master thesis international development studies november 2017
TRANSCRIPT
THE PURSUIT OF ALTERNATIVES TO REFUGEE CAMPS
FROM CARE-AND-MAINTENANCE TO SELF-RELIANCE, SUSTAINABILITY AND INTEGRATION:
EXPERIENCES FROM THE FIELD IN KAKUMA REFUGEE CAMP, KENYA
Master Thesis International Development Studies
Lianne de Jong
November 2017
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THE PURSUIT OF ALTERNATIVES TO REFUGEE CAMPS
FROM CARE-AND-MAINTENANCE TO SELF-RELIANCE, SUSTAINABILITY AND INTEGRATION:
EXPERIENCES FROM THE FIELD IN KAKUMA REFUGEE CAMP, KENYA
Lianne de Jong 930516404090
Sociology of Development & Change Wageningen University & Research Centre
Bram Jansen November 2017
RDS-80733 SDC-DIS Master Thesis
Copyright © 2016
All rights reserved. Nothing from this publication may be reproduced or made public, in any
form or by any means, without the prior written consent of the author.
Cover photo: made by the author in Kakuma Refugee Camp, 15 December 2016. Photograph
depicts a part of the Somali market and main street in Kakuma I.
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ABSTRACT
In policies on refugee hosting there is a notion that long term care and maintenance models have created
protracted refugee settings in which refugees are largely dependent on aid provision. In policies, stakeholders
search for alternatives to camps where the focus lies on creating more self-reliance, sustainability and integration
with the host community. However, there is a discrepancy between these policies and what happens on the
ground. In a two-month period of fieldwork I researched how refugees experience and give meaning to self-
reliance, sustainability and integration in the protracted camp setting, and which issues they face. The relevance
of this thesis is that it provides a local perspective on how these concepts are experienced by refugees, how policy
is translated into programs, and how it influences the relationship between humanitarian staff, refugees, the host
community and Kenyan authorities, creating an ambiguous situation where formal and informal spheres are
connected and have formed Kakuma’s distinct dynamic with its own social, economic and political organization.
In chapter two I set out the conceptual framework going into theoretical debates on protracted refugee situations,
the refugee camp, the way I perceive a camp, humanitarian governance, self-reliance policies and the discrepancy
between policy and practice. In chapter 3 I discuss the methods of this research. The thesis is based on a literature
study and a two-month period of fieldwork. I carried out qualitative fieldwork in the camp using the method of
participant observation. In chapter four I provide context for the fieldwork location, going into the history of the
camp, the population, the recent influx of South-Sudanese refugees and the growth of the camp.
In chapter five, I explore two recent policies that focus on alternatives to camps and compare them with Kakuma.
It is argued that the most important steps that should be taken to reach more self-reliance, sustainability and
integration, are the removal of restrictions on rights of refugees, alignment of service delivery with the local
structure, and the removal of the parallel system of service delivery. I problematize these steps for Kakuma where
Kenyan authorities still favour the restricted encampment policy and refugees are officially not allowed to move
out of the camp and to work. In Kakuma the host community is to a certain extent integrated in the humanitarian
arena. As such, it seems to be the other way around where the host community gets integrated into humanitarian
programs. Next to this, Turkana is the poorest region in Kenya and the lack of services from local authorities for
the host community makes alignment of the refugee community with this local system complicated.
In chapter six I look at how refugees experience the humanitarian presence In Kakuma, and the programs and
initiatives that focus on self-reliance, sustainability and integration. In the last five years, there has been an
increase of humanitarian agencies and programs that focus on self-reliance. In these programmes refugees receive
training in certain trades, get the opportunity to apply for loans, and receive business support. The main issue with
these programs is that most refugees are not reached and do not participate. There are not enough resources to
reach and assist everyone. Furthermore, considering the oversaturation of the markets in the camp, it is
questionable if refugees who are now being trained for certain trades can set up a successful business in the camp.
Refugees mention that some groups are favoured by agencies and some refugees manoeuvre the system and pay
to get incentive jobs or to participate in a certain program. Some changes are positively perceived by refugees,
such as the electronic cash voucher Bamba Chakula and the opening of a branch of Equity Bank in Kakuma.
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In chapter seven I focus on activities refugees engage in themselves, mostly outside of the formal service delivery
layer. Since the opening of the camp in 1991 Kakuma has been a site where formal – what is allowed and
implemented by authorities and UNHCR – and informal layers – that what happens outside the formal sphere –
developed and are connected, and thus created a grey area in which actors operate. Marketplaces have
developed, and refugees engage in agriculture, entrepreneurship and ship in goods from other cities in Kenya and
abroad. These processes show how in a protracted situation – where a return home or resettlement becomes less
likely – refugees find ways to create a way of normalcy, meaning they try to create a normal life as much as
possible. Refugees mentioned how police will ask for bribe, for activities that are formally not allowed.
Furthermore, the Turkana government has introduced business licences in the camp for refugee shop-owners.
This seems odd as formally refugees in Kenya are not allowed to work. Next to this, agencies offer incentive jobs
to refugees, to stimulate and give refugees the opportunity to work. However, without these incentive jobs service
delivery in Kakuma could not be maintained, which questions the purpose these incentive jobs serve. This way
authorities and agencies bear some responsibility for the perpetuation or continuation of encampment in Kakuma.
Lastly, throughout the thesis I refer to Kalobeyei settlement several times. This is a pilot project for Alternatives to
Camps which was set up by the Kenyan authorities, UNHCR and INGOs, and is located thirty kilometres from
Kakuma. Kalobeyei settlement is meant to be a hybrid settlement where the host and refugee community
integrate, and engage in entrepreneurial activities to sustain themselves. It is envisioned that by implementing
this program refugees will not rely as much on aid provision as in the care and maintenance model. However, the
recent influx of South-Sudanese and resettlement from Dadaab to Kakuma has obstructed these plans to a certain
level, as the focus now lies on providing emergency aid. Furthermore, in Kalobeyei agencies faced issues of service
delivery as the wells were not constructed yet, leading to a lack of water. There are differences compared to
Kakuma camp, as housing is set up in a more sustainable way, and refugees only receive Bamba-Chakula vouchers
to buy food. However, it remains to be seen in how far these activities are successful and in how far the Kenyan
government is engaged with the project. Furthermore, it would be interesting to see in how far Kakuma camp and
Kalobeyei settlement become connected overtime.
This research shows the complex setting in which refugees experience self-reliance, sustainability and integration.
It problematises the implementation of these three concepts as stipulated in policies on alternatives to camps.
The thesis uncovers the informal and formal layers in the camp through which refugees manoeuvre. The care and
maintenance model is still largely implemented in Kakuma. However, in Kakuma refugees have found ways to
achieve self-reliance outside of the formal service delivery from agencies, and some depend less on service
delivery than others. These activities are condoned, and at times utilized by UNHCR and agencies. Furthermore,
Kakuma camp is not only a place where refugees are aided and assisted, but also a way for UNHCR and the Kenyan
government to contain large amounts of refugees in one place. In the shift to the implementation of policies on
alternatives to camps the interconnectedness of formal and informal layers – and the role the refugee community,
host community, agencies, and Kenyan authorities play – in the protracted camp setting of Kakuma is not
considered.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The writing of this thesis would not have been possible without the help of many people, to which I owe much
gratitude.
First, I would like to thank Filmaid Kenya and professor Damaris Seleina Parsitau – director and lecturer at the
Institute of Women, Gender and Development Studies at Egerton University. The staff of Filmaid Kenya has been
very welcoming throughout my stay in Kenya and arranged my access to and accommodation in Kakuma Refugee
Camp. Damaris Parsitau supported me in acquiring a research permit. Without their support I would not have
been able to do my research and write this thesis.
Second, I would like to thank all the respondents for the time they took to hang out with me, open their homes to
me, and tell me about their lives and life in the camp. My respondents are the ones who showed me around and
provided me with insights I would otherwise not have gained. Your hospitality and willingness to help me with
complete this research is something I will not forget.
Third, I would like to thank my supervisor Bram Jansen from Wageningen University & Research Centre. Thanks
for your guidance, feedback and enthusiasm for the subject and fieldwork location. Lastly, I want to thank my
parents, family and friends for their support. Without them, I would not have been able to go to Kenya. A special
thanks to Esther Kapsoot and the Kapsoot family, for the time and effort they put in to make my journey to Kenya
possible, host me in Nairobi, and connect me with the right people.
Lianne de Jong
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MAPS
FIGURE 1: LOCATION KAKUMA REFUGEE CAMP1
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FIGURE 2: MAP KAKUMA REFUGEE CAMP2
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Abbreviations
AAHI – Action Africa Help International
CBO – community-based organisation
DAR – development assistance for refugees
DRA – Department for Refugee Affairs
DRC – Danish Refugee Council
GIZ – Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zussamenarbeit
IDP – internally displaced person
IOM – International Organisation of Migration
IRC – International Rescue Committee
JRS – Jesuit Refugee Services
KISEDP – Kalobeyei Integrated Socio-Economic Development Program
KRCS – Kenya Red Cross Society
KSh- Kenyan Shilling
LWF – Lutheran World Federation
NCCK – National Council of Churches of Kenya
INGO – international non-governmental organisation
NGO – non-governmental organisation
NRC – Norwegian Refugee Council
OAU – Organisation of African Unity
PRS – protracted refugee situation
PWJ – Peace Winds Japan
RAD – refugee aid and development
RAS – Refugee Affairs Secretariat
SRS – Self-Reliance Strategy
T&T – Team and Team International
UNHCR – Office of the United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees
UN – United Nations
WFP – World Food Programme
WTK – Windle Trust Kenya
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CONTENTS
Abstract ................................................................................................................................................................... 5
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................................. 8
Maps ....................................................................................................................................................................... 9
Abbreviations ........................................................................................................................................................ 12
1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................................... 16
1.1 Problem description .................................................................................................................................. 16
1.2 Problem statement & research questions ................................................................................................. 19
1.3 Thesis outline............................................................................................................................................. 20
2 Conceptual framework ....................................................................................................................................... 21
2.1 Protracted refugee situations .................................................................................................................... 21
2.2 Refugee camps .......................................................................................................................................... 23
2.3 Making sense of life in the camp ............................................................................................................... 25
2.4 Humanitarian governance ......................................................................................................................... 26
2.5 Shift in policy: from care-and-maintenance to self-reliance and integration ........................................... 29
2.6 Between policy and practice ..................................................................................................................... 31
2.7 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................. 33
3 Methodology ...................................................................................................................................................... 34
3.1 Research design ......................................................................................................................................... 34
3.1.1 Literature study ...................................................................................................................................... 34
3.1.2 Qualitative fieldwork .............................................................................................................................. 34
3.2 Access & positionality ................................................................................................................................ 35
3.3 Ethical considerations ................................................................................................................................ 37
3.4 Narratives: gossip, rumours & truth .......................................................................................................... 38
3.5 Limitations ................................................................................................................................................. 39
4 Context ............................................................................................................................................................... 41
4.1. Refugee policy .......................................................................................................................................... 41
4.1.1 Refugee policy in Sub-Saharan Africa ..................................................................................................... 41
4.1.2 Refugee policy in Kenya .......................................................................................................................... 42
4.3 Kakuma refugee camp ............................................................................................................................... 42
4.3.1 History .................................................................................................................................................... 42
4.3.2 Recent developments ............................................................................................................................. 43
4.3.3 Population .............................................................................................................................................. 45
4.3.4 The environment .................................................................................................................................... 47
4.4 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................. 48
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5 Self-reliance and integration in humanitarian policy ......................................................................................... 49
5.1 Alternatives to Camps – Making it Work ................................................................................................... 49
5.2 Kenya Comprehensive Refugee Program .................................................................................................. 50
5.3 Discussion & conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 52
6 Self-reliance, sustainability & integration in humanitarian programming in Kakuma ....................................... 56
6.1 Humanitarian structure ............................................................................................................................. 56
6.2 Focus on self-reliance, sustainability & integration .................................................................................. 59
6.2.1 AAHI ........................................................................................................................................................ 59
6.2.2 Swisscontact ........................................................................................................................................... 60
6.2.3 WFP - Bamba Chakula ............................................................................................................................ 61
6.2.4 Equity Bank ............................................................................................................................................. 62
6.2.5 Electricity ................................................................................................................................................ 62
6.3 Experiences of refugees with the programs and services ......................................................................... 63
6.4 Discussion & conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 65
7 Refugees’ experiences ....................................................................................................................................... 67
7.1 Small businesses ........................................................................................................................................ 67
7.2 Boda-boda business................................................................................................................................... 68
7.3 Shop-owners .............................................................................................................................................. 69
7.4 Gardens and agriculture ............................................................................................................................ 72
7.5 Incentive work ........................................................................................................................................... 72
7.6 Private refugee initiatives .......................................................................................................................... 73
7.7 Discussion & conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 74
8 Discussion & conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 76
8.1 Discussion .................................................................................................................................................. 76
8.2 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................. 79
References ............................................................................................................................................................ 80
Attachment I: list of humanitarian agencies working in kakuma .......................................................................... 84
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1 INTRODUCTION
In policies on refugee hosting there is a notion that long term care and maintenance models have created
protracted refugee settings in which refugees are largely dependent on aid provision. In policies, stakeholders
search for alternatives to camps where the focus lies on creating more self-reliance, sustainability and integration
with the host community. However, there is a discrepancy between these policies and what happens on the
ground. In a two-month period of fieldwork I researched how refugees experience and give meaning to self-
reliance, sustainability and integration in the protracted camp setting, and which issues they face. The relevance
of this thesis is that it provides a local perspective on how these concepts are experienced by refugees, how
policy is translated into programs, and how it influences the relationship between humanitarian staff, refugees,
the host community and Kenyan authorities, creating an ambiguous situation where formal and informal spheres
are connected and have formed Kakuma’s distinct dynamic with its own social, economic and political
organization
1.1 PROBLEM DESCRIPTION In 2015 the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) stated that 65,3 million people were
displaced from their homes as a result of persecution, conflict, generalized violence, and/or human rights
violations (Edwards, 2016). Of those, 21,3 million were officially counted as refugees by UNHCR (2016). It is
estimated that refugee crises nowadays last on average 20 years, compared to 9 years in 1993 (Vermeulen,
2013). In countries where state fragility, conflict and persecution have persisted for years, the majority of
refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) live in conditions of protracted exile with little to no prospect of
a durable solution to their situation (Zetter, 2011). Several factors, such as circumstances in the country of origin,
policy responses of the host country and lack of sufficient engagement by other actors, lead to protracted refugee
situations (Loescher & Milner, 2011).
I take this protractedness of refugee crises as the context for my research. In this thesis I explore how refugees
experience self-reliance, sustainability and integration in Kakuma refugee camp, as a protracted refugee camp. I
explore several policies and strategies for alternatives to refugee camps that were formulated by UN agencies
and humanitarian organisations. In these policies and strategies, the shift has focussed from the care and
maintenance approach – with the camp as a temporary solution to the refugee issue – to an approach where the
focus lies on self-reliance, sustainability, and integration. During my fieldwork I explored if and how these policies
affect humanitarian programming in a refugee camp and gained insights from refugees’ own experiences. Since
the opening of the camp in 1991 Kakuma has been a site where formal – what is allowed and implemented by
authorities and UNHCR – and informal layers – that what happens outside the formal sphere – developed and
are connected, and thus created a grey area in which actors operate.
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Considering Kenya’s restricted encampment policy, the focus on more self-reliance, sustainability and integration
as set forward in humanitarian programs, becomes problematic when you take into consideration that the level
of self-reliance that refugees are expected to reach does not stroke with the fact that refugees in Kenya are not
allowed to engage in any kind of formal business, to move in and out of the camp. Furthermore, in Kakuma there
is a lack of resources and opportunities both for the refugee and host community. Next to this, UNHCR’s dual
mandate, where they provide aid and assistance to refugees, but are also safeguarding the responsibilities of
states to respect refugee rights and thus to offers refugees protection, is problematic. Lastly, the camp is not
only a place where refugees are provided with aid, but also a way to contain large numbers of refugees in one
area, and through humanitarian programs refugees are steered in certain directions, for example in programs
dealing with gender equality and conflict resolution.
According to UNHCR refugee camps remain an important feature of the humanitarian landscape, as some thirty
percent of all refugees is estimated to live in camps (UNHCR, 2015d), especially in the east and the Horn of Africa.
Even though camps are set up to provide relief and temporary aid, many refugee camps nowadays host
thousands of refugees for periods that last far beyond the initial relief phase and/or the duration of the
emergency (Agier, 2002; Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000). The so-called durable solutions repatriation, third-country
resettlement and local integration have not proven to be immediately viable or have been met with resistance
from host countries (Colson, 2003). Today, the average lifespan of a refugee camp ranges from seven to twenty
years (Dalal, 2015). Now, it looks like the refugee camps initially established as temporary measures have
accidentally become permanent solutions (Martin, 2015).
On the one hand, a camp is a humanitarian structure, where people are aided and assisted, following
humanitarian principles, through the distribution of resources as food, water and shelter (Jansen, 2016). People
living in camps are there primarily because they search for shelter due to conflict, natural disasters or
persecution, which makes them qualified for refugee protection. Other ‘refugees’ are there because of other
reasons. For example, sometimes nationals register as refugees due to drought and poverty in their own country
(Jansen, 2016)., Others received refugee status in their first country of asylum but heard about better
infrastructure and services in another country and chose to settle there (Hilhorst & Jansen, 2010). Refugees in
camps often find themselves restricted in their rights, for example the right to move or the right to work. At the
same time, camps develop overtime and camp economies form and processes of social and spatial organization
take place. This also leads to social stratification in the camp, meaning some refugees adapted better to camp
life and engaged in entrepreneurship, or got more access to vital resource than others (Jansen, 2011). Agier
(2002), Montclos & Kagwanja (2000) and Dalal (2015) describe processes that are similar to urbanization in
refugee camps in terms of demographics, density, politics and economics processes. This urban approach ‘opens
up a perspective on refugees as social agents, with capabilities and strategies that actively seek to access and
manoeuvre the camp environment, hereby shaping and altering it’ (Jansen, 2015:153).
Consequently, a refugee camp becomes a reflection of the relation between humanitarian actors and refugees,
who form, negotiate and alter the organization of space, social life and power in the camp (Agier, 2002). This
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creates a paradoxical situation, where refugees are subject to the humanitarian structure, but also active agents
organizing life in the camp. In this context ‘processes of reordering, identity formation, emerging humanitarian
economies and politicization take shape’ (Jansen, 2015:151-152). A refugee camp should, then, not be seen
through the lens of temporality, but as a place, even though at the margins of society, where refugees create a
routine and create a sense of normalcy (Martin, 2015) .With the term normalcy I mean that refugees try to create
a normal life as much as possible. Most refugees try to find ways to sustain themselves, to earn some money to
buy food, to get a job or an education, to send their kids to school and thus create a level of autonomy.
Scholars and stakeholders argue that forced encampment policies have deteriorating effects on the living
standard of refugees. To mitigate these effects, different ideas and policies on how refugee camps should be
governed or managed have been brought up and implemented over the years. A common way of thinking is that
refugees living in camps can better contribute to the communities they live in when they are self-reliant and have
opportunities to maintain and sustain their livelihoods. Several policies have been formulated – such as
Development Assistance to Refugees (DAR) and Self Reliance Strategies (SRS) – through which humanitarian
actors experiment with programs focusing on self-reliance, protection and security, education, empowerment
and gender and age mainstreaming (Jansen, 2015). On some level, this has led to new opportunities for refugees
and influenced them to get education or training, find jobs at the agencies, or to start their own business.
In 2014 UNHCR published a new policy called “Policy on Alternatives to Camps”, in which they underline the need
to for refugees to have the possibility to live with greater dignity, autonomy and normalcy as members of the
community, either from the beginning of displacement or as soon as possible thereafter:
‘Where camps must be established or where they already exist, UNHCR will plan and implement the operational response
in a way that enables camps to be phased out at the earliest possible stage. Where this is not possible or practical, UNHCR
will pursue the progressive removal of restrictions on the ability of refugees to exercise their rights and seek to build
linkages between the camp and host communities and anchor the camp within the local economy, infrastructure and
national social protection and service delivery systems, in order to transform them into sustainable settlements.’ - UNHCR,
2014b:6
In practice, implementing this policy has proven to be difficult, partly because of UNHCRs own role in refugee
encampment. One the hand, the provision of aid may undermine protection and even result in threats to it arising
from UNHCR itself. On the other hand, the measures required to facilitate the provision of protection can
diminish the quality of aid provision, particularly from a developmental perspective. Furthermore, the effects of
self-reliance policy is paradoxical as ‘refugees are expected to exercise rights they do not have to achieve a
degree of independence which is not even expected of local populations in the same context and without access
to the bare minimum of resources’ (Hunter, 2009:2). At the same time, refugees have already engaged in
entrepreneurship outside of the humanitarian programs in an informal sphere. These activities are in a way
condoned and utilized by ways by UNHCR and authorities. These processes have together formed the social,
economic and political organization in the camp, and affect refugees, humanitarian staff, Kenyan authorities and
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the host community. In this thesis, I problematize these ambiguities and explore refugees’ experiences with self-
reliance, sustainability and integration.
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT & RESEARCH QUESTIONS I take Kakuma Refugee Camp as case study. Kakuma refugee camp was set up in 1991 and now hosts refugees
from over ten different countries, including Somalia, Sudan, South-Sudan and Ethiopia. Over the years the camp
has grown, marketplaces have emerged, relations with the host communities have developed, and a range of
agencies, overseen by UNHCR, have implemented their programs. Currently, around 159,000 people live in
Kakuma.3 This includes refugees that live in the new settlement in Kalobeyei which opened last year. The aim of
Kalobeyei Settlement was to digest Kakuma and Dadaab refugee camps, and to provide shelter for new refugees
coming from South-Sudan. Kalobeyei is planned to be a hybrid settlement where refugees and host population
coexist peacefully and are largely self-reliant. Also in Kakuma camp, agencies increasingly focus on self-reliance
and integration with the host community. In my research, I problematize the concept of self-reliance,
sustainability and integration as it is shaped in humanitarian policies and strategies in relation to what is
happening on the ground in Kakuma Refugee Camp. I take the protractedness of the refugee situation in Kakuma
as the context of my research, and explore and problematize the relationship between humanitarian
programmes focused on self-reliance, sustainability and integration, and refugees’ own initiatives to create a
sense of normalcy and routine. This relationship is ambiguous and at times paradoxical, which I explore in his
thesis.
Questions that arise are – among others – how refugees are expected to integrate in the local economy if the
host country does not recognize their rights. What happens the most vulnerable refugees or new arrivals that
are still in of need emergency aid? How do you develop a camp or a settlement to become integrated and
sustainable when it is in an environment dealing with fragility, corruption and drought? How do refugees gather
financial capital to start a business? What is the role of humanitarian agencies in this context of integration and
self-reliance? In this thesis, I explore if and how these policies are influencing what happens on the ground.
Therefore, the main research question is:
What do the concepts self-reliance, sustainability and integration mean for refugees in the context of the
protracted refugee situation in Kakuma refugee camp?
a) How has Kakuma Refugee Camp evolved over the last 5 years in the area of self-reliance, sustainability
and integration?
b) How is the concept of self-reliance, sustainability and integration implemented by humanitarian actors
in and around Kakuma Refugee Camp?
c) In what ways do refugees find ways to become self-reliant and integrate?
d) How is the concept of self-reliance and integration applied in Kalobeyei settlement?
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1.3 THESIS OUTLINE In this first chapter I introduced the subject of the thesis and the research questions. In chapter two, I introduce
the conceptual framework, elaborating on protracted refugee situations, restricted encampment, the care-and-
maintenance model, urbanization of refugee camps, humanitarian governance, policies on self-reliance and
integration and the relationship between policy and practice. In the third chapter I discuss the methods of the
research, consisting of the literature study and fieldwork research. The context for the fieldwork location can be
found in chapter four, in which I discuss Kenyan refugee policies and the history of Kakuma refugee camp. In
chapter five I explore two recent refugee policies that focus mainly on self-reliance and integration, which I
compare to my findings in the field. In chapters six and seven I discuss refugees’ experiences with humanitarian
programs on self-reliance, and how refugees themselves find ways to achieve self-reliance outside of the realm
of humanitarian aid and service provision. The eighth and last chapter contains the discussion and conclusion, in
which I reflect on my findings and give the main conclusions, thereby answering the main research question.
