the TACPs,FAC(As), and the fire direction of artillery andnaval gunfire.

Forward Air Controller (Airborne)A FAC(A) is a specifically trained and quali-fied aviation officer who exercises control fromthe air of aircraft engaged in close air support of

4-4 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-24

ground troops. The FAC(A) is normally an air-borne extension of the tactical air control party.(JP 1-02) Within the Marine Corps, the FAC(A)is a naval aviator or flight officer who is specifi-cally trained, qualified, and designated to per-form air reconnaissance and surveillance,conduct terminal control of aircraft engaged inOAS operations, control artillery and naval sur-face fire support missions, act as a radio relay,and control LZ preparations.

Assault Support Coordinator (Airborne) An ASC(A) is an aviator who coordinates, froman aircraft, the movement of aviation assets dur-ing assault support operations. (MCRP 5-12C)The ASC(A) is an experienced aviator withextensive knowledge of the MACCS who acts asan airborne extension of the DASC. The ASC(A)

assists in providing situational awareness to theassault force, relays requests to the DASC, exer-cises launch authority for immediate and on-callmissions, coordinates with the TAC(A), and pro-vides routing recommendations to the air mis-sion commander.

Helicopter Support Team

A helicopter support team is a task organizationformed and equipped for employment in an LZ tofacilitate the landing and movement of helicop-terborne troops, equipment and supplies, and toevacuate selected casualties and enemy prisonersof war. (JP 1-02) Within the Marine Corps, heli-copter support teams (HSTs) are accessed fromthe force service support group, specifically, thelanding support company of the support battalion.

APPENDIX AAIRCRAFT CAPABILITIES GUIDE

This ready reference of MAGTF aircraft should only be used for initial operational planning. Aircraftperformance is affected by many variables such as temperature, atmospheric pressure, humidity, wind,aircraft configuration, and mission requirements. Specific performance parameters are calculated forevery mission. Detailed mission planning requires close liaison with the ACE and use of appropriateoperations and tactical manuals.

CH-46E

Dimensions

Height 16 ft, 8 in

Weight 16,500 lbs (empty)24,300 lbs (maximum gross weight)

Rotor diameter 51 ft

Length 84 ft, 4 in

Airspeed

Maximum endurance 70 knots indicated air speed (KIAS)

Maximum range 110 to 130 KIAS

Maximum airspeed 145 KIAS

Fuel Capacity

Pounds 4,488

Gallons 660

Endurance

Payloads 4,300 lbs12 passengers (PAX)

Endurance 2 + 55 hours

Weapons Systems

Guns 2 X 50 caliber XM 218

Other Systems

GPS navigation Miniature Airborne GPS Receiver (MAGR) System

Communications Equipment

Very high frequency (VHF)/ultrahigh fre-quency (UHF)

12 X AN/ARC-210 w/KY-58 encryption device (CNCS config-ured aircraft only)

Aircraft Survivability Equipment

RWR AN/APR-39(V)1 radar warning receiver

IRCM AN/ALQ-157 infrared jammer

Expendables AN/ALE-39 countermeasuresdispenser

Missile warning AN/AAR-47 missilewarning system

A-2 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-24

CH-53CH-53D

CH-53E

Dimensions

Height 24 ft, 11 in

Empty weight 27,000 lbs

Rotor diameter 72 ft, 3 in

Length 88 ft, 6 in

Maximum gross weight 42,000 lbs

Airspeed

Maximum endurance 70 KIAS

Maximum airspeed 130 KIAS

Fuel Capacity

Pounds 13,178

Gallons 1,938

Endurance

Payload 37 PAX8,000 lbs internal

Typical 3 + 00 hours

Best case 5 + 30 hours

Weapons Systems

Guns 2 X 50 caliber XM 218

Communications Equipment

High frequency (HF) 1 X AN/ARC-94 or AN/ARC-174

UHF/VHF 2 X AN/ARC-182 w/KY-58 encryption device or 2 X AN/ARC-210 w/KY-58 encryption device

Aircraft Survivability Equipment

RWR AN/APR-39(V)1 radar warning receiver

IRCM AN/ALQ-157

Missile warning AN/AAR-47 missilewarning system

Dimensions

Height 24 ft, 4 in

Empty weight 36,000 lbs

Rotor diameter 79 ft

Length 100 ft

Maximum gross weight 73,500 lbs

Airspeed

Normal cruise airspeed 135 KIAS

Maximum airspeed 150 KIAS

Assault Support _________________________________________________________________________________________________ A-3

CH-53E (Continued)

Fuel Capacity

Pounds 15,000

Gallons 2,277

EndurancePayload 37 to 55 PAX

20,000 lbs internal

Typical 4 + 00 hours

Best case Indefinite with aerial refueling

Weapons Systems

Same as CH-53D

Other Systems

FLIR AN/AAQ-16B

Communications Equipment

Same as CH-53D

Aircraft Survivability Equipment

RWR Same as CH-53D

IRCM None

Missile warning Same as CH-53D

A-4 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-24

UH-IN

Dimensions

Height 13 ft,1 in

Empty weight 100 lbs (empty); 105,000 lbs (maximum gross weight)

Rotor diameter 48 ft

Length 57 ft, 4 in

Fuselage width 9 ft, 4.5 in

Airspeed

Maximum endurance 55 to 60 KIAS

Maximum airspeed 130 KIAS

Fuel Capacity

Pounds 1,329 internal; 1,020 additional w/auxiliary fuel cells (2 maximum)

Gallons 195; 150 additional w/auxiliary fuel cells (2 maximum)

Endurance

Best Case 1 + 30 (internal fuel only; 1,300 lbs gear/ordnance/PAX) 2 + 20 (1/2 auxiliary fuel cell; 900 lbs gear/ordnance/PAX) 3 + 10 (full auxil-iary fuel cell; 400 lbs gear/ordnance/PAX)

Worst case 1 + 15 (internal fuel only; 1,300 lbs gear/ordnance/PAX) 2 + 00 (1/2 auxiliary fuel cell; 900 lbs gear/ordnance/PAX) 2 + 45 (full auxil-iary fuel cell)

Weapons Systems

Guns M240D

Rockets 2.75 in folding-fin aerial rockets (FFARs)

Other Systems

GPS navigation Doppler GPS Naviga-tion System (control display navigation unit configured aircraft only)

FLIR AN/AAQ-22 Navigation FLIR with laser range finder and designator on 22D Miscellaneous ULQ-19 satellite com-munications (SATCOM) (nondemand assigned multiple access)

Communications Equipment

VHF/UHF 3 X AN/ARC-210 w/KY-58 encryption device (SATCOM available on one radio only)

Aircraft Survivability Equipment

RWR APR-39(V) 2

Infrared countermea-sures (IRCM) AN/ALQ-144

Expendables AN/ALE-39 counter-measures dispenser

Missile warning AN/AAR-47 missilewarning system

Laser warning AN/AVR-2

Assault Support _________________________________________________________________________________________________ A-5

AH-1W

DimensionsHeight 13 ft, 9 in

Weight 10,500 lbs (empty) 14,750 lbs (maximum gross weight)

Rotor diameter 48 ft

Length 58 ft

Fuselage width 3 ft, 7 in

AirspeedMaximum endurance 72 KIAS

Maximum speed 190 KIAS170 KIAS (w/wing stores)

Fuel CapacityPounds 2,037

Gallons 304

EndurancePayload 2,250 lbs (in addition to

full internal fuel)

Typical 2.3 hours

Best Case 2.6 hours 4.6 hours (with 2 auxiliary fuel tanks)

Worst case 1.8 hours 3.6 hours (with 2 auxiliary fuel tanks)

Weapons Systems

Missiles BGM-71 A/A-1/C/D/E/E-5B TOW AGM-114A/B/C/K Hellfire AGM-122A Sidearm AIM-9L/M Sidewinder

Guns M240D

Rockets 2.75 in folding-fin aerial rockets (FFARs)

Guns 20mm turret (+110 AZM,+30 elevation -50 degrees) 20mm ammo (MK 50 series, PGU 27/28/31 series)

Rockets LAU-61/68 2.75 in-rock-ets, 7 or 19 shot pod LAU-10, 5 in-rocket, 4 shot pod

Typical mix:AAW 2 X AIM-9, 2.75-in flechette, 20mm gun

OAS Hellfire, TOW, 5-in rockets, internal gun

Armed reconnaissance (RECCE Hellfire, TOW, 275-in rockets, internal gun (sidearm)

EscortSidewinder, 2.75-in RP/high exposive (HE), internal gun, TOW/Hellfire

FAC(A) Hellfire, TOW, 2.75 in-RP, internal gun

A-6 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-24

AH-1W (Continued)

Other Systems

GPS navigation Embedded GPS/INS(1686 upgrade)

FLIR Night targeting system

Laser Pulsed, 1064 nm, neodymiun: YAG; laser designator and ranging system.

