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COGNITION

Humberto R. Maturana

A paper originally published in:

Hejl, Peter M., Wolfram K. Kck, and Gerhard Roth (Eds.)Wahrnehmung und Kommunikation

Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1978, pp. 29-49.

This 1978 paper is perhaps the most difficult Maturana article to obtain.The volume in which it was published is a hard-to-find collection of papers given at aconference in April 1978 on the theme of 'The Theory of Autopoietic Systems as a NewFoundation for the Social Sciences'. All the papers are in German, with the exception of

Maturana's contribution, entitled 'Cognition'.This Observer Web Archive Edition provides you an online version of this rare document,formatted to reflect its original appearance.The published paper was formatted as a continuous 'block' of text, with no spacing /indentation to differentiate subsections. I have inserted some indentation, etc., to visuallyclarify the expository structure. The pagination and paragraph layout remain intact.It is presented with the permission of Professor Maturana. Peter Lang (the publishers)formally advised me that the copyright for this article had reverted to the author.This HTML transcription (exclusive of the otherwise copyrighted material) is copyright 2000 Randall Whitaker.

CONTENTS:

The problem.

The difficulty.

The starting point.

The phenomenon of

cognition.

Basic concepts.

Explanation

The living system.

The nervous system.

The medium.

Cognition.

Structural couplingOperational

Truth and falsity.

Consensual domains.

The observer.

General comments.

The observer andlanguage.


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UnityBackgroundOrganization andstructureSpaceStructure-specifiedsystems

recursion

ObjectivityCognitive domains.Determinism andpredictability.Creativity andfreedom.Ethics and love.

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Humberto R. MATURANA

Cognition

That we cognite seems to us self-evident. In the very processof doing what I am doing, cognition appears to me as myimmediate experience. I perform an act of knowledge when Iact in a manner that I describe as a manipulation or handlingof the world in which I exist. The cogito ergo sum ofDescartes grasps this and gives to the experience ofknowledge a central role: the cogito, the act of cognition, isfor Descartes the starting point. Or, in other words, cognitionis a human property and no question arises about cognition asa phenomenon. This I wish to change. I wish to present theway in which I make cognition a problem, and how I answerthe question, "What phenomenon is the phenomenon ofcognition?".

The problem.

If cognition is considered a humanproperty and, as such, agiven constituent of ourselves, and if we accept this as astarting point, whether explicitly or implicitly, then ourattention necessarily turns to questions related to the use ofcognition. If we do otherwise and consider cognition as aphenomenon that results from, or is produced by, ourbiological being, then cognition can be made an empiricalproblem and we can turn our attention to the question, "What


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kind of biological phenomenon is the phenomenon ofcognition?".

The latter is my approach. Accordingly, my purpose is tostudy cognition as a biological phenomenon; but in order todo so I must define cognition as a biological phenomenonwith the use of cognition, or, at least, I must show with the useof cognition how the phenomenon of cognition arises in theoperation of living systems.

The difficulty.

The view of cognition as an unanalyzable property withwhich human beings are endowed implies an objectrealitythat is cognited by the knower. The act of cognition requiresan agent and an object. From this perspective the universalityof knowledge is trivial: there are objects to be cognited and

their presence determines their knowability. Ignorance is, inprinciple, a fault of the knower. Yet, if cognition is consideredan analyzable phenomenon that results from the biologicaloperation of the living subject, then it is not

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necessarily the case that cognition should imply an objectreality that is cognited by the knower. Whether this is the caseor not, however, depends on how cognition as a biologicalphenomenon takes place; and then we must accept from thevery beginning that the objectivity of knowledge must, untilan answer is obtained, remain an open question. To do this is

more difficult than it seems because one cannot but usecognition to analyze cognition, but if one does not do it thephenomenon of cognition cannot be explained.

If cognition does not imply an objectreality, the universalityof knowledge becomes a non-trivial act of social creativity.Ignorance is, in principle, not a fault of the knower but asocial hitch.

The starting point.

Every approach to the question of cognition uses language asan instrument of discourse, communication, or analysis. Weuse language to uphold one view or to assail it, to support a


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proposition or to detract it. Language is the common elementin any explanatory attempt. Language, however, can either beused as something given without questioning its fundamentsor what it does, or it can be used as an instrument that is initself open to analysis and that constitutes a central problem inthe quest for the understanding of cognition as a biologicalphenomenon. This I propose to do. Language is myinstrument, but at the same time my problem.

My starting point is our use of language:Everything said issaid by an observer to another observer that could be himself.

We are observers and living systems, and as living systemswe are observers. Whatever applies to living systems appliesto us. Therefore, my task is to use language to describe livingsystems and to show how they may develop a language andbecome observers that may make descriptions as we do, andin the process use cognition to analyze cognition. I shallproceed accordingly.

The phenomenon of cognition.

As observers we assert or evaluate cognition in a givendomain through effective action or through successfulbehavior in that domain. We have no other way or criterionthat does not prejudge the answer to the questions that I amconsidering. Therefore, effective action or successfulbehavior will be the phenomenon that I shall seek to explain.

In other words, my question will be: "What takes place inliving systems that they can operate effectively andsuccessfully in a given domain, language included?"

This approach implies a fundamental departure from thequestions nowadays usually asked about cognition. In fact, Iam not asking about meaning,

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information or truth, but I am asking about mechanisms andprocesses; I am not asking about how we know or what weknow, but I am asking about what takes place in knowing. Iam changing, as will be seen, a semantic question into a

structural question, and in order to proceed in this manner Imust turn to consider living systems as systems and showhow they operate. Yet, in doing this I shall first use languageas an instrument given for descriptions and only later shall Iconsider its origin and participation in the phenomenon of


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cognition.

