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Canada and the Multinational StateAuthor(s): Kenneth McRobertsSource: Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, Vol. 34,No. 4, Citizenship and National Identity / Citoyennete et identite nationale (Dec., 2001), pp.683-713Published by: Canadian Political Science Association and the Société québécoise de sciencepolitiqueStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3232879

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Canadaand the MultinationalState

KENNETH CROBERTSGlendonCollege, YorkUniversity

Presidential Address to the Canadian Political Science

Association, Quebec City, Quebec,2001

Over the last decade,a new phrasehas surfaced n analyses and com-mentarieson Canadianpolitics: "multinationalCanada."As a way todenote the presenceof severalnations withinCanada,"multinational"is not the most fortuitousof terms. It has far too manyothermeanings.A better candidate would have been "plurinational."'But, for some

reason,"multinational"Canadahas stuck.

The Multinational StateUnlike the nationof the nation-state, he multiplenations of a "multi-national"state are not the creationsof the state itself. But they do nothaveto be understoodn essentialisttermseither.Despite the romanticnotions of some nationalisthistorians,these nations are indeed "con-

1 As with "plurinacional" in Catalan (as in Ferran Requejo, Federalisme, per a

que? [Barcelona: L'Hora del Present, 1998]). For his part, Michael Keating dis-

tinguishes between "multinationalism," referring to "the co-existence of two or

more sealed national groups within a polity," and "plurinationalism" in which

"the very concept of nationality is plural and takes on different meanings in dif-

ferent contexts," as in Canada where most people identify directly with Canada

but in Quebec identification with Canada is mediated through identification with

a Quebec nation (Michael Keating, "Beyond Sovereignty: Plurinational Democ-

racy in a Post-Sovereign World" [unpublished paper, 2001]).

Acknowledgment: Alan Cairns and Alain-G. Gagnon, Frangois Rocher and RegWhitaker offered helpful comments on the original text. Alexandre Brassard provided

indispensable research assistance throughout the preparation of this article.

Kenneth McRoberts, Department of Political Science, Glendon College, York Univer-

sity, Toronto, Ontario M4N 3M6; [email protected]

CanadianJournalof Political Science / Revuecanadienne de science politiqueXXXIV:4 (December/decembre 2001) 683-713

? 2001 CanadianPoliticalScience Association(l'Association canadiennede science politique)and/et la Societe quebecoisede science politique

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KENNETH MCROBERTS

structed."Still, they are not constructedfrom thin air. They rest onbases that are no less substantial than the political structuresthatunderlie the nation of the nation-state.They are supportedby social

conditions: language, culture, history,media structures,communica-tion networks,and so on.Decades of scholarlystruggleto find the one indispensable ocio-

logical basis of these nations have only served to establishthatit doesnot exist.2Nations are the work of nationalist eadershipswho try toinvest social conditions with "national"meaning, combiningthemtoform a national ideal. Only if the nation is defined in ways that arecredible to the generalpopulationandcapturepartof theirlivedexpe-rience will the nationalideal spreadbeyondits erstwhilepromoters o

the presumednationas a whole. Yet,once a sense of nationtakeshold,it is usually tenacious, persisting even underthe most draconianof

repressions.The concept of the multinationalstate has producedsome new

terms which often seem to raise as many questions as they resolve.There is talk of "sociological nations,"as opposedto politicalones.3

Yet, most so-called "sociological" nations have distinctly politicalaspirations, including control of autonomous political structures.There are "minoritynations."Theirminoritystatusis usuallya func-

tion of not only numbersbutpower.Still, cases such as Cataloniaandthe Basque Countryare sufficientto show thatminoritynationsmaybe the dominant economic, if not political, force. These minoritynations areusuallyassumedto be "stateless,"4butthis maynotholdifthe state is in fact a federation. With the multinationalstate there is

usually the assumptionof "multipleidentities" since many minoritynations do not in fact aspire to independence, for one reason or

another,andtheirmembers also identify with the largerstate.Finally,if there are minoritynations then there are also "majority"nations,

whetherthe criterionbe numbersor power.Here,the complexitiesareespecially great since, typically,membersof majoritynations do notsee themselves as distinct nations. They will understand heir own

nationality n terms of the central stateandwill see all of the stateas a

single nation.5Taking all this into account, I will refer simply to

2 IanAngus,A BorderWithin:NationalIdentity,CulturalPluralityand Wilderness

(Montreal:McGill-Queen'sUniversityPress, 1997), 13.3 See, for instance, Philip Resnick, ThinkingEnglish Canada (Toronto:Stoddart,

1994), chap.3.4 MontserratGuibemeau, Nations without States: Political Communities n a

GlobalAge (Cambridge:Polity Press, 1999), 17.5 The particularitiesof majoritynations and majoritynationalismare discussed in

Philip Resnick, "Recognition and Ressentiment:On AccommodatingNationalDifferences withinMultinationalStates" (unpublishedpaper).

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Abstract. Along withthenationscreatedby states,thereare "internalnations" withinstates. Several such nations exist within the Canadianstate, representing lose to one

quarter f thepopulation. nrecentyears,Canadian oliticalscientistshave beenactively

theorizing his multinationalismnd showinghow it might be accommodated.Yet, the

politicalrealmhas becomehighlyresistanto such notions.Dualism,theprimaryhistori-cal accommodation f the

francophone"internal

nation,"has been

displaced bya state

nationalismwhich, n turn,has entrenched purely erritorial ationale orfederalismandhas mademulticulturalismheonly legitimatebasis foraccommodatingulturaldiversity.Moreover, he nationalismsof the two predominant"internalnations," Quebec and"FirstNations,"have been mobilized n directopposition o each other. n the end,rather

than constitutinga new form of "post-modern tate" which transcendsnationalism,Canada s in fact caughtin the contradiction etween the nationalismof the Canadian

stateandthenationalisms f its "internal ations."

Resume. Il existe parralellementaux nations crees par les etats, des <<nations

interieures?au sein des etats. On trouveplusieursde ces nationsau sein de l'Etatcana-

dien et ellesrepresentent

nquart

de sapopulation

otale.Au cours des dernieresannees,les politologuescanadiens ont activement developpe des theories pour expliquerce

phenomeneplurinational t tente d'adapter a structureetatiqueen consequence.En

memetemps,le monde politiquea manifesteune resistancecroissanteh ces tentatives

d'accomodement. e dualisme, e mode d'accommodement rincipalet historiquede la

nation nterieurerancophone, ete remplaceparun nationalismed'etatqui, a son tour,s'est enracinedans unelogiquepurement erritoriale u federalisme t a fait dumulticul-

turalismee seul fondementde legitimitede toute tentatived'accomodementde la diver-

site culturelle.De plus, les nationalismesrespectifsdes deux <nations intdrieures>

predominentes,a nationquebecoiseet les peuplesautochtones ou <<premieresnations>>,se sont manifesteen s'opposants 'un a l'autre.Il resulte de tout cela qu'au lieu de

presider la constitution 'un nouvel etat<<post-moderne >ranscendante nationalisme,le Canada 'est enlise dansunecontradictionntre e nationalismede l'Etatcanadienet

ceux de ses <<ations nterieures >.

"internal nations." The term can embrace all forms of nations which

see their collectivity as being smaller than (or internal to) the state as a

whole.

The contemporary interest in multinational states evokes a school

of English liberal thought which has championed the state with several

nations.6 John Stuart Mill's declaration that it is "a necessary condi-

tion of free institutions that the boundaries of governments should

coincide in the main with those of nationalities"7 provoked Lord

Acton to declare that in fact freedom was secured by the presence of

6 See the discussion of the Acton-Cobbanpositionin WalkerConnor,Ethnonation-

alism: the questfor understanding Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1994),

chap. 1. See also Will Kymlicka,MulticulturalismCitizenship(Oxford:Claren-

donPress, 1995),

53.7 JohnStuartMill, Considerationson RepresentativeGovernment 1861), in Three

Essays (New York:OxfordUniversityPress, 1975), 380-88. Cobbannotes, how-

ever, that Mill went on to qualify the statementvery heavily (Alfred Cobban,National Self-Determination London:OxfordUniversityPress and Royal Insti-

tuteof InternationalAffairs, 1945], 65).

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KENNETHMCROBERTS

severalnationswithin the same state. Indeed,in an oft-quotedphrase,he wrotein 1907: "The co-existence of severalnations underthe sameState is a test, as well as the best securityof its freedom.It is also one

of the chief instrumentsof civilization; and,as such, it is in the naturaland providentialorder,and indicates a state of greateradvancementthanthe nationalunitywhich is the ideal of modern iberalism."8Fourdecades later,Alfred Cobbanwrote that "themulti-national tate mustre-enter the political canon from which, as Acton many years agodeclared, t shouldneverhave been expelled."9

Yet, theorists such as these were not necessarilycontendingthatthe state should itself be multinational.'0The new theorizations akethis extrastep, basing the multinational tate itself wholly or in parton

the multiple nations it contains. The political culture is one thataccepts thatmany if not most citizens will identify primarilywith oneof the internalnations;they may well identify with the commonstateand political communitybut this will be secondary,or of a different

character,to their national identity. By the same token, the state is

organizedmultinationally.Thereis a varietyof strategies or achievingthis. Federalism,in both "intra-state"and "inter-state"modes, mightseem to be the logical candidate for entrenchingmultinationalism

althoughin fact some scholars of federalism have agued otherwise.11

Theories of consociationalism can be put to use.12 And devolutionoffers itself as a way of accommodating"minoritynations."13Indeed,as we will note later,devolutionarguably s a more promisingroutethan federalismfor doing so.

