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8/11/2019 McCole - Simmel and Religion

1/29

Georg Simmel and the Philosophy of Religion

Author(s): John McColeReviewed work(s):Source: New German Critique, No. 94, Secularization and Disenchantment (Winter, 2005), pp.8-35Published by: New German CritiqueStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30040949.

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2/29

Georg

Simmel

and

the

Philosophy

ofReligion

John

McCole

The

ordinary

dea is: here is the natural

world,

there the transcenden-

tal,

we

belong

to one of the

two.

No,

we

belong

to

a

third,

nexpress-

ible

realm,

of which both the natural and the transcendentalare

reflections,

projections,

alsifications,

nterpretations.l

The authorof this

enigmatic ragmentmight

be describedwith the term

Max Weberdenied to himself,as religiouslymusical,in this case with a

leaning

to

mysticism.

He

belonged

to those central

European

ntellectu-

als

who circulated n an "interstellar

egion"

betweenacademicand bohe-

mian

life and

who,

as Paul

Mendes-Flohr

as

shown,

found themselves

powerfully

attracted

o

religion

and

mysticism

in the first

decade of

the

twentieth

century.2

But

while the

resurgence

of a wide

variety

of reli-

gious

impulses

among

his

Wilhelmine

contemporaries

ntrigued

him,

he

was not

among

those

eager promoters

of a "new

religion"

being

culti-

vated

by publishers

ike

Eugen

Diederichs.3

He

was,

in

fact,

Georg

Sim-

mel,

a

figure

betterknownas one of the founders f

sociology.

To

point

out Simmel's interest

n

religion

and

mysticism

is in no

way

to diminishhis

credentialsas

a social

analyst.

Indeed,

the

foundinggen-

eration of

European

sociologists,

most

famously

Emile Durkheim and

1.

Georg

Simmel,

FragmenteundAufsatze.

Aus dem

NachlafJ

und

Veroffentlichun-

gen

der letztenJahre

(Munich:

Drei

Masken-Verlag,

923)

3.

2. Paul

Mendes-Flohr,

"Martin

Buber's

Conception

of

God,"

Divided Passions

(Detroit:WayneStateUP, 1991)240-41.

3. See FriedrichWilhelm

Graf,

"Das Laboratorium

er

religiSsen

Moderne.Zur

'Verlagsreligion'

es

Eugen

Diederichs

Verlag,"Versammlungsort

odernerGeister:

Der

Eugen

Diederichs

Verlag,

AuJbruchns Jahrhundert er

Extreme,

ed.

Gangolf

Htibinger

(Munich:

Diederichs,

1996).

8


3/29

John McCole 9

Max

Weber,

regarded religion

as a

central

object

of concern. But

although

Simmel

has been

enjoying

a

renaissance

ately,

the

same

can-

not be said for his persistentattentionto the question of religion. In

fact,

his interest n

religion

is often

regarded

as

something

of an embar-

rassment,

even

in much of the best recentwork.4In

Germany,

here

has

long

been a streamof interest

n

it,

including

a literature hat

emerged

from

theological

institutes

and,

more

recently,

from a

revival

of the

sociology

of

religion.5

VolkhardKrech's

comprehensive

and

sophisti-

cated

monograph,Georg

Simmels

Religionstheorie,

has

eclipsed

much

of the

previous

literatureand has

set

a new

standard

or

discussion.6

But in English,no one has heeded the pointer by HarryLiebersohn n

his

chapter

on Simmel in Fate and

Utopia

in

German

Sociology.

Lieber-

sohn asserted

that,

contrary

o his

reputation

as a

champion

of moder-

nity,

Simmel harboreda

longing

for

unity

in

the form of a "secularized

Kingdom

of God." This

utopian onging,

which was

essentially

a subli-

mated form of

Protestantism,

was a crucial element in his

thought

and

Liebersohnclaimed that

it forces

us to revise the received view of

Sim-

mel as

a

tragic

thinker.7

Paul Mendes-Flohrhas made

the

suggestive

argument

hat MartinBuber's

dialogicaltheology

was

partly

nspiredby

Simmel's

sociology

of the

"interhuman,"

nd that a returnto his one-

time

teacher's

sociology

enabled him to overcome

the

inadequacies

of

his

early

"Erlebnis-mysticism."8

ut

apart

rom Krech's

study,

there has

4.

See,

for

instance,

he

surveys

of Simmel'swork

by

David

Frisby,Georg

Simmel

(London

andNew York:Tavistock

Publications,

984);

Frisby,

Sociological

Impressionism

(New

York:

Routledge, 1992);

Werner

Jung, Georg

Simmelzur

Einfiihrung

Hamburg:

Junius,

1990);

Ralph

Leck,

Georg

Simmel and Avant-Garde

ociology

(Amherst,

NY:

Humanity

Books,

2000);

and Klaus

Lichtblau,

Georg

Simmel

(Frankfurt/Main:

ampus,

1997).Many

of Simmel's

texts

on

religion

are collected n

Simmel,Gesammelte chrifien

zur

Religionssoziologie,

d.

Horst-Jtirgen

elle

(Berlin:

Duncker&

Humbolt,

1989),

and in

English

as

Georg

Simmelon

Religion

New

Haven,

CT:Yale

UP,

1997). Unfortunately,

his

collectionomits

Simmel's

essay

"On

Pantheism" s

well

as

an

earlyanalysis

of

spiritualism.

5. From a Catholic

perspective,

Peter-Otto

Ulrich,

Immanente

Transzendenz.

Georg

Simmels

Entwurf

einer

nach-christlichen

Religionsphilosophie Frankfurt/Main:

Peter

Lang,

1981);

from

an

Evangelicalperspective,

Hartmut

Kret,

Religiise

Ethik

und

dialogisches

Denken.

Das

WerkMartin

Bubers

in der

Beziehung

zu

Georg

Simmel,

Stu-

dien zur

evangelischen

Ethik,

Bd.

16

(Gtitersloh:

Giltersloher

Verlagshaus

Mohn,

1985).

6.

Volkhard

Krech,

Georg

Simmels

Religionstheorie Ttibingen:

Mohr

Siebeck,

1998).

Krech

argues

hat

Simmel had

a

coherent

heory

of

religion

that

is relevant o cur-

rent ssues in thesociologyof religion.

7.

Harry

Liebersohn,

Fate and

Utopia

in

German

Sociology (Cambridge,

MA:

MIT

P,

1988)

153-56.

8.

Paul

Mendes-Flohr,

rom

Mysticism

o

Dialogue:

MartinBuber

s

Transforma-

tion

of

GermanSocial

Thought

Detroit:

Wayne

State

UP,

1989).


4/29

10 Georg

Simmeland the

Philosophy

of

Religion

been

little interest in the reverse

question

as to whether reflection on

religionmight

have influenced he courseof Simmel'swork.

Of the many possiblereasons or thisneglect,threeare worthconsider-

ing.

One

is that we

may tacitly

be

accepting

a

stereotypical

efinition

of

modernity

as

antithetical

o

religion;

since

Simmel

was a theorist

of

modernity,

his attention o

religion

must thereforebe a minor

topic.

A

second

reason

may

be that we still fail to

appreciate

he

many ways

in

which discourses of

religion

were central elements of the intellectual

field in Wilhelmine

Germany.9

But as Thomas

Nipperdey,

David Black-

bourn,

Helmut

Walser

Smith and othershave

demonstrated,

eligion

was

anythingbut a fading residue;as Blackbournargues, it "continued o

color

the

way contemporarieshought

about

arge

areasof their lives" as

well as to

help shape public

debate.l0

In recenthistoricalwork an

older,

linear

theory

of secularization

as

yielded

to a

picture

hat is far livelier

and less

tidy. Particularly mong

the educatedmiddle

classes,

religious

innovationwas

rife,

and

decliningallegiance

to the establishedchurches

went

together

with an interest n new

forms of

religious

belief and

prac-

tice

that

Nipperdey

has called

"wandering eligiosity."ll

A

third

possible

factor concerns Simmel

personally.

