PublishedintheUnitedStatesofAmericaandGreatBritainin2015byCASEMATEPUBLISHERS908DarbyRoad,Havertown,PA19083and10HytheBridgeStreet,Oxford,OX12EW

Copyright2015©OscarE.Gilbert

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Contents

PREFACE

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

GLOSSARY

PROLOGUE

One ABrutallyComplexWorld

Two OperationDesertShield

Three TheStormBreaks

Four Intervallum

Five IntoIraq

Six BridgesintheDesert—An-Nasiriyah

Seven TheLowRoadtoBaghdad

Eight ThePrize

Nine ReturntoIraq

Ten TippingPoint:TheSecondBattleofFallujah

Eleven HarryingtheInsurgency

Twelve Afghanistan—WindingDown

EPILOGUE

WHEREARETHEYNOW?

REFERENCESCITED

ForOscarE.GilbertIVandLeviD.Gilbert

FPreface

ORMOSTOFHUMANhistorywarshavebeenpoorlydocumented,theirstories passed down as oral histories or recorded in the self-serving memoirs of leaders. Only after World War II did the

recollections and memoirs of those in the ranks became commonplace, andhistorians could delve more deeply into the documentation that resulted fromburgeoning bureaucracies and the proliferation of typewriters. But secrecy—sometimes warranted, often not—still cloaked much. The roles of the NativeAmericancode talkersand the successesof thecode-breakers thatallowed theAlliestoreadAxiscommunicationsremainedsecretfordecades.Onthewholesocietalnorms,officialcensorship,andself-censorshipbythepresscontrivedtolimitpublicviewoftheworstoftheblundersandhorrors.ThedisasteroftheD-Day rehearsal at Slapton Sands off the English coast “never happened.” Thebotched“indirectapproach”strategyof the1943NewGeorgiacampaign(withits “alarmingly high” incidence of psychiatric casualties) was just tooembarrassing.

ThewarinKoreawaslargelyjustignored.ItwascalledtheForgottenWarforareason.

Vietnammarkedaseismicshiftinourperceptionofwar.Tensofthousandsof highly-educated men and women were inducted (often unwillingly) at thesametime thatpresscensorshipdisappearedalmostentirely.Theresultwasan“inyourface”warwherecarnageanddeathweresplashedacrossthetelevisionscreen at the dinner hour.Military leadership fell into disrepute, and the goodsufferedalongsidetheincompetent.

InthemorerecentGulfWarsandtheso-called“waronterrorism”(2001topresent) thegroundshiftedagain.Modernwarsareatoncerecorded inminutedetail, yet poorly understood. Twenty-four-hour news coverage bombards thereader-viewer with flashing images andmind-numbingminutiae, but provides

little real understanding.Frequently thenecessary cloakofoperational secrecyconvolvedwiththemedia’scompulsiontogetthestoryontheairnowresultsina superficial understanding—or complete misunderstanding—of events thatbecomesembeddedinmillionsofmindsashistory.

Theprofessionalmilitaryanalyst(Iamnotone)isnowdrownedinafloodofdata fromcomputers, recordedmessage traffic,mappingand locatorprograms,paper records, and even old-fashioned interviews that can take years to sortthrough.Muchhasyet tobedeclassified,anditwillagain takedecadesbeforethesewarsareproperlyanddispassionatelyevaluated.

A new innovation—social media—resulted in another flood of morepersonal information: e-mails, websites, blogs, and postings. Much of it isephemeral, and will simply disappear like the burned letters and diaries ofanotherera.

Yet some things have remained fundamentally unchanged. Modernmisconceptions to the contrary, veterans of World War II and Korea wereunderappreciatedintheirowntime.Theyreturnedamideconomicboomswheneveryone (veterans included) was experiencing an economic boom and anunprecedented rise in the standard of living. Vietnam veterans disappearedbecause the war was unpopular, and the unpopularity unfairly rubbed off onthosewhofoughtthere.

LikeVietnam,publicattitudestowardthewarsofthelatetwentiethandearlytwenty-firstcenturiesareinfluencedbysocialchangesbeyondthewars.

Themore recentwars are different in someways, butmany fundamentalshavenotchanged.Themilitaryingeneralisheldinhigheresteem,andeventhemost judgmental anti-war activists will balk at judging the individual warriorwiththewar.Ourmilitaryisfarmoreprofessional,butthatprofessionalismhascomeatacost.Asortofinvisibility.

Our modern wars are fought by a small and chronically overextendedminorityofthepopulation.It’sthesimplearithmeticofAmerica’slongestwar.OnthewholethesevenyearsoftheVietnamwarwerefoughtbyasuccessionofmenservingasingletwelve-orthirteen-monthtoureach.America’slongestwarhasbeenfoughtbymenandwomenwhohavedonemultipletours;fourormorearenotuncommon.Andtheyvolunteeredforit,sowethinkweneednotconcernourselvesoverlymuch.

Atthesametimetheentertainmentmedia—particularlytelevisionandvideogames,buttoagreatdegreefilms—havedesensitizedthepublictotheviolence.The newsmedia do a better job, but the current “may be disturbing to some

viewers”warningsandpresentationofvideosofcold“precision”dronestrikesisitsownformofsanitization.Farmoreinfluentialaretheentertainmentmedia.

If previous generations of the entertainment media sanitized violence andwar, the current generation revels in it. Wanton violence that would havenauseated older generations of movie-goers and television watchers (just askyour grandmother) is all too often used to divert schoolchildren while momprepares dinner.A fewpresentations, particularly films likeBlackhawkDown,The Hurt Locker, and Lone Survivor provide a realistic and often highlyemotionalapproximationoftheviolenceofwar.Buttelevisionandvideogamesjustwallowinthefirepowerandgoreforitsownsake.

Theresultisanoddconfluenceofattitudesandcircumstances.Ourwarsarefought by a better-respected but shrinking minority, and the population as awhole thinks itunderstandstheexperiencesofthatminority.Butsuchattitudesare illusory.Seeingcombaton the screen is fardifferent fromexperiencing it,with its sensory and emotional overload, simultaneous physical numbing andsensoryheightening,andaboveall the imprintedmemories.Sowe feel free toslapayellow-ribbonmagneton thecar, think“Oh, I’veplayed that scenario,”mouth anobligatory “Thankyou for your service,” andgoback to our gamesandsocialmedia.

Notmuchhasreallychanged.

TAcknowledgments

HISREPRESENTSTHEfinalvolumeinafourbookseriesonthehistoryof the Marine Corps tank units. The primary people withoutwhomthisfinalvolumecouldneverhavebeencompletedarethe

interviewees;theirnamesarelistedinthe“wherearetheynow?”sectionattheend of the book.Thesemen not only agreed to interviews, but inmany casessuggestedadditionalcontacts.They representaminiscule fractionof themanyhundredswhoservedinIraq,Afghanistanandother,moreobscure,places.

Therehavebeenafewpatientpeoplewhohavebeen“infortheduration”ofthis fifteen year project.MasterGunnery SergeantDonGagnon (USMC, ret.)was instrumental in my efforts from the very beginning. Colonel Ed Bale Jr.(USMC, ret.)notonly figuredasacharacter in twovolumesof the series,butstill provides the benefit of his knowledge of the story of tanks in the Corpsthroughourfrequentconversations.ThecontributionsofLt.ColonelKenEstes(USMC, ret.) have grown considerably over the years. For this volume heprovided many critical documents, archival photos, and introductions to keyindividuals.

SueDillon andGregCina of theGreyResearchCenter atMCBQuanticohelped track down recorded interviews and other resources. The DefenseImagery branch of theDepartment ofDefense provided photographs, andBillHayes graciously providedmewith his extensive collection of privately-takenphotos.

The staff of Casemate Publishers, particularly Steve Smith and DavidFarnsworth, not only encouraged the writing and completed the publicationefforts,butwaitedpatientlywhileIdithered,unwillingtowrite thestoryofanunfinishedwar.

Of course the primary sufferers have been family. My children haveprovided support both emotional and technical. My wife Catherine for forty-

threeyearshas toleratedmystrangeworkhabits,andmyfrequentabsencesonbusinessofonesortoranother,haseditedbooks,andsometimesfollowedmetosomeverystrangeplaces.

Glossary

AAV—ShortforAAVP-7A1,AssaultAmphibiousVehicle,Personnel,thebasicversion of the standardMarine amphibious tractor, often simply called anamtrac. AAVC-7A1: the communications/command version of the AAV.AAVE-7A1: the unofficial designation for the engineer vehicle equippedwitharoof-mountedMk154MICLIClauncher.

BLT—Battalion Landing Team, a Marine infantry battalion and supportingelements.

CAX—CombinedArmseXercise.COIN—COunterINsurgencyCompany Wedge—A line of tanks in an offensive “arrowhead” with one

platooninfront,twoothersstaggeredbackandtotheflanks.CSSC—Combat Service Support Company, provides engineer and logistical

servicesDefensiveCoil—Atthehalt the tanksfaceoutwardina360degreedefensive

circle, with thick frontal armor outward and soft-skinned vehicles in thecenter.

DPICM—DualPurposeImprovedConventionalmunition isanartilleryroundthatscatterssmallcontact-detonatedbombletstoattackinfantryandvehicles.theartilleryversionofaclusterbomb.

DragonEye—ThesmallestUnmannedAerialVehicleinUSservice.Launchedbyanelasticcordandpoweredbya lithiumbattery, itcanbe fittedwithavarietyofsensors.Itcanbeflownfromthegroundorpreprogrammed.Uponcompletionofitsone-hourmissionthecontrollercrashesitintotheground,wherethemajorcomponentsbreakapartforrecoveryandquickreassembly.

FCP—ForwardCommandPost.Fedayeen—“Thosewho sacrifice,” a quasi-militia organized by theBa’athist

PartyinIraq.

FSSG—ForceServiceSupportGroup,responsibleforlogisticalsupport.Gypsy rack—The exterior rack on the back of a tank turret used to carry

miscellaneousgear.HEAT—High-ExplosiveAntiTank.HEMTT—Heavy ExpandedMobility Tactical Truck, any of several types of

ten-ton8x8trucks.IFAV—InterimFastAttackVehicle,atthisperioda“militarydunebuggy”.Javelin—the FGm-148 “fire-and-forget” self-guided shoulder-fired antitank

missile.Jihad—roughly “struggle,” the term has enteredWestern vernacular as “holy

war,” but the word is far more complex, including any struggle of faith,commonly the struggle to live a sanctified life, against personal moralweakness,andagainstoppressionorsocialinjustice.

LAI—Light Armored Infantry. The LAV-equipped battalions were originallyconceivedasmechanizedinfantry,buttheyweretoolightlyequippedforthisrole.

LAR—LightArmoredReconnaissance.TheroleoftheLAV-equippedbattalionswasre-evaluated,andtheirrolewaschangedtomechanizedreconnaissanceandforcescreening.

LAV—LightArmoredVehicle, theeightwheeledarmoredvehicleusedby theMarines.LAV-25:thebasicvehiclearmedwitha25mmchaingun,carryingfour infantry dismounts. LAV-AD: the Air Defense variant armed with achain-gunandeightStingermissiles.LAV-AT:theAntiTankvariantarmedwith a two-tubeTOWmissile launcher. LAV-L: the cargo carrier version;oftenuseasanarmoredambulance.LAV-M:81mmmortarcarrier.

LCAC—Landing Craft Air Cushion, a large hovercraft capable of carrying atank.

LPD—LandingPlatform,Dock.Anyofseveralclassesonnavalvesselsthatcanlaunch either landing craft or AAVs carried inside and helicopters from aflightdeck.AnLPDhasahangarforservicingaircraft.

LSD—LandingShip,Dock.IncurrentusagesimilartotheLPD,butwithoutanaircrafthangar.

LTI—LimitedTechnicalInspection—achecklistforpreventivemaintenance.MEF—Marine Expeditionary Force, a Marine Division and attached air and

supportassets.MEU(SOC) —Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable). A

forcebuiltaroundan infantrybattalionwithattachedsupportingunits suchasartillery,armor,airassetsandlogisticalsupport.theSOCsuffixindicatesahighlevelof trainingandthecapabilitytoundertake“specialoperations”missions.

MLRS—Them270multipleLaunchRocketSystem,with reloadable launcherpodsmountedonatrackedchassis.

MOS—MilitaryOccupationalSpecialty,theMarines’jobdescription.MOUT—MilitaryOperationsinUrbanTerrain.MPS or MPPS—Maritime Pre-Positioning Ship/Squadron, refers either to

individualshipsor tosquadronsofcargoships loadedwithheavyweaponsandsupplies,andstationedatstrategicpointsaroundtheglobe.Marinescanbeairlifted to “marryup”with theweaponsand supplies, greatly speedingdeploymenttotroublespots.

MSPF—Maritime Special Purpose Force, specialized sub-units within aMEUSOC undertaking special missions such as covert reconnaissance orhostagerescue.

MSR—MainSupplyRoute.MTVR—MilitaryTacticalVehicleReplacement,a7-ton6x6cargo truckbuilt

byOshkoshfortheMarineCorpsandNavy.Thedesignprovidesunusuallygoodoff-roadcapability.

MPAT—Multi-PurposeAntitank.thismulti-purposeHeAtroundcansensethenatureofthetarget,actingasaHEATroundtopenetratearmororasanHeroundtopenetrateandexplodeinsidesofttargets.

MULE—ModularUniversalLaserequipment,abig,box-liketargetdesignatorusuallymountedinfrontoftheloader’shatchonatank.

PhaseLine—Alineonamap,usually someeasily identifiable terrain featureusetoalignunitstoavoidfriendlyfireincidents.ThepracticedatestoWorldWarII.

ReactiveArmor—SometimescalledBlazerarmorthoughnotanofficialterm.Blocksofexplosiveinthinmetalshellsspacedafewinchesfromthetank’smainarmor, their impactdetonationwilldisrupt thepenetrating jet formedbyHeAtrounds.ItprovidesnoprotectionagainstAPDS(sabot)rounds.

REDCON—REaDinessCONdition.REIN—Asuffixusedtoindicateaunitisreinforcedbyassetsfromanotherunit.REMF—REarareaMother-Fucker,coinedinVietnamtoindicateanyonenotin

afront-lineunit.

Sagger—Originally the NATO code name for the older Soviet-made AT-3antitankmissile,itwasusedgenericallyforanyenemyantitankmissile.

SIGINT—SIGnalsINtelligenceSINGCARS —A secure radio that “hops” frequencies according to a

preprogrammed,time-keyedsequence.Short-Tracked—“Short-tracking”compensates foramissingwheelorbroken

suspensionarmonthefirstorlastwheelposition.thewheelisremoved,thesuspensionarm is removedorwired into theupposition,andseveral trackblocksremovedtomakethetrackshorter.

SOTG —Special Operations Training Group, provides specialized pre-deploymenttrainingforMEUSOCs.

Stinger—TheUS-madeFIM-92shoulder-launchedinfraredhomingantiaircraftmissile,italsoequippedtheLAV-AD.

TAC—TACticalcommandpost.TOW—The BGm-71 tube-launched Optically-tracked Wire-guided first-

generationheavyantitankmissile.TankTables—Prescribedfireandmobilityexercises involvingpop-uptargets

to be identified and engaged with various weapons. they are arranged inorder of increasing difficulty, one through twelve. Combat is sometimescalled“tablethirteen.”

Al-Wahhabi—literally “the generous donor,” perhaps an oblique reference towealthy Saudi backers. Adherents prefer al-Muwahhiddun (“themonotheists”).

VTR—VehicleTankRecovery,aheavytrackedvehicleusedtorecoverdisabledtanks,atthisperiodtheM88family.

ZSU-23–4—The Shilka is a radar-controlled four-barreled 23mm antiaircraftgun on a tracked chassis. They—like all antiaircraft guns—were prioritytargetsbecauseofthethreattolow-altitudeaircraft.

M

Prologue

Victoriouswarriorswinfirstandthengotowar,whiledefeatedwarriorsgotowarfirstandthenseektowin.—SunTzu

Battlesarewonbyslaughterandmaneuver.Thegreaterthegeneral,themorehecontributesinmaneuver,thelesshedemandsinslaughter.—WinstonChurchill

ostbattlesarewonbeforethefirstshotisfired.Somearewonyearsearlier,aroundapolishedwoodentable.

In the aftermath of theVietnamWar junior officers andNCOswhowouldonedayrisetohighpositionsweredeterminedtochangetheculture of the Marine Corps, and indeed the entire US military. This newgenerationhadseenotherjuniorofficersandyoungenlistedmensufferanddieinanumbingsequenceofbattlesfoughtfornocleargoal.TheyrealizedthattheAmerican public would no longer tolerate the costly frontal assaults that theMarines had of necessity endured in the island-hopping campaigns of WorldWarII,thetrenchwarfareforuselessrockpileslikethosealongtheJamestownLineinKorea,orleastofalltheendlessandultimatelyfutilebattlesofattritionoftheVietnamconflict.

AnewgenerationofMarineCorpsleaderswouldemphasizemaneuveroverslaughter, paralyzing an enemy and his will to fight by rapid maneuvercombinedwith the limited and precisely directed application of overwhelmingviolence. Interestingly the tank, the very symbol of mindless mechanicaldestruction, would play a key role in this new scheme of limited, more“humane”war.The tank’scannonandmachinegunscouldapplydeadly forcefarmoreprecisely,inawaythatminimized“collateraldamage,”theinadvertentdeath and destruction wreaked by air strikes and artillery fire, the bluntinstrumentsthatAmericahadpreviouslyrelieduponinitswars.

Martin R. “Marty” Steele had served as both an enlisted man and juniorlieutenant in Vietnam, and later as a company commander in both tanks andamtracs.Hewas the firstMarine tobe theDistinguishedGraduateof the jointArmy-MarineCorpstankschoolatFortKnox.Asafield-gradeofficerhestoodup the 1st LightArmoredVehicle (LAV)Battalion, commanded the 1st TankBattalion, andcontendedwithChryslerCorporationexecutives to squareawaythe troubled M60A1 tank procurement program. But as a passionate tankadvocatehismostcrucialbattlewouldbeagainsttheMarineCorps’institutionalinertia.1

Five Commandants ultimately wrestled with the issue of modernizing thetank fleet, andSteelewas a thorn in the fleshof each. In 1981 theCorps haddecided,inprinciple,toupgradeitstankfleetbyadoptingthenewM1series,thetanktheArmycalledtheAbrams.Thentheydeclinedtoimplementthedecision.Intheeternalcompetitionforashareofthebudgetarypie,manyseniorofficersadvocated for the “Super M60” program pushed by the tank’s manufacturer.Glowing reports by company executives who wanted to keep the M60productionprogramalive lentweight to theargumentsof thosewhowantedtospend the limited funds on other programs—aircraft, improved AssaultAmphibiousVehicles (AAVs), newLAVs, and a host of otherweapons.Newtankskeptslippingdownthelistofpriorities.

In1987GeneralAlGray,oneofthemostoutspokenadvocatesofmaneuverwarfare,becameCommandant,buttheCorpsstilldidnothavethemoderntanksthatwouldbeessentialtoimplementthenewdoctrine.By1988Steelewasstillon what seemed like a suicide mission, still advocating for the long-delayedreplacementoftheagingfleetofM60A1s.Steele’smoralewasatitslowestebbwhenonebitterlycold,gloomySundaymorninginFebruaryhewentforawalkinArlingtonNationalCemetery toclearhismind.Onhis icywalk itbegan torain and sleet, covering everythingwith a sheet of ice.Nearly blinded, Steeleliterallystumbledoveratombstone;thegraveofGeneralCreightonAbrams,thenamesakeofthenewtankandwithwhomhesharedabirthday,15September.Evenforareligiousman,itwasasclosetodivineendorsementofamissionashewaslikelytobegranted.ThenextdayGrayapprovedtheM1acquisition.Inprinciple.

In1990Steele still struggled to implement theM1A1acquisitionprogram,andontheeveofwarfinallygainedthesupportofMaj.Gen.JackSheehan,oneofCommandantGray’sclosestconfidantes.HeconvincedSheehanthatdespitetheassurancesofmany,theM60A1wasadyingcreature.TheCorpssimplydid

not procure enough tanks for a stand-alone program, and theArmywould nolongersupportasystemforsparepartsandsupplieslike105mmammunitiontokeep the obsolescent M60A1 viable. When Sheehan recommended approval,GrayfinallyissueddirectivesforReserveandRegularunitstoacquirethenewtank,butonalimitedbasis.LiketheM26inthelate1940s,thenewtankwouldappearonlyinafewtestunits.

ItseemedthattheCorps’tankerswerefinallyabitclosertohavingavehiclesomarkedlysuperiortoitspotentialfoesthatitbestrodethebattlefieldlikesomenearlyinvincibleseventy-toncolossus,abletodestroypreciselyatlongrangeinrainanddarknesswhileremainingfarlessvulnerabletotheenemy’sblows.Yetkeyaspectsoftankwarfareremainedunchanged.