The contemporarynterest n the multinational tatehas beenpro-pelled by the gatheringevidencethatpoliticallife is itself increasingly

8 JohnE. E. DalbergActon, TheHistory of Freedomand OtherEssays (Freeport:Books for LibrariesPress, 1967), 290.

9 Rather thanpropounding he superiorityof the multinational tate,Cobbanonlysought to show that "it must be accepted among the possible and legitimateforms of political organization" Cobban,NationalSelf-Determination, 3).

10 For instance, Acton saw federalismnot as aboutaccommodatingmultinational-ism but curbingthe powerof the state andpopularmajorities(Acton,HistoryofFreedom,98).

11 FerranRequejoarguesthatpast scholarshipon federalismhas been unduly nflu-enced by the American example and the presumptionsof the "mononationalmodel" (FerranRequejo, "Federalismand the Qualityof Democracy n Plurina-tional Contexts: PresentShortcomingsand Possible Improvements.The Case ofCatalonia" unpublishedpaper],14).

12 Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A ComparativeExploration(New Haven: YaleUniversityPress, 1977).

13 See Michael Keating, "Managingthe MultinationalState:ConstitutionalSettle-ment in the United Kingdom,"in TrevorC. Salmon and Michael Keating,eds.,TheDynamicsof Decentralization:Canadian Federalismand BritishDevolution

(Montreal:McGill-Queen'sUniversityPress,2001), 21-46.

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Canadaand theMultinationalState

shapedby the presenceof multiplenations.Clearly,the best efforts ofmost nation-states o eliminate their longstanding minoritynations or"historicnations,"whetherby persuasionor by outrightrepression,

have failed. In some cases, these are populationsthat saw themselvesas nationslong before the nation-statewas formed; indeed, eliminat-

ing these nationalismswas a primarypurposeof the nation-state romthe outset.Exampleswould be Croatiaor Slovenia andtheirsustainedresistance to a Yugoslav nation-state.In other cases, the sense ofnationhood emerged within an established state, as with Catalannationalism which did not emerge until the late-nineteenthcentury.Eitherway,most of thesenationalismsseem to be stronger hanever.

Globalization and regional integrationmay have contributedto

this directly, accelerating latent nationalisms and giving minoritynationsnew opportunities o express themselves. Indeed, this is oftenseen as a great paradox:transnationaland global forces seem to be

stimulatingand fostering decidedly local identities. But it is also thecase thatby reducingthe powersof the establishedstates in favourof

regionalorganizationsor international apitalthese forces have simplyserved to reveal the continuing orce of the nations within.

Yet, there is a second form of multinationalism hat does seem tobe quitedirectlyrelatedto globalizationandintegration.This involves

populationsthat did not necessarily think of themselves as nationsuntil recently, but have acquired a sense of nationhood throughinvolvementwith international rganizationsand public opinion. Thisis mostclearlythe case with indigenous peoples. Seven years aftertheWorld Council of Indigenous Peoples was formed on Vancouver

Island,in 1982 the UnitedNations established the WorkingGroupon

Indigenous Populationswhich, in turn,prepareda Declarationon the

Rightsof IndigenousPeoples. Throughthe InuitCircumpolarConfer-

ence, CanadianInuit leaders,who played a leading organizationrole,

are linked with their counterparts n Russia, Alaska and Greenlandelsewherein the FarNorth.14By the same token, the mobilizationofthe Quebec Crees against furthernortherndevelopmentwas assisted

by the supportof public opinion in the northernUnited States andWesternEurope.15

As a result of these twin processes, most contemporarystates

(even in the so-called "FirstWorld") are markedby some form of"internalnations." If the proportionof the populationcomprised byminoritynations is set quite high, say at 25 per cent, then several

examplescome to mind. One thinksof the United Kingdom,Belgium

14 Reportof the RoyalCommissionon Aboriginal Peoples, Vol I:LookingForward,

LookingBack(Ottawa:Ministerof Supplyand Services Canada,1996), 229-37.15 See Guibernau,NationswithoutStates,88.

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KENNETHMCROBERTS

and Spain not to mention states thatrecentlywere destroyedby theirmultinationalism:such as Yugoslaviaand Czechoslovakia.But if thethresholdis relaxed then few states are exempt. France has Brittany

andCorsica;New Zealand andAustraliahaveAboriginalpeoples,andso on. Thus, if only to protectthe utility of the concept of "multina-

tionalism,"it would be best to set the thresholdquite high, perhaps nthe 25 percent range.As we shall arguebelow,veryfew states thatare"multinational" n their composition are actually "multinational" nthe functioning.'6

Canada's Internal Nations

By all the conventional indicators Canada is clearly multinational nits composition. In other words, it contains important "internalnations." Not all of the population is composed of such nations;indeed, most of it is not. But close to one quarterof Canada'spopula-tion canbe claimedby "internalnations."

FrancophoneNations

Most of Canada's francophonepopulationhas long shared the dis-course of nationhood,even if the terms of this discoursehavechanged

radically. The old idea of a French-Canadiannation which bindstogetherall francophones n Canada, f not North America as a whole,dated back as far as the 1820s and remainedsupremeuntil the mid-twentieth century. Now, of course, it has virtually disappeared,replacedby ideas of nation that aremoreterritorially ound.17

The process throughwhich, starting n the 1960s, Quebecfranco-

phones began to see their nation as Quebec, rather than French

Canada, s a familiarstory.Far less well-known are the ways in which

during the 1960s New Brunswick's Acadians also experienced a

16 Whereverthe threshold s set for "multinationalism" t is importanto restrict t

to clearly constituted nternalnations. For instance,in MulticulturalCitizenship,

Kymlickadifferentiates wo manifestationsof multiculturalism: ethnicgroups,"that have resulted from immigrationand "nationalminorities,"based on histori-cal communities thatoccupy a territoryand share a distinctlanguageandculture

(11). Yet, this ignores the phenomenonof ethnically/culturally istinct historical

communities that do not have a nationalconsciousness. A case in point is the

linguisticallydistinctpopulationsof Switzerland,which clearlydo not see them-

selves as nations. To dub them "nationalminorities" is quite misleading,gener-

ating referenceto Switzerlandas "the most multinationalcountrylike Switzer-land" (ibid., 18) when, manifestly,it does not even qualify. In the process, the

challenge of accommodatingmultinationalism s occluded. By the same token,

treatingthese differentcategories as all manifestationsof "multiculturalism"s

itself quitemisleading.17 Yves Frenette,Brevehistoiredes Canadiensfranqais Montreal:Boreal,1998).

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Canada and the Multinational State

nationalist resurgence, triggered in large part by the modernization and

expansion of the provincial state.18The creation of the Parti Quebecoisin 1968 was paralleled four years later by the creation of the Parti

Acadien. By 1991 the notion of Acadian national distinctness was suf-ficiently entrenched that the association grouping Francophones out-

side Quebec was forced to change its name from La Federation des

francophones hors Quebec to La Federation des communautes franco-

phones et acadienne du Canada.

There is ample evidence that most francophones do indeed under-

stand themselves in these terms. Surveys regularly show that franco-

phones in Quebec see themselves primarily as Quebecois. At the same

time, many also see themselves as Canadian, however secondary that

identification may be.19 In New Brunswick francophones also beardual identities, except that the Canadian identity is the primary one.

Delimiting the social organization of the Quebec nation, and Aca-

dian nation, is a less straightforward task. But in major areas of civil

society one can identify structures and organizations that are distinct

to each nation. Thus, in many areas pan-Canadian organizations are

coupled with organizations that are distinct to Quebec. Examples are:

the labour movement, where the Confederation des syndicatsnationaux did not join the Canadian Labour Congress at its creation in

1957 and the Federation de travailleurs et travailleuses du Quebec,eventually withdrew from it; social policy advocacy, where the Cana-

dian Council on Social Development is now paralleled by a Conseil

quebecois de developpement social; and professional associations,such as the Canadian Medical Association which in Quebec plays a

secondary role to Quebec-based associations.20 In some instances,

18 PhilippeDoucet, "La Politiqueet les Acadiens," in Jean Daigle, ed., L'Acadiedes Maritimes:Etudes

thematiquesdes debuts a nos

jours(Moncton:Chairesdes

etudesacadiennes,1993), 322-25.19 By one interpretation,Quebec francophonesidentify only on a mediated basis

with Canada.They are Canadian hroughtheir identificationwith Quebec. Yet,the datamay also supporta more straightforwardttachment o Canadaor "dual

identities,"albeit with the Canadian dentity as secondary.Thus a survey taken

among Quebec francophonesin 1995, just before the referendum,found thateven then most Quebec francophones did profess to identify with Canada:

"Qu6becois(e)d'abord,Canadien(ne)ensuite" 29.1 per cent and "Qu6becois(e)et Canadien(ne) a part 6gale" 28.1 per cent with "Canadien(ne) d'abord,

Quebecois(e) ensuite" 6.7 per cent, "Quebecois(e) seulement 29 per cent, and

"Canadien(ne) eulement5.4 per cent (Andr6Blais, PierreMartin and RichardNadeau, "Sondageomnibusreferendaire"survey conductedby Leger et Leger,October23-26, 1995).

