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Transfer of Power? Politics of Mass Mobilisation in UPAuthor(s): Zoya HasanSource: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 36, No. 46/47 (Nov. 24-30, 2001), pp. 4401-4409Published by: Economic and Political WeeklyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4411386

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specialarticlesTransfer o f Power? Politics o f M a s s

Mobilisationn U PThe recent electoral history of UP that has witnessed the growth of parties representingthelower and middle castes speaks of a politics of more competitionand democracy.But asthis paper argues, though peasant and caste mobilisation may have challenged upper caste/class domination, this has not necessarily promoted policies of public expenditure forservices benefitingthe poor, nor has there been implementationof developmentalprogrammesthat address their vital concerns.

ZOYA HASAN

wostories rebeing oldabout ndia.One focuses on thechanges n thestateandthepoliticalsystem.Thisis a storyof the erosionof political nsti-tutions ndacrisisofgovernance.Politicalparties,parliament,he publicsectorareall in a stateof declineanddisrepair.Thesolutionsproposed ftenstress he neces-sityofstrengtheningherelativeweightofcivil societyvis-a-visthestate.l The sec-ondstory ine concentrates n theexten-sion of democracy,participation ndin-clusion.This line tendsto emphasise hedramaticurgenparticipationf the owerorders f societysignalling heexpansionof democracy.2Thechanges n theinsti-tutional ealm hatare inked othedemo-craticsurgeare,therefore,not an indica-tion of failedmodernisation;ather, heyarea pointer o the vernacularisationfpoliticsand the entryof the beliefs andinterestsof lower orders of society thatcould not be articulated nderthe ideo-logical hegemonyof the urbanand En-glish-educatedpoliticiansof the Nehruera.3Thusit has often been argued hatthe new phasemarks he comingof ageof Indiandemocracy. t indicates he dif-ferent characterof India's democraticexperimentrom hat f thewest.Espoused

bymany cholars,hisaccount asstressedthat hangesbrought boutbythedissemi-nationof the ideas of social justice andrights n the last two decades.4Differentversionsof thisstory ine note the defeatof IndiraGandhi'semergencyregimeinthe 1977 lectionsas aturning oint,whichbrought bouta decisive shift in the formand contentof democracy. t establishedtheimportancef the vote andrepresen-tative institutions f governmento givevoice to populardemandsof a kind that

had not hithertobeen able to disturb heorderand tranquility f the corridors fpower.Thisnotwithstanding,he nfluxofnew entrantsrom he owerordershasnotled to effective controlof the agendaofelections.In anattempto understandhegrowthofpolitical emocratisation,hispaperriti-cally examinesthe trajectories f massmobilisationnUttarPradeshUP),whichis the site of the most recentphase ofpoliticaldemocratisationn India, heso-called econddemocraticpsurge.5nUP,lower castes/classeshavebeen mobilisedpolitically n at leastthreedifferentways:peasantpolitics,reservation olitics,andthe'socialengineering' trategy f Hindunationalism.The rise of the JanataDal(1977-89), SamajwadiParty (SP) andBahujanSamajParty BSP)in the 1990shas transformedhe politicallandscape.From helate1980sa significant oliticalchurninghas been underway, which hasbroughtntoplay henumerousowercastesto restructurehepowerand asteand lassprivilegesof the uppercastes. It is nowdifficult o conceive of a politicalregimethatwill denythemrepresentation.t thesame ime, heBJP'sgrowth nd tsabilityto win power by exploiting divisionsbetween owercastepartieshas hadpro-found mplicationsor thecourseof masspoliticsanddevelopmentn thiskeystonestate.UP sends 85 MPsto the LokSabha,makingtpolitically he mostcrucial tatefor the formation f the centralgovern-ment n NewDelhi.Thesuccessof theBJPin UPhasbeencentral o its realisation fpoliticalpowerwhen it formed he coa-litiongovernmentn 1998,and ts continu-ance in power depends o a largeextentupon ts ability o maintainupporthere.

Thispaperooksatthethree ompeting,andat imes, ntersectingtrategies f massmobilisation: easantpolitics,reservationpolitics,and he'socialengineering'trat-egy of Hindunationalist oliticsin orderto situatethe lower castes' challengetoupper astecontrolof thestateandpublicpower,and theupper astecounter-resis-tance ocontainheeffect of thischallengeto theirdominance.Political democrati-sation in UP has createda situation nwhich new formsof mobilisation,whileenabling he emergenceof new constitu-encies,finds thoseengaged n thisunableto deal with theireffects. Drawingsub-stantially n studiesofpoliticsandsocietyinUP, I explore he nature ndcontradic-tions of massmobilisation, he extent ofwhich s significantlynfluencedby casteandcommunitydentities,and the effectof theseon governance nddevelopment.Theargumentsconstructedround broadquestion hathastwo parts: i) can lowercastepoliticsand heentryof lowercastesineducationalnstitutions ndadministra-tiveservices,and heirclaims orgrowingshareof politicalpower, ead osocialandpoliticalchange? ii) Cangreaterpartici-pation fthe owercastes nlegislature ndgovernmentpush governmentpolicy toaddress he concernsof the poor?Theprocessofpoliticaldemocratisationin India s historically iverse.Thisdiver-sity leaves scope for severalpatternsofinterconnectedoliticalandsocialchangewithina similar ramework f institutionsresultingn differences n thedemocraticfunctioning f different tates.A contex-tualapproachwouldbe useful in under-standing the regional dynamics ofdemocratisation,most importantly, hetiming and approach through which

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marginalisedroupsare ncorporatedntothepoliticalarena, hepoliticalalliancesandalignmentshatareavailable,andthetransformationshese can work on thepatternsof stable governance.6Theseconfigurations iffer across regions. InsouthIndiathe mobilisation f the non-brahmin asteshappened arlierthan inthe north.Thoughbackward aste move-mentsn TamilNaduandKarnataka erenot radical, he politicalmobilisationoflower asteswasanimportantehicle forsocialtransformationndtheconsequentdecreasensocial ndignities nd herapiddisplacementf uppercastes fromposi-tionsof power n the administration ndlegislatures. heestablishment f apoliti-calcommunity-basedn asingle anguageand hetransformationf its non-brahminideology ntoan anti-northern amil na-tionalismacilitatedhesechanges.Lowercastepartiesnnorthernndiawereunableto adoptthis strategyand therefore hetrajectoryf lower caste politics in thenorthhadto be different.This phenom-enon needs to be understoodn termsofspecifichistories, ncludingthe distinctsocial historiesof mass politics.7

Conditions in Uttar PradeshUP is India's argeststate,andone ofthemost ociallyandeconomicallyback-wardnthenorthern eartland.Mostof thestates n northIndia are comparable omedium-sizedountries.ndeed,hepopu,lationof UP, whichis projected o havecrossed160 million in 1997, is equaltothemostpopulous ountries f the world.