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2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
In this chapter I introduce the conceptual framework, elaborating on protracted refugee situations, restricted
encampment, the care and maintenance model, urbanization of refugee camps, the way I make sense of life in a
camp, humanitarian governance, policies on self-reliance and integration and the relationship between policy
and practice. I apply these concepts and theories to clarify the way I look at a refugee camp and to explore the
role of humanitarian actors and the relationship between humanitarian actors and refugees in the camp, in order
to answer the research question.
2.1 PROTRACTED REFUGEE SITUATIONS A protracted refugee situation (PRS) occurs when refugees live in exile and have no immediate prospect of finding
a durable solution to their situation by means of voluntary repatriation, local integration or resettlement (Crisp,
2003). In 2004, UNHCR defined a PRS as ‘one in which refugees find themselves in a long-standing and intractable
state of limbo. Their lives may not be at risk, but ‘their basic rights and essential economic, social and
psychological needs remain unfulfilled after years of exile’ (UNHCR 2009a). Most refugees and displaced persons
come from countries facing regional insecurity where conflict and persecution has persisted for years, such as
Afghanistan, Myanmar and Somalia.
Refugee situations can become protracted due to several different, but interrelated, factors. First, refugee
situations have become protracted because the armed conflicts which originally forced people to leave their own
country have dragged on for so many years, making it impossible for them to return home (Crisp, 2003).
Especially since 1990 civilians are increasingly deliberately targeted as an object of war, causing civilian casualties
and forced human displacement to dramatically increase. Furthermore, in most of these armed conflicts the
fighting goes on as various actors – politicians, military, warlords, militia groups, local entrepreneurs, and
international business concerns – have a vested economic interest in the continuation of the conflict (Crisp,
2010). The international community has failed to bring the conflicts and protracted refugee situations to an end.
In Africa, the geopolitical and economic stakes have generally been low for the industrialized states, with the
result that armed conflicts – and the refugee situations that originate from them – have been allowed to persist
for years on end (Crisp, 2003). This has led to a growing displaced community, where civilians lose their home
and are forced to migrate due to the violent circumstances at home, with no perspective of returning anytime
soon.
Second, refugee situations have become protracted as host countries, donor states, UNHCR and other actors
have given little attention to the solution of local integration in the past twenty years (Crisp, 2003). Earlier efforts
for local integration have had limited results, and refugees are often regarded as a burden on the host
community, a threat to national and regional security, and are hosted in states which are themselves fragile. This
makes host countries reluctant to approve local integration as the guiding policy. Rather than responding to this
impasse in innovative ways, host and donor countries, UNHCR and non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
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chose to implement long-term ‘care and maintenance’ programs which did little or nothing to promote self-
reliance amongst refugees or to facilitate positive interactions between those displaced and local populations
(Crisp, 2003).
Third, some of the people who find themselves in PRS are members of so-called ‘residual caseloads’ meaning
they decide to remain in exile when other members of the same population have been able to repatriate, resettle
or become locally integrated in their country of asylum. This can be explained by the fact that some refugees
have a continuing and legitimate fear of persecution; their homes, belongings and/or social networks are
destroyed in such a way they do not feel they can survive back home; they suffer from extensive trauma or
sickness; lack capital to make the journey back home; or conclude there are better opportunities to be found in
the country of asylum (Crisp, 2003).
In general, UNHCR argues that:
‘protracted refugee situations stem from political impasses. They are not inevitable, but are rather the result of political
action and inaction, both in the country of origin (the persecution and violence that led to flight) and in the country of
asylum. They endure because of ongoing problems in the country of origin, and stagnate and become protracted as a result
of responses to refugee inflows, typically involving restrictions on refugee movement and employment possibilities, and
confinement to camps’ – Loescher & Milner, 2011:1
Thus, protracted displacement is the combined result of the prevailing situations in the country of origin, the
policy responses of the country of asylum, and the lack of sufficient engagement in these situations by a range
of other actors (Loescher & Milner, 2011).
We can identify the following common features when it comes to protracted refugee situations (Crisp, 2003).
First, protracted refugee situations are usually found in peripheral border areas of asylum countries. Often these
places are insecure, not a high priority for the central government and for development actors, very poor and
climatic conditions are harsh. A second characteristic of settlements and camps is that they tend to be populated
by a large proportion of people with special needs, such as children and adolescents, women and the elderly.
The strongest members of the family or community are usually the ones to leave the camp and look for work, to
repatriate if there is a possibility and/or to self-settle in the country of asylum. Third, in the last years the focus
of humanitarian actors and donor states has been on high-profile crises. This means assistance programs in
protracted refugee situations have been deprived of funds and struggle to meet international humanitarian
standards of service provision. Fourth, and last, in many protracted refugee situations refugees are not able to
exercise their basic human rights, as they are limited in physical security, freedom of movement, civil and political
rights, legal rights, freedom of choice and the freedom to engage in wage-earning and income-generating
opportunities.
I need to make three remarks when talking about ‘protracted refugee situations’. First, the label implies that
those displaced find themselves in an unusual situation which is somehow different from a more ‘normal’ model
of a refugee crisis. This normal model assumes a humanitarian program providing relief and emergency aid, with
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a reasonably rapid cessation of violence or disaster, followed by the orderly return (or resettlement) of refugees
and IDPs. It is, however, doubtful if such conditions ever existed. Experience shows that protracted displacement
has now become the norm. Second, when talking about PRS this does not mean the population in this situation
is static. There are often periods of increase and decrease in the numbers of people displaced, and changes within
the population (Loescher & Milner, 2011). Furthermore, it must be acknowledged that refugee populations are
generally stratified, with some groups and individuals enjoying better conditions of life than other camp and
settlement residents (Crisp, 2003). Third, not every person displaced by violent conflict or persecution ends up
in an official refugee camp or settlement. A number of those displaced have self-settled outside of camps in rural
and urban areas (UNHCR, 2009). In some countries, there are no refugee camps, and asylum seekers and refugees
are permitted to live in urban areas. In other countries governments are incapable of enforcing the law that
designate asylum seekers and refugees to live in camps and settlements or they choose turn a blind eye
(Jacobsen, 2006).
2.2 REFUGEE CAMPS Since the late 1980s many governments in the global South have required displaced populations to live in
designated camps, with serious implications for the human rights and livelihoods of those displaced. As the
search for durable solutions has been anything but fruitful, refugees in Kenya are ordered to register at the
designated camps. There is a considerable number that illegally decides to self-settle in urban areas such as
Nairobi, if they have the financial means and social networks to do so. For some the camp is a place of transit
place where they navigate opportunities for resettlement, education or jobs; for others, it is their last resort as
they are too vulnerable to self-settle.
Created in a situation of emergency as a protective device intended to provide for the basic protection of
refugees, refugee camps agglomerate tens of thousands of inhabitants for periods that generally last far beyond
the duration of the emergency (Agier, 2002). UNHCR describes refugee camps as follows:
‘a camp is any purpose-built, planned and managed location or spontaneous settlement where refugees are
accommodated and receive assistance and services from government and humanitarian agencies. The defining
characteristic of a camp […] is some degree of limitation on the rights and freedoms of refugees, such as their ability to
move freely, choose where to live, work or open a business, cultivate land or access protection and services.’ – UNHCR,
2014:4
Refugee camps are meant to host refugees in the emergency phase to provide relief aid, after which a durable
solution should be found. In a refugee camp services offered entail arranging registration and documentation;
access to shelter, food, water, health care and education; administering and managing the camps; and
establishing policing and justice mechanisms that enable refugees to benefit in some way from the rule of law
(Slaughter & Crisp, 2009). As Crisp & Jacobsen (2015) argue the concept of a refugee camp is used to describe
human settlements which vary enormously in size, socio-economic structure and political character. There is,
however, a main line of thought on the life cycle of a camp, as shown in figure 3.
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FIGURE 3 LIFE CYCLE OF A CAMP ACCORDING TO UNHCR4
In the first phase the camp is opened, after a location is found and deals are made with the host government.
Refugees are registered, get shelter and relief aid is provided. After the emergency phase, the camp goes into
the ‘care and maintenance’ phase. UNHCR (2005a:4) defines ‘care and maintenance’ as ‘assistance to refugees
in a relatively stable situation, where survival is no longer threatened, but where future of the refugee group has
not yet been determined in terms of durable solutions’. The idea is that soon after relief aid is not needed
anymore, and durable solutions are found. As formulated in UNHCRs Camp Management Toolkit:
‘Camps are an option of last resort. They do not provide a permanent sustainable solution but offer temporary
provision of protection and assistance, in order to meet the basic human rights of displaced populations’ –
UNHCR, 2015:14
According to Smith (2006) most host countries resort to encampment policies in an attempt to manage the
growing security concerns until permanent solutions are found. Proponents of camp settings emphasize
advantages such as the ability to facilitate organized repatriation of refugees, attract international assistance due
to high visibility, and to monitor and target recipients and distribute aid faster and more effectively (Muiruri,
2014). Furthermore, issues of security often play a role for host governments as through encampment they can
control the presence and movement of refugees in their country (UNHCR, 2014b). Governments might be
concerned that refugees will compete with the host community over limited economic opportunities and scarce
resources and will less likely return home when they can settle in communities and integrate in the economy
(UNHCR, 2014b). For UNHCR camps can be an essential part of their operational response, as it facilitates the
rapid provision of protection and life-saving assistance, identification of people with special needs, and the
delivery of services.
When looking at these advantages, they make sense in emergency settings when large populations enter a host
country looking for short-term relief aid, and leave soon thereafter. But what happens when camps do not follow
the proposed life cycle and exist for longer periods of time. Does a restricted encampment policy still make sense
when camps have been in existence for over ten years? And what happens in the camp in the meantime? Chkam
(2016) argues these encampment policies have contributed to the endurance of camps, leading to a quasi-
permanent state of emergency and the absence of alternatives to encampment. Encampment – often for
extended periods of time – has led to adverse health, socio-economic, and environmental impacts, restrictions
on freedom of movement and employment, and a source of insecurity for refugee and host populations. Camp
critics point to the way these camp settings prevent integration of refugees with the host populations, stimulate
an increasing dependency on relief aid, ignore the resources and capacities of refugees themselves, neglect the
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repercussions of a refugee influx on the host populations, and limit refugees’ rights and freedoms (Muiruri,
2014). Others have referred to the repressive way refugee and migration situations are managed as a
‘humanitarian regime of detention’. It appears refugees have no alternative but to accept that they must give up
their autonomy in exchange for international assistance and protection, most notably the freedom of movement.
This has created a paradox whereby aid aimed at alleviating suffering can instead inadvertently prolong it.
2.3 MAKING SENSE OF LIFE IN THE CAMP The aim of this research is to study the social life of refugees in camp settings, to make sense of what is happening
on the ground in comparison or versus what has been set out in humanitarian policies and strategies on self-
reliance, sustainability, and integration. But how to approach and make sense of social life in a protracted camp
setting? I want to provide more context to how I perceive a camp. These insights are also useful as I discuss
humanitarian governance, refugee policies, and the relationship between humanitarian actors and refugees. It
helps analyse the dynamics in the refugee camp, the involvement and role of stakeholders (humanitarian
agencies, refugees, host community and Kenyan authorities) and the arena in which they operate.
Agier (2002), Jansen (2011) and Dalal (2014) found that processes happen in refugee camps in Kenya and Jordan
where camps take on urban features. They describe how a refugee camp that starts as a bureaucratic structure,
in which people are aided, assisted and emancipated, overtime develops into an economy with distinct
livelihoods and processes of social and spatial organization. They claim that although refugees may find
themselves in a protracted situation they make sense of their life in exile. Protracted refugee camps, then, should
be understood as more than desolate temporary waiting places as they encompass a variety of lives, livelihoods
and circumstances and develop through time (Jansen 2011).
Martin (2015:16) coined the term ‘temporary permanence’ to approach the ambiguities that come with
protracted camp settings, arguing ‘rather than seeing refugee camps as responding to the logic of emergency or
temporariness, there is an urgency to examine these sites through the lens of ‘normality’ and as ‘spaces in
evolution’. Rather than addressing the camps as situations of exception, it might be better to examine them as
laboratories or experiments of the workings of politics at the margins, places where refugees may reproduce
their new normalcy and negotiate their lives through the humanitarian arena. In this process camps evolve over
time, expand or even turn into city-like structures, in which life continues and where refugees and inhabitants
reproduce their own normalcy.
Dalal (2015) describes how through time refugee camps tend to urbanize: initial empty spaces transform into
vibrant markets, habitats and social spaces. The development of size, population density, layout, concentration
of infrastructures, socio-occupational profile and trading activities in refugee camps give them urban features
(Montclos and Kagwanja, 2000). Through these activities local and international networks expand between
camps and their surrounding areas, as well as with other towns and diasporic groups. Over time, refugees appear
to be some sort of ‘urban dwellers in the making’ and camps to be a preliminary step towards urbanization.
Furthermore, Crisp and Jacobsen (2015) argue once a camp has been formally established and provided with
26
international support, refugees are rarely ‘confined’ to their settlement. In many situations, refugees move out
of their camps periodically to visit their homeland, or to take on opportunities to earn money, for example by
engaging in the trade or agriculture business in the country of asylum. As such, the refugee camp evolves as
different people move out and into the camp, and becomes connected to other cities and areas.
The perspective of the urbanization of refugee camps makes it possible to view refugees as social agents, who
have capabilities and strategies and actively seek to access and manoeuvre the camp environment, hereby
shaping and altering it (Jansen, 2015:153). Refugees find ways to sustain themselves, look for opportunities to
earn an income, and search for opportunities in the humanitarian arena. Paradoxical life forms are found in
camps, ‘in which processes of reordering, identity formation, emerging humanitarian economies and
politicization take shape’ (Jansen, 2015:151-152). Refugee protection in this sense should not be reduced to a
single notion of assistance or aid, but rather approached as a form of governance, and the camp as a reflection
of the relation between aid governors and refugees, that due to the protractedness and intensity of the aid
encounter, surpassed the temporary provision of relief (Jansen, 2015:153).
2.4 HUMANITARIAN GOVERNANCE Historically, camp coordination and management roles have been played by UNHCR agencies and international
nongovernmental organisations (INGOs) (UNHCR, 2015b). UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies have
assumed a primary role in the delivery and coordination of support to refugees, initially by means of emergency
relief operations and subsequently through long-term ‘care and maintenance’ programs. Involvement of the host
country has generally been limited to the admission and recognition of refugees on its territory, respect for the
principle of non-refoulement (non-voluntary repatriation), and the provision of security for refugees and
humanitarian personnel. From the 1980s, and with marked acceleration in the 1990s, UNHCRs activities have
been extended far beyond its original mandate, and the organisation has come to play a greater role in the
provision of assistance and the management of camps, with many activities outsourced to partner agencies
handling water and sanitation, healthcare, food distribution and so on (Chkam, 2016).
UNHCR has a dual mandate where they provide aid and assistance to refugees, but also safeguard the
responsibilities of states to respect refugee rights (Bakewell, 2002). These two mandates can create internal
contradictions. On the one hand the provision of aid may undermine protection and on the other hand measures
required to facilitate the provision of protection can diminish the quality of aid provision (Bakewell, 2002). The
role of protection is to ensure that the refugees are treated in accordance with the provisions of the international
refugee conventions the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees from 1951 and the Organization of
African Unity (OAU) Protocol. The 1951 Refugee Convention that the term ‘refugee’ applies to any person who
‘as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not
27
having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or,
owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it’ - UN General Assembly, 1951:153
The core principle stipulated in this document is that of non-refoulement, meaning that a refugee should not be
returned to a country where they face serious threats to their life or freedom. In the 1967 Organisation of African
Unity Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees the timeframe of ‘before 1 January 1951’ was removed
(Organization of African Unity (OAU), 1969). UNHCR itself claims to serve as the ‘guardian’ of the 1951
Convention and its 1967 Protocol.5 According to the legislation, states are expected to cooperate with UNHCR in
ensuring that the rights of refugees are respected and protected. Priority aims of international protection in
emergencies are described as to ‘ensure admission and at least temporary asylum; prevent forcible return
(refoulement); and ensure that refugees are treated in according to basic human rights standards’ (Bakewell,
2002:229).
A defining characteristic of the ‘care and maintenance’ model is the extent to which it endows UNHCR with the
responsibility for the establishment of systems and services for refugees that were parallel to, separate from,
and in many cases, better resourced than those available to the local population. In doing so, this model created
a widespread perception that the organization was a surrogate state, complete with its own territory - refugee
camps - , citizens - refugees -, public services - education, health care, water, sanitation, etc. - and even ideology
- community participation, gender equality, etc. (Slaughter & Crisp, 2009). Considering these factors scholars
have conceptualized UNHCR as working parallel to the state, arguing in carrying out these tasks the organization
acts as a substitute for the host state (Kagan, 2011; Slaughter & Crisp, 2009).
The central argument for humanitarian governance is that foreign aid agencies, with at the top UNHCR, have
taken a leading role in managing refugee camps, and in taking on this role they bear some responsibility for the
perpetuation or continuation of encampment (Chkam, 2016). Their involvement is often justified through the
‘lesser evil’ argument. This means that because of the inability or unwillingness of certain states to provide
protection and assistance to refugees, aid agencies have had little choice but to fill this gap in the international
refugee regime, even if it involves the unintentional and occasional violation of refugee human rights. This is a
dilemma at the heart of humanitarian management of refugee camps and those displaced.
The anthropologist Didier Fassin defines humanitarian governance as ‘the administration of human collectivities
in the name of a higher moral principle that sees the preservation of life and the alleviation of suffering as the
highest value of action’ (in Barnett, 2013:381). As Barnett (2013) argues, although humanitarian governance
operates in the name of the victims of the world, governance is about rule, and rule is about power. Hyndman
(2000) argues humanitarianism is increasingly becoming a politicized process of balancing the needs of refugees
and other displaced persons against the interests of states. Aid for refugees and other displaced people is an ad
hoc political tool inspired primarily by the donor governments of this aid (Hyndman, 2000).
Minca (2015) argues that camps – be it detention camps, transit camps, refugee camps or tourist camps – are a
mix of custody, care and control. She sees the camp as part of a set of broader political technologies, aimed at
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controlling mobility and ‘governing life’ through coercion and at times direct or indirect violent means. For
refugee camps this provides interesting insights. UNHCR and its partners provide custody in the form of
implementing encampment policies, care in the form of service provision, and control through encampment
policies and security. As such, camps offer convenience for aid delivery and opportunities for surveillance,
containment and security for host states (Chkam, 2016). This view of the camp as a political technology is
important to consider. Apart from delivering services to refugees, encampment is also way to steer people, and
a form of mobility constraint and population governance.
This form of control also becomes apparent when looking at humanitarian programming in camps. Next to a form
of care, these programmes are also a form of control (Sagy, 2008). First, the programmes and encampment
policies are a way to control the refugee population. Second, programmes are implemented to convert identities
and behaviours. Programmes are directed to, for example, gender and hygiene, and say something about how
people are supposed to behave according to UNHCR and its partners. As such humanitarian programming is a
controlling process by which refugees in camps (mainly in Africa) are ‘encouraged’ the UNHCR to convert their
identities and behaviours (Sagy, 2008).
These insights are important when analysing the relationship between humanitarian actors and refugees. Ideally
humanitarian action is the service delivery of international humanitarian organisations in temporary conflict
situations according to the principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence (Hilhorst & Jansen, 2010). This
follows the idea that humanitarian workers find themselves in so-called humanitarian spaces, where they work
without hindrance and follow the humanitarian principles. However, as Hilhorst and Jansen (2010) argue, in
practice humanitarian action is an arena where actors negotiate the outcomes of aid. This negotiation can involve
any kind of strategy, including violence, formal and informal interactions, and gossiping’. And:
‘The realities and outcomes of aid depend on how actors along and around the aid chain – encompassing donor
representatives, headquarters, field staff, aid recipients and surrounding actors – interpret the context, the needs,
their own role and each other.’ - Hilhorst and Jansen 2010:1121
An important feature of this arena approach is that it recognizes how humanitarian action and governance is
based on a range of driving forces besides the humanitarian desire to alleviate life-threatening suffering around
the world. Political motivations, organizational politics and legitimation politics may partly inspire humanitarian
action. How humanitarians at the frontline define and organize their work makes all the difference. Furthermore,
this approach pays attention to the strategizing and constructive roles of aid recipients in shaping humanitarian
aid. Aid recipients do not passively hang abut until aid arrives, but strategize to reach agencies and become
eligible for their services (Hilhorst & Jansen, 2010). The dissemination of ideas, allocation of humanitarian
resources and implementation of relief projects take place through subtle power processes that transcend
preconceived notions about humanitarian agents and aid recipients (Hilhorst & Jansen, 2010).
Oesch (2017) captures what is argued above as he mentions the refugee camp should be considered as ‘a space
of multiple ambiguities and subjectivities’. Refugees are not only assisted subjects and beneficiaries, but also as
autonomous and productive subjects, as well as entrepreneurs and consumers. This ambiguous exercise of
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power is driven by geo-political and socio-economic considerations. A protracted refugee camp is a site where
formal – what is allowed and implemented by authorities and UNHCR – and informal layers – that what happens
outside the formal sphere – developed and are connected, and create a grey area in which these actors operate.
This gives interesting insights for my research, where I want to explore how refugees experience self-reliance,
sustainability and integration in a protracted camp setting. Refugees, humanitarian staff, the host community
and authorities all manoeuvre in this ambiguous camp setting, where formal and informal spheres become
interconnected.
2.5 SHIFT IN POLICY: FROM CARE-AND-MAINTENANCE TO SELF-RELIANCE AND INTEGRATION Since the opening of large-scale refugee camps in the 1960s a majority of stakeholders have seen the need for a
shift from care and maintenance programs to the stimulation of self-reliance, sustainability and integration
(Loescher & Milner, 2011). The idea is that when refugees are allowed to gain access to resources and freedom
of movement, and can work alongside their hosts to pursue productive lives, they would be less dependent on
aid and better able to overcome the sources of tension and conflict in their host communities (Jacobsen, 2002).
Economic activities help to recreate social and economic interdependence within and between communities,
and can restore social networks based on the exchange of labour, assets and food. Many scholars and
development practitioners have long recognized the benefits of allowing refugees to pursue strategies which
promote economic participation and sustainable livelihoods, as such activities are crucial to human dignity and
long-term well-being.
Before introducing different policies set up with this goal in mind, I first explain the concepts of self-reliance as
it is used in policies and strategies. Self-reliance is a concept which explores the ability of an individual to provide
for his or her own needs. The UNHCR Handbook for Self-Reliance defines self-reliance as:
‘the social and economic ability of an individual, a household or a community to meet essential needs (including protection,
food, water, shelter, personal safety, health and education) in a sustainable manner and with dignity. Self-reliance, as a
program approach, refers to developing and strengthening livelihoods of persons of concern, and reducing their
vulnerability and long-term reliance on humanitarian/external assistance.’ - UNHCR, 2005:1.
UNHCR (2014:7) argues building self-reliance is essential throughout all phases of displacement. Whether
refugees will return home, get resettled or integrate locally, self-reliance is a critical component in achieving
durable solutions and should be advocated for and supported. To be self-reliant requires the need for an
individual to enjoy social and economic rights. For refugee communities it also requires the ability to build strong
social, economic, and cultural ties with their host communities.
The concept of livelihoods is often used as the means to achieve self-reliance. Livelihoods comprise the
capabilities, assets and activities that are required for a means of living (Vriese, 2006). When livelihoods of
persons of concern are developed and strengthened this will increase their level of self-reliance. Essentially,
livelihoods refer to the means used to maintain and sustain life. Thus, livelihoods allow people to secure the
basic necessities of life, such as food, water, shelter and clothing (UNHCR, 2014a). Being able to engage in
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livelihood activities means to acquire the knowledge, skills, social network, raw materials, and other resources
to meet individual or collective needs on a sustainable basis with dignity. A sustainable livelihood, then, allows
one to cope with and recover from stress and shocks, to maintain or enhance capabilities and assets and to
provide sustainable livelihood opportunities for the next generations.
