MASKING INCONSISTENCY:THE TONKIN GULF CRISIS

RICHARD A. CHERWrrZ

Because crises evoke images of threatening events appearing beyond control, theysupercede previous rhetorical acts and assessments of them, helping to reconcilepotential contradictions within an administration's stance. President LyndonJohnson's response to the August 1964 naval skirmishes in Tonkin Gulf is a case inpoint. As the early months of 1964 unfolded, Johnson became convinced of the neces-sity of a United States intervention in Vietnam. This sentiment, however, was notreflected in his public discourse; there thus emerged a disjunction between the presi-dent's private image and public persona and between his actions and the proposedpolicies of Barry Goldwater-Johnson's political rival. The naval encounters in TonkinGulf allowed Johnson to reconcile his public persona with his private image withoutarousing suspicion. Tonkin Gulf, therefore, was an episode in masking inconsistency. Itdemonstrated how international crises permit chief executives to establish a credibleand consistent public image.

Research in the fields of speech communi-cation, history, and political science has un-derscored the rhetorical nature of interna-tional crises. Scholars have maintained thatpresidential discourse may construct animage of a crisis, often regardless of the situa-tional characteristics spawning such dis-course. Edelman, Vatz, Windt, and Bergerand Luckmann, for example, have arguedpersuasively that "crises" are fundamentallythe product of linguistic and rhetorical cal-culations.^ Applying this theory, I earlier

Richard A. Cherwitz (Ph.D., University of Iowa, 1978} isassistant professor of Speech Communication at theUniversity of Texas at Austin.

This research was made possible by a grant from theLyndon Baines Johnson Foundation, May 1977.

1. See, for example, Murray Edelman, PoJiticaJ Lan-guage (New York: Academic Press, 1977), pp. 43-49, andPoJitics as Symbolic Action (Chicago: Markham, 1971),pp. 66-67. See also Theodore Otto Windt, Jr., "The Presi-dency and Speeches of International Crisis: Repeatingthe Rhetorical Past," Speaker and Cavel, 11 (1973), 7;Richard E. Vatz, "The Myth of the Rhetorical Situation,"Philosophy and Rhetoric, 6 (1973), especially 160; andPeter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Con-struction of Reality (Garden City, New York: Doubleday,1967). The perspective of these scholars and others isperhaps best captured by Windt: "Political crises are

contended that President Lyndon BainesJohnson generated an internationalemergency in August 1964 through his em-ployment of weighted language, parallelstructuring of sentences, role reminders, andideological appeals. The 1964 Tonkin Gulfcrisis, I concluded, demonstrated the capac-ity of chief executives to create social realitieslinguistically, lending salience to unobserv-able situations through rhetoical efforts.^

The literature pertaining to the president'sability to create crises rhetorically, includingmy own analysis of Tonkin Gulf, however,has paid little attention to the underlying as-sumptions anchoring this claim. Like mostprevious research, my earlier investigationpresumed that these executive manipulationshave been purposive, deliberate and calcu-lated. Moreover, it was taken for granted thatthere were, and are, motives for action; yet theraison d'etre underpinning a president's de-cision to build a crisis atmosphere still re-mains unclarified.primarily rhetorical. The President announces to thepeople that a situation critical to the U.S. exists. Situa-tions do not crate crises. Rather, the President's percep-tion of the situation and the rhetoric he uses to describe itmark an event as a crisis."

2. Richard A. Chorwitz, "Lyndon Johnson and the'Crisis' of Tonkin Gulf: A President's Justification ofWar," Western JournaJ of Speech Communication, 42

SPRING 1980 27

The purpose of this essay, therefore, is touncover at least one reason capable of ex-plaining a president's desire to magnify, andto provide significance to, certain interna-tional events. I argue that a chief executive'smotive or intent may be tied inextricably tocommunicative and rhetorical precepts.Specifically, one underlying rationale forbuilding crises stems from a leader's need tomaintain rhetorical consistency. This articleillustrates the importance of rhetorical con-sistency through an analysis of PresidentJohnson's handling of the 1964 Gulf of Ton-kin incidents.

CRISES AND RHETORICAL CONSISTENCY

The Theory Explained

A survey of recent presidential adminis-trations highlights the strategic importanceof establishing a credible public image. Thelesson emerging from Vietnam and Watergateis that a chief executive cannot for long con-tinue to maintain a sizeable political base ofpower without spending time and energy tobuild and preserve a favorable public image.^

(1978), pp. 93-104. Citing Edelman, Vatz, Windt, Bergerand Luckmann, and others, I argue that President Lyn-don Johnson's rhetoric "created an international emer-gency," and "limited the foreign policy alternatives ofthe United States in Vietnam." It should be noted that inmy earlier article research was not based upon an exami-nation of the wide array of documents housed in thePresidential Library in Austin, Texas. The present essay,in addition to being grounded in a more thorough inves-tigation of primary materials, is concemed with funda-mentally distinct research questions, employing differ-ent rhetorical assumptions and methodologies. For ex-ample, while the earlier treatment operated out of theassumption that discourse can create and add salience torhetorical situations, this article emphasizes how suchdiscursive efforts may be prompted and occasioned bysituational variables, including prior public and privateutterances. Unlike the essay in Western Speech Commu-nication, this investigation evolves out of a concern forlocating the raison d'etre undergirding presidential at-tempts to construct crises. The present article thus beginswith the conclusions arrived at previously, exploring themotives and rationales capble of explaining such presi-dential initiatives. The notion of masking inconsistencyis offered as one possible explanation of presidentialcrisis construction.