Inorder tobetterdetect threats tohisvehicleandcrew,and toexecutehismissionof supporting the infantry, the tank commander’sgreatest assetwouldremain the unarmored eyeball.Tobetter see the battlefield—maintainingwhatthe military calls “situational awareness”—and direct his weapons, the tankcommanderwouldriskhisownlifetoridewithhisbodypartiallyexposedhighatopa“bulletmagnet.”

Asinallwarspast, thegreatest threattothetankanditscrewwouldcomenotfromenemytanksorguns,butthestealthymineinitsnewincarnation,thecommand-detonatedimprovisedexplosivedevice,orIED.

The tankwould also finally have an able stable-mate to share some of itsmore odious traditional missions like convoy escort and mechanizedreconnaissanceinhigh-riskenvironments.Initsconstantquestfor“lightness”—strategic mobility—the Corps had experimented with fast, lightly-armoredwheeled vehicles like the King armored car (1915–1934), the White M3A1Scout Car (late 1930s-early 1940s), and the M8 armored car (limited use inKorea). None had proven particularly successful, and everyone was painfullyaware that theywere not tanks. The newwheeled LightArmoredVehicle, orLAYwould for the first time provide the combination of firepower, armoredprotection,andmobility(thoughaswithalllightarmoredvehicles,limitedinallthree)plustransportabilitythattheCorpsconstantlysought.

BoththenewtankandtheLAVwouldsoonbetestedinanewcombatarena,thedesertsandmountainsoftheMiddleEastandsouthernAsia.

NOTES1TheaccountofSteele’stravailsiscondensedfromEstes,MarinesUnderArmor,p.183–185,andJones,Boysof’67,p.313–323.

T

CHAPTERONE

ABrutallyComplexWorld

Goddoesnotchangewhatisinapeople,untiltheychangewhatisinthemselves.—TheKoran,Chapter13,verse11

HIS IS NOT A story of religiouswars. Rather it is the story of onecountry spending treasure and the lives of its citizens to holdtogethertheremainingbitsofbrokenempires.Itisfashionableto

seethetroublesoftheMiddleEastandbeyondsolelyasastrugglebetweentheforces ofmilitant Islam andmore secularWestern cultures.Make nomistake,humans fight savagely over differences of religion. Religious minorities wereand are persecuted. However, far more of the conflict that has plagued theMiddle East stems frommundane but familiar evils: blind nationalism, greed,andnakedambition.

Much“religious”conflictstemssimplyfromtheveryhumantendencytousereligion to justify sordid personal ambitions. We can clearly perceive humanfacesbehind the religiousmasksof thenationalistsofRevolutionary Iranas itbacksHezbollah(PartyofGod),ortheseculartyrantSaddamHussein’scynicalinvocationofQadissayah(theepicbattlethatdeterminedthepathofmainstreamIslamicdynasticsuccessionandstilldividesSunnifromShia)asanationalisticrallyingcry.

For most of documented Middle Eastern history, religious persecution—when it flared—was largely a localmatter.Becauseof difficulty of travel andcommunication the flames of any farhud (religious purge) would burnthemselvesoutbeforereachingthescaleofanationalorinternationaldisaster.Incontrast,secularempires,andlaternationalgovernments,hadthemeansandtheabilitiestoimposelong-lastingandthoroughpersecution.

Iraq, around which most of this story inevitably centers, has had themisfortunetositattheintersectionofmanysecularempiresaswellaslieinthepathofbarbarianinvadersfromthesteppesofAsiaforthousandsofyears.Inthe

modernerasince1918,bothIraqandthesurroundingmodernstateshavebeenahotbed of intrigues, dynastic struggles, coups, and wars. Even an incompletehistoryofIraqaloneisbeyondthescopeofthisbook.1

AfterthefallofthedecadentAbbasidCaliphate(AD1258),andrulebytheMongols, Tamerlane, andPersia (modern Iran), in the early sixteenth century,Iraq—likemostof theMiddleEast—fellunder the ruleof theOttomanTurks.The Ottomans were astute rulers, adopting many of the practices of theByzantineEmpire,successorsoftheeasternRomanEmpire,whichtheyoverranin1453.

Theyprovidedformoreorlesslocalgovernancebysubdivisionintovilayets,or provinces, along ethnic and tribal boundaries. Under theOttomansmodernday Iraq was divided among three vilayets, governed from Mosul (Kurdish),Baghdad (Sunni), and Basra (Shia). Within vilayets, local rule was exercisedthroughfamilyortribalchieftainsacceptabletothelocals.TheproximityofthepowerfulPersianEmpirehelpedassuretheprotectionoftheShiaminority.

TheOttomanrulerassumedthetitleofCaliph,butformostoftheEmpire’slife the real power lay with the janissaries and themameluke. In a legalisticnicety to sidestep the Koran’s proscription against Muslim warring uponMuslim, the Ottomans created these classes of warrior slaves from ChristianEurope and theAsian steppes, respectively.Eventually thosewhowielded theweapons wielded the power, and they governed semi-autonomously, thejanissariesfromConstantinople,themamelukefromBaghdadandCairo.

TheOttomanmilitarycasteswerefrozenintimeandtradition,andbetween1826and1834thepowerofbothcastescollapsed.Asthepowerof theCaliphalso eroded, secular nationalists came to power, culminating in the rise ofnationalistfactionswithintheTurkishArmy.

Along the fringes of the dying Empire factions struggled for control overlandnomajorpowercoveted.Between1902and1936IbnSaudandAbdulAzizslowlyconsolidatedthedesertkingdomofArabia.Anotherobscurebitofdesertthat was competed for by two empires lay at the extremewestern end of thePersianGulf.PartofthevilayetofBasra,thispatchofdeserthadhadfewnaturalresources, but controlled waterborne commerce from the immenseMesopotamian drainage basin, which included the Ottoman Empire’s richestregions.Basrawasamajorport for thehaj—theIslamicpilgrimage toMecca,andwasaproducerofpearls.Under theprotectionof theRoyalNavyand theadministration of India, this strategic bit of sand, arbitrarily proclaimed theEmirateofKuwait,becameaBritishprotectoratein1897.

A seismic shift came with the ill-fated Ottoman decision to side withGermanyintheGreatWar.InOctober1918theOttomansagreedtoanarmisticewith Britain, and their Empire was partitioned into several protectorates thatwouldreshaperegionalhistory.

TheFrenchassumedmandateresponsibilityformodernSyriaandLebanon;the British took Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq. The British favored theHashemite dynasty as hereditary rulers. The Hashem, descendants of TheProphetMohammed’sclan,shouldhavebeennaturallyacceptable,buttoomanyother factors, not least the first stirrings of nationalism and old-fashionedambition, were at work. Only Abdullah I of Jordan established an enduringHashemitedynasty.Rulinguntilhisassassinationin1957,hisfamilysuccessioncontinuestoday.

InIraqtheBritishignoredmajorregionalandethnicpartitionsandpromotedthe Sunniminority which dominated only the deserts of the west. Theywereimmediatelyfacedwithrevolt,andby1920fightinghadspreadthroughoutthecountry. The revolts cost the lives of 6,000 Iraqi and 500 British and Indiansoldiers.2 The British eventually established a colonial government in whichmany of the senior posts were held by themore amenable Sunnis. They alsoestablished a second army, the Iraqi Levies, answerable only to the British,consisting of Kurds, Marsh Arabs,3 and Nestorian Christian refugees fromTurkey.

In neighboring Syria the republican-minded French backed the HashemiteAmirFaisal.4Hisrulelastedonlyafewmonths,andtheFrenchweresoonfacedwithresistanceculminatinginarevoltwhichtheybrutallyrepressedin1925.Atreatypromisedindependencein1936,buttheFrenchrenegedontheagreement.

The French drew the boundary between Syria and Lebanon, long a semi-autonomousprovinceundertheOttomans.Theborderwasmovedtothecrestofthemountains east of the Shia-and Druze-populated Baqaa (Bekka) Valley, alogicaldecisioninEuropeaneyesbutonewhichignoredlong-establishedethnicandtribalboundariesthathadplacedthevalleyfirmlyintheDamascusvilayet.5

The British established a Hashemite dynasty in Iraq, but chose theEuropeanized Amir Faisal of recent Syrian nationality, who lacked bothnationalist credentials and local acceptance. The cobbled-together state facedthreatsforeignanddomestic.TurkeywasloathtogiveuptherichesofnorthernIraq.TheKurdishgovernordeclaredhimselfkingofaKurdishstateinthenorth;theBritishimmediatelydrovehimintoexileinIran.

For thousands of years men had known that natural gas vented from the

ground,andPlutarchhadwrittenthatthelocalssetanoiledroadafiretoimpressAlexander the Great.6 On 15 October 1927 a consortium of British, Dutch,French,andAmericancompaniesdiscoveredoilinvastquantitiesnearKirkukinKurdish Iraq, establishing the Middle East as a rival to Russia and the EastIndiesforoilproduction.

ThefledglingIraqigovernmentcouncilfinallypersuadedBritaintosetadateforindependence,October1932.ThenewPrimeMinister,Nurial-Sa’id,wasaprogressive, a modernizer, and a pragmatic nationalist. But followingindependenceSunnilandownersandarmyofficerssoonbecametherealpowers.

The Iraqi Hashemite dynasty was long-lived, unlike its members; Faisalreigneduntil1933,andwassucceededbyhissonGhazi.UnderGhazithearmyfirst began to flex its muscle in domestic politics, staging a coup in 1936 toinstallacabinetmore to its liking.Ghazidied in1939,succeededbyhis threeyear-old son Faisal. The uncle of three year-old Faisal, Abd al-Ilah, servedineffectivelyasregent,unabletocontrolthearmy,whoopenlyfavoredtherisingdictatorsHitlerandMussolini.

In 1938 Anglo-Persian and Gulf Oil companies discovered oil in Kuwait,followedwithinweeksbydiscoveriesinSaudiArabia.SoonBritishinterestshadto compete with a flood of representatives from oil-starved Italy, Japan, andGermany. The outbreak of war in Europe stifled further exploration, asAmericanandBritishexplorersreturnedhome.

Following the fall of France to the Nazis in 1940 the Vichy governmentcontrolled Syria and Lebanon. In early 1941 Prime Minister Rashid Ali al-Kailani tried tobarBritishuseof treatybases in Iraq.After a coup the regentwent into exile in British Transjordan. Ali sought German aid; the Vichygovernment allowed a small force of German planes to transit Lebanon andSyria into Iraq. A Britishmechanized column (“Habforce”) from Transjordandroveout theGermansand restored thepro-British faction.7After theGermanincursion, theBritishandFreeFrench seizedSyria andLebanon. Iraq’sKurdsandShiaremainedrestive,andforthefirsttimeCommunistagitatorsappeared,exploitingnationalistambitions.

AnobscuresupporterofRashidAliwasKhairallahTulfah,amemberofthefledglingBa’ath (“ArabSocialistResurrection”) Party andmaternal uncle andpatronofasmallboyrejectedbyhisstepfather.Theboy,SaddamHussein,hadbeenbornbetween1935 and1938.Whenhis unclewas imprisoned followingthefailedGermanincursionSaddam’sstepfatherdrovetheboyfromhome,andhemadehislivingasaveryyoungpettycriminal.

In 1943 Lebanon declared independence, and the Free French brieflyimprisoned the entire government. France eventually abandoned Syria andLebanon in 1946. For Lebanon the French-mandated disruption of ethnicpartitionsresultedinaweirdconstitutioninwhichthePresidentwasrequiredtobefromtheMaroniteChristiancommunity,thePrimeMinisteraSunniMuslim,andtheChristianswereinpracticeguaranteedasix-to-fivedominantratiointheParliament, regardless of shifting demographics. It was a recipe for ongoingdisaster.

ThesecondseismicshiftinregionalaffairswasthefoundationofthestateofIsrael.In1917thesecretBalfourDeclarationexpressedsympathyforformationofaZioniststate.JewishsettlersbegantoflowintoPalestine,growingtoafloodin the aftermath ofWorldWar II. InMay1948 Israel proclaimed itself as anindependent state at the expiration of the British Palestinianmandate. AlmostimmediatelytheremnantArabPalestinianstate,Syria,andEgyptwereinvolvedinwarwiththenewstate.

Iraq,withno commonborder,wasnotdirectly involvedbut sent troops tonewlyindependentJordan(formerlyTransjordan),probablyhelpingtoforestallIsraeliconquestoftheWestBank.JordanhadanalmosttacitagreementtolimitfightingwithIsrael;JordansimplyannexedtheWestBankregionofPalestine.TheshortwardroveafloodofPalestinianrefugeesintoadjacentstates.

Soviet influence continued to grow, particularly among junior militaryofficers; in 1952 a coup overthrew the Egyptian monarchy, bringing GamelNassertopower.IraqiPrimeMinisterNurial-Sa’id,inandoutofpowerastheresultofinternalbickering,wasofcoursewaryofthisgrowingSovietregionalinfluence.HewasinstrumentalinforgingtheBaghdadPact,aregionalalliancewithTurkey,laterexpandedtoincludePakistan,Iran,andBritain.

Humiliated in its battleswith Israel, in 1956Syria invited the devil to theparty and entered into a pact with the Soviet Union. In the same year EgyptnationalizedthestrategicSuezCanal,andgainedconsiderableregionalinfluencethroughsuccessfulconfrontationwithBritainandFrance.Sovietefforts toruletheregionbyproxydefinedrelationswiththeUnitedStatesfordecades.

In February 1958 Nasser’s Egypt and Syria formed the United ArabRepublic (UAR), ostensibly forming a single country. It prompted a similarlytemporaryArabUnionoftheHashemitemonarchies,IraqandJordan.

BEIRUTPRELUDE,1958TheMaroniteChristianPresidentofLebanon,CamilleChamoun,hadsidedwith

Britain and France in the Suez Crisis of 1956, and openly favored the ArabUnion, offending Arab pan-nationalists including his own Prime Minister.DomesticunrestincludeddestructionoftheUSInformationAgencyoffices.TheUnitedStatesviewedthesituationwithincreasingalarm,inthemistakenbeliefthattheUARwasaCommunistfront.

Fearing Syrian invasion, and with the counterbalance of Iraq at leasttemporarily disabled, Chamoun requested help from the US. PresidentEisenhower invoked the self-proclaimed EisenhowerDoctrine, stating that theUS had the right to intervene in nations under threat from internationalCommunism. The agents of the intervention would be Army troops fromEurope,andtworeinforcedbattalionlandingteams(1/8and2/2)ofMarines.

Mounted on twelve hours notice, the Marine landings on 15 July were abizarre spectacle.Beirutwas amajor tourist destination, and the landing forcewas under strict orders not to interfere with beachgoers. The Marines of 2/2stormedashoreneartheairportamidswarmsofbikini-cladtourists(itwasstillthat kind of country) and local villagers. Teenagers helped the Marines dragheavy gear through the surf, while other civilians cheered. The force firstsecuredtheairportforthearrivalofArmyairborneunitsfromGermany.

EarlythenextdaytankscomeashoreacrossafloatingcausewaybuiltbytheShoreParty.The commanderof the2ndProvisionalMarineForce,Brig.Gen.SidneyWade, ledacolumnofvehicles includingtheonly twotanksavailable,intothecitytosecuretheport,criticalbridges,andtheembassycomplex.

There was reason to be nervous. GeneralWade had gone into the city tomeetwiththeUSambassadorandGeneralFuadShihab.8ShihabwasconcernedthathistroopsmightfireontheMarines.ThenwordarrivedthatLebaneseArmytankshadestablishedablockingpositionalongthehighway.Wadedrovetowardthe airport in an embassy car and encountered the Lebanese tanks; a shortconversation revealed that they had no clear orders, butwould probably resistanyAmericanadvance.

At1100hourstheMarines,stillundertheiroriginalorders,mountedupandmovedtowardthecity.

PFCJohnE.Dreisbachwasaradiooperator.

“On the long column—containing tanks, amtracks, trucks and jeeps—thatenteredBeirut,Iwassittingonajeepfender,”remembersDreisbach.“Therewerethousandsofpeopleliningthestreets,halfofwhomseemedtowelcomeus.Thelooksof theothersmademegetoff thefenderand

jump into a truck, as they didn’t look that friendly. I was also uneasyaboutthebuildings,whichseemedtobedamagedbyexplosives.”9

About a mile north of the airport, the column encountered the Lebanesetanks, whose guns were trained on the Marines. The Marine rifle battalioncommander had halted the advance when cars racing to and fro—Wade andnavalofficersheadedinto thecity, theambassadorandGeneralShihabheadedout—arrivedattheroadblock.

In a hasty conference in a nearby schoolhouse Shihab and the Americansworked out a plan. EachMarine unit would be preceded by Lebanese Armyrepresentatives,andotherswouldbe“embedded”(atermnot theninuse).TheMarineswouldbecarefultobypasstheMuslimquarterofthecity.10Thetrucewas fortunate, since theMarine tanks had nomain gun ammunition; the shipcarryingitandthebalanceofthetankplatoonhadgonetoMaltaforrepairs.11By1900hourstheMarineshadsecuredtheirobjectives.

When1/8,withfourteenmoretanksaswellasLVTsandOntos,arrivedtheMarineswereabletoundertakemechanizedpatrols.Thesefewvehicles(fifteentanks,tenOntos,andthirty-oneLVTP-5s)representedthetotalUSmechanizedpresenceuntilthearrivalofArmytankson27July.12

Ensuing confrontations were curiously polite by the standards of anothertime.Marinestakenprisonerbyanti-governmentIslamicforceswerelecturedatlength and then released, and theirweapons returned.Marines staged practicelandings,totheamusementofbeachgoers.

The last Americans withdrew on 25 October; the occupation resolved thecrisiswhenChamounwaspersuadedtoresign,replacedbythemorepragmaticGeneral Shihab. The cost to the US for this successful operation wasunbelievablyminimal:onesoldierkilledandonewounded.

Followinga1958coup,powerinIraqwasconsolidatedinthepersonofAbdal-KaremKassem, anArmygeneral ofmixedSunni andKurdishShi’a ancestry.Anotherreformer,hefelltogriefwhenheallowedtheKurdishDemocraticPartyto operate openly, only to face revolt as theKurds demanded autonomy.ThiswasthebeginningoftheKurdishproblem.

Kassem’sholdonpowerwasthreatenedbymultiplecoups,includingonebytheBa’athistsinMarch1959thatledtobloodyreprisals.SaddamHusseinwasby now an obscure but ruthless junior operative in the Ba’ath Party. He hadprovenhimself tohissuperiorsbymurderingSaddoumal-TikritiaCommunist

whohaddenouncedSaddam’suncle.SaddamHusseinattemptedtoassassinateKassem,butbotchedthejobandfledintoafour-yearexile.

Kassemlaidthefoundationformuchfuturemischief,assertingIraq’srighttocontrol themouthof thestrategicShattel-Arabwaterway,assertingownershipof Kuwait, and took the first steps toward nationalizing Iraq’s oil industry.Britain,alongwiththeUAR,disabusedhimoftheideaofannexingKuwait.Iraqfounditself increasinglyisolated,andworse,humiliatedbyfailure, intheArabworld.

The Ba’athists were by now a growing force in Iraqi politics. KassemarrestedsomeBa’athists,butthemeasureswereineffective.On9February1963Ba’athistarmyofficers seizedcontrolofBaghdad,andKassemwasmurdered.The young Saddam Hussein returned from exile. The one thing his uncle’spatronage could not provide was admission to officer’s training in the IraqiArmy, still a bastion of the well-born and educated. Despite his loyalty andservicetotheparty,hewassnubbedbytheofficercorps,everapowerinIraqidomestic politics. He came to admire dictators—particularly Stalin—who hadrisenthroughthepoweroftheirownwill.

InNovembertheIraqiBa’athistswereinturnoverthrown,andanationalist,Abdal-SalimArif,graduallyconsolidatedpower.HesuppressedtheBa’athandcreated the RepublicanGuard as a reliable personal army. Saddamwas againimprisoned following a failed counter-coup inOctober 1964.BynowSaddamhaddevelopedanetworkofinfluentialpatronswhothoughttheycouldharnesshis single-minded ruthlessness. Rather than being executed, Saddam escapedprisonundersuspiciouscircumstances.

Arifalsobrought tofruition thenationalizationof theoil industry, formingthe IraqiNationalOilCompany (INOC) todevelopoil reserves thatEuropeanandAmerican companieswere holding in reserve. Arif was succeeded by hislessastutebrother,Abdal-RahmanArif,afterhisdeathinahelicoptercrash.

