masaki miyake - core.ac.uk
TRANSCRIPT
(1)
Theories of C
to
ivil-Military Relations as related
Japan and a Comparison with
Germany’s Case
Masaki MIYAKE
Professor of International History, School of Political Sci.ence
and EconQmics, Meiji University, Tokyo, Japan
・
1
の つ
9θ34
サ ロ
にり6
Contents
Constitution, Democracy and Military Intervention
in Politics in Japan
Huntington’s Theory of Civil-Military Relations
Finer’s Theory of Political Culture
Perlmutter’s Theory of Praetorianism and the Japanese「
Pre-War ArmyBerghahn’s Theory of the Two Types of Militarism
Mounting Militarism in JapanNotes
1.Constitution, Demoeraey and Military Intervention in
Politics in Japan
Imagine that the German Empire, founded by Bismarck 童n
1871,had survived the First World War and continued to exist
until 1945-such a senario might make it easier to understand the
political development of modern Japan, for the Japanese Empire,
founded in 1868 by the Meiji Restoration, followed a path which
this hypothetical course of German history suggests. Both Japan
and Germany had in common a constitutional system which
totally lacked c量vilian control over the army and the navy. This
system existed in Germany effectively only unt量11918;in Japan
it lasted until 1945. Hirobumi It6, the most influentiai politician
among the founding fathers of moderll Japan, introduced to Japan
the Prussian Constitution of 1850. The Prussian system of the
prerogative of the supreme command, which was independent
(212) 212
(2) Theories of Civi1・Milltary RelatiQns as related to Japan
from the control of the civil government, was also introduced to
Japan by Japanese political leaders, especially by Tar6 Kdtsura,
who had studied for a long time in Berlin. As is well known,
the prerogative of the supreme command was established by
Katsura’s efforts to detach the gelleral stafεfrom the control of
the Army Minister. These e仔orts were made well before the
Meiji Constitution was granted by the Meiji Emperor. The Prus-
sian Constitution of 1850, the Meiji Constitution of 1889 and the
Constitution’of the German Empire had in common not only the
prerogative of the King or the Emperor of the supleme command,
but also the elements of parliamentarism, or at least the possibility
of promoting such a system. One Japanese historian had Suggested
that each of these three constitutions had two souls:that of the
absoluteness of the monarch, and that of parliamentarism.(1)
If the German Empire were to survive beyond 1918, and if
the German Emperor William II, or his successors, were to behave
as passively as he did during the First World. War toward the
armed forces, the intervention of the Germall military in politics
would have been more frequent and more tenacious than during
the short interlude of military dictatorship under Genelal Erich
Ludendorff(1917-18). It would have been very di伍cult, not only
for the Parliament and for the civilian premiers, but also for the
German Emperor himself, to control military intervention in politics
within the flamework of the German Constitution.
Generally speaking, German generals and o缶cers were less
interested in politics and political intrigues than their Japanese
counterparts. Generals who showed much interst in politics, such
as Alfred Graf von Waldersee or Ludendor仔, w6re rather excepti’on-
al in the German Empire. The Japanese Army, however, produced
lnany Waldersees, if not Ludendor任s. Ever since the early days
of the Meiji Era, many of its generals and oMcers had been fond
of political intrigues, as the‘Monday Club’A仔air exempli丘es.(2}
Katsura, one of the founders of the Japanese Army, himself later
became a politician and was appointed Prime Minister three
times, However, if the German Empire had enjoyed a lohger life一
211 (211)
Theories of Civi1-Military Relations as related to Japan (3)
span, it might also have produced many more Waldersees. The
examples of the political generals in the Weimar Repubilc such as
Hans v6n seeckt and Kurt von schleicher supPort this assumptiqn.
As mentioned above, the collstitutional system of these two
Empires also had the potelltial of developing parliamentarism. In
Japan, parliamentarism developed to the extent that the ‘party-
responsible cabinet’became a general rule from 1918 until 1932.
This period is called the period of‘Taish6 Democracy’accofding
to the name.of the Emperor Taish6 under whose reign(1912-
1926)this democratic trend began and came to full blossom. This,
however, was a political phenomenon within the framework of
the Meiji Constitution. The most representat玉ve political ideologue
of‘Taish6 Democracy’was Sakuz6 Yoshino. Yoshino was pro・
fessor of political history in the Faculty of Law at Tokyo Imperial
university. He wrote.articles in the most influential periodicals
in Japan and preached the necessity of controlling the m量litary
and banishing their interference.with・politics. Yoshino’s journa1-
istic activities demonstrate in a clear-cut way the soul of parlia-
mentarism as contained in Japa耳’s.Prussian-derived Constitution・
His role can be Iikended to activists such as Eugen Richter and
Friedrich Naunlann.in the German Empire. It is signi丘c4nt that
during the First World War, Yoshino quoted a parllamentary
speech l)y Friedrich Naumann and praised highly Naumann’efforts
to curtail military meddling in politics.(3) ・
AJapanese philosoph.er, Osamu Kullo, calls the system of the
Japanese state as devised by It6 ‘the state as a work of art’,
using a phrase from Jacob Burckhardt’s description.of the city-
states of Renaissance Italy.(4) After It6,s assassination in Korea
in 1909, a new・situation arose, alld the system which had the
Emperor at the centre began to lose玉ts unity. Kuno says of the
new developments: ・ . -
Two thinkers appeared who reread and reinterpreted the copstituaion
that Itδhad made. From It6,s constitution, that is, the emperor,s Japan,
they drew the opposite c6nclusion that it(should l)e) the peQple’s
emperor, the people’s Japan and sought to make this the principie of a
new uhity.。.One was Yoshino Sakuzσ, the othεr Kita Ikki。 Yoshino
(210) 210
(4) Theories of Civil-Military Relations as related to Japan
planned to achieve(the new con丘guration)on the basis of parliament
and responsible party cabinet, while Kita planned to achieve it through
military dictatorship. They aimed in the same direction in that both
tried to eliminate the organs that stood between emperor and people, and
to make a govermnent directly connected with the people,「 盾氏@one hand,
and with the emperor, on the other. They moved in opposite directions
in that one relied on public opinion and mass movements, the other on
violence and coup d’6tat.(5)
Kita’s ideas, had they been carr玉ed out thoroughly, without being
stopped l〕y the failure of the premature coup d’6tat of February
1936,might have given Japan something Iike fascism in Italy or
National Socialism in Germany.(6)
Yoshino’s political ideas of liberal reform soon lost appeal for
Japanese intellectuals. Solne of them began to be attracted by
Marxism, newly introduced by Kazuo Fukumoto among others.
Fukumoto studied ill Germany and France in the years 1922-24
and was influenced by Karl Korsch and Georg Luk合cs, ‘Fukumoto・
ism,was received by left-wing intellectuals ill Japan as a new
gospel of genuine Marxism. Soon after his return from Europe
Fukumoto became one of the most prominent leaders of the Com-
munist Party of Japan. Although Fukumoto lost his in伽ence
mainly due to his theory being discredited by Bukhari且in Moscow
in 1927, Marxism remained influential among Japanese intellectuals.
We can easily trace Marxist trends in the articles,(7)which tried
to explain why Hitler came to power. As I once dlscussed in
another article, both the Japanese opinion leaders with their
strong Marxist tendency and the Japanese charg6 d’affaires in
Berlin equally underestimated Hitler’s power and his skill as a
politician. The most influential writers of the leading contempo・
rary periodicals in Japa且were Marxist or leftist intellectuals.
The fact that one of the same periodicals published the complete
translation of Hitler,s speech on the occasion of the Funeral of
the German President Paul von Hindenburg in 1934, is a token of
aturn in editorial policy or in the intellectual climate, or both.(8)
In the same year,1934, the Japanese Army published the so-called
‘1~ikugun-Pamψhlet’(War Ministry Palnphlet). I will discuss the
209 (209)
、
Theories of Civi1-Military Relations as related to Japan (5)
meaning of this pamphlet in the following section of this chapter.