Basic concepts.

In my answer to the question, "What kind of systems areliving systems and how do they operate?", I shall use the

following concepts and notions:

i)Explanation: an intended reformulation orreproduction accepted by a beholder as a model of thesystem or phenomenon to be explained will be anexplanation.

ii) Unity (or operational whole): an observer defines aunity by specifying the operations of distinction thatseparate a discrete entity from a background. Theobserver may thus distinguish a simple or a composite

entity. If he distinguishes a unity as an "atom", as anentity without parts, he distinguishes a simple unity. Ifhe distinguishes a unity as made of components, hedistinguishes a composite unity. In principle, however,an observer may always treat an otherwise simple unityas a composite one and vice versa; all that he needs todo is to specify the proper operations of distinction.

iii)Background: When a unity is defined a backgroundis necessarily also defined, and both unity andbackground are endowed with the properties that theoperations of distinction that separate them specify.

iv) Organization and structure: Whenever I refer to therelations between components that define a compositeunity as a unity of a particular class, I shall use theword organization. Whenever I refer to the actualcomponents and actual relations that realize a particularcomposite unity as a concrete case of a particular classof unities, I shall use the word structure. From thisfollows: a) that only a composite unity has organization

and structure, and that a simple unity only hasproperties; b) that the relations that constitute theorganization of a composite unity are a subset of therelations that participate in its structure; c) that the classidentity of a composite unity remains unchanged aslong as its organization stays invariant; and d) that acomposite unity can undergo structural changes withoutloss of class identity, and thus be structurally plastic.

v) Space: A space is defined by the properties of a unityas the domain in which it can be distinguished. Thus, a

simple unity exists in the space defined


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by its properties, while a composite unity exists in thespace defined by its components because it is throughthe properties of its components that it is distinguished.Nevertheless, a composite unity treated as a simpleunity exists in the space that its properties as a simpleunity define.

vi) Structure-specified systems: If all the structuralchanges that a system (a composite unity) may undergoare specified at any instance by its structure, the systemis a structure-specified system. Or, in other words, if astructure-specified system undergoes an interactionwith an independent entity, what happens to it isspecified by its structure, not by the independent entitywhich in the interaction operates only as a triggeringagent for the system's structural changes. Or, in yetother words, an independent entity that interacts with astructure-specified system only selects the structuralchange that, in the system, follows the interaction butdoes not specify it. Science, as the domain of

statements validated by the scientific method, can onlydeal with structure-specified systems. Other systemswould not be accessible to scientific descriptionbecause in such cases the scientist would find himselfin the same position as King Midas of Phrygia with thegolden touch, specifying the structure of the systemsthat he wants to study with the touch of his analyticalinstruments.

If an interaction triggers in a structure-specified systema structural change that does not change its

organization, the interacting agent operates only as aperturbing agent and the Interaction only as aperturbation. However, if the interaction triggers astructural change that changes the organization of thesystem so that its class identity changes, then theinteraction is a destructive interaction and theinteracting agent a destructive (or disintegrating) agent.A structure-specified system, therefore, has astructure-specified domain of perturbations as well as astructure-specified domain of disintegrations.Furthermore, the structure of a structure-specifiedsystem also specifies which configurations of themedium may perturb it and which may disintegrate it.In other words, structure-specified systems do notundergo "instructive" interaction.


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The living system.

We cannot identify a living system unless we know what aliving system is like, and to know what a living system is likemeans to explain it, that is, to be able to describe a system

that, through its operation, may generate all the phenomenathat a living system may generate. Therefore, what I proposeto do is to characterize the kinds of system which in theiroperation are indistinguishable from known living systems,and claim that, given the

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proper historical contingencies, these systems will generateall biological phenomena:

There is a class of systems each member of which is definedas a composite unity (system), as a network of productions ofcomponents which: a) through their interactions recursively

constitute and realize the network of productions thatproduced them; b) constitute the boundaries of the network ascomponents that participate in its constitution and realization;and c) constitute and realize the network as a composite unityin the space in which they exist. Francisco VARELA and Ihave called such systems "autopoietic systems", and theirorganization the "autopoietic organization". A living systemis an autopoietic system in the physical space (cf.MATURANA/VARELA1975).

I shall not present a full discussion of autopoiesis here as itcan be found in several publications by Francisco VARELAand by myself (cf. MATURANA/VARELA 1975;MATURANA/VARELA/URIBE 1974; MATURANA 1970).I shall however, make, several remarks relevant to our presentpurpose.

i) Autopoietic systems are structure- specified systems:whatever structural change they undergo is specified bytheir structure. For this reason nothing is said in thecharacterization of autopoiesis about the lawfulness of

the processes that realize it; this is implicit in thestatement that the autopoietic network is constitutedand realized as a composite unity in the space in whichits components exist (i.e. in the space they define).Thus, living systems as autopoietic systems in the


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physical space satisfy the laws of physical processes,otherwise they disintegrate.

ii) In the operation of autopoietic systems everything issubordinated to their autopoiesis, if not, theydisintegrate. The result is that autopoietic systemsoperate as homeostatic systems with respect to theirorganization, and that, while autopoietic, they can onlyundergo structural changes that do not interfere withtheir autopoiesis.

iii) An autopoietic system as a dynamic system isnecessarily under continuous structural change. Yet, forevery autopoietic system, at any moment, its presentstructure determines its domain of possible structuralchanges, and its organization defines the limits withinwhich these may actually take place without it losing itsclass identity. Accordingly, as the structure of an

autopoietic system changes during its autopoiesis itsdomain of possible structural changes without loss ofclass identity changes too.

iv) As is the case with composite unities in general, anautopoietic system treated as a simple unity exists in aspace different from the space in which its componentsexist, and it also has properties as a unity determined byits organization, not by the properties of itscomponents.