Closed circuit televi-sion (TV)

TV camera

Videocassette recorder Super VHS and VHS recording capability

Optics Direct view

Communications Equipment

VHF/UHF 2 X AN/ARC-182 w/KY-58 encryption device

Aircraft Survivability Equipment

RWR AN/APR-39V(2) radar warning receiver (pulsed) AN/APR-44 radar warning receiver (continuous wave)

IRCM AN/ALQ-144

Expendables AN/ALE-39 counter-measures dispenser

Assault Support _________________________________________________________________________________________________ A-7

AV-8B

Models

AV-8B Day Attack dual mode tracker (DMT); AV-8B night attack (NVD/FLIR); AV-8B II + RADAR

Dimensions

Height 11 ft, 8 in

Weight 4,600 lbs (empty) 39,000 lbs mixed gross weight

Wingspan 30 ft, 3 in

Airspeed

Maximum endurance 230 KIAS

Maximum airspeed 585 knots calibrated airspeed (KCAS)/1.0 indicated Mach num-ber (IMN)

Fuel CapacityPounds 7,759 internal;

11,749 with 2 external drop tanks; 830 with 4 external drop tanks

Endurance

Varies significantly with ordnance load and mis-sion profile.

Communications Equipment

VHF/UHF 2 X RT-1250A/ARC with KY-58 encryption device

Weapons SystemsGuns GAU-12 25mm gunRockets 2.75 and 5 in-HE-

FRAG, antitank/APERS HEGP, WP, red phos-phorous (RP), ILLUM, and chaff

Bombs Mk 81, Mk 82, Mk 83 Mk 20 Rockeye, MK 77 Napalm GBU-12, GBU-16 LGB CBU-72 FAE, CBU-78 Gator

Missiles AGM-65E Laser Maver-ick AGM-65F IR Maverick (night attack only) AGM-122 Side-arm AIM-9 Sidewinder

Miscellaneous LUU-2A/B Illuminum flares, Mk 58 Marine location marker

Other SystemsGPS navigation Integrated P-coded

GPS targeting systemFLIR 1 power navigation

FLIRDual mode tracker laser spot tracker with 6

power TV videoCamera VTR head-up display

(HUD)/dual-mode tracker recorder

Litening pod Targeting FLIRLaser designator/range finderIR markerDay cameraLaser spot trackerVideo recorder

Aircraft Survivability EquipmentRWR AN/ALR-67 radar warn-

ing receiverDefensive electronic countermeasures (DECM)

AN/ALQ-164 DECM system

Expendables AN/ALE-39 counter-measures dispenser

A-8 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-24

F/A-18

Dimensions

Height 15 ft, 3 in

Weight 24,500 lbs (empty) 59,000 lbs (maximum T/O)

Wingspan 40 ft, 5 in

Airspeed

Maximum endurance 250 KIAS (approximate)

Maximum airspeed 750 KIAS (Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standard-ization) 650 KIAS (sea level)

Fuel Capacity

Pounds 13,000 (10,800 inter-nal, 2,200 centerline tank)

Gallons 1,919 (1,589 internal, 330 centerline tank)

EnduranceTypical 1.5 hours

Best case 2.75 hours

Worst case 12 minutes

Hi Hi Hi profile with centerline tank 2.75 hours

Weapons SystemsGuns 20mm internal gunRockets LAU-10 (5-in rockets)

LAU-51 (2.75-in rock-ets)LAU-61 (2.75 (2.75-in rockets)

Radar APG-65 and APG- 73 multimode radar

Missiles AGM-65E Laser Maver-ick AGM-65F IR Maverick (night attack only) AGM-122 Side-arm AIM-9 Sidewinder

Miscellaneous AGM-65E Laser Maver-ickAGM-65F IR MaverickAGM-88 HARMWalleye I/IIAIM-7 SparrowAIM-9 SidewinderAIM-120 AMRAAM

BombsMk 80 seriesMk 20 Rockeye, GBU-10/12/16CBU-59, antiperson-nel, antimaterialCBU-78 Gator, Mk 77 NapalmMk 36, Mk 40, Mk 4(Destructors)Mk 52, Mk 55, Mk 56(Bottom/Moored Mines)Mk 62, Mk 63, Mk 64, Mk 65(Quickstrike Mines)

Miscellaneous Tactical air-launch decoy

Typical mix:Air-to-air

2 AIM-9, 2 to 4, AIM-120 6 second 20mm

Air-to-ground 4 to 8 Mk 82 or2 to 4 Mk 832 AIM-9, 2 AIM-120

Assault Support _________________________________________________________________________________________________ A-9

F/A 18 (Continued)

Other Systems

FLIRAN/AAS-38 target FLIRAN/AAR-50 navigation FLIR(F/A-18C/D only

Laser AN/AS-1 73 laser spot tracker

Onboard recordingHUD recorder, digital display indicator (DDI) selectable AN/ASQ-1 73 35mm strike camera

Communications EquipmentVHF/UHF 2 X AN/ARC-20 w/KY-

58 encryption device

Aircraft Survivability EquipmentRWR AN/ALR-67 radar warn-

ing receiver

DECM2 X ALQ-126B AN/ALQ-167 (tactical con-tingency pod)

Expendables AN/ALE-47 counter-measures dispenser

A-10 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-24

EA-6B ICAP 2

Dimensions

Height 16 ft, 8 in

Weight 34,000 lbs (empty) 61,500 lbs (maximum T/O)

Wingspan 53 ft

Airspeed

Maximum endurance 53 to 55 IMN, aircraft configuration dependent

Maximum airspeed 86 IMN (tactical jam-ming system [TJS] pod limitation)

Fuel Capacity

Pounds 25,400 total; 15,400 internal, 10,000 external

Gallons 3,768 total; 2,268 inter-nal, 1500 external

Endurance

Varies greatly depending on aircraft configuration and mission profile; typical pod and external fuel load will result in approximately 1 hour and 45 minutes loiter without aerial refueling.

Hi Lo Lo Hi profile with 4 X TJS pods

425 nm mission radius

Weapons SystemsJammers 5 X AN/ALQ-99 tactical

jamming podsRadar AN/APS-130 ground

mapping radarMissiles AGM-88 HARMMiscellaneous AN/ALE- 43 corridor

chaff pod AN/ALQ-99 onboard receiver system

Typical mix: Load based on enemy order of battle and threat; typical load will be 3 to 4 tactical jam-ming pods, 1 to 2 AGM-88 or external fuel tanks

Other SystemsOn-board recording AN/ALQ-99 onboard/

TJS recorder

Miscellaneous UHF/VHF, AM/FM regency scannerUSQ-113 communica-tions jammer

Communications EquipmentHF 1 X AN/ARC-199

VHF/UHF2 X AN/ARC-210 w/KY-58 encryption devices

Aircraft Survivability Equipment

RWR None

DECM 2 X ALQ-167 AN/ALQ-167 tactical contin-gency pod (training only)

Expendables AN/ALE-39 counter-measures dispenser

Assault Support _______________________________________________________________________________________________ A-11

KC-130 (MODELS F/R/T)

Dimensions

Height 38 ft, 4 in

Weight 90,000 lbs (empty)

Maximum gross weight 155,000 lbs(service life extension program [SLEP])135,000 lbs (non-SLEP)

Length 97 ft, 9 in

Wingspan 132 ft, 7 in

Airspeed

Maximum endurance 240 KIAS

Maximum airspeed 250 KIAS

Fuel Capacity

Takeoff fuel KC-130F 41,406 cargo65,831 tanker

KC-130R/T 59,606 cargo84,032 tanker

Endurance

Typical 13 hours

Aircraft Survivability Equipment

ALQ-157AAR-47AN/ALE-139, APR-39*Night Vision lighting*

*Only specially configured aircraft

Air Delivery of Cargo and Personnel

Container delivery system

Up to 16 bundles; 37,248 lbs

Military free fall 64 jumpers

Heavy equipmentVehicles, ammo, cargo (42,000 lbs)

Personnel static line 64 jumpers

Short Unimproved Airfield Operations

Size and strength of runway are performance/weight dependent. Standard is 3,500 ft by 60 ft.