The Japanese Army’s interference in politics became in-
creasingly stronger, especially after the Manchurian Incident of
1931. At the same time a factional feud within the Japanese
Ar血y aggravated the situation. The February mutiny of 1936
was an outcome, not only of Kita’s political ideas, but also, to a
considerable extet, of this factional feud. It goes without saying
that the origins of this mutiny also existed in the economic
misery in the rural districts of Japan caused by the World Eco-
nomic Crisis since 1929. This mutiny and its failure would have
been a chance for the civilian politicians to regain political
leadership, but this opportun量ty was not utilized by them. Thus
the failure of the mutiny, instead of preventing the military from
further interference in politics, strengthened it under the pretext
of purging from the army the defeated faction、Kδdb-ha(‘Imperial
Way’faction). By reforming the law on the selection of military
ministers in 1913, not only generals or admirals on the active list,
but also retired ones were enabled to serve as military ministers.(9)
Shortly after the mutiny, this reform, which was a product of
‘Taish6 Democracy’, was annulled upon pressure by the military.
The military ministers were limited again to general or admirals
on the active list as in the days before 1913,
In connection with the subjects discussed above, I should like
to examine theoretical apProaches to military intervention in
politics and to the problem of militarism. These are two distinct
characteristics of Japanese domestic and foreign policy in the
period from 1931 to 1945 and such a theoretical discussion may
help us explain the phenomeIlon of military intervention in Japa-
nese politics, especially in foreign policy・(lo)
2. Huntington,s Theory of Civi1・Military Relations
When Samuel P. Huntington, one of America’s foremost
political scientists and Professor of Government at Harvard Uni-
versity, published The Soldier and the States’ The Theo「y and
(208) 208
(6) Theories of Civi1-Mllitary Relations at related to Japan
Politics qズCivil・1レfilitaり21~61ations in 1957,(11) the history of the
theories of civil-military relations entered a new stage. Before
this work was published. Harold Lasswell, another political
scientist, who saw dictatorships being set up one after another in
Italy, Germany, and Spain in the 1930s, had conceived the theory
of a‘garrison state’, which was made public in 1941.(ユ2) Because
this theory is discussed in detail in.Mili彦α7ゴ∫〃z’ The Histo乳y(ゾan
lnternational 1)ebαte 1861-1979, we need not discuss it further
here.(13) Although Lasswell’s theory is important as a historical
testimony characteristic of the age, we might say that Huntington’s
work represents a classical theory in every sense of the word. A
classical theory means, for example, that a researcher who intends
to make a coherent statement on civil-military relations, cannot
avoid a confrontation with the theory, whether he or she agrees
with it or not.
Let us view Huntington’s thery brieHy in order to re-examine
it in the light of Japanese experiences..The most important basic
concept ill his theory of civil-military relations is‘professionalism’.
He clearly states that‘the modern o缶cer corps is a professional
body and the lnodern military o缶cer a professional man’.(14)
Professionalism as an antonym of amateurism separates o缶cers of
the modern world from soldiers in older periods. Just as the
special character of physicians and lawyers lies in their profession-
alism, so does this form the character of modeln o缶cers. He
declares that essential component factors of professionalism are
‘expertise㌧‘responsibility’, and ‘corporatedness’.(15) In the case
of physicians and lawyers, these are three factors which form
their professionalism. In the case of of五cers, however, these
factors are endowed with the following special features:
(1) ‘ ”
207
(2)
(3)
The expertlse’of o缶cership ls‘the management ofviolellce,.(16)
An o価cer’s‘responsibility’is the military security of
his client, i. e. society.(17)
The‘corporate character’of of丑cers means that they
form an ‘automonous social unit, which is separated
(207)
Theories of Civil-Military Relations at related to Japan (7)
from the rest of society.(18)
Aphysician’s professional skill is diagnosis and treatment.
His responsibility means the health of the patients who are his
clients. Physicians form a physicians’society as an organization
of professionals who are distinguished from amateurs in medical
affairs. Professional o缶cers possesses in a similar way the above
three special characters. According to Huntington, professionlism
of this sort could not have been established among of丑cers of the
military forces of Japan before 1945(hereafter designated as the
former forces of Japan). They were dragged about by a sort of
spiritualism named‘Bushid6’, which is the warrior’s ethic, and
they were not taught to manage violence but to participate in the
battle as their idea1.(19》 Huntington asserts:
The professional military ethic draws a distinction between the military
virtues and the warrior virtues. For the Japanese, however, the ideal
o{丑cer was a warrior-a丘ghter engaging in violence himself rather than
amanager directing the employment of violence by other. This was a
feudal, not a professional, ideal.(20)
The key term which丘gures in Huntington’basic concepts,
next to professionalism or parallel with it, is‘civilian control’.
How are these two,‘professionalism’and‘civilian control’, related
to each other P According to Huntington, the establishment of an
o伍cer corps which met the above-lnentioned three de丘nitions can
be found in Prussia in the midst of the NapoleonicWars. He
declares that this establishment of the military profession is
Prussia’s unique contlibution to the culture of Western society.(21)
Before the establishment of such modern o缶cer corps-a move
which France and England soon followed-there was only ‘sub-
jective civilian control’as a way of attaining civilian authority.
‘Subjective civilian controP nlealls that military forces wele
suppressed by maximizing the power of civilians. However, this
could not be extended to all civilians, but rather, was limited to
the power of speci丘c civilian groups. But, when modern o缶cer
corps were estal)lished, one could achieve‘objective civilian con-
trol’by developing, promoting a且d maximizing the professionalism
(206) 206
(8) Theories of Civil-Military Relations as related to Japan
of the oMcer corps.(22) This view of‘objective civilian control’
has been severely criticized by other theorists of civil-military
relations, especially by Amos Perlmutter and Samuel E. Finer.(23)
According to Huntington, raising the degree of professionalism of
the military neutralizes its intervention in politics. Therefore,
the maximization of the professionalism of the lnilitary is according
to him the only road toward achieving ‘civilian control’ in the
most desirable form. Thus, he believes that if one is dedicated to
the professional spirit, one will give less thought to politics and
political intrigues。
Huntington asserts that the Japanese of丑cer corps was‘the
major lnilitary body in the world most lacking in professional
spirit’。(24) This assertion seems to be a logical conclusion drawn
from his theory of professionalisln, rather than an inductive con-
clusion extracted from close examination of the former forces of
Japan. That these forces of Japan intervened very frequently in
politics is an evident fact, the examples of which are abundant.
Some examples will be discussed below. To insist that the same
forces were fully equipped with professionalism would undermine
Huntington’s theory completely. So he is obliged to state that
the Japanese o田cer corps was‘most lacking in professional spirit’.
This is a logical necessity. But Huntington’s observations of the
former forces of Japan suggest that his theory of professionalism,
or, more precisely, his theory that the maximization of military
professionalism Ieads to the minimization of military interventioll
in politics, is very vulnerable.
We will examine Finer’s fundamental critique of Huntington’s
theoretical reasoning in the following section of this article. For
now it should be noted that the historical facts which Huntington
marshals are treated by him in too generalized a way. He says
for example:
In contrast to the professionl military view that war is generally
undesirable and that it is the last resort of national policy, the Japanese
feudal warrior tended to praise violence and glorify war as an end in
ltself. The Japanese Ministry of War declared that:‘War is the Father
of Creation and the Mother of Culture. Rivalry for Supremacy does for
205 (205)
Theories of Civil・Military Relations as related to Japan (9)
the state what struggling against advers玉ty does for the individual. It is
such impetus, in one case, as in the other, that prompts the birth and
development of life and Cultdral Creation’. With this philosophy of
war in general it is not surprising that the Japanese military in spec董丘c
circumstallces favored、.war as a means of achieving national goals.(26)
Huntington quotes this aforementioned‘War Ministry Pamphlet’
from K. W. Kolegrove’s work. This pamphlet was published on
10ctober 1934. The political circumstances which necessitated the
publication at that time are wholly neglected by Huntington.