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v) To an observer an autopoietic system appears as an

integrated regulated homeostatic whole. Yet, the unityor wholeness that an observer sees in an autopoieticsystem as a result of its autopoiesis, is realized throughthe interplay (operation) of the properties of itscomponents (that is, through relations of contiguityonly) in a manner determined by these properties.Therefore, if the properties of some of the componentsof the autopoietic unity change because they themselvesare composite unities and their structures change, thenthe manner of realization of the autopoiesis of thesystem may change too because the relations of

contiguity that realize the autopoietic network mayhave changed. If this takes place as a result of theinternal dynamics of the system in a manner thatstabilizes certain relations of production, the observer


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may describe this stabilization as regulation orhomeostasis. However, since the whole has nooperational participation in the processes generated byits components, the phenomena of regulation orhomeostasis "take place" only in a metadomain withrespect to what takes place in the realization of theautopoietic network.

vi) Nothing is said in the characterization of autopoieticsystems about the media in which they are realized, norabout the characteristics of the components that realizethem. This is so because the properties of thecomponents of an autopoietic system that do notparticipate in its autopoietic network can be anywhatsoever as long as they do not interfere with it, andbecause the autopoietic system determines the mediumin which it operates through its actual structure.

vii) Reproduction is not a constitutive feature of theautopoietic organization. Reproduction is logically andoperationally secondary to the constitution of the unityto be reproduced, and, therefore, secondary to theautopoietic operation of an autopoietic system.Reproduction, however, is necessary for evolution.

viii) An autopoietic system, with respect to its states,operates as a closed system that only generates states inautopoiesis. Or, in other words, every state in anautopoietic system is a state in autopoiesis, if not, it is

in the process of disintegration. However, with respectto its components an autopoietic system is open to theextent that their production implies an interchange witha medium.

ix) Biological phenomena are phenomena that arise in adomain defined by the operation of living systems.Thus, a given phenomenon is a biological phenomenononly if involves the autopoiesis of at least one livingsystem. Or, in other words, phenomena which areproduced with the participation of living systems but

without involving them through the realization of theirautopoiesis, are not biological phenomena. Forexample, the encounter of two organisms in courtship isa biological phenomenon, but their accidental

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collision is not. Also, the chemical reactions that takeplace in the autopoiesis of a cell are not biologicalphenomena, but those in digestion are.

The nervous system.

Anatomically the nervous system is composed of cellularelements of various kinds that, according to the view thedescriber holds, may or may not include sensory and effectorcomponents. In the following I shall not attempt a fullanatomical characterization of the nervous system, but I shallcall all its components neurons, including in the class ofcellular elements connoted by this term typical nerve cells aswell as sensory and effector elements which are anatomicallyquite different from these but which, as components of the

nervous system, operate in a similar manner.

A network of interacting neurons in which each state ofrelative neuronal activity leads in a closed manner to anotherstate of relative neuronal activity, is a nervous system. Or, inother words, a nervous system is a system organized as aclosed network of interacting neurons in which every state onrelative neuronal activity leads to another state of relativeneuronal activity, and that, given the proper historicalcontingencies, can generate all the phenomena that in livingsystems are proper to their operation with a nervous system.This is both a characterization and a definition and deservesthe following comments:

i) The nervous system operates as a closedsystem andas such generates only states of one kind, namely, statesof relative activity between its component neurons(nerve cells and sensory and effector elements). Thenervous system does not have input and output surfacesas features constitutive of its organization, and does notoperate as a system generating input and output

relations. Input and output surfaces are defined by theobserver who opens the nervous system by specifying aperspective for his description of its operation in amedium. Accordingly, the sensory and effector surfacesthat an observer sees in an organism do not constitutean exception to the operational closure of its nervoussystem. In fact, every change in activity at an effectorsurface of an organism leads to (triggers) a change ofactivity at a sensory surface of the same organism, andvice versa. The closure between effector surfaces andsensory surfaces is realized through what the observer

sees as the environment, yet this environment is only ameans for closure, and it is only as such that itparticipates in the operation of the nervous system as asystem. The importance of the environment for the


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descriptions that the observer makes should not misleadus. The observer stands in his descriptions in the verypath of closure of the nervous system, between thesensory and the effector surfaces of the organism, andfrom that perspective the nervous system appears tohim as an open neuronal network. The same

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would happen to the observer if he could becomeminiaturized and stand in a synaptic cleft. He wouldthen consider both the intercellular medium in thesynaptic cleft and the organism as his environment, andthe nervous system of the organism would appear tohim as an open neuronal network in which thepostsynaptic membrane constitutes the sensory surfaceand the presynaptic membrane the effector surface.

ii) I have not characterized neurons, yet I have referredto them as implying cells with properties that allowthem to form and integrate a network in which they

perturb each other in a localized manner, followingpaths of interactions specified by the architecture of thenetwork, and according to a sequence determined bythe relative course of their internal dynamics.

iii) As a component of a living system, a nervoussystem necessarily operates by generating relations ofneuronal activity subservient to the autopoiesis of theliving system which would otherwise disintegrate. Yet,it does so as a structure-specified system, generatingrelations of neuronal activity specified by its structure

(architecture of the network and properties of itscomponent neurons) which change if this structurechanges. Accordingly, different organisms withdifferent structures have different nervous systems (ifthey have them at all) which generate different sets ofrelations of neuronal activity, which themselvesparticipate in a different manner in the realization oftheir respective autopoiesis. At the same time, a neuron,by being a multiconnected node in the closed neuronalnetwork, may participate in the generation of numerousdifferent relations of neuronal activity within the

network. Whichever the case, the subordination of theoperation of the nervous system to the autopoiesis ofthe living system that it integrates, results in theautopoiesis of the living system necessarily operating as


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a reference selector for any structural change that thenervous system may undergo, even if such changes arecontinual.