Mission Profiles

DASC(A) capable, radio relay, battlefield illumination

Rapid Ground Refueling Flow Rates(lbs per minute)

Model Point In-Flightrefueling

Single Point

Refuelingpanel

Pod

AH-1W 1 59 34 49

2 54 29 44

CH-46 1 79 44 59

2 69 35 49

CH-53 1 66 40 56

2 56 31 46

A-12 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-24

KC-130 (Models F/R/T) (Continued)

Air Land Delivery of Cargo and Personnel Cargo-configured Airframe

Passengers Pallets Troops

0 6 0

92 1 76

72 2 44

52 3 33

41 4 32

24 5 16

70 litters with 6 attendants

74 litters with 2 attendants

Communications Equipment

VHF 2 X AN/AR126

UHF 2 X AN/ARC-159(V)1

HF 2 X AN/ARC-190

SATCOM*

DASC suite AN/UYQ-3A

Other SystemsRadar AN/APS 133 (weather,

ground, beacon IFF capable) INS GPS*Celestial Navigation*

* Some aircraft are configured to operate these systems

Tanker-configured Airframe

Passengers Pallets40 1

24 2

Aerial Refueling Transfer Rates(JP-5 at Standard Daytime Temperature)

1 receiver(lbs per minute)

2 receivers(lbs per minute)

F Cargo 980 490

R or T Cargo 1,020 510

F Tanker 2,040 2,040

R or T Tanker 2,040 2,040

Assault Support _______________________________________________________________________________________________ A-13

KC-130 (MODEL J)

Dimensions

Weight 88,500 cargo90,200 tanker

Maximum gross weight 155,000 lbs maximum normal175,000 maximum alternative

Length 97 ft, 9 in

Wingspan 132 ft, 7 in

Airspeed

Maximum endurance 150 KIAS at 20,000 ft weighing 120,000 lbs

Maximum airspeed Never exceed speed 320 KIAs at 13,000 ftNormal cruise 320 TAS (TAS is set for maxi-mum speed versus fuel flow)

Fuel Capacity

Cargo 58,356 lbs

Tanker 82,758 lbs

Aircraft Survivability Equipment

AN/AAR-47, AN/ALE-47, AN/ALR-56M, AN/ALR-157

Communications Equipment

VHF AN/ARC-222

UHF AN/ARC-164

HF AN/ARC-190

VHF/UHF AN/ARC-210

Other SystemsRadar LPCR-130J (weather,

ground mapping, mono-pulse ground mapping, beacon, skin paint, wind sheer)

INS/GPS EGI/radio solution with optional radar updates

Digital moving map

HUD

Glass cockpit

NotesThe aircraft has approximately 27% more power than the legacy aircraft.

Currently, the aircraft cannot serve as a DASC platform.

Maximum ceilings are considerably higher than those of the legacy airframes as are maximum airspeeds.

The aircraft has a much lower fuel flow, but that can only be realized by higher altitudes.

APPENDIX BASSAULT SUPPORT REQUEST FORM

BLOCK TITLE AND ELEMENTS EXPLANATION

SECTION I. MISSION REQUEST

1. UNIT CALLED Identifies the unit designation/call sign/preassigned number.

THIS IS Identifies the request originator by unit designator/call sign/preassigned number.

REQUEST NUMBER For preplanned missions, indicates the originator’s request number in series. For imme-diate missions, this number is a assigned by the DASC.

SENT Indicates the time and individual who transmitted the request.

2. REQUEST FOR Indicates whether request is for helicopter or fixed-wing support.

3. MISSION CATEGORIES

PREPLANNED:A. PrecedenceB. Priority

For preplanned requests, enter precedence (block A) and priority (block B). Precedence is stated numerically in descending order of importance, as determined by the requestor. Priority is expressed as shown below.

IMMEDIATE:C. Priority

For immediate requests, enter priority (block C). A precedence entry is not required for immediate requests because, by definition, all immediate requests are precedence #1.

Use the numerical designation below to determine priority (e.g., define the tactical situa-tion) for preplanned (block B) or immediate (block C).

1. Emergency. Missions which require immediate action and supersede all other catego-ries of mission priority.

2. Priority. Missions which require immediate action and supersede routine missions. For CASEVAC, use this category for patients who require specialized treatment not available locally and who are liable to suffer unnecessary pain or disability unless evac-uated with the least possible delay.

3. Routine. Missions which do not demand urgency in execution. For CASEVAC, use this category for patients who can be treated locally, but whose prognosis would bene-fit by evacuation with the least possible delay.

4. Urgent (for CASEVAC only). Evacuation of critically wounded, injured or ill personnel whose immediate evacuation is a matter of life or death.

RECEIVED Indicates the time and individual who received the request.

4. TYPE MISSION Indicates whether the mission is tactical or administrative.

5. MISSION IS Describes the mission to be performed. Check appropriate blocks 1 through 12 to iden-tify the mission to be performed. If block 12 (Remarks) is checked, enter an explanation.

6. PAYLOAD IS Describes the type and approximate amount of the payload to be transported. It is nec-essary to specify, even if a rough estimate, the number of troops. Otherwise ACE planner cannot determine what force is required-aircraft type/number. For internal cargo, include the dimensions of the largest item to be moved. For CASEVAC, indicate number of casualties in block 6A.

B-2 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-24

BLOCK TITLE AND ELEMENTS EXPLANATION

7. INSTRUCTIONS Indicates the time/coordinates of the PZ and DZ.

8. LZ DESCRIPTION Contains detailed information on the LZ.

9. LZ WILL BEA. UnmarkedB. Marked

Indicates if the LZ will be unmarked or marked. If the LZ will be marked, indicate the color.

10. LZ MARKED WITH Indentifies the type LZ marking.

11. COMMUNICATIONS Indentifies the call sign and frequency of PZ and DZ controllers.

12. REMARKS Allows the requestor to add other essential information not provided for in the request format. For CASEVAC, include type casualties/wounds, litter, ambulatory status, medi-cal attendant requirements or any other special considerations. If possible, medical personnel should provide a medical regulating code (MRC):

MC PediatricsMM Internal MedicineNP PsychiatrySB BurnsSC Spinal Cord InjurySG OB/GYNSO Orthopedic SurgerySS General SurgerySSC Thoracic SurgerySSM Maxillofacial SurgerySSN NeurosurgerySSO Opthamology InjurySSU Urology

ACKNOWLEDGEDBn/regtDivisionOther

Indicates that the request has been copied for concurrence by the GCE.

SECTION II. COORDINATION

13. NSFS NSFS coordination.

14. ARTILLERY Artillery coordination.

15. AIO/G-2/G-3 Air intelligence Officer, G-2, G-3 coordination.

16. ESCORT/AERIAL REFUELING Indicates if escort or aerial refueling support is required for the mission. Block A indi-cates support has been requested. Block B indicates TACC has assigned assets. After assets are assigned, the TACC enters the rest of the data.

17. REQUESTA. ApprovedB. Disapproved

Indicates the approval or disapproval of the request.

18. BY Indicates the individual who approved or disapproved the request.

19. REASON FOR DISAPPROVAL Self-explanatory.

20. RESTRICTIVE FIRE/AIR PLANA. Is NotB. Number

The restrictive fire/air plan refers to the airspace coordination area (ACA). An ACA is a three-dimensional block of airspace where friendly aircraft are reasonably safe from friendly surface fires. A plan number or code name is issued, as appropriate.

21. IS IN EFFECTA. From Time _______B. To Time ______

Establishes the time period that the ACA plan will be in effect.

Assault Support _________________________________________________________________________________________________ B-3

BLOCK TITLE AND ELEMENTS EXPLANATION

22. LOCATIONA. From Coordinates ______B. To Coordinates ______

Grid coordinates of the start/end points of the ACA centerline.

23. WIDTH (METERS) Defines the ACA from either side of the centerline.

24. ALTITUDE/VERTEXA. Max/Vertex ______B. Minimum ______

ACA in feet above mean sea level. Use block A for VERTEX only.

SECTION III. MISSION DATA

25. MISSION NUMBER Indicates mission number.

26. CALL SIGN Flight call sign of mission aircraft.

27 NO/TYPE AIRCRAFT Self-explanatory.

28. EST/ACT TAKEOFF Estimated or actual time the mission aircraft will take off.

29. ETA/ATA Estimated or actual time of arrival of the mission air-craft in the objective area.

30. MISSION CANCELLED/DIVERTED Indicates if mission is cancelled or diverted. By ______ indicates the individual/agency/unit who cancelled or diverted the mission.

31. TERMINATE REQUEST Indicates conditions under which to terminate the request.

32. MISSION RESULTS Self-explanatory, include pilot reports.

B-4 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-24

Figure B-1. Assault Request Form.

