EDUCATIONAL THEORY Sprin 1988, Vol. 38, No. 2 D I d 8 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois

Marxism, Science, and the Relation of Means and Ends in Educational Theory

By Donald Arnstine

James E. McClellan’s recent essay in this journal (“Can Progressivism Be Revived?” hereafter called “CanPro”), concluded with an invitation. “Now it is your turn, col- leagues,” he wrote. “Is the argument sound?”’

The argument to which McClellan referred is intended to support a program of schooling based on the principles of progressive education, on a commitment to theorizing that is compatible with explanations in the physical sciences, and on an acknowledgment of the veridicality of Marxist historical materialism. It’s hard to turn down McClellan’s invitation, even when one’s background (mine, at least) is ill-suited to distinguish among the niceties of Marxist theories and Quinean epistemology. But 1’11 take a crack at it anyhow, from the perspective of a provincial philosopher of education, because I think that McClellan’s topic is important to anyone who is seriously concerned about the practice of education in a democratic society.

So important, in fact, are the issues raised by McClellan that his argument cannot be dismissed, whether it is sound or not. And it does not seem very sound. J. C. Walker has already responded to it (in “The Possibility of a Scientific Politics of Education: A Reply to McClellan,” hereafter called “PossiSci”),2 and he has noted several places where the argument failed. Walker concluded, “I am confident that we should not support his [i.e., McClellan’s] program for education.”

If only the interplay of thought and action were as unambiguously simple as the examples found in logic texts! As I will try to show later, Walker’s criticisms of McClellan are often well taken. But they don’t afford grounds for rejecting McClellan’s program for education. In fact, I’m not even sure if McClellan’s bad arguments are even relevant to that program. The bickering in which philosophers engage is sometimes necessary and often good exercise, but it can obscure the important features of what a person is trying to say. In this instance, McClellan has tried to show a connection between progressive education, a scientific approach to the explanation of all phenomena as elaborated by W. V. Quine, historical materialism in the Marxist-Leninist tradition, and an approach to education which can help to reduce the probability of a mutually annihilating global armed conflict. When matters as serious as these are at issue, it may be more important to ask whether an argument is relevant (hence whether it can be dispensed with), rather than how it can be fixed.

In my view, the set of topics and problems entertained by McCleHan is far too extensive and far too complex for anybody to get all the arguments right. I also believe that the effort to get all the arguments right is misdirected; that is, that McClellan concluded his essay with the wrong question. He was well advised to call for more work on these topics, but I will try to show in what follows that the work that is appropriate is not likely to be performed by logicians, epistemologists, or even committed Marxists. Sound arguments are always preferable to unsound ones, and it is desirable to be correct about other people’s theories. But I will argue that the work that

Correspondence: Department of Education, College of Letters and Science, University of California, Davis, CA 95616.

1. James E. McClellan, Jr., “Can Progressivism Be Revived?” Educational Theory 37, no. 2

2. J. C. Walker, “The Possibility of a Scientific Politics of Education: A Reply to McClellan:’ (Spring 1987): 121 -34.

Educational Theory 38, no. 1 (Winter 1988): 131-37.

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philosophers of education need to do respecting the issues under consideration involves further thinking that is both imaginative and practical (and as sound as it can be) about the means, interpersonal and institutional, of educating the young.

I.

McClellan asks whether progressive education can be revived. Yes, he answers - insofar as its underlying principles are compatible with natural science ("Q-consistent") and insofar as its political dimension is compatible with Marxism-Leninism. He begins his discussion by acknowledging the vitality of progressive education and by regretting the failure of philosophers of education in the 1950s and 1960s to take it seriously and defend it. Then he notes the current decline of public education in the hands of a school bureaucracy held hostage by experts in measurement, by test publishers, and by a media-induced mania for competition and comparison of children's academic achievements. He ends his discussion by claiming that a commitment to progressivism leads us to embrace a Marxist perspective in politics and to work for a Constitutional Amendment that would outlaw private ownership of the means of production.

How does McClellan manage to cover so much territory? How are all these ideas connected to one another, and what might they have to do with the philosophy of education? At the risk of oversimplifying his thought, I would suggest that McClellan finds his key, unifying idea in a conception of science that refuses to entertain any ideas that cannot be expressed (with appropriate transformations) in natural, physicalist terms. Utilizing Quine, he insists that any set of ideas, to be taken seriously, must be Q-consistent - i.e., consistent with science conceived in this way. McClellan views progressivism, with its focus on science and democracy (and human perfectibility), as Q-consistent. He also interprets a Marxist explanation of social and historical change as Q-consistent. Thus to embrace democracy and science (as we all do) is to embrace a materialist explanation of history and a Marxist perspective on politics.

The connection of these ideas to a program for education can be made in something like the following way. If a respect for science (which few of us will deny) leads one to embrace Marxism, then philosophers of education must adopt a Marxist approach to politics and urge teachers to acquaint the young with the nature of class struggle, with the exploitative practices of the capitalist class, and with the grave threat posed by imperialist exploitation to the survival of life on this planet.