The medium.

A unity exists in a medium determined by its properties as thedomain in which it operates as a unity. Anything that a unitymay encounter as a unity is part of its medium. Anything fromwhich a unity may become operationally cleaved through itsoperation as a unity, is part of its medium. Depending on thekind of unity an observer distinguishes, what he sees as partsor states of a unity may be included in its medium. Themedium of a unity is always defined by the unity as thedomain in which it operates as a unity, not by the observer.The observer specifies a unity by an operation which impliesan organization in the distinguished unity if it is a compositeone, but the operation of distinction does not characterize theimplied organization. Under these circumstances it is theimplied organization of the unity that defines its

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medium, not the operation of distinction performed by theobserver. Therefore, when an observer distinguishes a unityhe does not necessarily have access to the medium in which itoperates as a unity, but he himself defines a domain in whichhe sees the unity as a separable entity. The domain in whichan observer sees a unity as a separable entity I shall call theenvironmentof the unity. Accordingly, the environment

overlaps with the medium but is not necessarily included in it.In this case the medium of a unity may include features thatthe observer does not see as parts of the unity's environment,but which, to him, appear to be inside the boundaries of theunity, even though they are operationally necessarily outsidethem.

Cognition.

If whatever takes place in a living system is specified by itsstructure, and if a living system can only have states inautopoiesis because it otherwise disintegrates (and stopsbeing a living system), then the phenomenon of cognition,which appears to an observer as effective behavior in a


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medium, is, in fact, the realization of the autopoiesis of theliving system in that medium. For a living system, therefore,to live is to cognite, and its cognitive domain is as extensiveas its domain of states in autopoiesis. The presence of anervous system in an organism does not create thephenomenon of cognition but enlarges the cognitive domainof the organism by expanding its domain of possible states inautopoiesis. Under these circumstances, there are two basicquestions to be answered in the study of the biology ofcognition, namely: a) How and why is it possible that anorganism has, at any moment, a structure that allows it tooperate effectively in a given medium?; and b) How does thenervous system change the cognitive domain of the organismthat possesses it in comparison to one that does not? The firstquestion refers to the problem of structural change which Ishall call structural coupling; the second question refers tothe operation in a closed network of neuronal interactionsunder conditions of structural coupling which I shall call

operational recursion.

i) Structural coupling: Any change in the relationsbetween components with invariant properties in acomposite unity I call a structural change of the firstorder; any change in the properties of the componentsof a composite unity I call a structural change of thesecond order. A composite unity whose structure canchange without it losing its class identity, that is,without change in organization, is a structurally plasticsystem; any plastic structural change in a composite

unity I call a change of state. Since a structure-specifiedsystem can only undergo changes of state specified byits structure, the domain of structural plasticity of acomposite unity is determined by its structure, not bythe medium in which it operates and is realized as aunity.

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The medium can only perturb a structurally plasticsystem, triggering a change of state that it does notspecify. Under these circumstances, the perturbationsby the medium operate as selectors of the structuralchanges of the perturbed unity, and the sequence ofperturbations that the medium provides in the history ofinteractions of a given unity, operates as a selector ofthe sequence, or path, of the structural changes that theunity follows in this history. The outcome of this is the


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establishment of a structural correspondence betweenthe unity in question and the medium in which itoperates, which, to the observer, appears as adaptationor structural coupling. The form of this structuralcoupling or adaptation in a given unity undergoing aparticular sequence of perturbations is specified by thestructure and organization of the (composite) unitywhich, respectively, determine the domain of possiblestructural changes of the unity and the limits that itcannot overstep without disintegration. In livingsystems these limits are determined by their autopoieticorganization, which must remain invariant while theyare alive; their structural coupling, therefore,necessarily results in the homeostatic stabilization ofautopoiesis under the constraints of the structurethrough which, in each individual case, it is realized.

In general, then, whenever a structurally plastic

composite unity undergoes perturbations, the outcomeis structural coupling, in the space in which thecomposite unity operates (is) as a simple unity, to thestructures of the medium that realize the unity's domainof perturbations. Since the result of structural couplingis the stabilization of the relations of the unity in itsmedium, what the observer sees, if the unity is adynamic unity, is the fitting of the structure of the unityinto a structure that allows it to operate effectively inthe medium of coupling. This phenomenon occurs inliving systems through two different processes that

imply two different domains of variability for theoperation of the selective interactions that they undergoin their medium in two different moments of their lifehistories:

i.i) Phylogeny: When the organization andstructure of a composite unity are uniformelypresent throughout the whole system and nocomponent is single or compartmentalized, asimple cleavage may separate two unities of thesame kind with identical or different structures.This phenomenon is reproduction by division andtakes place in living cells as well as in some othersystems. Whenever sequential reproduction bydivision takes place, so that each composite unityproduces other unities that can later reproduce,and the unities produced in each reproductivestep have different structures, differentialrealization of the offspring takes place throughtheir independent interactions and a phylogeny isestablished. The outcome of the establishment of

a phylogeny is the structural coupling of themembers of the phylogeny to the medium inwhich they operate as simple unities and in