During the 1970s the global refugee population grew significantly and instead of becoming self-sufficient, many
refugee camps and their inhabitants continued to rely on international assistance (Crisp, 2001). By the end of the
1970s international donors became reluctant to fund open-ended ‘care and maintenance’ programs, while host
countries called for ‘international burden sharing’ to the refugee issue. As a response several strategies were set
out to tackle the long-term nature of encampment. During the late 1970s and early 1980s a series of meetings
were held which became known as the ‘Refugee Aid and Development’ (RAD) strategy (Crisp, 2001). During the
1990s, aid actors became increasingly interested in the ways in which relief aid and development approaches
could be better linked, which became coined as relief-development continuum (Harmer & Macrae, 2004). At the
beginning of the 2000s several initiatives were launched by UNHCR within the Legal Framework of Durable
Solutions of which one component was the ‘Development Assistance to Refugee’ (DAR) approach. The strategy
was formulated as:
‘A programming approach which aims to place refugee concerns and those of the host communities in development
agendas, mobilize additional development assistance and improve burden-sharing with countries hosting large refugee
populations. It seeks to promote a better quality of life and self-reliance for refugees and prepare them for durable
solutions, and to contribute to poverty eradication in refugee-hosting areas’ - UNHCR, 2005a:5
These strategies all recognized the often long-term nature of refugee asylum in developing countries due to
limitations in finding durable solutions (Meyer, 2006). The basis was that from the outset assistance should be
oriented towards development, enabling beneficiaries to move quickly towards self-sufficiency, by achieving self-
reliance for refugees (Crisp, 2001; Meyer, 2006). The rationale behind this approach is that relief-based solutions
had proven to be largely insufficient, the living standards of refugees and host community should be improved,
refugee concerns should be reflected in development priorities at country-level, and using refugees’ capacities
would result in positive contribution to the development of host-communities and enhance dignity of refugees.
It was agreed international assistance should be used to promote sustainable development instead of open-
ended relief, and both refugees and the local populations should benefit from this process. Activities envisioned
were projects to provide agricultural, wage-earning and income-generating opportunities, strengthen physical
and social infrastructure, and efforts to combat the environmental degradation caused by long-term presence of
refugee populations. A greater emphasis was placed on a livelihood approach to enhance the productivity of
forced migrants, promote greater self-reliance, and help people to either regain sources of living lost during
displacement or cultivate new ones (Vriese, 2006).
These strategies proved to be seriously flawed. Factors were a lack of funding from the international community,
divergent objectives between host countries and donors, a change in focus from linking relief and development
to linking aid and security, and increased attention within UNHCR at that time to repatriation and reintegration
31
as durable solutions (Crisp, 2001; Harmer & Macrae, 2004). Furthermore, there was a concern to ensure that aid
did not create dependency, but contributed to revitalizing and protecting people’s livelihoods. Also, the objective
of the strategies was ambiguous in its nature. It was not clear if the purpose was to promote settlement and local
integration in the countries of asylum or if the purpose was to improve the situation of refugees and the host
community until those refugees would return to their country of origin (Crisp, 2001). As I argued before, it should
also be considered that these programmes were not merely a form of service delivery, but also a form of control
and a way to contain refugees in the camps. For example, the security concerns that came with the encampment
of large groups of refugees were partly created by this policy itself. By keeping refugees contained, in one place,
which is in the case of Kakuma camp, in a desolate region, they have partly created the need for service delivery.
It has become clear that humanitarian actors were partly responsible for the perpetuation of encampment
Chkam 2016).
2.6 BETWEEN POLICY AND PRACTICE Despite the enormous energy devoted to generating the right policy models in development, strangely little
attention is given to the relationship between these models and the practices and events that they are expected
to generate or legitimize (Mosse, 2004). There have been many scholars reviewing the effects of these policies
and strategies and they argue there is a disconnect between refugees’ experiences and perceptions of self-
reliance programs and the ‘official’ discourse surrounding the self-reliance strategies. It is interesting to see how
these programmes relate to the camp as a technology of control. Refugee self-reliance, as used in policies, can
in fact be in tension with refugee empowerment, rather than inextricably linked to it (Meyer, 2006:1). Not
everyone is reached by these programmes and there is a question which purpose these programmes serve.
Furthermore, outside of the formal service delivery in the camp refugees have found own ways independent of
agencies to reach a form of self-reliance, which are in a way condoned, and at times utilized or exploited, by
authorities and agencies, as I will explain later in the empirical chapters.
Overall, international efforts continue to focus on the provision of the major necessities of refugees (shelters,
medical assistance, supply of water and food), frequently neglecting livelihoods protection (Cavaglieri, n.d.). In
2000 Jamal called for UNCHR to move away from using ‘minimum emergency standards’ as a benchmark for
progress, and to focus instead on the more elastic concept of ‘essential human needs’ in protracted refugee
situations. Herein ‘minimum standards’ are ‘baseline standards that ensure human survival’ and ‘essential needs’
are those elements required to lead a safe and dignified life’ (Jamal, 2000:3). He argues that while at the start of
an emergency essential needs may be in accordance with minimum standards, over time essential needs will
grow, as refugee lives become increasingly inhabitable unless they can enjoy a wider range of human rights, and
to develop their human functions and capabilities. According to Muiruri (2014:v) – who analysed the role of aid
in protracted refugee situations in Kenya - ‘aid organizations and the government seem to be suck at the
emergency phase characterized by saving lives, protection and provision of basic needs, and have not yet moved
on to finding durable solutions’.
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This asks the question which agenda these initiatives serve (Meyer, 2006:1). As Mosse (2004) argues the main
aim of formulating a policy is to legitimize and mobilize political and financial support. This would mean the initial
goal is not to achieve results in camps as set out in the policies and strategies, but to gain funding and back-up.
UNHCR is constrained by the need to appeal to donors and asylum states and consequently its policies fail to
adequately protect and meet the needs of refugees (Hunter, 2009:1). The structure of UNHCR organization limits
its ability to develop autonomous policies which reflect the best interests of refugees. Hunter (2009) critiques
their approach claiming policies are self-serving, unambiguously focused on the reduction of material assistance
in line with falling UNHCR budgets, rather than addressing the real needs of refugees. Furthermore, even though
UNHCR is exercising de facto sovereignty, in practice it is merely an invited guest in the country, assisting in the
host state’s performance of its obligations in a manner wholly governed by the terms of the invitation (Wilde,
2014).
The level of self-reliance, as stipulated in policies, refugees can achieve is in a way directly related to the degree
to which host states extend and protect refugee rights. According to Hunter the idea of refugee self-reliance is
incompatible with contexts where refugees are confined to camps without freedom of movement and where
their economic activities are circumscribed (Hunter, 2009). Jacobsen (2002) argues that many refugees cannot
establish or maintain their livelihoods because they cannot exercise the rights to which they are entitled under
international human rights, humanitarian law, and/or refugee law. For one, how is it possible to stimulate refuge
livelihoods and self-reliance when refugees in camps live under restrictive conditions and are limited in their
physical security, movement, legal position, and not allowed to engage in wage-earning and income-generating
opportunities (Crisp, 2003). However, having said this it is important to consider refugees in camps have find
ways in this grey area to engage in income-generating activities, which creates an ambiguous situation of power
in the camp, where these activities are to a large extent condoned and/or utilized by authorities and agencies.
What needs to be considered is that This has also added to the social stratification in a camp where refugees
have different levels of capacities and resources, and have achieved different levels of self-reliance.
Another factor is that to be able to achieve self-reliance it is said that there needs to be an enabling environment,
including a viable economic situation, availability of affordable housing or access to land, as well as receptive
attitudes within the host community (UNHCR 2002b). Refugees have found ways to manoeuvre through these
challenges and found ways to achieve a level of self-reliance even if the enabling environment – the way it is
explained in policies – is not there. However, the physical characteristics of organized refugee settlements are
often incompatible with the needs of refugees and hinder any attempts to engage in sustainable livelihoods
(Hunter, 2009:31). The standardized approach to refugee settlements ignores essential contextual issues which
diminish the productive capacity of refugee settlements. Livelihood strategies, including agriculture, are
rendered inefficient by high levels of competition and lack of essential resources in refugee settlements. The
artificially high populations of refugee settlements induce fierce competition both for scarce resources as inputs
for livelihood strategies, but also for the fruit of one’s labour. Limited access to the job-market due to poor
economic conditions, remoteness of refugee camps, language differences, the lack of skills, tools and start-
33
capital, and possible resistance from the host community all disable refugees to achieve self-reliance (Vriese,
2006).
Since the 1990s Cavaglieri (n.d.) studied the outcome of the implementation of micro-finance programs by
UNHCR and humanitarian agencies. The aim of these programs was to foster self-sufficiency and productivity
under refugees. Implementing these programs in refugee camps proved challenging. First, the projects did not
target the most vulnerable, but instead the beneficiaries were those already endowed with business expertise,
and often had enough resources to sustain themselves. Second, many refugees were reluctant to set-up a
business in the host country, because they think or hope to return home as soon as possible. Third, refugees
were situated in a relief environment, where implementing organizations were often doubtful the full repayment
of loans provided was going to happen.
In most protracted refugee camps there is a co-existence of a protracted and an emergency situation (Chkam,
2016). This means there is a population of long-term encamped refugees combined with new arrivals in acute
need. When implementing policies on self-reliance, integration and sustainability it needs to be considered that
refugees may need different levels of support. Refugees who have just fled from their homes will most likely
need another form of aid, then refugees who have been in the camp for a considerable camp. From the policy
side, with the care and maintenance model this does not pose too much problems because it means that basic
services – shelter, food, and water – are be provided to all registered refugees. With programs that focus on self-
reliance and integration there is the need for an assessment of the capabilities, skills and assists refugees have,
which can differ considerably between new arrivals, the vulnerable, and among refugees who have been in the
camp for a longer time.
2.7 CONCLUSION In this chapter I set out the conceptual framework to clarify how I perceive the protracted refugee camp, how I
make sense of life in the camp, the relationship between humanitarian agencies and refugees and the arena they
manoeuvre in, and the way policies are formulated and how implementation of these policies can be
problematic. I use these insights to explore how refugees experience self-reliance, integration and sustainability
and what it means to them. I also look at how it forms the dynamic in the camp and how life in the camp is
organized. In the following chapters I take Kakuma Refugee Camp as a case study to see if and how refugees
experience self-reliance, sustainability and integration and which issues they face, in the context of a protracted
refugee situations.
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3 METHODOLOGY This research is based on a literature study and a two-month period of fieldwork carried out in Kakuma Refugee
Camp, Kenya, between November 2016 and January 2017. In this chapter, I discuss the research design, issues
of access & positionality, data recording and analysis, ethical considerations and limitations.
3.1 RESEARCH DESIGN
3.1.1 LITERATURE STUDY
For the literature study, I focused on academic literature, reports and news articles. First, articles from peer-
reviewed journals gave me background on and insights in protracted refugee situations, humanitarian
governance and conducting fieldwork in refugee settings. Second, I read reports and literature written by and
for humanitarian agencies, which gave insights in humanitarian and/or refugee policy, and how specific terms,
such as ‘self-reliance’, are conceptualized and used. Operational update reports, from agencies that work in
Kakuma, provided specific info about humanitarian projects and activities going on in the camp and the latest
overview of the general situation in the camp. As these are compiled from data from different agencies working
in the camp, they provided a nice comparison with my own findings the experiences of the refugees I spoke with
and interviewed.
I studied literature throughout the research, most extensively during the proposal-writing phase, my break from
the field, and the thesis-writing period. After I had been in the camp for some time I realized I needed to adapt
the initial conceptual framework and research questions. This was first due to the possibilities and restraints I
had as a researcher, and second due to new insights gained during fieldwork. The time I spent in Nairobi between
the two fieldwork periods, gave me the opportunity to rewrite my conceptual framework. Throughout the
research I also consulted media outlets, as news messages provided information about the most recent events
and conditions, which are important to explain the context of my fieldwork period.
3.1.2 QUALITATIVE FIELDWORK
Apart from the literature study, my research is based on a period of qualitative research in Kakuma refugee camp.
The main research method I used is participant observation, which is:
‘a method in which a researcher takes part in the daily activities, rituals, interactions, and events of a group of people as
one of the means of learning the explicit and tacit aspects of their life routines and their culture’ – DeWalt & DeWalt,
2011:1
The main advantage of this method is that by doing research in a certain community for a longer period, this
gives the researcher the opportunity to observe and experience everyday life in that particular context. By
hanging out with people and seeing them regularly and this allows the researcher to build so-called rapport – a
form of trust – in which both the researcher and the informant are comfortable with each other’s presence.
Then, this opens the door to ask questions and record information about the lives and views of the informants
(Bernard, 2011).
35
I found it valuable to be in the camp and hang out with people for a longer period, as it allowed me to get a
feeling of everyday life in the camp and gave me time to observe what was happening. By hanging out with an
Ethiopian family, who owned a coffee and shisha shop in Kakuma I, I got to know their friends and we could sit
all afternoon to talk about their lives and concerns. They were also interested in my story and life, meaning it
was not a one-way flow of information where I would only ask questions which they would answer. The
communication and sharing of information went both ways, and this helped to build trust and at times even
friendships. By talking to different people, I could check or review some of my findings, especially by talking to
people who have different social, economic and cultural backgrounds and positions in the camp. Doing research
in a refugee camp meant I was bound to some restrictions, which I discuss in the next section.
Most of my data stems from casual conversations, unstructured interviews and observations. At times, I made
an appointment to talk with somebody, and I would have questions ready. Other times, casual conversations
turned out to be very useful for my research. During these conversations and interviews I tried to engage as little
as possible, but sometimes had to steer the conversation in the right direction when informants would move to
much from the subject we were discussing. When talking with agency-staff I would have a list of questions ready.
I recorded most of my data through field notes. This immediate way of recording gave a good and sometimes
exact representation of what had been said. If it was not possible to make notes I would remember what I had
heard or seen and write it down later. Back in my room I would work out the notes on my laptop, adding what
came to mind. Furthermore, driving and walking around the camp I made notes of the surroundings and what I
saw happening, trying to get the feeling of everyday life in the camp.
During interviews and conversations, I asked the informants if they agreed with me taking notes, and they never
declined. I only recorded four interviews. I held this interviews at the Filmaid offices during the weekend, as they
were not in use then. I found that recording conversations and interviews was not the most fitting recording
method in this context, as it was hard to find a quiet place in the camp, there were always people around, the
issues to be discussed were too sensitive and/or in general people would be more hesitant to answer questions.
Even though I told my informants I was a student doing research for University and not working for an agency,
there was always a bit worried wrong information would end up with the agencies, and discredit them in some
way. I go into this issue more in the part on ethical considerations. Language was another issue, as sometimes I
used translators and the level of English was not good enough to make a sound recording useful.
To analyse my fieldwork data, I used Dedoose, which is an app for analysing qualitative and mixed methods data
and allowed me to search for common themes and patterns in my data.6 Through coding I grouped together
phrases or sections in which the same subject was discussed.
3.2 ACCESS & POSITIONALITY
Getting access to the camp was the most time-consuming step in my research. Due to time constraints, I decided
it would be best to find a host organization which could provide me with accommodation and assist me in getting
access to the camp. Through personal connections I arranged to be hosted by Filmaid Kenya – an NGO with
36
programs in Kakuma refugee camp. The next step involved getting a research permit from the National
Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation. During this period of waiting I decided to fly to Nairobi.
After I got the research permit, Filmaid had to get permission from the camp manager for me to access the camp.
All these steps took a considerable amount of time.
Issues of access and positionality came up throughout the fieldwork. As I was hosted by the NGO Filmaid and
rented a room at the LWF-compound, this meant I had to abide by certain rules and restrictions. For example, I
was not allowed to be in the camp after sunset for security reasons. In the first weeks, I got the opportunity to
join the Filmaid staff – incentive workers who go to different parts of the camp daily to host screenings,
workshops and mass awareness campaigns. I did not feel comfortable walking around the camp by myself at first
and Filmaid staff advised me not to. Luckily, these trips ‘to the field’7 gave me an opportunity to get acquainted
with my surroundings. After a while I felt comfortable enough to go to the camp by myself, on foot or on the
back of a motorcycle. Especially during my second month in Kakuma regularly met up with families and people
in the camp that I had met during my first weeks there. I would still join the Filmaid crew to events, to have
conversations or to meet other possible informants. Furthermore, I contacted staff from other NGOs – such as
AAHI & Swisscontact – who would take me on trips to show their projects in the camp. Having a host organisation
made it relatively easy to get in touch with other agencies, and often I would be introduced by a staff member
from Filmaid. I noticed when I would go to other agencies by myself, they would be more hesitant to talk to me.
In the last month, I hung out most at the Somali and Ethiopian markets in Kakuma I.
Doing qualitative fieldwork means you must be aware of your position in the field and much has been written on
the positioning of the researcher vis-à-vis the research subject (Lammers, 2007). As Lammers (2007) writes there
exists the connotation with the word research subjects as if they are somehow passive, that there is a difference
in power between the researcher and the research subject. However, she goes on to argue that this is not the
case, as ‘Ultimately, people decide what to tell, how to tell it, what to hide or when to be quiet’ (Lammers,
2007:73). What I found important to consider is fieldwork is a two-sided encounter between research
participants and ethical researchers (Keesing and Strathern, 1998:7-9 in Robben & Sluka, 2012). To make this
two-sided encounter work it is necessary to have mutual respect and understanding, open communication and
honesty between the researcher and the informant. This also means that relationships with informants were
different, as I connected better with some than others.
As Goodhand (2000:14) argues, ‘researchers need to be sensitive to the implicit messages they are sending out’.
Being a white, young woman there was no doubt I stood out in the camp. My presence had a major impact on
my research. People – refugees and humanitarian staff – often though I worked for one of the agencies, and
consequently refugees though that I was there to help them improve their situation. On the other side, people
were very interested why I was walking in the camp by myself which often opened space for a conversation. I
would always explain my reason for being in Kakuma, and the informants I spoke more often gained interest in
my research. Those people that I only spoke to once, understandably, were more apprehensive and not always
37
eager to answer my questions. This shows the importance of qualitative fieldwork, and taking time to build up
relationships built on trust.
3.3 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS It is important to discuss the ethical issues that arise when carrying out research in a refugee camp. Research
involving refugees is often undertaken in politically complex, difficult and sometimes dangerous settings and
with informants who may be traumatized and vulnerable (Mackenzie, McDowell, & Pittaway, 2007). The guiding
principle for doing fieldwork is to ‘do no harm’, meaning that researchers have the moral responsibility to not
infringe the security, privacy, well-being of their informants (Goodhand, 2000). Researchers need to be aware
how their presence and interventions may affect informants’ lives.
One of the ways to safeguard informants from harm is informed consent (Mackenzie et al., 2007). The minimum
requirements for informed consent are that informants are fully and adequately informed about the purposes,
methods, risks and benefits of the research and that their participation is fully voluntary. I made sure to inform
people that I spoke to about my research, the way I would use data I got from our talks. To ensure safety and
confidentiality I made the decision not to use names in the thesis. I ensured informants that asked about this
that their identity would remain secret. In the beginning, some informants were scared that my data could end
up in the hands of agencies or the government which could then be used against them. By openly discussing
these issues with my informants I kept an open line of communication.
There is a risk that researches give false hope to informants, and that informants have unrealistic expectations
(Mackenzie et al., 2007). I found that some informants thought I had the power and means to influence legal or
processes, access agencies and make their case. Before starting an interview, I would explain the purpose of my
research and that unfortunately I was not able to help them contact agencies or resettle – to make sure false
hopes were not created. However, in some cases I found that informants did not quite understand. Furthermore,
refugees have grown used to consultants, journalists and researchers being in the camp, advocating for them, or
in another way seeking to improve policies aimed at their protection and assistance (Jansen, 2011). As mentioned
in the conceptual framework refugees living in this protracted situation try to find normalcy and manoeuvre
through the humanitarian structure to get better opportunities. This helped me to grasp what was going on, even
though I stayed consistent in not offering help.
Another factor that plays a role is that social scientists researching in settings of humanitarian assistance and/or
forced migration, are both plagued by and attracted to the idea that their work be relevant (Jacobsen & Landau,
2003). They want to believe that their research contributes in some way to the theoretical understanding of the
world, while helping the millions of people caught up in humanitarian disasters and complex emergencies. I felt
uncomfortable about my presence in the camp at times. I would find myself wondering what I was doing in the
camp and what the reason of it all was. I did not feel I had anything to offer to my informants, as I could and did
not help them in a material way, for example by giving good or helping them get resettled. I did find that
informants were grateful for getting the chance to tell their stories and with some I became good friends. I
38
believe that when taking the ethical considerations into account, building relationships based on trust and being
genuinely interested and giving people space to tell their stories is, by itself, a good thing.
Another problem many researchers have faced is how to exit from the research site after being befriended by
refugees (Jacobsen & Landau, 2003). When I left I gave my belongings that I did not need any more to a families
and people I hung out a lot with in the camp. Having to say goodbye was a strange experience, as I had no idea
if I would ever meet these people – who let me into their homes – again. When I got back to the Netherlands I
initially refrained from contacting informants or responding to messages, as I had a small reverse culture shock.
Now, sometimes I find it hard to decide the extent to which I should keep in touch with informants. At times
informants text or call; some are interested in how I am doing, and others ask for favours, such as money.
3.4 NARRATIVES: GOSSIP, RUMOURS & TRUTH When I talked to informants sometimes they would tell me anecdotes or stories which I could not verify first-
hand. In first instance, using rumours and gossip as part of the data seems to contradict with principles of validity
and reliability. However, as researchers have argued rumours and gossip give valuable insights on social life in a
certain context. In fieldwork ‘narratives of research subjects form the main source of data for the anthropologist’
(Jansen, 2008:574). Gossip – and rumours – serve a function as they can convey valuable information to the
hearer about culture and society (Baumeister, Zhang, & Vohs, 2004). Anecdotes can reveal potentially useful
information about how a society operates. Furthermore, gossip is an important form of social communication
that serves to bond people together. In gossip people share information about themselves and about others in
their social community.
Throughout my fieldwork I heard stories or rumours about, for example, wrongdoing in humanitarian practice
by NGO staff. The issue arises how I as a researcher interpret these stories. I heard rumours on how the lack of
water was due to fraud by agency staff, who kept the money for themselves or who spend the money on other
projects. This narrative was widely shared by refugees in the camp. Another rumour spreading during the
verification exercise was how refugees that paid money would be driven by car into the field post, so they could
surpass the long waiting line. Simon Turner interpreted rumours in refugee camps as a way to achieve as sense
of knowledgeability in a complex environment, whereby refugees reclaim a sense of sovereignty (2004:227-47
in Jansen, 2008). Thus, these rumours and gossip were valuable to me as a researcher as they provided insights
to life in the camp and had a function by themselves.
I heard a lot of stories about daily corruption and fraud happening in the camp, in all levels of society. The
narrative of corruption and fraud plays an important role in everyday life in Kakuma. As Jansen (2011:574) argues
‘after consulting a wide range of practitioners, international and Kenyan researchers, and many refugees, I began
to understand how corruption entered every aspect of the refugee regime in Kenya, as well as the local
government agencies and the police’. Corruption both limits possibilities for some refugees and creates them for
others. Moreover, corruption should be viewed not as exception but as a very mundane given not only in Kenya,
but also in the camp environment, among refugee leaders, police and humanitarian workers. As Nuijten & Anders
39
(2007:1-24 in Jansen 2008:575) write: ‘What is defined as corrupt according to one legal order conforms to
another set of rules. Practices are never per definition corrupt, they are labelled as corrupt by reference to a set
of legal or other norms that draw a boundary between conformity and transgression’. Bribes were a common
practice for refugees to pass normal regulations and waiting lines. Bribes were paid to get into a compound, to
travel out of the camp or to receive services faster like traveling into Kenya or somewhere else. This is part of
the system as most refugees know it. As such, these rumours and gossip helped me understand how to make
sense of life in the camp.