CARIBBEANINTERLUDEI—THEDOMINICANREPUBLIC,1965TheMarinesarenostrangerstoeitherHaitiortheDominicanRepublic,thetwonations who share the troubled island of Hispaniola.13 One of the oldestEuropean colonies in the hemisphere, the Dominican Republic proclaimed itsindependencein1821,onlytobepromptlyoccupiedbyforcesfromneighboringHaiti until 1844. Spain then took advantage of the American Civil War toreoccupytheRepublicfrom1861until1865.Afterregainingits independence,theunhappycountrywasvictim toadizzying roundofcoupsand revolts,and

Marineswerelandedtosuppresstroublesin1903and1904.Civilwarsandcorruptionhaddriven thenationdeeply intodebt toFrench

andGermanbanks,andtheU.S.fearedthatEuropeanpowerswouldusethisasapretext to establishbases that coulddominate sea approaches to thePanamaCanal.In1907theUStookovercontroloftheDominicancustomsservice,andthereby the national economy, and Marines moved in to police the country.Though the Marines strove to establish a professional national police andimprovedthenationalinfrastructure,theoccupationgrewincreasinglyunpopularinAmerica,andtheMarineswerewithdrawn.In1930RafaelLeonidasTrujilloseizedpower,establishingadictatorship.

On 30May, 1961Trujillowas assassinated. Following rule by a series ofrotating juntas, the elections of early 1963 brought an exiled leftist reformer,JuanBosch, to thepresidency.His termwasshort-lived.ASeptembermilitarycoup, and another series of juntas, brought Donald Reid Cabral to thePresidency,opposedbyBoschleftistsaswellasmilitaryfactions.On24April1965dissidentArmyofficersarrestedtheirownChiefofStaff,andbyeveningthegovernmenthadindeedfallen.Bosch(“Constitutionalist”)supportersseizedcachesofweapons,andby27Aprilthecapitalwasrackedbysniping,looting,and arson.Onemilitary faction, the “Loyalists,” tried to fight itsway into thecity, only tobe repulsedby the rebels.On the afternoonof27April the rebelpresident,Molina,requestedAmericanaidinrestoringorder.

TheJohnsonadministrationwaspredisposedtosupport theLoyalist forces.On 28 April,Marines from the USSBoxer landed by helicopter to begin theevacuationofforeigncitizens.Thefollowingdaythe6thMEU(IndiaCompany,3/6) and supporting armor landed west of the capital. The Marines movedrapidly toward thecity.Shortlyaftermidnighton30Aprilplanescarrying thefirstArmyairbornetroopslandedatSanIsidroAirfieldeastofthecity.

Thatafternoonparatroopersofthe3rdBrigadeandMarinesbegantomoveintothecityasLoyalisttroopsunexpectedlywithdrew.ThepartofthecitytobeseizedbytheMarinesof3/6wouldconstitutemuchof theInternationalSafetyZone (ISZ), but containedmore rebel forces.Company columns, led by smalltask forces consisting of a rifle platoon supported by two LVTs and a tank,pushedintothecity.OtherMarinesfollowedintrucks.Forbiddentouseheavyweapons, the Marines were pinned down by heavy fire until permission wasgranted to use 3.5inch rocket launchers. On 1May theMarines and airbornesoldierslinkedup,splittingandisolatingtheConstitutionalistforces.

Over thefollowingweekmoreforcespoured in including theremainderof

Bravo Company (-) (REIN), 2nd Tank Battalion.14 Army forces engaged anddestroyed two armored vehicles, but Marine armor faced no opposition.Americanforceswereabletoquicklypacifythenation.

Forbiddentousetheirheavyfirepower,theMarinetanksneverthelessservedapurposethatwouldbeincreasinglyimportantinfutureoperationsofthistype—intimidation.

FornearlyadecadetheattentionoftheAmericanpublicwasfixatedonthewarinVietnam.15

The humiliation ofArab armies in the SixDayWar of 1967was anotherpivotalevent.ThebigloserswereSyria,whoseGolanHeightsfrontierpositionswere occupied by Israel, and Jordan, which lost control of the West Bankterritories. In 1970 Jordan decisively crushed Palestinian exile groups whichwere using Jordanian territory as a base of operations; Palestinians—theinnocentwith theguilty—weredriveneven fartherafield in theirexile. Jordaneventually renounced claim to the West Bank in 1988, leaving the remnantPalestinianpopulationinalegallimbo.

ThecrushingdefeatatthehandsofIsraelthrewseveralArabstatesintoinnerturmoil.Arif’sIraqigovernment,alreadysufferingfromthecontinuingKurdishrevoltandCommunistinsurrection,wasdeposedinaMay1968coup.SomehowSaddamHusseinreappeared,leadingoneoftheprominentunitsinthecoup.Asecond coup quickly brought Ahmed Hasan al-Bakr to power, with SaddamHusseinashisdeputy.

Bakrhadpromisedcontinuingprimacy in internalpolitics to thearmy,butsoonrenegedonthedeal,sendingmanyofthegeneralsintoexile.(Saddam,withhistypicalattentiontodetail,wouldeventuallyarrangetohavemostmurdered.)Saddam became head of the internal security apparatus, the path to power intotalitarianregimes,andlikeStalinmasteredtheartofrepression.

In November 1970 the Syrian Defense Minister, Bashar el-Azzad, seizedpowerinSyria,establishingafamilydynastythatstillclingstopower.

Saddam Hussein was growing beyond simple muscle for the regime. AsDeputyPresidenthesteadilyusurpedpresidentialpower,drivingfoesintoexile.When the army proved unable to control theKurds, Saddam bought off theiressential foreign support. He negotiated an agreement for massive armspurchases from the Soviets, and in 1975 renegotiated an agreement with theShah of Iran giving that country effective control over the Shatt el-Arabwaterway.Kurdishresistancecollapsedwithinweeks.Inthefirstagreementthe

Soviets cynically sold out the Iraqi Communist party. The latter agreementplacedtheIraq-IranborderontheIraqishoreline,ratherthaninthethalweg,theaxisoftheriverchannel.ThisgaveIraneffectivecontrolofthewaterway,Iraq’sonlyoutletfortankertraffic.

Saddamwas also busy on other fronts, finalizing nationalization of the oilindustry in 1972; a large proportion of the revenue went to buy those Sovietweapons. Saddam without doubt brought Iraq into the modern age, using oilrevenue to promote education, grantingwomen rights unheard of in theArabworld,andingeneral,Westernizingthesociety.

The 1973 Yom Kippur War, a coordinated assault by neighboring Arabstates upon Israel, was a rarity in that it produced a tangible peace. Jordandeclined any direct intervention. The Israelis and Egyptians fought to bloodymutualexhaustion,pavingthewayforanAmerican-brokeredpeace,albeitonethatwasdecidedlyunpopularinmostoftheArabworld.

ThewarwasthelastofthegreatconfrontationsbetweentheArabstatesandIsrael. ItalsopermanentlyestablishedaPalestinianrefugeepopulation,andsetthe ground for the disastrousLebanese civilwar of 1975–1990.Thewar bothdestroyedoneof themost affluent andcosmopolitanMiddleEastern societies,and eventually drew the United States back into the region, with disastrousresults.

In1979SaddamdecidedtoendtheobviousshamofBakr’spresidency.HehankeredtobecometheleaderoftheArabworld,andfearedthatanagreementto merge the Ba’athist regimes of Syria and Iraq would thwart his greatambition.InJulyBakrwentquietlyintoretirementfor“healthreasons.”

Ghastly purges within the party consolidated Saddam’s power. ThedenouementwasworthyofSaddam’s idol,Stalin.Thesecretary-generalof theparty, who had opposed Saddam, addressed the assembled party officials,describing a bogus Syrian conspiracy. Saddam then named numerous co-conspirators, and invited the assembled party members to participate in theimmediatemassexecution.Theexecutionswerefilmedfornationaldistribution.Saddamhadderailed theSyrianmerger, consolidatedpower, set averypublicexample to anywhoopposedhim, andbonded thepartyhierarchy in ablood-drenchedpact.

Thepartyinsinuateditselfintoeveryaspectofnationallife.Aslongastheydidnothingtoattract theattentionsof thestatesecurityapparatusorSaddam’sfamily,themassescouldliveafairlycomfortablelifeinawelfarestate.Thecostwasabsolute andunquestioningobedience.Thecostofdissentwas immediate

andoftengrislydeath.Still,SaddamwantedtobetheleaderoftheentireArabworld—indeed,the

entire Islamic world. Events unfolding in Iran would send him down a fardifferentpath.

Domestic resistance to the Shah’s rule in Iran coalesced around theAyatollahKhomeini,whohadlivedinexileinIraqandParis.Khomeinihadre-interpreted traditional Shi’a belief that religious rulers should eschewworldlypolitical power, and planned to export his revolutionary brand of Islam to theworld. The overthrow of the Shah brought Shia fundamentalists to power,rekindling the old threat on Iraq’s eastern frontier. The Iranian militantsexpendedmuchoftheirenergyonconfrontingtheUnitedStates,andtheIranianmilitary,oncethemostpowerfulintheregion,wasinnear-totalcollapse.Still,themassiveoilwealthof Iran,and its largepopulation,made itapower tobereckonedwith. Khomeini saw through Saddam’s attempts at conciliation, andcalledforhisoverthrow.

On22September1980,SaddamlaunchedamassiveairattackonIran.Thesurprise attack failed, and Iranian aircraft struck back at Iraqi airbases, navalbases,andoilproductionandshippingfacilities.Iraniangrounddefensesprovedless resilient. The Iraqi Army drove deep into Iran, but failed to capture keyobjectives such as themain Iranian oil export facility at Abadan. The Iranianleadership wielded population as a weapon, sacrificing tens of thousands ofuntrained adolescents in human wave attacks that overwhelmed the better-equipped Iraqis. Iran’s ability to interrupt tanker traffic through the Straits ofHormuz struck a telling blow at Iraq’s war-making economy. Disaster wasavertedbythebackingoftheUnitedStates(stillsmartingfromtheseizureandprolonged captivity of its embassy staff in Tehran) who provided limitedmilitarysupportbutmoreimportantlyin1984allowedothernations’tankerstoflytheUSflag.

Iran was hobbled by shortages of spare parts for its American-equippedforces. Iraqis mastered battlefield engineering, constructing defenses in depththatchanneledIranianhumanwaveattacksintomasskillinggrounds.EvenIraqiShi’aconscripts,reluctanttotradesecularforreligiousoppression,foughtwell.Inafinalirony,theonlyactiveinternalresistancetoSaddam,insupportofIran,camefromtheever-troublesomeKurds.Evenso,by1982thetwocountrieswerelockedinahideouswarofattrition.

TheIran-IraqconflictonlyreinforcedtheneedfortheMarineCorpstoplanformultipletypesofconflicts,nowincludingmechanizedwarfareagainstlocal

dictators flushwitharmamentspurchasedwithoil, banking, andothermonies.TheCorpsstruggledtoreconciletheneedforadequatefightingvehicleswiththeever-present need—and ingrained desire—for “lightness.” After severalexpensivebut faileddevelopmentprograms theMarineseventuallyadoptedan“off the shelf” solution, aGeneralMotors–Canada design based on the SwissMowageight-wheeledarmoredcar.

The LightArmoredVehicle (LAV) family seemed to offer everything theCorpswanted:simplicity;itcouldbeairliftedbytheCH-53heavylifthelicopterorcarriedinsideaC-130;multiplevehiclescouldbecarriedbylandingcraft;atleastlimitedamphibiouscapability;andabovealltheabilityforthebasicLAV-25 variant to transport four infantry-scout dismounts—the basicMarineCorpsinfantryfireteam.

The problemswith theLAVwere those inherent in any light vehicle: thinarmorandasmallmaingun(aTOW-missilearmedvariantwouldbeprovidedby mating the basic launcher from the Army’s anti-tank variant of theobsolescent M113). The real problem, though, was doctrinal. Despite itslightnessmantra,theCorpshadnocleardoctrinefortheuseoflightarmor.Wasit to be just infantry support? (At first the units had no dismount scouts, but“borrowed”infantryfromsupportedunits).Mountedlightinfantrywithorganicfire support? Mechanized reconnaissance? Mechanized scouts tasked withscreening and delaying the enemy until heavier,more capable assets could bebrought to bear? The troops in the ranks and theorists alikeworried over thisconundrum, one that was reflected in the evolving designation from LAVBattalion, to Light Armored Infantry Battalion, to Light ArmoredReconnaissanceBattalion.16

RepulsiveasmostoftheworldfoundSaddam’sregime,atthetimeitseemedthelesserofmultipleevils.Manywerepreparedtoseehimasabulwarkagainstmilitant Iranian fundamentalism. In 1983 theMarineswere among the first tosufferattackbyIran’snewwarbyproxy.

BEIRUTINTERLUDE,1983The secondAmerican intervention inLebanoncameabout as the result of thecollapse of effective government caused by an Israeli invasion. Given thepeacekeepingmission, theMarine infantryandtankswere limitedtopatrollinganassignedzoneofoccupation,andaddingacrediblethreattoreactionforces.17In theend the tanksplayed little role in the tragedy thatensued.Forbiddenbyrulesofengagementinwhichanyresponsetoattack(evenloadingweapons)had

tobeapprovedfromWashington,theMarinesweresittingducks.On23October1983, a truck bomb killed 241Americans,mostlyMarines, andwounded 115more.For theMarines itwas theworstsingleday’scasualtiessince IwoJima.Onthesameday58Frenchparatrooperswerekilledbyanothertruckbomb.

CARIBBEANINTERLUDEII—GRENADA,1983One of the oldest European colonies in the Caribbean, Grenada’s spiral intochaosbeganwellbeforeitsindependencein1974.In1950EricGairyreturnedfromexile,andeventuallyestablishedadictatorship.On12March1979Gairywas deposed in a near-bloodless coup. As brutal and capricious asGairy hadbeen, things became worse under the systematically brutal Marxist, MauriceBishop. The Soviets, however, favored the ambitious Bernard Coard, whoorchestrated the “Bloody Wednesday” coup of 19 October 1983. Extremeviolence caused concern for the safety of foreign students at the St. GeorgesUniversitySchoolofMedicine,thoughallfactionsinthecountrywereanxiousto protect the students, who were now the main source of foreign revenue.PresidentReaganmeanwhile seizedanopportunity tooverthrowaCommunistregime. For the US military, the task was formidable: “… a large combinedforce had to be cobbled together at speed,” with the added complexity thatcontingentsfromseveralCaribbeannationswouldbeincludedtolegitimizetheoperation.18

Aspartofanoverlycomplexplan,the22ndMAUwouldsecurethenorthernpartof the island, expected tobe the final redoubtof thedefenders.The22ndMAU was built around 2/8, Hotel Battery 3/10, five M60A1 tanks from 3rdPlatoon/ACompany/2ndTankBattalion,andfourteenLVTP-7s.19

OnD-Day,25October,theplanfounderedonlast-minutechanges,weather,the inexperience of the Special Operations units, and its own complexity. Byday’s end only a fewMarines were ashore. In the south, all save one of theSpecialOpsmissionshad failed.20Hamstrungbycommunications failures, theMarinesstillmanagedtoredeploytworiflecompaniesandmechanizedassetstothe west coast. The Marines, who had first boarded their assault vessels at0345hours,landedatGrandMal,twokilometersnorthofGovernmentHouse,at1901hours.

AtaskforcebuiltaroundGolfCompanystartedsouthinthepre-dawnhoursof26October,withthetanksbringinguptherear.Thecoastalroadwasbarelywiderthanthevehicles,andatseveralchokepointswasperchedalonghillsides

above the sea. Resistancemelted away at the squealing sound of tank tracks.Thatwasgood,sincethetankshadlandedwithnoammunitionfortheir105mmmainguns.21With the tanksprovidingmachinegunsupport—and intimidation—theMarinesrelievedtheisolatedSEALdetachmentatGovernmentHouseat0730hours. Golf Company pushed on to Fort Frederick, headquarters of theGrenadan defense forces. By nightfall Rangers, transported by Marinehelicopters,hadcollectedtheSt.GeorgesstudentsatGrandAnse.Thefollowingday the only task remaining was to patrol the nearly deserted streets, and to“rescue”ahandfulofCanadianvacationers—whodeclinedrescue.

AgaintheMarinetankshadproveneffectivethroughsheerintimidation.Atthe time the chaoticGrenada interventionwashailed as a triumph, andon thewhole theMarineshadperformedbetter thanmost.Whilesomeunits receivedtumultuouswelcomesat theirhomebases, theMarinesboardedship to relievethedecimatedforceinBeirut.

As theMiddleEastspiraledeverdownward, fromLibyaMuammaral-Qaddafiexportedhisbrandofinternationalterrorism.OntheIran-IraqwarfrontmoneyflowedfromtheroyalcoffersinthefrightenedGulfStatestoIraq,andmodernarms from the Soviets and others; the United States did not directly providearmaments,only“crop-spraying”militaryhelicoptersandintelligencedata.

In 1984 Saddam decided to use chemicalweapons to repulse a successfulIranianoffensive.Followinginternationaloutrage,Saddamtemporarilydesistedfrom their further use. The tanker war escalated when Saddam began to useExocetanti-shippingmissiles,inoneepisodeattackingthedestroyerUSSStarkin 1987. The situation was further muddied when it was determined that theimpoverished Iranianswereobtainingsparepartsandweapons from theUS inexchangeforinfluenceinattemptingtogainthereleaseofAmericanhostagesinLebanon,leadingtotheso-calledIran-ContraAffair.

Byearly1988Iranwasonthebrinkofeconomiccollapse,andhadsufferedoveramillioncasualties.InAugustIranacceptedaUN-brokeredceasefire.

Iraqhadalso suffered severe economicdamage.Onceoneof the strongestregional economies, it was effectively bankrupt. Domestic austerity programsdidnotsitwellwithapopulation thathadonceenjoyed thebenefitsofanoil-fundedwelfarestate,and tensof thousandsofveteranswereunemployed.TheKurds were again seeking autonomy. Under intense diplomatic pressure, Iraqhad discontinued the further use of chemical weapons, but in 1987 andcontinuing into 1988 Saddam directed their use against theKurds; one attack

alone inflicted some 15,000 civilian casualties. Many Western nations werealarmedbyIraq’scontinuingeffortstoacquirenuclearweapons.

CARIBBEANINTERLUDEIII,PANAMA,1989The United States continued to be distracted by other regional problems,including the growth of international drug cartels and “narco-terrorists.”ProblemsbetweenPanamaniandictatorManuelNoriegaandAmericanforcesintheCanalZone(CZ)continuedtofester,andinMay1989companiesfromthe2nd LAI Battalion began rotational assignments to the CZ. By 20 Decemberconditions had come to a head after the murder of a Marine by Panamaniansecurityforces.

FourteenvehiclesfromDCompany(-),2ndLAI,withunfamiliardismountsdrawn from a security company, took part in Operation JUST CAUSE, theoverthrow of Noriega. Task Force SEMPER FI quickly secured the westernapproachestoPanamaCityandtheBridgeoftheAmericasspanningthecanal.Later the task force’s LAVswere used to reduce roadblocks and provide firesupport.22

IraqwasdeterminedtorecoverthecostofitswarwithIran,whichSaddamsawas one fought for the benefit of all Arab states against the Ayatollah’s Shi’aregime.Inaperiodoffallingglobaloilprices,membersoftheOrganizationofPetroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) began to exceed their sales quotas,furtherdamagingIraq’seconomy,whoseonlyotherexportwasdrieddates.

Instead of forgiving Iraq’swar debt,Arab governments began to press forimmediate repayment.The leaders included theUnitedArabEmirates, but themost foolhardy was the Emirate of Kuwait. Despite sharing a border with anationthathadthelargestandmostbattle-experiencedarmyandairforceintheregion,thetinynationdemandedrepayment.InJuly1990Iraqidiplomatsgrewincreasinglybellicose, accusingKuwaitof stealingoilby increasedproductionfrom the Rumalia oil field which spanned the national border.23 Even KingFaisalofSaudiArabiaurgedtheEmirtogiveintoSaddam’sdemands.Finallyon25JulyIraqdeliveredalettertobedeliveredtoPresidentGeorgeH.WBushthat was essentially an ultimatum. The American ambassador to Iraq, AprilGlaspie,seemedblindtoSaddam’smessage.

On2August1990,threeRepublicanGuarddivisionsspearheadedanassaultthatsweptasidethetiny16,000-manKuwaitiarmy.Theroyalfamily,alongwith

elementsofitsmilitary,civilians,andforeignworkersfledthecountry.Theinvasionsentaneconomicshockthroughtheindustrializedworld.The

powerfulIraqiArmythreatenedhalftheworld’soilreserves.Saddamhadsorelymiscalculatedglobal reaction, andcouldno longerdependuponhis last, now-tottering patron, the Soviet Union. After a series of increasingly stringentresolutions, embargoes, and a naval blockade failed to dislodge the Iraqis, theUN on 29 November authorized Resolution 678: the removal of Iraqi forcesfromKuwait“byallmeansnecessary.”