Onlysix countries,China,India, heUS,Indonesia,RussiaandBrazilhavepopu-lations arger han that of UP. The statehaslaggedbehind n terms of economicandsocialdevelopment.n the 1990stheannualgrowth rate of gross domesticproducts estimatedo havebeen3.5 percent,the third owestamongst he majorstates,as against he combinedstatedo-mesticproductrowth f 5.94percentperannum.The caste and class structure f UP isdistinct.Thetwice-bornuppercastes ac-countfor 20 percent of the population,indeed,the brahminsalone account forover 10 per cent of the entire brahmincategorynIndia.Dominated ybrahmins,thecastehierarchy ere s the mostelabo-rated.Caste tatus, conomicposition,andpoliticalpoweroverlappedn mostpartsof thestate.The backward astes or otherbackwardlasses(OBCs)in thecontem-porarydiom,whichaccount or35-40percentofthepopulation,panawide culturaland structuralarch, including at oneextremehedominantandowning easantcastes,andat the other xtreme, hemany

poorartisan nd servicecastes ivingjustabove hepollution ndpovertyine.Theseincludethe wealthyyadavsand the poorservice astes.Thepooreratisamonghemaredescribed sthemostbackwardlasses(MBCs),whichconstitute 6 percent.Atthebottomof thehierarchy re heformeruntouchables,officially known as thescheduled astes.They performhe mostmenialandarduousobsandthemajoritycontinuesto depend uponwage labour.Lowercastepartieshave been successfulin ncorporatingomemembersfthe owercastes into government.Though herehavebeennomajor opu-laractionsormobilisation f thepoor,UPis a highlypoliticised tatewherepoliticsmeanscaptureand controlof power.Atpresent,two forces wield an importantinfluence n statepolitics:Hindunation-alism andparties hatrepresenthe lowercastes and classes. The Congressdomi-natedparty ompetitionor close to threedecades,andsince its decline n 1989theBJPhasbenefited he most. Eventhougha mainstayof Hindurevivalismandthecitadelof theAyodhyamovement,heBJPhas failed to establish its political su-premacynUP,notwithstandingtsbeinginpower orthe astfiveyearsandhavinghadseveral tints npower nall the otherstatesof northIndiaexceptBihar.

Strategies of Mass PoliticsHistorically,UP wasastrongholdf theuppercastes.Formingnearly20 percentof the population,he uppercastes wereover-representedln the political sphere.Theirdominationwasparticularlytrongin education,the professions, and theCongress. n mostpartsof thestate, hesecastes ontrolledusiness, rofessionalndwhite-collaremployment.Theoliticisationof caste identities, he increasingpartici-pationof the lowercastesin thepoliticalprocess,and the dramatic eclineof theCongressPartymark hehistory f demo-craticpolitics'These processesmay betraced ack oeconomic ndpolitical hiftsoccurringsince the late 1960s. At thattime, the centralgovernment hiftedthedirectionof developmentpolicy from astate-ledmodelof industrial rowth o a

morededicateddriveto improveagricul-turalproduction. his was thebeginningof thegreenrevolutionechnologies sso-ciated with an emphasis in increasingagricultural roduction hroughpricein-centivesand echnological hange.Oneofthe effects of this shiftin policy was therisingprosperity f sections of thepeas-antry n the fertileareasof the state.Thisupwardlymobilepeasantry elongedprin-cipallyto the intermediate nd backwardcastes. The initialchangeoccurredn the

1970s when thesegroupsbeganto enterthe egislative ssembliesnlargenumberswith the backingof the socialists.Thesegroupsposed he firstserious hallenge oCongresspower,questioningoo, for thefirst ime, heupper astemonopoly f thepublicsphere.The two principal forms of massmobilisation,ymbolisedby peasantpoli-tics and reservationpolitics, worked todisplacethe uppercaste urban stablish-ment rom tspositions fpower.The irst,initiatednthe ate 1960sunder he eader-shipof Charan ingh, sought o mobilisethecultivating lassesand hesecondwasinitiated by the socialist leader RamManoharLohia who focused on casteidentitiesand reservations or the lowercastes npublicemployment ndpoliticalparties. Restructuring tate power andinstitutionswas the principal oncernofboth nitiatives.Theproponentsf a ruralstrategymobilisedall those engagedincultivation rimarily n thebasisof socio-economicdemands,while the strategistsof reservation oliticsforgedan allianceof thenon-elite roups n thebasisofcastequotas o dislodge uppercastes. Lohia'sline cutthroughheurban-ruralectorsaswellas thecastesystem.Thesocialgroupstargetedby both came fromtheranksofpeasants ndOBCs;butsignificantly othtreated hemas aneconomicallyundiffer-entiated ocialcategory. nitially he twostrategies complemented each other,thoughin the end caste identitieshavetrumpedpeasantpolitics. Together,overthepasttwodecades, hesetwo strategiescontributedo the rise of lower castesinnorth Indianpolitics.9From he 1970s,thepeasantry f northIndiaemergedas a major onstituencynstate and nationalpolitics.Rich farmersand surplusproducers xerted a stronginfluence over governmentpolicy andCharan inghhimselfemployedhegrow-ing powerof the peasant obbyto greateffect in struggleswithinthe Janata oa-lition after t assumedpower n 1977.10Shortly fterCharan ingh'sdeathn1987,farmer's olitics n north ndiawas tofindits resurgence nder he BharatiyaKisanUnion (BKU), a non-party rganisationled by Mahendra inghTikait,a ruralatleaderrom heprosperousaneandwheatgrowingregionof westernUP.l Of thevariouseatures fCharan ingh'speasantdiscourse, he one mostemphasisedwasthe rural-urban ichotomy.12This di-chotomy was intendedto highlighttheurbanbias of developmentpolicies thathaveresultednagapbetween rban eoplewhowork orthe tate nd ndustrialectorsandruralpeoplewho work ntheagricul-turalsector. This duality succeededincombininga varietyof discontents xpe-

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riencedby differentclasses of the ruralpopulationntoaunitaryramework. heiractionsandagitations auseda modifica-tionofagriculturalolicies nmany tates,and everal f theirdemands oonbecamepartof officialpolicy.Evenso, therewereother ault lines inrural ociety hatwereignored.The strat-egy was notdesigned o include all sec-tionsof rural ociety,and in actuality hestructuralensionsandconflicts betweenthe richfarmersand lower classes couldnot be resolved.Some of these tensionsoverlappedwith the conflict betweenbackwardastesand dalits.Moreover, twas notjust the divide between owner-cultivators ndagriculturalabourers hatcaused ension.Even withinthecategoryof landownersthere were differencesbetween large farmers and small andmediumones. Then, amongst the richfarmers here were differences betweeniats andotherbackward astes:the lattersaw theBKUas a means orjat assertionof their owernthecountryside. otwith-standinghesecontradictions, hichwereacommon eature f farmers'movementsindifferent arts f thecountry,heywereable to achieve some of their aims, asrulingparties ound t easy to accommo-datesuchdemandsas they made thantodealwith argerssuesofstructuraleform.However,hepackage fpolicies ncludedpriceguarantees f outputand subsidiesfor nputs,whichprincipally enefited ichfarmers.At the same time, it also madethem moredependentupongovernmentpoliciesandprogrammes.The second approach to massmobilisation ook shape aroundthe de-mand or reservedquotas n government.From he 1960s, caste and caste quotaswere seen as an instrument or socialequalityand self-respect.13Reservationwas seen as the only way of securingrepresentationorgroupswhomightother-wise have no presence in the politicalprocessandpublicemployment.Histori-cally,UP has had the shortesthistoryofcaste-based ositivediscrimination oli-cies. A modestquotascheme was intro-duced n 1978, but it was discontinuedowingto objectionsover the criteria oridentificationf beneficiaries.The stimu-lus for changecame between 1989 and1991,a onjunctureefinedbythreemajorchangesnIndian olitics:Mandal,Mandirand Market.The almost simultaneousoccurrencef these hree ventscongealedthe caleand omplexity ftransition venas itprovided, t the sametime,anoppor-tunity or realignmentsn state and ra-tionalpolitics.All threeofferedthepros-pectof creating new cleavagestructureand husnew formsof mobilisation.14ntheend,all the threecleavagescouldnot