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which the selection takes place. To an observerthis phenomenon appears as evolution, as ahistory of structural transformation ofsequentially produced composite unities of thesame kind. In living systems this phenomenonoccurs readily because the conservation ofautopoiesis in each reproductive step allows inthe same breath for the occurrence of structuralvariability.

i.ii) Ontogeny: The individual history of thestructural transformation of a particularcomposite unity is its ontogeny. In astructure-specified composite unity, at anymoment, the structure of the unity determinesboth the set, or matrix, of its possible changes ofstate and the set, or matrix, of the possibleperturbations that it may accept. Accordingly anyof the possible perturbations would trigger achange of state in the composite unity, which

would result in a change in the matrix of thepossible perturbations of the unity. Under thesecircumstances, a particular sequence ofperturbations determines in a composite unity aparticular sequence in its changes of matrices ofpossible perturbations. Consequently, thoseperturbations which actually take place are notdetermined by the structure of the compositeunity but by the structure of the medium, andthese perturbations, without specifying thestructural changes of the composite unity, select

the path of structural changes it will follow. Theoutcome of any such process is the ontogenicstructural coupling of any structurally plasticcomposite unity to the medium in which it isrealized. Therefore, what an observer sees as aresult of ontogeny in any particular compositeunity, is either effective operation in anenvironment, i.e. structural coupling, ordisintegration. In living systems ontogenicstructural coupling (or ontogenic adaptation) ispeculiar because all that remains invariant duringthe ontogeny of any particular organism is itsautopoiesis and the manner in which it isrealized.


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ii) Operational recursion: The phenomenon ofstructural coupling takes place in relation to anydomain in which a structurally plastic composite unityis defined as a unity. Thus, the configuration of internalstates of a composite unity (as an observer sees them)can also operate as part of the medium in which thecomposite unity exists as a simple unity, and when thistakes place recursive structural coupling of thecomposite unity with its own states occurs. In principle,there is no other limitation for this to occur than theoperational distinguishability of the internal states ofthe system by the operation of the system as a unitythrough its interactions. In living systems the closedorganization of the nervous system is particularly suitedfor recursions of this kind. Accordingly, let us considerthe nervous system from the perspective of its operationas a closed neuronal network:

ii.i) Perception: a nervous system operates as aclosed neuronal network generating relations ofrelative neuronal activity specified by a structureselected along the phylogeny and the ontogeny ofthe organism which it

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integrates. All its dynamics of states is,accordingly, a continuous flow of changingrelations of neuronal activities modulated throughperturbations generated in the medium, whichresult in the production and stabilization ofrelations of neuronal activities subservient to the

autopoiesis of the organism. From the perspectiveof the observer, the intersection of the domain ofperturbations of the nervous system, which takesplace operationally through the interactions of theorganism with the latter's environment,constitutes the domain of perceptions of theorganism. Furthermore, for the observer anorganism appears to act upon the environmentand to accommodate its behavior according to thefeatures of the environment that he perceives.Yet, in their dynamics of states the organism andthe nervous system only operate as closedsystems, merely generating structure-specifiedstates, as would be the case for a pilot in aninstrumental flight. If the pilot had to fly and land


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under conditions of zero visibility, he would haveto maintain the indicators of the instruments ofthe aircraft within specified limits or following aspecified path of variations. When the pilotcomes out of the aircraft after landing, his wifeand friends may come to him saying: That was awonderful flight and landing! We were terrified!Yet, the answer of the pilot may well be: Whatflight? What landing? I did not fly, I was onlymaintaining certain dials within specifiedreadings. In fact, it was only for an externalobserver that there was a flight, and this isexactly what happens with an organism and itsnervous system. An observer sees a particularbehavior, courtship for example, but what takesplace in the organism and its nervous system isnot courtship but a particular path of changes ofstates in their dynamics of the closed system.

Perception as a phenomenon pertains to thedomain of descriptions defined by the observer.

ii.ii) Recursion: To write, to eat or to sustain aphilosophical conversation are, from theperspective of the observer, very different actionsin very different domains, but for the nervoussystem they are only different cases of a singlekind of phenomenon, different paths of change ofrelations of neuronal activities subordinated tothe autopoiesis of the organism, triggered by

different perturbations arising in the medium.This has a fundamental consequence: althoughdifferent relations or paths of change of relationsof neuronal activities in the nervous system maybe operationally distinguished in the domain ofinteractions of the organism through differentialtriggering, they are operationally distinguished inthe dynamics of the nervous system throughdifferent relations or paths of change of relationsof neuronal activities. Under these circumstances,what takes place in the operation of the nervoussystem is always the same kind of process:distinctions of relations of relative neuronalactivities through relations of relative neuronalactivities, and, potentially, so on recursively.Furthermore, in the same

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breath, through the coupling of the organism toits medium, the operation of the nervous systemmay result in what the observer sees as theoperational recursion of distinctions in thedomain of interactions of the organism.

ii.iii) Representations: From the perspective ofthe observer who considers an organism in amedium, the changes of state that theperturbations by the medium trigger in it, mayconstitute representations of the medium, and thereactions of the organism that he beholds as aresult of these perturbations may constituteindications, or descriptions, of the circumstancesthat constitute these representations. Theobserver, therefore, may describe the organism or

its nervous system as acting, in their internallyclosed dynamics, upon representations of themedium while generating descriptions of it. Thus,even though the organism and the nervous systemdo not operate upon representations because theyare structure-specified operationally closedsystems, an operational recursion of distinctionsin the domain of interactions of the organismmay, to an observer, appear to be a recursion in adomain of representations, as if the nervoussystem were making representations of

representations.