3. Nimmo, for example, has argued that a president'spopularity is not so much a function of specific policyinitiatives as it is a function of his ability to presentpositive images of those decisions. According to Nimmo,"People make political judgements without having'much information to support" them. "Americans makequick judgements about what the federal government isdoing, or about their rights as individuals; yet studies

One important constituent of a credibleimage is consistency. It almost goes withoutsaying that we expect political leaders to re-spond to national and international problemsin a consistent and clear fashion. Koenig andNeustadt, in their commentaries on the presi-dency, continually emphasize the need forpublic officials to appear to their constituentsto be decisive, avoiding ambiguity andequivocation. An indecisive, unsure, and in-consistent president is perceived to be weakand incapable of effectively leading the na-t i 4

Fortunately or unfortunately, the prac-ticalities of day-to-day foreign and domesticevents make such an image-building cam-paign difficult at best. The subtle nuances ofeconomic and social policies, as well as thecomplexities associated with diplomatic af-fairs, make the appearance of contradictionalmost inevitable. This reality, coupled withpublic ignorance regarding the government'sdecisions and initiatives, poses an inherentrhetorical problem for the chief executive. Inthose situations in which a president feelscompelled to alter his position, or in whichthe public has already adopted a negativeimage of him as being inconsistent, the presi-dent must take deliberate measures to avoiddisastrous political consequences.

Crises provide presidents with at least onemechanism for masking inconsistencies andpreserving a popular image. Bringing certainevents to the attention of the nation and

indicate that only about one-fifth of the American peopleknows what the three branches of the federal governmentare called or know anything about the Bill of Rights."Citing a classic study on the subject, Nimmo observesthat only about two-thirds of the public knows whatgovernment is doing about a problem in question. De-spite such ignorance, however, Americans are constantlyrendering assessments of presidential foreign anddomestic activities. These evaluations, therefore, are aproduct of images—our perceptions and subjective rep-resentations of various phenomena. See Dan Nimmo,Popular Images of Politics (Englewood Cliffs, New Jer-sey: Prentice-Hall, 1974), pp. 14-15. For a mroe systema-tic exposition of this thesis, see Robert E. Lane and DavidO. Sears, Public Opinion (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 61, and Angus Campbell, TheAmerican Voter (New York: John Wiley, 19600) pn171-176.

4. See, for example, Louis W. Koenig, The ChiefExecutive (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975),especially pp. 92-113, and Richard E. Neustadt, Presi-dential Power (New York: John Wiley, 1960), especiallychapters three and five. A more recent treatment appearsin Thomas E. Cronin, The State of the Presidency (Bos-ton: Little, Brown and Company, 1975), chapters one,two, three, and five.

28COMMUNICATION QUARTERLY

labeling them "crises" allows the chiefexecutive to modify public policies, and oftento equivocate without incurring serious po-litical penalties or arousing public suspi-cions. In particular, a foreign crisis affords thepresident the ability to communicate animage of decisiveness and determination, tokeep policy options open without appearingvague and inconsistent, and to establish aflexible decision-making posture. Becausecrises evoke images of salient, unordinary,unique, and threatening events that appearbeyond control, they have a tendency tosupercede all prior rhetorical acts and as-sessments of them, helping to reconcile whatmight otherwise seem to be contradictionswithin an administration's stance.^

Such a conclusion, while theoretically in-teresting, cannot be understood apart from aninvestigation of historical episodes. Hence,the remaining pages are devoted to an exami-nation of a particular presidential crisis,namely Johnson's handling of the 1964 Ton-kin Gulf incidents. I argue that this particularhistorical event lends credence to the theoryof rhetorical consistency. Only by carefullyrecording the historical elements of this crisiscan we extract those presidential motives re-sting at the heart of the theoretical claimbeing advanced. Historical research is thuspresented as at least one way of documentingrhetorical and communication theory.

Tonkin Gulf as an Exemplar

On August 2, 1964 the Maddox, a UnitedStates naval vessel operating off the coast ofNorth Vietnam in Tonkin Gulf, was attackedby enemy ships. Two days later, after awarning by President Johnson against the re-petition of such attacks, a second assault wasreported by a confused patrol consisting ofthe Maddox and a second ship, the G. TurnerJoy. Following this report on August 4,Johnson spoke to the nation, ordering thestrategic bombing of North Vietnam.

The events in Tonkin Gulf in 1964 havebeen the subject of considerable historicalinterpretation and speculation. At least twolines of analysis have been taken.

On the one hand, there are those who ques-tion the authenticity of the reported chain ofevents.^ Those who maintain that the attacks

5. See, for example, Murray Edelman, Poltiical Lan-guage, pp. 48-49.

6. William Miller, A New History of the United States(New York: Dell Publishing Company, 1968), p. 474.

were distorted or possibly fabricated usuallycite the fact that on August 4, the date of thealleged second assault, the destroyers wereundamaged. Moreover, the Maddox, the onlyU.S. ship that detected North Vietnamese pat-rol boats on August 4, reported mechanicaldifficulties with its sonar prior to the pre-sumed attack.^

While the accounts of several historianstend to indicate fabrication and/or distortion,the available historical evidence reveals thatthe first attack was real; the "Pentagon Pa-pers," the Senate Foreign Relations Gommit-tee investigation of 1968, and the testimonyof naval and Defense Department personnelunderscore the fact of the first encounter.^The second "attack," however, has no suchfirm documentation.