His

contemporaries

iffered about

whether he had a

religious

sensibility:Siegfried

Kracauer

ategorically

denied

it,

while

Margarete

usman

nsistedthat

religion

and even

mysti-

cism

were

among

his

deepest

impulses.12

Whatever

his inclinationto

religion

in

general,

what has counted

for

posterity

specifically

concerns

Simmel's

relationship

o Judaism

and Jewish

identity.

The verdict was

issued

by

Franz

Rosenzweig,

who

regarded

Simmel

as a

living

carica-

ture of the

assimilated,

elf-denying

German

Jew.

Perhaps

Rosenzweig's

rejection

has had a

lasting

effect

by disqualifying

Simmel

as

competent

to speakon issuesof religion.13

9.

For

various

aspects,

see

Gangolf

Hilbinger,

Kulturprotestantismus

nd

Politik

(Tibingen:

J.C.B.

Mohr,

1994); Harry

Liebersohn,

Religion

and

Industrial

Society:

The

Protestant

Social

Congress

in Wilhelmine

Germany Philadelphia:

Transactions

of the

American

Philosophical

Society,

1986);

and HelmutWalser

Smith,

German

Nationalism

and

Religious

Conflict Princeton:

Princeton

UP,

1995).

10. David

Blackbourn,

The

Long

Nineteenth

Century

New

York,

Oxford:

Oxford

UP,

1997)

283

ff.

See also Thomas

Nipperdey,

"Die Unkirchlichen

und

die

Religion,"

Deutsche

Geschichte

1866-1918,

vol.

I (Munich:

C.H.

Beck,

1990)

507-530.

11.

Nipperdey

521.

12. Siegfried Kracauer,"GeorgSimmel,"Das Ornamentder Masse (Frankfurt/

Main:

Suhrkamp,

1963);

Margarete

usman,

Die

geistige

Gestalt

Georg

Simmels

Tilbin-

gen:

J.C.B.

Mohr,

1959).

13.

See

Hans

Liebeschiitz,

Von

Georg

Simmelzu Franz

Rosenzweig.

Studien

zum

Jiidischen

Denken

m deutschenKulturbereich

Toibingen:

.C.B.

Mohr,

1970).


5/29

John McCole

11

Simmel

would

likely

have found this

neglect

of his interest n

religion

puzzling.

He wrote on the

topic

throughout

his

career,

and he

taught

courses on the sociology and philosophyof religion repeatedlyat the

University

of Berlin.14He considered

his statements bout

religion

to

be

politicalprovocations.

As

is

well

known,

Dietrich

Schtifer,

whose

poison-

ous evaluationof Simmel's

work

destroyed

his chances of an

appoint-

ment

at

Heidelberg,deplored

Simmel's elevation of

society

above state

and church

as "corrosive" f

authority.

But his

position

on

religion

itself

was heterodox

enough

to

have

earnedhim the

enmity

of

conservatives,

had

they

noticed

it.15 When he chose a

topic

for MartinBuber's mono-

graphic series, Die Gesellschaft,whose contributors ncluded Buber,

Werner

Sombart,

Eduard

Bernstein,

Gustav

Landauer,

and Ellen

Key

among many

other

representatives

f the

progressiveopposition

n cen-

tral

Europe,

he settledon

religion

and wrote his most extensivetreatment

of the

sociology

of

religion.16

Simmel had

initially

consideredcontribut-

ing

a book on the situationof

women,

and

the

pair

of

possible

choices

suggests

the

importance

he

accorded o

religion

and to what he called

"femaleculture" s transformative

orces

n the

contemporary

orld.

Not

only

was Simmel's

interest

n

religion politically

charged,

t was

also

an

important,ongoing problem

n the

development

of his

thought.

He once

expressed

frustration

t not

producing

a

comprehensive

reat-

ment of his ideas on

religion,

which were an

integralpart

of his

attempt

to come to

terms

with what he called "the

tragedy

of

culture."l7

One

can

begin

to

appreciate

Simmel's

ambivalence

about

religion,

and its

significance

in

his

thinking,by examining

its

place

in the

argument

of

Philosophical

Culture

(1911).

From the time

of

Schopenhauer

and

14. See the list of Simmel's "Vorlesungenund Ubungen"in Kurt Gassen and

Michael

Landmann, ds.,

Buch

des

Dankes an

Georg

Simmel

(Berlin:

Duncker&

Hum-

bolt,

1958)

345-349. At one

point

Simmeldescribed

his seminaron the

philosophy

of reli-

gion

to HeinrichRickertas his "most

satisfying,"despite

(or

perhaps

because

of)

its

being

"one

of

the most difficult

at a

German

university."

ee Buch des Dankes 98.

15.

Schifer's

letter s

published

n Buch

des

Dankes26-27. Simmel intended wo of

his

short,

"popular" ieces

on

religion

thatwere

published

n

a non-academic

enue to

be

"most

unpopular."

ee

Simmel,

Georg

Simmel

Gesamtausgabe hereafter:GSG],

Bd.

1, 7,

ed. OttheinRammstedt

Frankfurt/Main:

uhrkamp,

989-)

363.

16.

For discussions

of the

series,

see Paul

Mendes-Flohr,

rom

Mysticism

o

Dia-

logue:

MartinBuber

s

Transformation

f

GermanSocial

Thought

Detroit:

Wayne

State

UP, 1989) 83-92; and ErhardR. Wiehn,"Zu Martin Bubers Sammlung'Die Gesell-

schaft,'"

n Jahrbuch

r

Soziologiegeschichte 1991] (Opladen:

Leske &

Budrich,

1992)

183-208.

17.

See,

for

instance,

he

letters

cited in GSG 10: 413-415.


6/29

12

Georg

Simmel

and the

Philosophyof Religion

Nietzsche

(1907)

onward,

he

had been

exploring

multiple paths

to

address the discomfortsof a

modernity

hat his

sociology undoubtedly

wished to affirm. Two of these pathswere art and female culture,and

recent critical attentionhas focused on these. His

hopes

for female cul-

ture,

in

particular,

have been read as a

pioneering

effort to

produce

a

theory

of

gender

at the

inception

of classical

sociological theory.18

But

the

penultimate

ection of

Philosophical

Culture,

which sets

up

the final

meditation

on how female culture

may

show

a

way

out of

"the

tragedy

of

culture,"

consists

of a

pair

of

essays

on the

philosophy

of

religion.

While these

essays,

"The

Personality

of

God"

and "The Problemof the

Religious Situation,"were not Simmel's final statementon religion,

they

do

represent

the most

developed stage

of his

thinking

about it.

Read

together,

heir

questions

form a

counterpoint:

o

what extent

might

the cultural and semantic

resources

of

Christianity,

even after its

demise,

support

the

complex

forms

of

identity

that were

emerging

in

modernity?

And how far

might

one

go

in

interpreting

he

new wave of

religious

strivings

as

having

a transformative

otential,

one that

hinted

at

entirely

new

forms and

conceptions

of

subjectivity?

n these

essays,

Simmel

pushed

his

explorations

of

relativism,

emporality,

ubjectivity,

and

identity

to their

limits,

proposing

"a radical

refashioning

of our

inner life."

In the

process,

he

anticipated questions

that

Benjamin,

Heidegger,

and

otherswould

pursue

n the

next

generation.19

18.

For a

contemporary

ritique,

ee

Marianne

Weber,

"Die

Frau

und die

Objektive

Kultur,"

Logos

IV

(1913):

328-363.