ASSAULT SUPPORT REQUEST FORM

SECTION I — MISSION REQUEST DATE

1. UNIT CALLED THIS IS REQUEST NUMBER SENT

2. REQUEST FORA. HELICOPTERB. FIXED-WING

3. MISSION CATEGORIESA. PREPLANNED: PRECEDENCE __________B. PRIORITY __________C. IMMEDIATE: PRIORITY ________________

4. TYPE MISSIONA. TACTICALB . ADMINISTRATIVE

TIME BY

5. MISSION ISA. ASSAULT TRANSPORT G. TRAPB. LOGISTICAL SUPPORT H. SARC . AIR EVACUATION I. ILLUMINATION

D . MEDEVAC J. SPECIAL OPS

E. AERIAL DELIVERY K. OTHER __________

F. C2

6. PAYLOAD ISA. TROOPS __________________

B. EXTERNAL CARGO (WT) ____________________

C . INTERNAL CARGO (WT/CU) _________________

LARGEST ITEM (LxWxH) ________________

7. INSTRUCTIONS

PICKUP TIME COORDINATES LZ TIME COORDINATES

A. _______________________ __________________________________ ____________________________ _______________________________________B. _______________________ __________________________________ ____________________________ _______________________________________C. _______________________ __________________________________ ____________________________ _______________________________________D. _______________________ __________________________________ ____________________________ _______________________________________

8. LZ DESCRIPTION

A. WIND DIRECTION/VELOCITY _________________________________ B. ELEVATION _____________________________________________________ (FT MSL)C. SIZE _______________________________________________________ D. OBSTACLES _____________________________________________________________E. FRIENDLY POS _____________________________________________ DIR/DIST ______________________________/_________________________________F. ENEMY POS ________________________________________________ DIR/DIST ______________________________/_________________________________G. LAST FIRE RECEIVED TIME/TYPE _______________/______________ DIR/DIST ______________________________/_________________________________

9. LZ WILL BE A. UNMARKED 10. LZ MARKED WITH A. PANELS B. SMOKE C. FLARESB. MARKED WITH COLOR ____________ D. MIRROR E. LIGHTS F. NAVAID G. OTHER

11. COMMUNICATIONS A. PICKUP ZONE CALL SIGN _______________________________/FREQUENCY (COLOR CODE) _______________________________________B. LZ CALL SIGN _________________________________________/FREQUENCY (COLOR CODE)________________________________________

12. REMARKS ACKNOWLEDGED

BN/REGT

DIVISION

OTHER

SECTION II — COORDINATION

13. MSFS

16. ESCORT/AERIAL REFUELING A. REQUESTED B. ASSIGNEDC. NO/TYPE A/C _____________________________________________ D. CALL SIGN ____________________________________________________________E. COMMUNICATIONS_________________________________________ F. ARMAMENT ____________________________________________________________

17. REQUESTAPPROVED DISAPPROVED

19. REASON FOR DISAPPROVAL

20. RESTRICTIVE FIRE/AIR PLANA. IS NOT B. NUMBER

21. IS IN EFFECT A. (FROM TIME) ___________ B. (TO TIME) ___________

22. LOCATION A. _____________________ B. __________________

(FROM COORDINATES) (TO COORDINATES)

23. WIDTH (METERS) 24. ALTITUDE/VERTEX A. ___________ B. __________

MAX/VERTEX MINIMUM

SECTION III — MISSION DATA

25. MISSION NUMBER 26. CALL SIGN 27. NO/TYPE AIRCRAFT

28. EST/ACT TAKEOFF 29. ETA/ATA

30. MISSION CANCELLED/DIVERTED A. CANCELLED B. DIVERTED BY: _______________________________________

31. TERMINATE REQUEST A. GO/NO GO DTG ______________ B. WHEN COMPLETED ________________

32. MISSION RESULTS ACKNOWLEDGE

A. COMPLETE

B. INCOMPLETE

C. OTHER ____________________

APPENDIX CGLOSSARY

SECTION I. ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . antiaircraft artilleryAAW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . antiair warfareAAWS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . antiair warfare sectionACA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . airspace coordination areaACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . aviation combat elementAGM-65E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Maverick missileAGM-65F . . . Maverick imaging infrared missileAGM-88 . . . . . . high-speed antiradiation missileAGM-114 . . . . . . . Hellfire air-launched antitank

missileAGM-122A. . . . . . . . . . . Sidearm guided missileAH-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CobraAH-1W . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Super CobraAIM-7 . . . . . radar-guided, air-to-air missile with

high-explosive warhead (Sparrow)AIM-9/9L/9M . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sidewinder missileAIM-120 . . . . . . . . . . . advanced medium-range,

air-to-air missileAMRAAM . . . . . . . . . . advanced medium-range,

air-to-air missileAIO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . air intelligence officerAMC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . air mission commanderAN/AAQ-16B. . forward-looking infrared systemAN/AAQ-22 . . . . . SAFIRE navigational thermal

imaging system)AN/AAR-47 . . . . . . . . . . missile warning systemAN/AAR-50 . . . . thermal imaging navigation setAN/AAS-38 . . . . Terminator advanced targeting

forward-looking infrared podAN/ALE-39 . . . . . . . . . chaff and flare dispenserAN/ALE-43 . . . . . chaff cutter and dispenser podAN/ALE-139 . . . . . . . . .tactical jamming systemAN/ALQ-99 . . . . . . . . . .tactical jamming systemAN/ALQ-126B . . . . . . . . . . . deceptive electronic

countermeasures systemAN/ALQ-144 . . . . . . . . . . . . countermeasures setAN/ALQ-157 . . infrared countermeasures systemAN/ALQ-164 . . . . . radio frequency jammer podAN/ALQ-167 . . . . . . electronic countermeasures

noise and deception jamming system

AN/ALR-67 . . . . . . . . . . . radar warning receiverAN/APR-39(V)1/2 . . . . radar signal detecting setAN/APR-44 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . radar warning setAN/APS-130. . . . . . . . . . multimode search radarAN/APS-133. . . . . . . . . . . . weather radar systemAN/ARC-20 . . . . . . radio with/KY-58 encryption

deviceAN/ARC-94 . . . .single side band/high frequency

command transceiverAN/ARC-159(V)1 . . . . . . . . . ultrahigh radio setAN/ARC-174 . . . . . high frequency radio systemAN/ARC-182 . . . . very high frequency/ultrahigh

frequency radio systemAN/ARC-190 . . . high frequency liaison radio setAN/ARC-199 . . . . . . . . .high frequency radio setAN/ARC-210 . . . . . . . single-channel ground and

airborne radio systemAN/ASQ-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35mm strike cameraAN/AVR-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . laser detection systemAN/UYQ-3A. . . . . . . . . mobile direct air support

center (airborne)AO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . area of operationsAPAM. . . . . . . . . . . . . antipersonnel, antimaterialAPERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . antipersonnelAPG 65/73 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . multimode radarAPR/39(V)2 . . . . . . . . . radar signal detecting setARM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . antiradiation missileASC(A) . . . assault support coordinator (airborne)ASCS . . . . . . . . . . . . . air support control sectionASE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .air support elementASR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . assault support requestATCS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . air traffic control sectionATO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . air tasking orderAV-8B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Super Harrier

BGM-71A/A-1/C/D/E/E-5B . . . . tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided

antitank guided weapon

C2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .command and control

C-2 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-24

CAS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . close air supportCASEVAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . casualty evacuationCATF . . . . . . commander, amphibious task forceCBU-59. . . . . . .antipersonnel, antimaterial bombCBU-72. . . . . . . . . . 550-pound cluster bomb unit

(fuel/air explosive)CBU-78. . . . . . . . . . 500-pound cluster bomb unit

containing 45 antitank and15 antipersonnel mines (Gator)

CCTV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . closed circuit televisionCDNU . . . . . . . . . .control display navigation unitCH-46/46E . . . medium-assault transport aircraft

(Sea Knight)CH-53/53E/53D . . . . . . . .heavy-assault transport

aircraft (Sea Stallion)CLF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . commander, landing forceCNCS . . . . . communications/navigation control

systemCOA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .course of actionCSSE. . . . . . . . . .combat service support element

DAMA . . . . . . .demand assigned multiple accessDAO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Defense Attaché OfficeDAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . direct air supportDASC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . direct air support centerDASC(A) . . . direct air support center (airborne)DDI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . digital display indicatorDECM. . . . defensive electronic countermeasuresDMT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .dual mode trackerDZ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . drop zone

EA-6B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ProwlerEGI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . embedded GPS/INSEMCON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . emission controlEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .electronic warfare

F/A-18A/C/D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . HornetFAC(A) . . . . . . . forward air controller (airborne)FAE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . fuel/air explosiveFARP . . . . . . forward arming and refueling pointFEBA . . . . . . . . . .forward edge of the battle areaFFAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . folding-fin aerial rocketFFCC. . . . . . . . . . . force fires coordination centerFHA . . . . . . . . . . foreign humanitarian assistanceFLIR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . forward-looking infraredFM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . field manual (Army)FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .forward operating baseFSCC. . . . . . . . . . fire support coordination center