Subsequently, there has emerged a group ofhistorians who argue that while the conflictmay have occurred, or at least while it mightbe impossible to substantiate a claim of fabri-cation, the encounters were invited or pro-voked by the administration as part of adramatic pretext capable of securing the pas-sage of a resolution granting the president theauthority to widen the war in Vietnam.^

7. See, for example. The Gulf of Tonkin, the 1964Incidents, Hearing before the committee on Foreign Re-lations, United States Senate, Ninetieth Congress, 2ndSession, with the Honorable Robert S. McNamara, Sec-retary of Defense (February 20, 1968). See also, JosephGoulden, Truth is the First Casualty (Chicago: Rand Mc-Nally and Co., 1969). Goulden's work is based on inter-views with members of the crews of both American ves-sels involved in the encounters of August. All material isbased on McNamara's testimony and Navy records asincluded in the Senate's investigation. This materialcoincides with the chronological records found in Box14, National Security file. Country File Vietnam, Folder,Vietnam Gulf of Tonkin Misc. 1964, Presidential Papersof Lyndon Johnson, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin,Texas. Hereafter Johnson Mss. See also John Galloway,The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (Madison: Farleigh Dic-kinson University Press, 1970), pp. 48-66. Galloway in-cludes an excellent discussion ofthe events leading up toand surrounding the naval encounters of August 2 and 4,1964.

8. See also, Richard J. Bamet, Intervention and Revo-lution (New York: The World Publishing Company,1968), p. 217, and Truth is the First Casualty, p. 240.

9. There are several historians who take this view. See,for example, Eugene Windchy, Tonkin Gulf (GardenCity: Doubleday aind Co., Inc., 1971). Also see AnthonyAustin, The President's War (New York: J.B. LippincottCo., 1971), expecially chapter three, and Senator WayneMorse, quoted in Truth is the First Casualty, p. 52. Theclearest statement of this position is found in Ralph Sta-vins, Richard Bamet, and Marcus Raskin, WashingtonPlans and Aggressive War (New York: Random House,1971), p. 98.

SPRING 1980 29

Those maintaining this stance cite the factthat the two American vessels were admit-tedly on a spying mission to activite NorthVietnamese radar and monitor its communi-cations. In addition, they maintain that theUnited States Naval Command was wellaware of the potential dangers on August 4,especially in light of the events of two daysprior; the North Vietnamese officially hadwarned the United States following the attackon August 2 of the consequences of futurenaval operations, ̂ o Nevertheless, the Maddoxand C. Turner Joy were ordered to continuetheir spying patrol regardless of the conse-quences.^^

Unfortunately, the claim that Johnson in-vited the Tonkin Gulf naval encounter, usingit as a dramatic pretext to widen the war withpublic and congressional sanction, cannot befully documented at this juncture; most of theevidence is circumstancial. As might be ex-pected, few statesmen leave, or even make,written records of actions or thoughts thatwould clearly show them to be malevolent.Current investigation into the Tonkin Gulfquestion at this level, therefore, seems to havereached an impasse.

Yet it should be mentioned that underlyingthese schools of thought are two contentionssuggestive of Johnson's alleged motive; botharguments are indicative of the need forrhetorical consistency. First, the presidentdesired an expanded United States militaryrole in the Vietnam War in the spring of 1964.Second, Johnson needed an opportunity toaccomplish this goal without appearing in-consistent. For that reason, Johnson had toprovoke or even distort events which couldserve as prima facie evidence for his claimthat retaliatory bombing and a congressionalresolution were appropriate measures. Be-cause these suppositions emphasize the ele-ments of congressional and public support,the overall question may be regarded as atleast in part a rhetorical one. Thus, while it isfruitless at this time to advance a conclusivecase of presidential fabrication and/or provo-cation, it might be more reasonable to explore

10. See Truth is the First Casualty; Goulden's inter-views with crew members clearly document our aware-ness of this warning. This point is conistent with officialrecords of the United States Department of Defense. Seealso. The Culf of Tonkin, the 1964 Incidents, and Box 14,National Security File, Country File, Folder, VietnamGulf of Tonkin Misc. 1964, Johnson Mss.

11. Box 14, National Security File, Country File, Fol-der, Vietnam Gulf of Tonkin Misc. 1964, Johnson Mss.

the two rhetorical claims underlying thesearguments. It should be stressed, however,that the purpose of such an investigation is toillustrate communication theory. Affer all,even the documentation of both underlyingsuppositions could not count as positivehistorical proof for either the distortion or theprovocation argument. On strictly rhetoricaland communication grounds, nevertheless,such an exploration is warranted.

PRESIDENTT JOHNSON'S INCONSISTENCY

The President's Pre-Tonkin Handling of theWar: The Transition of Johnson'sPrivate Rhetoric

"Onjune 17,1967," declares Neil Sheehan,"at a time of great personal disenchantmentwith the war, Robert S. McNamara made whatmay turn out to be one of the most importantdecisions in his seven years at the Penta-gon." 12 On that day, the secretary of defensecommissioned what has since become knownas the "Pentagon Papers"—a massive top-secret history of the United States involve-ment in Vietnam. An examination of thedocuments pertinent to Tonkin Gulf includedwithin the study, and the New York Timesexclusive stories pertaining to them, indi-cates that as the early months of 1964 un-folded President Johnson became more con-vinced of the idea that the United States hadto become involved, perhaps overtly, in theIndochinese struggle in order to insure thesurvival of the government of South Viet-nam."

This transition in thought, and ultimatefirmness in policy, became the backdrop for apresident who, in public, clung tenaciouslyto an earlier stance of restraint and caution.This section of the essay highlights Johnson'sprivate change of conviction documentinghis decision in the spring of 1964 to becomemore directly involved in the Vietnam Warand to keep open, as a viable future alterna-tive, the possibility of massive overt escala-tion.i'* The remaining section contrasts thisprivate image with the president's publicpersona, indicating his need for consistency,and hence illustrating the rhetorical impor-tance of the opportunity offered Johnson bythe occurrence of the events in Tonkin Gulf.