For

analysis,

see

Heinz-Jtirgen

Dahme,

"Frauenund

Geschlechterfrage

ei Herbert

Spencer

und

Georg

Simmel,"

Kolner

Zeitschriftfiir

Soziol-

ogie

und

Sozialpsychologie

8

(1986):

490-509;

Suzanne

Vromen,

"Georg

Simmeland the

CulturalDilemma of

Women,"

Historyof European

deas

8.4/5

(1987):

563-579;

Klaus

Lichtblau,"Erosand Culture:GenderTheory n Simmel,Tinnies, andWeber,"Telos 82

(1989):

89-110;

Lawrence

Scaff,

Fleeing

the

Iron

Cage (Berkeley:

U California

P,

1989)

144-149;

Katja

Eckhardt,

Die

Auseinandersetzung

wischenMarianne Weberund

Georg

Simmel

uber

die

"Frauenfrage"

Stuttgart:

bidem,

2000);

Ursula

Menzer,

Subjektive

und

objective

Kultur

Georg

Simmels

Philosophie

der Geschlechter

vor dem

Hintergrund

seines

Kultur-Begriffs

Pfaffenweiler:

Centaurus,

1992);

Ralph

Leck,

"An Avant-Garde

Sociology

of

Women,"

Georg

Simmel

and Avant-Garde

ociology (Amherst,

NY: Human-

ity

Books,

2000)

131-165. Simmel's

writings

on

female

culture

and

related

topics

are

gathered

n

Georg

Simmel,

Schriften

zur

Philosophie

und

Soziologie

der

Geschlechter,

eds.

Heinz-Jtirgen

ahmeand KlausChristian

Kihnke

(Frankfurt/Main:

uhrkamp,

985)

and

Georg

Simmel,

On

Women,

exuality,

and

Love,

ed.

Guy

Oakes

(New

Haven,

CT:

YaleUP, 1984);bothcollectionshave valuable ntroductions.

19.

Simmel,

"Das Problemder

religidsen Lage,"

GSG

14:

370;

"The Problemof

Religion Today,"

n

Simmel,

Essays

on

Religion

9.

Though

I

have consulted

he

published

translations,

have modifiedor retranslatedmost

of

those

I cite.


7/29

John

McCole

13

I.

Tragediesof

Culture

Simmel's

analysis

of

the

modern

"tragedy

of culture"

s well

known,

but its religious referents have often been overlooked. In this quasi-

Hegelian, expressivist

model,

culture s a dialectic of

objectification

and

reappropriation:

ubjectsexpress

themselves

in

objective

culturalforms

in which

they

later

recognize

themselves,

producing

"subjective"

cul-

ture. In its

heightened

orms,

and

particularly

n the German raditionof

Bildung,

this

process

is

thought

of as

leading

to

an

interweaving

of sub-

ject

and

object

that enables

individuals

o unfold and

perfect

their inner

totality.

Cultures

egularly

outgrow

old

forms,

but

historically, hey

have

continued o createnew ones thathelp producesubjectiveculture.In the

experience

of

European

modernity,

his

process goes awry, leading

to a

disjunction

between

objective

and

subjective

culture

and a failure to

produce subjective

cultivation.But

why

should

modernity

be

incapable

of

generating

new forms of

objective

culture

with

binding

force and

instead lead

to a crisis

of

subjectivity?

Simmel's

answer can be traced

back to his Introduction o the

Science

of

Morals

(1892),

where he had

argued

that the

modem

ethical

predicament

esults from the demolition

of foundationalabsolutes. His "Self-Portrait"esumed his line of

argu-

ment with a particularemphasis on its religious dimension. "Criti-

cism,"

he

asserted,

had

simply

demolished

the contents of "the

historical

religions."20

This

diagnosis

recalls

Max Weber'smore evoca-

tive account

of disenchantment

s the

intellectualization

f the

world,

and

Nietzsche's

description

of

the rationalization f

myth

in The Birth

of Tragedy:

cultures

begin

to demand internal

consistency

and eviden-

tiary

soundness

from

their

myths,

and

this

Socratic

(or perhapsmerely

philological) enterprise

nds

by

depriving

ndividuals

of

binding

values

and leaving them adrift. In this account,generic "modernity"s a pos-

treligious

society

facing

the deathof God.

The

tragedy

of culture is

ultimately

its failure to

produce subjective

cultivation,

or

even,

perhaps,

coherent

subjectivity.

This statement

expresses

the tenor

of

Simmel's somewhat

different,

more

sociological

analysis

of this

failure in The

Philosophy of Money

(1900),

which he

summarized

more

pointedly

in

Schopenhauer

and Nietzsche

(1907)

in

relation to a

specific religious

situation: he demise of

Christianity.

n

this account,the problemwas not so muchthe rationalization f objec-

tive

culture as the

increasingly

impenetrable

network

of

intermediary

20.

"Anfang

einer unvollendeten

Selbstdarstellung,"

uch des

Dankes

10.


8/29

14

Georg

Simmeland

the

Philosophy

of

Religion

means in social life. Humans

are

"indirect

beings":

n

"higher

cultures"

we find ourselves

"forced,

n order o reach our

goals,

to

proceed

along

increasingly ong and difficultpaths"that obscure "thesimple triad of

desire-means-end."While this is

inherently

human,

and

potentially

lib-

erating,

cultures

may

reach a

degree

of

complexity

in which

the

means

become fetishized and

the ends vanish

behind them. This

"technology"

of means

changes, through

a dialectic of

enlightenment,

rom a liberat-

ing

device into an

imprisoning

pparatus.21

ntangled

n

this

apparatus,

the

subjectexperiences

a kind of

vertigo

and finds himself

condemned

o

"restless

searching,"

ost

on

"impenetrable riss-crossingpaths,"asking

"anxiousquestions"and finding only "tumultuous onfusion."22 n The

Philosophy of

Money,

he articulated his

problem

in the formula

that

money

has

taken

the

place

of

God.

His

point

was not the trivial observa-

tion

that modems

worship

money,

but that the

relativity

of interminable

chains

of meanshas

replaced

he

finality

and

certainty

f

absolute

nds.23

In

Schopenhauer

and

Nietzsche,

Simmel describes

modern

Europe-

ans'

experience

of this situation

as

having

been

decisively

shaped

by

the

legacy

of

Christianity.

The evolved

society

of the Roman

Empire

was

similarly

afflicted

by

a

proliferation

f

means,

and

Christianity

had

offered a solution to such problems;now, the Christiansolution has

ceased

to

convince

modems.

Nevertheless,

ts

ghost

continuesto

haunt

modernity

n

the form

of a

deep longing

for absolute

goals:

"This

long-

ing

is the

legacy

of

Christianity,

which has

bequeathed

o

us

the need

for a definitivum

n the movements

of life

-

a need that

persists

as

an

empty urge

toward

a

goal

that

has become

inaccessible."24We

are

haunted

by

the

longing

not

only

for an absolute

goal,

but also

for a

strong

form

of

unity.25

This

longing

for

unity

had become

so

thoroughly

21.

Simmel,

Schopenhauer

und

Nietzsche,

GSG 10:

176;

Schopenhauer

and

Nietzsche,

trans.Helmut

Loiskandl,

Deena

Weinstein,

nd Michael Weinstein

Urbana:

U

Illinois

P,

1991)

3-4. As Michael

andDeena Weinstein

point

out

in their

ntroduction,

im-

mel's use of the term

"technology"

o describe this

apparatus

of means adumbrates

Heidegger's

analysis

(xxviii).

22.

Schopenhauer

ndNietzsche

177-178;

Schopenhauer

nd

Nietzsche

4-5.

23.

Philosophie

des

Geldes,

GSG

6:

305 f.

24.

Schopenhauer

und Nietzsche

178;

Schopenhauer

and Nietzsche 5

(translation

modified).

The motif

of a

longing

left behind

by Christianity

lso

appears

n The

Philoso-

phy

of Money,

GSG 6: 491-492.

Simmel's

view

recalls

Weber's

mplicit

argument

about

the Protestant thic: its unrecognizedorce,woven into the fabricof culture, ives on.

25.