20 The last two examples are drawn from studies preparedfor the "PatternsofAssociationin CanadianCivil Society: LinguisticRelations in Non-Governmen-tal Organizations,"a researchproject led by David Cameron,Jane Jenson andRichardSimeon. Interestingly,a study in the project by William Coleman and

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KENNETHMCROBERTS

relationsbetween the pan-Canadianand Quebec-basedorganizations

may be quiteharmonious.Nonethelesstheirexistencereflectsdistinct,even competingideasof nationhood.

As with any "minority nation," Quebec nationalists haveinvestedgreatenergiesin securinginternational ecognition.The 2001Summit of the Americas in Quebec City was testimonyto this deter-mination but also to the resistance of established states to grantsuch

recognition.On the otherhand,Quebecnationalistshave been remark-

ably successful in securing recognition among other "minoritynations." Indeed Quebec often stands as a "model," given both the

political autonomy it enjoys and the uses to which it has put that

autonomy.Forinstance,Cataloniaclaims to have modeledits Linguis-

tic NormalizationLaw afterQuebec'sBill 101,21 he CatalanpresidentandQuebecpremierhave madeofficial visits to eachother,andso on.

Claims of Quebecnationhoodhave drawnmanycriticisms.If the

nation is territorialand extends to all the populationwithin Quebec,whatis the statusof the culturaland ethnic minoritiesor,withinQuebec

governmentparlance, he "cultural ommunities"? f, as is the case withmost of these groups,the overwhelmingmajorityof the membersrejectthe idea of a Quebec nation,are they still partof the Quebecnation?

Quebec nationalistscan make a plausiblecase that the Quebecnation

does extendto these groups,whatever heirself-perception.ndeed,theaccommodation f diversityandthe developmentof a pluralist oncep-tion of the nation have become basic staplesof intellectualdebatein

contemporaryQuebec.But,does this extendto anglophones,who have a

longstanding dentificationwith the Canadiannation?And whatof the

AboriginalPeoples, who in 1985 were themselvesformallyrecognizedas nationsby the QuebecNationalAssembly, ed by ReneLevesqueandthe PartiQuebecois?22 retheystillpartof theQuebecnation?

Yet, these ambiguitiesabout the preciseboundariesof the Quebec

nation do not weaken the contention that such a nation exists. Norhaveregularcriticismsalong these lines mutedthe sense of most Que-beckers (albeitessentially francophone) hat thereis indeeda national

collectivity, of which they arepart,andthatthey arefollowing a longhistoricaltradition n seeing themselvesthis way.

Tim Mau shows that business associationhave been quite successful in bridgingthe nationalquestion,as their class interestswould commend.

21 The two arecompared n KennethMcRoberts,Catalonia: Nation Buildingwith-

out a State(Toronto:OxfordUniversityPress,2001), chap.7.22 Adopted on March 20, 1985, "Motionportantsur la reconnaissancedes droits

autochtones"begins: "Quecette assemblee:Reconaisse 'existenceau QudbecdesNations abenaquise,algonquine,attikamek,crie, huronne,micmaque,mohawk,

monagnaise,naskapieet inuit"(as reproducedn EricGoudreau,"LeQuebecet la

questionautochtone,"n Alain-G.Gagnon,ed., Quebec:Etatet socite' [Montreal:

Quebec/Amerique],34).

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AboriginalNations

Over the last two decades, the centuries-old idea of a francophonenationalcollectivity (or collectivities) has been joined by a claim to

nationhood on the part of Aboriginal leaders. The term "FirstNations" is itself of recentorigin,reflectinga reneweduse of the term"nation" after a long disuse. When the first lobby organization to

group togetherStatus and TreatyIndians was createdin 1968, it wascalled the National IndianBrotherhood;only in 1982 was the name

changed o the Assemblyof First Nations.While the notion of Aboriginal Peoples extends beyond status

and non-status Indians, to include Inuit and Metis, maintaining acoherent eadershipamongall fourcomponentshas provento be a vir-

tual impossibility.23Moreover,Aboriginalsocial organization s verydiffuse. The Royal Commissionon Aboriginal Peoples declared thatthere are between 60 and 80 distinctAboriginalnations in Canada.24Nor are these Aboriginalnationsclearly delimited territorially:abouthalf the Aboriginalpopulation ives in urbanareas.Nonetheless, Abo-

riginal leaders have been remarkablysuccessful in securing interna-tional sympathyandrecognitionfor their claims to constitute nationsorpeoples, indeed more successfulthan theirQuebeccounterparts.

In sum, reasonablycompellingclaims to nationhood,as "internal

nations," an be made on behalfof Quebecfrancophones,Acadians andAboriginalPeoples.Togetherhey represent bout7 millionpeopleor23

per cent of the Canadianpopulation.To be sure, the overwhelmingmajority f theCanadianpopulationdoes not see itself in these terms.Itthinksof itself simplyas Canadian, ndsees itself as partof a nationthat

extends hroughoutCanadaand is centred n theCanadian tate. There sno interlocutoror the internalnations.Yet, this does not seem to deterthe internalnationsfrom seeing themselvesas such. Canada'smultina-tionaldimension s simplytoo strong o be ignoredor wishedway.

Canadian Political Theory and Multinationalism

For that matter, the issue has engaged some of Canada's leadingthinkersand commentators.One of the first Canadianreferences to a

"multinational tate" appears n an article by none other than PierreElliott Trudeau,published in Cite libre in 1962.25There,Trudeau

23 As Alan Cairnspoints out, the 1982 ConstitutionAct declares that Indian,Inuitand Metis are all included in Aboriginal peoples in Canada (Alan C. Cairns,

"Searching or MultinationalCanada:The Rhetoric of Confusion" [unpublished

paper],24).24 Ibid., 11.25 "On the one hand they could respondto the vision of an overbearingAnglo-

Canadiannation-statewith a rival vision of a French-Canadiannation-state;on

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KENNETH MCROBERTS

seems to be entertaining he notion thatthroughfederalism "nations"can secure autonomous institutions thatthey might quite legitimatelyuse to pursuetheir national interests.26But Trudeaurarelymade this

explicit in his writings.For his part, CharlesTaylorarguedin his 1970 Patternof Poli-tics thatTrudeauunderestimated he importancefor francophonesof"the collective dimensions of identification with la nation canadi-

enne-franqaise."27 On this basis, he proposed a strongly asymmetri-cal federalism in which Quebec would effectively have a special sta-tus. In his 1979 essay "Why Do Nations Have to Become States?"he called for "public acceptance that the countryis the locus of twonations."28 Other academic commentators have echoed this bina-

tional vision: Gad Horowitz, Mel Watkins, and a host of Quebecfrancophones.

By the 1990s the "binational"formulationhad been replacedbyone of "threenations,"in which AboriginalPeoples werepresentedasa third nationalcollectivity. Spawnedby the manifestoof a groupofToronto-basedacademics,29"three nations" very rapidlybecame thecommon perspectiveof all who were prepared o recognize the pres-ence of distinctnationswithinCanada.Binationalismbecamemultina-

tionalism,but by and large multinationalism eally stood for a "three

nation"vision.

the other handthey could scrapthe very idea of a nation-stateonce and for all

and lead the way towardmaking Canadaa multi-nationalstate" (PierreElliott

Trudeau,"New Treasonof the Intellectuals,"Cite libre,1962, as reproducedn

Trudeau,Federalism and the French Canadians [Toronto: Macmillan, 1968],164).

26 In the same essay, Trudeaudeclaresthat "thedifferentregionswithinthe countrymust be assured of a wide range of local autonomy, such that each national

group, with an increasing backgroundof experiencein self-government,may beable to develop the body of laws and institutionsessential to the fullest expres-sion and developmentof their national characteristics" ibid., 178) and "By thetermsof the existing Canadianconstitution, hat of 1867, FrenchCanadianshaveall the powers they need to make Quebeca political society affordingdue respectfor nationalist aspirations and at the same time giving unprecedented cope forhumanpotential n the broadestsense"(ibid., 180;emphasisadded).

27 "A CanadianFuture," in Charles Taylor,Reconciling the Solitudes:Essays onCanadian Federalismand Nationalism (Montreal:McGill-Queen's UniversityPress, 1993), 34.