be activated and caste remained theepicentreof politicalchange.Theturningpointwas V P Singh'sde-cision to implementhe MandalCommis-sion Report,which had in 1980 recom-mended extensionof the system of re-servedjobs in central. overnmentromonly the scheduled astes and tribes o abroadercollection of socially and eco-nomicallybackward lasses. There.waslittlepublicresponsen south ndiawherethebattleagainst eservations adalreadybeen oughtand ost.15However,nnorthIndia,uppercastestudents oughta highprofilecampaign gainst heextensionofreservationso lower castes. At the sametime,the students eared hattheirhopesof governmentobswouldbe thwarted ya coalition of lower castes, which theywere largelyshaping hemselvesby pro-vokinganewcleavagebetweenupper ndlowercastes.Theywanted o abolishallreservations ncluding reservations orscheduledcastes.Theyprotested gainstthenewquota hatwoulddeprive hemofgovernmentobs. Employment pportu-nities areextremely nadequate, ndcon-flicts have beenamplifiedbecauseof ris-ing levelsofeducationhatadd o the orceofcompetition. overnmentjobsre oughtafterastheyprovidemuchneeded ecurityand decentwages or salary.Hence,it isconsidered a desirablepath of upwardmobility n an underdevelopedtate.Thealternativetrategy, ssociatedwiththe secondformof mobilisation,hatis,caste politics, arrivedwith the growinginfluence of the BSP founded n 1984,which attempted o mobilise the lowercastesby promising hem a shareof po-liticalpower by theirown caste/commu-nitymembers.Following he breakdownof the Congress n the 1980s, the BSPbecame a majorpartnern an anti-uppercastecoalition overnmentn1992-95andaBSP-ledgovernmentwasestablishedn1995 and 1997 under the leadershipofMayawati. y 1996, heBSPhadmanagedto win59 seats nthe egislativeassemblyand notchedupanimpressive 0 percentof thevote,whichwas muchhigher hanthe Congressvote.At thispoint, t seems usefulto drawadistinctionbetween elites that mobilisesupport hroughparticularistic,ocal orregional trategies nd hose hatmobilisea massbasein national ociety,eitherbyappealing o thecitizenry n.generalor toaparticularlass. Since ndependence,hescheduledcastessupportedhe CongressParty,which historicallymobilised theneeds andaspirations f the lowercasteswithinanoverarchingramework f phil-anthropiccompromise such that theirpotential ntagonism as neutralised. heCongressfocused on generaleconomic

issuesand gnored ultural nd ocialones.The BSPcriticised hesefeatures f Con-gress politics. First, the BSP promisedpoliticalrepresentationo dalits,an aspi-rationneglectedby the Congress.UnderCongressrule,despitethe importance fthe dalit vote, they achievedvery littlerepresentationn thegovernmentndpartyorganisation.n otherwords,the signifi-canceofthedalitvotedidnot ranslatentoperceptiblenfluence or individualmem-bers in the organisation r government.Thisapproachwasnoteworthy ecause tssuccess was not contingent on massmobilisation, utderived romcapture fstate power via anti-high caste propa-ganda, emphasising the fulfilment ofthe reservedquotaanddemandingmorepositions ormembers f scheduled astesin government.ts aimis to capture tatepower or heoppressedmajority yoppos-ing caste oppressionrather hansettingout social and economic policies ofredistribution.The ascentof Mayawati o the officeofchief minister n less than a decade ofscheduled aste mobilisation hanged hesituationordalits.16Duringher wo stintsin office, andespeciallyhersecondterm,Mayawatisucceededin buildinga newpoliticalpresence orthem.Shesought omakegood thepromiseof empowermentby fillingthereservedquotaandappoint-ing membersof scheduledcastes to im-portantpositions n government.For ex-ample,scheduledcaste officersreplacedall theuppercastesfunctionaries oldingimportant ositions, uchas thoseof chiefsecretary nd the chief minister'sprivatesecretary.This change provokedresent-mentand,correlatively,he dalitassertionpolarised the upper and lower castes.Throughhis trategyheBSPhad auncheda new phase n themobilisation f lowercastes ntheregion. thadhowever ailedin terms of its own statedobjectiveofcreatinga widerallianceof the 'bahujansamaj'(majority).17t has succeeded nconsolidating alitsandappearsodependexcessivelyonthesupportf asinglecaste.Nonetheless, t changed tatepolicy ina number f otherways.Theprogrammeof Ambedkarisationnd introduction ftheAmbedkar illageschemes o providespecialgovernment ssistance o villageswith a highproportionf dalitsappearohave beensignificantpolicyinitiatives nthisparticularontext.Localstudiesof theBSPhavereported substantialnhance-ment in the access of scheduledcastesmembers o education ndbasic services.Theenrolment ate nhigher ducation fscheduled astes in 1995 washigher hanthegeneralpopulation.18 eservation or'scheduledcastes in public employmenthasincreasedocalemployment pportu-

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nities or hepoorest astes.19Though heBSP's stint in powerdid not entailanystructuralhangesn heeconomyobenefitthe vast numbersof ruralpoor, it hasimprovedheirpolitical onfidence,ivingstandards, nd representationf certainscheduled asteswithin local bureaucra-cies.20 Their efforts to marshalgovern-mentinterventiono settledisputesoverlandrightsor social abuse and violencewere takenmoreseriouslywhentheyre-negotiated heir relationshipwith stateofficials hrough scheduled asteofficerorthepradhan21thas orcedgovernmentofficers opaymore han ipservice o theneedsof the low caste poor.Undeniably,heriseof lowercasteshasalteredUP's stagnantpolitics. As lowercaste leadersexpressed ncreasedunhap-pinesswith hewidespread ractice f notfilling reservedvacancies becausetherewere no 'qualifiedcandidates',govern-mentshavehad to findwaysof reducingtheseblockages.Ruleswere ntroduced tthecentraland state levels so thateveryseventhor eighthnew recruithad to befrom a scheduled caste or tribe.22Notsurprisingly,he gap betweenthe upperand owercastes narrowed nd the shareof lower castes shotupduring he 1980sand 1990swhen owercastepartiesbeganto growandacquirepower.This can beseen rom hemajorncreasen thenumberof lowercastelegislatorsand seniorcivilservants n influentialgovernmentposi-tions.The shareof upper astelegislatorsinall he egislative ssemblies ndnationalparliamentas beendecliningandthatofthe lower castesrising.23At present helower caste legislators form the singlelargest roupn the stateassemblies f UPand Bihar.At the same time, the rise oflowercasteshasprovoked tronghostilityofupperastes,and o counterheir rowthuppercastesaveralliedbehindheBJP.24The BJP-ledAyodhyamovement, hegreatestmass mobilisationn UP's post-independentistory,epitomisesthethirdform of mass politics.25The BJP is theprincipal ainer t thecostof theCongressandthe divisionsamong ower castepar-ties.Theriseof the BJPoccurred etween1989 and 1991 when the BJPprojecteditself as a pro-Hindu arty hatsupportedthe imaginedcommunity'f Hindus. incethe destructionf the Ayodhyamosque,theBJPhasshifted tsstrategyromethnicmobilisationo social ngineering'norderto mobilise broad-basedsupport.Theprincipal argetsof this strategyare thebackwardastesanddalits.However, vennow its core supportcomes from themembers f theupper astes, hemajorityofwhomhaveralliedbehindheBJPsince1990; its supportamong the backwardcastes is comparablyweaker.