12. Neil Sheehan, The Pentagon Papers (New York:The New York Times, 1971), p. ix.

13. Ibid., Chapter Five.14. Ibid.

30 COMMUNICATION QUARTERLY

The administration's decision in the springto step up efforts that would allow an even-tual widening of the war (if deemed appro-priate) is perhaps best understood in thecontext of the clandestine operations orderedand expanded by the president in early 1964.The "Pentagon Papers" reveal that "for sixmonths before Tonkin Gulf in August 1964,the United States had been mounting clan-destine military attacks against the North,while planning to obtain a CongressionalResolution that the Administration regardedas the equivalent of a declaration of war." *̂ Itshould be pointed out, however, that Johnsonfailed to reveal the extent or even the exis-tence of these maneuvers to either Congressor the public following the attacks in August.Yet, these covert military moves had reachedsuch proportion by August 1964 that "Thaipilots flying American T-28 fighter planesapparently bombed and strafed North Viet-namese villages near the Laotian border onAugust 1 and 2."*^

That Johnson was, in fact, giving seriousconsideration to American bombing prior toAugust is apparent from the nature and scopeof administration contingency planning. Ac-cording to Neil Sheehan, "Although a firmdecision to begin sustained bombing of NorthVietnam was not made until months later, theAdministration was able to order retaliatoryair strikes on less than six hours' notice dur-ing the Tonkin Gulf incident because plan-ning had progressed so far that a list of targetswas available for immediate choice."*^Moreover, the Pentagon documents indicatehow "the target list had been drawn up inMay, along with a draft of the congressionalresolution, also as part of a proposed scenarioculminating in air raids on North Vietnam."With the exception of references to the Ton-kin Gulf crisis, this resolution is remarkablysimilar to the document sent by Johnson toCongress in August.*^

Admittedly, contingency planning pro-vides only circumstantial evidence. How-ever, a systematic delineation of the covertmilitary measures ordered by the adminis-tration and the stepped-up plans for overt wardo document the gradual shift made by thepresident in the six months preceding the

15. Ibid. p. 245.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid., p. 245, and pp. 294-296. The latter is a draftof a Congressional Resolution dated May 25, 1964.

naval encounters. For example, what the"Pentagon Papers" refer to as "an elaborateprogram of covert military operations againstthe State of North Vietnam" began on Feb-ruary 1,1964.*^ Operation Plan 34-A was thecode name given to designate these clandes-tine maneuvers. According to Sheehan, thepresident ordered the program on the rec-ommendation of Secretary McNamara, "inthe hope, held very faint by the intelligencecommunity, that 'progressively escalatingpressure' from the attacks might eventuallyforce Hanoi to order the Vietcong guerrillas inVietnam and the Pathet Lao in Laos to halttheir insurrections."^^ Several Johnson biog-raphers maintain that during this initialphase of clandestine operations, the presi-dent remained "noncommitting" to com-bat.21 The Pentagon study, says Sheehan,confirms this hesitation by the executive inthe first few months of his term.^^

It must be remembered, though, that onJanuary 22, 1964, just prior to the beginningof the 34-A operations, the Joint Chiefs ofStaff warned the administration in amemorandum signed by the chairman. Gen-eral Maxwell Taylor, that while "we arewholly in favor of executing the covert ac-tions against North Vietnam . . . it would beidle to conclude that these efforts will have adecisive effect on Hanoi's will to support theVietcong." In this same document. Number62 of the "Pentagon Papers," the administra-tion was told that it "must make ready toconduct increasingly border actions [sic]" in-cluding "aerial bombing of key North Viet-nam targets, using United States resources,sending American ground troops to SouthVietnam, and employing United States forcesas necessary in direct action against NorthVietnam.""

Although it is unclear from these docu-ments what Johnson's position was on thismatter in January, it is apparent that by Feb-ruary the President was moving closer towarda policy of intervention. According to thePentagon documents, "after a White House

19. Ibid., p. 245.

20. Ibid.21. See, for example, Doris Keams, Lyndon Johnsor

and the American Dream (New York: Harper and Row,1976).

22. The Pentagon Papers, chapter five.

23. See, for example. Document #62, "1964 Memo byJ.C.S. Discussing Widening of the War," in Ibid., pp.282-285.

SPRING 1980 31

strategy meeting on February 20, PresidentJohnson ordered that 'planning for thesekinds of pressures against North Vietnam[referring to the Taylor memorandum] shouldbe stepped up."' The president's gradualshift in thought surfaces in the language usedto engage the order: "particular attentionshould be given to shaping such pressures soas to produce the maximum credible deter-rent effect on Hanoi." ̂ ^

The Pentagon study of 1967 notes that "theimpelling force behind the administration'sdesire to step up action during this periodwas its recognition ofthe steady deteriorationin the positions of the pro-American govern-ments in Laos and South Vietnam, and thecorresponding weakening of the UnitedStates hold on both countries." North Viet-namese and Pathet Lao advances in Laos, thepapers indicate, "were seen as having a directimpact on the morale of the anticommunistforces in South Vietnam, the primary con-cern." ̂ ^ This same sentiment was shared byWalter Rostow, who was in the State Depart-ment at the time. In an interview conductedon May 19,1977, Rostow stated that althoughhe was not in a position to know what specificchanges occurred in the president's thinkingin 1964, there would certainly have been "alogical reason for such a shift based on theincreasing reports of disintegration regard-ing the American position in Indochina."Rostow went on to say that in the spring of1964, Johnson began to receive informationabout increased infiltration from the Northand the introduction of North Vietnamesecadres. To the extent that a shift did take placein Johnson's thinking about the role of theUnited States in the Vietnam war, Rostowbelieved that this deterioration in early 1964provided "the sound rationale" underpin-ning such a change.26 The point to be under-scored is that this deterioration in the Ameri-