Then, in the context of my fieldwork area, I do not perceive corruption in and around the camp as an anomaly to
the normal order of life, or an exceptional issue, but something that is part of the social reality people in the
camp live in. It is part of the normal order of how things are done, how social life is organized and how people –
be it refugees, the host community, agency staff or government officials – navigate through life.
3.5 LIMITATIONS During my fieldwork I encountered certain limitations. Time would be the main one. Initially, I had planned to be
in the field for a period of three months. The first obstacle I encountered was to get a research permit from the
Kenyan government. Without this permit, I would not be allowed to enter the camp, or so I was told. This was
my first real experience with Kenyan bureaucracy, leading to me living in Nairobi for five weeks before I could
depart for Kakuma. As I had already booked my flight back, this took some time I wished I could have spent in
the field. I left the field during the holidays. From mid-December, most NGO-staff – and all Filmaid staff – left
Kakuma to spend the holidays with their families. At that time, I did not feel comfortable enough to remain
behind at the compound for two weeks, and I decided to head back to Nairobi. During my time in Nairobi, I was
fortunate enough to visit two slums – Kibera and Mathare – and to see more of the Kenyan countryside. These
experiences offered me interesting insights in the national context in which a refugee camp exists. Being born in
the Netherlands, my perceptions of ‘normal life’ differ considerably from ‘normal life’ in Kenya. Being able to see
more of Kenya, and see how Kenyans live, and following the news put my observations and insights gained in
Kakuma in a larger perspective.
Language is the second issue. Kiswahili was the main language among aid staff and the refugee population. As I
do not speak Kiswahili this meant I had to use translators at times. Furthermore, ethnicities and tribes have their
own language as Somalis speak Somali, Ethiopians mostly spoke Oromo, and South-Sudanese speak Arabic.
Luckily, a large part of the population could speak English, in various levels. This factor has influenced who is part
of the research population, and at times could lead to confusion when speaking about certain topics. The last
issue I touch upon here is my accommodation arrangement in Kakuma. Being hosted by an NGO and living at a
compound had both limitations and advantages. Hanging out with Filmaid Staff and driving in the typical agency
jeeps, surely influenced my appearance and the way I was perceived. For safety reasons, I was not allowed to
enter the camp between sunset and sunrise, which meant I do not have access to the camp in the evening and
at night. The main advantage of being hosted by an NGO is their assistance in getting me access to the camp.
Another advantage of living at the compound was that it made access to other NGOs and staff quite easy.
40
Even though there were some limitations to my fieldwork, I found ways to deal with most of them or changed
my research accordingly. Furthermore, some decisions were made for safety reasons – for both me and
informants – and this remains the most important consideration when doing fieldwork. In the following chapters,
I discuss the context of Kakuma refugee camp and Kenyan refugee policy and elaborate on and analyse my
findings in the field, also relating the main findings to the conceptual framework.
41
4 CONTEXT
In this chapter, I discuss the context of my fieldwork location, going into refugee policy in Sub-Saharan African
and narrowing down to Kenyan refugee hosting policies after. Third, I discuss the history, recent developments,
population and conditions in and around Kakuma refugee camp.
4.1. REFUGEE POLICY
4.1.1 REFUGEE POLICY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Refugee policy in post-independence Africa can be divided in two periods: the so-called ‘golden age’ of asylum
from the early 1960s to 1990 and the more restricted period from 1990 until now (Rutinwa, 2002). Until 1990
African countries exhibited a generous attitude towards refugees and self-reliance was stimulated (Crisp, 2004;
Rutinwa, 2002). Through the OAU Convention, African states implemented what was known as an ‘open door
policy’ (Rutinwa, 2007). An important element of this policy was the commitment to asylum and the principle of
non-refoulement. The principle of non-refoulement forbids the involuntary repatriation of refugees. Overall,
there was a strong commitment from the UNHCR and African host countries to assist with durable solutions such
as local integration, third-country resettlement and voluntary repatriation. Most refugees were protected in
camps, that were, overall, large enough to enable refugees to acquire land and engage in economic activities,
through which they could earn a dignified living. Also, refugee camps and settlements were designated far from
border areas. Refugees were free to leave the camps temporarily or permanently and to settle in other parts of
the host country.
Since the late 1980s there has been a shift in refugee policies in Sub-Saharan Africa. The main features of this
shift are a preference for containment of refugees in countries of origin instead of granting them asylum, the
refoulement of refugees, a disregard of basic rights of refugees and a retreat from durable solutions other than
repatriation (Rutinwa, 2002). Governments now preferred refugees to receive protection in ‘safe zones’ or
similar areas within their countries of origin. Several factors explain this change in policy: the increasing
magnitude of the refugee problem, external and internal insecurity caused by the influx of refugees, the impact
of refugees on resources in host countries, restrictive asylum policies employed in industrialized countries, and
a growing xenophobia towards refugees (Rutinwa, 2002). Increasingly refugees in African countries found
themselves confined to camps in designated zones, where they were discouraged from becoming self-reliant and
under pressure to repatriate (Crisp, 2004). As such, refugees were more excluded from the host country’s
population and services and local integration was discouraged. Since then, African states have routinely been
rejecting refugees at the border or forced them to return their countries. Refugees who manage to enter and
remain in host countries receive so-called ‘pseudo-asylum’, as their basic rights, such as physical security, dignity
and material safety, are not guaranteed (Rutinwa, 2002).
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4.1.2 REFUGEE POLICY IN KENYA
In Kenya, the influx of refugees began in the 1970s with Ugandans fleeing the dictatorial Amin regime. Recognized
refugees were issued with identity cards and able to integrate into Kenyan society. In the 1990s the refugee
situation dramatically increased with a vast number of refugees entering the country in response to regional
crises in Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan and Congo (Muiruri, 2014). In 1992 the number of refugees had grown to nearly
400,000, compared to 14,500 in 1991 (Muiruri, 2014). The government was not prepared for this upsurge in
refugee numbers and lacked the capacity for refugee protection. In addition, Kenya faced a rough political climate
with the anxious call for a multi-party democracy increasing, making the government shift focus from refugee
protection to stabilizing its own political climate (Muiruri, 2014). The government transferred its responsibilities
for refugee protection to the UNHCR who stepped in to fill this gap. Both parties agreed to encampment, which
was initially meant as a temporary solution that would make it easier for UNHCR to access the refugees and
provide the much needed relief and protection (Muiruri, 2014).
Since the early 1990s the Government of Kenya has carried out an encampment policy for refugees (Marrazza,
2013). With the Refugee Act the 1951 UN Convention and the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention were implemented
at the national level. The Act established a government department responsible for refugee issues, the
Department for Refugee Affairs (DRA), which operates within the Ministry of State for Immigration and
Registration of Persons, which is responsible for the management, coordination and administration of refugee
issues. The vision for the DRA was to take over from UNHCR as lead agency on refugee issues in Kenya (Muiruri,
2014:34). However, this process continues to be conducted by UNHCR.
With this encampment policy come certain restrictions and allowances for refugees living in the camps. Refugees
registered in the camps are formally not allowed to move out of the camps, unless they obtain a movement
permit from the camp manager and refugees are not allowed to work. Being registered as a refugee in Kenya’s
camps gives access to basic needs as shelter, food, water, healthcare and education. Even though the
encampment policy is largely implemented, Kenya knows a large population of urban refugees living outside the
camps in urban settings such as Nairobi. The restrictions that are put in place have thus proved less rigorous than
they appear.
4.3 KAKUMA REFUGEE CAMP 4.3.1 HISTORY
In 1992 Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya was established by UNHCR in collaboration with the Kenyan government,
in the Turkana region of Kenya, bordering Sudan, Ethiopia, and Uganda. It was set up to host about 12,000 ‘Lost
Boys’ who fled, what was then, the southern part of Sudan and had walked hundreds of miles to reach Kenya
(Jansen, 2011; Honan, 2015; Grayson, 2014). Before the refugee influx, the locality of Kakuma was insignificant,
being home to between 2,000 to 8,000 Turkana (Grayson, 2014; Ohta, 2005; Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000).
However, as the early 1990s saw a multitude of armed conflicts in East Africa and the Horn of Africa, Kenya
became a central player in diplomatic, military, relief and media efforts for these events and a major destination
for refugees (Jansen, 2011).
43
Traditionally Turkana maintain a pastoral lifestyle keeping cattle, camels and goats. Turkana have been positively
and negatively affected by the camp and the influx of refugees. Especially in the early years of the camp violent
clashes occurred between Turkana and refugees, mainly over resources. Both the droughts and opportunities to
generate income led many Turkana to settle on the periphery of the town and the camp, selling goods like
firewood and milk (Ohta, 2005). Some have been employed by UNHCR or work in the camp in other ways.
Furthermore, compared with the Turkana region, Kakuma camp has better health facilities and a higher
percentage of children in full-time education (De Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000). With time the host community
and refugees actively cultivated personal ties, forming quasi-marital, friendship, and business relations (Ohta
2005).
In 1998, according to numbers provided by UNHCR, Kakuma had a refugee population of 58,000 (De Montclos &
Kagwanja, 2000). In a short time, it grew to become the second largest shelter site for refugees in the country,
following the Dadaab refugee complex. As a result of the growth in population three new sections, called Kakuma
II, III and IV, were set up, expanding the camp over more than ten kilometers (Grayson, 2014). By early 2006 the
camp hosted approximately 95,000 inhabitants, coming mainly from Sudan and Somalia, and to a lesser extent
from the Congo, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda (Jansen, 2011). The year before, the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed which ended the war in Sudan. This had a considerable influence
on Kakuma refugee camp the year after. After some initial reservation, Sudanese refugees began returning to
their home country, causing the camp to significantly decrease in population. In January 2006 Sudan and Kenya,
together with UNHCR, signed a tripartite agreement in helping South-Sudanese refugees return home from
Kenya. This agreement was supposed to facilitate the return of some 10,000 Sudanese refugees from Kenya.8
The vacant space in Kakuma camp led the Kenyan government and UNHCR to relocate over 15,000 Somalis from
the overpopulated Dadaab complex to Kakuma in 2009. The combined effects of war, drought and famine made
more Somalis follow, also independently, and consequently the camp started to grow again.9
4.3.2 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
4.3.2.1 SITUATION IN SOUTH-SUDAN
In 2011 South-Sudan became an independent nation. Renewed violence and war in the Nuba mountains and
Jonglei state caused South Sudanese to flee. Reportedly, not only the new outbreak of violence, but also a search
for facilities, such as healthcare and education that are still largely lacking in South Sudan, led to the new influx
of refugees. Simultaneously more Congolese refugees arrived, due to the intensification of violence in Eastern
DRC. At the end of 2013, the violence in South Sudan was reignited in a full civil war, which resulted in a renewed
influx of South Sudanese into Kenya. As a result, at end of 2014 Kakuma had grown bigger than ever, with a
population of 179,396 (UNHCR 2014; Jansen, 2015:8). Since December 2013 over 50,000 South Sudanese
refugees have entered the camp following the outbreak of war (UNHCR10). In February 2016, the total registered
camp population was 186,865 with South-Sudanese making up about 50% of the population UNHCR (2016).
During my time in the camp the consequences of the civil war in South-Sudan was very visible with South-
Sudanese refugees coming to the border with Kenya, and taken to the Reception Center every day.
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4.3.2.2 KENYAN GOVERNMENT & RUMORS OF CLOSING THE CAMPS
On the 6th of May 2016, the Kenyan Ministry of Interior Affairs made a statement to close all the refugee camps
in the country, due to economic, security and environmental burdens. 11 According to government officials
refugee camps like Dadaab have been assumed to be hosting grounds for Al-Shabaab - Somali based terror
group. At a conference I attended in Naivasha in October 2016, the head of Refugee Affairs Secretariat (RAS)
stated that only Dadaab would be closing and non-Somalis would be resettled in Kakuma.12 In conversations I
had with Kenyans and refugees about the statements of the government and their decision to close the camps,
they often mentioned how this was a call for attention and a way of the Kenyan government to try and receive
more funding for refugee hosting. For Kakuma the closing of Dadaab meant an influx of non-Somalis who were
relocated from Dadaab to Kakuma. However, some of my informants mentioned they also heard or saw Somalis
among those resettled to Kakuma.
This is not the first time the Kenyan ministry made a statement with the intention to close, for example, in April
2015, after the terrorist attack at Garissa University College they made the same announcement.13 The call for
closing again received negative international response. This time, the ministry also disbanded the DRA and was
working on a mechanism for the closure of Kenya’s refugee camps 14. The DRA was set up to oversee the
registration of persons, management of refugee camps and determination of refugee status in the country. Some
weeks after the disbandment of the DRA the Ministry of Interior set up RAS, which is assumed to take over the
full responsibilities of the DRA.15 On 9 February 2017 Kenya’s High Court ruled that both decisions of the
Government, to close Dadaab refugee camp and to dismantle the DRA, had to be turned back, but this has not
happened yet16. Reasons as to why the DRA was disbanded and the RAS was set up remain unclear.
4.3.2.3 KALOBEYEI SETTLEMENT
In June 2015, the Government of Turkana County allocated land known as the ‘Kalobeyei site’ to UNHCR and the
DRA for the building of a new refugee settlement. The project is funded by the European Union.17 The main aim
of this settlement was to reduce overcrowding in Kakuma camp, and especially Kakuma I. During my time there,
the settlement was already being used, however a lot of facilities and buildings were not finished yet. Kalobeyei
settlement is located about 30 kilometres from Kakuma refugee camp and a hundred kilometres from the South-
Sudan border, along the Kitale-Lodwar-Lokichoggio-Juba highway (UNHCR18).
In this thesis I refer several times to Kalobeyei settlement as I visited the site several times and it offers a good
comparison with Kakuma refugee camp. This is because the rationale behind the two sites is different, with
Kakuma camp as a protracted refugee camp where the care and maintenance model has been implemented and
Kalobeyei settlement as an alternative to a camp, focusing on self-reliance, sustainability and integration,
meaning humanitarian programs in the settlement and the settlement itself are set up differently. Furthermore,
it is necessary to take Kalobeyei settlement into account because the same agencies that work in Kakuma camp
will work in Kalobeyei, and the sites are only thirty kilometres apart from each other. I find it useful to explore
the relationship between a camp that has existed for twenty-five years and a new experimental site such as
Kalobeyei.
45
As I said the approach towards Kalobeyei settlement has been different than the traditional ‘care and
maintenance’ approach to refugee camps. According to UN Habitat the Kalobeyei Integrated Socio-Economic
Development Program (KISEDP) is:
‘a Turkana-based initiative that seeks to facilitate collaboration and coordination between the Kenyan Government, UN
agencies, development actors, NGOs, private sector and civil society to build sustainable services and economic
opportunities in Kalobeyei, a new settlement in Kenya that is expected to accommodate more than 60,000 refugees and
host communities’ - UN Habitat, 201619
The Kalobeyei site is to become a hybrid settlement with the capacity to eventually accommodate 80,000
refugees and 23,600 members of the host community in Kalobeyei. The integration is about an agreement made
with the Turkana that they want an equal share in resources and benefits.20 The idea behind this set-up is to not
rely on donors pumping money in the camp. The focus is on promoting self-reliance and sustainability of refugee
and the host community. As a representative of UNHCR- states:
‘This is really a new way of working for UNHCR that does not simply provide what we used to call ‘care and maintenance’
which means day-to-day survival of the refugees, but we want to establish a more long-term, sustainable model’ – KTN
News, 201621
4.3.3 POPULATION Kakuma refugee camp is densely populated. With around 160,000 refugees from over nine countries it is a
melting pot of different cultures and ethnicities. The main countries of origin are South-Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia,
the Democratic Republic of Congo, South-Sudan and Sudan. To a lesser extent Kakuma camp also hosts refugees
from Eritrea, Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda. When looking at Kakuma-town and the camp the main groups to be
distinguished are the refugee community, host community, national and international staff working for
humanitarian agencies, government officials and staff, and businessmen. All these groups are very
heterogeneous. For example, within the refugee population socio-economic strata have emerged, as there is a -
visible and invisible - division of labour and livelihoods (Jansen, 2009). There are businessmen who can afford to
hire employees, refugees that just started a small business, refugee leaders that are responsible for blocks or
zones, incentive workers that are employed by aid agencies, refugees who receive remittances from family
abroad or have income from working somewhere outside of the camp, and refugees who are completely
dependent on the aid distributed and handouts from the community.
In the last years the camp has grown in surface and population. Several factors contribute to the population
growth. First, when comparing the UNHCR Kakuma Population Statistics over the last seven years the influx of
South-Sudanese refugees largely explains the growth of the camp (see table 1 and 2). Refugees from South-
Sudan fled from the renewed violence and some reached the border of Kenya. When these refugees get to the
border, they are taken to the reception center in Kakuma III – which was taking in more refugees its facilities
could handle during my time there – where after they get settled somewhere in the camp. In 2014 Kakuma dealt
46
with the largest influx of South-Sudanese, which were at that time settled in Kakuma III and Kakuma IV. Since
Kalobeyei settlement was opened in 2016 most new arrivals get settled there.
Camp population statistics
by:
Total camp population
Kakuma
27-08-201122 81,994
22-01-201223 86,251
22-01-201324 109,034
05-01-201425 128,568
13-02-201526 180,138
31-01-201627 185,984
30-06-201628 156,923
30-09-201629 163,192
31-01-201730 159,053
TABLE 1 TOTAL CAMP POPULATION (UNHCR)
Year Number of registered South-
Sudanese arrivals
2010 0
2011 0
2012 9,311
2013 10,306
2014 40,066
2015 7,206
2016 22,358
2017 (for January) 1,701
TABLE 2 NUMBER OF SOUTH-SUDANESE ARRIVALS (UNHCR)
Second, Kakuma I is the most popular place to live in the camp. New arrivals that originally had been placed in
Kakuma II, III, and IV, would ‘move’ to Kakuma I as there were more facilities - markets, clinics, etc. – at those
places, and it was closer to the agency compounds and Kakuma town. At other times, people got resettled by
UNHCR or made the individual decision to move away from their original compounds because of security issues,
and to live closer to people of their own community.31
The last factor is the ongoing resettlement of non-Somali refugees from the Dadaab camps to Kakuma. In 2008
and 2009 the International Organisation of Migration transported refugees from the overcrowded Dadaab
Refugee Camp to Kakuma.32 Somali refugees from Dadaab that were up for third-country resettlement were
relocated to Kakuma for bio-metric screening and cultural orientation.33 In 2016, the UNHCR Monthly Update
47
report covering the period from the 16th until the 31st of July UNHCR Dadaab was planning to relocate 16,000
non-Somali refugees and asylum seekers and 15,000 Somali refugees in the resettlement from Dadaab to
Kakuma.34
As such Kakuma is a place that encompasses a variety of lives, livelihoods and circumstances and develops over
time. The population has changed over the years and the relations between the refugee and host community
developed. Consequences mentioned by informants are the saturation of markets, overcrowding in Kakuma I
and the strain the growth of population puts on the provision of basic services. I will go into these factors at a
later stage in the thesis.
4.3.4 THE ENVIRONMENT Refugee camps are often built in desolate and remote areas and Kakuma is not an exception. The camp is situated
in the Northwest of Kenya in Turkana county. Turkana District covers an area of 68,000 kilometers and is well-
known for its droughts. The land is very dry with an average of 200 to 400 millimeters of annual rainfall (Ohta,
2005). This is one of the most remote areas in Kenya, and one that was continuously ignored by national
development policies (Ohta, 2005), especially before the arrival of refugees in 1992.
In Kakuma climatic conditions are harsh. The average temperature is around 38 degrees Celsius. Combined with
the drought and sand as soil, these are not easy conditions to live in. A common phrase I heard a lot was ‘In
Kakuma it is raining sand’, describing the sand storms that occur in Kakuma quite often and referring to the lack
of actual rain. Especially in KII, III, IV and in Kalobeyei settlement there is not enough shelter from these sand
storms. When I asked about the climate in Kakuma, one refugee commented ‘you cannot see wild animals here.
This place is not good for a human being’.35 He explained how when there are no wild animals living in a certain
place, this means it is not a place where living beings are meant to survive.
The times rain does fall the main benefit is that the wells become filled. However, flood rains cause challenges
as a lot of refugees do not know how to swim and the rain causes the banks of the river to deteriorate, destroying
with it houses of refugees disappear.36 Furthermore, during times the river banks flood Kakuma II, III and IV get
cut off from Kakuma I, the NGO-compounds, police and the town. This causes problems as the main referral
hospital is located in Kakuma IV, and roads become impossible to use.37 Due to the climate conditions, there are
not a lot of useful resources in the area. Resources that can to be found, are often scarce. Gathering firewood
has for long been a main issue leading to conflict between Turkana and refugees. The climate makes agricultural
activities challenging, as there is not enough water available and the soil is not suited for growing crops.
Furthermore, the remoteness of Kakuma town and the camp has implications for refugees and locals trying to
engage in income-generating activities. The roads from and to the camp are not well-maintained which means it
takes time for lorries and trucks to arrive to the camp. Doing business outside of the camp then becomes difficult
as it is not the time it takes to get products to a certain place is unreliable. Also, moving in and out of the camp
is an undertaking, as refugees need permission from the camp manager, and the roads and vehicles are bad. The
48
remote location is also an obstacle for agencies trying to get goods and products to the camp, which is a time-
consuming and costly process.
4.4 CONCLUSION In this chapter I provided the context for the fieldwork location. I discussed Kenyan refugee hosting policies, the
history of Kakuma refugee camp, the population and conditions. In the next three chapters I discuss my findings
from the field.
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5 SELF-RELIANCE AND INTEGRATION IN HUMANITARIAN POLICY In this part I compare what is set out in humanitarian policies with my experiences in Kakuma. I look at both
Kakuma refugee camp and the new Kalobeyei settlement. It is interesting look at both hosting situations as
Kakuma camp is a protracted refugee camp where the care and maintenance model has been implemented and
Kalobeyei settlement is a pilot for alternatives to camps. Exploring these policies shows how humanitarian policy
for self-reliance and integration is formulated, which strategies are attached to it, and how agencies are
supposed to implement them. Then, I explore what happens on the ground and how programs are implemented
in Kakuma.
I explore two policy-programs on refugee hosting that have as common thread the argument that refugees in
protracted refugee situations should be stimulated and/or supported to achieve more self-reliance and
integration. Both policies focus on reasons why and ways to achieve more self-reliance and integration within
the refugee (and host) community. The first document is a general strategy for alternatives to camps adopted by
UNHCR in July 2014, which applies to all UNHCR operations for refugees in all phases of displacement. The second
document was formulated particularly for Kenya, by UNHCR, NGOs, INGOs and the Government of Kenya. These
policies serve as an illustration, and I do not argue that these are the most important policies in the field of
protracted refugee situations. However, they do provide a good image of how policies are formulated, on a global
and national level, and offer an opportunity to compare those strategies with my fieldwork findings. This shows
the complexities of implementing policies in the field, and how every protracted refugee situation needs a locally
adapted approach. I give a short overview of the strategy, and share my thoughts based on my experiences in
the field. A further elaboration on my findings in Kakuma can be found in chapters six and seven.
5.1 ALTERNATIVES TO CAMPS – MAKING IT WORK The implementation of the UNHCR policy requires the pursuit of alternatives to camps whenever possible,
meaning restricted encampment is not seen as a solution for refugee hosting. Instead, UNHCR and partners opt
for so-called integrated and hybrid settlements. If this policy is rightly implemented, this means traditional care
and maintenance programs become increasingly rare exceptions (UNHCR, 2014b). The main argument behind
creating integrated and hybrid settlements is that refugees can better contribute to their host communities in
this way. Refugees are supported in achieving self-reliance in a way that is adapted to local conditions and
markets (UNHCR, 2014:5). The policy focuses on the skills and abilities of refugees which they already possess –
for example, former employment, education, training, etc – and argues it is useful to take these assets into
account. Another argument for self-reliance is that refugees are better able to survive when they go back to their
home country or get resettled.