The draft of this famous panlphlet was prepared by Sumimasa
Ikeda, then Lieutenant-Colonel and Staff of the Military Affairs
Bureau(Gunmu-kyoku)of the War Ministry. His memoirs state
that this pamphlet was prepared as an ideological counterattack
by the 7bsθゴーha (‘Colltrol’faction) of the army against the
vehement ideological attack of theκσ4δ・ha(‘Imperial Way’fac-
tion). Ikeda’s draft was examined and approved by Malor・General
Tetsuzan Nagata, the head of the Bureau, who was to be murdered
by Lieutenant-Colonel Sabur6 Aizawa, a zealot of Kδd∂-ha who
resented Nagata as an outstanding figure of TOsei-ha. The
assassination occured on 12 August 1935, about one year after the
publicatioll of the pamphlet. Such historical context is not taken
into consideration by Huntington.(27)
Ishall discuss only one more example here of the other too
sweeping assertions by Huntington on Japanese history. He says:
tt The one possible weak point which existed in th’e military struture
of authority was the division of responsibility among a large number of
military o岱ces. In this respect Japanese organization resembled pre-
World War I German organization. The army was headed by the‘Big
Three’:the Minister of War, the Chief of the Army General Sta∬, and
the Inspector General of Military Training_The potential rivalry of these
various organizations was curbed by the mutual feeling that they could
all increase their power by working together. In 1931, for instance,
when the political parties were increasing in importance, the Big Three
of the army reached an understanding that all signi丘cant personnel
appointments would only be made with their mutual concurrence. Subse-
quently, the War Minister became more powerful and, in 1935, asserted
his authority over the Inspector General of Military Training. The
understanding of 1931 was abrogated, and the minister assumed full
authority with respect to appointments. The Minister of War thus
(204) 204
(10) Theories of Civil-Military Relations as related to Japan』
tended to become丘rst among equals. Either cooperation among the
military authorities, or the subordination of one to another, prevented
civillans from bene丘ting by the profusion of military o缶ces,(28)
There are many mistakes in this assertion. First of all,it
was in 1913, and not in 1931, that the Big Three of the army
reached an understanding that personnel appointments of lieu・
tenant-generals and generals would only be made with their
mutual concurrence. This regulation was made by the‘A∬ange-
ment between the War Ministry and the General Sta仔’(‘Sh6-bu-
ky6tei-jik6’)of 1913. This arrangement was a counteroffensive
of the army agaillst the new regulation introduced on 13 June
1913,which extended the qualification of war and navy ministers
-as we have seen above-to reserve o缶cers of the rank of general
or admira1, including lieutenant-general or vice-admiral,(29)
Huntingtoll says that ever since 19000nly a general or lieutenant-
geernal of the army on active service could be minister of war in
Japan.(30) Yet is was not in 1912 as he says, but in 1913, that
‘this restriction was limited so as to permit the appointment of
reserve o缶cers of comparable rank’.(31> As we have also seen,
this new regulation, which might have been helpful in establishing
some sort of civilian control over the military by a civilian prime
minister, was abolished in 1936, shortly after the military mutiny
in February. Moreover, this system of the Big Three was not a
weak point of the army, as Huntington says. Rather this system
was used or abused to strengthen the army’s political standpoint.
According to Yoshio Matsushita, a specialist of the Japanese
- military system, this new arrangement among the Big Three was
abused at least three times:
(1)War Minister Giichi Tanaka utilized the conference of
the Big Three in order to prevent the appointment of
Masatar6 Fukuda as his successor. Fukuda was recom-
mended by Field Marshal YOsaku Uehara, who was
Tanaka’s rival. Tanaka succeeded in this way in
appointing Kazushige Ugaki as his successor(July 1924).
(2)War Minister Ugaki in his turn utilized the conference
203 (203)
Theories of Civi1-Military Relations as related to Japan (11)
of the Big Three in order to prevent the appointment
of Nobuyoshi Mut6 as Chief of the General Staff and
to realize the appointment of his favorite, Hanz6
Kanaya. Again it was Uehara who recommended Mut6
(February 1930).
(3)When Ugaki was appointed Prime Minister, the army
prevented him from forming his cabinet by means of
the conference of the Big Three. The conference decided
not to appoint a war minister. Uhaki was forced to go
(January 1937). He was now the victim of the same
institution which he had fully abused in the past.(32)
●
3 Finer,s Theory of Political Culture
Theories of civil-military relations proposed by Samuel E.
Finer, Professor of Government and Public Administration at All
Souls College, University of Oxford, in The Man on Horseback
also deserve mentioning. According to the Random House English・
ノdPanese Dictionary this title sometimes means a military dictator,
based on the fact that General Boulanger often appeared on
horseback before the masses in Paris,
Finer,s key terms are ‘military intervention五n politics’and
‘political culture’. Finer de丘nes‘military intervention in politics’
as‘ 狽??@armed forces’constrained substitution of their own
policies and/or their persolls, for those of the recognized civilian
authorities’.(33) Finer thinks that the military has a tendency by
itself to intervene in politics at any time and in any place.
According to Huntington, the factor which prohibits the desire
for intervention is the establishment of the military’s professional-
ism. However, Finer claims that there are many actual examples
which fundamentally disprove the assertion made by Huntington.
Finer says:
In so far as professionalism makes the military look on their task as
different from that of the politicians, and as self-su伍cient and full・time,
it ought, logically, to inhibit the army from wishing to intervene. Yet
it is observable that many highly professional o伍cer corps have intervened
(202) 202
(12) TheQries of Civil・Military Relations as related to Japan
in politics-the German and Japanese cases are notorious. It is of no use
to retort that in such cases these armies cannot be described as‘fully’
professional. This is the whole weakness of Huntington’s thesis. All is
made to hallg upon a very special de丘nition of professionalism, and by
pure deduction from this, of a so-called‘military mind’. The argument
then becomes‘essentialist,,(34)
One would not have to wait for Finer’s criticism in order to
realize that in carrying through his basic assertion that dedication
to professionalism is the biggest factor for the achievement of
civilian control, Huntington is forced to handle his accounts on
German and Japanese military in a very abstruse manner. Upon
reading Huntington’s The Soldier and the State, one is immediately
aware of the di仔iculty.
Concerning the German military, Huntington attempts to
structure his theory by丘nding the finest model丘gure 6f professiona1-
ism since the early nineteenth century in the Prussian Army,
which, in extended form, also comprised the German military in
the Second German Empire (1871-1918). Thus, all the more,
Huntington is greatly annoyed at the military dictatorship by
General Ludendor鉦during the First World War, and at the subse-
quent course of the German Reichswehr under leadership of
General Hans von Seeckt who was said to have aimed at creating
‘astate within the state’ln the Weimar Republic. Even Hunting-
ton cannot help but admit that the German military intervened in
politics during the period of the Ludendorff dictatorship, and to
some extent during the period of von Seeckt. Consequently, he can
do nothing but think that the same German military which had
achieved the most ideal way of existence from the viewpo三nt of
the realization of civilian control, changed its character to the
worst and most undesirable in a very short period. One must
say that assuming such a sudden change and discontinuity is
against common understanding of history and involves considerable
di伍culty.(35)
In the case of the Japanese military, it is a clear fact that
the military, especially the army, was highly political in nature
from the very beginning and that their frequent intervention in
201 (201)
Theories of Civil-Military Relations as related to Japan (13)
politics reached an extreme in the early half of the Shδwa era
(1926-45).Thus, in order to make his theory tenable, Huntington
declares that the Japanese army did not establish professionalism
at alL As we have see11, Finer fully rejects such efforts by
Huntington on the Japanese and German military.(36)
Finer thinks that there have been many cases where pro-
fessionalism itself gave rise to a confrontation with civilian
authorities. He classi丘es these cases into three types. The second
type, with which we are concerned, is military syndicalism. It
can be found in the German and Japanese Armies until the out-
break of the Second World War and in the French Army during
the Dreyfus period.(37)This‘military syndicalism’has something
to do with the fact that within the armed forces the laymen
outside the army are often called‘civvies’,‘frocks’, or‘p6kins’.(38)
Tee Japanese Army treated the world outside as‘local’and
civilians.as ‘Iocal people’(chih6-jin). Only the Army was
thought to be ‘central’.