24. Ibid., p. 249.

25. Ibid.

26. Interview with Walt W. Rostow, the Lyndon B.Johnson Library, Austin, Texas, May 19,1977, Tape #1.That Rostow played an important role in the Johnsonadministration's Vietnam policy is made clear in anInterview with Clark M. Clifford, The University ofTexas, December 15,1969, Tape #5. "And I think insofaras the relationship between President Johnson and Mr.Rostow is concerned, I know the President had a greatregard for his loyalty, his patriotism, his dedication andhis judgement. I think the fact that he had access to thepresident at almost anytime any day gave him a certainadvantage, and from time to time I had the feeling that inorder to get my view over to the president it took perhaps

can stance and subsequent shift in thinkingby tbe administration was concealed fromGongress and the public as much as possible"to provide the Administration withmaximum flexibility to determine its movesas it chose from behind the scenes. "^^

In accordance with the president's order onFebruary 20, McNamara supervised the plan-ning of two major operations, both indicativeof the administration's change of mind andwish to keep overt entrance into the conflictas a viable policy option. The first, entitled"Border Gontrol and Retaliatory Action," wasdesigned to be launched on 72-hours' notice.These plans, argues Sheehan, "would in-clude assaults against infiltration routesalong the Ho Ghi Minh Trail network of sup-ply lines through southeastern Laos, 'hot pur-suit' of the guerrillas into Gambodia, 're-taliatory bombing strikes' into North Viet-nam, and 'aerial mining ofthe major ports inNorth Vietnam."'28

The second program was called "Grad-uated Overt Military Pressure." "This pro-gram was to commence on thirty hours'notice and would go beyond reacting on atit-for-tat basis," Mr. McNamara told thepresident. "It would include air attacksagainst military and industrial targets."^^

President Johnson was kept informed oftheprogress of these plans throughout Februaryand March. In addition, during the middle ofMarch, he began receiving more informationindicating the deterioration of stability inSouth Vietnam. Thus, according to the Pen-tagon study, on March 17, the president ap-proved McNamara's recommendation to in-crease planning, noting that such prepara-tions should "proceed energetically."^^

Within weeks of this executive decision,further changes in Johnson's thinking ap-peared. "In his March memorandum," saysSheehan, "Mr. McNamara mentioned thegrowth of 'neutralist sentiment' in Saigon

additional active and strenuous efforts in order to keeppace with other views that were being presented to himdaily by those who had such access to him."

27. The Pentagon Papers, p. 249.

28. Robert S. McNamara to the President, as quoted inIbid., p. 251.

29. Ibid. See, Memo for the President from McNamara,March 16, 1964, Box, National Security File/NationalSecurity Council History Presidential Decisions—TheGulf of Tonkin Attacks on August 1964, Vol. I, Folder,Tabs 1-8, Johnson Mss.

30. The Pentagon Papers, p. 251.

32 GOMMUNIGATION QUARTERLY

and the possibility of a coup by neutralistforces who might form a coalition govern-ment with the Communists and invite theUnited States to leave."^i The Pentagonstudy, as well as several documents in theJohnson archives, highlight Johnson's con-cern with this problem.32 in a cablegram toHenry Cabot Lodge in Saigon on March 20,the president revealed that he was intent on"knocking down the idea of neutralizationwherever it rears its ugly head, and on thispoint I think nothing is more important thanto stop neutralist talk wherever we can bywhatever means we can."^^

By May and June of 1964, the administra-tion's intent was clear. As noted earlier, inMay, a congressional resolution had beendrafted and targets for United States bombingraids had been determined. On June 4, Mr.McNamara, in an order reflecting the admin-istration's thought, directed the Army to"take immediate action to improve effective-ness and readiness status" for possible actionin Vietnam.3"*

Emerging from these statements and ac-tions, therefore, was a president who nolonger believed that the struggle in Indochinacould remain solely in the hands of the Viet-namese people. The administration clearlywas bent on preserving American interests inthat part of the world with "whatever means"necessary. Again, however, it must be em-phasized the president's thoughts remainedprivate. There is no indication that the publicor even key congressional figures were cog-nizant of this transition in administrationthinking and policy formulation.

The picture painted by these private delib-erations is one of a president who was moving"energetically" toward an escalated UnitedStates military role in Vietnam, while at thesame time continually hesitating to translatethese plans into immediate military actionand to inform the public of his change inpolicy. "The glimpses," declares Sheehan,"are of a Chief Executive who was deter-mined to achieve the goal of an 'independent,non-Communist South Vietnam' as he hadenunciated in a national security actionmemorandum in March, yet who was holding

31. Ibid., pp. 251-252.

32. "Cable from President to Lodge on EscalationContengencies," document #65, in Ibid., pp. 293-294.

33. Document #65, in Ibid., p. 293.34. Ibid., p. 260.

back on actions to achieve that goal" until hebelieved they were politically viable. He con-cludes, "Above all, the narrative indicates aPresident who was carefully calculatingdomestic political conditions before makingany of his moves in public." ̂ ^ This accountseems to square with many of the commentsmade by Mr. Rostow. In Rostow's words,"Domestic political considerations" wereamong the more important reasons behindJohnson's decision not to act immediately inthe spring of 1964.̂ 6 The picture is thus one ofboth restraint (in public) and decisiveness (inprivate).