NOTES

1Forexample,seeKeegan,TheIraqWar,p.8–55.2Ibid,p.15.3Ibid,p.15.TheMarshArabsareaminoritypopulationoccupyingthewetlandsatthemouthoftheTigris-

Euphratesdelta.Long intractable, theyarenowbest rememberedas thevictimsofSaddamHussein’s“finalsolution,”drainingthetidalmarshestoeliminatetheirtraditionalhomes,refuges,andwayoflife.

4Faisal,thesonoftheSharifofMecca,wasaSunniraisedinIstanbul.5TheDruzefaithisanoffshootofIslamwhichincorporatesaspectsofseveralotherphilosophies,andis

sometimesconsidereda separate religion.Persecuted forcenturies, and isolated inmountaindomains,liketheGhurkastheyhaveoftenprovenloyalmercenarywarriors.

6ForacomprehensivehistoryofMiddleEasternoilexploration,discovery,andenergypolitics,seeDanielYergin,ThePrize:TheEpicQuestforOil,MoneyandPower.

7OnecasualtyofthefightingwasIraq’ssizeableJewishcommunity.AnintegralpartoftheculturesinceAssyriantime,manywerekilledinthefirstofthenationalistfarhud.

8ShihabistransliteratedphoneticallyfromArabic.InsomesourcesitisspelledShehaborChihab.9AsquotedinAlasdairSoussi,50YearsLater,U.S.MarinesRememberThe1958U.S.“Intervention”inLebanon.

10CraigSymondsandWilliamClipson,TheNavalInstituteHistoricalAtlasoftheUSNavy,p.200–201.11Estes,MarinesUnderArmor,p.159.12Ibid,p.159.Marinetankplatoonscouldbeoperationallysubdividedintoaheavysectionofthreetanks

undertheplatoonofficer,andalightsectionundertheseniorNCO.13ForamoredetailedsummaryofthelengthyinvolvementoftheMarineCorpsinDominicanaffairs,see

Millett, pp. 137, 179–183, 194–207, and 556–558; and Ringler and Shaw, U.S. Marine CorpsOperationsintheDominicanRepublic,April-June1965.

14Thesuffix(-)indicateslessthanthetotalunit,(REIN)indicatesreinforced.Inatankcompany(REIN)typically indicates support such asmaintenance or communications elements from the battalionH&SCompany.

15For theMarineCorpsarmor involvement in thatmost frustratingofwars, see thecompanionvolumeMarineCorpsTankBattlesinVietnam.

16Estes,MarinesUnderArmor,p.180–182;Michaels,TipoftheSpear,p.3–4.17Turner,TankswiththeMEU:ATeamforSuccess,p.39.18Ibid,p.39.19Ibid,p.234–235;Estes,MarinesUnderArmor,p.182.20Adkins,UrgentFury—TheBattleForGrenada,p.251.21Estes,MarinesUnderArmor,p.182.

22ThecompanyincludedLAV-25,LAV-L,andLAV-C2variants.PanamanianarmorincludedV-150andV-300 armored cars, the latter armedwith a 90mm cannon.Varying numbers of LAVs available arecited by different sources. Estes, Marines Under Armor, p. 183, Reynolds, Just Cause: MarineOperationsinPanama,1988–1990,p.15,22–26;Johnsonetal,IntheMiddleoftheFight,p.131–133,135.

23ArabicisoftentranslatedintoEnglishinseveraldifferentforms.AlternativespellingsincludeRumeila,Rumailia,Rumalla,andothers.

T

CHAPTERTWO

OperationDesertShield

“Idon’tknowwhateffecttheywillhaveupontheenemy,butbyGod,sir,theyfrightenme.”—ArthurWellesley,DukeofWellington,observinghisowntroops

HE IRAQI SEIZUREofKuwaitprovokedan immediate response fromthe Western world, and caught the Marine Corps with unitsdeployed from Sierra Leone to theMexican border.1 The first

American unit on scenewas the 7thMarine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), adesert-trainedunitwiththreeinfantrybattalionsandanLAIbattalion.

The first tankunit todeploywasLtColAlphonsoBusterDiggs’3rdTank.DiggswasatChicoStateCollegewhenanofficerselectionteamwasconfrontedbyanti-wardemonstrations.He fell foranoldploy.“When itwasallover theprotestersallleft.Ijustpickeduptheliterature,andthisCaptain,hesaid‘Whatareyoudoingthereson?’

“IsaidAh,I’mjustlookingattheliterature’“Hegoes‘Don’tworry.Youcouldn’tqualifyforthisprogramanyway.It’s

toohard.’”DiggsendedupinPlatoonLeadersclassbetweenhisjuniorandsenioryears.

His initial assignment was in amtracs, and he attended the Advanced ArmorSchool atFortKnox. “Therewas aguy therenamedPaulLessard. If he likedyou,hewouldputinforanMOSchangetotanks,becausebothamtrackersandtankswentthere[as]captains.”

Diggs—likemostofhisofficers—wasnewtothebattalion.RickManciniofAlphaCompanyhadbeenacollegestudentwhenhecasuallytalkedtoaMarineofficerabouttheMarinesandendedupintheofficercandidateprogram.Whendutyassignmentswereannounced“Iprobablymadehalftheclasspissedoffatmebecauseofthefactthatsomanypeoplewantedtanksanddidn’tgetit,andIdidn’twantitandgotit.”AtFortKnoxMancinifoundhiscallingthankstoanoutstandingArmyNCO,StaffSergeantLayton.Assignedto3rdTank,Mancini

hadbeenaboardonlythreemonths.Diggs’s tank commander was Sgt Kevin Kessinger. Kessinger joined the

Reserves tohelppay for college.Not liking college, hevolunteered for activedutyand“endeduplovingit.”

Thebattalioncommandercoulddirecthisunitfromhistank(HotelOne),anAAVC-7A1command track,orHumveeashesawfit.Diggspreferreda tank,but the problem was task overload. He had to direct his own crew, monitorseveralradios,directthebattalion,andcoordinatesupportingarms.Diggssolvedtheproblembyridingas loader, lettingKessingercontrolcommunicationsandthe tank. “Essentially we were a three man crew.” At stops “Colonel Diggshoppedoff thetankanddidn’tdothekindofdutiesa loaderwoulddo.Reallyyourgopherguy,doesalotofthemenialtasksonatank.ColonelDiggswasn’tabouttodothosethings.”

ThetankwasmodifiedforDiggs.Kessinger:“Myjobwasalwaystogetthetaskforcetacs[radiofrequencies],theregimentaltac,battaliontac,evensomeofthecompanytacs,havethempre-loadedontheRT246sothatthecolonel,allhehadtosaywaswhohewantedtotalkto.Ikindofkeptthechannelsorganizedsodependingonwhohewantedtotalkto,Icouldputhimontherightchannel….Wekepthismapsuptodate,andmadesurehehadasmuchinformationaswecouldputinfrontofhim….

The othermembers of the crewwere the driver, LCplKevinMoroni, andgunnerGalvan.KessingerwasparticularlyproudofMoroni,whohadcomeasa“messedupkid,”butbecameanexcellentMarine.

MikeMummey had grown up with his uncle’s stories of tank warfare inWorldWarII. In1977aMarineCorpsrecruiterhadbeencallingafriend,andMummeywentwithhimto“tell therecruiter to leavehimalone.AssoonasIwalkedinthere’sapictureofanM-48goingthroughabigmudbog.Ilookedupat the staff sergeant and said “You guys have tanks?’He’s like ‘Well yeswedo!’Thatwasit.NextthingyouknowIgetmyparentsdowntheretosignformebecauseIwasonlyseventeen.”

But“WhenIgotoutofbootcampIhadorderstogotoTwentyninePalmstobe(MOS) twenty-eight-hundredcommunicationsMarine.WhenI talked to theseriesgunnerysergeantthere,theChiefDrillInstructor,hesaid‘Hey,shithead,that’s because theyhave radios in them tanks.That’swhyyou’re gonnabe intanks.’Thatwasn’ttrue.

“WhentheyfoundoutIwasn’tsupposedtobeatwenty-eight-hundredtheysaid ‘Well, you cango to ITS (InfantryTrainingSchool), everybody canbe a

grunt.’SoIwenttothegrunts.”Mummeywasdischargedin1979,butre-enlistedin1984.Afteratourasa

DrillInstructorhejoined3rdTankin1988,andbecamethePlatoonSergeantof1stPlatoon,CharlieCompany.ThirdTankwastrainingfordesertwarfare.“Wewerealwaysoutinthefield.MyfirstyearatTwentyninePalmswewereoutinthefield283days.”

In modern war the logistical effort is paramount, and the combat supportunits—engineers, logisticspersonnel,cargohandlers,andothers—areoften thefirst to arrive. Normal procedure would have been to deploy these “off loadpersonnel”toDiegoGarciatotravelaboardtheships,buttheshipshadalreadydeparted Diego Garcia. Combat personnel were flown to Kuwait aboardchartered airliners to marry up with equipment loaded aboard the ships ofMaritime Pre-Positioning Squadron 2 (MPPS-2) from Diego Garcia. But firstlogisticsspecialistshadtounloadmountainsofweaponsandmateriel.

ChrisFreitus,ExecutiveOfficerofCharlieCompany,3rdTankdescribedalong flight packed inside the airliner, not allowed to disembark for thirty-sixhours.2The temperaturewas106F(41C)whentheplanearrivedat0200hours.Buster Diggs thought conditions were not bad “Except humidity. TwentyninePalms is dry. Remember that’s on the [Persian] Gulf. It’s horrible. When Iopenedthedoorofthatplane,Isaid‘I’mnotgonnabeabletodothis.I’mforty-twoandI’mnotgonnabeabletodothis.’Butyouacclimatequickly.”

Mummey:“Wegetoff theairplaneandoperationchaosbeginsbecause it’sgoing so quickly there’s not a lot of liaison people that went over before us.There’sa lotofbigquestionmarkshoveringaround.Youdefinitelyhad togoand find out what was going on.” TheMarines boarded trucks and charteredbusesfortheridetotheportatal-Jubayl.Thetripwasanintroductiontolocaldriving practices: mutter a prayer of “Insh’Allah” (“God willing”), and dosomethingnosanepersonwouldattempt.

TheSaudis confined theMarines to the immediate areas of thepiers, over9,000Marinescrowdedintowarehouseswithinadequatewatersuppliesandfewfunctioningtoilets,intemperaturesabove120degreesF(49C).“Thosenexteightdayswerethemostmiserabledaysofmylife,easily,”recalledKessinger.“WegotputintothesehugewarehousesthatlinedbothsidesofthepieratJubaylaswelinkedupwithourMPPS.Aswewerewaitingfortheshipstocomein,wewereaskedtostayinsidebecausewedidn’thaveairsuperiorityyet.”

Severalthousandmenwere“prettymuchjustlyingaroundtheinsideofthisfootball field-sized warehouse, just literally lying on cement floors. It was a

hundredfifteen,hundredandtwentyoutside,soitwashotterinside.Irememberlying on a piece of cardboard, panting like a dog. Uncontrollably.” The menspenteightdaysinthewarehouse.

BusterDiggs:“Noneofthosethingsworkassmoothlyas[they’re]supposedtowork.FSSGissupposedtoflyinfirst,youflyinfivedayslater,FSSGhastheequipmentall readyforyou.Thatdidn’thappenbecauseweneeded the troopsonthegroundquickly.”

Kessinger:“Whentheshipscameinandtherewasworktobedone,thatwasbetter.Wedid that in shifts.Those [FSSG]guys tookcareofus thebest theycouldwithwhattheyhad.Irememberjustcoolwaterwasaluxury.

“We drove just about anything off the ships,” sorting through the gear onland.

Rumorswererife.Mummeyrecalledthat“ThereweresupposedtobeIraqispecial forces frogmen under the pier, this and that. There was a lot of bumscoopgoingaround.”

The tankers found that equipment necessary to operate the tanks—tools,fluids,maintenanceequipment—wasmissing.Thecrewsbartered;an ice-chestfor a set of wrenches, tool boxes for batteries. Douglas Smith was a NavyReserve corpsman: “We’ve had to fight for everything. We almost stole thetanksofftheshipsinordertogetthem.”3

Partof theproblemwas sheerbad luck.BusterDiggs: “Letmeput this inperspectivenow.Our[MPS]Squadronwasdueformaintenance.Infact,oneofourshipswasinBlountIsland[Florida]formaintenance.Thecontractorcrewshadflownoff.ThestuffwasprobablyinapoorstateofreadinessonlybecauseitwasgoingbacktoBlountIslandformaintenance.”4“Theyhadthewrongweightoil.Youdon’tknowwhereyou’regoingtofight.Yougonnafightinthedesert?Sothat’skindofunfair.”

Tanks were missing gun sights, batteries, rangefinders, and other parts.“TherewasayellowIOUtaghangingthere,”saidMummey.

AmajorproblemwasthereactivearmorontheoldM60s.TheMarineCorpshad aborted the upgrade in 1989, and theNavyobjected to the explosive tilesstored on its ships.The first shipment of tanks from theUSwentwithout theexplosiveblocks.Theexplosivesweredugoutofstorage,morewereacquiredfromArmystocks,andallhadtobehurriedlyshippedandinstalled.5

“ThetanksthatcameofftheMPSshipscameinawholebunchofflavors,”Mummey added. “One squadron theywere all sand-colored, and they all hadreactive armor.There’s another squadron came in, and all these tankswere in

four-colorMERDCcamo‘reddesert,’andhadnoreactivearmor.Thetanksthat1stMarineDivision—1stTankBattalion—drewwere three color black, greenand brown NATO colored, with reactive armor. Later on these tanks fromOkinawa started showing up, and also fromLeje-une… theywere four-colorjungleMERDC,somewithreactivearmorandsomewithout.”TeamsfromtheAnnistonArmyDepotwereflownintoJubayl.“Theywouldputontheantlers(brackets)aswecalleditforthereactivearmor.”Thecrewshadtoaddtheactualexplosive tiles, “And thatwas apain in thebutt, becausenormallyyou take adummy tile off and put a live one on. These tanks would come up, and youwouldn’t know which way [to put the tiles on]. You had to park it next toanothertankanduseitasanexample.”

Withmore experience at deployments, the LAV personnel brought aboardtheir civilian transport planesmuch of the equipmentmissing from the storedLAVs:maintenancetools,machineguns,andsecureSINGCARSradios.6

The Marines discovered that at night dew gathers on every surface, andcombineswithsaltdustintheairtocorrodeexposedmetalalmostinstantly.

TheMarineswerefrustratedbythelackofcooperationfromlocalofficials.Itseemedthatsomeprinceownedthelocalconcessionfornearlyeverything.Inperhaps the sandiest country on the planet, sand to fill sandbags had to bepurchased.7

By25August,tendaysafterarrival,7thMEBwasreadytodefendtheport.Evenasthetanksdeployedforwardtobecomea“tripwire,”theverybasicswereinshortsupply.Mummey:“Whenwerolledoutall Ihadwasonecanof two-hundredroundsformycoaxmachinegun,andwhateverninemillimeteroffive-five-six we took from a pallet at the Air Force Base in Riverside before weflew… . The ammo in the MPS hadn’t been discovered yet.” The Marinesquicklyconcluded,“ThatwasGeorgeBush’sbigbluff.Heputusoutthereinthesand.Wedidn’thaveammo:nomaingun,wehadliketwomissiles.Thatwasit.”

Kessingerexplained:“ThirdTankswas inCampFive.WerotatedataboutfiftypercentstrengthfromthefieldbacktothisCampFive.Ithinkwedidsixdaysout,threedaysbackorsomethinglikethat.Wewereconstantlymovingthebattalionaroundinthedifferentpositions.”Inevitablysomeplatoonswerebackatthebasecampwhenthebattalionmoved.Mummey:“You’dhavetomovetheotherplatoon’s tanks.That turnedout tobea realadventure.”Themenhad topack up gear and shiftmultiple tankswith short crews. “That included takingdown that big circus tent net, folding it up. The battalion would do its road

march, we’d move to a new battalion assembly area two or three clicks indiameter.You’dhavetosetupthetank, thensetuptheirnet.Gobackovertoyour tank” and repeat the process. The tanks moved at night to avoidinconveniencingthelocaldrivers.

JamesGonsalves,thesonofaNavycorpsman,wasimpressedbytheMarinefaculty members at the Naval Academy. He graduated Tank School inSeptemberandinlateOctoberjoined3rdTankalreadyinSaudiArabia.CharlieCompanycommanderEdDunlapdrovehim“…righttomytankplatoon.Said‘Okay, talk to theplatooncommander,anddoaquick turnover.Theplatoon’syours. Don’tmess it up.’” The outgoing leader “Basically said a quick hello,jumpedintotheHumveewiththecompanycommander,andhewentofftohisnext job,whichwasaTOWplatooncommander….I turnedaroundandtherewerefifteenMarinesstaringatme,anditwasaprettyhumblingexperience.”

At this point the Marine armor force consisted of 53 M60A1 tanks, 28LAVs,andabout100AAVs.8

Freitusdiscoveredthatconfusionwasevenworseforsomeunits.Aboutmid-day a bedraggled convoy ofArmy airborne armor pulled in from the airbase,looking “… totally lost, shell shocked.”M551 light tankswere running short-tracked, and one was towing a disabled M113 personnel carrier. The Armyplatooncommanderneededpartsandsupplies,evenwater.Unabletoofferanymechanicalassistance,theMarinesgavethemfoodandwater,andpointedthemtowardwheretheythoughtArmytroopsmightbe.9

More units of IMEF arrivedwithin days, the leading edge of a force thatwouldgrowto tworeinforceddivisions,anenlargedairwing,and twoservicesupportgroups.10TwoMEBsremainedafloatasanamphibiousthreattheIraqiscouldillaffordtoignore.

Shoulderholsters,supposedtobeanissueitemfortankers,werepurchasedwith personal funds. Other items as mundane as sunglasses were donated,thoughinmanycasessuchitemsfoundtheirwayintothehandsofothersalongthelongsupplychain,andneverreachedthefront-linetroops.11

TheMarinesandairborneunitswouldhavetodefendtheborderforweeksbefore heavy Army units could arrive. They referred to themselves as speedbumps.Diggs: “Weweren’t ready.Weknewwhatwas up there. Jeez, I thinkthey had three tank and five mech divisions in Kuwait. I was the only tankbattalionthere.Iwasn’treadytoattack.That’sludicrous.”Saudiunitsformedathinwarningline,withtheAmericansbehind.Intheorytheywouldtradespacefor time,with air power and tank-hunter teams trying to slow any attack.But

therewasnospacetotrade.IncaseofinvasiontheMarineswouldhavetofightinplace.MajorGeneralJohnI.Hopkins,thecommanderofthe7thMEB:

Wewouldscreenasfarforwardaspossible,delayandattacktheIraqiswith air power, then defend in a main battle area along what becameknownas“cementridge.”TheIraqishadtwopossibleattackroutes.Wethoughtthey’deithercomedownthecoastorusearoutealittlebittothewest,butboth theseroutescometogetherata junctionnear thecementfactory. If they kept coming, we had drawn a line in the sand by thecementfactory.Weweregoingtostaythere.12

OftheirdefensivepositiononCementRidge,Diggsrecalledthat“It’shighground, probably twentymeters higher than every place else, and they dig in.Task force commander says ‘I want overhead cover’ and all this crap. I said‘Jeez, they’re just gonna drive around us.’Whywould they attack down thisroad,rightintoourteeth,whentheycoulddriveoutinthedesertandgoaroundus? So I stayed mobile. I thought it’d be a meeting engagement out in thedesert.”

Likemany,HopkinswasalsoconcernedaboutfacingthemoremodernT-72tankswitholdM-60s.

Theonly thingwe’vegot todo iswhen theycome,we’vegot toclosewith them right away and take away the advantage they have ofoutgunningus.Inclose,we’llhavemoremaneuverability,we’llhavethesabotround,andwe’llcausesomeproblems.13

Themixtureofoldandnewvehicles,andtheenormousrequirements,causedlogisticalproblems.DennisBealwasBusterDiggs’sS-4.“Fuelwasabigissuebecauseyoubroughtyourfive-thousand-gallonrefuelerswithyou…youneedtwohundredthousandgallonsof[in]bladdersonthegroundtokeepthissoyoucan fill up your refuelers, you can fill up your tanks, you can fill up yourwheeledvehiclesthatareflowingbackandforth.Thenthisbladderfarm,whichmany of themwere over amillion gallons, that has to be constantly refueled.Thattomewasthebiggestissue.MREscomingouttheyin-yang,therewasnoproblemwith food.Waterwasn’t an issue.You could fly in pallets of bottledwater,butyoudon’tjustmakefuelonthespot.”