Truth and falsity.

If cognition is the effective operation of a living system in amedium, and if this effective operation is the result in eachindividual of a history of phylogenic and ontogenic structuralcoupling, the question of how cognition takes place is, inprinciple, answered. In fact, organism and medium are

operationally interdependent systems in their dynamics ofstates, each following its independent structural specification.Therefore, adequate behavior is, necessarily, possible only asthe result of structural coupling, and an organism is either instructural coupling or in disintegration. Furthermore, that anorganism should be in structural coupling is not surprising.An organism is never outside a history, and necessarilyalways finds itself in a particular state and position as a resultof its previous states and positions. Consequently, if at aparticular moment an organism is not structurally coupled tothe medium either because the independent dynamics of states

of the medium has resulted in a state of the medium to whichthe organism is not structurally coupled, or because aprevious state of the organism has led to a new one which isnot structurally coupled to the present state of the medium,


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then the organism disintegrates (its autopoiesis is lost). Inaddition, structural coupling is commutative between allorganisms of the same class adapted to the same medium, andan interchange or an operational replacement can take placebetween them without loss of adaptation.

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How the structural coupling is obtained, whether throughphylogeny or ontogeny, or through operational recursion, is,of course, irrelevant. The enaction of both modes of behavioris equally structure-determined. Or, in other words, instinctiveand learned behaviors do not differ in their structuraldeterminations; they differ only in the history or origin of thestructures that determine them. Thus, instinctive behavior isdetermined by structures established through phylogeny whilelearned behavior is determined by structures establishedthrough ontogeny. Furthermore, both modes of behavior areequally triggered by specific (internal or external)perturbations, regardless of the circumstances that generatethem, and both instinctive and learned behaviors can take

place under conditions that an observer would callinadequate.

If a dog takes a slipper to play with, an observer may claimthat the dog does not know what the slipper is for. Similarly, ateacher who asks a student to measure the height of a towerwith the use of an altimeter, may flunk the student if he usesthe length of the altimeter to triangulate the tower and obtainsthe height of the tower through geometry and not throughphysics. The teacher may say that the student does not knowphysics. Yet, it is only with respect to the observer, in the first

case, and with respect to the teacher, in the second, that thedog and the student are in error or lack knowledge. In fact, thedog and the student have behaved according to theirrespective structural determinations, but each has operated ina domain different from the one expected, and has definedwith his behavior a different unity than the one offered andhas handled it properly. The dog has defined a toy and thestudent a problem in geometry. Therefore, the dog's misuseand the student's mistake are "misuse" and "mistake" only inthe domains defined by the observer and the teacher, and onlywith respect to their definitions of their respective referentialsituations. The behaviors of the dog and the student are, inthemselves, flawless, and reveal in each case a structuralcoupling different from the one expected by the observer andthe teacher. Truth and falsity exist only in a referential


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domain defined by an observer.

Consensual domains.

If two structurally plastic composite unities interact with eachother and thus operate as selectors of their individual paths of

structural change, a reciprocal structural coupling takes place.As a result the changes of state of one system trigger thechanges of state of the other recursively, and a domain ofcoordinated conduct is established between the two mutuallyadapted systems. If this takes place between living systemsduring their ontogenies, a domain of coordinated behaviorarises that is indistinguishable from a

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domain of consensus established between human beings.Accordingly, I shall call such a domain of coordinatedbehavior established between organisms as a result of theirontogenic reciprocal structural coupling, a consensual domain

or domain of consensus.

For an observer who beholds two or more organismsoperating in a consensual domain, the organisms appear to beoperating with consensual representations and, therefore, forhim a consensual domain operates as a linguistic domain inwhich the behaviors of the interacting organisms constituteconsensual indications or descriptions of their domain ofinteractions. Moreover, if, once a consensual domain isestablished, the structural coupling continues in such amanner that the interactions within the consensual domainoperate as selectors for further structural coupling within thedomain, and if the participating organisms are structurallysufficiently plastic, then a recursion takes place in which theparticipating organisms make consensual distinctions ofconsensual distinctions. When this recursive consensualdomain is established an observer sees a generative linguisticdomain in which metadescriptions take place. A linguisticdomain with such characteristics is a language, and to operatein it is, from the point of view of the observer, to operate in adomain of descriptions that permits recursive descriptions of

descriptions.

At this stage the following comments are necessary:

i) From the point of view of the observer every


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behavior is action in some domain, and different kindsof behaviors differ in the domains in which the actionstake place. Yet, in terms of what takes place in thenervous system every behavior is a particularconfiguration of relations of relative neuronal activitiesin a closed neuronal network. Accordingly, what wouldappear to an observer as different behaviors in differentdomains of structural coupling (whether in a domain ofinert components or in a consensual domain) would beshown at the level of the nervous system to be butdifferent instances of phenomena of the same kind.

ii) Every behavior can be seen by an observer as adescription connoting the circumstances that elicit it.Thus, a consensual domain can be seen by an observeras a domain of descriptions in which ontogenicallyestablished descriptions operate as perturbations in asystem of recurrent interactions between reciprocally

structurally coupled organisms. Furthermore, adescription can be seen as a distinction of that which itconnotes, and a consensual description as a consensualdistinction. From this point of view a recursion in aconsensual domain is a description of descriptions. Thatthis kind of recursion in a consensual domain shouldtake place offers, of course, no intrinsic difficulty withrespect to the operation of the nervous system as aclosed neuronal network. For this same reason,however, a description is

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constitutively not a description ofanything, but it is a

behavior in a consensual domain in which thedescriptions only connote operations within the domainof consensus.