"Vom

Heil

der

Seele,"

in GSG 7:

110;

"On he Salvation

of the

Soul,"

in

Essays

on

Religion

30. Simmel's

descriptions

f formalsocial

processes

have often been

charac-

terized

as ahistoricalwhen

compared

with

Weber's

particular

istorical

rajectories.

n this

case,

however,

Simmel identified

a

specific,

historical ourceof the

longing

for

unity.


9/29

John

McCole

15

embedded in

European

culture that it survived belief in

Christianity.

Modem

Europe

was not

just

generically

postreligious

but

specifically

a

post-Christian society.

What,

then,

was left of

religion?

And

what,

if

anything,

did

Simmel

think was to be made of

Christianity's

remains? In his work

before

Philosophical

Culture,

Simmel

had

already

made two moves

that

asserted the

autonomy

and the

continuing

presence

of the

religious.

The

first was

epistemological:

Simmel

argued

that the corrosive

effects

of

"enlightened"

criticism do not

destroy religion

without

remainder;

instead,

they

purify

it. His

writings

on

religion

balance two

assertions:

not

only specific dogmas,

but all

religious

contents will

collapse

under

the

scrutiny

of

criticism;

however,

it is shallow to think that the

Enlight-

enment has

thereby exposed religion

as a

mere

falsehood

or

projection.

Confidence in the

historical

religions

has

eroded,

and this was

a soci-

etal fact that must be

confronted. What

survived,

unscathed

by critique,

was

something

Simmel called

"religiosity,"

the

purely

subjective

atti-

tude of belief. In the

opening pages

of

Religion (1906/1912),

he

defended the

autonomy

of

religiosity

with one of his most

radical

state-

ments of

epistemological

pluralism.

His

gambit

was to demote

empiri-

cal "reality" to just one reality

among

many - one of many possible

ways

of

world-making:

Reality

is

by

no means the world as

such,

but

only

one

world,

along-

side the worlds

of

art and

of

religion.

It

is

built

up

out of the same

materialsbut with differentforms and

presuppositions.

The

empiri-

cally

real world is

probably

he

ordering

of

elements

pragmatically

best

adjusted

o

promote

he

survivaland

development

of the

species

...

Thus

it

is our

purposes

and our

categoricalpresuppositions

hat

decidewhich "world"he soul creates,andthe realworld is only one

of

manypossible

worlds.26

On other occasions

Simmel

included

Epicureanism

and the view

of the

world as a

game

in

his series of

possible

and

equally

valid

ways

of

world-making.

His

pluralism

recalls

Weber's

conception

of

value-

spheres

in

the "IntermediateReflections"on the

sociology

of

religion.

But unlike Weber's

value-spheres,

Simmel's

"worlds"do

not

conflict.

"Theoretically,

hese different

nterpretations

f the

world

then

would be

no morelikely to hindereach otherthan would musical sounds be likely

26. Die

Religion,

GSG 10:

43-44;

"Religion,"Essays

on

Religion

140.


10/29

16

Georg

Simmeland the

Philosophy

of

Religion

to clash

with

colors."27

Nothing

forces us to make a

choice,

as

long

as

we are inclined to tolerate he inner

multiplicity

of the soul

-

and

per-

haps even to find value in it. This radical epistemological pluralism

suggests

that

religion might

survive in

contemporary

ulture,

though

perhaps

n an

unprecedented

orm.

II.

A

Religion of Modernity?

Functionalist

Temptations

Simmel's second move was to

argue

that the

religious

attitudecannot

be debunked

as an erroror an illusion because its foundations

persist

in

social

interaction.This is the burdenof his

sociology

of

religion,

which

offers a theory of what Durkheimprovocativelycalled "the eternal in

religion."

Simmel's

sociology

of

religion

was first sketched in "A Con-

tribution

to the

Sociology

of

Religion"

(1898)

and

most

fully

devel-

oped

in

the

second edition of

Religion (1912).

He

argues

that

subjective

religiosity

is

omnipresent,

lbeit

latent,

n all social

relationships.

Under

particular

conditions,

it

may crystallize

and become visible

in its own

right;

for

instance,

periods

of intense

patriotism

make

visible the latent

religious

moment n the individual's

elationship

o the

group.28

His

para-

digmatic

example

is the

experience

of

"faith,"

whose

originary

orm he

finds in interpersonalelationships.To have an ongoingrelationshipwith

someone

requires

in

varyingdegrees

of

intensity)

a

belief in them

-

not

just

that

they

exist,

but that one can

depend

on them

in

ongoing

recipro-

cal interaction.

For

Simmel,

this

interpersonal

aith is

analogous

o

reli-

gious

faith.

In

Sociology,

he described his faith

as

an

acknowledgment

f

the

irreducible

alterity

of our interlocutors

"the

fact of the Thou

[die

Tatsache

des

Du]."29

Without

t,

"society

as we know

it would not exist.

Our

capacity

to have faith

in

a

person

or

group

of

people

beyond

all

demonstrable vidence- indeed,often in spite of evidence to the con-

trary

is

one of the most stablebonds

holding

society

together."30

At

times,

Simmel's

exposition

of

"belief'

as

something

necessary

and

beneficial

for

maintaining

ocial bonds takes on

a

functionalist one and

27.

Die

Religion

2;

"Religion"

38.

28. Die

Religion

57;

"Religion"

153-154.

29. "Exkurs

iber

das Problem:Wie ist Gesellschaft

m6glich?"

Soziologie,

GSG

11:

45.

For the

influence

of this

conception

on

Buber,

see

Mendes-Flohr,

rom

Mysticism

o

Dialogue

25-47.

30. Die Religion 73; "Religion"170. Simmel stresses that it is "interindividual

forms

of

life,"

not individual

psychological

characteristics,

hat manifest his

relationship

with

religiosity.

For

instance,

see

"Zur

Soziologie

der

Religion,"

GSG 5:

278;

"A

Contri-

bution

o the

Sociology

of

Religion,"Essays

on

Religion

112-113.


11/29

John

McCole

17

begins

to

sound

like a

sociological

explanation

of the

origin

of

religion.

This functionalismsits

uneasily

beside his assertions

about

the

auton-

omy of the religious. Simmel would have regarded his as a misunder-

standing.

He

was,

he said

repeatedly,

nly examining

analogies

between

the

religious

and the

social;

the

logical sequence

of terms was

"religios-

ity

-

social

phenomena

-

objective religion,"

which

preserves

the

autonomy

of

religiosity.31

But we should not discountthis functionalist

moment too

easily.

It

is

the

legacy

of an

older,

deterministicmodel in

Simmel's

work: the

Spencerian

model of social evolution as a

progres-

sion from

unity through

social differentiation o a differentiated

unity.

Simmel's turnto neo-Kantian houghtand to Nietzsche had led him to

assert the

autonomy

of

subjectivity

and culture

vigorously,

but the

ghost

of

Spencer

was never

quite

laid to rest.

This

Spencerian

cheme remainsvisible in Simmel's middle and even

his late work. It recurs n

Philosophical

Culture,

where he describes t as

the

developmentalpath

of culturerather han of

society.32

t also

guides

his

account

of

the individual

and the social in

Religion.

There,

Simmel

first treats

the elements of

religiosity

that

promoteunity,

then those con-

flicting

tendencies

that

promote

the distinctiveness and

autonomy

of

individuals,

and

finally

the

conflicts that arise between the forces of

cohesion

and differentiation. In

purely

conceptual

erms,"

he

suggests,

a solution

[to

these

conflicts]

is

possible

here,

namely

a structure

of

the whole that is oriented toward the

independence

and the

stable

unity

of its

elements,

a

structure

ndeed that such

independence

and

unity

make

possible...

The

perfectsociety

would then

be thatwhich

consists of

perfect

individuals ...

Conceivably

... this

supraindivid-

ual

entity

might

be such that t

accepts

constructive

ontributions

nly

fromindividualswho arecenteredharmoniouslywithinthemselves.33

Simmel's

hypotheticals

are

not

empty placeholders.

He had been devel-

oping

an

interpretation

f

Christianity

hat described t as

providing ust

such a vision

of

differentiated

unity.