28 In 1979, Taylorcalled for "A new form of Canadianfederation... foundedon

a recognition of the duality that is basic to the country" and "a public accep-tance that the country is the locus of two nations" ("Why Do Nations Have toBecome States?" in Taylor,ReconcilingtheSolitudes,57.)

29 ChristinaMcCall, et al., "ThreeNation: Eleven of Canada'sLeadingIntellectu-als Declare Their Supportfor a CanadaEquitablefrom Sea to Sea,"CanadianForum,March1992, 4-6.

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Canada and the MultinationalState

Over the years many Canadian academics have endorsed thenotion of multinationalism,ypically in the tripartiteversion.30 ndeedthe new interest in multinationalismhas been sufficiently strong to

alarmthe keepersof the Trudeau lame, who have railed against thisnew heresy.31Nonetheless, the notion has reached beyond academia,

strictly speaking, to appearin influential commentaries aimed to the

larger public, such as John Ralston Saul's Reflections of a SiameseTwin which, while avoiding any talk of internal nations, refers toCanada's"triangulareality."32

The "threenation" vision of Canadadoes have its problems.33t

presumesa certaincoherenceof each of the components.Yet, amongfrancophonesit is hard to deny the presence of an Acadian nation

along with Quebec. And AboriginalPeoples are far too diverse to betreated as a single national collectivity. Beyond that, the literaturetends to presumea commonalityamongthese various national entitiesthat is not at all evident.

Still, this attempt o conceive Canada n "threenation" termshasbeen complementedby a more recent effort on the partof some Que-bec intellectualsto conceive Quebec itself in "trinational" erms. Forinstance in a collection of essays, Penser la nation quebecoise, Gilles

Bourqueinsists that "le mouvement national ne peut menerson com-

bat pourla reconnaissancepolitiquede la nationquebecoise en niantle caractereplurinationaldu Quebec."He contends that Quebec soci-

ety is "plurinationale" ince it contains not only the Quebec nationbut Aboriginalnationsand members of the Canadiannation.34DenysDelage insists thatjust as Canada s based on three foundingpeoplesso is Quebec35 nd Danielle Juteauevokes a vision of "la collectivite

30 PhilipResnick, "Towarda MultinationalFederalism:AsymmetricalandConfed-eralAlternatives,"n F. Leslie Seidle, ed.,

Seekinga New Canadian

Partnership:Asymmetricaland ConfederalOptions(Montreal:Institute for Researchon Pub-lic Policy, 1994), 71-90; and Will Kymlicka,Finding Our Way:RethinkingEth-noculturalRelationsin Canada(Toronto:OxfordUniversityPress, 1998,

31 See, for instance, Max Nemni, "Two Solitudes, Two Nations, Two Illusions,"Cite libre,June-July1998, 31-40.

32 John Ralston Saul, Reflectionsof a Siamese Twin: Canada at the End of theTwentiethCentury Toronto:PenguinCanada,1997), 81-100.

33 See the critiquesin Alan C. Cairns,"Searchingfor MultinationalCanada,"and

Sigurdson,"Canadaas a Multi-nationalFederation."34 Gilles Bourque, "Le Quebec: entre nations et socidet," in Michel Venne, ed.,

Penser la nationquebecoise(Montreal:EditionsQudbec-Amerique, 000), 185.35 Deny Delage, "Le Qu6becet les autochtones," n Venne, ed., Penser la nation,215-28. To be sure there is no consensus aroundthis problematic.For instance,GerardBouchard seeks to accommodate these forces within the Quebec nation

througha "coalition nationale"that would be composed of Franco-Quebecois,

Anglo-Quebecois, Aboriginals, and "communautes culturelles" (G6rardBouchard, "Construire la nation qudebcoise: Manifeste pour une coalition

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The initial versionsof the compacttheory,first elaborated n the

mid-1880s, saw Canada as a compact among the colonies and theirseveralsuccessors, the provinces,ratherthan between nations. How-

ever, by the turn of the centuryHenri Bourassa had established thenotion of a double compact. For Bourassa, the "political" compactamongthe provinceswas coupledwith a "national"compactbetweenthe two Canadian olonies: CanadaWest and CanadaEast. The idea ofCanada as a pact between two founding peoples rapidly became a

given among Quebec's intellectual and political elites.38 Their

English-Canadian ounterpartsmay not have shared such binationalnotionsbut at least they continuedto subscribeoverwhelminglyto theidea that Canadawas a compactamong provinces.A Canada of com-

pacts,howeverdefined,could not be the unitarynationof a Canadiannation-state.The constitution tself affordslittle explicit recognition of bina-

tionalism. The British NorthAmericaAct simply proclaimed a verylimitedrecognitionto Englishand French within the federal and Que-bec provincial governments.Moreover,despite some claims to the

contrary,ederal institutionshave never demonstrateda serious adher-ence to consociationalnorms andpractices.39Nonetheless, Confedera-tion drewuponthefederal principle in a most creativefashion. While

it hasbeenregularlynoted thatCanadawas the firstpolitical system tocombine federalismwith parliamentary overnment,it is not alwaysappreciatedhat Canadawas the firstpolitical system in which federal-ism was designed,at least in part,to accommodateandprotectculturaland linguisticdifferences,as opposed to purely territorialones. EvenSwitzerland annot claim thattitle, contrary o some experts.40

This understanding f Canadian ederalism was fully recognizedat the time by Confederation'schampionsin Quebec. Thus, the Bleu

newspaper a Minerve celebratedConfederation n these terms: "As a

distinctand separatenationality,we form a state within the state. We

38 See RamsayCook, ProvincialAutonomy,MinorityRightsand the CompactThe-

ory, 1867-1921. Studies of the Royal Commissionon Bilingualismand Bicultur-alism No. 4 (Ottawa:Queen's Printer,1969), 57, RichardAres, Dossier sur le

pacte federatif de 1867 (Montreal:Bellarmin, 1967), Paul Romney, Getting it

Wrong: How Canadians Forgot Their Past and Imperilled Confederation(Toronto:Universityof TorontoPress, 1999), 142; and McRoberts,Misconceiv-

ing Canada,19-24.39 I try to demonstratethis in Kenneth McRoberts, Quebec:Social Change and

Political Crisis (3rd ed.; Toronto:Oxford University Press, 1993), 35-36, and"The Structure f English-FrenchRelationsin Canada"(unpublishedpaper).

40 Kymlickanotes that the old Swiss Confederationwas based entirely on cantonsthat were ethnically and linguistically Germanic in contradictionto the lateDaniel Elazar'sclaim that Switzerlandwas the first federation built on cultural/

linguisticdifference(Kymlicka,FindingOurWay,206, n. 17).

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enjoy the full exercise of our rightsandthe formalrecognitionof ournationalindependence."41 he assumption hat a fundamentalpurposeof the Quebec provincialgovernment s to protectand nurture ranco-

phone society in Quebec has become a leitmotiv of Quebec govern-ments, whatever the political party.Moreover, t was on this premisethat, duringthe 1960s, the Pearsongovernmentafforded the Quebec

governmentvariousasymmetricalarrangements nd was laudedby theother federalpartiesfor doing so.42

In the immediate postwar period the federal leaders began toarticulate he discourseof a Canadiannation-state.Forhis part,LouisSt. Laurentrejected the compact theory outright.43But in the 1960s,faced with the rise of Quebec neo-nationalism,Lester Pearson'sgov-

ernmentopenly embraced the binational tradition.It gave the RoyalCommission on Bilingualism and Biculturalisma mandateto recom-mend how the CanadianConfederation should be made "an equalpartnershipbetween the two foundingraces [the unfortunate ransla-tion of "deux peuples fondateurs"]."44 he ProgressiveConservativesandthe New Democraticpartyboth adopted he "two nation" credo.45Even then, the idea of an English-Canadian ationproducedconsider-able discomfort. But, duringthe 1960s at least there was a majoritysentimentamong federalpolitical leaders,anglophoneas well as fran-

cophone,that there existed a French-Canadianr Quebecnation.Now, of course, it would be very difficultto find suchintimationsin Canadianpolitical discourse. Merely the idea that Quebec consti-tutes a "distinctsociety" within Canada,and that this should be rec-

ognized in the constitution,was the death knell of the Meech LakeAccord among not only most of public opinion outside Quebec butalso many of Canada'spolitical leaders. The collapse of Meech in1990 provedthat for most Canadians ederalismcan only be aboutter-

ritory not culture, let alone "nations," and Quebec can only be a

"province ike the others."In the wake of that debacle, all political leaders have treadedmost carefully. Even the near victory of "Yes" forces in the 1995

Quebec referendum could not engender any readiness to recognizeQuebec's distinctiveness, beyond a House of Commons resolution

41 La Minerve, July 1, 1867 (as translated and quoted in Arthur I. Silver, TheFrench-CanadianIdea of Confederation, 1864-1900 [Toronto:University ofTorontoPress, 1982], 41).