Until recently, the BJP had chosen notto use caste explicitly as an organisingcategory that divides Hindus. It opted forwhat ChristopheJaffrelot called 'indirectmobilisation',that s, forgingalliances withparties representing the lower castes.26An attempt to mobilise the lower castesas a part of the Hindu constituency wasmade during the Ayodhya movement,which in the words of L K Advani 'suc-ceeded in sublimating caste tensions'.However, thesupportgained thenwas lostafter the demolition of the Babri masjidin December 1992.Many amongthe lowercastes looked at the assault as an uppercaste backlash against the Mandal moveinitiated by the Janata Dal government.This resulted in an alliance of the SP andthe BSP thatcompelled the BJPleadershipto concentrateits attentionon splitting thelowest castes. This strategy succeeded in1995, breaking he SP-BSP allianceforgedin the 1993 elections and bringing downthe MulayamSingh government.The BJPthen threw its weight behind the BSP,whichallowedMayawatitocome topoweras chief minister. This proved importantin checking the consolidation of the lowercastes, as thecooperationof the backwardsand dalits presentsa formidablechallengeto the BJP and can potentially prevent itfrom coming to power.Working in small town upper castemilieus, the BJP has on the whole keptaway from caste reform. However, theupper caste bias was a handicap in thewake of low caste mobilisation, the partybeing unable to ignore the lower castephenomenon that was conspicuous in itsstrongholds.To endorse it would howevercompromise its traditionalsupportamongupper castes and would imply an accep-tance of internal divisions in the Hindunation,which the RSS had abouredagainstfor 70 years. In the years afterthe MandalCommission, they have had to make ges-tures of accommodation towardsthe lowercastes, practicing their own brand ofMandalisation,inductinga growing num-berof lowercastecadres n importantpartypositions, and assigning them assemblyconstituency nominations. Several OBCleaders of the BJP have espoused socialengineering: bringing upper caste mem-bers and backwards on a common plat-form. While this policy has enabled theBJP to broaden its base, the leaders ofthe RSS have opposed it, even though ithelped the party to extend its supportbase, but this was limited to the uppercastes. There is undoubtedly a tensionbetween the BJP leadership's advocacyof.social engineering and the traditionalRSS view based on 'varna' hierarchy,which questioned the notion of socialengineering.27

On thewhole, Hindunationalists avebeenincreasingly aughtbetweengivinga greater hareof power o theOBCsandemphasising Hindu unity over casteinterests.28Thoughhe BJP commandsconsiderablesupportfrom sections ofOBCs, tremains bastion fupper astes.Theupper astes'votesconstantly olarisein favourof theBJPfromthetime whenthe owercasteparties ecamekey playerssubsequentto the Congress' terminaldecline.As a predominantly ppercasteparty,whose leadershave ittlesympathyfor owercasteaspirations,he nterests fthe uppercaste middleclass have beenover-represented ithinHindunational-ism. Since the late 1980s, the BJP hasreceived hegreatest upport f themiddleclass who disapproves f the reservationsystemand want to defendtheircontrolover hegovernmentnd,aboveall,govern-ment obs, whichhave beentraditionallyheldby brahmins ndbaniyas.Arguablythe Mandaldecisionwas as importantsthe Ayodhya movement n rallyingtheuppercaste middle class supportaroundtheBJP n the1990s.29Thisgroup,whichincludes all the uppercastes, sharestheBJP'sdisquietabout he rise of dalitsandOBCs:thatis, its unease with the socialdepthof democracy.Themajor ppeal heBJPholds forthisgroup s that t ensuresthe statusquo and thus their sustaineddominationvergovernmentnthe aceofthestiff ower asteattack ntheir uprem-acy. The extentof its support or lowercastesand astequotashasvaried, epend-ing uponcalculationselatingomaximis-ationof support ven though ome of itslocal leaderswere in the forefront f theanti-Mandalagitationsthat rocked UPtowns n 1990.While he BJPhasnotbeenable odownplayhedivisions n itsranks,it hasmanagedo weakenhemby winningover omesections f the ower astes o itsside.It s wellknown hat hekurmis,odhsand atshavepreviously acked heparty.Facedwith oughcompetitionrom heSPand heBSP,bothof whichhavegiventhelowercastesa share fpower nproportionto theirpopulation,heBJPgovernmentnJuly 2001 proposeda quotawithin thequota 15 percent)of reservationsortheMBCs and scheduled o win them overwith the promiseof governmentobs.

Impact of Mass MobilisationHas heriseof lowercastessignificantlychangeddemocracy?Electoralcompeti-tion betweenpartiesandpoliticalpartici-pation s flourishing, ndpoliticalpowerhasmoveddownward, developmenthatcannotbe dismissedightly.30As a result,the political elite is not monolithic. Inconsequence,politicsand movementsof