TheM60A1sexperiencedfuelproblemsbecauseCENTCOMhadadopteda

single-fuel policy, and the available high-quality fuel caused degradedperformance,highfuelconsumption,andcloggingofthefuelsystem.Thetankshad been operating on diesel fuel, and had condensate water and impurities.Whenjetfuelwasadded“Thatimmediatelystartedgoingtothefuelcells,andweranoutoffuelfilters”saidMummey.“They’dbarelygothreemilesanhour.Isawsomecreativestuff.We’dpullthefuelfiltersoutandthey’dblow‘emoutwithanairgun,wraptheminasock…andstick‘embackin thereandget itdown the road.”Parts arrivedbyodd routes; in one instanceMummey’s crewreceivedaFedExboxaddressedtothetank.“Weallthoughtwewasgonnagetaspecialpresent.Wepullitopenandit’sjustabunchofstinkin’fuelfilters.”

Fuel also caused problems with the LAVs, designed to operate oncommercial grade diesel. The fuel purged accumulated sediment andcontaminantsfromthefuelsystems,cloggingfuelfiltersandinjectors.14

Tank battalions using the M60A1 also received a tiny handful of moremodernM60A3tanks.BusterDiggs:“ThefirstArmytanksthatwereovertherewereM60A3s,andassoonasM1scame,theyabandonedthoseandwepickedupsomeofthose,too.”

Theproblem inusing twomarksof theM60was the thermal sights. “Thetankautomotively is the same tank.The ‘A3hada thermal sightdevice,nightpassive vision.We liked it. The ‘A3 had a better sight than theM1A1. Thatthermal sightwas tremendous.”Manciniacquired twoof them,andwas savedbyhisFirstSergeantwhohadbeentoMasterGunner’sSchool,and“Thatwasarealblessing.”

Marine deployment of the M1A1 tank had been delayed for budgetaryreasons.TankerswerehastilytrainedonthenewM1seriestanksbeforeflyingtoSaudiArabia,where16M1A1and60newM1A1(HA)tankswereissuedfromArmystockstothe2ndTankBattalion.

Twocompaniesof theReserve4thTankBattalionacquired thenew tanks.Bravo Company of 4th Tank was not activated until 17 November. TheydepartedforTwentyninePalmson15Decemberfor twoweekstrainingonthenewtanks;thetrainingcourseisnormallyelevenweeks.

Although theReservists of 4thTankhadworked longandhard to achievehigh proficiency, theymetwith the scorn often accorded “weekendwarriors.”ThemajorinchargeoftheschoolinformedcompanycommanderCaptainRalphF.“Chip”ParkisonthathewasnotpleasedatdealingwithReservists.Themajorassured Parkison that his men would not satisfactorily complete the intensivetraining. Parkison replied that “With all due respect, sir, you are in for a big

surprise.”15Formaltraininglasteduntil12January,conductingbothdayandnightfiring,

and exercises over the rugged Mojave Desert. The Reservists completed thetrainingwiththehighestproficiencyratings.16AsaReserveunitequippedwiththeCorps’ newest andmost expensiveweapons system, therewould bemanyeyesfixeduponBravoCompany.

With few of the new tanks in the supply line, Alpha Company, 4th TankwouldgotowarinM60A1s.ArecruitervisitedSamuelCrabtree’shighschool,and“Everybodysaid theMarineswere thehardest, so I said ‘Well, Imightaswelltrythat.’”Hisfather—formerAirForce—advisedhimtojointheReserve:“Ifyoulikeit,thenyoucangoactiveduty.”

Crabtree thought that theM60s “…were easy to maintain. They weren’tvery complicated… . Once you got them running, they prettymuch ran non-stop.”Thebiggestproblemwas“Ifthestartergoesout,youhavetoremovethewhole power-pack, just to get to the starter. Something as simple as a startercould takemanyhours, andyouhave touse theEighty-Eight in the field… .”Theydevelopedaworkaroundforthefuelproblem.“Thesixtywasn’tdesignedto handle multi-fuels. What you had to do was add oil to the fuel… . Theproblemwasitwouldclogupthefiltersifyouputintoomuch.”

They took onM60s from those left behind by 1stTank, and sailed on theUSSTarawa.TheNavyallowed the tankers to run theengines infrequently tochargebatteries.AtastopinthePhilippinesthetanksweredisembarked“…toshootthemanddrivethemaround.Theproblemwehadtherewasthefuelcellsweremadeoutofmetal.Theageofthemetal,theystartedcracking.Wehadtopullthemallout,rinsethemout,weldthem,andthenputthembackin.”

LAV units were now “Light Armored Infantry,” with organic dismountscouts.Thecompositeunitwasanamalgam,withAlphaandCharlieCompaniesfrom1stLAI,BravoandDeltaCompaniesfrom3rdLAI.Internalcoordinationwasaproblemexacerbatedbydifferingtraining,procedures,andevendoctrinefrom one battalion to another. The battalion commander, Col. C. O. Myers,developedawholenewunit identity,beginningwithdesignationof theunitasTaskForceSHEPHERD.17

Particularly troublesome were the inability of the LAV-25s main gun topenetrate tank armor, and the absence of a thermal sight. The LAV-AT’soutdatedmissile launcher system took about 30 seconds to deploy, and up tofour minutes to re-boresight the weapon after each time the vehicle wasmoved.18 The Marine Corps also has to rely upon the AAV as its primary

infantrycarrier.ThefleetofAAVsaboard theMPPSfleet lackedkeyupdates,particularly to the transmissionsandweaponssystems.19 InSaudiArabia therewereno trainingareas forheavyweaponsor integrated live fireexercises.Fortankcrews,theonlytrulyintensivetrainingwasinobstaclebreaching.20

ChristopherSwift,anewcrewmaninCharlieCompany/3rdTank,saidmosttrainingcenteredonforming thebattalion intoadefensivecoil,andputtingupcamouflagenets.Thedarkgreencamouflagenetswereofdubiousvalueinthedesert,butBusterDiggsfeltthatanysmalladvantagethenetscouldgivemightbecritical.“Iwasnotsureweweren’tgoingtobeattacked….Ifwe’regoingtobeattacked,Ifeelsorryformybrotherbattalioncommanders,butitaintgonnabeThirdTanks!”

GregMichaelsfoundthatthenetswereuseful;erectedonabarrenhillsideorinaravine,theycouldbeusedtolure“opposingforces”intoanambush.Moreeffectivewas“desertpaint,”localmudsmearedoverthevehicles.21

EventuallytheMarineswereallowedtoconstruct improvisedfiringranges,onlytodiscoverthatthedesertwasnotthatempty.Bedouinshadtobeshooedout of impact areas. Task Force SHEPHERD constructed targets, but scarcebuilding materials were scavenged by other units. The battalion acquiredwrecked vehicles to serve as targets. Sergeant Ramirez of the battalionheadquarters was determined to guard these prizes and slept in the desert toprotectthem.OnenightRamirezlistenedtoreportsofanIraqiattack,andspentanervousnighthidingnearthewrecks.Theattackturnedouttobealargegroupof deserters.22 The tanks were eventually allowed to fire practice rounds andboresighttheircannonsonmeasuredranges.23

Heavyemphasiswasplacedonnavigation,buttherewerefewlandmarksinthe low, rolling terrain, and road patternswere confusing.Mapswere in shortsupply, and of dubious value. This was alleviated only when a Britishcartographyunitshowedup“Andthen’swhenwestartedgettinggoodmapsthatwedidn’thavetomakeourselves,”saidMummey.

Greg Michaels observed that the desert “… was like a living being; itchanged every day.”24 Dunes moved with the constant wind, and sandmightencroachoverroads.Nearthecoastweresabkha,flatplainswiththincruststhatoverlaystinkingbrine-saturatedmud.Menonfootcouldbreakthroughthecrust,and they were completely impassable to vehicles. Thickness of the crustfluctuatedwithseasonaltides,andavehiclewouldbreakthroughthecrustofasabkhathathadbeenpassabledaysbefore.

“Afterawhileyoucouldkindofseethem,”saidDiggs,“weweretheresixmonths.Assoonasyoubogdown,youdon’tstop.Don’tkeepdrivingforward,fool.Don’tdothat!It’snotgonnagetbetter.Stopandbackup.Youdon’tknowwherethesabkha’sgoing.”Windblownsandmightformsmalldunesabovethesabkha,makingitindistinguishablefromthesurroundingdesert.

The sabkhas provided the LAV crews with practice recovering miredvehiclesusingthenewkinetic-energyrope.Thenylonhawsercouldbehookedto amired LAV, and coiled on the ground. A second vehicle hooked up andbacked away at speed. The elastic hawser snatched the stuck vehicle free andsavedhoursofdigging.25

Considerableingenuitywasdevotedtocreaturecomforts.WhentankswereretrofittedwithturbochargersKessingersaid,“Wewouldtakethese[old]blowermotors…andwewouldhookupafifty-calbarrelcleaningrod,andwewouldputaoneliterbottleofwaterintoanissuesock,coverthesockwithwater,and…spintwoofthematonetime,likeacentrifuge,coolingthewateroff.Eightydegreewatertasteslikeice-waterwhenit’sahundredandtwenty.”

Inthedaytimethetroopssatinthebakingsun,tormentedbyhordesoffliesthat swarmed onto food, eyes, human waste, and sweat.More serious threatswere dung beetles that crawled into Lister bags seeking water and causingdysentery, scorpions, and spitting cobras. Even the roving camels causedproblemsastheyateanythinginsight,andlearnedtospringopenthetophatchonawatertrailerandsticktheirheadsinside.26

More pervasive pests were those fans of war, rodents. Molly Moore, areporterforTheWashingtonPostwrote:

MREs developed amajor following among the desert’s rats andmice.DuringastayatoneMarinesupplycenterneartheKuwaitiborderbeforethegroundwar,halfadozenlargeratsinvadedourtentnightly,wakingusas theygnawed through thebrownplasticpouchesandnibbled theirwaythroughthecontents.27

TaskForceSHEPHERDestablishedheadquartersat theChickenRanch,anabandonedpoultryfarmwithawellthatsuppliedstinking,sulfurouswater.Thetroopsgrewaccustomedtothesmelloftonsofmanurebakingintheheat.Thefarmwasre-occupiedwiththecomingofcoolweather,andtheownersbroughtthousandsofbabychicksthatpeepeddayandnight.28

Kessingerrecalledthat“InthemorningI’dgetupbeforeeverybody,startthe

coffee… . I’d go to the battalion briefing which was at seven-thirty everymorning.ThenIwouldcomeback,andbythetimeIgotbackfromthatmeetingmy men were up, and dressed, and they had had chow.We usually had hotbreakfast… . Once we got to where things were just routine, you had hotbreakfastandhotdinner,andwehadMREsforlunch.”

But“Lotsoftimeswewouldn’teatlunch.Justtoodamnhot….Wewouldrelaxataboutthirteenhundred,andthenwewouldhavesomekindofPTinthehottestpartoftheday,butwewouldplayNerf™football,orgoforalittlerun,ordosomethingfun.Thenatfifteenhundredwewouldalwaystakeamakeshiftshower.”

Eachcrewwasallotedtwentygallonsofwaterperday.“Wewouldsavetengallons. We made a makeshift shower on the back of our tank. We took anammocrate lid formaingun rounds, andon topof thatwe affixed a fifty calammocanwherewepunchedsomeholes in thebackof it.Oneguywouldbestanding on the tarp on the ground below the back deck of the tank, and wewould fill the ammo can up with water, and rinse off and lather. Then theywouldfillitupagainandrinseoffthesoap.Thenwewouldtaketurns.Takingashoweratfifteenhundredaftertheheatofthedayreallymadethingsalittlebitmorebearable.

“Then chow showed up around sixteen hundred, sixteen-thirty. Then aftereveningchowwewouldstandaroundandlistentotheArmedForcesRadio.Itwasalwaysahighpointoftheafternoon,listeningtowhatwasgoingon.Thenwe’dspendthenight,guysplayingchess,writingletters,playingspades….Theusualstuff.”

MikeMummeydidnotlethisplatoonhavecotsbecause“Iftheyhadacot,theytriedtobuildanapartmentoutofit.”

British armored formations trainedwith theMarines, and the exchange ofrationswas awelcomechange.Lesspleasantwas a shipmentof green apples.Thetankersof3rdBattalionfellupontheseunexpectedtreats,whichproduceddysentery and dehydration. Chris Freitus: “Once stricken, we soon ran out oftoilet paper and developed a routine: roll out of your cot, run into the desert,evacuatefrombothends,cleanup,burythestuff,andreturntoyourcotandliebackdowncompletelydrained.”Muchofthebattalionwasstricken,withsomerequiringintravenousfluids.29

Diggs said his battalion was spared worse afflictions because “I had abattalionsurgeonbythenameofDavidWhitehurst…hereaduponwhatwouldhappen in a situation like that. He also read that they use night soil [human

excrementforfertilizer].Heordered—Idon’tknowthedrug—abigbluepill….There’sneveranysalad.Onedaytheybroughtoutallkindsofsalad,andIjustchoweddownonthestuff.Itwaslocalstuff,andtheyfertilizewithnightsoil.

“Yourwholebattalioncanreallybedownwithdiarrhea,theentirebattalioncouldbejustonitsbutt.Ifhehadn’torderedthosepills,we’dhavebeendownonourbutts.”Whitehursthadorderedsomanydosesthatthebattalionsuppliedotherunits.

The Iraqis constructed defenses that hadworkedwell against the Iranians,deep “boxes” of open terrain divided by high earthen berms.An attackerwasforcedtobreachorcrosseachberm,only tobeexposedtocrossfireonthefarside.

RetiredLtGenBernardTrainorbriefedthem,andDiggssaidthat“Itwasthemost importantbriefing I evergot.”Trainor told them“They’re settingup thesameway[as]fortheIranians.’Whenheexplainedtheirsystem,Isaid,‘ThebigdifferenceistheIranianswerewalking.I’mnotgonnawalk.Speedwouldbeourgreatestasset.Iturnedtotheinfantry[commander],myboss,andsaid,‘Well,iftheinfantryevergetoutofthe‘tracs,we’renotgaininggroundhere.’”

Planners abruptly changed the Marine Corps mission: though amphibiousforcewould remain as a threat, itwouldbe a land campaign.The amphibiousrusetieddownfourinfantryandtwomechanizedIraqidivisions,andabouthalfofallIraqiartillery.30

Winter cold and rain brought its own miseries. Cannon ammunition issensitivetomoisture,andmachinegunammunitioncorrodedsothatbeltshadtobe cleaned—round by round, and link by link.31 Mummey said that afterThanksgiving “They sent our supply guy—he flewback toTwentyninePalmsandwent into our battalion supplywarehouse and embarkedwith some otherMarinesallofoursleepingbags.”

Coalition aircraft began an aerial pummeling on 17 January 1991. Iraqretaliatedbylobbingballisticmissiles intoSaudiArabiaandIsrael, forcingtheUS to divert air assets to the “Great SCUDHunt.” Diggs underestimated thepsychological effect of chemicalweapons until one night he observed anotherofficer. “One of the battalion commanders… he broke out his MOPP suits.Therewasobviouslyarealfearofgas.Ijustdidn’thaveit.Gasisnotasbadasyouthinkifyou’removing.Ifyou’restationaryitcanbeasinofabitch.Justkeepgoing.Getoutofit.”

TheaircraftcarryingReservistsfromB/4thTanklandedatal-Jubayljustasthe all clear sounded after aSCUDalert.Assigned to support the 2ndMarine

Division, the company found that new tanks from Army stores were missingcriticalgear.Fivedayswereconsumedinbringingthetanksintooperation.

TheLAV-ATsandLAV-MsoftheWeaponsCompanycouldnoteffectivelycommunicatewiththelinecompanies.Problemssurfacedduringamissionon21JanuarywhenAlphaCompany,TaskForceSHEPHERDwasorderedtoextractathreatenedobservationdetachmentfromOP6.32

TheIraqishaddriventhereconteamfromaclusterofbuildingsintoarallypointinaculvert,abandoningaHumveeandsensitiveequipment.Theanti-tankandmortarLAVsbecameseparated.WhentheLAV-25sofACompanyarrivedmanyofthereconteamleaptintotherearandbeatahastyretreat.

The LAVs and recon men were sent back to retrieve the abandonedequipment.Theplanwas for1stPlatoon tomove into the cluster ofbuildingswhile2ndPlatoonprovidedabaseoffire.Themortarswerenotintheplan,butcommenced firing on the objective. Unable to directly coordinate with themortars,1stPlatoonmoveduneasilyintotheimpactzone,riskingfriendlyfire,point-blankRPGsfromanyIraqis,andincinerationbygasolinefromawreckedfillingstation.

The recon team recovered their gear and retreated. In the confusionLAV-ATshadmovedpastthebuildingsontotheIraqiside,anddidnotgettheordertowithdraw.GregMichaelshadtotakehisvehiclebackamidthebuildingsandordertheTOWvehiclestowithdraw.

Commencingon 20 January, theMarines conducted artillery raids.One ortwobatteriesofhowitzers,protectedbyascreenofLAVs,woulddisplacetoapoint in thedesertsouthof theborder.Theartillerywouldfireahastybarrageagainstpre-selectedtargets,andmovequicklytotherear.Thiswouldinevitablydrawcounter-batteryfire,revealingthepositionsoftheIraqiartilleryforaerialattackorcounter-battery fire.33Altogether theMarineswouldconductadozensuchraids.

BravoCompanyofTaskForceSHEPHERDconducted another raid on 25JanuarytodestroyapolicestationusedasanIraqiobservationpost.34TheFACaccompanying the LAVsmoved up onto the berm, using hisMULE tomarktargets for air attack, and the artillery opened fire. When the Iraqis returnedmachinegun fire theFAC retreated.The supportingLAVs tried to return fire,buttheirroundsimpactedonthefriendlysideoftheberm.

Theraidwasasuccess,butatabout0525afatiguedLAVdriverdozedoff,andawoketoseeavehicleintheparallelcolumndirectlybesidehim.Speedinguptorecoverhisproperpositioninthestaggeredcolumns,hecollidedwiththe

rearofanotherLAV,killingthreeMarinesandinjuringfour.

TRAGEDYOFTHELIGHTARMOR:RA’SAL-KHAFJITiny Ra’s al-Khafji, a cluster of abandoned buildings around a pier, adesalination plant, and a refinery,was no place anyonewould have chosen tofight over. North of a broad expanse of coastal sabkha, vehicle traffic waschanneled along a narrow coastal highway. Considered indefensible, it wasscreenedbynumberedobservationpoststhatoverlookedaborderberm.35

The observation posts were intermittently occupied by reconnaissance andobservationunits,andscreenedbycompaniesfromTaskForceSHEPHERDandthe2ndLAIBattalion.Saudi,Qatari,andMoroccanmechanizedbattalions laysouthoftheoutposts.

On the night of 28 January observation teams reported enemymechanizedmovements. Coalition commanders paid little attention to LtCol Richard M.Barryof1stSurveillance,Reconnaissance,andIntelligenceGroupwhowarnedthat“theIraqiswantKhafji.”36

With limited transport, the Marines planned for a “slingshot logistics”offensive. Huge dumps were established ten kilometers forward of the maindefensessothatcombatelementscouldmoveforwardunimpeded,andresupplyconvoyswouldhaveshortertripsasthebattleunfolded.Butthelogisticalunitsandmassivepilesofsuppliesandammunitionwerethoughtvulnerable.37

On29JanuarytheoutpostlinewasheldbyReconplatoonsandascreenofLAVs.Atabout2115abrigadeoftheIraqi5thMechanizedDivisionadvancedonpositionsheldbyAlphaCompany(REIN),2ndLAIBattalionnearOP1,andaircraft disabled aT-62 tank. Shortly beforemidnight the Iraqis broke off thefight.

TheheaviestfightingoccurrednearOP4northofTheHeel,thepointwherethenationalboundaryturnednorthafterextendinginfromthecoast.OP4wasoccupied by a platoon from the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, supported byDeltaCompany (REIN)ofTaskForceShepherd,with19LAV-25s and sevenLAV-ATs northwest of the outpost. Charlie Company held an extended linebehind OP 6 to the north. Alpha Company was in a reserve position 10kmbehindthetwooutposts,whileBravowas25kmtothesouthwest.38

Around 2000hours the Marines spotted a large Iraqi force arrayed in askirmish line of tanks followed by BMPs. Captain Roger L. Pollard of DCompany shifted south to support the Recon detachment and gain maneuver

space. Battalion was unable to hear Pollard’s transmissions because of Iraqijamming.