According to Finer intervention in politics by the military
involves the following four levels:
(1)
(2)
1ner
levels are the four levels of
of the world
countrles
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Thus,
(200)
(3)
(4)
F’
the level of influence upon the civil authorities (consti-
tutional and legitimate);
the level of pressures, or’blackmail’(covers a wide
range from barely constitutional to clearly unconsti-
tUtiOnal CaSes);
the level of disPlace〃¢ent:
the level of sul)plant〃lent.(39)
asserts that those that closely co-relate to these four
‘political culture’, Various countries
are classi丘ed into the following four groups of
of the level of ‘political culture,:
countries of a mature Political Culture∫
countries of a developed political culture ;
countries of a low political culture∫
countries of mini〃ial Political cultuγe.(40)
according to Finer’s classi丘catio11, Germany from the
200
(14) Theories of Civi1-Military Relations as related to Japan
Empire to Hitler,s seizure of power, Japan between the two World
Wars, France from the Third Republic onwards,.as well as the
U.S. S. R. fall into the second group.(40)What interests us is that
he recognizes something common among the Kapp riot in Germany
(March 1920), the 26 February mutiny in Japan(1936), and the
French rebellion in Algeria (April 1961):in all these rebellions,
the military took actioll independently, ignored the intentions of
civilians, then ultimately became isolated, and were eventually
forced to fail due to civilian resistance.
Why did these rebellions by the military fail?While they had
their own reasons respectively, the ult童mate cause for their failure
lies in the political cultures of Germany, Japan and France, which
were fairly highly developed, or at least at the second level,
according to Finer’s schema. The German and Japanese military
which learned that military dictatorship(supplantment)through
rebellion would be impossible, gave up this approach, and, instead,
devoted themselves to intervention in politics from level(1)to
(2),namely, at the levels using influence by exerting pressure, up
to‘blackmailing’. Both the German Reichswehr and the Japanese
‘Control’ faction (7「δsθ∫一勿) realized high-level political inter-
vention by this means.(42)
We can analyse the February mutiny in Japan from yet
another point of view. The Japanese Constitution of 1889(Meiji
Constitution)defined the Emperor as possessing both civilian and
military supreme power. The military supreme power of the
Emperor was called ‘T6sui-ken’(the Emperor’s prerogative of
supreme command). Because the civilian supreme power was in
reality entrusted to a civilian government, and furthermore be-
cause this government became increasingly dependent. on the
political parties within the parliament(the Lower House), it was
possible for parliamentary democracy to flourish under the Meiji
Constitution. This was a development in Japan under‘Taish6
Democracy’. Parallel with this development, Tatsukichi Minobe,
Professor of Constitutional Law at the Faculty of Law of Tokyo
Imperial University, elaborated a theory of‘the Emperor as an
199 (199)
Theories of Civil-Military Relations as related to Japan (15)
organ of the state’.(43)His theory was based on that of勿万s∫ゴsc勿
Staα彦sperson(judicial person of the state)developed by the German
scholar Georg Jellinek. Minobe Inade a study trip to Germany and
introduced Jellinek’s theory to Japan, adapting it to Japanese ロ
Sltuatlon.
Emperor Hiroshito himself was inclined to the theory of the
Emperor as an organ of the state and intended to act as a con-
stitutional monarch who reigns, but does not govern. It is often
said that three times in his life, he acted, not as a collstitutional
monarch of this type, but as an absolute monarch in full posses。
sion of the Inilitary supreme command. The丘rst case concerned an
incident in Manchuria. He reproved Prime Minister Giichi Tanaka
vehemently when Tanaka reported to him(July,1929)falsely
that the assassination of General Chang Tso-ling (4 June 1928)
was not committed by any personnel of the Japanese Kwantung
Army. This report was made in order to conceal the fact of
assassination by the Japanese Colonel Daisaku K6moto, member of
the staff of the Kwantung Army. The Kwantung Army pressed
Tanaka to collceal the truth.(44) The second case occured during
the February mutiny in 1936. The third case was the Emperor’s
decision to end the war in August 1945. In the case of the
February mutiny, to‘suppress the rebels quickly’, the Emperor
issued orders against the resistance of hesitating generals such as
War Minister Yoshiyuki Kawashima and Chief Martial Law
Administrator K6hei Kashii, who sympathized with the rebels.
This is what the important source material, namely the Kidb
K砒雇Nikki, the diary of Marquis K6ichi Kido, who later in 1940
was appointed to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, reports.(45)
Another source says that the Emperor insisted on suppressing the
reわels even by commanding himself the Imperial Guard Division.(46)
According to these source, the rebellion failed, not because of the
high level of ‘political culture’of the Japanese people, but be-
cause of the Emperor’s own decision which has little to do with
the ‘political culture’of the governed people.
More analogous to the rebellion of the French colonial army
(198) 198
(16) Theories of Civi1・Military Relations as related to Japan.
in Algeria in 1961 are Colollel K6moto’s plot in 1928 and the
Kwantung Army’y plot in Manclluria in 1931, as these were also
rebellions by colonial armies. The former failed by the resistance
of the Emperor, but the latter succeeded to establish Japan’s
puppet state‘Manchukuo’in 1932. The February mutlny of
1936has little in common with these rebellions by colonial armies.
It seems to have more in commoll with the Kapp riot in Germany.
4. Perlmutter,s Theory of Praetorianism and the Japa-
nese Pre・War Army
T12e Military and P・litics・in・M・dern Times:On Pr()fessi・滋1s,
Praetorians, and、Revolutionary Soldiers,1977, by Amos Perllnutter,
Professor of Political Science and Sociology at the American Uni・
versity in Washington DC, is one of the most noteworthy works,
in terms of both quality and quantity, that appeared during the
period of twenty years after Huntington’s presentatioll of his
classical theory in The Soldier and the Sta te.(47) To avoid clutter-
ing the context of this article, I shall confine myself here to a
l〕rief summary of his work,
Perlmutter accepts totally, even if only tentatively, Hunting-
ton’s three terms of professionalism in the military. However,
Perlmutter tries to revise Huntington’s theory to a large extent
by asserting that the increase in size of corporatedness-Perlmutter
calls it‘corporatism’-destroys sound civil-military relations.(48)
He classifies the military in modern nation-states into three
types of‘military.corporatism’which correspond to the three
ways of modern nation-states: 層
(1)
(2)
(3)
Concerning
regarding Prussia
197
aclassical type of professional soldler;
atype of corporate professionalism represented by the
praetorian soldier;
atype of professionlism represented by the noncorporate
revolutionary soldier.(49)
(1),he follows Huntington’s way of thinking
and France. The border between (1) and (2)
(197)
Theories of Civi1-Military Relations as related to Japan (17)
is in flux. Thus:‘Japan was brought to the brink of praetori・
anism when the state, the society, and the forces of ideology all
converged in support of expansionism’.(50) And the German
Army showed the trend of praetorianism during the period of von
Seeckt in the 1920s.〔51) Form (2)reached its apex in Latin
America in the twentieth century and‘by the 1970s was the only
form of military organizational behavior in the Middle East,
North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa’.(52) Form (3) is repre・
sented by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army and the Israeli
Forces. The military does not involve itself in politics in these
cases, although it forms the basis of both states.(53)
Perlmutter’s analysis of Japanese civi1-military relations is, as
he admits in a footnote,(54)largely based on secondary works.