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theRightare as activeas those of lowercastesand this has counterbalanced nddefusedhegainsmadebythe owercastes.This aspecthas often been ignored indiscussions f the dalitupsurge.Thepoliticsof 'presence'hasundoubt-edly produced shift in the balance ofpoliticalpower n governments ndleg-islaturesin UP.31Within this form ofrepresentation,hepolitical ctor laims oact onbehalfof his owncaste,religionorlinguistic roup,or even simplyforhim-self.This is distinct rom the earliereliteformof representationn whichtheeliteself-consciouslyctedon behalfof alargergroupof whomtheywere not a partandwhose identityor interests hey did notshare.But checkmating he furtherad-vanceof thisstrategyand its capacity oshape hepolityis the disunitybreakingtheir anks.Castes lassified sOBCs ametogetherntheearly1990sin response otheupperasteopposition gainstMandal,but such unity has vanished.32This ispartlybecause he rise of the OBCs hasbeen in effect the rise of the yadavsandto some extent hekurmis,as their sharein public employment and MPs andMLAsbearwitness.This is notentirelysurprisingbecause he yadavsare morenumerous nd relativelymore educatedthanotherOBCs,andwere also the mostfavoured y thegovernment f MulayamSinghYadav.33A number f authors avenoted heabilityof yadavs o manipulatetheprocessof recruitmentn governmentemployment,34ndseveralotherreportshighlightedheyadavisation f thepolicein UP in the mid-1990sand argued hattheywerebeingsystematicallyavouredin recruitment.35Suchmanoeuvringwas not surprisingevenas in thepastCharan ingh's'kisan'strategywasperceivedby jatsas a meansof promotingheir nterests.Still,there sa basicdifference.PartiesandcampaignsledbyCharaninghhad eentheconstruc-tionof a farmerdentity,whichbothmadeuse of and at thesametime transcendedcastecleavages o createa commonalityof rural nterests.This was whythe ideo-logicaland ntellectual irection ivenbySingh'scritiqueof the dominantmodelsof developmentucceeded n mobilisinga coalitionof ruralgroupsunderan anti-government opulism.3The fundamen-talsof thisdiscoursepositeda sharpdif-ference etweenBharatandndia,and hisin turnwasbuiltonacritique f the urbanbias of development.However,the pro-ponents fpeasant oliticscameprimarilyfrom he ranksof richpeasantswho de-ployedhisdiscourse opromoteheirowninterests ndheldback owercastes. Thisedifice was weigheddownby the socialstrainshatpermeate orth ndian ociety

andwas builtonprevailingxclusionsandintersection f caste and class rule.37nconsequence,hese rural oalitionsbrokedown on caste lines, and in time wereoutstripped ythequotapoliticsof social-ists who ascribed nequalityentirelytocasteandpromotedeservationngovern-ment obs as the solution o all forms ofdeprivationnd nequality. oput hepointdifferently,quota politicssucceededbe-causepoliticalunder-representationendsto aggravateeconomicdeprivationn ahighly politicisedstate such as UP. Fur-thermore,heJanata algovernmentmple-mentedthe reservationpolicy, and thusestablished hecapacity f thesepartiesoofferpolitical epresentationn contrastotheiropponentswho wereunable o do so.By givinglowercastesa share n power,castepoliticsaddressed he critical ssueof therepresentationallockage npoliti-cal institutions.38However,politicalgainsdo not corre-spond to the substantial caste-basedmobilisation uring hepast wodecades.It has notgivenlowercastestheleverageand political advantage hat they havegained nsouth ndia. ncomparisonwithUP, the non-brahminmovement n thesouthIndianstates institutionalisedar-ticipation t anearlystage,anddevelopedsufficiently raduallyoallowupper astestime to adjust o their oss of power: hissmallminority f upper astesmoved ntothe commercialand industrialsectors,central overnmentjobs,ndmany f themmigratedo US,while the erstwhileback-wards apidly ose obecome hedominantcommunityandthe vast majorityof thepopulationwere coveredby reservations.Incontrast,n UP themembers f theuppercastes orma fifthand hebrahmins early10 percentof the population.The largeproportionf upper astesmade t hardertodisplace hem ompletely ndtheyhavestayedto fightback.Furthermore,ppercastes, particularly brahmins, regardgovernment obs as theirbequest,espe-cially since alternativeopportunities femployment n UP's sluggish economyare limited.

Challenges of Developmentand GovernanceWhathasbeen he mpact f lowercastemobilisation n development ndgover-nance,especiallyin the area of povertyalleviation? he nseparableinksbetweensocial and politicalstructures nd inad-equatedevelopment uring heCongressera havedetailedlsewhere.39rincipally,Congressgovernmentsailedto establisha developmental tate(an issue that de-servesa separate nalysis).On the otherhand,hepost-Congressovernmentsave

not been able to reverse this tendency.Theincorporationinto the political system oflower caste elites and members of thescheduled castes has apparentlydone littleto reduce the enormous social and eco-nomic disparities that persist in the un-equal social order. This raises a basicquestion: if there are so many lower castepoliticians andbureaucrats,why is this notreflected in state policies to promote thewell-being of lower castes and classes?As far as the development effort isconcerned,facts speakforthemselves. UPis the largest state where growth has beenslowest.4 A chronically disadvantagedstate,UP is home to five of India's 14 mostbackward districts. It has the largest con-centrationof poor and the worst infrastruc-tureandsocial indicatorsof development.UP's per capita income is below the na-tional average:the third owest aheadonlyof Orissa and Bihar. Though foodgrainsproduction in the state has deceleratedsharply in the 1990s, UP is the largestproducer of foodgrain and oilseeds, andgrows aboutS0 percent of the total sugar-cane,withagricultureaccounting or40 percent of the state's grossdomestic statepro-duct and75 percentof its totalemployment.In understandingthe question of publicpolicy and distribution of public goods, itis important o note thatthe persistenceofpoverty is in parta consequence of UP'spoor economic performance. Economicgrowth has decelerated in UP since 1991,even as growth has accelerated in otherstates. In 1950, UP's per capita incomewas almost equal to the all-India average,and since then it has declined to 65 percent of that of the country. According tothe WorldBank, 'Thegapbetween UP andthe rest of India widened substantially inthe 1990s as annual growth in per capitaincome slowed down to less than 1 percent.'4 Employment andgrowth dependsupon factors such as the level of humanresourcedevelopment, thequalityof infra-structure,and the public policy environ-ment, all of which are poorly developedin UP. The state governmenthas failed toraise the revenue to match the growingneeds of the population: developmentexpenditure has declined whereas non-developmental expenditureon administra-tive services rose from Rs 3,399 crore in1999-2000 to Rs 4,282 crore in 2000-01.Significantly, the administrativeexpendi-ture in the state is equal to the combinedexpenditure on agricultureand allied ac-tivities, irrigationand flood control, ruralemployment, special areas programme,industries, minerals, water supply andsanitation. Consequently, there is an ab-solute reduction in expenditureon indus-tries, irrigation, water supply, sanitation,and urban development.

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The state has made little progressinreducing overty incethe ate1980s,andover41 percentof the 160millionpopu-lations ives belowthepoverty ine. Bet-ween 1957-58and4987-88,UP achieveda reduction n povertyby 13.6 per cent(from55 percentto 41.6 percent).Thisprocess loweddown o 0.2 percent from1987-88 o1993-94whereas herestof thecountry chieved reductionnpovertyby3.2 percent.43 heaccelerated conomicgrowthnsomestates rom heearly1990shas left UP lagging behindthe rapidlydevelopingtates f Gujarat,Maharashtra,West Bengal, Tamil Nadu, MadhyaPradesh, ndRajasthan,ts growthactu-ally decelerating.44s per capita ncomegrowth ontinuedo be very ow, povertymay not have declined at all. The loweconomicgrowthmeant hatemploymentdidnotkeeppacewithpopulation rowth,wagesremainedow,andopportunitiesorsocialmobility orthelowerclasses werelimited. ngeneral,developmentpolicieshavenotsubstantiallyeducednequalitiesin termsof food, education,healthcare,andproductive ssets.45This has meant that resources or theinvestmentn public goods - schools,healthervices,drinkingwater-expandedslowly.There s substantialvidence hatpublic ervicesandprogrammes,articu-larly hosemeant orthepoor,workhope-lessly n thisstate.TheCAGreport1999)highlightsnumerousrregularitiesn theimplementationf anti-poverty rogram-mes,such as theEmploymentAssuranceScheme(EAS),JawaharRozgarYojana(JRY)andtheMillion Wells Scheme.Areviewof implementationf programmesby Audit,as well as a surveycarriedoutby ORG-MARG,evealed hatthe fundsavailableortheprogramme eregrosslyinadequate.46hese rregularitiesncludediversion f funds,a lowerwage compo-nent hanprescribed, elayedpayment fwages.It was noted too that these werebelowtheprescribedminimumwages inmanycases there was improper ngage-mentof contractors,ndmaintenance fmusterolls,diversion rmisutilisationfthe grain component of EAS wages,etc.4 The upshot of this irregularityandcorruptionwas lower employment hanplanned,owerremunerationo labourersthan ustified, and non-employmentoffemale labourers.Unsurprisingly, thestate'sperformancen the JRYis notuptoscratch. rovision orrural mploymentthroughchemessuch as the JRY formsonly one per cent of the revenuebudget.48his is clearlythecase in ruraldevelopmentrogrammeshereeakage sestimatedobebetween 0 and70 percent.While analysing the IntegratedRuralDevelopment Programrie (IRDP),