The policy consists of a series of documents, providing guidance, tools and practices to support he
implementation, and is meant for UNHCR staff working in the field. To achieve this goal the UNHCR formulated
six key actions in which they focus on settlement, shelter response, service delivery, the legal framework and
50
strengthening community-based protection. I discuss the key actions that are relevant for the refugee situation
in Kakuma. The quote below shows the main factors that humanitarian agencies should be focused on:
‘Where camps must be established or where they already exist, UNHCR will plan and implement the operational
response in a way that enables camps to be phased out at the earliest possible stage. Where this is not possible or
practical, UNHCR will pursue the progressive removal of restrictions on the ability of refugees to exercise their rights
and seek to build linkages between the camp and host communities and anchor the camp within the local economy,
infrastructure and national social protection and service delivery systems, in order to transform them into sustainable
settlements.’ – UNHCR, 2014:1
First, the policy stipulates that refugee camps should be avoided as much as possible, and that current care and
maintenance refugee camps should be phased out. Furthermore, it is argued that for this policy to work camps
or settlements cannot host over 20,000 refugees.38 Second, to make integrated and hybrid settlements a success
it is necessary to remove the restrictions that come with having a refugee status, such as the limitation on the
rights and freedoms of refugees and their ability to make their own choices about their lives. The most important
rights are freedom of movement and residence, permission to work and access to basic services and safety nets.
This is connected to action three, arguing that programmes for refugees and host communities need to be
embedded into national development plans whenever possible to ensure sustainability. This means that refugee
operations need to phase out parallel delivery systems, to mainstream into national, local and community-based
systems and structures.39 It is argued to anchor the camp within the local economy and service delivery systems.
This requires innovate models and approaches – such as enrolment of refugees in health insurance schemes and
expanded access to public education. The last key action of the strategy is to build sustainable livelihoods for
both refugees and the host community. An important factor to achieve these goals is to strengthen lies between
the refugee and host community, and with agencies and government institutions.40
To achieve these goals key tips and actions are given which practitioners can use. First, agencies are advised to
avoid the development of parallel services in delivery systems, and to align or mainstream services as closely as
possible with national systems and standards. Second, it is said all stakeholders should be involved and consulted
– meaning local governments, national governments, host and refugee communities – and partnerships should
be sought and made with new potential stakeholders, such as the private sector. Lines to local and national
ministries should be small. Third, it is necessary to lift restrictions on movement and work for refugees, by
assessing the local legal frameworks and assess institution gaps in governance institutions and raise awareness
among refugees about their rights and how to access them.41
5.2 KENYA COMPREHENSIVE REFUGEE PROGRAM
In late 2015, UNHCR, NGOs, UN agencies and the Government of Kenya jointly reviewed and defined the needs
for all three refugee operations in the country – the Dadaab, Kakuma and urban program. The parties agreed on
the main priorities in all sectors within the refugee operation for 2016. The outcome is the ‘Kenya
Comprehensive Peace Program 2016 – Programming for Solutions’ (UNHCR, 2016a). According to the UNHCR
Representative in Kenya (UNHCR, 2016:i) the document ‘reflects our collective efforts towards solutions and a
51
departure from the traditional model of humanitarian assistance in Kenya’. On the shift in the humanitarian
programming it states:
‘2016 is set to be an important year for a programming shift in the Kenya refugee operation. Reorientation from traditional
care and maintenance in the camps, towards truly solutions-oriented programming, is starting to take root in response to
the new circumstances and unprecedented global challenges.’ - UNHCR, 2016:1
The document describes five key areas of the 2016 refugee programme. Here, I only discuss the three key areas
that are important for Kakuma and Kalobeyei.
The first area focuses on innovations in the sector of assistance delivery. It is argued that the way the refugee
assistance program is currently being managed, requires more resources than are available. Because of the high
cost of providing refugees with basic resources, this leaves little room for expanding skills training and livelihood
interventions. As the report states it is believed that after more than 20 years of displacement not all refugees
have the same needs for humanitarian assistance, and if they would be provided with specific assistance, a larger
number of refugees could be self-reliant (UNHCR, 2016a). In 2015 a study was conducted by UNHCR, the World
Food Program (WFP), donors and NGOs in which it was found that only 10% of refugees in Kakuma camp could
support themselves without any aid provided, and only 8% of households were involved in formal business
activities. Another important finding from this study is that that protracted stay in the camp does not mean a
household is not vulnerable. This means that refugees who have been in Kakuma for a long time cannot be
automatically assumed to be able to sustain themselves.
From these findings the main conclusion and programming strategy that came out of the research for the
assistance delivery sector is the need to ‘to ensure the viable use of modern technology to increase efficiency in
the Kenya refugee operation and to capitalise on the expertise of new partners including those from the
development and corporate spheres’ (UNHCR 2016:1). During my fieldwork I saw various examples of the
implementation of modern technology in service delivery. The first is ‘Bamba Chakula’ (Get Food), an electronic
cash voucher that replaces the dry ration and the second is the Biometric Verification Process, a registration
system using fingerprints and eye-scans. I discuss these innovations further in the next chapter.
The second key area concerns the strengthening of the legal status of persons of concern in Kenya. It is curious
that in this key area only rights to citizenship are discussed. Strategies to provide refugees, who are not registered
or do not want to be registered as a Kenyan national, with more rights, such as the right to move and to work,
are not discussed. This makes me wonder in how far the concepts self-reliance, sustainability and integration can
be implemented fully. In the strategy it is argued ‘UNHCR and its partners will continue to work with the Kenya
Citizens and Foreign Nationals Management Service to assist refugees in accessing Kenyan citizenship’. In
practice, gaining Kenyan citizenship remains very challenging and a lengthy process. However, there is no major
interest on the part of most refugees to become Kenyans. The strategy mentions the biometric verification
exercise, which should provide a better overview of who is in the camp and makes it easier for government
agencies to process requests for citizenship. The verification exercise was implemented by UNHCR and the DRA
in Kakuma in 2016 and finished during my time in the camp. Furthermore, the document mentions the need for
52
a stand-alone DRA database, for the issuance of standardized identification documents for refugees, and for
access to Kenya Revenue Authority Personal Identification numbers, through which refugees and asylum seekers
would have the opportunity to transact business with, and receive services from the government and its partners.
There is no deadline for when these processes will actually be implemented.
The last key area is the development of the Kalobeyei settlement. The ‘Kalobeyei Integrated Social and Economic
Development Programme’ (KISEDP) programme is a multi-agency collaboration to develop the local economy
and service delivery at Kalobeyei settlement. At the Turkana Roundtable on the Integration of Refugees and Host
Community Economies in November 2014 there was a clear consensus on the need for a different approach to
refugee assistance programming in the country.42 The overall objective of the program is to re-shape the refugee
assistance program so that it contributes to: the improvement of the socio-economic conditions of the refugee
and host communities, better prepare the host community so that they can benefit from emerging economic
opportunities in future extraction and irrigation-fed agriculture, and to reduce the ‘over-dependence’ on
humanitarian aid and support the refugees to achieve durable solutions.
“The ongoing care and maintenance programme [in Kakuma], which was based on the assumption that the refugee
situation is temporary, focuses on providing refugees with basic humanitarian assistance, including free food, non-food
items and basic services. With the displacement situation ongoing for over two decades, the current form of aid is not
tailored to the needs, situation and prospects of refugees and host communities. The economic potential of the camp has
not been fully utilized and the host community, which is one of the most marginalized in Kenya, feels that it has not
benefited much from the presence of refugees.” – UNHCR Comprehensive Refugee Programme, 2016:16
Key characteristics are sustainable urban and agricultural/livestock development for the host community (20,000
persons) and refugees (60,000 persons), non-discriminatory services for both, avoidance of parallel service
delivery and private sector involvement. The site is to be developed as an urban centre, using the same
development and planning techniques as for cities. During phase one of the implementation – which lasts from
May to December 2020 – the influx of refugees is likely to continue and KISEDP will facilitate the emergency
response while laying the ground for longer-term development. During Phase Two (2021-2025), KISEDP will focus
on building sustainable services and economic opportunities. If the improving situation creates conditions for
mass return, Phase Three (2026-2030) will focus on continuing efforts to build Kalobeyei for remaining refugees
and host communities.
5.3 DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION The first problem I encountered when looking for policies and strategies is the omnipresence of strategies,
handbooks, approaches, forms, learning modules, toolkits and catalogues for refugee policy. Finding your way
through this bulk of recommendations, tips, and practical actions to be taken seems almost impossible. There is
considerable overlap between most documents, in which the common thread is the same. The second issue,
which is often the case with policies, is that they are formulated in a general manner, leaving room for
interpretation, which contributes to the disconnect between policy and practice. As said before every refugee
situation is different, and every host country has different policies, practices and legal and service system. The
53
third issue is the interrelation of the different actions in these policies. On the one hand, this is a good thing, as
it means the strategy is comprehensive and integrates different factors. On the other hand, this can mean that
if one of the actions cannot be implemented, the whole policy strategy falls apart. Fourth, when comparing these
recent policies to earlier policies there have not been radical changes in way of thinking. The focus on self-
reliance and integration is not new (Hunter, 2009), neither is the argument to mainstream services with the local
and national framework nor to engage the host government.
For Kakuma, the main challenge in implementing the first policy On Alternatives to Camps is that it covers all
UNHCR refugee operations. UNHCR states that implementation of the policy depends on the communities,
cultures, laws and policies of the countries where refugees reside (UNHCR, 2015:4). This leaves room for
interpretation of agencies, and the political, economic and social environment can largely influence to what level
these kinds of policies are implemented. Kakuma Refugee Camp has gone through many developments in its
twenty-five years of existence and has its own economic, social, and political organization. Furthermore, Kakuma
camp has over 150,000 inhabitants, which is nowhere close to the maximum of 20,000 refugees UNHCR claims
is the maximum amount of refugees for one camp or settlement, in order for agencies to provide all the services.
Further, there are no signs that Kakuma refugee camp will be closing anytime soon. The new influx of refugees
from South-Sudan, the persisting conflict in Somalia, and the persisting prosecution of certain tribes in for
example Ethiopia makes that the refugee population is growing rather than decreasing. Then the option,
following this policy, for Kakuma camp would be to transform it into a sustainable settlement. Even though I
have seen some small initiatives that focus on sustainability of the camp, I could not see a big change happening
towards more integration and sustainability.
The second challenge is that the government of Kenya has not been favouring the local integration of refugees
and providing them with more rights, which is a cornerstone of the policy. In Kakuma access to legal assistance
is minimal. Furthermore, it is not expected the Government of Kenya will agree with lifting the restrictions on
the freedom to move. This connects to the camp as a technology of control. The reason for the existence of
Kakuma camp is not only to provide aid to refugees, but to contain a large number of refugees in one place, as
the Kenyan government does not want them to integrate locally.
The argument to get service delivery in line with local structures is interesting with Kakuma as the case study.
Turkana is the poorest and most remote region of Kenya. Turkana also relief emergency aid for droughts and lack
of food. To mainstream programs in the national and local context makes it is necessary for refugees to have the
same rights and have access to the same services as the host community. The idea for Kakuma camp would then
be that refugees are integrated in service delivery as provided by the Kenyan government and that they engage
in the economy of the local community. However, the Turkana region is known to be one of the poorest areas in
Kenya. In the whole region there is lack of food and water.43 In Kakuma the host community benefits to a certain
extent from services offered by humanitarian organisations and refugees have stimulated the economy and
markets. Refugees have more access to services and opportunities than the host community (Jansen, 2011; Ohta,
54
2005). Next to this, informants argued that shop owners in the camp provide better products and services than
shop-owners in Kakuma-town, and business is better in the camp.44
Thus, in its own way there is already a form of integration in Kakuma, however this is not the way as proposed
in the policy, but the other way around, where the local community gets integrated to a certain extent in the
humanitarian arena and the camp. For example, if necessary members of the host community get referred the
main hospital in Kakuma IV which is run by the International Rescue Committee.45 On the one hand, this means
there is integration between the host community and the refugee community. On the other hand, the host
community gets integrated into the humanitarian programs instead of the refugee community getting integrated
in the Kenyan service delivery programs. Thus, the host community is integrated in the humanitarian programs,
but only to a certain extent. There are also programs particularly for Turkana, but these are not aligned with
camp programs. As UNHCR is in Kakuma to support refugees and not the host community, there seems to be a
discrepancy between programs for refugees and programs for the host community, which should be more
connected.
What makes integration difficult is difference in cultures and backgrounds of the host population and among the
refugee community itself. This is strengthened by the fact that some Turkana feel neglected as they have not
received the same assistance as refugees. Relations are better than they were before, as there used to be fights
between the host and refugee community on a regular basis. However, with Kalobeyei settlement there have
been reports of fighting between the host population and the refugee community.46 The camp is a mix of people
who come from different countries and tribes and Turkana follow a mostly nomadic lifestyle. This can be a cause
for friction when it comes to integration. Furthermore, it can be difficult for refugees to make use their skills and
abilities, for example due to language. If you need to learn a language before you can find a job you have skills
for this takes up a long time.
For Kalobeyei settlement, is remains to be seen what will happen. During my time in the field Kalobeyei
settlement was in a very early stage. The massive influx of refugees from South-Sudan required some changes in
the approach to Kalobeyei, as cases of malnutrition needed to be treated and training had to be given on issues
of hygiene, etc. However, there are already some changes when comparing Kakuma to Kalobeyei. In Kalobeyei
there is no dry ration in food distribution only Bamba Chakula – the electronic cash vouchers. Members of the
host community are also given permits to be able to sell goods in the Bamba Chakula program. Most informants
mentioned that it would take time for Kalobeyei settlement to develop, and that in the end it would probably be
a better place to live than Kakuma, but for now not yet.47 I elaborate further on the service delivery in Kalobeyei,
in the next chapter.
Two other questions came to my mind when exploring these policies. First, the documents call for the removal
of the parallel system of service delivery. This would mean that national organisations, government agencies,
take over the tasks of humanitarian agencies, meaning there is no room for these agencies anymore and they go
out of business. From the perspective of NGO staff this does not seem favourable, as this means they would – in
the end – be out of work. Second, if restrictions on movement and work are lifted and refugees receive citizenship
55
status and work permits, this would mean that refugees actually become locally integrated, which is one of the
durable solutions the Kenyan government has not been supporting. I wonder how the Kenyan government
perceives this issue, and in how far they are engaged with the KISEDP programme in Kalobeyei and want to make
it a success.
In this chapter I explored two policies that focus on reasons why and ways to achieve more self-reliance and
integrate with the host community. I set out the most important ways to achieve this, and compared that with
what I saw in Kakuma and Kalobeyei. The most important steps from the policy on alternatives to camps are the
removal of restrictions on rights of refugees, alignment of service delivery with the local structure, and the
removal of the parallel system of service delivery. In all steps there should be involvement of all stakeholders
(local governments, national governments, host and refugee communities and the private sector). I
problematized these steps for Kakuma where Kenyan authorities still favour the restricted encampment policy,
refugees are officially not allowed to move out of the camp and to work. In Kakuma the host community is to a
certain extent integrated in the humanitarian arena. As such, it seems to be the other way around where the
host community gets integrated into humanitarian programs. Next to this, Turkana is the poorest region in Kenya
and the lack of services from local authorities for the host community makes alignment of the refugee community
with this local system complicated.
In the Kenya Comprehensive Refugee Programme innovations of service delivery, the removal of restrictions on
rights refugees have, and the opening of Kalobeyei settlement. I found there were some innovations in service
delivery such as Bamba Chakula – the electronic cash voucher to buy food – and some agencies were running
pilots in the camp for more sustainable and innovative ways of refugee hosting, which I discuss in the next
chapter. As I said before, it is not expected the Government of Kenya will agree with lifting the restrictions on
rights refugees have. Lastly, Kalobeyei settlement should be a hybrid and integrated settlement where the
refugee and host community live together and engage in entrepreneurship and agriculture and livestock-herding.
However, there have been some issues with the implementation of this program, which I discuss in the next
chapter.
This chapter reveals that is a discrepancy with what is set out in the policies and what is happening on the ground.
To illustrate the issues and questions raised in this part further, in the following chapters, I discuss refugees’
experiences with these programs and the way they find ways to become self-reliant and integrate outside of –
but connected to – the formal sphere of service delivery.
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6 SELF-RELIANCE, SUSTAINABILITY & INTEGRATION IN HUMANITARIAN
PROGRAMMING IN KAKUMA
In this chapter, I analyse several programs and initiatives that focus on creating more self-reliance, sustainability
and integration in Kakuma. This provides insights in how policy is formed into programmes and how refugees are
affected by these programs. It shows what the concepts mean for refugees in Kakuma. It is relevant to look at
these programmes as it illustrates the formal options refugees have to become more self-reliant and integrate
with the host community. First, I give an overview of the humanitarian structure and agencies in Kakuma.
Second, I look at two NGOs whose main aim is to stimulate refugee self-reliance and livelihoods. Third, I introduce
other recent initiatives and developments that are connected to the self-reliance & integration policy framework.
6.1 HUMANITARIAN STRUCTURE
In Kakuma Refugee Camp the UNHCR is the managing and coordinating body. They work together with Kenyan
government institutions, the police, INGOs and NGOs. UNHCR coordinates and approves the activities and
programs NGOs are working on. For an overview of INGOs and NGOs in Kakuma and the sectors they are involved
in see Attachment I. Agencies working in the camp are often involved in different sectors, depend on funding
which can determine the programs they implement, and co-operate with other agencies. In the last few years
there has been an increase in humanitarian agencies settling in and around the camp.48 Agencies such as Action
Africa Help International (since 2015), Swisscontact (since 2014), Team and Team International (since 2014),
Windle Trust Kenya (since 2015) and Peace Winds Japan (since 2016) are relatively new, settling in Kakuma in
the last three years.
The present NGOs and INGOs are involved in different sectors and provide different services. Below, I give a
general overview of the services that are provided for refugees. This is not an exhaustive or complete picture,
but serves as an illustration to the services that are available and provided to the refugee community.
When refugees arrive in Kakuma they are first send to the reception center where they get registered. Then, the
new arrival waits for his or her ration card or Bamba Chakula voucher, provided by WFP. Furthermore, they
receive non-food items such as blankets, pots and pans, and jerry cans. After the new arrival is registered as a
refugee – this takes between two and three weeks – he or she gets appointed a place to stay in the camp.
Refugees in Kakuma start building mud houses as soon as possible, which replaces tents they are initially
provided with. Iron roofs for these mud houses are provided by the National Council of Churches in Kenya (NCCK).
Once a month the head of the household – in Kakuma camp – must pick up the dry ration at one of the Food
Distribution Centers in the camp. With the Bamba-Chakula voucher refugees can buy their own food at licensed
Bamba-Chakula shops. In theory, a family member can take one jerry-can per member of the family. However,
in practice this does not always happen. During my time in the field there were severe issues with water
distribution in parts of the camp. There are police agents present in Kakuma, whose offices and cells located in
between the agency compounds. Security in the camp is also provided by the Lutheran World Federation (LWF)
57
who have set up a community police system, employing refugees as guards. Furthermore, there are protection
units, providing extra protection for children and adults. Other agencies also deal with these security cases, such
as the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and UNHCR. There is one hospital in Kakuma IV, and clinics
in the other parts of the camp, which are managed by the International Rescue Committee (IRC). Next to this,
there are agencies focussing on persons with special needs, such as Handicap – treating those physically disabled
– and Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS) – treating those who have mental health issues. Some agencies are mainly
involved in logistics, infrastructure and maintenance for different sectors, such as Peace Winds Japan (PWJ) and
Team & Team International (T&T).
Primary and secondary education is provided by two agencies: LWF is responsible for primary schools and Windle
Trust Kenya (WTK) is responsible for the high schools. When it comes to tertiary education, several agencies
provide vocational training. The Salesians of Don Bosco have been in the camp since 1991 to provide vocational
trainings to refugees, for example in agriculture, carpentry, tailoring, masonry, IT and motor vehicle mechanics.
The NGOs Action Africa Help International (AAHI) and Swisscontact just arrived in Kakuma, and also offer
vocational training in agriculture, IT, tailoring, etcetera. Some agencies, such as WTK and JRS provide scholarships
to university. However, the number of scholarships offered is low in comparison with the population of the camp.
Furthermore, there are agencies involved in sports, arts and other forms of empowerment programs, focussing
mainly on the youth and women. Other agencies focus on gender based violence, legal security for refugees,
resettlement and voluntary repatriation.
All these programs are implemented in different ways. Within the humanitarian program in Kakuma some
projects are implemented through a joint initiative of agencies. For example, LWF & the Danish Refugee Council
(DRC) have a joined program where they manage and support sport tournaments in Kakuma IV. The level of
involvement of an agency in a certain sector varies. Also, some projects or services have been established since
the beginning of camp. These are mostly the basic services such as the distribution of food, water and the
provision of education. Other agencies or start-ups are running pilot projects in the camp, testing more efficient,
integrated or sustainable initiatives. For example, Sanivation is carrying out a pilot on installing container based
toilets through which human waste is transformed in affordable fuel and Refunite is developing an app through
which block members can communicate with each other. These initiatives are interesting as the camp is used as
a laboratory where organisations experiment with new forms of technology to create more sustainability.
Most agencies are implementing partners, meaning they receive funding on a yearly basis from UNHCR. Other
agencies are funded by governments or privately implement the programs of their governments or private
corporations. The DRC, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and Swisscontact are
funded by their respective governments in Denmark, Germany and Switzerland.49 An example of funding by a
private co-operation is the Instant Network Schools Project funded by Vodafone Foundation funded a project for
UNHCR. 50 This project provides teachers with access to technology, the internet and educational content,
providing computers, tablets and connections. One of the issues with funding, especially those that focus on
creating more self-reliance and integration, is that funding by UNHCR is allocated on a yearly basis. This can
58
complicate the implementation of programs on a long-term basis, as agencies are not sure they will receive the
same amount of funding every year.
The increase in humanitarian agencies in and around Kakuma leads to some competition between them, as there
is considerable overlap in the services they provide. As an informant mentioned:
‘There is competition between agencies. Most funds come from UNHCR. At the end agencies get evaluated, so the
project does not get taken from them. For example, the Danish Refugee Council offers counselling. If the UN finds
JRS is not performing well without reason, they can give those funds to DRC’– field notes 16 November 201651
The budget allocation by UNHCR can cause competition as the best performing agency gets funding. Another
example an informant gave is that of mental counselling in Kakuma camp. He mentioned how Jesuit Refugee
Services and the Danish Refugee Council provide counselling. He says, ‘If the UN would find out JRS is not
performing well without reason, they can give those funds to DRC’52.
There was also some competition over which agencies would get approval to carry out their programs in
Kalobeyei. For example, while the IRC is managing the health clinics and main hospital in Kakuma camp, the
Kenyan Red Cross Society (KRCS) is the main lead in health facilities in Kalobeyei settlement.53 Most agencies
started working in Kalobeyei from January 2017 onwards, as, it was still being determined which agencies would
get confirmation to start work in Kalobeyei and how funds would be allocated. Agencies dealing with basic
services such as health (KCRS), education (LWF and WTK), shelter (NCCK and PWJ), food (WFP) and water (NRC)
have been working in Kalobeyei since the beginning.54 The purpose of Kalobeyei settlement was to decongest
Kakuma camp, integrate the refugee community with the host community, and stimulate livelihoods and self-
reliance. However, the new influx of refugees from South-Sudan and resettlement of non-Somalis from Dadaab
to Kalobeyei meant a temporary switch in priorities for agencies. For example, the reception center was
operating above its capacity, there were cases of malnourishment among the new arrivals, and hygiene was an
issue which needed to be addressed.
Even though Kalobeyei settlement is in an early stage, there are some differences in humanitarian programming.