Much of his interpreta’狽奄盾氏@is based on James B. Crowley,s work.(55)
Although Crowley’s is a solid study of Japanese politics in the
1930s based on Japanese source materials, Perlmutter’s interPreta-
tion of the Japanese situation is a little one-sided. He overesti-
mates the predolninance of the members of the traditionary
military‘han’, namely local territorial states in Japan before
the reforln of 1871,0r clans, especially of the Ch6sh亘(army)and
the Satsuma(navy)clans.(56)This predominance was not able to
stand the test of time. The First World War taught the Japanese
Army that modernization and mechanization aimed at total
mobilization was an absolute necessity. On 270ctober 1921 in
Baden・Baden three Japanese o伍cers studying in Germany discussed
Ludendorff,s idea of total war and conspired to crush Ch6shU
predominace, reform Japan,s military institution, and work towards
total mobilization of the nation. The three o缶cers were Tetzuzall
Nagata, Toshishir60bata, and Neiji Okamura. They belonged
to the same generation and although their action ill Baden-
Baden was largely symbolic, were Iater to play important roles
within the army.〔57) Nagata was born in 1884,0bata in 1885,
Okamura in 1884.
A second symbolic act was the appointment of Kazushige
Ugaki as War Minister in 1924. Although Ugaki’s appointment
(196) 196
(18) Theories of Civil-Military Relations as related to Japan
tutional system of Japan began
civilian and military, after the
Kinmochi Saionji, the last‘genrδ’
personality. The rise of extreme
aroused misgivings in some army eircles, as described above, it
showed that the age of the Ch6sha clan was clearly over. Ugaki
came from Okayama prefecture, not from Yamaguchi prefecture
(the former Ch6shtt domain). The fading of Ch6shU predominance
in the army, however, resulted in the formation of a new and
extreme kind of militarism. As pointed out above, the Japanese
Emperor monopolized theoretically both civil supreme power and
supreme command of the army and navy according to the Meiji
Constitution. The former was entrusted to the civilian cabinet,
and the latter was entrusted to the general staffs of the army and
the navy. There was no constitutional body which could have
regulated these two authorities. There was only a group of
‘genrO’(elder statesmen), outstanding politicians who were also
the founding fathers of the new nation・state of Japan, such as
Hirobumi It6, Iwao Oyama, Masayoshi Matsukata, Kaoru Inoue,
and Aritomo Yamagata. Yamagata, born in 1838, survived alI
others and exerted the strongest power of all. To some extent,
these‘genrO’, especially It6 and Yamagata, Played the role of
regulating the two powers, civilian and military, which were
supposed to belong to the Emperor. To put it simply, the consti一
tumult surrounding the signing of the London N
Treaty (1930), or more specifically
Manchurian Incident(1931)discussed in Chapter 2
be directly attributed to the predominance
within the army. It must be noted that in the meantime
Democracy,had appeared and Ch6sh
not only within the army, but also in Japanese politics and society
at large. Ugaki symbolized this age of transition before the rise
of a new, and to some extent, modernized and extreme form of
militarism.(58)
to split lnto two authorities,
death of Yamagata in 1922.
was not such a strong Political
militarism in Japan after the
aval Disarmament
after the outbreak of the
,could no longer
of the Ch6shtt clan
,‘Taish6
a’predominance faded away,
195 (195)
Theories of Civil・Military Relations as.related to Japan (19)
5. Berghahn,s Theory of the Two Types of Militarism
As is suggested above, the llew militarism of J4pan in the
Sh6wa period contained to some extent the modernizing elements,
as the convent of Baden-Baden demonstrates. In this respect, the
theory of the two types of militalism proposed in the previously
mentionedハ4ilitarism :The、History of an In彦ernational Debate 1861-
1979by Volker R, Berghahn, Professor of Modern History at
Brown University, attracts our attention. He begins his discussions
on the two types of militarism by reviewing the recent work of
Michael Geyer.(59)Berghahn says as follows:
General Hans von Seeckt, the father of the Weimar Army, held
impeccably conservative views about its organization and function in
society. His approach was elitist・exclusivist, hostile to the existing
parliamentary regime and with little appreciation of the lessons to be
learned frQm the First World War in the丘elds of technology and econQ・
mics。 In short, he stood for the ideas and principles of the old Prussian
Army. What was true of Seeckt, was not necessarily true of the majors and
colonels ori his staff。 According to Geyer, Inuch of what has been written
about the Reichswehr since 1945 represents merely half the picture. His
evaluation of fresh archival material revealed a different and very
‘modern’image of the German army. He discovered that there had
been a number of younger o田cers in the planning and operations depart-
ments of the Ministry who had drawn their own conclusions from the
course of the First World War. Whereas many of their older comrades
were convinced that the war had been lost by Germany because of a
breakdown in her morale and ‘will power’, the ‘industrialization of
warfare’Ieft an indelible impression on the planners in the young
Republic’s military bureaucracy. These oHicers saw themselves as pro-
fessionals devoted to putting an end to the chaos and decentralization
which marked the organizatiQn of the Reichswehr in the early 1920s,
So they began to improve the system of mobilizatiQn and to rational・
ize Iogistics in an attempt to gear Germany’s armed forces to the age of
h量gh mechanization and automation of warfare.(6e)
Asimilar development in Japan parallel to this new trend in
the German Reichswehr can be seen in the effort of War Minister
Ugaki. He began to modernize the Japanese Army in May 1925
by abolishing four divisions and by newly estqblishing the tank
(194) 194
(20) Theories of Civil・Military Relations as related to Japan
units, strengthening the army air force, and by modernizing, for
example, wireless communication. By abolishing the divisions,
he did away with about 34,000 men and allotted the budget thus
gained to the modernization of the army. These attempts are
called in Japan the‘Ugaki Disarmament’(Ugaki Gunshuku).(61)
In November 1925 a new Army Minister, Paul Painlev6, was
appointed in France. Painlev6 tried to modernize the French
Army by reducing the length of conscript service from a year
and a half to one year and by abolishing two divisions. Painlev6’s
idea seems to be closer to Ugaki’s than to von Seeckt’s. Anyhow
it will be an interesting task to study in comparison the military
and political ideas of von Seeckt, Painlev6, and Ugaki.(62)Although
Ugaki’s efforts to modernize the army were not fully realized due
to the stubborn resistance of the conservative o伍cers and generals,
grees with Tim Mason’s argument that
ence of the Flrst World War and the collapse of the homefront in
1917/18played a major part in Hitler’s velvet-glove approach to
the working population,(63)and continues:
such as the cavalry generals,
them as the prime mover of the
are worth reassessing as those
time and under the pressure of
Berghahn a
and although he was resented by
‘Ugaki Disarmament’, his efforts
modernizing the army in peace-
‘Taish6 Democracy’.
.‘the experi一
This is the immediate hlstorlcal background to the guns-and・butter
policy which Hitler adopted in the 1930s. The regime did not dare to
make a choice between mainta圭ning living standards and fully-fledged
‘in-depth’rearmament. Instead it pursued a policy which providedわo漉,
but both, as it turned out, in insu伍cient quantities. By the late 1930s,
the economic e仔ects of the programme of rapid rearmament could befelt.(64)
wasmilitarism into these two types:old-style
reliance on sacrifice and tight discipline’(66)
logical militarism’.(67) He concludes:
According to Berghahn, Hitler’s escape from this dilemma
‘swift victories,by‘lightning attacks’.(65)Thus he classifies
Given that highly industrialized
consu血ptlon and hence』wi
193
militarism ‘with its
and the new‘techno一
societ三es are orientated towards
11not bear indefinitely the extended austerity
(193)
Theories of Civil-Military Relations as related to Japan (21)
of a society permanently mobilized for total war, the attempt to do both
at the same time will prove self。destructive. Since the new‘technological
militarism’cannot operate without a skilled workforce which demands
material appeasement, the old・style militarism with its reliance on
sacri丘ce and tight discipline becomes counter・productive and tends to
jeopardize the. stability of the entire system。(68)
When we consider the nature of the militarism and the world・
view of the military in Japan, we may be allowed to insist with-
out going into the details of statistics that they fall into Berghahn’s
categorization of the first rather than the second type of militarism.