GAU-12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25mm Gatling gunGAU-16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50 caliber machine gunGAU-17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7.62mm automatic gunGBU-10/12/16 . . . . . . . . laser guided bomb units

(Paveway II)GCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ground combat elementGPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . global positioning system

HARM . . . . . . . . . . . . . .high-speed antiradiationmissile

HCS. . . . . . . . . . . helicopter coordination sectionHDC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . helicopter direction centerHE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . high explosiveHE-FRAG . . . . . . . high-explosive fragmentationHEGP . . . . . . . . . high-explosive general purposeHF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . high frequencyHMM . . . . . Marine medium helicopter squadronHMM-362 . . . . . . . . . .Marine medium helicopter

squadron 362HMR-161 . . . . . . . . Marine Helicopter Transport

Squadron 161HRS-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sikorsky helicopterHST. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . helicopter support teamHUC . . . . . . . . . helicopterborne unit commanderHUD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . head-up display

ICAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . improved capabilityIFF. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . identification, friend or foeIFR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . in-flight refuelingILLUM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . illuminationIMN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . indicated Mach numberINS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . inertial navigation systemIPB . . .intelligence preparation of the battlespaceIRCM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . infrared countermeasures

JCS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Joint Chiefs of StaffJFC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . joint force commanderJP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . joint publicationJP-5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . jet fuelJTF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . joint task force

KC-130 . . . . . . . . multirole, multimission tacticaltanker/transport

KCAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . knots calibrated airspeedKIAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .knots indicated airspeedkt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . knot (nautical miles per hour)KY-58 . . . . . . . . . . encripted ultra high frequency

communications system

Assault Support__________________________________________________________________________________________________ C-3

LAU-10/51/61/68 . . . . . . . . . . . . .rocket launcherLCAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .landing craft air cushionLGB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . laser guided bombLSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . limited scale raidLUU-2A/B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . illumination flareLZ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . landing zone

M240D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7.62mm machine gunMAB . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine amphibious brigadeMACCS . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine air command and

control systemMAGR . . . . . . . . miniature airborne GPS systemMAGTF . . . . . . . . . Marine air-ground task forceMASS . . . . . . . . . . . Marine air support squadronMATCD . . Marine air traffic control detachmentMBA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . main battle areaMCDP . . . . . . Marine Corps doctrinal publicationMCO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine Corps orderMCPP . . . . . . . . .Marine Corps Planning ProcessMCWP . . .Marine Corps warfighting publicationMEF . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine expeditionary forceMETT-T . . .mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available- time availableMEU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine expeditionary unitMEU(SOC) . . . . . . . . . Marine expeditionary unit

(special operations capable)MK 20 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .dumb bomb (Rockeye)MK 36/40/41. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . destructorMK 50 . . . . . . . . . . advanced lightweight torpedoMK 52 . . . . 1000-pound aircraft-laid bottom mineMK 55 . . . . 2000-pound aircraft-laid bottom mineMK 56 . . . 2000-pound aircraft-laid moored mineMK 58 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . marine location markerMK 62/63/64/65 . . . . . . . . . . . . Quickstrike mineMK 77 . . . . . . . . . . . . incendiary bomb (Napalm)MK 81/82/83. . . . low drag general purpose bombmm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .millimeterMMT. . . . .Marine air traffic control mobile teamMOOTW. . . . . military operations other than warMRC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . medical regulating code

NATOPS. . . . . Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures StandardizationNEO . . . . . . noncombatant evacuation operationnm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .nautical mileNSFS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .naval surface fire supportNVD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . night vision deviceNWP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .naval warfare publication

OAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . offensive air supportOMFTS . . . . . operational maneuver from the seaOPSEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . operations security

PAX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passengersPROVMAG . . . . . . provisional Marine air groupPSS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . plans and support sectionPZ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . pickup zone

RECCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . reconnaissanceRGR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . rapid ground refuelingROE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . rules of engagementRP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . red phosphorousRT-1250A/ARC . . . . remote receiver-transmitter

with MIL-STD-1553B data bus interface

RWR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . radar warning receiver

SADF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . sector air defense facilitySAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . surface-to-air missileSAR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . search and rescueSATCOM . . . . . . . . . . . satellite communicationsSEAD . . . . . . .suppression of enemy air defensesSLEP . . . . . . . . . . . service life extension programSPR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . single point refuelingSTOM . . . . . . . . . . . . ship-to-objective maneuver

TAC(A). . . . . . tactical air coordinator (airborne)TACC (Marine). . . . . tactical air command centerTACC (Navy) . . . . . . . . tactical air control centerTACP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . tactical air control partyTADC . . . . . . . . . . . . . tactical air direction centerTAOC . . . . . . . . . . . tactical air operations centerTAS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . true air speedTCN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . third country nationalTJS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .tactical jamming systemT/O . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . table of organizationTOW . . . . . . . . . tube launched, optically-tracked,

wire-guidedTRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . tactical recovery of aircraft

and personnel TTP . . . . . . . . tactics, techniques, and proceduresTV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . television

UAV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .unmanned aerial vehicleUH-1/1N/1Y . assault utility helicopter (Iroquois,

commonly called Huey)UH-34D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SeahorseUHF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ultrahigh frequency

C-4 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-24

ULQ-19. . . . . responsive jammer set (RACJAM)US . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . United States

VHF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . very high frequencyVHS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .video home systemVOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . very high frequency

omnidirectional range

Walleye . . . . . . . . . . . self-guided, high-explosiveweapon system

WP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . white phosphorous

XM-218. . . .(GAU-15/A) 50 caliber machine gun

YAG . . . . . . . . . . . . . Yttrium-Aluminum-Garnet

Assault Support__________________________________________________________________________________________________ C-5

SECTION II. DEFINITIONS

air contingency MAGTF—An on-call, combat-ready MAGTF that deploys by airlift. Air contin-gency MAGTFs vary in size based on missionrequirements and the availability of airlift. Becausethey deploy by air, they generally have a limitedorganic logistic capability, and require an arrivalairfield. Air contingency MAGTFs usually areactivated to respond to developing crises, and maydeploy independently or in conjunction with otherexpeditionary forces. Also called ACM. See alsoaviation combat element; combat servicesupport element; ground combat element;Marine air-ground task force; Marine expedi-tionary force; Marine expeditionary force(Forward); Marine expeditionary unit; specialpurpose Marine air-ground task force; taskforce. (Proposed for inclusion in the next editionof MCRP 5-12C.)

air defense—All defensive measures designed todestroy attacking enemy aircraft or missiles in theEarth’s envelope of atmosphere, or to nullify orreduce the effectiveness of such attack. (JP 1-02)

air interdiction—Air operations conducted todestroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy’s militarypotential before it can be brought to bear effec-tively against friendly forces at such distancefrom friendly forces that detailed integration ofeach air mission with the fire and movement offriendly forces is not required. (JP 1-02)

air reconnaissance—The acquisition of informa-tion by employing visual observation and/orsensors in air vehicles. (JP 1-s02)

air superiority—That degree of dominance inthe air battle of one force over another whichpermits the conduct of operations by the formerand its related land, sea and air forces at a giventime and place without prohibitive interferenceby the opposing force. (JP 1-02)

air threat levels—The conditions which relate tothe enemy’s air defense capability againstairborne friendly aircraft. There are three levelsof air threat:a. low—An air threat environment which permitscombat operations and support to proceed with-out prohibitive interference. Associated tacticsand techniques do not normally require extraordi-nary measures for preplanned or immediatesupport.b. medium—An air threat environment in whichthe specific aircraft performance and weaponssystem capability allow acceptable exposure timeto enemy air defenses. This air threat environ-ment restricts the flexibility of tactics in theimmediate target/objective area. It is an environ-ment in which the enemy may have limited radarand/or electro-optical acquisition capability atmedium ranges, but the air defense system is notsupported by fully integrated fire control systems.c. high—An air threat environment created by anopposing force possessing air defense combatpower including integrated fire control systemsand electronic warfare capabilities which wouldseriously diminish the ability of friendly forces toprovide necessary air support. This air threatenvironment might preclude missions such asimmediate close air support, as the requirementfor effective radio communications and coordina-tion may not be possible. (MCRP 5-12C)antiair warfare—A US Navy/US Marine Corpsterm used to indicate that action required todestroy or reduce to an acceptable level the enemyair and missile threat. It includes such measures asthe use of interceptors, bombers, antiaircraft guns,surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles, electronicattack, and destruction of the air or missile threatboth before and after it is launched. Othermeasures which are taken to minimize the effectsof hostile air action are cover, concealment,