The

key

text was "On the Salva-

tion of the Soul"

(1903),

where he

had

described

his

concept

as demand-

ing

the realizationof "the ideal

of

his

own

self"

that

"every person

has

31. Die

Religion

8,

115;"Religion"

65,

211.

32. "DerBegriffunddieTrag6dieerKultur,"SG14:387;"On heConcept nd

Tragedy

of Culture" n

Simmel,

The

Conflict

n ModernCultureand Other

Essays,

ed.

K.

PeterEtzkorn

New

York: eachers

ollege

P,

Columbia

,

1968)

29.

33.

Die

Religion

9-90;

"Religion"

86.


12/29

18

Georg

Simmeland

the

PhilosophyofReligion

within him."34The Nietzschean overtones

of

"become

who

you

are"

[werde,

wer du

bist]

were not accidental: Simmel

argued

that

Nietzsche's hostilityto Christianity ested on a misunderstanding,ince

Christianity

had

actually pioneered

a form of radical ndividualism hat

was

compatible

in some

ways

with

his

intentions.35

n the

Christian

conception,

however,

the

flourishing

of individual

perfection

does not

lead

to

an

anarchy

of

unregulated ubjectivism,

because the fulfillment

of one's inner

nature,

he

"law

of

the

self,

is the same

as

being

obedi-

ent

to

God's

will,

living according

to

His

principles,

and . . .

[there-

fore]

in

harmony

with

the ultimate values of

being

itself."36 A

modernizedChristianity ould provide an appropriate ision for mod-

em

society,

a sustaining

deal of the ultimate

reconcilability

of

individu-

ation and social

unity.3

One

might

call this the functionalist

emptation

in Simmel's work. He was

certainly

not a

functionalist

n

the sense that

he assumed that

evolving

social

structureswould

automaticallygener-

ate

appropriate

orms of culture.In

fact,

he was

arguing

that

the

prob-

lem resulted from a dissonance between the

ways

social and cultural

processes promoted ndividuality.

However,

he was

tempted

o

put

forth

a

modernized,

agnostic

form of Christianmonotheism

as a vision that

reconciled

the

conflicting

demands

of individualization nd social inte-

gration

in Liebersohn's

erms,

as a

modem

utopian

vision. The

prob-

lem was that when

Simmel

took a closer look at

the

unity

of the

individual

in the

pieces

on

religion

in

Philosophical

Culture,

he

pros-

pects

for

this sort

of

religion

of

modernity

broke

down.

III. "The

Personalityof

God"

Simmel wrote

in his

"Beginning

of

an

Incomplete

Self-Portrait"hat

he

was wrestlingwith the problemof securing"values"againsttheir com-

plete

dissolution

[Auflosung]

nto "the flow of

things,

historicalmutabil-

ity,

a

merely

psychological

reality."

He cited

"truth,

value,

objectivity,

34. "Vom

Heil

der

Seele"

110;

"On he Salvationof the Soul"30.

35. "VomHeil der Seele"

114-115;

"On

the

Salvation

of the Soul" 34-35. Simmel

makes this

argument

at

greater ength

in

Schopenhauer

und Nietzsche 352

ff.;

Schopen-

hauer

and

Nietzsche 140

ff.

36.

"VomHeil der Seele"

112;

"On he Salvationof the Soul"32.

37. This is the thesis

of

Volkhard

Krech,

"Zwischen

Historisierung

nd

Transforma-

tion von Religion. Diagnosenzur

religiisen

Lageum 1900 bei Max Weber,GeorgSim-

mel,

und

Ernst

Troeltsch,"

Religionssoziologie

um

1900,

eds.

Volkhard Krech

and

Hartmann

Tyrell

(Wiirzburg:Ergon,

1995), developed

more

fully

in

Krech,

Georg

Sim-

mels

Religionstheorie.


13/29

John McCole 19

etc." as

having

become

problematic,

but

identity

was

surely

also

among

those

dissolving

values.38

ndeed,

his

own

earlierwork

had

helped

com-

plicatethe understandingf selfhood in modernsociety. Beginningwith

"On Social Differentiation"

1890),

his

sociology

redefined

he

individ-

ual as the intersectionbetween

multiple

social

circles,

which created

problems

of

agency

and relativism hat he

eventually

addressedwith his

conception

of an "individual law."39

Schopenhauer

and Nietzsche

(1907)

took the

subject's

nner

multiplicity

its

entanglement

n

multi-

ple

series of

interests,

concepts, mages,

and

meanings

as its

point

of

departure.40

Whatthreatened hese values? It was not

relativism;

n

fact,

Simmel's philosophical experiment n the years around 1910 was to

reject

the recourseto foundationalabsolutes and instead to venture an

avowedly

relativistic

philosophy

of

reciprocal

nteractions,

or Wechsel-

wirkungen.

In the

"Self-Portrait,"

Simmel identified the

pitfall

as

"unmoored

haltloser]

subjectivism

nd

skepticism.''41

But

part

of the

problem

was even more

far-reaching.

Subjectivism"

suggests

an

unregulated

worldof otherwisecoherent

ubjects.

Behindthis

lurked

the

prospect

that the

very

coherenceof

identity

was

dissolving,

producing

not

just

unstable heoriesbut

disoriented,

perplexed

ndividu-

als -

haltlose Menschen.

Earlier,

n his

sociological

work,

Simmel had

asked,

"how

is

society possible?"

He

answered

by

identifying

a set of

"sociological

a

prioris,"

such as the fact that relations

among

individu-

als

are both made

possible

and distorted

by

their social

roles,

or that

38.

Simmel,

"Anfang

einer unvollendeten

elbstdarstellung"

-10. As the editorsof

the Simmel

Gesamtausgabe eport,

his text was not

really

a

self-portrait

ut

the

draftof

an

introduction o a never-realized

ollection of his

"Investigations."

GSG

14:

479)

The

evidence

in the

text

suggests

that it

might

have been writtenaround1910. Kthnke sensi-

bly cautionsagainst reading t as a reliableguideto Simmel'sdevelopment,particularly

his

early

concerns.

Rather,

t shows how Simmelwished to

present

himself at a later ime

(in

response,

K6hnke

argues,

to a

long

series of failed and frustrated

hopes).

It is also

closely

related o the

program

f

Philosophical

Culture.See KlausChristian

K$hnke,

Der

junge

Simmel in

Theoriebeziehungen

und sozialen

Bewegungen

(Frankfurt/Main:

Suhrkamp,

996)

149

ff.

39.

Georg

Simmel,

"Das individuelle

Gesetz,"

Das individuelle Gesetz. Philoso-

phische

Exkurse

(Frankfurt/Main:

uhrkamp,

1987)

174-230. This

argument

s recon-

structed and examined in Kdhnke's

pathbreaking study,

Der

junge

Simmel in

Theoriebeziehungen

ndsozialen

Bewegungen.

40.

Schopenhauer

ndNietzsche

192;

Schopenhauer

nd Nietzsche 15.

41. Simmel's studentKarlMannheim aterproposed he samepath:not backward o

foundational

absolutes,

but forward o what Mannheim alled "relationism."Mannheim

would

argue

hat

anxietiesaboutrelativism

betrayed

nostalgia

or absolutes.See the dis-

cussion in

KShnke,

Derjunge

Simmel

473-489.


14/29

20

Georg

Simmeland the


individualsare absorbed o a

greater

or lesser

degree,

but never

totally,

by any given

role or even

by

the entire constellationof their roles.42

In

effect, he was asking: in light of these sociological precepts,how is

identitypossible?

Partof his motive for

leaving sociology

behind

in

the

years

after 1908 was to

explore

this

issue

by focusing

on new

materi-

als. In his

"Self-Portrait,"

e cited two lines of

inquiry

his

interest

n

metaphysics

and his

philosophy

of

religion.43

But how

could

reflecting

on

religion help

to illuminatethis

problem

if its

dogmas

and

even its

contentshad

been

fatally

undermined?