The observer.

When a metadomain of descriptions (or distinctions) isgenerated in a linguistic domain, the observer is generated.Or, in other words, to operate in a metalinguistic domain

making distinctions of distinctions is to be an observer. Anobserver, therefore, operates in a consensual domain andcannot exist outside it, and every statement that he makes isnecessarily consensual. This has four basic implications:


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i) A metalinguistic domain is a metadomain only fromthe point of view of the observer because it is onlywithin the domain of consensual interactions and fromthe perspective of the history of this domain, that adistinction is a metadistinction (a distinction ofdistinctions). Otherwise a distinction and ametadistinction are both consensual operations. For thisreason, and because of the operation of the nervoussystem as a closed neuronal network, once ametadomain of distinctions is operationally defined, ameta-metadomain of distinctions can be operationallydefined, and so on recursively. Under thesecircumstances the limitation to infinite recursion is notin the nature of the process, but lies in the actualpossibilities of structural plasticity and diversity ofpossible states of the nervous systems of the organismsthat participate in the consensual domain. Therefore, an

observer can, in principle, always define ametadescriptive domain with respect to his presentcircumstances and operate as if external to it.

ii) The operation of an organism in a consensualdomain is, as all that takes place in a living system,necessarily subordinated to its autopoiesis. Thus,although the linguistic behavior is consensual, it cannotcontradict the laws of the space that the components ofthe living systems define because the linguisticbehavior of an organism is a manner of realizing the

autopoiesis of the organism in that space. As aconsequence, there is an intrinsic isomorphism in therelational consistency of the operation within aconsensual domain and the relational consistency of theoperation of an organism in its domain of autopoiesis.

iii) The operation of an observer is structurallyspecified. Semantic relations, relations of meaning,symbols, etc., do not participate in the operation of theobserver as a living system. The observer, however, byspecifying a metadomain of distinctions with respect to

a ground domain of distinctions, defines relations ofmeaning, symbols, etc., as consensual relations ofrelations, in a metalinguistic domain. Semanticrelations are not necessary for the establish-

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ment of a linguistic domain, but they arise from therecursive application of distinctions upon distinctions.

iv) An observer operates in two nonintersectingphenomenic domains. As a living system he operates inthe domain of autopoiesis. As an observer proper, he

operates in a consensual domain that only exists as acollective domain defined through the interactions ofseveral (two or more) organisms.

General comments.

The observer and language.

The observer and language have been generated through the

description (with the use of language) of living systems andtheir operation. However, in this process language hasappeared as a contentless consensual behavior the validity ofwhich is established only through its consistency within thedomain of consensus. Yet, I have generated the observer bydefining a metalinguistic domain from the point of view ofwhich language has content, and I have shown that languagearises only if there are at least two organisms that interact andgenerate a consensual domain. However, in this processlanguage has appeared as a contentless consensual . . .Therefore, by assuming objectivity (objects to whichlinguistic descriptions refer) I have denied objectivity. Whathave I done? I have defined a network of descriptive relationswhich, if realized as objective relations, generates an observerwho can only make contentless descriptions through hisconsistent behavior in a domain of consensus in whichobjectivity exists only as a relation defined in a metalinguisticdomain.

Objectivity.

Objectivity, content to a description, is needed forepistemological reasons only when we speak about speaking.Then we are in a metadescriptive domain, and the logic of themetadescription requires a substratum for the describedphenomena to take place. Yet, we cannot characterize thatsubstratum which we need only for epistemological reasons.The actual operation of language, as an ontogenicallyestablished system of coordinated reciprocal triggering ofbehavior between organisms, is contentless. In order todescribe an absolute object we must interact with it, but as weinteract all that the said absolute object can do is to trigger in

us changes of state specified by our structure. Therefore, thechanges of state in ourselves that would constitute thedescription of the absolute object would not be specified bythe absolute object which, since the description would only


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Page 46

reflect us in an interaction, would vanish in the relativerelations of consensuality. We move in the world like thepharmacologist who uses a biological probe and describes thevarious substances that interest him with the changes of stateon his probe. However, it is we ourselves who are our ownprobes for the descriptions that we make, even when speakingof the pharmacologist's procedure. Thus, to describe the worldin a domain of consensus whose only claim to validity is itssubordination to our autopoiesis, we use our own changes ofstate in autopoiesis. Therefore, we cannot make any otherontological claim about the nature of the substratum which forepistemological reasons we need for the realization of theautopoiesis, than that its relational structure must be, in someway, isomorphic with the relational structure of the domain ofdescriptions.

Cognitive domains.

To cognite is to live, and to live is to cognite. We as observersexist in a domain of descriptions, and this domain as aconsensual domain is a cognitive domain. In fact we operatein many different cognitive domains which constitute manydifferent ways of realizing our autopoiesis. Furthermore, eachcognitive domain constitutes a closed domain of relations orinteractions defined by features of internal consistencyspecified in the structural coupling that determines it. Thus, ingeneral, any system of adaptations, whether to the inert

medium or to other living systems or to both, whetherestablished through phylogeny (symbiosis, parasitism,particular modes of habitation) or through ontogeny(consensual domains, learned activities), constitutes cognitivedomains. In particular, there are many different consensualdescriptive domains that we describe in different manners,each determined by the procedure of generation of thestatements that pertain to it. All these domains tend to bedescribed by the observer in terms of "knowledge". Science, apolitical doctrine, a particular religion, and many, many othercreations that appear as particular cultural systems, constitute

such domains. Yet, we as observers can always define ametacognitive domain from the point of view of which we areexternal to them, and behold them. This we can do, of course,because in our nervous system everything takes place in the


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same phenomenic domain of closed relations of relativeneuronal activities. However, by doing so, we can observethat in each cognitive domain we, and all living systems withus, operate as if in a domain of objective (absolute) realitywhose relativity can only be asserted if we step out and definea metacognitive domain with respect to it.