Although it is extremely difficult to assessthe president's "political" motivations un-derpinning this discrepant stance, a perusalof the administration's public discourse andrhetorical choices, as early as January 1964helps explain his decision to remain quiet inthe spring, and hence the importance of theopportunity offered him by the occurrence ofthe events in Tonkin Gulf.

The President's Public Discourse: TheEmergence of Contradiction

In marked contrast to Johnson's privateconviction was his public image, charac-terized by restraint. On numerous occasionsthroughout the early months of 1964, thepresident maintained a position of not wish-ing to send American boys to fight an Asianwar that should be fought by Asian boys. Hisdiscourse indicated an interest in merelygiving material aid to the South Vietnamesein order to allow them to wage the war them-selves. There is thus a disjunction betweenJohnson's private sentiments and his publicpersona.

Recalling that Johnson's change of mindtook place between February and the end ofMarch 1964, it is instructive to consider rep-resentative examples of his public rhetoric forthe corresponding period fo time. On Feb-ruary 29, just nine days after he orderedstepped-up covert operations by the UnitedStates in South Vietnam, Johnson told theAmerican public, "We have a very difficultsituation in South Vietnam. But, we are fur-nishing advice and counsel and training tothe army of Soath Vietnam. And we must rely

35. Ibid., p. 253.

36. Interview with Walt W. Rostow, Tape #1.

SPRING 1980 33

on them for such action as is taken to defendthemselves." ̂ ^

Similarly, Johnson told a news conferenceon March 7 that United States MPs would bewithdrawn continually from Vietnam. "Wesee no reason," said the president, "to keepthe companies of MPs out there, after theyhave already trained the Vietnamese who canperform the duty equally as well."^^ Eightdays later, the president told the press thatAmerica's role in Vietnam was one of givingaid, and that the struggle in Indochina de-pended upon the Vietnamese people. Asimilar sentiment was voiced by Johnson inhis April 20 "Remarks on Foreign Affairs atthe Associated Press Luncheon" in NewYork. Again, the president recapitulated theneed to give only aid and "work through

EATOA close scrutiny of Johnson's public state-

ments between January and August revealsno mention of preparations for overt warfareand no indication of the nature and extent ofcovert land and air measures that alreadywere operational. Rather, the president'scomments were limited to statements mini-mizing the U.S. role in the conflict; a clearinconsistency existed between Johnson's ac-tions and his public discourse.

Johnson's public rhetoric may also be con-trasted with Barry Goldwater's speeches atroughly the same juncture. Senator Goldwa-ter was the forerunner among the potentialRepublican nominees. On several occasions,he criticized the Johnson administration for"being indecisive" and "failing to take astronger military stand" on the Vietnamquestion.'*° A brief glance at a few Goldwaterstatements during the spring of 1964 exhibitsthe marked contrast between him and thepublic image of the president. For example,speaking in Oregon on the seventh of April,Goldwater, in reference to Vietnam, insistedthat it "is a commitment we have to keep.""We must decide," he declared, "that what

37. Johnson as quoted in The Gulf of Tonkin Resolu-tions, p. 159.

38. U.S., President, Public Papers of the Presidents ofthe United States (Washington, D.C: Office of the Fed-eral Register, National Archives and Records Service,1965), Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-1964, p. 323.

39. Ibid., p. 498.40. Barry Goldwater as quoted in Truth is the First

Casualty, p. 29. The differences between the presidentand Senator Goldwater are articulated more extensivelyin The Pentagon Papers, pp. 104, 114, and 152.

we are doing is to win. This is a war and wewill be in it for a long time.'"** In an interviewwith ABC News, Goldwater reiterated thisconviction: "The first decision is one that weare going to win. We are not just there asadvisers, we are down there with our boys,now, and the boys are getting shot. I think themost reassuring thing to the boys over therewould be to put the United States governmentstrongly behind what they are doing." '^^ ThatGoldwater was willing to risk massive U.S.intervention is apparent in his remarks inTucson, Arizona, on June 25: "Let me repeatmy absolute and full support for whateverstrong actions are needed to save SoutheastAsia from Communist aggression and ero-sion.'"*^ Perhaps Goldwater's "hawkishness"was most evident when on May 20 he warnedthat he would "drop a low-yield atomic bombon the Chinese supply lines in North Vietnamor maybe shell them with the seventhfleet."'^^

THE NEED FOR CONSISTENCY: ANINVESTIGATION OF PRESIDENTIAL MOTIVES

Goldwater's public statements, with the ex-ception of his desire to use atomic weapons,paralleled the president's private thoughts. Itmight be argued, therefore, that Johnson wasincapable of admitting his change of mind inpublic, not only because it would be rhetori-cally inconsistent, i.e., in direct contradictionwith his earlier utterances, but also becausesuch a shift would bring him closer to theposition espoused and defended publicly byhis political rival.

This political interpretation of Johnson'smotive is congruent with both the contentand the tone of the Pentagon study of 1967. Itis also consistent with Rostow's observationthat the president wished to avoid a "politicalpush to the right" that he thought wouldoccur if he announced in May or June thedecision to become more directly and exten-sively involved in the Vietnam conflict.'*^ It is

41. Barry Goldwater, Speech in Oregon, April 7,1964,quoted in Files of the Aides, George Reedy, Box 1497,Folder, What Goldwater Said 1953-1964, p. 144, JohnsonMss. Hereafter Reedy File.

42. Barry Goldwater, "Issues and Answers," ABCNews, May 24, 1964, quoted in Reedy File, p. 144.

43. Barry Goldwater, "Remarks at Tucson, Arizona,"June 25, 1964, quoted in Ibid., p. 145.

44. Barry Goldwater, Interview with Newsweek, May20, 1964, quoted in Ibid., p. 147.

45. Interview with Walt Rostow, Tape #1.

34 COMMUNICATION QUARTERLY

difficult to conceive of any other reasonJohnson may have had for wishing to main-tain a discrepancy between his public andprivate discourse. Admittedly, though, theresearch to date has uncovered no presiden-tial documents or memoranda directly sub-stantiating this political paradox.