"The

Personality

of God" is one of

Simmel's most

important ttempts

to "take the conceptof personalityseriously"by pushingit to its lim-

its.44

In a

move that resembles

one made

by

Weber,Troeltsch,

and oth-

ers,

it looks back to Protestant

raditions

which saw the

workings

of

divine

purpose

n the

unfolding

and

perfection

of the

personality,

a tra-

dition

that Troeltschcalled "the secret

religion

of the educatedclasses"

in

Germany.45

immel describes

his

enterprise

as a

philosophy

of reli-

gion,

rather han a

sociology

of

religion.

His

essay attempts

o accom-

plish

two

quite

different tasks. On the one

hand,

the

philosophy

of

religion

is to

avoid

any

"unfair

competition"

with

religion

and remain

strictly agnostic

about the existence of the

objects

of belief. In fact,

Simmel's

agnosticism

goes

more than

halfway

to

meet the concerns of

believers

by insisting

that the

concept

of

personality

s not a

projection

of human

qualities

but instead

"belongs

to

that

conceptual

order

which

is not

characterized

by

a human

perspective

but

which rather confers

meaning

and form

on

everything

below

it."46 On

the other

hand,

he

also

pursues

his

own,

constructiveaim of

elucidating identity

in

gen-

eral

and both the

possibilities

and fault-lines

of

modern

dentity

in

par-

ticular.The essay gives what seems like a clear answerto the question

of whether we can have

the sort of coherent

identity implied

by

a

strong concept

of

"personality."

We

can,

he

asserts,

but

only

if

our

con-

cept

of

personality

ncorporates

wo

of the constitutive

principles

of his

42. See "Exkurs ber das Problem:Wie

ist

Gesellschaft

miglich?"

43.

Simmel,

"Anfang

iner unvollendeten

elbstdarstellung"

0.

44. "Die Pers6nlichkeit

Gottes,"

n GSG 14:

357;

"Personality

f

God,"

in

Essays

on

Religion

53.

45.

Ernst

Troeltsch,

The Social

Teachingsof

the Christian

Churches

New

York:

Macmillan,1931)794-795. Troeltsch awthistradition, ndthe"fertile oil" it had found

in

Lutheranism,

s

part

of

the

explanation

or

the

contemporary esurgence

f interest n

mysticism

and

spiritualism.

46. "Die PersinlichkeitGottes"

366;

"Personality

f God"62.


15/29

John

McCole

21

sociology:

that

subjects

are constituted

by

relationswith

others and

by

reciprocal

interactions. f the

personality

s to

have

any unity,

it

can

only be as a dynamic unity of reciprocal nteractions Wechselwirkun-

gen].

There is no

way

to return o an

understanding

f the self as

an

unproblematic,

oundational

unity.

If we are to avoid unmoored

subjec-

tivism

and

skepticism,

we

can

only go

forward o a new relationism.

Simmel sets

up

his

argument

with a

conception

of

individuality

as the

unfolding

of an

inner,

organic

unity:

Whatdoes

personality

ean? t would eem o me to mean he

height-

ening

and

perfection

hat he

corporealrganism

chieves

y

its exten-

sion intospiritualbeing [das

seelische

Dasein].47

With its

emphasis

on

"perfecting"

he soul

by developing

its inner

unity,

this

passage

evokes

the notion

of

selfhood that underliesthe mandarin

traditionof

Bildung.48

The rest of Simmel's

essay

can be read as a fare-

well to this

conception,

ts dissolution nto a series of

reciprocal

nterac-

tions that can never be

totalized,

unified,

or

perfected; yet

it

is a

farewell that wishes

to

rescue

the

possibility

of

perfection

and

unity

in

some form. That

form,

unattainable

or

humans,

is a

possibility

made

intelligibleby

the idea of the

personality

f God.

Simmel

presents

the self as embedded in three sets of relations that

undermine

any

notion of

it as

a

perfectly

unifiable

entity,

much less a

"substantial"

ne. The first set

involves the

body:

because the self is

rooted

in a

body

that is not

self-sufficient,

but

engaged

in

ongoing

exchanges

with its

physical

environment,

t

can never achieve

closure or

coherence

[Geschlossenheit]

on its own

terms,

or

"unity

in

the

strict

sense."49

The

unity

of

the

self faresno betterwhen he turns o the idea of

the soul in a higher,non-materialense. To showthis,Simmel discusses a

second

set of

reciprocal

elations

not,

surprisingly,

he inner

multiplic-

ity

of the self thatresults rom social

interaction,

ut

memory

and its con-

stitutive

role in

creating

and

maintaining

dentity.

At

any given

moment,

Simmel

asserts,

personality

is constituted

by representations

uirnished

by

two

streams:

memory

and current

inputs.

Remembered contents

make

up

the

larger

part

of what we

are;

more

significantly,

the two

47. "DiePers.nlichkeit ottes"

51;

"Personality

f God" 7.

48. This tradition tself hadoriginspartly nreligion.

49.

"Die

Persinlichkeit

Gottes"

352;

"Personality

of

God"

48,

which

renders

Geschlossenheit

imply

as

"unity."Throughout,

t is this

strong

sense of

unity

as

requiring

perfection

and

Geschlossenheit

hat is at stake for Simmel.


16/29

22

Georg

Simmeland the

Philosophy

of

Religion

streams nteractand

mutually

nfluenceone another.

Thus,

the

personal-

ity

is not a self-enclosed

entity

which can recall elements of a

distinct,

separatepast. Rather, t is the productof a continuous,reciprocal nter-

action

[Wechselwirkung]

f

past

and

present.50

The contents of mem-

ory

are

further

complicated

by

the natureof memories hemselves. The

contents

of

memory

are

preserved

s an unconscious

process;

but

they

are

not

the

discrete

packages

of

transcribednformation nvisioned

by

mech-

anistic

psychology.

nstead,

hey

interact nd form

new,

multifarious om-

binations

n this

latentstate.51

Finally,remembering always

contains ts

contrary, orgetting";

nd

therefore

"it

furnishes

ts

contents

only

in

frag-

mentsto the interactive rocessof the current tate"of consciousness.

Summing

up

this

point,

Simmel's terms

subtly

shift the

emphasis

from

memory

o

temporality

s the decisive element:

The

very

fact hat

he formof ourexistence

Dasein]

s

thatof a tem-

poralprocess,

hat t must herefore

remember'n order o

bring

he

contents f

memory

ntoan interaction

Wechselwirkung]

hat

always

remains

ragmentary,revents

he

unity

of contentshatwouldmake

us

personalities

n

theabsoluteense.5

In this passage, Simmel formulates n the negative. Such limits would

not constrain

a

divine

memory,

which

would

not

be bound

by

the limi-

tations of the

human,

temporal

form; "thus,

the

concept

of God

is the

true realizationof

personality."53

he

self, then,

is not an

entity,

much

less

a

unity,

but rather

a form

of existence

[Dasein] thoroughly

consti-

tuted

by

its

temporality

and

not

merely placed

in time.

Personality

s

"that

process

[Geschehen]

hat we

designate

with the formal

symbol

of

reciprocal

nfluence

among

all its

elements."

t is

only

in the

concept

of

the personalityof God that we find the true realizationof personality

the formal

unity,

totality,

and

perfection

that are not

possible

for

humans.

Explicitly,

Simmel

uses the

concept

of a

divine

personality

n

orderto elucidatea

conception

of the self

that has the

dynamicunity

of

a relationalwork in

progress

and,

by implication,

o vindicate a distinc-

tively

modemrn

onception

of

individuality.

One should note the

implicit,

obverse side of this

argument,

which he

actually

states

at

one

point.

The

concept

of God's

personality

could also be cited

against any

claim that

50. "DiePersinlichkeitGottes"353;"Personality f God"49.

51. "Die Pers6nlichkeitGottes"

354;

"Personality

f God"50.