The military leaders i亘Japan always dema且ded from the Japanese
people austerity, sacrifice, and tight・discipline by utilizing Pro-
paganda appealing to the loyalty of the people to the Emperor.
The Emperor system(tenn6-sei)was fully exploited by them as
asource of propaganda. During the Paci丘c War, slogans quoting
the legendary founder of the Imperial Family, Emperor Jimmu,
were pasted at almost every corner of the streets in Japan. The
millitary leaders in Japan paid little attention to the welfare of
the working ciass and of the Japanese people in gelleral・ This
situation, again, has to do with the fact that the ‘Prussian’
system persisted in Japan up to 1945. Therefore, the quasi-military
dictatorship by General Hideki T616 during the years 1941-44 has
more elements in common with the Ludendorff dictatorship than
with Hitler’dictatorship.
6.Mounting Militarism in Japan
The military intervention in Japan after the outbreak of the
Manchurian Incident in 1931 was essentially strengthened after
the February mutiny of 1936. The military impact was felt not
only in domestic politics, but also in foreign policy. One of the
results of military intervention was the conclusion of the Anti-
Comintem Pact with Hitler’s Germany in November 1936. The
military intervened strongly in Japan,s foreign policy to strengthen
the rather vague pact into a ful1-scale military alliance between
Japan, Germany and Italy, which also joined the pact in Novem.
(192) 192
(22) Theories of Civil-Military Relatlons as related to Japan
ber 1937. But because the civil politicians and the top.Ieaders of
the Japanese Navy objected to a widening bf cooperation b’ ?狽翌??
Japan, Germany and Italy into a military alliance against, Great
Britaill and France, the negotiations with Germany and Italy
were hampered.(69)
The diplomatic stalemate between・Japan and. Germany con-
cerning the military alliance after the shock of the German・Soviet
Non-Aggression Pact of August 1939,’was again activated in the
summer of 1940 after the victories of the Iightning attacks by
Hitler’s Germany. The key persons in the.making of the Tripartite
Allience Berlin-Rome-Tokyo were Foreign Minister Y6suke Matsu-
oka and his German counterpart Joachiln von Ribbentrop. They
cherished similar ideas of a quadruple pact Berlin-Rome-Moscow-
Tokyo. This coincidence appears to have been・instrumental in
the drafting of the Tripartite Pact of September 1940. It..seems
to me that it is necessary to pay more attention to these key
丘gures and also to the difference of diplomatic concepts existing
between von Ribbentrop and Hitler than has been done in research
up to now on this alliance.(70) ・
In pre-war days, the Soviet Union was a troublesome neighbour
for Japanese foreign policy decision-makers, including the military.
To the Japanese military attach6 in Berlin, Major・General Hiroshi
Oshima, the lessons of the secret treaty of Bj6rk6 in July 1905
hinted at an agreement between Japan and Germany against
Russia。(71) The harsh lessons of the local war in Nomonhan in
the summer of 1939 between the Kwantung Army of Japan and
the Red Army of the Soviet Union taught the leaders of the
Japanese Army the tremendous military strength of the latter.
The shock of the Nomonhan affair remains to be discussed much
more thoroughly by the historians.(72).Hitler’s Germany seem§to
have drawn a(lifferent lesson from the war between Finland and
the Sov.iet Union in the winter of 1939/40 and,come to the con-
clusion that the Red Army Was rather weak in comparison to the
German Army. Soon this conclusion proved. to be mistaken.
Anyhow, the development of the Gerlnan-Soviet relations was,a
191 (191)
Theories of Civll-Military Relations.as related to Japan (23)
matt曾r of great concern for the Japanese leaders including the
military. The shock of the Non-Aggression Pact between Berlin
and Moscow misled the Japanese leaders, especially Foreign Minis-
ter Matsuoka, to believe that good relations between Berlin and
Moscow「would endure for a considerably long period of time.
This erroneus perception of German-Soviet relations was injurious
for the・destiny of Japan.
Also injurious fbr Japan was the Prussian system of the
supreme command’s independence from civilian control. To show
to what extent this system troubled the civil government, I shalI
quote the memoirs of Prince Fumimaro Konoe who acted three
times as civilian Prime Minister with no power over the military:
The fact that the Supreme Command and State Affairs are indepen一
dent of each other has been a matter of anguish for cabinets from gener-
atlon to generatlon.
During the present Japanese-American negotiations, too, the govern・
ment was conducing these negotiations with all its powers, but the
military was vigorously making preparations in case the neotiations should
be broken off:Moreover, as to what these preparations were, we did not
know at all, and it was not possible to have them go along step by step
with diplomacy. Since the military vigorously went about moving ships,
mobilizing troops, etc., and these things were discovered by the United
States, the United States would question the sincerity of our diplomacy,
so that we were frequently embarrassed because the relationship between
diplomacy and military matters was not smooth.
In t,he pressing atmosphere since September last year(1941), when
we were either to have war with the United States or not, Prince Higashi-
kuni, who was one of the supporters of prudence, used to say that in
order to effect a break in this situat三〇n there was no other way but for
the EmperQr to stand丘rm, But.it is said that the Emperor-and this is
something that he also said to me-said a number of times to Higashikuni
too, that he was having a hard time of it because of the military. On
such occasions the Prince said to・the Emperor that it wouldn’t do for
him to say things that a critic might say, but if he were to feel that
anything was improper he should say so.
The fact that the Emperor practically never expressed his opinlons,
so rarely that one would think he.was Qn the reserve side, was due, I
think, to Prince Saionji, Count MakinQ, and others, who, thinking of the
ρperations of a cQnstitution in the English style, said that the Emperor,
as far as possible, ought not to take the initiative and interfere in matters
aside from stating three items at the time of issuing a command to form
anew Cabinet, namely, repect for the constitution, not being unreasonable
(190) 190
(24) Theories of Civil・Military Relations as related to Japan
by the Emperor, and
st1tutlon.
Supreme Command, the government has no power at all of raising its
voice, and the only person who may retain both the government and the
Supreme Command is the Emperor. Any yet, the fact that the Emperor
is on the passive side, acting in the English style, gives rise to numerous
d面culties in wartime, although it may be all right in peace. In the
Japanese-America negotiations, I bitterly felt the fact that it could not
be settled simply by the urgings and suggestions given, in the English
style, by the Emperor.(73)
in diplomacy, and not bringing about s血dden and great changes in the
丘nancial world.
But the Japanese constitution is built on a framework of direct rule
is fundamenta11y di鉦erent from the English con-
’ Especially in reference to the problem of the authority of the
Prime Min玉ster Konoe was replaced by General Hideki T6j6
in October,1941. T6j6 held also the posts of Home Minister,
War Misister, later Munitions Minister, a豆d i且1944 the post of
the Chief of the General Staff. The two prerogatives, civilian and
military, were thus uni丘ed by him. Asituation similar to the
Ludendorff dictatorship began in Japan. The politician Seig6
Nakano alone dared to criticize T6j6’s quasi・dictatorship openly.