C-6 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-24

dispersion, deception (including electronic), andmobility. Also called AAW. (MCRP 5-12C)

armed reconnaissance—A mission with theprimary purpose of locating and attacking targetsof opportunity, i.e., enemy materiel, personnel,and facilities, in assigned general areas or alongassigned ground communications routes, and notfor the purpose of attacking specific briefedtargets. (JP 1-02)

assault support—The use of aircraft to providetactical mobility and logistic support for theMAGTF, the movement of high priority cargoand personnel within the immediate area of oper-ations, in-flight refueling, and the evacuation ofpersonnel and cargo. (MCRP 5-12C)

assault support coordinator (airborne)—Anaviator who coordinates, from an aircraft, themovement of aviation assets during assaultsupport operat ions. Also cal led ASC(A).Formerly referred to as helicopter coordinator(airborne) or HC(A). (MCRP 5-12C).

aviation combat element—The core element ofa Marine air- ground task force (MAGTF) that istask-organized to conduct aviation operations.The aviation combat element (ACE) provides allor a portion of the six functions of Marine avia-tion necessary to accomplish the MAGTF’smission. These functions are antiair warfare,offensive air support, assault support, electronicwarfare, air reconnaissance, and control ofaircraft and missiles. The ACE is usuallycomposed of an aviation unit headquarters andvarious other aviation units or their detachments.It can vary in size from a small aviation detach-ment of specifically required aircraft to one ormore Marine aircraft wings. The ACE maycontain other Service or foreign military forcesassigned or attached to the MAGTF. The ACEitself is not a formal command. Also called ACE.See also combat service support element;command element; ground combat element;Marine air-ground task force; Marine expedi-tionary force; Marine expeditionary force

(forward); Marine expeditionary unit; specialpurpose Marine air-ground task force.)(Proposed for inclusion in the next edition ofMCRP 5-12C.)

casualty evacuation—The movement of thesick, wounded or injured. It begins at the point ofinjury or onset of disease. It includes both move-ment to and between treatment facilities. All unitshave an evacuation capability. Any vehicle maybe used to evacuate casualties. If a medical vehi-cle is not used it should be replaced with one atthe first opportunity. Similarly aeromedical evac-uation should replace surface evacuation at thefirst opportunity. (MCRP 5-12C)

close air support—Air action by fixed androtary-wing aircraft against hostile targets whichare in close proximity to friendly forces andwhich require detailed integration of each airmission with the fire and movement of thoseforces. Also called CAS. (JP 1-02)

combat service support element—The coreelement of a Marine air-ground task force(MAGTF) that is task-organized to provide thecombat service support necessary to accomplishthe MAGTF’s mission. The combat servicesupport element (CSSE) varies in size from asmall detachment to one or more force servicesupport groups. It provides supply, maintenance,transportation, general engineering, healthservices, and a variety of other services to theMAGTF. It may also contain other Service orforeign military forces assigned or attached to theMAGTF. The CSSE i tself is not a formalcommand. Also called CSSE. See also aviationcombat element; command element; groundcombat element; Marine air-ground taskforce; Marine expeditionary force; Marineexpeditionary force (Forward); Marine expe-ditionary unit; special purpose Marine air-ground task force. (Proposed for inclusion in thenext edition of MCRP 5-12C.)

combined arms—The full integration of combatarms in such a way that to counteract one, the

Assault Support__________________________________________________________________________________________________ C-7

enemy must become more vulnerable to another.(MCRP 5-12C)

command element—The core element of aMarine air-ground task force that is the headquar-ters. The command element (CE) is composed ofthe commander, general or executive and specialstaff sections, headquarters section, and requisitecommunications support, intelligence and recon-naissance forces, necessary to accomplish theMAGTF’s mission. The CE provides commandand control, intelligence, and other support essen-tial for effective planning and execution of opera-tions by the other elements of the MAGTF. TheCE varies in size and composition and maycontain other Service or foreign military forcesassigned or attached to the MAGTF. Also calledCE. See also aviation combat element; combatservice support element; ground combatelement; Marine air-ground task force;Marine expeditionary force; Marine expedi-tionary force (forward); Marine expedition-ary unit; special purpose Marine air-groundtask force. (Proposed for inclusion in the nextedition of MCRP 5-12C.)

communications intelligence—Technical infor-mation and intelligence derived from foreigncommunications by other than the intended recip-ients. Also called COMINT. (JP 1-02)

concept of operations—A verbal or graphicstatement, in broad outline, of a commander’sassumptions or intent in regard to an operation orseries of operations. The concept of operationsfrequently is embodied in campaign plans andoperation plans; in the latter case, particularlywhen the plans cover a series of connected opera-tions to be carried out simultaneously or insuccession. The concept is designed to give anoverall picture of the operation. It is includedprimarily for additional clarity of purpose. Alsocalled commander’s concept. (JP 1-02)

counterinsurgency—Those military, paramili-tary, political, economic, psychological, and civicactions taken by a government to defeat insur-gency. (JP 1-02)

deception—Those measures designed to misleadthe enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsifi-cation of evidence to induce him to react in amanner prejudicial to his interests. (JP 1- 02)

deep air support—Air action against enemytargets at such a distance from friendly forces thatdetailed integration of each mission with fire andmovement of friendly forces is not required.Deep air support missions are flown on eitherside of the fire support coordination line; the lackof a requirement for close coordination with thefire and movement of friendly forces is the quali-fying factor. (MCRP 5-12C)

demonstration—1. (DOD/NATO) An attack orshow of force on a front where a decision is notsought, made with the aim of deceiving theenemy 2. (DOD only) In military deception, ashow of force in an area where a decision is notsought made to deceive an adversary. It is simi-lar to a feint but no actual contact with the adver-sary is intended. (JP 1-02)

direct air support center—The principal aircontrol agency of the US Marine air command andcontrol system responsible for the direction andcontrol of air operations directly supporting theground combat element. It processes and coordi-nates requests for immediate air support and coor-dinates air missions requiring integration withground forces and other supporting arms. Itnormally collocates with the senior fire supportcoordination center within the ground combatelement and is subordinate to the tactical aircommand center. Also called DASC. (JP 1-02)

direct air support center (airborne)—Anairborne aircraft equipped with the necessary

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staff personnel, communications, and operationsfacilities to function as a direct air support center.Also called DASC-A. (JP 1-02)

direct support—A mission requiring a force tosupport another specific force and authorizing itto answer directly the supported force’s requestfor assistance. (JP 1-02)

electronic warfare—Any military action involv-ing the use of electromagnetic and directedenergy to control the electro-magnetic spectrumor to attack the enemy. Also called EW. Thethree major subdivisions within electronicwarfare are: electronic attack, electronic protec-tion, and electronic warfare support.

a. electronic attack. That division of electronicwarfare involving the use of electromagnetic,directed energy, or antiradiation weapons toattack personnel, facilities, or equipment with theintent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroyingenemy combat capability and is considered aform of fires. Also called EA. EA includes:1) actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy’seffective use of the electromagnetic spectrum,such as jamming and electromagnetic deception,and 2) employment of weapons that use eitherelectromagnetic or directed energy as theirprimary destructive mechanism (lasers, radiofrequency weapons, particle beams).b. electronicprotection. That division of electronic warfareinvolving passive and active means taken toprotect personnel, facilities, and equipment fromany effects of friendly or enemy employment ofelectronic warfare that degrade, neutralize, ordestroy friendly combat capability. Also calledEP. c. electronic warfare support. That divisionof electronic warfare involving actions tasked by,or under direct control of, an operationalcommander to search for, intercept, identify, andlocate or localize sources of intentional and unin-tentional radiated electromagnetic energy for thepurpose of immediate threat recognition, target-ing, planning, and conduct of future operations.Thus, electronic warfare support provides infor-mation required for decisions involving elec-

tronic warfare operations and other tacticalactions such as threat avoidance, targeting, andhoming. Also called ES. Electronic warfaresupport data can be used to produce signals intel-ligence, provide targeting for electronic ordestructive attack, and produce measurement andsignature intelligence. (JP 1- 02)

feint—1. In military deception, an offensiveaction involving contact with the adversaryconducted for the purpose of deceiving the adver-sary as to the location and/or time of the actualmain offensive action. (JP 1-02). 2. A limited-objective attack involving contact with theenemy, varying in size from a raid to a support-ing attack. Feints are used to cause the enemy toreact in three predictable ways: to employreserves improperly, to shift supporting fires, orto reveal defensive fires. (MCRP 5-12C)

final protective fire—An immediately availableprearranged barrier of fire designed to impedeenemy movement across defensive lines or areas.(JP 1-02)

fire support—1. Fires that directly support land,maritime, amphibious, and special operationsforces to engage enemy forces, combat formations,and facilities in pursuit of tactical and operationalobjectives. See also fires. (JP 1-02). 2. In MarineCorps usage, assistance to elements of the Marineair-ground task force engaged with the enemyrendered by other firing units, including (but notlimited to) artillery, mortars, naval surface firesupport, and offensive air support. (MCRP 5-12C)

fire support coordination center—A singlelocation in which are centralized communica-tions facilities and personnel incident to the coor-dination of all forms of fire support. Also calledFSCC. (JP 1-02)

fire support coordination line—A fire supportcoordinating measure that is established andadjusted by appropriate land or amphibious forcecommanders within their boundaries in consulta-tion with superior, subordinate, supporting, and