52. "Die

PersSnlichkeit

Gottes"

355;

"Personality

f God"51.

53. "Die

Pers~inlichkeit

ottes"

355;

"Personality

f God"51.


17/29

John McCole

23

reciprocal

nteraction

provides

an

adequate

basis for

personality

n the

strong

sense:

"just

as little as

we fulfill the

pure concept

of an

organism

with ourbodies,so little do our souls fulfilltheconceptofpersonality."54

Almost half of Simmel's

essay

is devoted to a third set of relations

that creates

a barrier o the

unity

of

personality,

which he

describes

as

relations between the self and

something

that is over

against

it,

a

Gegeniiber

or alter.55Like

memory,

he existence of this alter is simul-

taneously

an

enabling

condition for

personality

selfhood would not

be

possible

without it

-

and a limitation on its

ability

to achieve

unity.56 Its

function

thus

resembles he

sociological

a

prioris

hat make

sociation possible but also preclude full knowledge of the other in

social

relations.)

And like

the

principle

of

reciprocal

interaction,

his

principle

-

which we

experience intersubjectively

s "the fact of the

Thou"

[die

Tatsachedes

Du]

-

has

its

roots

in

Simmel's

sociology.

This

Gegeniiber

akes

many

forms: for the

believer,

it is God

(and

for

God,

God's

creation);

for the

lover,

the loved

one;

for the

personality,

its own multifarious

"contents";

nd

in

self-consciousness,

which

Sim-

mel

calls

the

personality's

most concentrated

orm,

the alter is the self

as a

whole,

or "its inner division

of

itself into

subject

and

object,

which

is one and the same

thing

as its

ability

to address itself to itself as it

does to another."57 immel's

argument quates

the

self's

relationswith

these rather

differentsorts of alters

by finding

their common

qualities

at

a

high

level

of abstraction.His

description

of self-consciousness

as

the

self's

"ability

to address itself

to itself as it does to another"comes

close to

suggesting

that

interpersonal, ntersubjective

elations are the

paradigmatic

orm of our

experience

with all altersor

counterparts.

But

Simmel

does not make that

argument,

which he

might

have con-

sidered an unacceptable orm of sociologicalreductionism.Rather, n a

thoroughly

characteristic

move,

he declines to

explain any

form

in

terms

54. "Die

Pers6inlichkeit

ottes"

355;

"Personality

f God"51.

55.

This train of

thought

can be tracedto his brief

essay

"On

Pantheism"

1902),

where he had asserted hat in all our

relations,

ncluding

nterhuman

elations,

"whatstim-

ulates our

activity,produces

our

feelings,

and determines ur

position

in our milieu is our

reciprocal

difference" nd thatthe sense of life is

"inextricably

ound

up

with the form of

alterity

and distinction

die

Formdes

Gegentibers

nd der

Besonderung]"GSG

7:

84).

56. Simmelalso

argues

hat he existence of the

Gegeniiber

makes

pantheism

a self-

defeatingconception,andmuch of the secondpartof his essay concernsthis theological

point.

According

to

Simmel,

the

aporias

of the

pantheisticconception

of God can be

resolved

by

his

conception

of the

personality

f

God.

57.

"[S]eine

Fihigkeit

zu sich selbst so Ich zu

sagen,

wie zum andernDu." "Die

PersinlichkeitGottes"

361-62;

"Personality

f God"58.


18/29

24

Georg

Simmeland the

Philosophy

of

Religion

of

anotherand

simply

likens them to one another.

There

are alters who

are other

subjects;

we are

alters to

ourselves;

and we have

multiple

inneralteritiesas well. It is simplyinherent n the "formof existence of

a

soul that has been

shaped

into a

personality"

o

experience

the con-

stant,

manifold,

almost erotic tensions of

"nearnessand

distance,

con-

trast and fusion."58 The

ineluctable tension

created

by

what he

evocatively

calls "the

barrierof

otherness" die Schrankedes Ander-

sseins

-

both constitutesthe richness of the

personality

and sets

its

limit.59

Only

in a

formally

perfect personality,

n the

personality

of

God,

would

such

limits

be

lifted.

"ThePersonalityof God"presentsa complexdefense of the possibili-

ties

of selfhood in

modernity.

"Religion"

an

extremely

abstract

and

decidedly

monotheistic

religion

-

provides

a cultural

resource hat can

help

make

modernity

more

intelligible;

and if the

personality

must

be

reconceived

relationally,

as a

dynamic,

interactive

unity

of

reciprocal

effects,

then

the idea of the

personality

of God can also

help

reconcile

us

to this

modernity.

This,

at

any

rate,

is Simmel's

explicit argument.

But there is an undercurrent

n the

essay

that

occasionally

surfaces to

suggest somethingquite

different

and

decidedly

ess

reassuring:

he

pos-

sibility

of a

deeply perplexedpersonhood,

opaque

to itself.

Throughout

the

piece,

there are moments

when Simmel

struggles

to find

language

that

captures

he

possible

unity

and

coherence;

n the

end,

it_eludes

him

more

than is

convenient or his

argument.

As we have

seen,

the self and

its

heightened

orm,

the

personality,

become

something

he can

only

des-

ignate

with the

strikingly mpersonal

erm,

"ein Geschehen,"

a

process

or occurrence.

The

unity

of the

personality,

he assures

us at one

point,

is

nothing

like "the

simple persistence

of

a

center,"

but the

proliferation

of terms thatimmediately ollows this assurancebetraysa discomfort n

describing

the alternative:

t is "an

interpenetration,

unctional

adapta-

tion, transference,

nterrelationship,

fusion

of

psychic

contents."60

When

we no

longer

think of the

self

simply

as a

persistent

entity,

but

instead

consider it as

something

constituted

by

its

temporality,

the

imperfections

of

memory

and

time

have

more serious

consequences

than

his relationistsolution

suggests.

In

memory,

which does so

much

to

constitute

the

self,

past

and

present

moments

not

only

constantly

58. "DiePers6nlichkeitGottes"360;"Personality f God"56.

59. "Die

Persfnlichkeit

Gottes"

357;

"Personality

f God"

53,

where the

phrase

s

rendered

imply

as "barrier."

60.

"Die

Pers6nlichkeit

Gottes"

354;

"Personality

f God"

50-51.


19/29

John

McCole

25

interact but

change

one

another as well.

As

a

result,

the dependenceof our existence on memory .

.

. [means that] no

moment is

truly

self-enclosed,

each one

depends

on the

past

and the

future,

and so none is

really quite

tself.61

No moment is ever

quite

itself;

and

so,

no one is ever

quite

himself or

herself

-

Keiner

ganz

sich

selbst.

In

a

similar

vein,

Walter

Benjamin

would later

wryly

recall his discomfort at

being

expected

to resemble

himself when

being photographed

as a child. And in

"On Some

Motifs in

Baudelaire,"

he

posed

the

question why,

under

modern

conditions,

it

has

become a matterof chance whether one ever grasps one's own image.62

One

of the most

powerful passages

in

Simmel's

essay

evokes this

enigmatic

moment in selfhood:

Just as we concentrate

verdichten]

ur own

imperfect

unity

into

the

ego [Ich]

that

mysteriously

bears

it,

so the

true

unity

of

the

being

of

the world

crystallizes

tself in the form of an

ego [Ichform]

with no

remainder the absolute

personality.63

We have somehow condensed [verdichtet] or even fabulated [gedichtet]

the

complex

interactions that constitute us into

something

that we can

bear,

but even then it remains

mysterious

how this

shifting unity

can be

attached

o a

persisting

sense of self.

Here,

identity

s not a comfortable

dialectic of

reciprocity,

but

something

nherently nigmatic.

Moreover,

f

this is

so,

then the

relationship

between the

human and

the divine

per-

sonality figures quite differently

in this

passage

than the rest of

the

essay

would have it. Instead

of the

comforting mage

of our

imperfec-

tions

being

lifted

and

guaranteed

n a

higher,

divine

unity,

the divine

would be distantand unfathomable o us, as we areto ourselves.In this

case,

the

philosophy

of

religion

tells us

something

more

troubling

about

modernity

hanSimmel would seem to wish.