At 2100 hours the6thArmoredBrigade, 3rdArmoredDivision struck theRecon platoon. Unaware that the Recon Marines had their own transportvehicles,at2144hoursLt.DavidKendall’s2ndPlatoonfromDCompany,withLAV-ATsaccompanying,rusheduptocovertheirwithdrawal.39

Kendall:“WeweremovingforwardsothatwecouldgettheATsinpositionsotheycouldobservebetterwhatwasgoingondownthere,andunderstoodthatoncewegotinpositionwheretheycouldseetheenemygoodenoughtotakeashot at it we’d stop.”Unable to fire on themove, the LAV-ATs advanced inbounds.“WestoppedonlineandtheATsvolleyfired.Atthistimenoneofthetwenty-fiveshadopenedup.”

Pollard:“Myorderswere tomoveouton line,but in theheatofbattle theformationendedupmoreintheformofawedgemovingsoutheasttosupporttherecon unit.While thismovewas underway, theLAV-ATs updated the enemycounttomorethan75,withabouthalfbeingtanks.”40

The two forces flailed at each other in the darkness. First Platoon wasengagingtargetsto2ndPlatoon’sfront.Pollard’sXOradioed“They’reshootingoverfriendlyhead.Someonefrom1stPlatoonsaysthey’reshootingtooclose,soItoldthemtoceasefireandthenshifttothesouthwestandgeton2ndPlatoon’srightflank.”Thisshiftedtheplatoonfromtheleftflanktothefarright.41

TheIraqisfiredtankgunsandSaggermissiles,and“…theCOjustmissedgettinghit himselfwith aSagger.”42 Pollardordered theLAVs tobackout ofmaingunrange.

OneoftheLAV-ATshadmisidentifieditstarget:itwasGreenTwo,anotherLAV-AT.Kendall:“ThisAT(GreenTwo)gotoffitsround.Asitwastracking[theflightofitsmissile]anATbackbehindit—howitgotbehinditI’mstillnotsure—fired.Itcamethroughthebottomrighttroophatchonthisone,andhitalltheothermissilesIguess.”(Wreckageindicateditwashitonthelefthatch).43

The vehicle disintegrated in a huge fireball.“There were no secondaryexplosions. Nothing. Thiswhole thing just went up.”With radio contact lost,some believed it had been hit by Iraqi fire, others hoped that the radio hadmerely failed.Observing the friendly fire incident, theReconplatoonmounteditsvehicles andevacuated theOPTheLAV-25sbegan to fire ineffectivelyonthe Iraqi tanks. To their rear, Alpha Company was moving forward. CharlieCompany3rdTankwasalerted,thenorderedtostanddown.

KendallcontinuedtomoveforwardtoaidtheReconteam.“AtthistimetheATshadallpulledback.”

Controlofairassetspassed toDCompany.Pollard:“On thesuggestionofoneoftheplatoonsergeants,aLAV-25wouldfire25mmhighexplosiverounds,andtheLAV-ATswouldguidethemontargetusingtheirthermalsights.Oncethevehiclewasontarget,asectionortheentireplatoonofLAV-25swouldfireonthedesignatedtarget.Thisresultedinhundredsof littleexplosionsshowinguponagroupofvehicles,whichtheaircraftcouldthenfindandtarget.”44TOWvehiclesdetectedIraqitankstryingtoflankthecompany,anddestroyedthreeofthem as Pollard backed up even further. At this point the LAVs were, byPollard’saccount,fiveormorekilometersfromtheenemyatOP-4.

An0V-10droppedan illuminationflarewhichfell25mfromRedTwo,anLAV-25.At2300hours twoAirForceA-10s rolled inon thegroundbattle.Aradio operator tried unsuccessfully to deflect the A-10s. Pollard: “One of thescoutsinbackofthevehiclejumpsouttotryandburyit[theflare].Noneofusknowswhatitis.TheFACtellstheXOthat’safriendlymark….Justaboutthattime,itallseemslikeithappenedinstantaneously,RedTwoexplodes….ThatwasthefirsttimeIgotscared….”AMaverickmissilerippedtheturretoffthevehicle, killing seven Marines; survivors were the infantryman who haddismounted,andthedriverwhowasblownoutofhishatch.

“I talked tomy TOWs andmy platoon down there, and they said no, wehaven’tbeenflanked.NextthingIthought,myinitialthingtodo,wasIwantedtogetthehelloutofthearea,butIdidn’tknowwheretogo….”

About2305hoursPollard calledAlphaCompany,whoverified that hehadnot been struck by their fire. “TheXO tellsme he thinks itmight have beenfriendlyair.”Pollardorderedhiscompanytobackupanotherkilometer.

By2351hoursDeltawithdrewbehindAlphaCompany’sscreen line.BravoCompany also moved in on Alpha’s south [right] flank, where the attachedLAV-ATsrequestedpermissiontofireonobservedvehicles.CaptainHammondordered the TOW gunners to dismount and shoot a compass azimuth todeterminethetruelocationofthetargets.ThesimpleexerciserevealedthattheTOWunitwasdisoriented;thestrangevehicleswerefriendlyLAVs.HammondfrozeLAV-ATfireuntildawn.45

TothenorthnearOP5CharlieCompanywithasectionofLAV-ATsandasection of LAV-M mortar carriers had fired on Iraqi positions earlier in theevening, and pulled back. At 2230 they were ordered to take up blockingpositionsaroundOP5,thenorderednorthtorepulseIraqiunitsthathadcrossed

the berm east ofOP6. The LAV-ATs fired at Iraqi vehicles, which fell back,leavingtheirinfantrytosecureOP6.

Around dawn Greg Michaels’s section of LAVs from Alpha Companynervouslyenteredal-ZabrtolocatemissingReconmen.Theyalsorecoveredthedriver of the vehicle struck by the Maverick, suffering from burns andconcussion.46

At0720AlphaCompanycalledinairstrikes,andCaptainShuppinstructedthe aircraft topositively identify andcount all hisvehiclesbefore anyattacks.WhentheCobrastookgroundfirefromabuilding,MichaelsfiredonitbuthischaingunmalfunctionedandcouldfireonlyAProunds.AlphascreenedtheareawhilebatteredDeltaCompany andgraves registrationpersonnel recovered thedead.Maintenance personnel repairedMichaels’ ammunition feedmechanism,happilyinforminghimthatthereplacementpartwasstrippedfromthewreckedvehicle.

TwoLAV-MEWSS(MobileElectronicWarfareSupportSystems)appearedandlocatedtheenemyradiojammerthathadcausedsuchmischiefinabuildingontheKuwaitiside;aTOWmissiledestroyedthebuildingandjammer.

Sergeant Hernandez was assigned to capture the crew in an enemy tankparked alongside another buildingon theKuwaiti side.His scouts roundedupfourprisoners,whoturnedoutnottobethetankcrew.TheyhadfledthefightingaroundOP6tothenorth,onlytowanderintothemiddleoftheOP4fight.AlphathenretreatedtoleaveDeltainpossessionoftheOP4area.47

Alltheseattacksweremerelydistractionsfromthemainassault,where15thMechanizedBrigadepushedalong thecoastalhighway.At2230hoursastrongforceoftanks,armoredcars,andpersonnelcarriersloadedwithinfantryenteredal-Khafji.48TheIraqissecuredthecityatabout0200.Marineobservationteamspulled back, but two reconnaissance teams remained inside the city. A thirdpowerfulIraqiattackfartherinlandwasbloodilyrepulsed.

About26kilometerstotherearat3rdTank“Wewereinposition,readytogo counterattack, should they be successful and start pushing south,” saidMummey.“Wewereat100percentalert,and‘Iwonderhowlongtheythinkwecandothis?’”

The counterattack of 29 January-1 February was primarily a Saudi andQatarieffort,withairandartillerysupportfromtheMarines.TheSaudi-Qatariforcedestroyedninetyarmoredvehicles,killed thirtyenemysoldiers,and tookover fivehundredprisoners.Marines from3/3stagedanunsuccessfuleffort torecovertwoAmericansoldierscapturedwhentheyblunderedintotheoccupied

city.49TheperformanceoftheLAVbattalionsreflectedthedoctrinalambiguitythat

stillplaguedtheseunits.Theyperformedwellasascreeningforce,andcheckedtheadvanceofamajorattack,butcommanderswereunpreparedtoexploittheirsuccess. The LAV crewmen had also gained confidence from prisoners whorevealedthatalthoughthe25mmcouldnotpenetratetankarmor,theexplosionsoverwhelmedthesightingmechanisms,blindingthetank.50

TheMarineshadassumedtoomuchoftheenemy.IntheaftermathMummeyandotherNCOswere sentup to see thewreckage. “Westarted lookingat theequipment.‘Theseguysareraggedy.Thesearejustfrontlineguys,andmaybetheguysbehindthemarebetter.Maybetheseguysarejustfodder.’

“We could tell their equipment could still shoot,move, and communicate,butweknewtheyweren’tMarinesorAmericans.”

FINALPREPARATIONS

Airpower advocates were still confident the Iraqis could be pounded intosubmissionwithnoneed for a costlygroundcampaign.Trapped in thedesert,thefront-linetroopsgrewincreasinglycynical.Intelligenceassuredthemthatthe105mmmaingunoftheM60tankscouldnotpenetratethefrontalarmoroftheT-72,thoughArmyexpertsatAberdeenProvingGroundknewbetter.51

After the al-Khafji affair, the forward logistical bases seemed lessvulnerable.InretrospectDennisBealthought“Thatworkedokay.CertainlywiththeIraqis,becausetheycouldn’tdoanything.Theyweren’tgonnacomeoutandtaketheinitiativetogetanyofthisstuff.Youcouldhaveputitahundredmetersin frontof theobjectiveand theywouldn’thavegone to touch it.Ninety-eightpercentofthesepeoplewereconscripts.Theydidn’twanttobethere.There’snoleadershipbelowaboutthebattalionlevelatall.Noonetakesanyinitiative.”

In the long deployment the old M60s were rapidly wearing out. RickMancini’s tank developed amajor fuel line leak, with little hope of getting areplacement.MaintenanceChiefRandyCrane improvised. “So he gets a sodacan,cutsitinhalf,slapssomeputtyonthere,bubble-gum,onthepinleak,putsthat thingonthere….Thatheld the thingtogetherasfaras lettingthefuelgothrough. Had no problem whatsoever. It was stuff like that he was justinvaluablefor.”

Senior tank officers likeBusterDiggswon an unseen battle. TheMarines

facedamechanizedforce,andtheshockpowerof largetankformationsmightbe the key to survival. “The primary driver for that was a retired LieutenantGeneral by the name of Marty Steele. He started talking about tanks as amaneuverelement.”Anewgenerationoftankofficersinstitutedthepracticeofintegrating whole companies of tanks with infantry battalions to form “tankheavy” and “mech [infantry] heavy” teams. “We would tell people ‘No, youdon’tgetatankplatoon,yougetatankcompany.Ifyouwanttanks,theycomeincompanies.’

“He [Steele] kind of pushed for the tank battalion as a kind of maneuverelement.”

In 3rd Tank “At Twentynine Palms we always gave up tank companieswhichalwaysledtheinfantry’sattacks.”

Diggs was impressed by “The reasonableness of people to listen to you.Infantryofficers.To say that ‘I’vedoneabattalionCAX.’ Iwould tellpeople‘Thisishowwedothis,’andeverybodywouldlisten.”

Al-Khafji had enormous impact on the campaign that was to follow.ObservingIraqitimidityintheattackandpoortacticalcoordinationandcontrolconvincedMarinecommanders that theenemywouldnotbeas resolute in thedefenseasoriginally feared.Theperformanceof theQatari andSaudiunits inAl-Khafjiprovidedleveragetodemandabiggerrole.

Theoriginalplanwasfor1stMarineDivisiontobreachthedefensesand2ndMarineDivisiontoexploitthebreach.Rehearsalsdemonstratedthepotentialforamassivetrafficsnarl.ColonelJoeFulfordcalledDiggsinoneday.“Onedayhesaid‘Buster,Ijustwanttogeteverybodyoutthere.Iwanttoseewhatallthesevehicleslooklike.Wejustgotoutinthefieldsowecouldseeallthisstuff.’

“ButIkeptemphasizingtohim…I’mnotfightingsixtytanksandtwenty-five mechanized vehicles and TOWs. I’m just fighting four companycommanders. I said to him ‘You’re just fighting four battalion commanders,boss.We’lldomostoftheworkamongstourselves.’”

More confident,ArmyGeneralNormanSchwarzkopf allowed theMarinesmoreleewayintheplanningoftheirassault.TheMarinesenteredthecampaignwithlimitedbreachingcapabilities,sobreachingequipmentwasscavengedfromall over the globe. Two weeks before the offensive began MGen Bill Keys,commandingthe2ndMarineDivision,convincedLtGenWalterBoomerthatthe2ndMarineDivisioncouldeffect itsownbreaches.Theplanchangedagain.52TheMarineswouldsmashthroughalongabroadfront.Arabcontingentswouldfollow,andveereast toattackdirectly towardKuwaitCity.OtherArab forces

would advance to the west of the Marines, and then veer east to join in theassaultonthecity.

The greatest fear was that Iraqi artillery fire would rain down upon theengineersastheycutbreachesthroughtheobstacles.

The twoMarinedivisionswouldusefundamentallydifferentapproaches tobreach the defenses. On the 1st Marine Division front, east of The Elbow,infantryofTaskForcesTAROandGRIZZLYwouldinfiltratethroughthefirstminefieldsbystealth,andscreenthemechanizedbreachingforces,TaskForcesRIPPERandPAPABEAR.TheLAIunitswouldbeamongthefirstthroughthebreaches,todelaycounterattacks.

Third Tank was designated to join Task Force RIPPER, built around JimMattis’s1/7,witha“tankheavy” teamunderDiggsanda“mechheavy” teamunderMattis.Diggs:“Igavehimmybestcompanycommander[RickMancini],fortworeasons.A,he’sgonnabeonmyrightshoulder,leadingMattis’sattack,andB,eventhoughMattisisasmartman—obviously,heretiredafour-star—Iknewhedidn’tquiteunderstandthis,hejusthadtofollowRick.PlusIcouldtalktoRick;wesharedallthefrequencies,IcouldtalktohimifIneededto.

“He[Mattis]gavemehisbestcompanycommander,becauseIdon’tknownothing about trench clearing. I don’t want to know nothing about trenchclearing.Ifweneededtocleartrenches,youjusttell[Bob]Hathaway‘Hathaway[Alpha/1/7],youneedtoclearthattrench.’MycaptainswerebetterthanIwas.MyXOwasfarbetterthanIwas,MikeO’Neal,farbetterthanIwas.”

Onthe2ndMarineDivisionfrontnorthofTheElbow,artilleryandaircraftwouldscreenwhileengineersboldlycutsixlanes.Theassaultbattalionsof6thMarineswouldleadthebreachingeffortwhiletheattachedArmyTigerBrigadeand the 8th Marines would move through to exploit the breaches. The 2ndMarineDivisionwouldbethemostpowerfulMarinedivisioneverfielded,with257tanks.53

Gonsalves’sThird (“Blue”) Platoon ofCharlieCompany, 3rdTank got allthe “toys,” first ablademounted to theplatoon sergeant’s tank. “Thenwegottwomine plows… .We got these towed assault bridges, I thinkwe got themfromtheIsraelis.Theyweretheselongbridges.Wegottwoofthem.Atfirstwedidn’tknowwhattodowiththem.Doyoutowthem,ordoyoupushthem?Weexperimented to figure out howwe’re gonnamove these things.” FortunatelySergeantWhitewas “Like aMacGyver.He figuredout all these neatways todetach the bridge from inside the tank with a rope and clip. It was reallyinteresting.

“ThenonedaytheyshowedupwiththisthingcalledtheRoller-Dude.Itwasaroller, so theysaid ‘Okay,give it toGonsalves’splatoonand let themfigureout how to use it.’ Youwould plow, push themines out, and push the rollerthroughtheminefieldtoblowupany[remaining]mines.”

Eventuallytwotanksineachplatoonwerefittedwithspecialequipment.Atank fittedwith a rake or plow and anAAV-7E1, the engineer variant of thepersonnel carrier, would work in tandem. The tank would approach theminefield and halt, and the AAV would fire a Mine Clearing Line Charge(MICLIC)overthetank.

Tanksfittedwithrakes,plows,orrollerswouldclearminesnotdetonatedbytheMICLIC. “Every tank butminewas either pushing or pulling something,”saidDiggs.

RickMancini’scompanywas“Training,andtraining,andtraining….Youcan’t justdothis thingonceor twice.Youhavetdoitcontinuously.”Mancinidecided to run one exercise at the dark of themoon. “Partway through I said‘Stop!Don’tnobodymove.’”Atdawn“Youlookaroundandyouseeonehellofa gaggle of tanks pointing every which a way… . I said ‘Well, this is goodlearningpointforallofus.Wegotalotofworkcutoutforus.’”

Iraqi infantry was dug into positions with inadequate overhead protectionfrom air and artillery fire. There were no alternate firing positions once adefensive linewaspenetrated.Tanksweredug in to anchor infantrypositions,with little or no provision for mobility. The most effective aspect wascamouflage,aswindblownsandobscuredmanypositions,andMarinesreportedthatenemyinfantrywouldappearanddisappear,seeminglyfromnowhere.54

James Gonsalves was a bit dismayed by what little he knew of the plan.WhileArmyunitswiththemostmodernequipmentmadeasweepingmovementthrough empty desert, “We were going straight up the middle. There was nomaneuver,straightuptheguthere….Wegotthetankswiththeleastamountofarmor,wecan’tseeatnight,wedon’thavethelatestinrangefindinggear.Itwaskindoflike‘Thisiscrazy!’”

The IraqiArmywas heavilymechanized. The vastmajority of tanksweremodeernizedT-54/T-55s,Type-68(Chinese)equivalents,anda fewheavierT-62s.ThemoremodernT-72madeupabouttenpercentoftheforce.55Themostpotentiallyeffectivearmwastheirartillery.

Thebuildup continueduntil the very lastminute, andAlphaCompany4thTankwasamongthelasttoarrive.DuringaquickexerciseinOman,thereweremore problems. Crabtree: “The fording kit restricts the exhaust. One of those

tanks[crew]didn’tlisten,andendedupblowingtheenginebecausetheydidn’ttakeoffthefordingkit,ortheywerejusthaulingass.”OnceinSaudi“Wetookthem off the night before the ground war started.” In line for ammo issue,“We’relisteningtotheBBCsayingthegroundwarhasstarted.”OnetankhadtobeleftinKuwaitwithabrokendrivetrainpart.

OPENINGMOVES:17–23FEBRUARYCivilians have the idea—reinforced by the news media—that major militaryoperationscanbeconductedasaninstantaneous“boltfromtheblue.”Inreality,even “surprise” operations like the final assault intoKuwait requireweeks ofpreparation, and once begun the momentum is inexorable. Coalition forcesbegan to shuffle from defensive to offensive postures, leaving some sectorslightlydefended.Onesolutionwas thecreationofTaskForceTROY,abogusforcetoassumetheplaceof2ndMarineDivision.

Lt.Freitusandhislogisticalcoordinator,MasterSgtGrahamhadsignedfor“… an incredible amount of gear, munitions, ordnance, all very expensiveelectronicwizardry.”Nowthelogisticalbeancountersinsisteduponanitemizedaccounting. After sleepless nights, the two finally decided that the imminentfightingwasmore important. They had not yet discovered that expensive and“important”itemscouldsimplydisappearwithoutatraceintheoverallwastageofwar.56

On 18 February reconnaissance elements filtering into Kuwait discoveredthat the defenses had been poorly maintained: wire was sagging and broken,minesexhumedby thewind.TheMarinesmarchednorthunderasoakingrainthatturnedthedeserttomiserablesludge.

At noon on Thursday 21 February 2nd LAI Battalion began crossing intoKuwait, screening the preparations of the 2ndMarine Division, searching foralternatebreachpointsfortheTigerBrigade.TheIraqisrespondedwithartilleryandmortarfire,andarmoredcounterattacks.IntherunningbattlesIraqiartillerywas deluged with air strikes and counter-battery fire. The armoredreconnaissanceunitsexpandedtheiractivitiestotheeastalongtheMarinefront.

Mummeywassurprisedthataftertherains“Thedeserthadavelvetylooktoit.Ithadagreenfuzzgrowingonitbecauseofallthemoisture.Itlookedkindofunreal.”Britishtanktransportersmovedthemforward.“Westartcreepingcloserand closer [to the border].”They found that “…every timewe’dmove, therewouldalreadybeholesdugforus.Theyhadengineerunitsgoingaheadofus.Holeswherewe’dpull the tank in there, andyou couldn’t seeout of thehole

unlessyouwerestandingontopoftheturret.”Justaftermidnighton22FebruaryGRIZZLYmovedacrosstheborderand

halted just south of the mine barrier. Iraqi artillery was silenced by Marinecounter-battery fire, but GRIZZLY withdrew in the face of Iraqi tanks. ThateveningTARObeganitsmuddyslogintoKuwait,andsettledintopositionsjustsouthoftheminebarrier.