42 McRoberts,MisconceivingCanada,40-45.43 In 1943, as minister of justice, St. Laurentdeclaredthat "La Conf6derationn'a

pas ete vraiment un pacte entre les provinces" (quoted in Ares, Dossier sur le

pactefde'ratif, 92).44 Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Preliminary Report

(Ottawa:Queen'sPrinter,1965), 151.45 This is documented n McRoberts,MisconceivingCanada,45-53.

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which recognized that "Quebec is a distinct society within Canada"

but had no concrete import46 and a carefully contrived premiers'

(excluding Lucien Bouchard) statement, the Calgary Declaration, in

which recognition of "the unique character of Quebec society" wascoupled with a firm declaration that "all the provinces are equal."47The current federal government has been steadfast in presentingCanada as a single nation with itself as the "national government."48Gone is the older vocabulary of a "Canadian Confederation," let alone

a "compact" that is binational, interprovincial or both. Among the

federal parties, only the Bloc Quebecois has consistently articulated

the arguments for a binational Canada, and has been marginalized for

its efforts.49

Such a state of affairs has given the Parti Quebecois free rein toclaim that it is only by assuming full political sovereignty that Quebeccan secure recognition of its nationhood. In other words, the Quebecnation can exist only within the framework of a nation-state. If Canada

is to be a nation-state, then so must Quebec. Canadian political culture

seems to have lost forever the capacity to distinguish between state

and nation and to imagine creatively the relationship between the two.

State Nationalism and Nation-building

How could such a total change have come about? The short answer

lies in the rise and dominance of a Canadian state nationalism which,

by definition, precludes any meaningful recognition of "internal

46 "ResolutionRespectingthe Recognitionof Quebec as a Distinct Society,"Houseof Commons,Journals, 1st session, 35th Parliament,No. 273, December 11,

1995,222.47 As reproduced rom OntarioSpeaks:A Dialogue on Canadian Unity, Govern-

ment of Ontario,1998.48 FederalIntergovernmental ffairs MinisterStephaneDion has acknowledgedon

occasion thatQuebecconstitutesa "sociological nation": "Insociological terms,I would say that a nationexists as soon as humanbeings consider thatthey formone. They feel that they sharecommon historical, cultural,ethnic, linguistic or

religioustraitsand on this basis see themselvesas a nation. It is undeniable hata

largenumberof Quebecersconsider themselves to be a nationand are one fromthat momenton." At the sametime, he presentsthis as the "French" understand-

ing of the termnation,as to be distinguishedfrom an "English" understandingwhich equatesnation with a sovereignstate (St6phaneDion, "In Honourof the

Presidentsof the Council for CanadianUnity: Some Reflections on the Concept

of Nation,Notes for a keynoteaddress o the Council for CanadianUnity,"Mon-treal,Quebec,April6, 2001).

49 Among the federal opposition parties, the New Democratic party has gesturedtowardQuebec's national distinctivenessby recognizing Quebec as a "people."(New DemocraticParty."Fixing Federalism: A Better Unity," Position Paper,N.D.P. WebSite, September15, 2001).

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nations."However, as I will arguebelow, this new state nationalismhas had the ancillaryeffect of erectingnew principlesof Canadian ifewhich are themselveshighly inimicalto multinationalism.

The stage for Canadianstate nationalismand state-buildingwasset in the post-SecondWorldWaryears by the decline of the Britishconnectionand the idea of a largerBritishnationalityassociatedwith

it, and the rise of the cultural and economic hegemonyof the UnitedStates.FormanyEnglish-speakingCanadians heneedfor a new polit-ical identity was most efficiently met by a Canadiannationalismthatfocused upon the Canadiangovernmentand saw it as the nationalstate. The Massey Royal Commissionon NationalDevelopment n the

Arts,Letters and Sciences was the most prominentamong manypost-

war intimations of this state nationalism.During the 1960s, the newCanadiannationalism ostled with notions of binationalismas federalleadersstruggledto come to termswith the QuietRevolution andthe

Quebec nationalismthat animated t. However,Canadian tate nation-alism took full flightwith the arrivalof the Trudeaugovernment.

Pierre Trudeau'svision of a Canadiannation unitedby a charterof rights and a strong national government, combining bilingualismwith multiculturalism,may have been devised to integrateQuebec

francophones with the rest of Canada. But it had relatively little

impact there: most Quebec francophonesremained attachedto themuch older idea of a distinct nationof their own. In one of the greatestironies of Canadianpoliticalhistory,the new identitytook hold not in

Quebecbut in the rest of Canada.Not only did the vision offer a com-

pelling responseto the felt need for a Canadian dentity,but such ele-ments as the charter and multiculturalism urned out to be ideal for

mobilizingsocial forces alreadyemergingoutsideQuebec.Some claims to the contrary,Trudeau did not bring about this

fundamental transformationsinglehandedly. Rather, he mobilized

social forces outside Quebec that were themselves attracted o a char-ter of rights or multiculturalismor a strong governmentin Ottawa.

Beyond that, he appealed to a growing nationalismby offering avision of the Canadiannationthat was free of ambiguityand contra-

dictoryprinciples.These forces had alreadybeen buildingwell beforethe Trudeauerabegan;Trudeauhad the effect of tippingthe balance ntheir favour.It seems to me that it is legitimate to ask whetherthiswould havehappenedunderanotherprimeminister.

In Quebecas well, state nationalism nd"nation-building"ame to

the fore in the 1960s. Unlikethe old French-Canadianationalism,Que-bec neo-nationalism lacedthe statefrontandcentre.TheQuebec"gou-vernementprovincial"became "l'Etatnationaldu Quebec."Indeed, he

very term "provincial"wasbanned romofficial discourse.This whole-sale adoptionof the "nation-state"modelhasleft littleroomforsubtletyorcreativity.Thus,amongthepequisteleadershiphere s littleacknowl-

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edgmentthatQuebec itself might be "multinational," lthoughthis isthe logical consequenceof theNationalAssembly's 1985 recognitionof

Aboriginalnationhood.And it is generallypresumed hatrecognitionof

Quebec'snationhoodmust meanfull sovereignty.There is, of course, a direct, indeed symbiotic, relationshipbetweenthese two statenationalisms.The Quebec neo-nationalismofthe 1960s was at least in parta response to the federal government'spostwarnationalismand the many incursions into heretoforeprovin-cial functions that this nationalismlegitimized. Indeed, during the1950s Ottawa'sexpansionism provokedMaurice Duplessis' govern-ment to charge the TremblayRoyal Commission on ConstitutionalProblems with articulatinga comprehensive defence of provincial

jurisdictions;JeanLesage's governmentused the Commission'selabo-rate vision of a decentralized ederalismto legitimize its own interven-tionistagenda.Conversely, n morerecentdecades the alleged need tocounter he Quebecgovernment's tatenationalismhas providedmuchof thejustification or Ottawa'snation-buildingmeasures. The primaryofficial rationale for the Trudeaugovernment'sconstitutionalpatria-tion, without the consent of the Quebec legislature, was the need tocounter he secessionism inherent o Quebecstatenationalism.

In their mutual celebrationof state nationalism,the federal gov-

ernmentand the Quebecgovernment at least in pequiste hands)haveeach sought to reserve full sovereigntyfor itself and, in the process,doomedpoliticaldebateto sterility.Neithergovernmenthas displayedmuch interestin notions of "divided sovereignty,"however fashion-able they have become elsewhere. The federal principle lends itselfwell to such ideas. Back in the 1950s, the TremblayReportfashioneda sophisticatedvision of Canada n precisely these terms.50But whenthe erstwhile federalistRobertBourassa evoked notions of "cultural

sovereignty"to characterizeQuebec'splace within the Canadian ed-

eration,he was quicklyrebukedby Ottawa or his heresy.OutsideQuebec,the new Canadian tatenationalismhas provedtobe mostresilient.Free tradeandglobalizationmay havegreatlycircum-scribed the powers of the federal state and virtuallyeliminated anynotionof a nationalmarket,yet at the level of popular dentitytheCana-dian nation s justas strongas ever.Forinstance, n a 1998 survey90 percent of respondentsoutside Quebec agreed strongly that they were"proud o be Canadian."nQuebec,the figurewas 50 percent.51t is as

50 Quebec,Rapportde la commissionroyaled'enquete sur les problemesconstitu-

tionnels, 1956, 5 vols.51 The GoldfarbPoll, conducted n Januaryand February1998 was published in

Maclean's, July 1, 1998, 13. A Canadian nstituteof PublicOpinionpoll, releasedon June30, 1999 found somewhat owerpositiveresultsto "Howproudareyou tobe a Canadian?"OutsideQuebec heprovincialpercentagesdeclaring"veryproud"

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if, havingcome late to the idea of the nation-state,Canadiansaremak-

ing up for lost time.In part,the success of the new Canadiannationalismmay lie in

the way it has been constructed.Unlike many majoritynationalisms, tdoes not portray the nation in terms of the majority population.Whereas Spanish nationalism affords no status in central institutionsto the minoritylanguages,whetherCatalan,Basque, or Galician,andFrench nationalismtreatsBreton,Corse and Occitan in the same man-

ner, the dominant form of Canadiannationalismcelebrates the minor-

ity language. In official discourse, French is given formal equalitywith English in the nationalgovernmentand presumedto be recog-nized throughoutthe Canadiannation. A central basis of Quebec's

claim to nationhood,the Frenchlanguage, is instead attachedto theCanadiannation as a whole.With such assumptionsof linguistic and culturaldiversity,the

Canadian nation can be presentedas somehow transcending he con-ventional nation. Indeed, Anthony Giddenshas dubbed Canada "thefirstpost-modernstate."52On this basis, it mightbe arguedthat Cana-diannationalism s notreallynationalismat all. As this ideologyof the

"non-nation,"Canadian state nationalism can escape many of thecommon criticisms of nationalism, while decrying the "narrow"

nationalismof Quebec.