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affected commanders. Fire support coordinationlines (FSCLs) facilitate the expeditious attack ofsurface targets of opportunity beyond the coordi-nating measure. An FSCL does not divide an areaof operations by defining a boundary betweenclose and deep operations or a zone for close airsupport. The FSCL applies to all fires of air, land,and sea-based weapon systems using any type ofammunition. Forces attacking targets beyond anFSCL must inform all affected commanders insufficient time to allow necessary reaction toavoid fratricide. Supporting elements attackingtargets beyond the FSCL must ensure that theattack will not produce adverse effects on, or tothe rear of, the line. Short of an FSCL, all air-to-ground and surface-to-surface attack operationsare controlled by the appropriate land or amphibi-ous force commander. The FSCL should followwell defined terrain features. Coordination ofattacks beyond the FSCL is especially critical tocommanders of air, land, and special operationsforces. In exceptional circumstances, the inabil-ity to conduct this coordination will not precludethe attack of targets beyond the FSCL. However,failure to do so may increase the risk of fratricideand could waste limited resources. Also calledFSCL. (JP 1-02)

forward air controller—A member of the tacticalair control party who, from a forward ground orairborne position, controls aircraft in close air supportof ground troops. Also called FAC. (JP 1-02)

forward air controller (airborne)—A specifi-cally trained and qualified aviation officer whoexercises control from the air of aircraft engagedin close air support of ground troops. Theforward air controller (airborne) is normally anairborne extension of the tactical air controlparty. Also called FAC(A). (JP 1-02)

forward arming and refueling point—Atemporary facility—organized, equipped, anddeployed by an aviat ion commander, andnormally located in the main battle area closer tothe area where operations are being conductedthan the aviation unit’s combat service area—to

provide fuel and ammunition necessary for theemployment of aviation maneuver units incombat. The forward arming and refueling pointpermits combat aircraft to rapidly refuel andrearm simultaneously. Also called FARP.(JP 1- 02)

forward-looking infrared—An airborne, elec-tro-optical thermal imaging device that detectsfar-infrared energy, converts the energy into anelectronic signal, and provides a visible image forday or night viewing. Also called FLIR. (JP 1- 02)

forward operating base—An airfield used tosupport tactical operations without establishingfull support facilities. The base may be used foran extended time period. Support by a main oper-ating base will be required to provide backupsupport for a forward operating base. Also calledFOB. (JP 1-02)

general support—That support which is given tothe supported force as a whole and not to anyparticular subdivision thereof. (JP 1-02)

ground combat element—The core element of aMarine air-ground task force (MAGTF) that is task-organized to conduct ground operations. It is usuallyconstructed around an infantry organization but canvary in size from a small ground unit of any type, toone or more Marine divisions that can beindependently maneuvered under the direction ofthe MAGTF commander. It includes appropriateground combat and combat support forces and maycontain other Service or foreign military forcesassigned or attached to the MAGTF. The GCE itselfis not a formal command. Also called GCE. Seealso aviation combat element; combat servicesupport element; command element; Marine air-ground task force; Marine expeditionary force;Marine expeditionary force (forward); Marineexpeditionary unit; special purpose Marine air-ground task force. (Proposed for inclusion in thenext edition of MCRP 5-12C.)

helicopter support team—A task organizationformed and equipped for employment in a landing

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zone to facilitate the landing and movement ofhelicopterborne troops, equipment and supplies,and to evacuate selected casualties and enemy pris-oners of war. (JP 1-02). Within the Marine Corps,helicopter support teams are sourced from theforce service support group, specifically from theLanding Support Company of the Support Battal-ion. Also called HST. (Proposed for inclusion inthe next edition of MCRP 5-12C.)

immediate air support—Air support to meetspecific requests which arise during the course ofa battle and which by their nature cannot beplanned in advance. (JP 1-02)

maneuver warfare—A warfighting philosophythat seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesionthrough a variety of rapid, focused, and unex-pected actions which create a turbulent andrapidly deteriorating situation with which theenemy cannot cope. (MCRP 5-12C)

Marine air command and control system—Asystem which provides the aviation combatelement commander with the means to command,coordinate, and control all air operations withinan assigned sector and to coordinate air opera-tions with other Services. It is composed ofcommand and control agencies with communica-tions-electronics equipment that incorporates acapability from manual through semiautomaticcontrol. Also called MACCS. (JP 1-02)

Marine air-ground task force—The MarineCorps principal organization for all missionsacross the range of military operations, composedof fo rces t a sk -o rganized under a s ing lecommander capable of responding rapidly to acontingency anywhere in the world. The types offorces in the Marine air-ground task force(MAGTF) are functionally grouped into four coreelements: a command element, an aviationcombat element, a ground combat element, and acombat service support element. The four coreelements are categories of forces, not formalcommands. The basic structure of the MAGTFnever varies, though the number, size, and type of

Marine Corps units comprising each of its fourelements will always be mission dependent. Theflexibility of the organizational structure allowsfor one or more subordinate MAGTFs, otherService, and/or foreign military forces, to beassigned or attached. Also called MAGTF. Seealso aviation combat element; combat servicesupport element; command element; groundcombat element; Marine expeditionary force;Marine expeditionary force (forward); Marineexpeditionary unit; special purpose Marineair-ground task force. (Proposed for inclusionin the next edition of MCRP 5-12C.)

Marine expeditionary brigade—A Marine air-ground task force that is constructed around areinforced infantry regiment, a composite Marineaircraft group, and a brigade service supportgroup. The Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB),commanded by a general officer, is task-orga-nized to meet the requirements of a specific situa-tion. It can function as part of a joint task force,or as the lead echelon of the Marine expedition-ary force (MEF), or alone. It varies in size andcomposition, and is larger than a Marine expedi-tionary unit but smaller than a MEF. The MEB iscapable of conducting missions across the fullrange of military operations. It may contain otherService or foreign military forces assigned orattached. Also called MEB. (Proposed for inclu-sion in the next edition of MCRP 5-12C.)

Marine expeditionary force—The largestMarine air-ground task force and the MarineCorps principal warfighting organization, particu-larly for larger crises or contingencies. It is task-organized around a permanent command elementand normally contains one or more Marine divi-sions, Marine aircraft wings, and Marine forceservice support groups. The Marine expedition-ary force is capable of missions across the rangeof military operations, including amphibiousassault and sustained operations ashore in anyenvironment. It can operate from a sea base, aland base, or both. It may also contain otherService or foreign military forces assigned orattached to the MAGTF. Also called MEF. See

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also aviation combat element; combat servicesupport element; command element; groundcombat element; Marine air-ground taskforce; Marine expeditionary force (forward);Marine expeditionary unit; special purposeMarine air-ground task force. (Proposed forinclusion in the next edition of MCRP 5-12C.)

Marine expeditionary force (forward)—Adesignated lead echelon of a Marine expedition-ary force, task-organized to meet the require-ments o f a spec i f i c s i tua t ion . A Mar ineexpeditionary force (forward) varies in size andcomposition, and may be commanded by theMarine expeditionary force commander person-ally or by another designated commander. It maybe tasked with preparing for the subsequentarrival of the rest of the MEF/joint/combinedforces, and/or the conduct of other specifiedtasks, at the discretion of the MEF commander. AMarine expeditionary force (Forward) may alsobe a stand-alone MAGTF, task-organized for amission in which a MEF is not required. It mayalso contain other Service or foreign militaryforces assigned or attached to the MAGTF. Alsocalled MEF (forward). See also aviation combatelement; combat service support element;command element; ground combat element;Marine air-ground task force; Marine expedi-tionary force; Marine expeditionary unit;Marine expeditionary unit (special operationscapable); special purpose Marine air-groundtask force. (Proposed for inclusion in the nextedition of MCRP 5-12C.)