The infantry ofGRIZZLYwere planning to breach themine barrierwhenIraqi deserters appeared along undiscovered paths through the minefields.Marines rushed down tomeet them, had the Iraqismark the return pathwithchemicallights,andpushedacompanythroughtotheotherside.GRIZZLYhadits breach. On 23 February the task force commander decided on his ownauthoritytopushabattalionthroughthegapasa“reconnaissanceinforce.”

GRIZZLYpushedon,hamperedonlybyIraqidefectorsheadingsouth,andstumbledacrossanunexpectedminebelt. Ithadtobebreachedbyprobingforthemineswithbayonetsintherain,mud,anddarkness.

Behind them other units were moving into place. Despite advancedreconnaissancebyseniorNCOs,therewereproblemscausedbycommunicationsbreakdowns and malfunction of the Polaris satellite navigation system; theMarines fell back upon civilianGPS.On a tank in Freitus’s First Platoon thecamouflagenetcameadriftandtangledinthedrivesprocket.Itwaslaboriouslycutaway,theothersjettisoned.57

Onthe2ndDivisionfrontunitspusheduptothebermintheblackness.OneofB/4thTank’snewvehicles,WHEN’SCHOW?(Sgt. JohnGibbert)was leftbehind because of a fuel leak and joined the company only fifteen minutesbeforetheassault.58Thewarhadnotyetbegunbutsomeunitswereuptotwelvemiles(20km)insideKuwait.

NOTES

1Simmons,GettingMarinestotheGulf,p.3.2Exceptasotherwisenotedtheaccountofthisunit’sarrivalisexcerptedfromFreitusandFreitus,Dial911Marines,p.43–47.

3Moore,OutFrontAttheFront:MarinesBraceforTaskofClearingMines,p.186.4BlountIslandisaciviliancontractfacilitynearJacksonville,Florida.5Estes,InterviewwithDennisBeal,20096Michaels,TipoftheSpear,p.22–23.7FreitusandFreitus,Dial911Marines,p.48–49.8Estes,MarinesUnderArmor,p.185.9FreitusandFreitus,Dial911Marines,p.80–8.

10Estes,MarinesUnderArmor,p.185.11FreitusandFreitus,Dial911Marines,p.90–92.12Anonymous,ThisWasNoDrill,p.25.13Ibid,p.30.14Michaels,TipoftheSpear,p.34.15Dacus,BravoCompanyGoesToWar,p.9andZumwalt,Tanks!Tanks!DirectFront!,p.74.16Ibid,p.74.17Michaels,TipoftheSpear,p.6–8.18BattlefieldAssessmentTeam,Armor/AntiarmorTeam,Armor/AntiarmorOperatonsinSouthWestAsia,

p.15–16.19Ibid,p.15,28.20Ibid,p.10–11.21Michaels,TipoftheSpear,p.81–83.22Ibid,p.102–105.Michaelsdoesnotprovidefirstnamesformostofthepersonsmentioned,presumably

topreserveprivacy.Herethispracticeisfollowedwhereveraccountsaredrawnfromhisbook.23FreitusandFreitus,Dial911Marines,p.99–100.24Michaels,TipoftheSpear,p.70.25Ibid,p.77–78.26FreitusandFreitus,Dial911Marines,p.80–84.27Moore,StormingtheDesertwiththeGenerals,p.108.28Michaels,TipoftheSpear,p.35–36.29FreitusandFreitus,Dial911Marines,p.72–73.30Anonymous,5thMEBDeployment toSWA,unpaginated;Anonymous,The1stMarineDivisionintheAttack,p.145.

31Forexample,Michaels,TipoftheSpear,p.102–103.32ThefollowingaccountisfromMichaels,TipoftheSpear,p.117–125.33Winicki,TheMarineCombinedArmsRaid,p.54–55.34ThefollowingaccountisfromMichaels,TipoftheSpear,p.126–129.35Theobservationpostswereatfirstnumberedintheorderinwhichtheywereestablished.TheMarines

tried to re-designate them in geographic order from the cost inland, and the dual numbering systemscauseconsiderableconfusion;seeWintermeyer,TheBattleofal-Khafji,p.9forexplanation.

36Wintermeyer,TheBattleofal-Khafji,p.13.37Anonymous,AWarofLogistics,p.157.38Wintermeyer,TheBattleofal-Khafji,p.15,Michaels,TipoftheSpear,p.134.39Therearediscrepanciesinthetimingofevents;timesreportedherearetakenfromCureton,InterviewwithCaptainRogerL.Pollard.SubsequentquotesfromPollardarefromthisinterview.TherearealsodiscrepanciesbetweenpublishedaccountsandCureton,InterviewwithLieutenantDavidKendall.

40Pollard,TheBattleforOP-4:StartoftheGroundWar,p.48–49.41Cureton,InterviewwithCaptainRogerL.Pollard.42ThecompanyXOspeakinginbackgroundoftapeinCureton,InterviewwithCaptainRogerL.Pollard.43Cureton,InterviewwithLieutenantDavidKendall.44Pollard,TheBattleforOP-4:StartoftheGroundWar,p.49.45Michaels,TipoftheSpear,p.141.46Ibid,p.142–144.47Ibid,p.145–154.48Wintermeyer,TheBattleofal-Khafji,p.22.49bid,p.27–28.50Estes,MarinesUnderArmor,p.137–138,Estes,LearningLessonsFromTheGulf?,p.93,Michaels,TipoftheSpear,p.156.

51 Freitus and Freitus, Dial 911 Marines, p. 127; see also Gilbert and Swan, T-72 In Iraqi Service,

unpaginated.52Anonymous,RollingWith the2dMarineDivision,p.149;Anonymous,SpecialTrustandConfidenceAmongtheTrailBreakers,p.89.

53Anonymous,RollingWiththe2dMarineDivision,p.150–151.54BattlefieldAssessmentTeam,Armor/AntiarmorTeam,Armor/AntiarmorOperatonsinSouthWestAsia,

p.4–5,9.55Ibid,p.4–5,9.56FreitusandFreitus,Dial911Marines,p.141.57Ibid,p.149,153–154.58Dacus,BravoCompanyGoesToWar,p.11.

A

CHAPTERTHREE

TheStormBreaks

Onemayknowhowtogainavictory,andknownothowtouseit.—PedroCalderondelaBarca

DAYONE:SUNDAY,24FEBRUARYT0400HOURS1STMarineDivisionunitsmovedacrosstheborderandintoKuwait.Theirprimaryobjectivewasthebigairbaseatal-Jaber.

At 0620 RIPPER encountered the first minefield, and paused to bring upBuster Diggs’s Team Tank and the breaching equipment. Diggs: “GeneralBoomer,whenheshowedup for thebreachingoperation,pulledmeasideandsaid‘Youguysreallydothis,huh?’He’sthecommander!Igo‘Yeah,wereallydo.’ This is our time; it’s our turn. It’s open desert. This is a tank-artillerybattle.’”

“When you do the breach,” explained Mummey, “you’ve gotta have asupportforce,sowewouldpullupandbethesupportforceengagingtargetsinand around the breach site.” Once the enemy was suppressed, “One-sevenMarineswithAlphaTanksattachedandtheirengineerdet(achment),theywouldcomeupandactuallydothebreaches.Thenwewouldturnintotheassaultforce,andpushthroughthoselanes….”

Theinfantrywasstillunaccustomedtoworkingwithtanks.AnAAVstoppednearMummey’stankanddisgorgeditsload.“ThegruntspullingupinfrontofmeandsettingupmortarsinfrontofmytankwhileI’mtryingtoshootatstuffontheotherside….

“Thesekidsstartsettinguptheirsixtymillimetermortarsrightinfrontofmytank.I’mtryingtoyellatthem‘Hey!Getthefoutoftheway!We’reshootin’here!”Thegruntswereheedlessofthedanger.“Itoldmywingmanweneedtomovetotheright….becausethegruntsweren’tgonnamove.”

The engineer breach teams included marking teams mounted in AAVs,MICLICsonAAVs,largerlaunchersontrailers,andtankswithplowsorrakestoproof the lanes.LieutenantKurtKempsterof theengineersattachedtoTaskForce PAPABEAR explained that the seven-manmarking teamswere to “…markanentranceandanallclearpointontheminedlane,andifweweretodothe breach at night theywould alsomark the left-hand side of the lane asweplowedthroughitwithchemlights….”1Thefirstchargeswouldbefiredfromtrailers towedby tanks.“Thegunnerand tankcommanderare tankers,and thedriverandtheloaderareengineers.”

InMancini’ssecondbreach the leadAAVwith theMICLICgotstuck inacrater.“Ihadtobringupthesecondonethatwehad.AtthesametimeIbroughtupmyM88….Andhewasdoingrecoveryopswhileundermortarfire.Ittooktwenty-fourminuteson the secondbreach… . insteadof the twelveandahalfthatitdidonthefirstone.”

TheMICLIClinechargesarcedthroughthesky.“Thesethingsaredesignednottogooffuntilthey’recompletelydeployed.Thisonedetonatedabouttwentyfeetinfrontofthetank,inmid-air,soitwasprettyexciting.I’msuretheygotareal good ride. It was pretty exciting for me, being out of the hatch about ahundredfeetfromthem.”TheMICLICfailureratewashigh,andengineershadtogointotheminefieldsonfoottodetonatethem.2

StaffSergeantLouder,anengineer inTaskForcePAPABEAR:“Wewentaheadandshotachargeout…overa tank.Thatchargewentoutnoproblem.Once we shot our second charge out, it didn’t go off. We decided to throwanother charge out to detonate the first charge. That charge didn’t go off.”LouderandLCplHouseholdertriedtosetitoffmanually.

Trafficwasbeginningtobackup.“Bythistimeitwaspitchblack,we’reatMOPP level four, communicationswas next to nil; everybody and his brotherwas on the net… . We came down to a plan of actually going outside andblowingthis….”Theproblemwashowtoreachasafedistancebeforethehugechargeexploded.

Householderworkedout aplan. “The tank swunghis turret around so thatthe hatchwould be on the close side.He plowedout about five feet from thechargesothatthelanewasprettyclear.Wehadpre-madeblocksofC-4already.Randownintotheminefieldaboutfiftymeters,puttheblockofC-4ontopofthe line charge, and ran back into the tank and waited for it to go off.”Householder felt“LikeawhiteCarlLewis. Itwaskindofscary,but Iknewithadtogetdonesothere’snowayaroundit.”

IntheawkwardMOPPsuitandgasmask,hestumbledoverthetank’smineplow “… and ended up slipping and sliding up the front of it in these rubberboots.IkindofforaminutethoughtIwasn’tgonnamakeit,”buthadsecondstospare.Withthetankhatchopen“…dirtcameflyingin.Kindoffeltlikethetankmoved,poppedupkindoflikeafrontstandorawheelie.”

In Task Force RIPPER’s area one of Gonsalves’s tank commanders,SergeantWhite,was awarded aNavyAchievementMedal for dismounting tohelp detonate a failed MICLIC. By 0645 Lane Four was through the minebarrier.

At RIPPER’s Lane Three, MICLICs failed to detonate. Even wheneverything goes perfectly the refracted blast wave from the ground creates a“skipzone,”andfails todetonatemines.Tanksequippedwithmineplowsand“rollerdudes”movedintoproofthelanes.3

The plows dug into the earth, pushing sand and rock—and livemines—toeither side. At Lane Three Sgt Scott Helm’s tank detonated a large mine,blowingofftheleftfrontroadwheelandbendingthesuspensionarm.Mummey:“As tanks and vehicleswould pass, theweight and the vibrationwouldmakethose things comebackdownandanAlphaCompany tankendeduphittingamine.Thatstartedcloggingupthelanes;itstartedmakingforabaddealbecausenobody[could]getthroughthelanes….

“That’swhenStaffSergeantJohnnyCruzgothisBronzeStar, forgoing inthereandpullingthattankoutofthebreach.Heground-guidedanM88upthere,throughtheminefield.There’sstillmineslayingaround.”

Kessinger thought that “Breaching themine fields for realwas easier thanwhatwemadeitoutourselvesintraining.You’resupposedtodoitthatway.Intrainingyoualwayshad this feeling like ‘yougottaget through those lanes asfastasyoucan;we’regonnabetakingartilleryanddirectfirethewholetime.’Andwe’rethinkingtwenty-fivepercentofusaren’tgonnamakeitthroughthefirstminefield.”Oncethedrillcommenced,“IdrankaDr.Peppergoingthroughthefirstminefieldbelt.IsavedmylastDr.Pepper.Iwassavingit,[but]Ifigured‘Well,thisisit.I’mgoingtoatleasthavesomethinggoodtodrink.’”

There was “… no direct fire that I knew of and no appreciable artillery.Everyonce inawhilea roundwould land somewhere.Youcouldhear it.Butnothingevenclosetodoinganydamage.”

Once through the breaches, the tank companies deployed into companywedges. The company command groupwas free to roam, supporting all threeplatoons.

RIPPER’s tankscameunderartillery fire in thezonebetween the first andsecondminebelts.Diggs:“He[GeneralTrainor]toldusabouttheartilleryandhow they’ll build barriers in front of you and then the artillerywill shell you.Call me cocky, but there’s no contest between attacking tanks and artillery.There’sjustnocontest.Weshoottoofastandtooaccurately.Youmightgetoneortwoofme,butyou’regonnadie.”

Mummey:“Everytimewe’dstartgettinghitwiththat,we’dhavetoholdup,start buttoning up.You’d lose your situational awareness.Then you gotta callandmakesureit’snotourstuffcomingdown.”

Tim Frankwas a TOWgunner assigned to Task ForceRIPPER. “We didtakeamultiplerocketattackthatfirstnight.Wehadabunchofpeoplegethurt.A couple of vehicles got hit directly. But that didn’t really change anybody’sattitude. It just firedusupa littlebit….Withour technologyandour trainingandourtechnology,wehadthissensethatwe’reinvincible.”4

AsCCompany sat stationary in thegap, artillery ranging roundsbegan towalktowardthetanks.FreitusintuitedthattheIraqiobserverwasinaconcretewatertowerjustoutofrangeofthetankguns.HehadtheFACridinginplaceofhisloader,CaptainJeffButler,“paint”thetowerwiththeMULE.AfterseveralHellfiremissilesstruckthetower,theartillerybecamelighterandmoreerratic.Others were less fortunate.When Lt. Leo Teddeo moved forward and beganheavingsmokegrenadestoobscuretheretreatoftherestofhiscompany,hewaswoundedinthearmbyshrapnel.5

Iraqi infantry proved less resolute. Freitus: “Heads bobbed up and down,looking much like a prairie dog town.” A lone Iraqi ran from position toposition. When the Marines did not kill him, the desert began to sproutimprovisedwhiteflags.6

Kessinger: “I’ve got theweapon (anM16A3) shouldered aswe’re drivingthroughthistightareathathasalotofthesebivouacseverywhere.AndIknowthatifsomeonehadjumpedoutofoneofthosebivouacs,Iwouldn’thavebeenlookingforawhitepieceofpaperthattheywerewavingovertheirhead.IknowIwouldhavejustpulledthetrigger.Thankgoodnessnobodyjumpedout.”

On the far side of theminefield the tanks spotted the first T-55 and T-62tanks,dug inup to their turretswithapronsofbuilding tiles,gravel,orcanvastarpsinfrontofthem.

Fatigueanddistractionwerealreadybeginningtotell.Kessinger’stankcamearoundaknoll: “I saw theT-55aboutninehundredmeters tomy front, and I(said)‘Gunner!Sabot!Tank!’

“The colonel wasn’t doing anything. I just looked over. ‘Colonel! Load asabot!’

“Hejustjumpeddownandthrewoneinthebreech.It’slike‘Ohshit!I‘mtheloader!’HehadafewotherthingsonhismindIsuppose.

“I firedandmissed,andwhatever tankwasonmyrightblew it away. I’mnotevensureImissed.Yauknowsabotroundsgorightthroughthosethings,butIdidn’tseeaflash.Butwithinafewsecondsitwasgone.”AnAlphaCompanytanktotherightfiredaHEATround“Soitmakesabigboom.”

This was one of only two rounds the command tank fired as the crewsquickly realized that most of the Iraqi tanks were abandoned. Targets wereprioritized,andenemytankswerelowonthelist.Theotherroundwasfiredataradar-controlledZSU23–4.“That’saprioritytarget.Anytimethatpopsup,yougotta take itout,nomatterwhether it’smannedornotbecauseof the threat toaircraft.”

Thebattalionwheeledtowarditsfirstobjective,takingIraqipositionsintheflank. In Mike Mummey’s platoon the platoon leader and platoon sergeant’stanks carried HEAT loaded and the two wingmen carried sabot. “If a targetpoppedup,whoeverhadtherightammotooktheshot.”Mummeyspottedatankpositioned to fire into the hull of any American tank coming over a ridge.“There’s this T-55 sitting there in his dugout, his little hull-down, and he’saimingupattheridgetohisrightfront,whichwouldbemyfarleft.Hethoughtthat’s where everybody’s coming from. All of a sudden here comes CharlieCompany sweeping around, and you see the turret came over to us, andwentbackupthehill,andstartedtocomebacktous.

“About that time [to]mygunner, [Corporal]Gilger, I said ‘HEAT!Tank!’andheletflyaround.Hititrightattheturretring,andknockedtheshitoutofit….Thatwasaboutanine-hundredmetershot.

“Gray smoke anddust cameout of every apertureon that tank; everybolthole.Itjuststartedburning.”

Thetankershadneverfireddepleteduranium(DU)ammunitionintoahardtarget.“Thefirsttime‘Fritz’Fitzpatrick,mywingman,shotatank,IspottedandIwaslike‘Ican’ttell!’Itlookedlikeithit,butitdidn’tmakeaflash….Itjustwentinandout,andIsawthisbigsandplumegoupbehindit.

“I told him ‘Lost! Reengage!’His gunner—about the time hewas gettingreadytoshoot[again],allofasuddenrightaroundtheturretringiteruptedwithfire.”

On the 2nd Marine Division’s sector to the west, the assault began at

0430hourswithadelugeofMLRSrocketsontheIraqiartillery.At0530thefirstwaves ofMarines crossed the berm, and by 0600hours reached the firstminebelt. Task Force BREACH ALPHA was lavishly equipped with engineerequipment.7

At 0700hours 2ndLAImoved through the breaches.Without artillery andmortar support,CCompanywithdrew in the faceof enemy fire,butwasbackthroughthebermby1030hours.BehindtheminebarrierswereIraqiinfantryandtanksinrevetments;theLAV-25susedcannonfiretomarkthemfortheTOWvehicles.8

The thirteenM1A1 tanksofBCompany,4thTank,operated in supportof1/8.Two tanks from each platoonwere fittedwithmine plows to “proof” thelanes. Breaching began at 0600, and operations at four of the laneswent likeclockwork.AtGreen5andGreen6,thetwolanesontherightflank,therewasnosuchgoodfortune.9

At Green 5 the first engineer AAV fired its second MICLIC over anelectricalpowerline,bringingdownthelines.Theplowtankcreptunderneath,tryingtoworkapaththroughtheunscathedminefield.Twohugeblastsliftedthetank into the air and dropped it onto its broken tracks. The trapped AAVlaboriouslybackedoutofthelane.

A secondM60 plow tank carefullyworked itsway alongside the crippledtank,followedbytheAAV.TheAAVfireditsthirdandlastMICLIC,butwhentheM60movedforwardtoproofthelane,itstruckanothermine,blowingoffatrack.Therewerenocasualties,buttwoofthepreciousplowswerelost.

Athirdplowtanktowingatrailer-mountedMICLICpickeditswayintothelaneandfiredtheMICLIC,startedanewlanesegment,andsuccessfullyproofedit.AnotherengineerAAVmovedupandfireditslinecharge,butwhentheplowmoved in toproof the lane itstruckanothermine.TheAAVbackedoutalongthelong,crookedlane.Thecompanybladetankmovedintopushthedisabledtanksaside,butcouldnotbudgethem.Withthreetanksdisabledandonetrappedinthecrooked,dangerouslane,furtherworkceased.

AtGreen6thecommanderoftheleadM60A1plowtank,SSgtB.M.Shaw,wasstartledwhentheengineerAAVfollowinghimhitamine.Shawhadmissedthemarkerstake,andwastrappedinsidetheminefield.Thesecondvehicleteammovedup70meterstotheleftofShaw’stank.Theengineers’MICLICfailedtodetonate.Anengineerpickedhisway into theminefield,manuallyprimed theline charge, and ran back, racing the thirty-second fuze. A second MICLICfailedtodetonate.Anotherengineerwentoutandprimedit,divingtosafetyin

theAAVjustas the1,800-pound(818kg)chargedetonated.LaneGreen6wasfinallycleared.