Making Canadian Federalism Exclusively Territorial

Beyond a frontalattackon binationalism,or anyrecognitionof a fran-

cophone nation, the new nationalismof the Canadian state has hadindirectconsequences for binationalismor any other form of distinct

nationalitywithin Canada.The first impact has been to entrenchthe

principlethat federalism is exclusively aboutterritory, husundermin-

ing the historical notionthat Canadian ederalismwas intended o pro-tect the cultural/national istinctivenessof francophonesn Quebec.From the very beginning, Canadianfederalism had been shaped

by the competitionbetween these two principles,territoryand culture.While it may well have been pressuresfrom Quebec that forced the

werein the70s, exceptfor 61 percent in BritishColumbia.ButtheQuebecpercent-age was also lower:40 percent(TheGallupPoll, "MajorityVeryProud o be Cana-

dian,"TheGallupPoll, Toronto, une30, 1999).

52 AnthonyGiddens, "Canada:The FirstPostmodernState?"keynoteaddress,Uni-versityof Cambridge,March1993 (I owe this reference o Annis May Timpson).In a similarvein, Peter Katzensteinhas writtenthatCanada s "arguably he first

post-modem state par excellence" (Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The CultureofNational Security:Norms and Identityin WorldPolitics [New York:Columbia

UniversityPress, 1966], 25 [I owe this referenceto StephenClarkson]).

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adoption of federalism, the federal principle took rapidly elsewhere in

the new British North America. The case of Quebec aside, Canada

paralleled quite readily the federation to the south: the difference

among the original provinces was no greater than among the Americancolonies. Indeed, it was considerably less; there, a civil war had

resulted. If the entities within a federation are differentiated only by

geography then it follows quite readily that the same set of jurisdic-tions and powers should be sufficient for all. And, of course, it mightalso be argued that the real purpose of the federation is not to meet the

needs of collectivities, however defined, but to protect individuals

from arbitraryactions of a central state. Federalism is only one amongdifferent means to do this, and it may well not be the most efficient.

Entrenching individual rights in a charter is another means and mightwell have precedence over the federal principle. Be that as it may, with

such priorities as the protection of individual rights and the uniformityof rights across the country, federalism can only be about territory.

Thus, in Canada the possibility of using federalism to protect cul-

tural/national difference was always under attack from a competing

principle that had the potential to place in question its very legitimacy.

Many scholars have commented on this competition between princi-

ples but they have generally overlooked the singularity of this situa-

tion. As best as I can determine, Canada is the only federation to havebeen founded upon two competing principles. All other federations

were based on one principle or the other.53 At least 12 federations fol-

lowed the US model, and were founded squarely on territory:

Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, The Comoros, Germany,

Malaysia, Nigeria, St Kitts and Nevis, Switzerland and Venezuela.

Seven others, all of them created after Canada, clearly used cultural/

national difference as the essential basis for drawing up the constituent

units: Belgium, Ethiopia, India, Pakistan, Russia, the United Arab

Emirates and Yugoslavia.54

53 Resnickdistinguishesbetween "territorial ederations"and"multinational eder-ations."The latter are federationswhere "more thanone majorlinguistic or cul-turalgroupingclaims to be considered a distinctnationalcommunitywithin thatfederation"(PhilipResnick, "Towarda MultinationalFederalism:Asymmetricaland ConfederalAlternatives," n F. Leslie Seidle, ed., Seeking a New Canadian

Partnership: Asymmetrical and Confederal Options [Montreal: Institute forResearch on Public Policy, 1994], 71) Strictly speaking, this distinctionignorescases of culturaldifference thatdo not

giverise to a sense of nationhood.Thus,

Switzerland s listed as a multinational ederation even though the several lin-

guistic groupsof which it is composed bear no national identity. Kymlicka fol-

lows this samepractice.54 Spain is the closest exception to this proposition. The Constitution of Spain

refers to "the right to autonomyof the nationalitiesand regions of which it is

composed" (Spanish Constitution,Article 2, Presidencia del Gobierno, 1982,

13). But, formallyspeaking,Spainis not a federation.

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The singularityof the Canadian ederationalso can be seen in itssocial composition. It is the only federation n which only one majorunit is culturallydistinctand all the others are defined n termsof terri-

tory. Spain comes closest: three culturallydistinct entities, the "his-toric nations" of the Basque Country,Cataloniaand Galicia stand

against 14 otherAutonomous Communitieswhich have no significantculturaldistinctiveness.But, technicallyspeaking,Spainis not a feder-ation.

In short,the legitimacyof the culture/nationality rincipleof fed-eralismwas neverfully securein Canada; t was always threatenedbya competing principle of federalism that afforded it no legitimacywhatsoever.Nonetheless, for one reason or another,most successful

Canadian eadersdeliberatelysoughtto managethis conflict,in partic-ularby cultivatinga certainambiguityregarding he purposeof feder-alism. The compact theory served this goal wonderfully,especiallywhen it allowedfor alternative ormulationsbasedupon provincesand

upon peoples.The Trudeau era brought an end to all this. In the name of

"nation-building,"contradictions over principle were to be faced

squarely rather than finessed. For Trudeauthe prime minister, as

opposed to the political essayist of the 1960s, only the territorial

vision of federalismcould be legitimate,andeven it was problematicto the extent it threatenedrights entrenched n a charter.Withinhisvision of the Canadian nation-state here was no room for compacts,howeverconceived.55The Meech debate confirmedthat outside Que-bec Canadianshadbecome weddedto this belief that federalismcould

only be aboutterritory.As it happens,in manypartsof the world scholarsof federalism

are at last abandoningthe longstandingpresumption,reflectingthe

hegemonyof the Americanmodel, that federalism s aboutaccommo-

55 Trudeaumade this crystalclear in a remarkable ntervention n the House: "We

[the Members of Parliament]arethe only groupof men and women in this coun-

try who can speak for every Canadian.We are the only group,the only assemblyin this country,which can speak for the whole nation, which can express the

nationalwill and the national interest."He even went so far as to proclaim t a

good thing that the Fathers of Confederationhad given the powers of disal-

lowance and reservationto the federal governmentso that it could intervene

against a province that was acting "contrary o the national interest."After all,"when there is a conflict of interest,not of laws, which will be judged by the

courts, the citizens must be convinced thatthereis a nationalgovernmentwhichwill speakfor the national nterest andwill ensurethatit does prevail"(Canada,House of Commons, Debates, 1st session, 32nd Parliament,April 15, 1980,

32-33). And he repeatedlyused the same reasoning to justify repatriating he

constitution without the consent of the Quebec provincial egislature-or indeed

withouta majorityof all the provinces.

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which nations are based, appearto absorb them within a commonnation.58

To be sure, this need not happen.Multiculturalism ould be con-

ceived within a multinationalframework and stand for relationsofdiversitywithineach of the internalnations.59t can be argued hat the

Quebec government's policy of "interculturalisme"s in fact quitesimilar to the federal government's policies of multiculturalism.60Conceived in this manner,multiculturalism an free multinationalismfrom the ethnic connotationsof such terms as "foundingnations."

But, by definition,the overall frameworkmust be multinational.Oth-

erwise, multinationalismmaybe occluded.

Programmatically, specially when conceived as partof a nation-

building project,multiculturalism an be directlyopposedto multina-tionalism-and has been so in Canada.The issue may not have arisenin othersocieties where the conceptof multiculturalism as takenroot,as in Australiawhere only indigenous peoples might claim nationalstatus and multiculturalismhas generallynot been extendedto them.But the issue has arisen in Canada.Despite what some critics claim,multiculturalism n Canadahas been demonstrably ntegrative,espe-

cially of new immigrants.61 ut to precisely "what"are these individ-uals being integrated?There is every reason to believe that they are

being integrated o the entity articulatedby the Canadianstate: a sin-gle Canadian nation which is multicultural,perhaps bilingual, but

which bears no "internalnations"and in whicheven federalism s los-

ing much of its pertinence.This fundamental ension between multiculturalism ndmultina-

tionalismis frequently gnored,or even denied, in the scholarly itera-ture.Thus, a leading study proposingthatCanadabe made a "multi-national federation" at the same time celebratesCanada'smulticul-turalpolicy. In makinga case for both concepts, it fails to analyzethe

relationshipbetween the two. Noting that in Canadamulticulturalismhas prosperedbut multinationalismremainsproblematic, t does not

58 As Alain Dieckhoff writes, before commenting on Canadian multiculturalism:

"Malgre la difference structurelle entre minorites immigrees et groupesnationaux,certainshommespolitiquesse sont pourtant ngenies,pourdes raisons

plus ou moins avouables,a gommertoutes les nuancespourles subsumer ous la

categoriegeneriquede multiculturalisme"AlainDieckhoff,La nation dans tousses Etats:Les identites nationalesen mouvement Paris:Flammarion]189).