KristoffelLietenandRaviSrivastava otethatmost, f notall,thesubsidy omponentof the IRDPis often siphonedaway byvariousntermediaries,ncludingdalals',panchayat,nd ural evelopmentndbankfunctionaries.Micro-studies eveal simi-lar eakages,a lowerwage abour ompo-nent han tipulated,ndpanchayats lay-ing a negligiblerole in projectplanningandsupervision.49 ripaShankar'studyof JRY n two districts eports eakage otheextentof 40 percentand hat hewagecomponentwasas owas29percentwhenit shouldhave been 60 percent.50It is the same story with the publicdistributionystem(PDS).Conceivedofas a measure o ensureavailability f es-sentialcommodities,PDS 'failed o func-tion optimally'. n spiteof thehighinci-denceofpoverty,hestategovernment idnot fully utilise PDS on accountof tardyimplementation.tdoes not lift even halfof all that is allocated o it.51Accordingto theCAGreport 1999), slum dwellersinfourofthe10 testcheckeddistrictswerenot targeted husdepriving hem of thebenefitof thescheme.Foodsecurity ouldnotbe ensuredbecauseof 'pooroff takeandpoorpercapitadistribution,inancialmismanagementnd nadequatenforce-ment'.52 twas estimated hat herewereat least20 percentboguscards.A numberof other nefficienciesandissuesof mis-managementrenoted nthereport,whichalso documentsextensivelosses due tostorage, mbezzlement,heft,andmisap-propriation. his is confirmedby a studyconducted y the TataEconomicConsul-tancyServices,which also foundexten-sive leakagedue to diversion f a signifi-cantportionof the subsidised oodgrainto theopenmarket.53Theleakageswereestimated o be 46 percent in wheat,49percent nriceand36per entsugar.Someof thesefindingshave been corroboratedby other studies.54As is well known,UP ranks ow withregard o humandevelopment.A few de-mographic nddevelopment haracteris-ticswill indicate he nature f challengesthatconfront he state.UP's performancein female literacy s abysmal,and afterRajasthant has made the leastprogressin narrowinghegendergap.55In 1991,74.7 per cent sufferedthe indignityofilliteracy n UP. If UP were treatedas aseparate ountry or thegenderdevelop-ment ndex, twouldrank123rd utof the137 countries n theindex,whichadjustsfor humandevelopment index.56 Themid-daymeal chemedesignedo ncreaseenrolments ndreducedropoutsailed tosetany argetorenrolmentndattendanceduring he implementationrom 1995to1999 of the Nutritional upport or Pri-mary Educationscheme.5The scheme

envisaged distributionof food grains di-rectly to schools afterbeing lifted fromtheFood Corporationof India(FCI) godowns.TheCAGreport 1999) found thatthe stategovernment introduced a middle level ofstocking of food grainsattransportagencygodowns resultinginmisuse and diversionof grains.58 Poor governance, increasedcorruption, declining performance, andlack of concern for the poor manifestingitself in ineffective public programmesand delivery, and inept and wastefulpublic expenditure is thus one of the keyfactors impinging on UP's growth anddevelopment.5In Salman Rushdie's novel TheMoor'sLast Sigh, one of the characters offers hisdefinition of modern Indian democracy('one manone bribe') and of what he callsthe Indian Theory of Relativity ('every-thing for relatives'). Like many thingswritten about India, this is an exaggera-tion, but it would appear that the secondpart of the definition provides a fittingdescription of UP's contemporary politi-cal culturewhere political representativesdo everything for themselves and theirsupporters. Several commentators havedocumentedand criticised UP's recordofgovernance. While doing fieldwork inwestern UP, Akhil Gupta was struck byhow frequently the theme of corruptioncropped up in everyday conversations ofvillagers.0?He writes:Mostof the storiesthe men toldeachotherwhen the day's work was done andsmallgroupsgathered t habitualplacesto shootthe breeze,hadto do withcorruptionandthe 'state'. Sometimes he discussiondealtwith how someone hadmanaged o outwitan official who wantedto collect a bribe,at othertimeswith 'thegoing price'to getanelectrical onnection or a new tubewellconnectionor to obtain a loan to buy abuffalo, at still other times with whichofficial had been transferred r who was

likely to be appointed o a certainpositionand whoreplaced,with who hadwillinglyhelped his caste members withouttakinga bribe,and so on.61Paul Brass reached the same conclusionin his exploration of social violence: theincreased importanceof political brokerslocated outside the state. Brass takes thisargument further in charging that:rule in the countrysideis not based onabstractionsbut on control over resourcesand safety. It is a Hobbesianworld, inwhichsecurityandsafetyarenotprovidedby the state, but are themselves values -that is valued objects - integral to andinseparablefrom the struggle for powerand influence.62Over the last 20 years the expansion ofstate functions has increased bureaucraticcontrol of the various schemes of produc-