A difference between Kakuma and Kalobeyei is that in the settlement there are street names and blocks are
called neighbourhoods. Space is constructed in a certain way, different from Kakuma where areas are divided in
zones which are numbered, and then in blocks which are also numbered. Even though this seems superficial, it
does illustrate the integrated and long-term approach. However, as was argued by a researcher during the
conference in Naivasha is that apart from different names not much was actually different then from Kakuma
camp.55 The question is if the use of names means something for refugees living there. By only changing names
sustainability will not be reached. A whole different approach to refugee hosting is needed. Furthermore, there
have already been news articles published that the situation for refugees in Kalobeyei is not better compared to
Kakuma camp, and that the initiatives towards a more self-reliant community, and more integration with
Turkana, have not yet been effective.56
There are some differences compared to Kakuma. For example, the shelters are built with timber and strong
canvas walls, instead of only tents, and set up in a different way from Kakuma. The units are organized in U-
59
shapes of ten to fourteen houses, with small plots of land, a water tap in the middle and a solar-powered
community light. This is different especially from Kakuma I where the saturation of people and the movement
from other parts of the camp to Kakuma I has created a sort of maze.57 Another example is that in Kalobeyei
refugees only receive vouchers to buy food through Bamba Chakula and there is no dry ration. A refugee receives
1400KSh per month.58 Some old traders from Kakuma camp and members from the host community were
licensed to sell food for vouchers. There is an area allocated for marketplaces, and the construction has started.
Now, the traders are placed in two big tents where they can sell their products. Concrete buildings for schools
and clinics were being constructed. However, infrastructure is a problem with the construction.59 Agencies are
mostly working logistics from Kakuma and the distance from Kakuma to Kalobeyei settlement caused some
delays and issues with planning. There were no water wells constructed yet, meaning water trucks brought water
from Kakuma to Kalobeyei settlement daily, resulting in a shortage of water.
6.2 FOCUS ON SELF-RELIANCE, SUSTAINABILITY & INTEGRATION Over the last few years the amount self-reliance programs have increased in Kakuma camp. As several informants
argued this is a new and popular sector to focus on.60 These programs cover vocational trainings, business
training, loan-opportunities, etcetera. Two agencies which arrived in Kakuma recently are only focused on
stimulating refugee livelihoods and self-reliance. The two agencies make for an interesting comparison as they
approach the livelihood-focus in different ways. I interviewed staff members of both NGOs and went on field
trips to the camp with both agencies. After, I discuss a recent project implemented by WFP concerning electronic
cash vouchers to buy food, the consequences of Equity bank settling in Kakuma, and the initiative by the Kenyan
government to install and implement state-run electricity in and around Kakuma.
6.2.1 AAHI AAHI61 (Action Africa Help International) is an international NGO which has been working in Kakuma camp since
2015. Their goal is to improve sustainable livelihoods in communities where maintaining livelihoods is difficult.
They focus mainly on facilitating refugee communities in camps. There is an agricultural program in which the
host community is involved, as in one of the gardens in Kakuma camp members of the refugee and host
community own sectors of the garden. According to AAHI this fits the integrated approach, where host
community is included and can benefit from services offered in the camp. However, the host community is not
involved in the business-side of the program. The focus of AAHI is business development. Staff members go to
the field to monitor business health performance in the camp and to do assessments, checking if businesses
comply with regulation, and how they handle their business capital.
Next to this, AAHI is involved in socio-economic profiling, to assess the socio-economic activities new arrivals
were involved in before getting to Kakuma. AAHI has an office at the Reception Center where they invite new
arrivals to the office to answer a list of questions focused on socio-economic status. The goal is to gather data on
the skills and resources of new arrivals and then connect them with the right agencies or actors. They ask about
family information, level of education, livelihood activities the person was involved in in her/his home country,
60
income status, interest in business support. However, as this is not a mandatory exercise I wonder in how far
new arrivals are reached. Furthermore, I do not know what happens with these questionnaires after they are
filled in, and if proposed actions are taken.
AAHI is also involved in providing refugees with loans from Equity Bank. Refugees can get loans with a 0% interest
from 1,000 to 100,000KSh. The money needs to be paid back in twelve months with an extension of two months.
For a refugee to apply for this loan, certain requirements need to be met: an applicant should have been in
business for at least six months, should have a business license, should have a bank account for at least six months
at Equity bank and should have a license from the country governor. Loans are not given to start-ups. These
requirements are not easy to be met. Often refugees struggle to save the capital needed to start a small business.
In the last 1,5 years 1,000 people applied for a loan from Equity Bank, of which 300 refugees were granted with
a loan.
With AAHI staff I visited one of their agricultural plants.62 It is a joint project for the refugee and host community,
which started in 2015. Two hundred farmers are organized in twenty groups, of which 30 people are from the
host community. They plant kale, spinach, cowpeas and eggplant. The food is produced for consumption and to
sell at the markets. The project is funded by UNHCR and implemented by AAHI. AAHI provides water and seeds.
This project is going well, and there is enough water, provided by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). The
farmers receive training in farming through AAHI. There is a supervisor from AAHI present to oversee the plant
and the groups.
6.2.2 SWISSCONTACT
Swisscontact is an independent foundation funded by the Swiss government.63 They have been working in
Kakuma since 2013. They mainly target youths who have just finished or failed to finish primary school, and who
are not integrated in the mainstream community. They focus equally on the host and refugee community.
With the project Skills4Life – in cooperation with NRC – they promote development of market-oriented, flexible
and low-cost skills development. The project is focused on the local market opportunities and enabling trainees
to generate income immediately with the sills required. Trainers or mentors are selected from the refugee and
host community and offered career guidance and counseling in Learning Groups. They argue they look for gaps
in the market, on which they base the trainings they offer. Training is given in computer and phone repair, bakery,
plumbing, masonry, tailoring, agriculture, hairdressing. However, when walking around the marketplaces in the
camp I wondered if these are really gaps to fill, as all these businesses already exist. Participants are provided
material by Swiss contact during the training and two to three months after, so they can set-up their business.
Swisscontact does not give money or loans, but only the materials to carry out the work (sewing machines,
threats, needles, etc.).
Next to this Swisscontact facilitates table-banking groups. The table-banking project is called ‘Mavuno’, which
means harvest. Participants are put together in different groups, where they put in a certain amount of money.
Depending on their needs they can loan money from the group for business purposes. The groups meet every
61
month, and must pay the loan back with an interest of ten percent the next month. As a staff member from
Swisscontact mentioned most of them do not have a bank account, and cannot apply for the loans of Equity
Bank. This way individuals that have gone through training at Swisscontact, have some capital to start a business.
The target of Swisscontact is to reach between 2,500 and 3,000 people. They also have the same programs for
Kalobeyei town and Kalobeyei settlement.
6.2.3 WFP - BAMBA CHAKULA At the beginning of 2016 the World Food Program (WFP), together with UNHCR, introduced a new food
distribution system in Kakuma refugee camp called ‘Bamba Chakula’, which translates to ‘get food’.64 Bamba
Chakula is an electronic cash-based food voucher. Per family unit a sim-card is registered on which they receive
a monthly voucher to use for buying foodstuffs. Its aim is to give refugees more control over what they consume,
and a chance to buy fruits, meats and vegetables, which are not distributed as part of the dry ration. There is no
transaction fee for buying products. Refugees were made aware of the new food distribution system through
video workshops by Filmaid staff, mass awareness campaigns and video screenings.
To be able to receive a Bamba Chakula sim card people need to be registered as a refugee. It takes a month to
request a new sim-card when it gets lost, the reason partly being that it stimulates people keep it safe. The sim-
card has limited functionality, and cannot be used for communication. The vouchers can only be used at traders
who are contracted as Bamba Chakula traders by WFP, these licensed traders are both from the refugee and
Turkana community. This way money spend by refugees goes back into the local economy. The first advantage
of BC is that it gives refugees some freedom to buy what they want. Beneficiaries can make their own choice in
what kind of food product they want to buy. With the dry ration, a main issue is that in some communities are
not accustomed to certain types of food.65 The food would then be traded on the market with Turkana or other
communities from the camp. Now a part of this issue is solved by the Bamba Chakula system. Second, Bamba
Chakula is meant to replace part of the dry ration and offers diversity in nutrition to its beneficiaries. 66
Furthermore, logistically it is an easier process, as the transport of the dry ration to the camp from Mombasa to
Kakuma is a lengthy process.
According to a staff member from WFP when the Bamba Chakula program started it had a lot of resistance. There
have been some issues with the implementation of the new program.67 For example, in the beginning some men
would use the vouchers to go out and drink beers which meant their wife’s and children would suffer as they
could not use it to buy food. Some are worried about the expiry dates of the vouchers. Furthermore, in some
cultures/groups it is common to have large stockpiles of food stored, while the vouchers are distributed monthly
and thus a change in the minds of these consumers mindset. It would also happen that traders made products
more expensive, told people they could only buy products at their shops, or sold other items than foodstuffs.
This so-called price-hiking and misuse should be reported to LWF through their telephone helpline, however
refugees mentioned these helplines did not work properly.
62
One other issue is that not everyone in the camps owns a phone. If people do not have a phone they are supposed
to borrow from others or use the extra phone from the shop trader. Lastly, for the illiterate and elderly the
voucher is difficult to use. However, the counter-argument brought up is that they can be assisted by family,
shop owners or community members. The last issue revolves around the amount of money given for Bamba
Chakula each month. At the beginning of my stay the amount giving to one person was 500KSh per month. At
the beginning of 2016, when the project was just launched, people would receive 100KSh per person per month.
When I left Kakuma, the amount people got that month was 300KSh a month. There was a lot of unclarity about
the amount that was going to be given in the next months.
6.2.4 EQUITY BANK
Equity bank was the first bank to open a branch in Kakuma in 2014.68 There is an ATM and office located between
Kakuma-town and Kakuma I. Equity bank is participates in the Humanitarian Private Sector Partnership Platform
East Africa. This platform stimulates private sector partners to play a key role in improving the humanitarian
system and to strengthen disaster management 69 Both policies discussed in chapter five emphasize the
engagement of the private sector in protracted refugee situations to achieve more self-reliance and integration,
and lessen the burden for agencies and sponsors. The issue with most of these cross-sector partnerships is that
they are often ad-hoc, with engagement focused on single responses or one-off donations, while there is a need
for continuous and sustainable partnerships. 70 However, the presence of a bank in Kakuma does create a
connection for the refugee and host community with each other and with the rest of Kenya, and is a form of
integration. These corporations or banks are not dependent on the kind of funding humanitarian agencies get,
which can help create sustainable solutions and more economic and social integration with the host community
and host country.
The main advantage of the bank in Kakuma is that both refugees and the host community can open bank accounts
and save money. Most people I spoke with were happy with the presence of a bank.71 In the past incentive staff
– refugees that are hired by agencies – would receive their salary through Mpesa.72 or in cash at the office of the
agency. This meant salary was only to be received at certain times in the month, and this led to long rows and
anxiety of waiting.73 Now, most agencies pay salaries through Equity Bank.74 Furthermore, Equity Bank co-
operates with agencies providing loans for refugees together with AAHI and providing the cash vouchers in co-
operation with WFP.75 According to the Equity bank they have over 50,000 customers, both refugees and locals.76
For others, worries about the cost to open an account and the location of the bank made them apprehensive to
open an account.77 As the bank is located right after the bridge coming from Kakuma-town, next to LWF-
compound, this means it is not easy to reach for refugees living in Kakuma II, III, or IV.
6.2.5 ELECTRICITY During my stay in Kakuma the Government of Kenya – in collaboration with UNHCR - was in the process of
bringing electricity to the camp. 78 Wooden poles were already set up and electric cables lay on the ground to be
installed. Even though almost everyone I spoke to was happy about this development, there were two main
issues.79 The first issue is that it was unclear when the electricity would work. When I arrived at the end of
63
November people told me the government had already been working on getting electricity for three months and
it was not sure when they would finish. Second, it was not clear if the electricity would be both for communal
and private use. Several informants were not sure if the electric would be only for public places, such as schools,
clinics and marketplaces, or if it would also be provided for households and private use.80
The advantage of having state-provided electricity is, in the first place, safety. Now at night most of the camp is
dark which leaves space for burglars, violence and rape.81 Second, the state-owned electricity would be cheaper
than the one from the generator operators in the camp. In the community, it was expected the electricity would
cost about 1000KSh a month.82 Now, the operators of generators determine the price of electricity and the time
it gets turned on and turned off. Third, if there is light in communal spaces like markets and schools, this means
it would be possible for refugees to work and/or study during the evening. One of the Kenyans working in Kakuma
town told me how having electricity 24/7 would be very beneficial for shop owners who have a refrigerator as
they could afford to keep it on at night.83 The big question remains how reliable this state-provided electricity
will be. From my own experience in Nairobi electricity was very unreliable and would fall out weekly, lasting one
hour to a whole day.
6.3 EXPERIENCES OF REFUGEES WITH THE PROGRAMS AND SERVICES Above I discussed initiatives and programs that focus on self-reliance, sustainability and integration. This can be
linked to the shift in policies where the humanitarian sector and governments are looking for to counter the
protractedness of refugee camps and alternatives to the care and maintenance model that has been
implemented in Kakuma camp for a long time. Now I explore how refugees experience these programs and
particularly the issues they face, based on my findings in the field.
A main issue is that only a small part of the population benefits from these programs. There are too many people
in the camp and to little capacity within the agencies to target all of them. The new programs on self-reliance,
implemented by AAHI and Swisscontact reach a limited amount of people. AAHI supported three hundred
refugees to get loans from Equity Bank in one and a half years, while one thousand refugees applied.84 The target
for Swisscontact is to reach 2,500 to 3,000 people, half of the refugee community and half of the host
community.85 Next to this some programmes are only targeted towards a certain group of people. For example,
the AAHI loans are only accessible to refugees who have already established a business. Other informants talked
about how certain groups are favoured or manoeuvre the humanitarian arena in such a way that they are
admissible for certain programs. Jansen (2015) uses the term ‘digging aid’ to explain how refugees at times
construct stories, for example by raising a security issue, to be admissible for a certain program. Individuals or
groups that are deemed more vulnerable have faster access to these kinds of programs. Corruption and bribing
also takes place within these programmes, for example in the schools and health clinics, where refugees pay
agency staff to get employed for incentive jobs.86 I met one Ethiopian refugee who applied for a cooking program
but said she was not let in because other groups are favoured.87 She said agencies think Ethiopians have a lot of
money and that for this cooking program fifteen Congolese, ten Sudanese and only two Ethiopian refugees were
admitted.
64
The environment makes it tough to carry out work and for programs to run. I remember sitting in the Filmaid
offices writing down my notes, and due to the heat and sand storms it was difficult to keep equipment like
laptops and camera’s in a good condition. Furthermore, power cuts that are scheduled at the compounds makes
it hard for staff to carry out their work as well as refugee staff and students that work at the compounds. A staff
member from Swisscontact mentioned that when there are sand storms vocational trainings, such as tailoring
and IT, are cancelled because of the weather conditions as everything gets covered in sand.88. What makes it
more problematic is that the provision of food, water and shelter – the basic services – is lacking89, which
influences refugee’s health and mindsets and can hinder refugees to engage in education, business or agricultural
opportunities. Hanging out in the camp I saw a lot of people passing time by sitting in coffee shops and not really
doing something. There is a danger – of what an informant called – ‘becoming idle’, meaning that people spend
time doing nothing and do not see a point to engaging in activities such as education90. This can be linked to the
protractedness of the camp, and how refugees experience their time there. Some see no point in engaging in
programs, as they feel that it is not going to help them get out of the camp.
Another problem is that not everybody is being reached with the programs, as the communication and outreach
is problematic. I attended a workshop Bamba Chakula, and more than half of the participants present did not
know about program exists or did not know exactly how the vouchers worked91. Not even all the staff members
giving the workshop had the vouchers. The translation or transfer of the programme to the refugees does not
always work, and there is a lot of unclarity surrounding some of the programs. I joined the Filmaid team on their
mass awareness campaigns, where messages about for example Bamba Chakula and the Verification process are
communicated by means of a car with speakers. However, as refugees speak different languages not everybody
is reached. Furthermore, the car does not stop for security reasons, which means that refugees cannot ask
questions about the programs.
When it comes to education there is a lack of opportunities to engage in education after high school. Getting a
degree for university is almost impossible.92 For example, JRS offers thirty to fourty scholarships a year, which is
compared to the total population of about 150,000 refugees is not much93. WTK, LWF, DRC and JRS all provide
online course for tertiary education, but it is very competitive and only a small number of participants Is elected.94
I spoke to one refugee from South-Sudan whose high school diploma from South Sudan is not recognized in
Kenya, making it difficult for him to enter university in Kenya.95 Another refugee from the Democratic Republic
of Congo was educated via the French system, meaning he had to adapt to the English system which is applied
in Kenya, and it is was difficult for him to make the transition.96
Even though refugees are not allowed to leave the camp this does happen. The legal way to leave the camp is to
ask for a movement pass at the office of the camp manager. However, informants mentioned this takes a long
time and often they are not allowed to go. Some try to leave without the movement pass, with the danger of
being caught and having to pay a bribe to the police or to be sent back to the camp. I spoke to several refugees
who would stay in Nairobi or other towns in Kenya for business purposes or because they felt like they needed
to leave the rough conditions for a bit. Within Kakuma, refugees are also not allowed to be outside of the camp
65
and their compound after a certain curfew, especially in Kakuma I. The reason mentioned by UNHCR is that this
way clashes with the host community are prevented. Still, refugees find ways to move around after sunset. I met
one informant several times outside of the camp after sunset at the bar.97 He said that he hides when he sees
police when walking back to the camp because they will ask for a bribe.
For some, however the camp is also a place where they find more opportunities and chances than elsewhere,
and it becomes a reason to stay there or return. One refugee who works for Filmaid explained that his family
lives in Nairobi and he studied there.98 He came back to Kakuma because of the opportunity to work and learn
more skills. This could also be because as he is not a Kenyan resident, it is hard for him to get these opportunities
outside for the camp. Still, it is very interesting to see that refugees find ways to use the humanitarian arena and
services provided to create a higher level of self-reliance.
6.4 DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION In this chapter I explored how refugees experience the humanitarian presence In Kakuma, and the programs and
initiatives that focus on self-reliance, sustainability and integration. I found that in Kakuma camp the care and
maintenance model is still applied among the whole refugee population. There is however, a lack of water and
food, which exacerbated due to the influx of new refugees. In Kakuma there is a co-existence of a protracted and
an emergency situation as there are refugees who have been there for a long period as well as new arrivals who
are in acute need of services (Chkam, 2016). When implementing policies on self-reliance, integration and
sustainability it needs to be considered that refugees need different levels of support.
There has been an increase of humanitarian agencies and programs that focus on self-reliance in the last five
years. In these programmes refugees receive training in certain trades, get the opportunity to apply for loans,
and receive business support. For some refugees these programs have proven to be successful and because of
the support of agencies they have been able to set up businesses and create more self-reliance. However, a large
part of the refugee community is not engaged in the programs. The main issue with these programs is that most
refugees are not reached and do not participate. High levels of competition and a lack of essential resources
make it difficult to implement the strategies in the right way (Hunter, 2009). The physical characteristics and
environment at times in Kakuma is incompatible with the needs of refugees and at their attempts to engage in
sustainable livelihoods (Hunter, 2009).
Agencies and authorities do not have enough resources to reach and assist everyone. Furthermore, considering
the oversaturation of the markets in the camp, it is questionable if refugees who are now being trained for certain
trades, can set up a successful business that has enough customer to reach a profit. Refugees argue how some
groups are favoured by NGOs and how some refugees manoeuvre the system and pay to get incentive jobs or to
participate in a certain program. Some changes are positively perceived by refugees, such as Bamba Chakula and
Equity Bank and provide refugees with a higher level of self-reliance and autonomy. The involvement of the bank
in the camp adds another layer to Kakuma camp. It integrates refugees in the Kenyan society and it increases
their level of autonomy and self-reliance. The programs focussed on self-reliance, sustainability and integration
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do not seem to be implemented from a coherent idea to serve as an alternative to long-term refugee
encampment. Considering Kenya’s policy on restricted encampment it is questionable if this is what the
government wants. Also, the question what purpose these programs serve. One refugee argued that national
and international staff of agencies earn money because refugees live in the camp, and how they ‘do not want
them to leave.99 As, Chkam (2016) argues this way encampment policies have contribute to the endurance of
camps, leading to a quasi-permanent state of emergency and the absence of alternatives to encampment.
Because of the initiatives on self-reliance, sustainability and integration as discussed above, only a part of the
population becomes a bit more self-reliant, and less in need of humanitarian services. Still, the need for services
remains.
In the next chapter, I elaborate on the way refugees have created self-reliance outside of – but still connected to
– the formal layer of service delivery in the grey area of the camp.
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7 REFUGEES’ EXPERIENCES
In this chapter, I explore ways in which refugees engage in activities to generate income, participate in trainings
or education, and how they are affected by humanitarian programming when it comes to maintaining livelihoods
and becoming self-reliant. This chapters serves to illustrate how members from the community in Kakuma
refugee camp have found ways to create normalcy and navigate and negotiate their lives in at the margins of
society, in a protracted refugee camp. It is not an exhaustive overview of activities refugees are engaged in, but
serves as an illustration of how refugees create a level of self-reliance, and the problems they face.
Even though formally refugees are not allowed to work and earn an income, it is widely known that refugees find
ways to earn money to supplement services that are provided by agencies. Processes of urbanization take place,
where marketplaces form, business takes place and ties with the host community are formed. By earning money,
engaging in business and taking incentive jobs refugees create normalcy at the margins of society. In these
urbanization processes refugees, the host community and NGOs all shape the social, political and economic
organization. A large part of these activities takes place in a grey or informal area, as refugees are formally not
allowed to work, but it is in a way condoned by the authorities. This says something about the dynamic in the
camp and how the protractedness of the refugee situation influences what happens on the ground. Refugees,
in this context, are social agents that manoeuvre this camp environment, looking for opportunities to earn an
income or to use the humanitarian structure to their advantage. There is also social stratification in the camp,
meaning refugees have different levels of power, wealth and status. There are refugees who have become rich
businessmen owning one or more business in the camp, refugees who are employed by other refugees or NGOs,
and those who are totally dependent on humanitarian services. Furthermore, a percentage of refugees receive
money from family members abroad in remittances.
7.1 SMALL BUSINESSES A part of the population in the camp is engaged in the small-business sector, selling tea, mandazi and clothes on
the streets or in the marketplaces. With this they earn between zero and 200 to 300 Kenyan shilling a day.100
Both refugees and Turkana engage in this small-business sector. For some the profit from having a small business
allows them to buy food, water or school supplies for their kids and others save it to get a small capital to
eventually start their own business. Other refugees are employed by businessmen from the camp, to work in
their shops or restaurants. Some refugees have hired Turkana girls or boys to do household work in the camp. It
shows how refugees themselves – without help from agencies – find ways to earn an income and reach a level
of self-reliance.
I interviewed several families in the Somali community in Kakuma who hired Turkana to do household work, like
washing clothes and cleaning the compound. This relationship between refugees that hire people from the host
community, shows how some refugees in the camp are better off than the host community. It illustrates how
some Turkana feel neglected by the fact that humanitarian services are directed only towards refugees and do
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not include the host community. On the other hand, job opportunities are created because of the presence of
refugees for the host community.
7.2 BODA-BODA BUSINESS
One of the large and saturated business sectors is that of boda boda drivers. Boda boda drivers are the ones that
drive motorcycle’s and take people from one destination to another in the camp. In the past people were
transported on bicycles, but with the influx of Somalis to the camp motorcycles were brought in (Jansen, 2011).
Nowadays the motorcycle is a popular for transport of people from one part of the camp to another, or to
Kakuma town and the compounds. With the growth of the camp, and the opening of Kakuma III and IV, distances
between compounds, field offices and town have visibly increased. However, not everyone can afford the boda-
boda fare and walk instead. There are also some cars, but not as much and the sandy roads are not suitable for
these vehicles.
As one informant mentioned there is a lot of competition between the drivers.101 He argues from 2010 the
business really kicked off and more motorcycles were brought to Kakuma. Three students who participated in a
social media course at Filmaid interviewed a boda boda driver and wrote a header about him. I asked permission
to use the story as it shows some of the struggles these drivers deal with:
“Because I am a Burundian and I only understand French I can’t get a job opportunity in Kakuma refugee cap.