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Determinism and predictability.

Living systems are deterministic systems, they arestructure-specified unities. Furthermore, as scientists we canonly deal with structure-specified systems; this is a feature ofthe scientific cognitive domain as specified by the scientificmethod. The fact, however, that as scientists we can only dealwith deterministic systems, does not mean that we can alwayspredict their changes of state. Determinism is a feature thatthe observer as a scientist must claim because he deals withstructure-specified systems (otherwise he could not makeexplanatory models) and as such it is an epistemological

necessity. But a prediction is a computation in a system in onedomain (a model) claimed to be isomorphic to a system inanother domain where the observation of the predicted eventwill take place. Therefore, whether a prediction is fulfilled ornot is always a function of the relations that the observerestablishes between the two domains, and does not dependindependently on any of the systems involved. Therefore, anyontological claim of objective indeterminism based onscientific analysis is necessarily at fault. Finally,predictability does not constitute a proof of objectivity, it onlyconstitutes a proof of an isomorphism between the relational

structures of two cognitive domains. The effectiveness in themanipulation of the environment that the success of theexperimental sciences shows is therefore not surprising. Infact, it is a necessary outcome of the basic ultimate referenceof our scientific statements (as behaviors in a consensualdomain), through the realization of our autopoiesis in aconsensual domain, to the space (the physical space) whichwe define as autopoietic systems.

Creativity and freedom.

We are deterministic systems. Creativity and novelty, then,are not features of our operation as autopoietic systems, weassert them as observers. They are, therefore, features of the


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consensual domains in which we operate as such. If weundergo an interaction not specified in the consensual domainin which we operate, we undergo a structural change (of firstor second order) not determined by the structural coupling ofthe consensual domain, and a new behavior appears withrespect to the behaviors proper to the consensual domain.Under these circumstances we as participating organismshave operated as structure-specified systems, but an observerhas seen a novel behavior that he could not have predictedfrom the determination of the consensual domain. Suchinteractions can take place only because the medium and theorganisms operate in their interactions as independentsystems, each determined in its dynamics of states by its ownstructural

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specification. Novelty and creativity in living systems,therefore, are always the result of their interactions outsidetheir domains of structural coupling, and take place as suchonly for the beholder that would have predicted otherwise. It

follows that structural coupling necessarily results in areduction of creativity and novelty, and that the formation of acognitive domain consists in the reduction of novelty andcreativity in that domain. We as observers, however, have oneescape from the ultimate reduction of creativity that would bethe necessary outcome of our progressive structuralcouplings. This is the very condition that makes us observers,namely our operation in a linguistic domain that allows us togenerate a metadomain of descriptions. In fact, this is ouronly (and the only worthwhile) claim to freedom. We can inprinciple always be observers of our circumstances. For this

to take place all that we need to do is to extend ourinteractions beyond our domains of structural coupling(consensual and otherwise). This is also the reason why theultimate aim of every totalitarian political system is prudishsocial morality, i.e. the total specification of the experiencesof the human beings under its sway. This, however, is noteasy to obtain because it would require the destruction of theobserver and, with it, of language.

Ethics and love.

A human behavior that affects the lives of other human beingsis ethical conduct. All our behaviors within the consensual


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domains that we establish with other human beings are,therefore, behaviors with ethical significance. This we cannotescape. Yet, since we, as observers, exist only in a linguisticdomain, that is, in a consensual domain with other humanbeings, the denial of the ethical significance of our behavioras observers would necessarily lead to our alienation.

As living systems we exist in complete loneliness within theclosure of our individual autopoiesis. It is only through theworlds that we create with others through consensual domainsthat we acquire an existence that, without breaking this ourfundamental loneliness, transcends it. Furthermore, it is onlythrough this that we can define a domain of self-knowledgethrough self-descriptions in a metadescriptive domain inwhich we are objects to our descriptions. For that we need theother person because we can only see ourselves in thereflections of a consensual domain. We cannot see ourselvesif we do not learn to see ourselves in our interactions with

others and, by seeing the others as reflections of ourselves,see ourselves as reflections of the others. Fortunately we asliving systems spontaneously generate consensual domainswith other living systems in general, and with other

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human beings in particular. We map upon them and enjoytheir company. Love is not blind because it does not negate,love accepts, and, therefore, is visionary.

(Rear of the Volume)

(References Cited -- Listings reflect format and spellings of

the original)

MATURANA, H.R. 1970, "Neurophysiology of cognition",in GARVIN, P. (ed.) 1970, Cognition: A multiple view, NewYork/Washington, 3-23.


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MATURANA, H.R. 1970,Biology of cognition, Urbana/Ill.bersetzt von Wolfram K. Kck, Peter M. Hejl, GerhardRoth, Paderborn (1974).

MATURANA, H.R./VARELA, F. 1975, "Autopoieticsystems", in: Biological Computer Laboratory, Report No.9.4, Univ. of Ill., Urbana/Ill.

VARELA, F.G./MATURANA, H.R./URIBE, R. 1974,"Autopoiesis: The organisation of living systems, itscharakterization and a model", in:Journal of Molecular,Cellular and Behavioral Origins and Evolution5, No. 4,Univ. of Cile, Santiago, Chile.

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