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tion anddistribution,ven as the controlover the IAS has graduallyshifted topoliticians.63 sN C Saxenamakesclear:'to individualswho wantedto sharethespoilsandpatronage,owever, pricehadto bepaid n terms f obeisance opoliticalbosses.Thus hisperiodwas characterisedby bothenhancedrole of the state andenhanced control of politicians overbureaucracy'.64hepolitician-bureaucratnexus has exploitedthe statemachinerythrough ent-seeking ehaviour orparti-san ends.Corruptionnd nefficiency s rampant.Corruption as overrunvirtually everyinstitution,ncluding nstitutions uchasthe police andjudiciary,which are sup-posed o takeactionagainst t. Accordingto an IndiaTodayand ORG-MARGur-vey, UP was perceived o be the secondmostcorrupt tateafterBihar.65A reportsubmittedo theUPAcademyof Admin-istrationn 2000 foundthatUP was seento be moreproneto corruptionhan therest fthecountry.66eople ated hepolicedepartmentnd hedepartmentf electricsupplyas thebiggestproblemsacingthestatebecause heywere the mostcorrupt.Most mportantly,corruption,itizensbeli-eved,began t he op.67Thewell-deservedreputationf poorgovernance nd nsidi-ous corruptionwas one of thecausesforthepersistence f backwardnessndapp-alling implementationof anti-povertyschemes.6This is also why the state isseen as an unattractivedestinationforcapitaland investment.The existenceof widespread leaze ineconomic transactionsand recruitmentprocedureshatfavourthe locally domi-nantgroups rean mportantonsequenceof partisan overnance.Speed moneytoget one's work done is so commonplacethat t is not eventhought o be a corruptpractice, t is moneygiven 'to spur ntoaction, a perfectly legal process thatwould not takeplace unless a monetaryincentive was given'.69 Corruption shardlynew;the newaspect s its 'brazen-nessandopenness'.70 oliticshasbecomeincreasingly ependent n the manipula-tionof statepatronage,lectoralmachines,and dealsbetweendifferent actions andgroupswithinparties.Inshort,'parallelauthoritytructures ndmafiagangshaveemerged'.7'Craig Jeffrey's research nthe upperDoabregion of westernUttarPradesh oints otheexistenceof 'shadowstate'or informalnetworksof intermedi-aries n establishingnfluencewithpoli-ticians nd hepoliceforce,andas aresult,the richerstratacoopt the local state tolegitimate heir access to state institu-tions and employment within stateinstitutions.72trevealed leardifferencesregardingormaland informalaccess to

land,access to lucrativenon-agriculturaljobs, and ties to the stateapparatus,orinstance, etweenheJatsandother roups.Meanwhile, he poorerstrata ind it im-possible obuypolice protection r assis-tanceorpaybribes o securegovernmentjobs. While nearly everyonefeels inse-cure, hepoorare hemost nsecure wingto theirvulnerable ocial and economicsituation.Despite mountingpopularresentmentagainstdismalgovernance ndcorruptionthere s notmuchpopular ressurermanymovements in civil society demandinggreater ccountability.tappearssthoughpeoplehaveresigned hemselves o theirfate,preferringnstead o approach oli-ticiansand egislatorsor favours. ndeed,politiciansare importantntermediariesbetweenpeople and officials and linkswith a politiciancan help in obtainingassistance romgovernment fficials,orjobs or assistance rom the constituencydevelopment funds at the disposal ofmembers f parliament.heres thusvery

littleground-levelmobilisation utside heparty ystemwhich ouldpush hegovern-ment andpolitical eaders o adoptmoreresponsive trategies owards hepower-less;veryfew initiatives orpoliticalar)dsocialreform uch as thestruggle or theRightto Informationn Rajasthan r theRightto Education ampaignn MadhyaPradesh. Evidently the emergence ofbroader ocial solidarities s impededbythe absence of non-electoral socialmobilisationand action.Conclusion

Thispaperhas advanced wo principalarguments. ven ust lookingatelectoralhistory nd hegrowth fparties epresent-ing middleandlower casteswe can seethatUPpoliticshasbecomemore ompeti-tiveanddemocratic. hesalienceof casteidentitiesand their role in politicalandelectoral mobilisationhas been rightlyrecognisedas a crucialelement in thesuccess of farmers'politics.73However,the rise of Hindu nationalismhas beenseen asapowerful orcebreaking easantandcastesolidarities.More ecently, astehas come to dominatepolitics; indeed,caste boundaries re more mportanthanthe Hindu-Muslimboundary(notwith-standinghepervasivenfluence f Hifidunationalist olitics)orpeasantolidarities.This hasbeenin partdueto theelectoralsuccess of politicalpartiesrepresentingbackward nd lower castes, whichhaveenlistedmembers f castegroupsas partof caste coalitions.To thatextent, owercaste politics has succeeded n drawinghithertodisadvantaged roups into,thepoliticalmainstream,ndby givingthem

a share of political power they havedevelopeda vital stake n thedemocraticsystem. Owing to the success of thesecoalitionseven BJPpoliticianshavehadto cutdealswith scheduled astesand heOBCsby offeringthema growingarrayof job reservations, special economicprogrammes,ndsub-quotaswithincastequotasrather han the merepromiseofa grandRam'temple n Ayodhya.Empirically,hereservationstrategy asworked more effectively than its criticswouldhave expected.As in manyotherstates, here s greater mphasis odayon'proportionality'n government mploy-ment than ever it was underCongressregimesanda newemphasis nenforcingexisting ob reservations ndproportionalallocationof government esources uchas the new 'Special ComponentPlans',whichexplicitlyset aside a proportionfgovernmentexpenditure or scheduledcastesand ribes4 Large umbersflowercastes have gained government jobsthrough eservations, nd an even larger

number ave heopportunityoparticipateindemocratic olitics.This is not ustdueto the argenumber f groupsnoweligiblefor reservations,but also due to betterenforcement.evertheless,n tsown ermsit is flawed in three respects.It is notworking o the advantage f lower castewomen.OBCs orm he ingle argest roupin the UP legislative assembly,but therearehardly nyOBC emaleMPsor MLAsevenas OBC menhavegreatly ncreasedtheirnumbersnlegislatures. econd, t isworking o thebenefitof the lowercastemiddleclasses.Itis clear hat he commu-nitiesasawholehavenotbenefited; ather,the membersof somefamilieswho havemanaged o takeadvantage f whatare,afterall, stilla verysmallnumber fjobsfor a very large numberof aspirants.75Finally, it has given rise to resentmentamong Muslims and MBCs, who havebeenexcluded rom heemphasisonpro-portionalityn government mployment.Although hecentralgovernment ndUPgovernment esistedextending he prin-ciple of proportionalityn governmentemploymentand spendingto Muslims,non-BJPgovernmentshave made someefforts to ensure that Muslims receivea share,if not their 'fair share',of jobsandeconomic programmes.The MBCshave not asserted heirclaimsagainst heupperOBCs even as the yadavs havebenefitedmore hananyother owercastegroup rom thepolicies pursuedn UP.76They can make gains only when theyare united on a common platform orwhenthey unite to gain their share ofpoweragainst he dominantOBCs. Thisis the major challenge ahead for thelowercastes.77