Marine expeditionary unit (special operationscapable)—The Marine Corps standard, forward-deployed, sea-based expeditionary organization.The MEU(SOC) is a MEU, augmented withselected personnel and equipment, that is trainedand equipped with an enhanced capability toconduct amphibious operations and a variety ofspecialized missions, of limited scope and dura-tion. These missions include specialized demoli-tion, clandestine reconnaissance and surveillance,raids, in-extremis hostage recovery, and enablingoperations for follow-on forces. The Marine

expeditionary unit (special operations capable) isnot a special operations force but, when directedby the President or Secretary of Defense, thecombatant commander, and/or other operationalcommander, may conduct limited special opera-tions in extremis, when other forces are inappro-priate or unavailable. It may also contain otherService or foreign military forces assigned orattached to the MAGTF. Also called MEU(SOC). See also aviation combat element;combat service support element; commandelement; ground combat element; Marine air-ground task force; Marine expeditionaryforce; Marine expeditionary force (Forward);Marine expeditionary unit; special purposeMarine air-ground task force. (Proposed forinclusion in the next edition of MCRP 5-12C.)

offensive air support—Those air operationsconducted against enemy installations, facilities,and personnel to directly assist the attainment ofMAGTF objectives by the destruction of enemyresources or the isolation of the enemy’s militaryforces. Also called OAS. (MCRP 5-12C)

operations security—A process of identifyingcritical information and subsequently analyzingfriendly actions attendant to military operationsand other activities to: a. identify those actionsthat can be observed by adversary intelligencesystems; b. determine indicators that hostile intel-ligence systems might obtain that could be inter-preted or pieced together to derive criticalinformation in time to be useful to adversaries;and c. select and execute measures that eliminateor reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabili-ties of friendly actions to adversary exploitation.Also called OPSEC. (JP 1-02)

preplanned air support—Air support inaccordance with a program, planned in advanceof operations. (JP 1-02)

raid—An operation, usually small scale, involv-ing a swift penetration of hostile territory tosecure information, confuse the enemy, or todestroy installations. It ends with a planned

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withdrawal upon completion of the assignedmission. (JP 1-02)

rear area operations center/rear tactical opera-tions center—A command and control facility thatserves as an area/subarea commander’s planning,coordinating, monitoring, advising, and directingagency for area security operations. (JP 1-02)

rear area security—The measures takenbefore, during, and/or after an enemy airborneattack, sabotage action, infiltration, guerrillaaction, and/or initiation of psychological orpropaganda warfare to minimize the effectsthereof. (MCRP 5- 12C)

rules of engagement—Directives issued bycompetent military authority which delineate thecircumstances and limitations under whichUnited States forces will initiate and/or continuecombat engagement with other forces encoun-tered. Also called ROE. (JP 1-02)

special operations—Operations conducted byspecially organized, trained, and equipped mili-tary and paramilitary forces to achieve military,political, economic, or informational objectivesby unconventional military means in hostile,denied, or politically sensitive areas. These oper-ations are conducted across the full range of mili-tary operations, independently or in coordinationwith operations of conventional, nonspecial oper-ations forces. Political-military considerationsfrequently shape special operations, requiringclandestine, covert, or low visibility techniquesand oversight at the national level. Special opera-tions differ from conventional operations indegree of physical and political risk, operationaltechniques, mode of employment, independencefrom friendly support, and dependence ondetailed operational intelligence and indigenousassets. Also called SO. (JP 1-02)

special purpose Marine air-ground taskforce—A Marine air-ground task force orga-nized, trained and equipped with narrowlyfocused capabilities. It is designed to accomplisha specific mission, often of limited scope andduration. It may be any size, but normally it is arelatively small force-the size of a Marine expe-ditionary unit or smaller. It may contain otherService or foreign military forces assigned orattached to the Marine air-ground task force. Alsocalled SPMAGTF. See also aviation combatelement; combat service support element;command element; ground combat element;Marine air-ground task force; Marine expedi-tionary force; Marine expeditionary force(forward); Marine expedit ionary unit .(Proposed for inclusion in the next edition ofMCRP 5-12C.)

suppression of enemy air defenses—That activ-ity which neutralizes, destroys, or temporarilydegrades surface-based enemy air defenses bydestructive and/or disruptive means. Also calledSEAD. (JP 1-02)

surface-to-air weapon—A surface-launchedweapon for use against airborne targets. Futuredevelopments in air defense systems may lead tothe employment of weapons other than missiles.Examples include rockets, directed-energy weap-ons, and air defense guns. (JP 1-02)

tactical air command center—The principal USMarine Corps air command and control agencyfrom which air operations and air defense warn-ing functions are directed. It is the senior agencyof the US Marine air command and controlsystem which serves as the operational commandpost of the aviation combat element commander.It provides the facility from which the aviationcombat element commander and his battle staffplan, supervise, coordinate, and execute allcurrent and future air operations in support of theMarine air-ground task force. The tactical air

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command center can provide integration, coordi-nation, and direction of joint and combined airoperations. Also called Marine TACC. (JP 1-02)

tactical air control center—The principal airoperations installation (ship-based) from whichall aircraft and air warning functions of tacticalair operations are controlled. Also called NavyTACC. (JP 1-02)

tactical air control party—A subordinate opera-tional component of a tactical air control systemdesigned to provide air liaison to land forces and forthe control of aircraft. Also called TACP. (JP 1-02)

tactical air coordinator (airborne)—An officerwho coordinates, from an aircraft, the actions ofother aircraft engaged in air support of ground orsea forces. Also called TAC(A). (JP 1-02)

tactical air direction center—An air operationsinstallation under the overall control of the Navytactical air control center (afloat)/Marine Corpstactical air command center, from which aircraftand air warning service functions of tactical airoperations in support of amphibious operationsare directed. Also called TADC.(JP 1- 02)

tactical air operation—An air operation involv-ing the employment of air power in coordinationwith ground or naval forces to: a. gain and main-tain air superiority; b. prevent movement of enemy

forces into and within the objective area and toseek out and destroy these forces and theirsupporting installations; c. join with ground ornaval forces in operations within the objectivearea, in order to assist directly in attainment oftheir immediate objective. (JP 1-02)

tactical air operations center—The principal aircontrol agency of the US Marine air commandand control system responsible for airspacecontrol and management. It provides real timesurveillance, direction, positive control, and navi-gational assistance for friendly aircraft. Itperforms real time direction and control of allantiair warfare operations, to include mannedinterceptors and surface-to-air weapons. It issubordinate to the tactical air command center.Also called TAOC. (JP 1-02)

tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel—Amission performed by an assigned and briefedaircrew for the specific purpose of the recoveryof personnel, equipment, and/or aircraft when thetactical situation precludes search and rescueassets from responding and when survivors andtheir location have been confirmed. Also calledTRAP. (MCRP 5-12C)

time on station—The time that an aircraft canactually spend performing its assigned mission. Itdoes not include the time transiting to and from theoperating site. Also called TOS. (MCRP 5- 12C)

APPENDIX DREFERENCES AND RELATED PUBLICATIONS

Joint Publications (Joint Pubs)

0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces(UNAAF)

1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations 3-02 Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War3-30 Command and Control for Joint Air Operations3-52 Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in a Combat Zone3-54 Joint Doctrine for Operations Security 3-58 Joint Doctrine for Military Deception5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

Naval Doctrine Publications (NDPs)

1 Naval Warfare5 Naval Planning6 Naval Command and Control

Naval Warfare Publications (NWPs)

3-09.11M Supporting Arms in Amphibious Operations3-02.1 Ship-to-Shore Movement

US Army Field Manuals (FMs)

34-130 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

Marine Corps Orders (MCOs)

3120.9B Policy for Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU[SOC])P3500.16C Aviation Training and Readiness Manual, Volume 3, Tactical Helicopter

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications (MCDPs)

1 Warfighting1-1 Strategy1-2 Campaigning1-3 Tactics2 Intelligence5 Planning6 Command and Control

D-2 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-24

Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWPs)

3-2 Aviation Operations3-11.4 Helicopterborne Operations3-16 Fire Support Coordination3-16.1 Artillery Operations3-22 Antiair Warfare3-22.2 Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD)3-23 Offensive Air Support3-24.1 Shipboard Helicopter Operating Procedures For Air-Capable Ships3-25 Control of Aircraft and Missiles3-25.3 Marine Air Command and Control System Handbook3-25.5 Direct Air Support Center Handbook3-31.5 Ship-to-Shore Movement3-40.3 Communications and Information Systems5-1 Marine Corps Planning Process5-11.1 MAGTF Aviation Planning (Formerly FMFM 5-70)

Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP)

5-11.1A MAGTF Aviation Planning Documents (Formerly FMFRP 5-71)

Fleet Marine Force Manuals (FMFMs)

4-3 MAGTF Landing Support Operations6-21 Tactical Fundamentals of Helicopterborne Operations7-22 Tactical Fundamentals for Aviation in Cold Weather Operations8-2 Counterinsurgency Operations

Miscellaneous

Concept Paper, Forward. . .From the SeaConcept Paper, Ship-To-Objective Maneuver Concept Paper, Operational Maneuver From the Sea