In an article‘Senli saish6 ron’(On War-Time Premier)published
in the newspaper Asahi on l January 1943, Nakano criticized T6j6
quoting the example of Hindenburg and Ludendorff.during the
First World War. Nakano wrote that both Hindenburg and Luden-
dorff, though excellent as warriors in Tannenburg, degenerated
into super丘cial despots at the moment when they monopolized the
command of the whole German Army, and that they oppressed
the German people instead of relying upon them. T6j6 was
infuriated at Nakano’s art圭cle, and suppressed the edition of the
newspaper. But this punishment came after this edition had been
widely distributed and was not effective. Leslie Russell Oates, who
teaches Japanese language and East Asian history at the Univer・
sity of Melboume in Australia, describes this event as follows:
Banning and censorship of Tδtairileu (Eastern Continent-Nakano’s
periodical) were intensi丘ed and even the New Year’s Dtiy 1943 issue of
the/lsahi(newspaper)was banned for carrying an article by Nakano on
wartime prime rninisters. Although this spoke through guarded historicaI
allusions some of these were rather telling, for example the point that
Generals Hindenburg and Ludendorff were great in the field, but when
189 (189)
Theories of Civil-Military Relations as related to Japan (25)
placed in supreme control of the war failed to put a proper trust in the
people, instead restricting them and‘trampling on their patriotism by
imposing a servile drudgery,.㈹
Although these comments may be interpreted as“guarded
historical allusions” as Oates does, Nakano’s comments on
Hindenburg and Ludendorff are highly interesting when we pay
attention to the similarily between the“Ludendorff dictatorship”
in Germany during the First World War and T6j6’s quasi-
dictatorship in Japan in the Second World War.㈹
Notes
(1)
))23
((
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
))89
((
Yukio Mochida, Hikale u kindai shi no ronri :2>ihon to Doitsu(The
Logic of a Comparative Study of Modern History:Japan and Germany)
(Kyoto,1970), pp.109 ff. MQchida is Professor of Western History at
Dδshisha University in Kyoto. The styling of the Japanese constitu。
tion after the Prussian model is discussed in:Masaki Miyake,‘German
Cultural and Political In舳ence on Japan,1870-1914’, John A. Moses
and Paul M。 Kennedy(ed.), Ger2nany in伽Pacific and Far East,
1870-1914(St. Lucia, Queensland,1977).
Miyake, ibid., p.164.
Yoshino quoted Naumann’s interpellation of 9 0ctober 1917 in the
German Reichstag and fully sympathized with it in his artlcle‘Gun-
batsu no gaik6 y6kai o nanzu’(I BIame the Military Crique’s Inter-
vention in Foreign Policy), in the Chti∂・KOron(the Central Revue)
of May,1918.
George M. Wilson,1~adical Nationlist in/apan’Kita llehi 1883-1937
(Cambridge, Mass.,1969), p.149.
Ibid., pp.151 f., translated and quoted.by Wilson from a chapter by
Oasmu Kuno, in Osamu Kuno and Shunsuke Tsurumi, Gendaiハrohon
犯oshisO’Sono itsutsu no uzu(Five Whirlpools of ContemporaryJapanese Thought)(Tokyo,1956), pp.138 f.
Cf. Masaki Miyake,‘Kita Ikki’s Political Ideas and February Mutiny
of 1936’, Janet Hunter (ed.), 1nterna彦ional Studies 1987/1∫’ ∠【spects
o/Pan・Asianism, Suntory Toyota International Centre for Economics
and Related Disciplines, London School of Economics and Political
Science(London,1987).
Cf. Masaki Miyake,‘Japan und die nationalsozialistiche Machtergreif-
ung’, Wolfgang Michalka(ed.), Die nationalsozialistische Ma cht〃-
greiノ擁π8・(Paderborn, 1984).
Ibid., p.309.
Testuo Najita, Hara Kei in the Po〃tics o/Co〃lpromise 1905-1915
(Cambridge, Mass.,1967), pp.178-182.
(188) 188
(26) Theories of Civil・Military R61ations as relhted to Japan
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)、
(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)
(22)
(23)
(24)
(25)
(26)
(27)
(28)
(29)
(30)
On the phenomenon of military intervention in Japanese diplomacy, cf.
Masaki Miyake, Sino-Western Rapprochement and the Response o∫
the /aPanese 」Fo「eign Policy 」Decision一ル∫akers 1928-1938’ ルfilitary
In彦ervention in Politics and /apanese 1)iplomacy, The Bulletin of
lthe Institute of Social Sciences, Meiji University, Vol。12, No.2,1989.
Samuel.P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State :The. Theory and
Politics o/Civil-。ハ4ilitary 1~elations. first.published by Belknap Press
of the Harvard University Press,(Cambridge, Mass.,1957), with a
new edition available since 1981 as’aHarvard paperback in the Belknap
Press series. Ava三lable also in a Caravelle Edition, Vintage Books, a
division of Random House, New York. This book has been recently
translated into Japanese by Ry6ichi Ichikawa as Gunブin to koleka,2
vols.,(Tokyo,1978-9).
Harold D. Lasswell,‘The Garrison State and the Specialists on Vio一
lence,,∠4〃terican /ournal oアSociology(January 1941),
Volker R. Berghahn,ルfilitaris〃1’The History oアα%
ヱ)ebateヱ861-1979,(Leamington Spa,1981), pp.43-46.
Huntlngton,アhe Soldieアand tゐθState, P.7.
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
pp.7-10.
P.11.
P.15.
P.16.
pp. 126 f.
p.126.
pp.30 f.
pp. 80-3.
pp.455-68.
International
Amos Perlmutter, Theルfili彦aryα%4 PoJ漉cs in Modern Times’OnP70ノ乙ss∫oηα1s, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers(New Haven
and London,1977), pp.5f. Samuel E. Finer, Theルtan on Horse∂acle :
丁加Role o∫the.Military in Politics, second, enlarged edition (Har・
mondsworth,1976), pp.21 f..
Huntington, The Soldier and the State, P.126.
Ibid., p.129.
Ibid. .
Masaki Miyake,‘Seigun kankel no shikaku kara mita.1930-nen dal no
Nihon’(Japan in the 1930s Reconsidered from the Aspect of Civil一
Military Relations), ln Kimitada Mlwa(ed.), S嫌δ
2enya’Nihon.no 1930-nen dai ron to shite(The Eve
War Reconsidered:As Discussions of Japan’s 1930s),
On the‘War Ministry Pamphlet’, cf. Michio Fujimura,
ku sen taisei to k亘deta keikaku’(The System of
and the Plans of Coup d’6tat), ibid., pp.88-91.
Huntington,7「he Soldier and彦he State, pp.132 f.
YoshiQ Matsushita,ハ硫o%gunsei to sθゴガ(The
of Japan and Japanese Politics)(Tokyo,1960), PP.
Huntington, The Soldier and the State p.131.
taiheiyδsensoof the Pacific
(Tokyo,1981).
‘Kokka s6ryo.
Total Mobilization
Military Organization 109f.
187 (187)
Theories of.Civil←Military Relations as related to Japan (27)
く31)
(32)
く33)
(34)’
(35)
(36)
(37)
(38)
(39)
(40)
(41)
(42)
(43)
(44)
(45)
(46)
Ibid.
Matsushita, Nihon gunsei, pp.110 f.
Finer, The Man.01¢Horsseback, p.20.
Ibid., pp.21 f.
Ibid., p.21..
Ibid.
Ibid.,、 p.23.
James B.
and
On‘TState), cf.
no tenn∂-leilean-setsu
setsu:Three Types ofHistory
Political Science at Kyoto Unlversity
Meili Constitution by Sh Uesugi, Mitsue Ichimura
as the three types of the theory of the Emperor as an organ of the
state. Uesugi and Minobe w.ere rivals in the same faculty of law of
Tokyo Imperial Univer5ity. These two professors interpreted the Meili
Constitution from.tWo totally d遜erent standpoints. Uesug董’s inter・
pretation resembled much the‘Divine Richt of Kings’theory. On the
prerQgat董ve Qf supreme command of the Japanese Emperor under the
Meiji Constitution, see Tomio Nakano, TOsui-ken犯o doleuritsu(The
Independence of.the Prerogative of Supreme Colnmand), first published
.in・.1934, and reprinted in 1974, Tokyo. Nakano was Professor of Wa-
seda University in Tokyo. See also Tsuguo Fujita,. Meiji leenpδron:
1(獅kenpδkara shin leenpδe(The Meli CQnstitution;From the Old
Constitution to the New Cons‡五tution)(Tokyo,1948);Tsuguo Fujita,
Guntai toブiya(The Military and Liberty)(Tokyo,1953), Fujita
taught Constitutional Law at Sophia University in Tokyo.