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Thesecondargumentelates o regimechange nd he mpact fmassmobilisationon governanceand development.Whilethe two models of peasant and castemobilisation avechallenged pper aste/classdomination,his has notnecessarilypromotedpolicies or public expenditurefor servicesthatbenefit he lower castesor implementationf developmentpoli-ciesandprogrammeshataddress he vitalconcerns fthepoor.There re hree ikelyreasonswhy ncorporationf members flowercastes ntogovernments ndlegis-latureshas not been accompaniedby acorrespondingncrease n the welfare ofdeprived roups.First,conflicts betweendisadvantagedroupsand he socialfrag-mentationollowing the collapse of theCongress reated ircumstancesn whichtheCongress trategyof domination ndaccommodation asedon a 'grand-coali-tion' that ncludedrepresentativesf allgroupsbrokedown, this was not be re-placedby an alternativeype of middlecaste/class egimeon the linesof AndhraPradesh rKarnatakaralternatively o-liticalregimes n TamilNadu, Kerala,orWestBengalwhere lowercastes/classesare trongly epresented.78ore rucially,uppercastes,heavily representedn theBJPstageda comeback, ndcontinuedowieldconsiderableowerand nfluence nstatepolitics.Second, owercastepoliticsentailed argeting articularastegroupsrather hana broad-basedmobilisation ocreate rainbowoalition f thedisadvan-taged.UP's lowercastepartieshave beenfocused nspecificgroups ndaggregatedwell-established nterests that have as-sumedthe form of political monopolies.Thesegroups avenotdevelopedhorizon-tal solidarities, s they are caughtup inrivalriesbased on statusand economiccompetition. hird,heconditions f scar-cityhavegeneratedut-throatompetitivepoliticsthat.is averseto structuring ndregulatingpowerto servesocial ends orto sustaina larger enseof politics.As aconsequence,variousgroupsandpartieslookupon hepolitical ystemasbasicallya vehicle orservingparticularlaimsandthereforework irmlywithin he old stateproject.Thus, hetendencys tomakeuseof mobilisationas a means of winningpoliticalpower,andnotasaprovision orintra-group r inter-group quality andeconomic development. n brief, UP ispassing througha somewhat extremeversionof whatSunilKhilnanihascalled'pure politics' that he suggestsIndia ispassing hrough:hat s, intense trugglesover the access,capture,andexercise ofpower nwaysthatshow ittleconcern orprocedureshatregulatepower'sexerciseandmuchless usingpoliticalpowerforpublic nds.79The ntense ompetitionor

powerand 'loaves andfishes of officesandjobs', as Asoka Mehtaonce put it,generates a politics of proximity andconveniencewhereelectedpoliticians eeit theirdutynot o acton behalf feveryoneor anyone except themselves and theirsupporters.8Incomparisonoregionalparties,whichincorporatedasteand anguagewithin heideaof apolitical ommunity, P'spartiesmadeno attempt o combinecasts withother social categoriesto build broadercoalitions. Historically, the Dravidiancommunitywas conceived primarily ntermsof a coalitionof mega-castes, hat.is,thenon-brahminindu,whowasneitherbrahminnor scheduledcaste. NarendraSubramanian'snalysis hows this was alayered dentity,andprocessesof mobil-isationed otheemergence fan nclusivepoliticalarena based on a politicaldis-course thattranscended aste cleavages,andincludedall Tamils/south ndiansnthe formationof a homogeneousTamilpoliticalcommunity.81 hough he DMKmadeno effortatstructuraleform, espitethe sharprural nequalitiesand incomedisparities,tsubstitutedorreform setofsocial welfarepolicies which,combinedwithalmost 0percentreservationsor thebackwardastes neducation ndgovern-ment, satisfied popular aspirations.82Socialwelfareprogrammes,angingrommassiveurbanhousingdevelopmentsorthe lower middle classes to ruralpro-grammesorconstructionfvillageroads,schoolbuildings, romotionfcleandrink-ing watersupply,the installation f oneelectric ightconnectionn everyhut andthe free middaymeal scheme for eightmillionchildren,has given substance othe government mageof generosityandaccommodation.83uchapublicdiscourseis virtually bsent tthe evelofUP'spartypolitics,andwhere texists, tis frequentlyused to serve particularnterests.Even as UP's democraticpolitics hasshifted from the earlier conceptionofrepresentationominated y anelite act-ing on behalf of a largergroupto a nu-mericalone, in whichelectedpoliticiansact on behalf of theirgroup, t has beenunable o dealwithits effects. Anchoredin a politicsof identityand interests hatlink representationndrights chiefly toreservations,this politics is generallyuninterestedn procedures nd policies.Today,none of the political partiesarecommitted o a changein the structuresthatgenerate lass,genderorcommunityinequalities.Rather,they only seek toredistributehe spoilsof office to favouronegroupover another.At best,this canbroaden he avenuesof upwardmobilitywithoutgreatlychanging he normsandstructures f distribution.33

Notes[I am most grateful to N C Saxena and RaviSrivastava for suggestions of materials and toImtiazAhmad,JohnHarrisandCraigJeffreyforextremelyhelpfulcommentson anearlierversionof this paperand to Adil Tyabji for his excellenteditorialadvice.]

I AtulKohli,Democracy ndDiscontent: ndia'sGrowingCrisis of Governability,CambridgeUniversityPress (CUP), Cambridge, 1991.2 Yogendra Yadav, 'Electoral Politics in theTimes of Change: India's Third ElectoralSystem, 1989-99', Economic and PoliticalWeekly EPW),August21-28 and September3, 1999,YogendraYadav, 'UnderstandingheSecond Democratic Upsurge: Trends ofBahujanParticipationn ElectoralPolitics inthe 1990s' in FrancineFrankel,Zoya Hasan,Rajeev Bhargava and Balveer Arora (eds),Transforming India: Social and PoliticalDynamics of Democracy, OUP, New Delhi,2000;AshutoshVarshney, IsIndiaBecomingMore Democratic?'Journalof Asian Studies(JAS), February2000; Atul Kohli, (ed). TheSuccess of India's Democracy,CUP,Cambridge, 2001.

3 YogendraYadav, 'Understanding heSecondDemocraticUpsurge' in FrancineFrankeletal (eds), Transforming ndia.4 Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and ItsFragments: Colonial and PostcolonialHistories,OUP,Delhi, 1993;Partha hatterjee,'Democracyandthe Violence of the State: APoliticalNegotiation fDeath',paperpresentedat aconferenceon Globalization nd theState,Paris,June 2000, (mimeo); SudiptaKaviraj,'A Critiqueof thePassiveRevolution',EPW,23(45,46,6), 1988and Modernity ndPoliticsinIndia,Daedulus,Winter2000;AkhilGupta,'Blurred Boundaries: the Discourse ofCorruption, he Culture of Politics and theImaginedState'inZoyaHasan, ed),StateandPolitics nIndia,SagePublications,NewDelhi,2000.5 The OBCs rise to power has been describedby YogendraYadav as a' seconddemocraticupsurge', Reconfigurationn IndianPolitics:State Assembly Elections 1993-95', EPW,January13, 1996.6 Francine Frankel, Introduction n FrancineFrankel et al, Transforming ndia, pp4-5.7 JohnHarriss rovides classification fregimesbycomparing egimedifferencesacross statesat both the structuralevel and thatof party-dominatedgovernment.There aredifferencesbetween states in termsof theorganisation fagriculture, development of capitalism, theextent of industrialdevelopmentetc. Thesedifferences may then be reflected n terms ofthe nature of political mobilisation. See'ComparingRegimesacross IndianStates:APreliminary ssay',EPW,November29,1999.8 Estimates from Montek Singh Ahluwalia,'Economic Performance of States in Post-Reforms Period',EPW, May 6, 2000.9 Christophe Jaffrelot, 'The Rise of OtherBackward Classes in the Hindi Belt', JAS,February2000.10 T J Byres, 'CharanSingh (1902-1987): AnAssessment',JournalofPeasantStudies JPS),15 (2), 1988; IanDuncan, 'PartyPolitics andthe North IndianPeasantry:The Rise of the



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