61.

"[K]ein

Moment

ener

wirklichn sich

geschlossen,

in

eder

auf

Vergangenheit

und Zukunft

angewiesen

und so keinerwirklich

ganz

er selbst." Simmel's

rhythmic

and

elusive

phrasing,

one of the

essay's

rhetorical

high points, gets

lost in translation."Die

Persi6nlichkeit

ottes"

356;

"Personality

f

God"

52.

62. Walter Benjamin, "Berliner Kindheit um Neunzehnhundert,",Gesammelte

Schrifien

IV

(Frankfurt/Main:

uhrkamp,

981)

261;

Benjamin,

"Ober

einige

Motive bei

Baudelaire,"

Gesammelte

chriften

(Frankfurt/Main:

uhrkamp,

1974)

610.

63. "Die

Pers6nlichkeit

Gottes"

356;

"Personality

f God"52.


20/29

26

Georg

Simmeland the


IV

"The

Problem

of

the

Religious

Situation"

In

Philosophical Culture,

Simmel

paired

his

essay

on

"The Personal-

ity of God" with one on "The Problemof the Religious Situation."He

described hem as

addressing

he two sides of

religion

-

the first treat-

ing

the content of

religious

beliefs,

the second

the

subjective

attitudeof

religiosity

-

but the tone struck

by

the two

essays

differs

dramatically.

The difference

becomes evident

in

the

opening

words

of

"The

Problem

of the

Religious

Situation,"

which

depict

the state of

religion

as not

merely problematic

but dire. We find

ourselves,

he

declares,

"in an

unspeakably unsettling

situation" with

respect

to

religion.

The

first

essay is written from the relativelycomfortableperspectiveof a con-

structive

critique

of

religious

traditions.

Theistic

religious

traditions till

speak

to

us,

even to

nonbelievers,

f

taken at a

deep

level

of

abstrac-

tion.

But in the

second

essay,

Simmel

unbrackets

he

issue

of

belief and

insists that

the

historical

contentsof

religion

have ceased to sustain

any

conviction.

A troubled and

emphatic

rhetoric

replaces

his

carefully

weighed agnosticism:religion

faces fateful

problems,

and

the

issues

are

marked

with

enormous

and

unsettling question

marks.64

Eight years

earlier,

in "The Salvation

of

the Soul"

(1903),

he had described the

rediscovery

of

religion

as

instinctive,

but tentative.65

Now,

the

problem

was more

urgent,

because

the force of new

religious

needs

was

produc-

ing

a

"confusing,"

even

"threatening"

ituation.

In

response,

Simmel

categorically

rejects

"any way

out

other

than a radical

refashioning

of

our

inner life."66The second

essay

thus takes the first

essay's

undercur-

rent

of

perplexity

and

doubt

as its

point

of

departure.

At

stake is not

only

the future

of

religion

as a resourcefor

modem

culture,

but

moder-

nity

itself. Whereas

he

first

essay

tries to

show how

religious

resources

can help elucidate he chancesfor a rich form of individualityn moder-

nity,

the second

starkly highlights

the

problematic

side of

religion

in

modernity

and hints

at a "a

truly

fundamental

urning

[Wendung]

f our

worldview,"

an

"axial

rotation"

toward radical

subjectivity.67

Sim-

mel's

account

makes it difficult to decide

whether

this

turning

would

create

a

religiosity

suited to

modernity,

or

one

that

points

beyond

modernity.

f the crisis

opens

the

door to a new form of

"intensive

and

64.

"DasProblemder

religi6sen

Lage"

381,

383;

"Problem f

ReligionToday"

16,

18.

65. "VomHeil derSeele,"GSG7:115; "On he Salvationof the Soul"35.

66.

"Das Problemder

religiLsenLage"

367-70;

"Problemof

Religion Today"

7-9.

The translationmutes

the tone of Simmel'sassertions.

67. "Das Problemder

religiRsenLage"

378, 380;

these

passages

are omitted in the

translation. n the

concludingparagraph

f the

essay,

Simmel

emphasizes

he

prospect

of a

"turning" y insistently

and

rhythmically epeating

he term

Wendung,

utthis is lost in the

translation

"Das

Problemder

religidsenLage"

383-84;

"Problem

f

Religion

Today"

18).


21/29


22/29

28

Georg

Simmel

and the


by

"certain

piritually rominent

ircles."72He is far

more

respectful,

but

no less

firm,

in

distancing

himself from

religious

iberalism,

which offers

more latitude for individual beliefs while dodging the question of

whether

any

beliefs

in

transcendental

bjects

remain

enable.73

In

the

first

pages

of the

essay

Simmel

steadily

builds

the rhetorical

force of this

threat,

until he

suddenly

resolves the tension

by

locating

the

facticity

[Tatsaichlichkeit]

fa fixed

point:

he undoubted

resence

of a

religious

eed

or,

o

put

t

more

autiously,

f

a

need

hatuntil

nowhasbeen atisfied

y religious

ulfillments.74

Our feet suddenly ouchground or rather,hey seemto, for no sooner

does Simmel

name

a

clear solution

than

he takes it back with

a

qualifi-

cation.

His Archimedean

point

is the

subjectivereligious

attitude

tself,

religiosity

without

any object.

This

religiosity

will do without transcen-

dental

content,

much less

dogmas

and

institutions,

s no

other

previously

has.

Only

individual

mystics

-

Simmel was

particularly

aken

with

MeisterEckhart offer

a

guide;

as a more

widespread

orm of

belief,

it

would be

a

radical

departure

rom the

previous

history

of

religion.75

Yet

his qualification eaves open a backdoor,an alternative hatdeprivesus

of the

clarity suggested by

the

"facticity

of

a fixed

point."

Instead of

the

emergence

of

a

purely

subjective

religiosity

without

content,

we

might

see its "satisfaction

n channels other than

the

religious,"

ust

as

historically

t has

always

also

been fulfilled

within

moral,

aesthetic,

and

intellectual

culture.

This,

he

insists,

"certainly

does not mean the

diver-

sion

or

numbing"

of

the

religious

need.76These substitute

ulfillments

may,

however,

prove dangerous.

He worriedthat

the

religious

urge,

if

diverted,

could

unleash

"despair,

or an iconoclastic

fanaticism

of

denial... in which religiositywould live itself out with the same energy

as

before,

only

now with a

negative

character."77immel

did not

spell

out

what

he

meant,

and he did

not name

politics among

the alternative

72. "Das

Problem

der

religiasenLage"

368,

384;

"Problem

f

Religion

Today"

8,

19.

The "circles"

o

unnamed.

WhileSimmel

denounced

rendy

evivalsof

mysticism,

he main-

tained

a

long-standing

nterest n the

relevance

of

genuinemystics

such as Meister

Eckhart.

73.

He

appears

o meanthe sort

of liberal

Protestantism

epresented

y

Troeltsch.

74.

"Das Problemder

religiSsen

Lage"

369;

"Problem f

Religion

Today"

8-9.

75. It has sometimesbeenarguedhatSimmel's onception f religionwas inspiredby

Eckhart.

ee

the

thoughtful

iscussion

n

Krech,

Georg

Simmels

Religionstheorie

10-226.

76. "Das

Problem

der

religiSsenLage"

372;

this

passage

s omitted

n the

translation.

77. "Das Problem

der

religi6sen

Lage"

382;

"Problem f

Religion Today"

17.


23/29

John

McCole

29

channelsof fulfillment. n

light

of the

history

of the

twentieth

century,

t

is

easy

to

imagine

that one such

negative

outcome

might

emerge

if

ideo-

logicalpoliticsbecamea substitute eligiousobject.

What would this

purely subjective

religiosity

be

like? In

answering

this

question,

on which

so

much

depends,

mccole - simmel and religion

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