You will note that these ideas have little to do with education per se. They do not deal with learning, schools, or classrooms, or with parents or school boards, or with the nature of growing children in the sort of world that confronts us. For these reasons it is to be doubted whether McClellan is offering a philosophy of education at all. He offers a political point of view with an epistemological grounding, and this enables him to arrive at conclusions about what schools should do. In this respect, McClellan's strategy is Platonic. Like Plato, he too probably has beliefs about what children are like and how they interact, although he doesn't discuss such matters. But the important thing seems not to be the children, but the sort of world we must create. Like Plato, McClellan zeroes in on his chosen ends, and schools and children seem to be just means to those ends.

McClellan's views are in sharp contrast to the progressivism that he admires. For the progressive, ends and means exist as a continuum: means are to be evaluated as ends, and ends turn into means as they near achievement. For the progressive, whether ultimate ends are reached or not, the means for reaching them are far too important to be taken for granted. An end becomes an end-in-view, a guide for the direction of means, and the focus of attention and judgment shifts to the means at hand. Thus a progressive philosopher of education focuses on teachers, children, and school struc- tures in the light of his views about the sort of world worth living in, and in the light of the historical, political, and economic conditions necessary to create such a world.

Late in his discussion, McClellan examines some objections to the point of view he has developed. The objection he most extensively criticizes is that of J. C. Walker, who claims that Marxist historical materialism "is both deficient as a global theory of

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society and philosophically flawed” (McClellan quoting Walker, CanPro, p. 131). Mc- Clellan offers three points in defense of his views. First, he cites an instance of historical materialism’s explanation of the contemporary contradictions between material pro- ductive forces and property relations. Second, he notes the scientific program effected by the uniting of socialist scholars who have linked Quine with Marx. And third, he claims that a Marxist analysis allows for the creation of “Progressive movements throughout the world in a campaign for peace” - a campaign which recognizes the conflict between the worldwide exploitation sponsored by international capitalists and the obligation of socialist countries to support national liberation movements.

In his reply, Walker applauds McClellan’s presentation of the Quinean view of science, but he strongly objects to McClellan’s claim that such a view entails a Marxist understanding of history or a Marxist analysis of class relations. Marxism, says Walker, is not Q-consistent, and McClellan has failed to demonstrate that it is. In fact, McClellan merely asserts rather than argues his case. McClellan’s response to Walker is entitled “Possibility of a Scientific Politics of Education: Continued” (hereafter called “Pos~iSciCon”).~ McClellan claims that he has argued the case, albeit elsewhere. That, of course, is of no use to his readers, and Walker’s point holds. McClellan also refers to his claim (CanPro, p. 132) that “naturalism requires explanatory principles in human behavior continuous with those explaining animal behavior elsewhere.” Now this suggests that a Marxist explanation of human behavior and social change strives to be Q-consistent, but it surely is not an argument that it is. Walker’s point still holds.

By way of showing how it is that Marxism fails to be Q-consistent -that is, consistent with a physicalist theory of the world - Walker charges it with dualism. “Marxism has explained the nonmaterial by reference to the causal priority of the material. But the material/nonmaterial distinction cannot be drawn within physicalism, either ontologically or epistemologically” (PossiSci). The claim that “being determines consciousness” is said to be another instance of ontological dualism. McClellan’s response to this charge is only to say that “[Walker] chooses non-Q-consistent residues of nineteenth-century idealism as central to Marxism” (PossiSciCon). But this only ducks Walker’s attack. References to “consciousness” and other alleged nonmaterial entities are not incidental to Marxism, but they don’t necessarily imply dualism, either. They can be explained and understood without any reference to affairs beyond the reach of scientific inquiry, and McClellan’s only defense is to show how this can be done.

Walker concludes his critique of McClellan by attacking the latter’s Call for solidarity with the Soviet Union. His main reason for rejecting solidarity is his distrust of what he takes to be the objectionable and undemocratic forms of the Soviet government. Specifically, Walker deplores a one-party system of government, which he labels elitist, and he criticizes the Soviet attachment to “democratic centralism,” which appears to demand a rigid and hierarchical form of governmental decision-making - despite “the current vogue of glasnost” (PossiSci).

McClellan’s answer to these criticisms is, first, to express “irrepressible contempt” (PossiSciCon) for what he calls the “moral arrogance” of such charges. He then claims that nations which must create new forms of political and economic life in a Context of internal struggle and pressures from neighboring states (Nicaragua is a salient example) must make do with whatever particular political forms will enable that state to survive. The moral arrogance, he says, attaches to those critics whose own democratic traditions were forged without those struggles and pressures. In short, Americans (and Australians) have a lot to be thankful for, not least the fact that their nations were founded on brand-new continents that were rich in natural resources and peopled by virtually defenseless aborigines.