59 See IanAngus,A BorderWithin,146.60 See McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada, 129-30; and Kymlicka, Finding Our

Way,68.61 This is well documented n Kymlicka,FindingOurWay.

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bec's demands for national recognition, especially among Canadians

who feel themselves to have been recognized through multicultural-

ism. This was quite evident during the debate over Meech. Some of

the strongest opposition to the "distinct society" clause came fromchampions of multiculturalism, themselves of neither French nor

British heritage, who saw the clauses as an attack on the co-equal sta-

tus of all cultures and cultural heritages within Canada.72

In sum, the old tradition of recognizing a francophone nation, if

not outright binationalism, has been undermined by a new nationalism

of the Canadian state which has attacked it both directly, through the

outright denial of its existence, and indirectly through the erection of

new principles, territorial federalism and multiculturalism, which pre-

clude the very possibility of recognizing geographically grounded"nations within."

Recognition of Aboriginal Nations

At the same time, while politics has been drained of any remnants of

recognition of a francophone nation, contemporary Canadians politicshas allowed a certain, well-constrained space for recognition of Abo-

riginal nations. Generally speaking, multiculturalism has not pre-

cluded recognition of Aboriginal Peoples. Unlike Quebec nationalism,Aboriginal nationalism does not have a significant secessionist variant

that directly challenges Canadian nationalism, and the very integrity of

the Canadian state. On the other hand, the constitutional initiatives that

the Quebec question has generated over the last few decades, whether

they be designed to accommodate or to frustrate Quebec nationalism,have created an opportunity for Aboriginal leaders to campaign for

initiatives to address Aboriginal concerns.73 Indeed, it can even be

argued that political and opinion leaders outside Quebec have at times

72 For instance,two LiberalMPs, Charles Caccia and Sergio Marchi,declaredthat

thatAccordconstituted"a review-viewmirrorvision which may have been valid

generationsago, [an]outdated[definitionof Canada] . . primarilysatisfiedwith

only depictingourpeople's past and our country'shistory ... Millions of Cana-dians are left out who do not identify with eitherEnglish or French"(quotedinAlan Cairns, "Political Science, Ethnicity and the Canadian Constitution,"inDavid ShugarmanandReg Whitaker, ds., Federalismand Political Community:Essays in Honourof Donald Smiley(Peterborough:Broadview,1989), 124.

73 Thus, the 1982 constitutionalrepatriationand revision, ostensibly designed to

respondto Quebec,affordedAboriginalleaders the opportunity o secure recog-nition of "existing aboriginaland treatyrights" in section 35 of the new Cana-dian Charterof Rights and Freedoms.In effect, an importantbreakthrough or

First Nation claims took place under Trudeau'stenure. Nonetheless, Trudeau's

own attitude o recognitionof Aboriginalclaims was revealedin his fierce oppo-sition to the provisions of the CharlottetownAccord that had been secured by

Aboriginal eaders.

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seemed to endorseAboriginalobjectivesin order o countertheclaimsof Quebec nationalists.Finally,international pinionhas provento bemuch more sympatheticto Aboriginalclaims than to those of Quebec

nationalists.As a result,at least the vocabularyof AboriginalnationalismhasenteredmainstreamCanadianpolitics. "First Nations" has become a

generally accepted term;even the federal governmentroutinelyusesit.74The Reportof the Royal Commissionon AboriginalPeoples,Peo-

ple to People, Nation to Nation, forthrightlyelaborates proposalsthroughwhich AboriginalPeoples would be formally recognized asnations and would control "nationalgovernments."75 reatynegotia-tions are now underwaywith respectto land andgovernancequestions

at around80 "tables" bringing together Aboriginaland governmentrepresentatives in different parts of Canada.76A new territory,Nunavut, has been created specifically to provide Aboriginalauton-

omy: 85 percent of the territory'spopulation s Inuit. Under an agree-ment with the federal andBritishColumbiagovernments, he Nisga'apeople would be formally recognizedas citizens of the Nisga'a nationand their governmentwould have supreme law-making authority n

key areas.77

Nonetheless, these accommodations to Aboriginal nationalism

havereal limitations.The Nisga'a Agreement s highly unpopularwithpublic opinion in British Columbia and has been the subject of

widespreadcondemnationby politicians andcommentators,preciselybecause it directly contradictsthe idea of Canada as a single nation.After being formally embracedby the responsible federal minister,Jane Stewart,78 he report of the Royal Commission on AboriginalPeoples promptlyfell from public view. As to Nunavut,it remains a

territoryof the federal governmentand, as such, does not directlychallenge the now prevailingview thatfederalismcannot be basedon

74 Alan C. Cairns, "Searchingfor MultinationalCanada:The Rhetoric of Confu-

sion," (unpublishedpaper),9.75 "A first crucialcomponentof the renewedrelationshipwill be nationrebuilding

and nation recognition. All our recommendationsfor governance, treaty pro-cesses, and land andresourcesare based on the nation as the basic political unityof Aboriginal peoples. Only nations can have a right of self-determination"

(Renewal: A Twenty-YearCommitment,Report of the Royal Commission on

AboriginalPeoples [Ottawa:Ministerof Supplyand Services Canada,1996],5).76 Peter H. Russell, "ConstitutionalPolitics in a Multi-National Society," Cite

libre,Fall 2000, 59.77 Ibid.78 MinisterStewartoutlined an "actionplan" for implementing he Report "Notes

for an Addressby the HonourableJane Stewarton the occasion of the unveilingof 'GatheringStrength-Canada's AboriginalActionPlan,' Ottawa,Ontario,Jan-

uary7, 1998").

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culturalor nationaldifference.The ill-fatedCharlottetownAccord didcontainmeasuresthroughwhich Canadian ederalismwould requireanew level of government tructured n the basis of AboriginalPeoples

butwas, of course,massivelyrejected n a referendum.Beyond that,whatever ts limitations,the acceptanceof Aborigi-

nal nationalism n Canadianpolitics has not served the largercause ofmultinationalismby restoring the former role of binationalism or

recognitionof a francophonenation.Indeed,the two dimensions haveremainedvery much in competition.At most, Canadianpolitical lifehas simply exchangedone formof internalnation for another.This, in

turn, points up the greatest challenge facing multinationalism inCanada: t seeks to bring togetherfundamentallyopposed notions of

the "nation." This contradiction,which once again is unique toCanada,has also been largelyoverlookedby the theoreticiansof Cana-dian multinationalism.

Contradictory Bases of Canadian Multinationalism

Unlike the old notion of Canadianbinationalism,the new multina-tional idea seeks to combinetwo very differentconceptionsof nation:nations thatoriginatedwith white settlercolonies, while subsequently

acquiringotherpopulations,versus nations that consist of AboriginalPeoples. As best as I can determine,once again Canadais unique inthis-at least amongthe stateswith which it is normallycompared.

The differences between the two conceptionsof nation are obvi-

ous, but no less profoundfor that. The Quebec and Acadian nationshaveseen themselvesas distinctnations for centuries; he idea of Abo-

riginalnations,at least in its contemporary orm, is a phenomenonofthe last few decades.The nationsof Quebec, Acadia and, if need be,

anglophoneCanada,sharea commonEuropeanheritagethatcontinues

to formthe basis of conceptsof justice, authorityand the good society.The First Nations claim a very differentheritage, which produces adifferentconception of the appropriatepolitical order.79The criteriafor determiningmembershipn the nation arenot the same. Nor is therole of languagein contemporaryife of the nation. At the beginningof the twentieth century, 60 Aboriginal languages were spoken in

Canada;now only four areregularlyspoken. Accordingto the Assem-

79 See the argument n Menno Boldt and J. Anthony Long, "TribalTraditionsand

European-Western olitical Ideologies: The Dilemma of Canada's Native Indi-

ans," in Menno Boldt, J. AnthonyLong and Leroy Little Bear, eds., The Quest

for Justice: Aboriginal Peoples and Aboriginal Erights (Toronto:UniversityofToronto Press, 1985), 333-46; and Richard Sigurdson, "Canada as a Multi-National Federation:PromisesandProblems"(unpublishedpaper).