Masashi Nezu, Dai・Nihon∫ε伽々π%o hδkai’Tennb shδwa海ゴ,1(The
Fall of the Japanese Empire, VoL l of the Emperor Shδwa Chronology)
(Tokyo,1966), pp.88 ff. Nezu publlshed seven vQlumes of theハlihon
gendai shi(Colltemporary History of Japan)(Tokyo,1966)and also
translated V. Gordoll Child’s works,
K6ichi Kido, Kido](bichi niklei(The Diary of K6ichi Kido), Vol.1
(Tokyo,1966). Cf. Yale C. Maxon, Control o∫ノapanese、Foreign
Policy :AS彦udツof Cit/il-1レrilitary 1~ivalry 1930-1945, 0riginally pub・
lished in 1957, Berkeley, reprinted in.1983, Westport, Conn. pp.108-10.
Masashi Nezu, Hihanハlihon. gendai shi(Contemporary History of
Japan. A Critical Survey)(Tokyo,1958), p.138. Nezu quotes here
Ibid., p. 21。
Ibid., pp.77 f.
Ibid., pp.79 f.
Ibid., p. 79.
Ibid., pp.80-5.
Crowley,ノaPan’s Quest/br Autono〃ty:National Secu7ity
Foreign Policy 1630-1938(Princeton, New Jersey,1966), p.258.
enn6-kikan-setsu’(Theory of the Emperor as an Organ of the
Seitar6 Miyamoto, TennO・kilean-setsu no shtihen :Mittsu
to shδwa shi no shOgen(Around Tenn6-kikan・
Tenn6-kikan-setsu and the Testimony of the
of the Sh6wa Era)(Tokyo,1980). Miyamoto, Professor of
,demonstrates the theories on the
inkichi and Ikki Kita
(186) 186
(28) Theories of Civil・Military Relations as related to Japan
(47)
(48)
(49)
(50)
(51)
(52)
(53)
(54)
(55)
(56)
(57)
(58)
(59)
))01
魔∪ρ0
((
(62)
(63)
(64)
(65)
(66)
(67)
(68)
(69)
(70)
185
the diary of General Shigeru Honjδto demonstrate his interpretation.
Honj6 was at that time Chief Aide・de・Camp to the Emperor. See
Hb勿δ”ゴ々々ゴ(The D三ary of Honl6)(Tokyo,1967), p.276.(Entry of
27 Februar 1936). Cf。 E〃ψθ707 Hirohito and his Chieノノ1ゴ4ε一1)e・
CamP, The HonノδDiary,1933-36, Translation and Introduction by
Mikiso Hane(Tokyo,1982), p.170.
See above, n.23. Cf, Amos Perlmutter and Valerie Bennett(eds.),
The Potitical lnfluence O∫theルrilitary.’AComParative 1~ead〃(New Haven and London,1980)。
Foreword to Perlmutter, Theハ石〃tary and P∂litics by Huntington, xi.
Ibid., preface, xv.
Ibid., p.75.
Ibid., p.55.
Ibid,, preface, xv,
Ibid,
Ibid., p.301, n.87.
See above, n.38.
Perlmutter, Theルfi〃tarアα〃4 P∂〃tics, P。74.
Masae Takahashi, Sん伽απo gun-batsu(The Military Clique of the
Sh6wa Era),(Tokyo,1969), pp.54 ff. The Sh6wa Era began on 25
December 1926 and ended on 7 January 1989. Takahashi focuses on
militarism in the first half of the Sh6wa Era until 15 August 1945.
Crowley,ノapan’5 Q〃est/b7∠4utonomy, pp.85 f. On‘genr6,see also
Roger F. Hackett,‘Political Modernization and the Meiji Genrδ’in
Robert E. Ward(ed,), P∂litica’Development inルfodern/apan(Princeton, New Jersey,1968), and, Hackett, Yamagata.4ritomo in
the 1~ise of Mod〃n/apan 1838-1922(Cambridge, Mass.,1971). The
TaishδEra begins on 30 July 1912.
Michael Geyer,‘Der zur Organisation erhobene Burgfrieden’, Klaus・
J丘rgen M荘11er and Eckardt Opitz(eds.),ル露〃tdr und Militarismus
in 4〃仰rei〃2arer Repub〃k(D廿sseldorf,1978).
Berghahn,ルtilitaris〃2, p.110.
Makoto Ikuta,ハ励oπrikugzan shi(History of the Japanese Army)
(Tokyo,1980), p.112.
Judith M. Hughes, To theルfaginot L吻,7’he.po1露ゴcs o/French
ルti〃tarpt Preparation in疏θ1920’s(Cambridge, Mass.,1971), p.200.
Berghahn,ハ4ilitaris〃霊, p.114.
Ibid,, p.115.
Ibid., pp.115 f.
Ibid., p.117,
Ibid., p.116.
Ibid,, pp. 116 f.
Masaki Miyake,‘Japans Beweggrund f廿r den AbschluB des Dreimti-
chtepakts Berlin-Rome-Tokyo:Zuln Forschungsstand in Japaガ, Geschi・
chte in Wissenscゐaノ’und こi勿terri’cht,(Stuttgart,1978/11).
Ibid. Cf. further Klaus Hildebrand,丁加、Foreig・πPo’ゴσy oノ’乃θThird
(185)
Theories of Civil・Military Relations as related to Japan (29)
(71)
(72)
(73)
(74)
(75)
fi~eich, translated by A. Fothergill(London:1973).(German Origina1:
Deutsche Aussenpolitik 1933-1945’ Katletil oder 1)09〃la~, Stuttga「t,
1970).
D.C. B. Lieven, Russia and the Origins of the First World War(Lon・
don and Basingstoke,1983), p.28.
Cf. Masaki Miyake,‘Die Lage Japans beim Ausbruch des Zweiten
Weltkrieges’, Wolfgang Benz and Hermann Gram1(eds)., So〃zmer
1939:Die G70β〃thchte und der EuroPtiische Krieg(Stuttgart,1979),
pp.714-6.
Hearings be/bre the loint Co〃1〃litteθon thθ lnvestigation o/ the
pearl」lfarbor A〃ασ鳥 Congress of the Unted States, Seventy・Ninth
Congress, Washington D. C.1946, Part 20, Joint Committee Exhibits
Nos.173 through 179, Exhibit No.173,‘Memoirs of Prince Konoye’,
p.4014.
Cf・LR・Oates, Populist 1>ati・nalism・in Prewar/apan’A・Bi・9ノ妙勿
o/Naleano Seigo,(Sydney-London-Boston,1985), p.104.
Quite recently a critical survey on the theories of civil-military rela.
tions developed by Huntington, Finer, Perlmutter and Yale・Maxon was
published:Atushi K6ketsu,‘Seigun kankei ron ni kansuru ichi k6satsu:
Huntington no“nij通seifu ron”ochtishin to shite’(A Study of Civil-
Military Relations:the History of an International Criticism),1, II,
Seiiikeizaishigaleza(The Journal of Historical Studies:The Politico-
Economic History), No,288, April 1990 and No.289 May 1990. K6ketsu
criticizes these theories, especially the theory of“dual government”
developed by Huntington. His crit五cisms are based on his own periodi-
zation in丘ve stages of modern Japanese h童story 1868-1945.
「
(184) 184