There nearly everyone speaks English said the driver. He came to the camp in 2013 and in 2014 he began his boda
boda business to sustain his livelihood. Boda boda business is a major source of income to many refugees living in
the camp. He undergoes a number of challenges like police harassment, chest diseases and high competition from
other boda boda operators. Despite all this many boda boda earns only 500 KSh per day, which makes it
impossible to save [money]. The boda boda business is not without dangers. It is hard for non-English speakers to
find a job in the camp. Bribes are payed daily allowing boda boda drivers to move outside of the camp and use the
main road. - Field notes, 24 November 2011102
The boda-boda market is oversaturated, meaning there is a lot of competition between drivers. Another factor
for this refugee is language. He mentions that if he could speak English this could help him out, as this is often
required for being an incentive worker. Motorcycles are not cheap. Some refugees save money to buy their own
and others rent the boda-boda from the owner, meaning they pay an amount of their earnings to the owner.
Several refugees I talked to used or use the boda-boda business to save money as start capital to buy or rent a
small place to start a business.103
The police will ask for bribes from boda-boda drivers who offer rides from the camp to town and vice-versa. This
is interesting considering the ban on work. Refugees are not allowed to work, but they do, and the police does
not stop the work, but instead asks for bribes. This way the grey area and illegal form of work is maintained, and
authorities and refugees are involved in an ambiguous relationship of power. And even though the boda-boda
business is not officially allowed, it has become one of the main sources of income for refugees.
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Furthermore, next to boda-boda’s there are not a lot of other options for public transport, while the camp is of
a size that it is necessary. For example, for refugees living in Kakuma IV working for NGOs at the compounds is
complicated because of the distance. One staff member Filmaid told me that he had to walk one to two hours to
arrive at the Filmaid compound. With the motorcycle businesses it is easier to get from one place to another.
Not all agencies provide transport to and from the compounds for incentive workers. The point that I want to
make with this is that the boda boda business is also necessary to keep the camp services going. However, at
times this also means that it is harder for refugees living further away from the compounds and field offices to
apply for an incentive job.
7.3 SHOP-OWNERS
There are several marketplaces in the camp. In Kakuma I you can find the Ethiopian and Somali markets and
another market in Hong Kong. You can find shops as you would find in any Kenyan town. There are coffee shops
and restaurants, barbershops, beauty salons, electronic shops, tailors, bike shops. This illustrates how a camp
can form urban features. The success that shop-owners have varies considerably. It is not only refugees who do
their shopping the camp, but also agency staff and Turkana.
I met H. in the second part of my fieldwork when I was walking down the Ethiopian market and she invited me
to her home to meet her family. H. arrived in Kakuma in 2005. She got married in the camp, and together they
run a coffee and shisha shop in the Ethiopian market and together they have three children.104 Her sister arrived
in the camp in 2014, and met her husband in Kakuma. They are from the Oromo tribe which is prosecuted in
Ethiopia, meaning they had to flee. Before having the shop, H. would sell injera on streets every morning, earning
about 100 Kenyan shilling a day. She saved some of this money to build the coffee place. They started with the
business 1 year ago where they sell coffee and tea for 20KSh and shisha for 50KSh. Their shop is doing well, and
they work from Monday until Saturday. The couple earns around 500KSh a day. She sends her oldest boy to a
private school in Kakuma-town for which they pay fifty dollars a month. She saves 150KSh for school every day.
With two children now growing up, she worries about the payment for private school for them. I hung out at the
place several times where I would sit with H., her family and friends. This illustrates the ways refugees create a
form of normalcy, where they set up a business and use the money to send their kids to school.
There are three necessities to open a business like this one. First, there is the need for a space for the businesses.
Some refugees do this in their own compounds, and others rent spaces in or near to the marketplaces. On
average, prices for rent vary from 2.500 until 4.000KSh a month or more. Depending on how many electricity is
needed and the operator of the generator I heard prices vary from 1.000KSh until 5.000KSh a month. Lastly,
there is a need for products. Most products come from Nairobi, Lodwar or Kitale, meaning they are brought in
lorries to the camp. Refugees who do not have the money to get products from these towns, buy products in
Kakuma-town or in the marketplaces of the camp itself. Competition on the markets has also increased.105 Some
refugees see the benefits, as they can get a nice service.106 However, refugees who want to start a business face
challenges of getting customers and products making it hard to break even or get a profit.
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Some refugees set up successful businesses, while others struggle to keep their shops open. Well-known – also
among humanitarian staff – in Kakuma I are the restaurants Franco’s & Unity, and the supermarket Sarafina,
which have been in Kakuma for quite some time and have good reputation. These business owners are doing
very well in comparison to the rest of the refugee community, and the restaurants were filled with people every
time I went there. Furthermore, it is interesting that most humanitarian staff I went out with rather went to the
restaurants in the camp than to Kakuma-town.
I met a girl from Sudan who worked a hair salon in a small street between the Ethiopian and Somali markets.107
When we started talking she explained that she started the business 3 days ago. With a group of five women
they put the money together to rent the space. They do not receive assistance from agencies. They pay 5.000KSh
per month for electricity and 3.000 Kenyan shilling for rent, meaning she has to pay 1.700KSh a month, not
including the products she needs to run the business. She got the capital to start the business from doing people’s
hair at her house in the community she lives in. The products for the shop were brought by a friend from Nairobi.
The girl is the head of a family of eight people, and if they make a profit, the money will be used to support the
family. She mentions that business is slow, and they only had one customer the day before. That day there had
not been any customers yet. When I went back to the place in my last week before leaving, it was closed. The
large and growing population of the camp and the businesses that are already established makes it hard for
refugees to set up a business if they do not receive support from agencies. In certain branches, such as the boda-
boda business, barbershops and tailor shops there seems that the supply – amount of businesses in the camp
providing these services - is higher than the demand.
When talking to shop owners in the camp I found that some had business licenses and health licenses from the
Turkana County Government and Ministry of Health.108 Refugees I spoke too that had these licenses told me they
were required by the government. A business license is valid for a year and the price depending on the kind of
business one is involved in, such as a Small Kiosk Services and Small Accessories Services, which both cost 2.000
KSh.109 The license can be picked up at the Turkana county government office in Kakuma-town. If a shop-owners
sells food or drugs he or she needs a Food Drugs & Chemical Substances Act which costs 1.600KSh and a Health
Certificate.110 One informant told that these licenses were introduced in the camp 3 years ago. However, not
everyone I spoke to that owns a business has these licenses, or knew that they existed. In my time in the field I
could not figure out exactly how the system of licenses for shop-owners work works. Some shop-owners in the
camp told me they are obligated to have the licenses or otherwise their businesses would be closed. To be eligible
for the loan program from the humanitarian agency AAHI in co-operation with Equity Bank a license is necessary.
When I talked with staff from Swisscontact who are engaged in creating business opportunities for refugees, they
told me they did not know about these licenses. Some refugees told me they did not have the licenses because
they did not trust this system, or they had not been approached by the license-providers yet.111
I was confused about these licenses and found it illogical that refugees, who are not allowed to work and move
– even though they do in a grey area – need to have business certificates and licenses. One informant said that
if he pays tax in the form of a license to the Government of Kenya, he wants protection for his investment in
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return. He mentioned how is paying tax while he is not allowed to work or to move. 112 Furthermore, he
mentioned that he is paying tax while the land is not theirs. This issue with licenses shows the ambiguous
relationship between authorities and refugees in the camp. On the one hand it is a form of formalization and
normalcy, where established businessmen pay tax. It is a form of formalization and of integration of refugees
with the local community. On the other hand, it seems strange that authorities ask for licenses from refugees
who are formally not allowed to work. I wonder however in how far it was introduced as part of a policy, as I got
the idea that as time passed and businesses in the camp started growing more casual choice to implement
licenses, and the reasons why are not clear.
This case of business licenses illustrates the camp as an ambiguous place where the formal and informal spheres
are connected. The confusion surrounding the business licenses illustrates the dynamics in the camp and how
there is a distinct economic, political and social arena in Kakuma, blurring the lines between government
agencies, humanitarian agencies, the refugee community and the host community. There are restrictions in place
for refugees and basic services are provided, but self-reliance and integration are stimulated at the same time.
Refugees are officially not allowed to work, but have opened businesses, and some of them have licenses from
the Kenyan government, while others do not. This grey area illustrates the issues with the implementation of
alternatives to camps, as Kakuma camp has developed its own organization and dynamic.
When it comes to Kalobeyei settlement there were no businesses or shops yet when I went there. The idea was
that Kalobeyei settlement would decongest Kakuma camp, and attract ‘entrepreneurially-minded’ refugees who
could use the plots of land on offer and trade with the local community.113 Kalobeyei would be the place where
refugees could set up businesses, engage in agriculture and stock. However, when the civil war in South-Sudan
intensified this problematized the initiative. Furthermore, new arrivals came in large numbers when buildings
such as water wells, schools and marketplaces where still being constructed in Kalobeyei. New arrivals from
South-Sudan were and need emergency aid, have no resources which mean that and thus cannot not directly
engage in these livelihood opportunities. As one informant, who lives in Kakuma camp, said ‘If you go to
Kalobeyei, you will see the real refugees’.114 I found this statement telling as it implies that he does not see
himself as a real refugee and he sees real refugees as people who just fled war and needed emergency services
such as food, shelter and water. He did not put himself in this category.
It would be interesting to see if the programs in Kalobeyei and the program in Kakuma can remain separate, and
how they deal with refugees moving between the two places, which I expect to happen. Furthermore, I was told
that businessmen from Kakuma camp went to Kalobeyei, without approval from UNHCR, to start businesses
there, but had been sent back by UNHCR. Some of my informants said they expected that a road would be created
between Kakuma 4 and Kalobeyei, making it easier for communities from both sides to travel, and connecting
the two. Furthermore, it is expected by most that the wealthy businessmen from Kakuma camp will expand their
business, and open shops in Kalobeyei settlement, when the settlement is more developed and has grown in
population.
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7.4 GARDENS AND AGRICULTURE A sector that is often focused on in self-reliance policies is agriculture. It makes a lot of sense as by producing
your own food, an important part of livelihoods is covered. In Kakuma there are several initiatives which focus
on agriculture and farming. Unfortunately, the climate makes it difficult to harvest vegetables and fruit.
I met a refugee who works in the gardens next to the road from Kakuma I to Kakuma II.115 He owns a part of the
garden, and has been working there since 2011, providing for his family of nine members. They eat and sell the
vegetables they grow. In the garden people grow cassava, spinach, kale, and bell peppers. He mentioned that
agencies used to provide seeds, but that this does not happen anymore. Furthermore, because of the lack of rain
the well is almost empty, and it is very hard to get the water up. Because the ground is very dry there are only a
few types of fruits and vegetables that can grow here, and because there is not enough water to feed, they
remain small. I spoke to other refugees who had their own small gardens and they experienced the same issues.
As such, refugees that are engaged in agriculture – without help from agencies – are restricted because of the
climate, lack of water and the struggle to get the seeds. Furthermore, plots like these are often allocated,
meaning they cannot look for more fertile soil.
7.5 INCENTIVE WORK I met a girl from South-Sudan on one of my field trips in December.116 She lives at in Hong Kong, where she
opened a hair salon the month before. She was born in Kakuma in 1995 and has lived here all her life. Her mom
came to Kakuma in 1991, her father died. The family consists of eight people. She dropped out of high school to
take care of her brothers and sisters in 2013. She mentions how the food provided by WFP lasts for two weeks,
while it is supposed to last for of a month. Luckily, the small children go to school where they receive porridge.
When I asked her how she managed to have the nice building for her shop, she answered that is was built by
UNHCR for her brother who is physically disabled. The brother was now in Nairobi for studies.
The fact that she was born in the camp, and along with her a growing new generation of children and adults, and
has lived there all her life is something that needs attention. It shows what the protractedness of refugee
situations means, and how for some the camp is the only home they have ever had, and probably will ever have.
I realized that these children are born with the status refugee, and are added to the registration cards of their
families as refugees. This with the earlier story of H. wo got married and gave birth to three children in the camp.
In a – very sad – way this is also a form of normalcy, as refugees start families and raise them in the setting of a
protracted refugee camp.
When I met the girl again in January she had gotten a job at IRC, working at the clinic as a Community Health
Promoter. With this job she would earn 5,500KSh a month. She still has the shop on the side of the compound,
which she opens in the evening. Business is not going that well as it is hard for her to get the products. The money
that she is earning is used to pay for school supplies for her smaller brothers and sisters. She opened a bank
account at Equity Bank, and paid 700KSh for an ATM card. Her brother got back from Nakuru in the meantime.
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However, as his last school fees were not paid he cannot get the certificate of graduating. Now she is trying to
get her brother enrolled in high school in the camp.
A significant part of the refugee population in Kakuma camp receives an income from working incentive jobs.117
Incentive jobs are jobs offered by humanitarian agencies. Refugees fulfill positions ranging from cleaners to
teachers, guards, community awareness officers, nurses, etc. Without incentive workers agencies would not be
able to provide all their services in the camp. As refugees are officially not allowed to work they earn between
3,500 and 10,000KSh a month for a fulltime position. Refugees are not allowed to make more than 10,000KSh a
month for incentive work as they receive food, water and shelter for free and because they are formally not
allowed to work due to their refugee status.118 Most NGO’s hire incentive staff. For refugees it is a chance to earn
money, get work experience and a possibility to receive extra benefits, such as mobile phones, education, and a
connection with NGO staff.
However, most incentive workers I spoke with were not happy with the arrangement. One informant mentioned
he did not think it was fair that he received less money when he is doing the same amount of work as national
and international staff, and he felt used by NGOs.119 Even though he was proud of the work he was doing, and
happy to help his community, incentive work does not allow him to grow in terms of financial capital.
Furthermore, he argues life in Kakuma is expensive and prices are going up, which is not considered by agencies,
meaning the incentive salary remains the same while there is price inflation on the markets in the camp. Lastly,
he mentioned that there were some cases of fraud were unqualified refugees paid money to NGO-staff for a
certain incentive job, which would look got on their CV or through which they would have access to other
benefits. Another issue, was that when some agencies advertise for positions they do not always employ qualified
persons. I heard about nurses that did not know how to do a normal blood test.120 There were cases were
teachers were not able to speak English or write in Kiswahili, who were fired after students complained and
agencies carried out an assessment of the quality of teaching.121
These incentive jobs are a way through which UNHCR and agencies can keep providing services following the
care and maintenance model and a way through which the long-term encampment is sustained. However, the
question is what would happen if these services are not provided, and refugees must become self-reliant
according to the policies. This change needs to gradually implemented, and a part of the refugees will still need
relief aid. This illustrates the problematic arena in which agencies, authorities and refugees operate.
7.6 PRIVATE REFUGEE INITIATIVES In the camp and in town there are several private initiatives from refugees through which services are delivered
outside of the realm of humanitarian assistance. Examples of these are community-based organisations, private
clinics and private schools that are run which are run by refugees in Kakuma.
Some refugees I spoke with initiated their own organisations or initiatives called CBOs (community-based
organisations). Some of these CBOs work independent from any agency or authority, while others work together
with agencies. I attended one of the board meetings of the CBO Youth in Action for Sustainable Development. I
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met one of the founders of the organisations a few weeks before that.122 The CBO has been in existence since
2014. There are five board members who all represent a group of five to six people. The aim is to help community-
members set up their own projects and they target refugees that are between 18 and 35 years old. They focus
on this age group as they see that after high school these young adults often become idle, and start to use drugs,
drink alcohol and hang around the camp. With this CBO they want to stimulate them to get a job or open a
business.
To start a business a start capital is needed and the board members set-up a table-banking system. Table-banking
is group funding method where members of the group save and borrow directly from their savings in short-term
or long-term loans. This way beneficiaries do not need to be connected to a finance organization, but arrange
the loans and repayments among themselves. The founders have put in most of the money allowing participants
to get money to start a business. The board members contribute 500KSh a month, and other participants about
200KSh per month. For some projects or plans they would put in more money. One participant was given a loan
to buy a motorbike, and is now paying back this money. With this initiative they try to empower refugees to go
to work, and allow them to borrow some money. Because the initiative takers are from the refugee community
themselves, they are closely collected to their beneficiaries and know what they need.
When I spoke to H. about the education for her children, she mentions that her oldest son goes to a private
school in Kakuma town, because it has better facilities and the quality of education is better. Lastly, I heard about
private banks for Somalis through which they arrange their own bank matters.123 These private refugee initiatives
then fill in a gap in the camp, as, for example, a lot of refugees are struggling to save money to start a business.
As these initiatives are not all connected with agencies, some of their work also happens in this grey and informal
area of the camp. They create own initiatives to help other refugees set up businesses and achieve more self-
reliance.
7.7 DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION In this chapter I focused on activities refugees engage in themselves, mostly outside of the formal service delivery
layer. I set forth ways refugees create a level of self-reliance. As said, refugees, agencies and authorities engage
in activities which are outside of the formal service delivery, in a grey area of the camp. These examples illustrate
the variety of activities refugees are engaged in, independently or in relation to an agency, the private sector or
the government. Refugees engage in different kinds of entrepreneurship and some have set up successful
businesses. Even though the environment is though – due to the heat, drought and sand storms – refugees did
find ways to beat these conditions. These processes show how in a protracted situation – where a return home
or resettlement becomes less likely – refugees find ways to create a way of normalcy, meaning they try to create
a normal life as much as possible.
Refugees mentioned how police will ask for bribes, for activities that are formally not allowed. Furthermore, the
Turkana government has introduced business licences in the camp for refugee shop-owners. This seems odd as
formally refugees in Kenya are not allowed to work. As such, refugees, agencies and authorities all play a role
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and sustain this grey area of the camp. NGOs offer incentive jobs to refugees, to stimulate them to work. At the
same time, without these jobs the service delivery in Kakuma could not be maintained. This is interesting as the
activities that happen in the grey area of camp organization and life are condoned, and at times utilized or
exploited, by UNHCR and authorities.
When looking at policies on self-reliance, sustainability and integration these different layers of the camp are not
considered, creating a discrepancy between what is said in policies and what happens on the ground. This makes
implementation of alternatives to camps problematic in Kakuma, as refugees themselves have created a form of
self-reliance and even assistance to other refugees outside of the formal layer of service delivery. Authorities
and agencies are involved in these processes in the grey area of the camp. Furthermore, the saturation of
markets, leads to fierce competition between refugee shop owners, and creates difficulties for newcomers to
the market.
In the next, and final, chapter I discuss my findings and link them to the theoretical debates that were brought
up in the conceptual framework.
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8 DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION In this thesis I explored the meaning of self-reliance, sustainability and self-reliance for refugees in the protracted
refugee camp Kakuma, in Kenya. The restricted encampment policy has led to the long-term implementation of
the care and maintenance model in Kakuma. Recently, policies were created in which UNHCR, INGOs and
governments argue for alternatives to camps where the focus lies on creating more self-reliance, sustainability
and integration with the host community. However, there is a discrepancy between these policies and what
happens on the ground. In a two-month period of fieldwork I researched how refugees experience and give
meaning to self-reliance, sustainability and integration, and which issues they face. This thesis provides a local
perspective on how these concepts are experienced by refugees, how policy is translated into programs, and
how it influences the relationship between humanitarian staff, refugees, the host community and Kenyan
authorities. It illustrates the ambiguous context in which these policies are supposed to be implemented, as in
Kakuma camp formal and informal spheres are connected and have created Kakuma’s distinct dynamic with its
own social, economic and political organization.
8.1 DISCUSSION In this discussion I take the main findings from my fieldwork and link it to the theoretical discussions brought up
in the conceptual framework in chapter two.
Kakuma refugee camp is co-ordinated and managed by UNHCR. UNHCR has the mandate to provide
humanitarian services, as well as the mandate to guard the responsibilities of states to respect refugee rights
and thus to protect refugees. These two mandates are at times paradoxical, as the provision of aid may
undermine protection and measures required to facilitate the provision of protection can diminish the quality of
aid provision (Bakewell, 2002). In Kenya, UNHCR is guided in its practices by the restricted encampment policy
that is enforced by the government. Thus, in Kakuma, the camp is not only a place where UNCHR to provide aid
and assistance to refugees, but also a way for the government to contain large amounts of refugees in one place,
and for UNHCR to control what happens in the refugee community and to steer towards expected behaviour.
This connects with Minca’s (2015) argument that the camp is as a place of custody, care and control. In Kakuma,
aid is provided to refugees, even though most refugees I spoke with find this care lacking due to the shortages in
water and food. Refugees are officially not allowed to move out Kakuma camp. Some refugees have found ways
to overcome this custody and control factor, as they engage in activities in a grey part of the camp and found
ways to manoeuvre the humanitarian arena to their benefit. However, this does not count for everyone, and
there is a part of refugees that are mostly dependent on the services provided by agencies.
Since the opening of the camp in 1991 Kakuma has been a site where formal – what is allowed and implemented
by authorities and UNHCR – and informal layers – that what happens outside the formal sphere of service delivery
and protection – have developed and are connected. This created a grey area of informality in which refugees,
agencies and authorities operate. Since 1991 refugees have found their own ways to reach a certain level of self-
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reliance outside of the services offered by UNHCR, agencies and authorities. Marketplaces have developed as
refugees engaged in agriculture, entrepreneurship and shipped in goods from other cities in Kenya and abroad.
Although illegal, these activities were condoned by agencies and authorities. As these processes were not
prohibited, Kakuma camp has developed urban features, as put forward by Dalal (2015), Montclos and Kagwanja
(2000) and Jansen (2015). Refugees engage in small business, selling tea and mandazi on the streets, some have
set up successful businesses. Even though the environment is though – due to the heat, drought and sand storms
– refugees did find ways. These processes show how in a protracted situation – where a return home or
resettlement becomes less likely – refugees find ways to create a way of normalcy, meaning they try to create a
normal life as much as possible. This has created social stratification in Kakuma, where some groups and
individuals enjoying better conditions of life than other camp residents (Crisp, 2003). By condoning these
activities, authorities and UNHCR have contribute to the endurance of Kakuma camp in a quasi-permanent state
of emergency (Chkam, 2016).
In Kakuma there has been an increase of humanitarian agencies and programs that focus on self-reliance in the
last five years. In these programmes refugees receive training in certain trades, get the opportunity to apply for
loans, and receive business support. The main issue with these programs is that most refugees are not reached
and do not participate. There are not enough resources to reach and assist everyone. Furthermore, considering
the oversaturation of the markets in the camp, it is questionable if refugees who are now being trained for certain
trades, can set up a successful business that has enough customer to reach a profit. Some refugees do not have
the resources, skills and/or assistance to engage in entrepreneurship. Some families only rely on the aid provided
by agencies. Refugees argue how some groups are favoured by NGOs and how some refugees manoeuvre the
system and pay to get incentive jobs or to participate in a certain program. This can be linked to Cavaglieri (n.d.)
who found that micro-finance programs implemented by UNHCR did not target the most vulnerable. Also in
Kakuma, at times programs do not target the most vulnerable, but instead those refugees that are already
endowed with business expertise, and often had enough resources to sustain themselves. For example, the loans
from AAHI are only available, for those refugees who have been in business for six months and have a business
licence. The most vulnerable are not targeted through this approach, while they have more issues to get in
business due to the high cost for rent, electricity and products. In this way, refugee self-reliance as used in
humanitarian programming is tension with refugee empowerment, rather than inextricably linked to it (Meyer,
2006).