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bly of First Nations half of Aboriginal adults and three quartersof

Aboriginalchildrendo notknow an Aboriginal anguage.80Beyond that, there is a profound asymmetry in the political

resources and infrastructuresnjoyedby the Aboriginaland non-Abo-riginal Nations. Thus, the discourse of equality and nation-to-nation

negotiationlends itself reasonablywell to relations between the Que-bec nationand the rest of Canadaandeven the Acadiannation andtherest of New Brunswick. But the disparitiesbetweenAboriginalnationsand the rest of Canadaaresimplytoo greatfor this discourseto hold.81If anything, it is highly deceptive. Finally, the Aboriginaland non-

Aboriginalnationsarenot well differentiatederritorially.In short,the "three-nation"conceptionand similarversions of a

multinationalCanada seek to equate fundamentallydifferentconcep-tions of the nation. Not only do they lack theoreticalcoherence,but

they cannotprovidethe bases for an effective social movement.Typi-cally, adherents o the multinationalcause havebeen longtimesympa-thizerswith a specific form of nation,whether t be Aboriginalor non-

Aboriginal. They have difficulty sharing a common discourse, letalone agreeingon programmatic oals.

In sum, Canadianstatenationalismhas served,both directlyand

directly, to undermine the historicalbasis for recognitionof internal

nations within Canada,focused on a francophonenation centredinQuebec. A new form of internalnation,based on AboriginalPeoples,has emerged but it has secured only limited recognition.Nor has itsrelative success served to give new life to the older sense of internalnation. Ratherthan allies, the two have been competitors,effectivelystultifyingeach other. This internalcontradictiongoes a long way to

explainingthe failure of theorizationsof Canadianmultinationalismohave an impacton Canadianpolitical life.

Constructing a Multinational Order

Among critics of a multinationalCanadathere is a common fear that

any movementin this directionwill be self-reinforcingand could lead

straightto the break up of Canada.82Yet, this ignores the extent to

which members of minority nations may have dual identities: theirnational identities are coupled with continuing identification withCanadaas a whole. Ratherthanleading to the abandonment f Cana-dian identity, recognition of minority nations could have quite the

opposite effect since it would show that minoritynationalidentities

80 FCFAdu Canada,Parlons-nous Dialogue (Ottawa:2001), 32.

81 Cairns,"Searching or MultinationalCanada,"12.

82 See, for instance,Sigurdson"Canadaas a Multi-NationalFederation."

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Canadaand theMultinationalState

are indeed legitimate in Canada.The dramaticpost-Meech surge in

support or Quebecindependencewas driven,not by some recentshiftof powerto Quebec,but by the perceptionthat there was no place in

Canada or those who identifiedwith Quebec.Still, there are some hardquestions about a multinationalorderthatwould need to be faced. Defining Canadain terms of its internal

nations, if only in part,may cause an estrangementand weaken thesense of common civic responsibility among Canadians. Thus, itwould be important hat the members of the respective nations con-tinue to have some direct involvement in common political institu-

tions, if only to pursuetheirdistinctobjectives, and that these institu-tions be perceivedas operating airly.83Perhapsthere could be estab-

lished a purely "functionalcitizenship" that would in turnsupporta"constitutionalpatriotism."84 ecognitionof rightsand distinctivenesscould be secured on a reciprocalbasis, creating a process of mutual

recognition.85Once it is established that Canadianfederalism cannot be based

on 10 equalprovincesbut must come to terms with a wide varietyofinternalnations,then the door is open to highly complex institutions.

Conceivably,all this could be costly for the weakerminoritynations-in effect, for Aboriginalones.86Yet, it is hard to see how these con-

cernsjustify the obstinatepursuitof a vision of a unitarynation-statewhich,by all indications, s doomed to failure.

The Challenge of Multinationalism

The fact of the matter is that while many states are multinational ntheircomposition very few of them actuallyfunction as multinationalstates.87 witzerland s often cited as a model yet it hardly qualifies:it

83 See the discussionin Kymlicka,FindingOur Way,171-81.84 FrancoisRocher,"Citoyennet6 onctionnelle et Etat multinational:pour une cri-

tique dujacobinismejuridiqueet de la quete d'homogeneit6,"in Michel Coutu,PierreBosset, Caroline GendreauandDaniel Villeneuve, eds., Droitsfondamen-taux et citoyennete. Une citoyennete ragmentee, limitee, illusoire? (Montreal:Les EditionsTh6mis,2000), 201-35.

85 MichaelIgnatieff,TheRightsRevolution Toronto:Anansi,2000), 120.86 Cairns,"Searching or MultinationalCanada,"18.87 Resnick cites as examples of multinationalfederations Switzerland, Belgium,

Spain, India and "until recently" Czechslovakia, Yugoslavia and the Soviet

Union (Resnick, "Towarda MultinationalFederalism,"71). In effect, he followsKymlicka's 1995 treatment of Switzerland (MulticulturalCitizenship, 13). In

Finding Our Way,Kymlickaincludes Switzerlandwith Belgium, Spain, Russia,India,MalaysiaandNigeria (128 and 135). For his part,FerranRequejorestrictsthe list to Belgium, Canada,India and Spain in "Federalism and the Quality of

Democracy in Plurinational Contexts: Present Shortcomings and Possible

Improvements.The Case of Catalonia" unpublishedpaper).

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does not even have internal nations. Spain does not recognize itsmultinationalismo anyreal extent.Nigeriahas been cited,butits fed-eralism is resolutely territorial.Malaysia might be seen as multina-

tional on the basis of the central state's asymmetricrelationswith thetwo Borneo states, althoughthe official state discourse has soughtto

implant a new resolutely Malaysian national identity. Belgium andIndia would clearly qualify as states thatfunction on a multi-nationalbasis. They,of course,do not have the distinctivelyCanadian ituation

wherebythe territorialprincipleof federalismhas competedwith, and

ultimately defeated, the notion that federalism might accommodateculturaland nationaldifference.Not only was federalismbased on thelatterprinciplefrom the outset, but all the units do possess such dis-

tinctiveness.Yet, neitherstatemay be attractivemodels for those whoprize high levels of political stability.

However, there is a case of a multinationalstate in the makingwhich Canadiansmightfindespecially inspiring: he UnitedKingdom.While remaininga unitarystate,the UK has devolvedsignificantpow-ers to Scotland,andto a lesser extent, to Wales,creatinga regimethatis highly asymmetrical.Thus, the UK has not been stymied by the

problem which is so frequently cited to argue multinationalism's

impracticality n Canada: he asymmetrybetweenQuebecandthe rest

of Canadain preferencesfor the roles of federaland provincialgov-ernments.

Yet, these reforms have been possible preciselybecausemultina-tionalism itself has a legitimacy that it does not in Canada.Britain's

political culturehas long been firmlymultinational,as can be seen inthe unquestionedpracticesof maintainingdistinct sportingteams forWales and Scotland, organizing the British military along national

lines, or issuing Scottish notes throughthe Bank of Scotland.Any ofthese practiceswould be inconceivable n Canada.Forthatmatter, he

very term "nation"is regularlyused by Britain'spolitical leadership.That too is inconceivable n contemporaryCanada.For its part, Canada remains undeniably multinationalin its

underlyingcomposition;indeed,its "internalnations"aremore mobi-lized than ever before. In 1995, the most importantof these nationscame breathtakingly lose to a mandatefor secession. If only for this

reason,Canadianpolitical theoristshave been in the forefrontof theo-

rizing the multinational tate.Yet, these schemes remainno more thanthat: speculative schemes whose circulation is essentially limited to

the academy.As we have argued,Canada'spoliticalinstitutionsshow little evi-dence of multinationalism. ndeed,Canadahas lost the historical radi-tions upon which multinationalismmight have been fashioned.Bina-

tionalism, or at least the recognition of a Quebec nation, has fallenvictim to state nationalismand the new principlesit has put in place:

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thatfederalism s exclusivelyterritorialand thatall culturaldifferenceshould be equatedwithinmulticulturalism.The limitedprogressmadein accommodatingAboriginalnationalism has not broughtthe Cana-

dianpolity any closer to a comprehensivemultinationalism;he inher-ent tensions between Quebec and Aboriginal nationalism have been

greatlyheightenedby the ways in which each of themhas been treated

by the Canadian tate.And yet, if Canada has not joined the very small circle of for-

mally constitutedmultinationalstates, neither has it joined the far

largercircle of nation-states.Too much of the populationrefuses tosee itself exclusively,or even pre-eminently, n terms of the Canadiannation.

Given this stateof affairs, t has been temptingto suggest thatinfact Canadahas transcended he alternativesof nation-stateand multi-national state to constitute something totally new: a "post-modernstate" that points the way to an emerging world cosmopolitanism.Flatteringas such a notion may be, it is fundamentallymistaken.Instead of creating something new Canada is simply caught in an

impassebetween two established notions of the state, and the nation:the attemptto establish a Canadian nation-statehas run up againstCanada'sunderlyingmultinationalism.On the basis of presenttrends,

ratherthan being the harbingerof something radically new Canadaseems headed for quite a different distinction:to be among the laststatesto try to become a nation-state,and to risk its very existence intheprocess.

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