That Johnson wished to avoid disastrouspolitical consequences, nevertheless, seemsreasonable in light of several actions takenand not taken by Johnson in the late springand early summer of 1964. According to the"Pentagon Papers," in June Johnson re-quested a draft from Walter Rostow for amajor policy speech on Southeast Asia thattook an "aggressive approach." The Presi-dent then rejected Rostow's draft, relying on"news conferences and speeches by other of-ficials to state the official view." The studyconcludes that "in contrast to the Rostow ap-proach, the President's news conference on23 June and Secretary Rusk's speech at Wil-liams Gollege, 14 June, emphasized theUnited States' determination to support itsSoutheast Asian allies, but avoided any directchallenge to Hanoi and Peking or any hint ofintent to increase our military commit-ment."'^^

Because Johnson's unwillingness to talkprior to Tonkin Gulf is an essential part oftheargument advanced in this study, this inves-tigator asked Mr. Rostow about the nature ofhis speech and the reason for the president'srejection of it in June. Rostow refused to showhis copy of the proposed speech, but wasamenable to discussing it during the inter-view. He indicated that he was approached bytwo members of Johnson's staff—probablyspecial assistants Douglass Gater and JackValenti—at a party on June 2, 1964. At thattime they conveyed to Rostow the president'sdesire to solicit his views on the subject ofVietnam. According to Rostow, it was his de-cision alone to put the memorandum in theform of a speech. Thus, on or about June 7,Rostow drafted a policy statement to be givenby the president reflecting Rostow's positionregarding the United States' role in Vietnam.Although not working from notes, Rostowwas able to say a great deal about the pro-posed speech. Its general theme was that theUnited States should become more directlyand overtly involved in the Vietnam war, be-cause of both our commitment to SEATO and

46. The Pentagon Papers, p. 261.47. Interview with Walt Rostow, Tape #1.

the deterioration of the situation politicallyand economically in South Vietnam. Rostownoted that what he had in mind and what thespeech tried to convey was the need for "overtair and ground efforts by the UnitedStates."^^

When asked why the president rejected hisproposal for a candid series of remarks indi-cating the United States' new policy in In-dochina, Rostow responded that "politicalreasons were certainly a factor." In the courseof the interview, he elaborated on two politi-cal reasons undergirding Johnson's decisionnot to speak to the nation in June. First, Ros-tow indicated that to act immediately andspeak in June "would have caused lower rat-ings in the polls." Rostow likened the poten-tial detriments to the Johnson administrationto what had happened at the end of Truman'sadministration, suggesting that Johnson mayhave wanted to avoid such political costs. Butsecond, Rostow noted that because of theGoldwater position at the time, Johnson"feared" that decisive action in June "wouldpush the country politically to the right.'"*^Rostow's statements, therefore, lend cre-dence to the claim that there was a politicalmotive anchoring Johnson's actions in thespring of 1964.

In addition to Rostow's oral comments, adraft of a presidential speech placed in one ofthe "National Security-Defense" boxes in theJohnson Archives was located. This speechwas never delivered by Johnson, but it ad-vances the arguments offered by Rostow.There is no date on the document, but it wasput into Johnson's files on June 22 and isfollowed by several documents initiated byRostow."̂ ^ Thus, there is good reason to be-lieve that this memorandum is the one sol-icited by President Johnson from Rostow.

In the same folder as the Rostow memoran-dum there was a note froni special assistantBob Hunter to Douglass Gater. In this memo.Hunter spoke of the need to talk about "draftsof speeches that are frank about Vietnam,"and the need to keep in mind "political con-siderations." Without question, the note re-

48. Ibid.49. See, for example. National Security-Defense (EX

ND 19/CO 230), Box 214, Folder, ND 19/qp 312 11/22/63-8/10/64, Johnson Mss. This includes what I believe is adraft ofthe speech prepared by Rostow early in June. Thisis followed by a memo from Bob Hunter to DouglassCater, which speaks of drafts of speeches that are frankabout Vietnam.

SPRING 1980 35

veals concern by members of the Johnson staffregarding potential hypocrisy and rhetoricalinconsistency.^® This political concern isseen especially in a series of memoranda fromRostow to the president and Rostow to Ruskin May of 1964. In each case Rostow exhibitedpolitical and rhetorical concern for the presi-dent, suggesting the "need for public infor-mation campaigns." According to Rostow, a"campaign of public information may, evennow [May], be in order." "Such a concertedprogram," wrote Rostow, "would strengthenour hand in . . . laying a firmer base for actionagainst the North." Referring to a possiblecongressional resolution, Rostow furtherhighlighted the need for a "Presidential mes-sage." "Such a message," he claimed,"should not come as a bolt from the blue; itshould itself be preceded by a clear indicationof the increasing firmness. Such indicationcould be given only by public statements ofhigh officials or by such devices as a WhitePaper." 51

When taken as a whole, these materialshighlight the importance of rhetorical deci-sions that were being made in the spring of1964 by the Johnson administration, all ofwhich were indicative of the precarious pos-ition of the president.