McClellan’s moral outrage is understandable, although his case is not made clearly. And he has not offered any defense of the features of Soviet political life criticized by

3. James E. McClellan, Jr., “Possibility of a Scientific Politics of Education: Continued,” Educational Theory 38, no. 1 (Winter 1988): 139-42.

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Walker, On the other hand, one may reasonably wonder whether our “two-party” system of indistinguishable Republicans and Democrats is much different, when consequences are examined, from the Soviet one-party system. The eagerness with which Democrats in Congress embraced Ronald Reagan’s “Tax Reform” for 1987 is an example of this. This particular dispute between McClellan and Walker cannot easily be settled, but if both Soviet and American political forms are flawed - as they certainly are - little is to be gained by adopting a moralistic posture toward either one. On the other hand, everything can be lost by cultivating a mistrust which prevents the development of the sort of solidarity envisaged by McClellan. In short, McClellan’s case is not well argued here, but he is probably right, anyhow.

II.

The upshot of McClellan’s discussion and the subsequent dispute with Walker is that (a) Walker has revealed a lot of gaps in McClellan’s arguments which McClellan subsequently failed to plug, and (b) the point and the direction of McClellan’s discussion is just as important as he says it is. Now we must ask, will McClellan’s point carry the day if the gaps in his argument are plugged correctly? It seems to me that the answer is, no, it will not. The reason for this is that plugging McClellan’s gaps will only distract us from the point of what he is trying to say. If this seems confusing, try another paragraph.

Recall the structure of McClellan’s argument. First, he expresses sympathy with the principles of progressive education. His critic, Walker, has nothing to say on that matter. Then he affirms the value of Q-consistency, with which Walker has no dispute. McClellan’s conclusion (a proposal for a Socialist Constitutional Amendment and an educational program of a certain kind) is preceded by a discussion of the link between Marxism, science, and a trustworthy “theory of the world.” This is the matter in greatest dispute, and to settle it will require a brave and perhaps terminal plunge into the deepest waters of Marxist scholarship. I say “terminal” because that is the sort of plunge from which some divers never return. There are, of course, many interpretations of Marx, and many more interpretations of his interpreters. A rising throng accompanied by a great shuffling of chairs can be expected to follow the request, “Will the real Marxist please stand up?”

This is not intended as a derogation of Marxist scholarship. But it is intended to provide a reason for my claim that the posture we take toward children, schools, and education cannot afford to wait on decisions about the correctness or truth of Marxist theory. What is wanted is some Q-consistent theory of why people act the way they do and of how social change occurs. Any number of versions of Marxism can help in the development of such a theory. Indeed, some ideas that are common to all versions of Marxism are indispensable for the understanding of social change, e.g., the crucial role of economic determinants, or the kind of exploitation that is required, both at home and abroad, for the survival of capitalist institutions. Still, if one’s concern is with education, then one cannot afford to be overly concerned about the adequacy of any particular version of Marxism considered as a philosophical system, much less as an ideology. That sort of concern not only distracts one’s attention from the matter at hand (which is education, if one makes a living as a philosopher of education), but it also carries a peculiar danger.

The danger - which is illustrated in CanPro and which has been mentioned earlier - is that a dominant focus on Marxism (or on any social/political/economic theory) can lead one to believe that a particular educational program can be derived from it. As noted above, a steady focus on social and political ends tends to treat schools - and children and teachers - as mere means to those ends. Plato can be accused of having done this, and B. F. Skinner did not apologize for doing it. But progressive educators - at least those inspired by John Dewey - cannot do this, for it would violate what is most fundamental to the theory on which it is based.

In CanPro, James E. McClellan displays a serious respect for the principles and traditions of progressive education. He seeks to join to those principles and traditions

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a Quinean approach to epistemology and a Marxist approach to historical change and political economy. But the manner in which he puts together these complex and profound ideas grates and produces sparks which threaten to incinerate the whole. One cannot settle on fixed ends and preserve the integrity of one's means. Children and teachers, like all humans, must be considered as ends in themselves. Progressives, of course, were not the first to note this. But progressive educators called special attention to the fact that treating teachers and children as ends in themselves requires respect for their intelligence. That, in turn, means that the educational program you recommend must strive to establish conditions for teachers and children to make their own judgments. In order to remain progressive in his educational thinking, McClellan must take this into account. And that means trying to develop a Q-consistent theory for dealing with teachers and children (and parents and schools) in such a way that they come to understand and see the significance of the humane ends McClellan cherishes and the systemic and often calculated obstacles that at present interfere with the realization of those ends4

4. A recent effort to use Marxist theory as an instrument for the guidance of schooling is Kevin Harris's Teachers and Classes: A Marxist Analysis (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982). It should come as no surprise to readers of McClellan that Harris's analysis is quite compatible with the main principles of progressive education.

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