When analysing the Policy on Alternatives to Camps and the Kenya Comprehensive Refugee programme I found
several problems comparing it to Kenya. The most important steps that should be taken are the removal of
restrictions on rights of refugees, alignment of service delivery with the local structure, and the removal of the
parallel system of service delivery. In all steps there should be involvement of all stakeholders (local
governments, national governments, host and refugee communities and the private sector). First, the Kenyan
authorities do not favour the local integration of refugees, seeing the restricted encampment policy they have
implemented for years. Refugees are officially not allowed to move out of the camp and to work and it does not
seem that the legal status of refugees has priority for the Kenyan government. Even though in the grey area
78
refugee do engage in activities for self-reliance as said before, the Kenyan government still maintains they do
not allow this. Furthermore, it is argued that service delivery should be in line with local structures. For Kakuma,
the host community is to a certain extent integrated in the humanitarian arena. As such, it seems to be the other
way around where the host community gets integrated into humanitarian programs. Next to this, Turkana is the
poorest region in Kenya and the lack of services from local authorities for the host community makes alignment
of the refugee community with this local system complicated. Lastly, the policies call for the removal of the
parallel system of service delivery, which are UNHCR and NGOs. As one refugee mentioned, this would mean
staff working for those would be out of a job, and, that this is not what the agencies want. In the last years, the
number of agencies working in Kakuma has increased instead of decreased. This connects to Chkam (2016) that
UNHCR, agencies and authorities themselves play a role in the perpetuation of encampment.
Muiruri (2014) argued that in Kenya agencies and the government seemed to be stuck at the emergency phase
characterized by saving lives, protection and provision of basic needs, and that there was no move towards
finding durable solutions’. I did find some initiatives that were recently implemented and have a more
sustainable. example is Bamba Chakula - an electronic food voucher – through which refugees have a higher level
of self-reliance and autonomy. Because of this initiative refugees can now partly choose what their diet consists
of as they can use the voucher to buy food products at licensed Bamba-Chakula traders in the camp and in town.
This way the money gets pumped into Kakuma’s economy, which makes it more sustainable. However, there
was some unclarity surrounding the amount of cash that would be allocated every month. This unclarity
surrounding programs is something refugees experienced as a problem, as they did not receive the right
information about opportunities that could benefit them. I found involvement of the private sector in Kakuma.
The opening of Equity bank was positively perceived by most refugees, as it allows them to have a bank card and
to save money on their accounts. Furthermore, in co-operation with an NGO the bank provides loans for
refugees. The involvement of the bank in the camp adds another layer to Kakuma camp. On the one hand, the
existence of the bank integrates refugees – who can afford a bank card – in the Kenyan society and it increases
their level of autonomy and self-reliance.
Furthermore, I found the opening of Kalobeyei settlement to be surprising. It was planned to become a hybrid
settlement where the host and refugee community integrate, and engage in entrepreneurial activates to create
more self-reliance. Considering Kenya’s restricted encampment policy this seems like an import step in achieving
self-reliance, sustainability and integration. However, the recent influx of South-Sudanese and resettlement from
Dadaab to Kakuma has obstructed these plans to a certain level, as the focus now lies on providing emergency
aid. Furthermore, in Kalobeyei they faced issues with provision of goods, as the water wells were not constructed
yet, meaning refugees did not have enough water. There are differences in service delivery compared to Kakuma
camp which are focused on creating more self-reliance, sustainability and integration. The houses are set up in a
different, more accommodating way and refugees in Kalobeyei only get Bamba-Chakula vouchers and no dry
ration anymore. However, it remains to be seen in how far these activities are successful, and how much support
is given by the Kenyan government. Next to this, it will be interesting to see in how far Kalobeyei settlement
79
becomes connected to Kakuma camp. For further research, it would be interesting to follow the developments
in Kalobeyei settlement in comparison. with Kakuma camp.
This thesis is based on the findings of a two-month period of fieldwork I carried out in Kakuma. Therefore, I do
not argue this thesis gives a complete overview of how refugees experience self-reliance, sustainability and
integration in Kakuma. This work was created by the way I interpreted the talks and interviews I had with
informants, by the field visits I undertook with agencies, and by my own walks through the camp and
observations. I believe the qualitative approach is useful when doing research in a camp setting, as it allows the
researcher to hang out with informants and to make observations over a longer period. What people say they
think or do, and what they actually think and do, can be very different. I think this is even more true when doing
research in a camp setting, and therefore the qualitative approach is useful. As a researcher, doing qualitative
research in Kakuma’s camp setting was difficult, as I was not allowed to actually live in the camp, but in one of
the compounds for agency staff. This meant I could not participate as much with my informants as I would have
liked. However, I considered the safety of my informants and of myself as more important. Furthermore, being
hosted by one of the agencies meant I could get easier and faster access to the camp, which I needed due to
time constraints for this thesis.
8.2 CONCLUSION To conclude, this research shows the complex setting in which refugees experience self-reliance, sustainability
and integration. It problematizes the way these concepts are set out in recent refugee hosting policies that argue
for alternatives to camps. It uncovered the informal and formal layers in the camp through which refugees
manoeuvre, and which problematizes the implementation of these policies. Refugees have found ways to
achieve self-reliance outside of the formal service delivery from agencies, and some depend less on service
delivery than others. Activities that happen in the grey area of the camp are condoned, and at times utilized by
UNHCR and agencies. As such authorities, UNHCR and agencies maintain this grey area in the camp and play a
role in the continuation of encampment in Kenya. Programmes for self-reliance are implemented in Kakuma, and
some successfully so. There is an upsurge in agencies that focus on self-reliance, sustainability and integration.
However, the size of the camp which creates competition on markets and the lack of resources to reach a larger
part of the community, makes that the outcome of these programmes is small. The main problem with the
implementation of policies on alternatives to camps is that the existence of formal and informal layers in the
camp, which are interconnected is not considered. First, Kakuma’s distinct economic, social and political
organization should analysed and, and from there on out programs can be created and implemented that create
more self-reliance, sustainability and integration.
80
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ATTACHMENT I: LIST OF HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES WORKING IN KAKUMA1
Abbreviation Name Operating in
Kakuma since
Type Sectors
AAHI
Action Africa Help International 2015 INGO Self-reliance & livelihoods, vocational training
AAR Japan https://aarjapan.blogspot.rs/search/label/Kenya
Association for Aid and Relief, Japan 2014 INGO Education, WASH-water, health (mostly construction &
maintenance)
AIC-LOK Africa Inland Church Lokichoggio - Religious Mission Health
AMREF
African Medical & Research
Foundation
- INGO Health
DBK2
Don Bosco Kakuma 1993 Religious mission Vocational training, livelihoods
DRC 3
Danish Refugee Council 2014 INGO Volrep, Livelihoods, SGBV, Child Protection,
psychosocial support, sports
FAO 4 Food and Agriculture Organization
of the United Nations
- UN Agency Environment – SAFE cookstoves
FAI
FilmAid International 2001 INGO
Information dissemination-SGBV, health, registration,
livelihoods, community mobilisation & awareness,
education/vocational training
FH 5 Food for the Hungry In Kenya
since 1976
INGO Food
1 This table is compiled from my own fieldwork observations & interviews, and data I retrieved from the websites of agencies, and reports from UNHCR: https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/57133 - “Who Does What, Where Matrix 30 May 2017”; https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/57798UNHCR - “Who does What, Where for Whom UNHCR Sub Office Kakuma, Kenya, 18 June 2017”; Kenya Comprehensive Refugee Programme 2016, last accessed on 30 June 2017 2 https://www.infoans.org/en/sections/special-reports/item/698-kenya-don-bosco-kakuma-the-city-of-mercy 3 https://drc.ngo/what-we-do/stories-from-the-field/danish-minister-for-development-cooperation-visits-kakuma-refugee-camp-in-kenya 4 https://www.fao.org/energy/emergencies/en/ 5 https://www.fh.org/our-work/countries/kenya/
85
GIZ6
Deutsche Gesellschaft für
Interantionale Zusammenarbeit
In Kena since
1975
IGO Host community, conflict resolution, environment,
livelihoods, sports
HI7
Handicap International In Kenya
since 1992
NGO Specific needs services
GNI8
Good Neighbours International 2015 INGO Shelter
IRC9
International Rescue Committee 1992 INGO Clinics and hospitals (Kakuma), Nutrition, RH, HIV,
Protection, WASH
IsraAID10
- 2011 INGO SGBV, WASH, psychosocial support, livelihoods, sports
JRS11
Jesuit Refugee Service 1992 INGO Child Protection, SGBV, special needs services,
education, scholarships, health (mental/psychosocial)
KMH
Kakuma Mission Hospital - Health, reproductive health
KRCS
Kenya Red-Cross Society - INGO Health (Kalobeyei), nutrition (Kalobeyei), SGBV, WASH,
Family Reunification
LOKADO12
Lotus Kenya Action for Development
Organization
2003 Registered as NGO
in 2007 (previously
CBO)
Host community, energy, environment, firewood
LWF13
Lutheran World Federation 1992 Communion Community mobilisation & awareness, security,
education, special needs services, child protection,
reception, distribution non-food items, nutrition,
livelihoods, sports
6 https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/317.html 7 https://www.handicap-international.org.uk/ 8 http://reliefweb.int/report/kenya/good-neighbors-launched-shelter-construction-project-kakuma 9 https://www.rescue.org/country/kenya 10 https://www.globalgiving.org/projects/kakuma-refuge-camp-holistic-support/ 11 http://en.jrs.net/ 12 https://lokadoke.wordpress.com/about/ 13 https://www.lutheranworld.org/content/about-lwf
86
NCCK14
The National Council of Churches of
Kenya
- Shelter, special needs services, child protection,
reception, infrastructure, wash, livelhoods, HIV/AIDS
NRC15
Norwegian Refugee Council 2012 INGO Sanitation, WASH, volrep, livelihoods, food distribution,
education
PWJ16
Peace Winds Japan 2016 NGO
Shelter and Infrastructure (mostly building and
maintenance)
RCK
Refugee Consortium of Kenya Founded in
1998
NGO Legal aid, protection monitoring, detention, advocacy
Refunite17
Refugees United Founded in
2008
NGO Family unification, community mobilisation &
awareness, communication
SVhttp://sanivation.com/blog/2013/06/kakuma-
refugee-camp-project/
Sanivation 2013 Social Enterprise WASH, environment
SC Swisscontact 2013 INGO Livelihoods, vocational training, business training,
table-banking
T&T18
Team and Team Korea 2014 NGO
WASH - water
UNFPA
United Nations Population Fund - UN Agency SGBV
UNHCR
United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees
1992 UN Agency Co-ordination & management, infrastructure,
registration, protection, environment, nutrition,
logistics, WASH
UNICEF
United Nations Children’s Fund - UN Agency Education, child protection, health, water
UN IOM
UN International Organisation of
Migration
- UN Agency Protection, resettlement, migration, health
14 http://www.ncck.org/newsite2/index.php/information/news/316-unhcr-ncck-to-upscale-refugee-partnership 15 https://www.nrc.no/countries/africa/kenya/ & https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/annual-reports/2012/nrc-horn-of-africa-annual-report-2012.pdf 16 http://peace-winds.org/en/activity.html 17 https://refunite.org/ 18 http://www.teamandteamint.org/history
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UNOCHA
United Nations Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs
- UN Agency Co-ordination
WFP
United Nations World Food
Programme
1992 UN Agency Food security and nutrition, environment (energy-
saving stoves)
WV19
World Vision International 2013 NGO WASH, distribution non-food items, environment, food
distribution, livelihoods, shelter and infrastructure
WTK20
Windle Trust Kenya 2015 NGO Education, scholarships
19 http://wvi.org/kenya/article/world-vision-providing-humantiarian-assistance-thousand-refugees-fleeing-violence 20 http://www.windle.org/
88
1 Retrieved from http://www.mystartproject.co.uk/kakuma/, last accessed on 8 November 2017 2 ‘Kakuma Camp – Map’, retrieved from https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/58199, last accessed on 8 November 2017 3 ‘UNHCR Kenya Kakuma Operational Update 16-31 January 2017’, retrieved from https://reliefweb.int/report/kenya/unhcr-kenya-kakuma-operational-update-16-31-january-2017, last accessed on 18 September 2017. 4 ‘UNHCR. (2015). Camp Toolkit: Chapter 1 About Camp Management, retrieved from http://cmtoolkit.org/media/transfer/doc/chapter_1.pdf, last accessed on 18 September 2017. 5 ‘1951 Refugee Convention’ , retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/1951-refugee-convention.html, last accessed on 16 October 2017 6 http://dedoose.com/ 7 When NGO-staff and even refugee staff were going into the camp for work they talked about ‘going to the field’. Often for agency staff this meant going to the different field posts in the camp, where they had their sub offices. Incentive staff often went into the camp to talk with refugees from blocks, disseminate information and carry out workshops. 8 ‘Refugees Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement’, retrieved from https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/provision/refugees-sudan-comprehensive-peace-agreement, last accessed on 23 April 2017 9 ‘South-Sudan Refugee Repatriation Tops 100.000 Milestone’, retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2008/3/47ecd8bb2/south-sudan-refugee-repatriation-tops-100000-milestone.html, ast accessed on 23-4-2017 10 ‘UNHCR Kenya Kakuma Operational Update, 01-31 July 2016’, retrieved from https://reliefweb.int/report/kenya/unhcr-kenya-kakuma-operational-update-1-31-july-2016, last accessed on 24 September 2017 11 ‘UNHCR appeals to Kenya over decision to end refugee hosting’, retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/5/5730b5f36/unhcr-appeals-kenya-decision-end-refugee-hosting.html, last accessed on 15 June 2017 12 Head of Refugee Affairs speaking at the Conference ‘Refugees and Forced Migration in Eastern Africa: Crisis, Trends, Dynamics, Challenges, Opportunities and Conundrums’ 25 October 2017, Naivasha, Kenya. 13 ‘Refugees must go, Kenya says’, retrieved from http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2016/05/06/refugees-must-go-kenya-says_c1345961, last accessed on 15 June 2017 14 Ibid. 15 ‘Closure of refugee camps’, retrieved from https://kanere.org/2016/12/31/closure-of-refugee-camps/, last accessed on 23 February 2017 16 ‘Kenya: Protect Somalis Facing Conflict, Abuses, Drought’, retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/03/23/kenya-protect-somalis-facing-conflict-abuses-drought, last accessed on 30 June 2017 17http://www.nation.co.ke/counties/turkana/Kalobeyei-settlement-gets-boost/1183330-3805914-kqq63s/index.html, last accessed on 31-10-2017 18 ‘Alternatives to Camps: Making it Work’, retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/55fff7026.pdf. Last accessed on 30 June 2017 19 ‘UN-Habitat to lead in planning Kenya’s first Integrated Settlement in Kalobeyei, Turkana County’, retrieved from https://unhabitat.org/un-habitat-to-lead-in-planning-kenyas-first-integrated-settlement/, last accessed on 8 November 2017 20 Ibid. 21 ‘Kalobeyei Settlement, Northwest of Kakuma’, retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sHdL5k4NEnE, last accessed on 3 September 2016 22 https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/30974 23 https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/31376 24 https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/31729 25 https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/31846 26 https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/29919 27 https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/30620 28 https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/49396
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29 https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/51473 30 https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/53519 31 Interview W. - Interview S. – Interview J. @ FilmAid Offices, 22 January 2017 32 ‘Refugee resettlement programmes in Kenya’, retrieved from https://kenya.iom.int/our-work/programmes/refugee-resettlement-programme-in-kenya, last accessed on 26 June 2017 33 ‘Dadaab Refugee Camps, Kenya: UNHCR Bi-weekl Update 16 – 30 April 2016’, retrieved from https://reliefweb.int/report/kenya/dadaab-refugee-camps-kenya-unhcr-bi-weekly-update-16-30-april-2016, last accessed on 23 September 2017 & interview C. @ resettlement compound Kakuma 4, 12 December 2016. 34 ‘Dadaab Refugee Camps, Kenya: UNHCR Monthly Update 16 – 31 July 2016’, retrieved from https://reliefweb.int/report/kenya/dadaab-refugee-camps-kenya-unhcr-monthly-update-16-31-july-2016. Last accessed on 26-6-2017 35 Interview E. @ Franco’s, Kakuma I, 8 January 2017 36 Field notes 8 January 2017 & 9 January 2017 37 Interview E. @ Franco’s, Kakuma I, 8 January 2017 38 ‘Key Action #1: Settlement Shelter Response’, retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/protection/operations/560cf9279/key-action-1-settlement-shelter-response-printable-version.html, last accessed on 24 September 2017. 39 http://www.unhcr.org/protection/operations/5673d5529/key-action-3-adapting-service-delivery.html, last accessed on 24 September 2017 40‘Key Action #5: Strengthening Community-Based Protection’, retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/protection/operations/5804a0dd7/key-action-5-strengthening-community-based-protection.html, last accessed on 27 August 2017. 41 ‘Key Action #4: Promoting an Enabling Protection Environment’ retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/protection/operations/5873870c7/key-action-4-promoting-enabling-protection-environment.html., last accessed on 27 August 2017 42 ‘Kalobeyei Settlement’, retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/ke/kalobeyei-settlement, last accessed on 8 November 2017 43 Talk with FA student @ Kakuma Town, 24 November 2016 44 Ibid. 45 Interview E. @ Franco’s, K1, 8 January 2017 46 Talk with P. @ Filmaid office, 9 January 2017 47 Conversations FA-staff, Red Cross HIV/AIDS day @ Kalobeyei settlement, 1 December 2016 43 Interview E. @ Franco’s K1, 8 January 2017 49 DRC by the Denmark’s Development Cooperation under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Kenya, GIZ by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation & Development and Swisscontact by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation. 50 Interview K @ Teacher Resource Center, 16 January 2017 & ‘Instant Network Schools’ retrieved from https://www.vodafone.com/content/foundation/instant-network-schools.html, last accessed on 5 September 2017 51 Interview Pa @ Arrupe Center Kakuma I, 16 December 2016 52 Ibid. 53 Interviews Filmaid staff @ Red Cross HIV/AIDS Day, Kalobeyei settlement, 1 December 2016 54 WFP interview staff member @ WFP Compound, 26 January 2017 55 Conference on ‘Refugees and Forced Migration in Eastern Africa: Crisis, Trends, Dynamics, Challenges, Opportunities and Conundrums’ 25-27 October 2016, Naivasha 56 ‘Residents Isolated, Disillusioned at Kenya’s ‘Integrated’ Refugee Settlement’, retrieved from https://www.voanews.com/a/residents-isolated-disillusioned-kenya-integrated-refugee-settlement/3963512.html, last accessed on 4 November 2017 57 Conference on ‘Refugees and Forced Migration in Eastern Africa: Crisis, Trends, Dynamics, Challenges, Opportunities and Conundrums’ 25-27 October 2016, Naivasha 58 WFP interview staff member @ WFP compound, 26 January 2017 59 WTK interview staff members @ WTK offices, 26 January 2017 60 Interview staff Swisscontact @ Swisscontact Offices Kakuma Town, 9 January 2017 61 Interview staff member AAHI @ office compound 7 December 2016 62 Going to the field with AAHI @ 24 February 2017 63 Interview S & J @ Swisscontact offices, Kakuma-town, 9 January 2017
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64 Interview WFP staff member @ WFP compound, 26 January 2017 & Bamba Chakula workshop FA @ Kakuma 1, 29 November 2016 65 Interview staff member FA @ Filmaid Offices, 23 November 2016 66 Interview B. @ Kakuma 2, 20 December 2016 67 Ibid. 68 ‘Equity Bank branches codes’, retrieved from https://venasnews.com/equity-bank-branches-codes/, last accessed on 6 September 2017 69 ‘Humanitarian Private Sector Partnership Platform HPPP Launched’, retrieved from https://reliefweb.int/report/world/humanitarian-private-sector-partnership-platform-hppp-launched-east-africa, last accessed on 23 September 2017 70 Retrieved from https://reliefweb.int/report/world/humanitarian-private-sector-partnership-platform-hppp-launched-east-africa, last accessed on 23 September 2017 71 Interview K. @ Teacher Resource Center Kakuma I, 16 January 2017 & Interview P. @ Filmaid Offices, 22 January 2017 72 M-Pesa is a mobile phone-based money transfer, financing and microfinancing service, the largest mobile network operators in Kenya and Tanzania. Retrieved from https://www.safaricom.co.ke/personal/m-pesa, last accessed on 6 September 2017. 73 Interview K. @ Teacher Resource Center Kakuma I, 16 January 2017 & Interview P. @ Filmaid Offices, 22 January 2017 74 Interview M. @ Kakuma-town, 7 December 2016 & Interview B. @ Kakuma 2, 20 December 2016 75 Interview staff member AAHI @ AAHI Offices, 7 December 2016 76 ‘UN looks to business to cut aid bill for refugees in East Africa’, retrieved from https://citizentv.co.ke/business/u-n-looks-to-business-to-cut-aid-bill-for-refugees-in-east-africa-117738/, last accessed on 6 September 2017 77 Interview B. @ Kakuma 2, 20 December 2016 78 Interview Mo. @ workshop Bamba Chakula, Kakuma 3, 29 November 2016 79 Interview Pa. @ Arrupe Center, Kakuma I, 16 December 2016 80 Ibid. 81 Interview Ma. @ Barbershop Kakuma-town, 7 December 2016 82 Interview M. @ Kakuma-town, 7 December 2016 83 Interview Ma. @ Barbershop Kakuma-town, 7 December 2016 84 Interview E. @ AAHI offices, 7 December 2016 85 Interview staff members Swisscontact @ Kakuma-town, 9 January 2017 86 Interview P. @ Arrupe Center, 16 December 2016 & Interview B. @ Kakuma 2, 20 December 2016 87 Interview H. @ Kakuma I, sisters compound, 18 January 2017 88 Interview staff members @ Kakuma-town, 9 January 2017 89 Interview E. @ Franco’s, Kakuma I, 8 January 2017 90 CBO meeting J. @ Unity, Kakuma I, 25 February 2017 91 Workshop Bamba Chakula @ Kakuma 3, 29 November 2016 92 Refugee speaking @ 16 Days of Activism event Swiss Contact, Kakuma-town, 28 November 2016 93 Interview P. @ Arrupe Center, Kakuma I, 16 December 2016 94 Interview K. @ Teachers Resource Center, 16 January 2017 95 Talk refugee @ Filmaid offices, 5 December 2016 96 Interview P. @ Arrupe Center, 16 December 2016 97 Talk with Filmaid staff member @ Filmaid storage compound, 5 December 2016 98 Ibid. 99 Interview E. @ Franco’s Kakuma I, 8 January 2017 100 Interviews Somali community @ Kakuma I, 9 January 2017 and Interviews shop-owners @ Somali Market Kakuma I, 22-1-2017 101 Interview M. @ Kakuma-town, 7 December 2016 102 Lead Written by Catherine Ekomben, Angelo Kochgor and Peter Tabah - Workshop on social media @ Filmaid office, 24 November 2016 103 Interviews shop-owners @ Kakuma 3 and 4, 12 December 2016 104 Interviews Somali community @ Kakuma I, 9 January 2017 and Interviews shop-owners @ Somali Market Kakuma I, 22-1-2017 105 Interviews shop owners @ Kakuma 1, 10 December 2016 106 Interview E. @ Franco’s, K1 8 January 2017
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107 Interview shop-owners @ Kakuma 1, 10 December 2016 108 Ibid. 109 Interviews shop-owners @ Kakuma 3 and 4, 12 December 2016 110 Ibid. 111 Interview H. @ Kakuma I, 18 January 2017 112 Interview E. @ Franco’s, 8 January 2017 113 ‘Same old problems in Kenya’s newest refugee settlement’, retrieved from https://www.irinnews.org/feature/2017/08/29/same-old-problems-kenya-s-newest-refugee-settlement, last accessed on 31 October 2017 114 Movie screening @ Reception Center, Kakuma 3, 30 November 2016 115 Interviews shop owners @ Hong Kong and K3, 8 December 2016 116 Field notes - Interviewing shop owners @ Hong Kong and K3, 8 December 2016 & Follow-up, 13 January 2017 117 Talks with FA incentive staff @ Filmaid office, 5 December 2016 118 Talks with FA incentive staff @ Filmaid storage LWF compound, 5 December 2016 119 Interview P. @ Arrupe center, 16 December 2016 120 Interview E. @ Franco’s, K1, 8 January 2017 121 Interview B. @ K2, 20 December 2016 122 CBO meeting @ Unity, Kakuma 1, 25 February 2017 123 Interview H. @ Kakuma I, sisters compound, 18 January 2017