The president's rhetorical approach to theVietnam issue, therefore, may be seen as oneof sending up trial balloons that would avoidrhetorical contradiction and political ruina-tion. An example of this indirect or backdoormethod is outlined by Sheehan: "In June,State and Defense Department sources maderepeated leaks to the press affirming UnitedStates intentions to support its allies and up-hold its treaty commitments in SoutheastAsia."^2 The Pentagon study argues thatthese leaks were carried in several storiesprinted by the New York Times. It might beadded that the New York Times version of thePentagon Papers confirms this report.^^

Moreover, the analyst for the Pentagon dis-closes that "in June 1964, the President al-ready felt 'the political convention justaround the corner and the election issues re-garding Vietnam clearly drawn' and so he

50. Memorandum from Bob Hunter to Douglass Cater,National Security-Defense (EX ND 19/CO 230), Box 214,Folder, ND 19/CO 312 11/22/63-8/10/64, Johnson Mss.

51. See, for example. National Security File Vietnam,Box 2, Folder, Vietnam Memos Vol. Ill 5/64, Johnson Mss.

52. The Pentagon Papers, p. 260.53. Ibid., chapter five.

recoiled at this time from the repercussions ofmajor escalation and seeking a Congressionalresolution. "54 As support for this motive, theanalyst cites a high-level meeting on bothsubjects on June 15, at which the presidentthrough a "White House memorandum"postponed the decision for the present.^^ Inexamining the documents in the Johnsonarchives, it was discovered that a memoran-dum fitting this description and dated June15 had been removed from the file for "na-tional security reasons." Furthermore, the"Presidential Daily Diary" for June 15 in-cluded an entry regarding this event.^^

This finding, coupled with what severalbiographers call Johnson's frustration in thespring of 1964 concerning when to act, lendsadditional support to the notion that thepresident was faced with a rhetorical/political dilemma. He needed an opportunitythat would allow him to implement previ-ously formulated plans with minimal oppo-sition. In other words, he needed a way ofreconciling inconsistencies in his public andprivate discourse. Such an opportunity ofnecessity would have to appear to be beyondthe president's control, compelling him to actin contradiction to his wishes and plans.Also, the opportunity would have to be non-partisan in nature, capable of precluding adivision along party lines. Only in the midstof this type of atmosphere could Johnson'shypothetical plans become operational with-out incurring serious political losses. This isnot tantamount to saying that Johnson cont-rived or provoked the enounters of TonkinGulf in order to preserve a positive politicalimage. It is indicative merely of the need forrhetorical consistency. Yet this is not to arguethat the quest for rhetorical consistency wasthe only reason for the president's actions inAugust; my contention is that Tonkin Gulffurnished Johnson the chance to do some-thing—to reconcile his public persona withhis private image—without arousing suspi-cions about his motives.

That the events of August gave the presi-dent the opportunity to justify rhetoricallythe implementation of previously formulatedplans with regard to the war is bestdocumented by the lack of persuasibility in-

54. Ibid., p. 265.

55. Ibid.

56. See, for example. Daily Diary, Box 2, 6/1/64-11/30/64, Folder, Daily Diary June, 1964, Johnson Mss. Seethe entry for June 15, a.m.

36 COMMUNICATION QUARTERLY

herent in his only other alternative. In light ofthe president's prior public utterances, forinstance, the subversion and alleged com-munist infiltration in Indochina provided in-sufficient persuasive ammunition to con-vince the public and Congress that a radicallydifferent policy option was necessary, viz.,escalation and retaliatory bombing. As Sta-vins, Barnet, and Raskin contend, "TheUnited States was prepared to widen the warunilaterally and justify it on the basis that theNorth was infiltrating troops into the South.But the infiltration argument... lacked theglamour attendant upon a surprise or shockattack."

In marked contrast, the Tonkin Culf inci-dents afforded the administration therationale necessary to present a persuasivecase to the public and Congress for interven-ing in Vietnam. Unlike the infiltration argu-ment, which Stavins, Barnet, and Raskincontend was "grey, dreary and continuous,requiring research and explanation," theevents in Tonkin Culf were more dramaticand convincing. "The death of Americans,the sinking of a United States ship on the highseas," they argue, "was dramatic, shockingand unique. It was the stuff of headlines." Asthey conclude, "The immediate dispatch ofUnited States airplanes to bomb the North inresponse to the death of innocent Americansoldiers or the sinking of an innocent Ameri-can ship could tap the romantic impulse ofthe American public and drum up sufficientsupport for a wider

57. Washington Plans an Aggressive War, p. 98.

That Johnson did, in fact, masterfullyutilize the rhetorical opportunity providedhim by the Tonkin Culf attacks is clear. As Ihave argued before, the president mustered ahost of rhetorical techniques, all of whichhelped to secure a crisis atmosphere and sol-idify popular sentiment behind his Vietnampolicy. T'he president's handling of the Ton-kin Culf affair was thus instrumental not onlyin garnering support for the war, but also inmasking inconsistency from the public.^^

CONCLUSION

This paper has examined one of the underly-ing assumptions behind a president's gener-ation of a crisis atmosphere. Beginning withthe already documented claim that crises are,at least in part, a rhetorical phenomenon, thisessay sought to uncover a raison d'etre forsuch purposeful and calculated acts by thechief executive. It was contended that presi-dential conduct often may be guided by aconcern for maintaining rhetorical consis-tency. Yet we saw how the practicalities ofday-to-day policy formulation make almostinevitable the appearance of contradiction. Itwas argued, therefore, that crises provide thepresident with a means of reconciling allegeddiscrepancies between words and actions.Focusing on a particular historical episode,viz., the Tonkin Culf incidents, it was con-cluded that crises allow the chief executive tosatisfy the need for rhetorical consistency.

58. Richard A. Cherwitz, "The Contributory Effect ofRhetorical Discourse: A Study of Language-in-Use,"Quarterly Journal of Speech, (in press).

SPRINC 1980 37