Chip Parkison’s B Company, 4th Tank was supposed to be first throughGreen6,buthedidnottrustthelane.HeorderedViper2,SgtRobertTrainor’sM1A1 with a plow, into the lane. Re-plowing the lane was dangerous; itdeepenedthetrackruts,allowingthetanktobellyoutonthecenter.TwothirdsofthewaythroughthelaneahugeblastliftedViper2,andradiocommunicationwaslost.

WhileParkisonwas trying to raiseTrainor on the radio,Trainor’sPlatoonLeader,WarrantOfficerLarry“Wolf”Fritts,radioedthathewasgoingintothelane. Ominously, undiscovered anti-personnel mines were detonating underViper1’stracks.

Inside the disabled tank a fine spray from a ruptured hydraulic line wasmistaken for the oily spray from a chemical mine. The turret crew donnedprotective masks and climbed out, but Lance Corporal Arnel Narvaez wasmissing,trappedinthedriver’scompartmentbytheturretoverhang.

FrittsshoutedtoTrainortomanuallytraversetheturret,anagonizinglyslowprocess.WhenTrainoropened thehatch,Narvaez lookedup,unscathed.FrittscrammedTrainor’screwintohisownvehicle.

Pressurefromtherearwasgrowing;columnswaitedbehindtheunbreachedminefield, exposed to potential artillery or chemical attack. By 0724hours theMarineswerepouringthroughtheotherbreaches.Onthedivision’sexposedleftflank 2nd LAI Battalion spread out to screen the advance, and the divisionforgedahead,itsrightflankexposed.

Shaw, sitting in his trapped tank, could take nomore.He inched his tankforward, plowing through theminefield to connectwith the cleared section ofGreen6. Incredibly,Shaw reached the far side, then turnedand re-plowed thelane.

Parkison’s tanks flooded through Shaw’s path. Captain Brian Winter,Parkison’s Executive Officer in Predator 5, struck three mines. The first twowere anti-personnel mines, but the third was a shaped-charge anti-tank mine.Shaw’s plow had flipped it upside down, and the deadly explosive jet blewharmlessly into the sand. After hours of delay, the Marines flooded throughGreen6.ShawwaspromotedtoGunnerySergeantandawardedtheSilverStar.

Past theminefieldthetanksencounteredIraqiT-55s,BMP-1s,andinfantrythatchosetofight.LCplLanceMiler,inanM60A1,destroyedaBMP-1at3,200yards (about 2,900m), the longest known kill. He was awarded the Bronze

Star.10 After fifteen minutes of concentrated fire from tanks, artillery, andinfantrytheenemybegantosurrenderindroves,wavinganythingwhite.

TheproblemsatGreen5and6causedmomentumoftheattacktoshiftleft,soC/2ndLAIshiftedlefttogiveACompanymaneuverspace.SergeantRichardSmith’s LAV-25, serial number 521666, had seemed a jinxed vehicle so thecrew arranged a blessing by a bemused Catholic chaplain. Six-six-sixencounteredalowridgeatrightanglestothemaindefensiveline.Smithbargedovertheridgeandintoahornet’snestofenemyinfantry.AtnightfalltheLAVshalted, but all night the Marines called in supporting artillery and engagedentrenchedinfantrywith25mmfire.11

Delaysinbreachingtheminebarrierledtoconfusion.Anartillerybattalionwas to cover the breaching operation, with priority of fire controlled by 3rdTank. When breaching operations began, priority switched to Task ForceRIPPER,and3rdTank’smissionssliddownthe“hopper,”orqueue.Diggs:“Ifthereareanymissionslefttheydon’tgoaway.TheyjustshootMattis’smissionsfirst, then when I became the exploitation force, then I had priority of fire[again].Sothat’swhattheartillerydid;startedshootingthosemissions.

“AllofasuddenherecomesDual-PurposeICMdownonme,butIseeit’scoming from the back! I wounded somebody. Stupid battalion commander.”Diggsacceptedresponsibilityfortheerror.“Alotofpeopleshouldhaveknowntodothat,butmainlythebattalioncommander.”

Task Force SHEPHERD’smovementwas impeded by surrendering Iraqis,whichGregMichaels likened to “a steady,moving roadblock.” The LAIwastaskedwithescortingprisoners to the rear,but theyweresimplyoverwhelmedbynumbers.

The LAI had to struggle through the congestion to assume the lead.SHEPHERD’staskwastoscreenagainstforcesintheal-Wafrahandal-Burqanoilfieldswhilethedivisionseizedtheal-Jaberairfield.

Tankswere “… dropping plows because a plow’s pretty heavy. Droppingplows,droppingbridges”accordingtoDiggs.Hewasconcernedaboutprisonersbecause “I had also heard that was a tactic the Iraqis used on the Iranians.They’dhavewholeunitssurrender,andthentheIranianswouldbeboggeddownprocessing prisoners. I have one infantry company, andwe had pistols on thetanks. That’s not gonna work. I’m not gonna give up my infantry company,[because] now I’mboggeddown.Luckily therewas a police stationwe couldsee…andIgotmybossandsaid‘Let’ssendthemoverthere,andlet’sjustkeepmoving.’Iwasafraidtheywerebuildingmoreobstacles.”

The advancingMarines encountered clouds of toxic hydrogen sulfide gasleaking from broken wellheads and pipelines. Hydrogen sulfide in smallconcentrationssmellslikerotteneggs.Inhigherconcentrationsitkillsbeforeahuman can register the odor.Raised pipelines provided other impediments forthescoutingLAVs.Allthistookplaceunderadrizzleofoilrainingdownfromtheburningwellsoftheal-Burqanoilfield.Visibilitydroppedtotenfeet(3m).

SamCrabtreeawokeinhisHumveeandthought,“Ohlook,thesun’scomingup.ThenIlookatmywatch,andit’sthreeinthemorning….Wewereseeingtheoil fires.”Anothernight“…Itwas rainingoil.Not likea full-on rain,butsprinkling oil from the sky.”Mancini also remembered the oil fields “Yougointothemit’sjustblack….Attheotherendyougotsootalloveryou.”

Kessinger:”We had to navigate to the left of the oil field. In the oilfieldswith the pipelines, you can get caught up in one. It’s like a spiderweb.Youreallyhavetogetoutsideofoneandmovecompletelyaroundit.Ifyougoinsideofityougetchanneledandlockedin,andthere’snowayout.”

MAP1.MarineCorpsAreaofOperations,Kuwait.KA=KuwaitInternationalAirport;KC=KuwaitCity;6RR=SixthRingRoad;7RR=SeventhRingRoad.

BeforethebattletheT-72seemedtohavetheadvantage.“Itoutgunnedus,”saidDiggs.“MyconcernwascouldIpenetrate it.Butonceweget tackedintooil smoke, our engagementswere one-five-hundred (meters) and below.Well,

thatone-oh-fivewouldgothroughanything….Inthatoilsmokewecouldkillanythingatone-five-hundredorless.”

InthedarknessandconfusionSergeantAnecitoHernandez’sLAVengagedtwotrucksatpoint-blankrange.TracersfiredfromavehiclebehindarcedpastHernandez’shead,andlaterhefoundbulletholesinrationboxesstackedbehindhis head. At nightfall the company set into positions overlooking a broaddepression,usingthethermalsightsoftheLAV-ATstocontrolmortarfire.12

TheconfusionwassuchthatonetankcommanderreportedsightingaT-72,butwassoexcitedthattheneglectedtofireonit.Acrewmaninoneofthetanksfartherbackinthecolumnspottedtheturretslowlytraversing,andfiredontheenemytank.13

By1445hourstheM1A1sofBravoCompany,4thTankmovedthroughthesecond mine belt, after providing long-range covering fire for the breachingteam. At about 1600hours the advancing Marines routed Iraqi infantry, andBravoCompanypreparedtoengagesupportingIraqiarmor.

The ensuingBattle of theCandyCaneswas a long-range gunnery duel inwhich the Iraqi armor stood no chance. Drawn up in a line atop a ridge inadvance of the main force, B Company could see Iraqi armor dug intorevetmentsandinmotionbeyondarowofredandwhiteelectricaltransmissiontowersthatgavethebattlefielditsname.Beginningatabout1650hoursMarinegunnerssystematicallypickedoffvehiclesatextremeranges;SgtGlenCarter’sSTEPCHILDdestroyed an IraqiT-55 at 3,750meters (4,100 yards).When thecompany withdrew, they had destroyed ten tanks, a ZSU-23–4 self-propelledgun,andnumeroustrucksandlightvehicles.14At0230hoursthetankswentintoa defensive coil and the tankers caught a few hours sleep.A kilometer to thenortheast a paved road ran along a raised roadbed through a complex ofseeminglyabandoned trenchesandbunkers; theelevationwasenough tomaskthegroundbehindtheroadbed.15

Atabout1730onthe1stMarineDivisionfrontapairofIraqiT-62striedtoengageTaskForceRIPPER,andonewasdestroyedbyTOWmissilesfiredbythe infantry’s CAAT (Combined Anti-Armor Team). Freitus watched inamazement as an artillery round landed between two Humvees. The TOWgunnerononenevertookhiseyesoffthetarget.“AfterseeingthatIstoodintheopenhatchofmytankandpretendedtobebrave.”16ThetanksandCAATbegantosystematicallydestroyIraqitanksintheirrevetments.

During the finalmovement to the al-Jaber Airfield, Freitus had the “most

personalmomentofthewar…takingahumanlife.”Inflictingdeathforatankeris usually an impersonal thing. In the moving tank Freitus shouted and thedriver,Florence,veeredtoonesidetoavoidashallowpit.Glancingtotheside,Freitussawaconcealedmortarpit.Unabletofiredownintothepit,hegrabbedagrenadeandheavedit,duckingdowntoavoidthefragmentation.

Therewasnoexplosion.Therewasnopin inhishand.He jumpedoff thetank, ran back, and lobbed a secondgrenade.As he turned to run back to thetank, he glimpsed motion in the pit. Leaping onto the fender in a singleadrenaline-fueled bound, he dove into the hatch as the grenade exploded,touchingoffaseriesofsecondaryexplosions.17

Kessinger: “We would get mortar rounds landing on us, and then threeminuteslatercomeacrossamortarcrew.Youbastards!Youwerejustshootingatusasecondago,andnowyou’regivingup!”

Kessinger said that “I never saw one cruel thing done to anybody in theenemy[forces].IfanythingIsawcompassionandkindness.AnybodyIknowisprettyproudofthat.Whenwetookanyprisoners,wewouldgivethemourfood.They desperately needed it, that’s for sure. At the same time they were theenemyandyou’rejustnotgonnatrustthem.”

Early nightfall in the 1stMarineDivision zone found Task Forces TAROand GRIZZLY screening the flanks near the breach sites, PAPA BEAR hadveered east. Task Force RIPPER sat observing the al-Jaber airfield, andSHEPHERD the al-Burqan oil field. B Company of SHEPHERD had beendetailed to provide security for the division’s Forward CP Losses wereunexpectedlylight;onlyoneMarinekilledineachdivision.

The Iraqis spent the night struggling to mount armored counterstrikes.Conditionswere sobad thatwhenFreitusdismounted fromhis tank to relievehimself, hebecamedisoriented.Thiswas extremelydangerous; amanon footcaneasilyberundownifthetanksaresuddenlycalledupontomove.Hefoundthe tank by feeling for the tracks in the sand, and following them until hesmackedhisheadintothetank.Heclimbedbackaboard,tooembarrassedtotelltheotherswhathadhappened.SaintElmo’sfire,ablue-greenelectricalcharge,begantodanceon the tallantennae,eventuallybathingentire tanks in itseerielight.18

About 2300hours Iraqi artillery impacted near Richard Smith’s 666; heordered the driver to move backward about 75 meters, but the next volleyimpacted just to the right of the vehicle, shredding tires, the exposed exhaustsystem, and external gear. The blast dislocated Smith’s right shoulder; he

poppeditbackintoplacehimself.Therewasnopain,butseveralminuteslaterSmithfeltsomethingrunningdownthearm.Blood.

Smithtoldhisgunner,“Vega,I’vebeenhit.”“Bullshit!Youhavenot”Vegareplied,beforeseeingtheblood.Keyinghisradio,Smithcalledout“FatChick!FatChick!ThisisJuggernaut.

I’ve been hit,” and passed out. Hustled to the ambulance and then to anevacuation hospital, Smith’s last sight of Kuwait was towering plumes ofsmoke.19

ThecompanyHeadquartersPlatoonfromAlphaCompany,4thTankwasanassortmentofwheeledvehiclesandanM88A1.CrabtreewaspartoftheContactTeam,withanothermechanicandtwocommunicationsmenridinginaHumvee.Iftherewasaproblem,“Wewoulddriveovertherefirst,andseeifwecouldfixit.Thatwaywedidn’t have todrive theEighty-Eight all over theplace.”Themechanicsworkedatnightwithinsightandsoundoftheenemy.“Wehadred-lens flashlights, but sometimes you had to use awhite light because you justcan’t see.Eitheryoudo it,and take thechance,or try to throwaponchooveryouorsomething….

“One nightwe had to pull the pack because the starterwas out.WeweretakingitofftheCO’svehicle…becausehewasgoingtoberidingaHumvee.Wewere set up in a coil, and then aCobra flew in… and started firing thatGatling gun they have.”Crabtreewas later told someone had spotted anRPGteam,butheneverdeterminedwhathadhappened.

DAYTWO:MONDAY,25FEBRUARYIraqieffortstomountacounterstrikewerehamstrungbyotheruncertainties.Anamphibious feint by 4thMEBpinned Iraqimobile forces in place.Air strikespoundedIraqimechanizedforces.Themidnightcounterattackfoundered in thefaceoffirefromTOWunitsandLAVs.

Kessinger: “We were shaving … so our gas masks would fit properly.Otherwiseyoumightnot reallycare in themiddleofcombat.Wewere takingturns, keeping two guys on the tankwhile two guys got cleaned up, and thenswitching.”Kessingerandhisdriver(KevinMoroni)wentfirst.

“ColonelDiggsandCorporalGalvanjumpeddown,andnosoonerdidtheygetbasicallyundressedthan‘Gas!Gas!Gas!’cameovertheradio,thebattaliontac.That’syourworstnightmare,thatyougethitbysomethinglikethat.”

ThecrewmenwerestillintheMOPPsuits.“ColonelDiggshashisgasmaskon, and all of us, but Corporal Galvan had left his gas mask in the gunner’s

position.He literally dove in. I’m sitting inmy suicide chair [a small foldingseat]inthecupola.Idon’tknowhowhedidit.Hedoveinrightthroughmylapheadfirstdownintotheloader’sseat.Hisfeetwerestillstickingupinmylap,and he’s fishing around for his gasmask, trying to hold his breath thiswholetime.

“Irememberhimlookingupatmeandsaying‘Isn’tlifeabitch?’”About 0530hours at C/4th Tank’s coil position south of al-Abdaliyah,

CaptainAlanHartwalkedovertoParkison’stanktodiscussthemorningplan.CorporalBradBriscoe fromHart’s2ndPlatoon ran tonotify them thathehaddetectedvehiclesmovingacrossthecompanyfront.Hartassuredhimitwasjust“our own amtracs running around in front of us again.”20 Briscoe toldHart’sgunner to turn on his thermal imaging system and watch their front. Thedistinctive sounds of tracked vehicles was now audible: Parkison told Hart“Thosearen’touramtracs.”

Hart ran back to his tank, shouting for everyone to man their positions.Divingintohisowntank,helookedthroughthethermalimager.HartcouldseeatleastadozenT-72semergingfrombehindtheraisedroad,movingacrossthecompanyfrontfromlefttoright.

An Iraqi tank unitwas stumbling blindly, but not one of theMarine tankswaspreparedtoseizetheadvantage.Itrequiresaboutthreeminutestobringthetank’ssystemsonline.Crewmenwerestillontheground;firingthebigcannonscouldinjureorkillthem.Hartshouted“Tanks!Tanks!Directfront!”Thenovertheradio,“Predator6.ThisisHawk1.Enemytankstomydirectfront!Comeonlinenow!”

Hartshiftedhis tanktoasafefiringposition.Hisgunner,CplLeeFowble,calmlysaid,“Sir,we’vegottoshoot!They’retraversing!”Fowblehadorderedtheloadertochamberaround,savingpreciousseconds.Hartgavetheordertofire,andtheleadT-72explodedinafireball.

In the T-72 ammunition is stored throughout the crew space. Theammunition is consumable case; the casing of the propellant charge iscombustible.Virtuallyanypenetrationofthearmorsendshotshardsandmoltendroplets of the tank’sownarmor spraying throughout the interior, igniting thestoredpropellant.Theusualeffectwastoblowtheturretabout tenmeters intotheair.21

Fowble shiftedhis aimand fired, destroying anotherT-72.AnotherM1A1cameon line,but tworoundsfromtheother tankflewhigh.FowbledestroyedanotherT-72.

Hart realized that three parallel columns were emerging from the blindground,crossingtheroadbedatseparatepoints.InterspersedwereChinesemadearmored personnel carriers and wheeled vehicles. This was an Iraqi tankbattalion.

Titan4[SSgtJeffreyDaucus]cameonlineandengagedtheenemy;1stand3rdPlatoonsweremovingintofiringpositionsonHart’sflanks.Humveesfrom1/8begantomoveupandengagewithTOWmissiles.

From his position behindHart’s 2nd Platoon, Parkisonwatched the T-72sineffectivelyreturnfire.AftereachroundtheautoloaderintheT-72elevatedtheguntubeasitejectedthestuboftheprojectilecase,loadedanewround,andintheory returned to thepointof aim. In fact it seldomdid.The rateof firewasslowerthanwithahumanloader,andthegunnercouldnotusetheimpactofthemissedshottoadjusttheaimingpoint.22

Hawk4[GySgtAlfonsoPineda]hadamalfunctioninglaserrangefinder,butthe problem was resolved in time to fire the last round of the seven-minutebattle.By0700thesurvivingIraqisweresurrendering.Inwhatbecameknownasthe“ReveilleBattle”thetanksandTOWvehicleshaddestroyedthirtyT-72s,four T-55s, and seven APCs of the veteran 8th Mechanized Brigade, 3rdArmoredDivision.23

Dazed and wounded Iraqis staggered and crawled about among burningtanks.Somedraggedor supportedwoundedcomrades.Cautiously theMarinesandNavycorpsmenbegantogatherinthewoundedanddyingtoofferwhathelptheycouldtothementheyhadbeenslaughtering.

Chip Parkison watched as a haggard Iraqi officer, desperately clutching ajacket tohischest,surrendered.Achildhoodfriendhadbeenkilledin the tankbehindhis,andthejacketfromthebodyofhis“brother”wastheonlymementohecouldtakehometohisfriend’sparents.

AnevenbiggerIraqiforceoftwobrigadeshadconcentratedintheal-Burqanoil field, on Task Force PAPA BEAR’s right flank, on the extreme right. At0815hoursamassiveartillerybombardmentflushedtanksoutintothesightsofattackhelicopters,TOWgunners, and theM60A1sof 1stTankBattalion.Theshootingdraggedonintotheafternoon.

About 13km (8miles) to the north the 1st Marine Division’s ForwardCommandPostwassituatedwestoftheEmir’sFarm,anoasisrightoutofanoldfilm. The FCP was screened by a rifle platoon and seven LAVs from BCompany ofTaskForceSHEPHERD. Just before 0930 enemy artillery beganfallingaroundtheFCP

The command LAV-25 with Captain Hammond and his gunner, SergeantRandyBuntin,wasontheextremeleftoftheline.AHumveecameracingoveralowridgeaboutakilometertothenorth,thedrivershouting,“Therearevehiclescomingthisway.”24

Little help was available because of the fight around the oil field. BuntinopenedfireasthefirstBMPtoppedtheridge,butatcloserangetheroundsflewoverthelow-slungBMP25Buntinfiredagainandthevehiclestaggeredtoastopas the25mmrounds ripped through the thin frontalarmor. Infantryspilledouttherearhatches,butBuntin’scoaxialmachinegunjammed.TheIraqisfiredanRPG,andBuntinrakedthemwithHEfromthe25mm.26

A second BMPwas stopped by 25mm fire, but the infantry fired anotherRPG thatdetonated in the trees aboveBuntin’svehicle, spraying the scouts inbackwithsplinters.WhenathirdBMPemerged,BuntinstoppeditandrakedtheemerginginfantrywithHE.TheLAVscounterattacked,drivingtheIraqisbacktowardtheEmir’sFarm.

TwohelicoptergunshipscametotheaidoftheFCP,theirattacksdirectedby25mm fire.Around theLAVs lay38wrecked Iraqi armoredvehicles.CaptainHammondwas awarded theNavyCross, andBuntin theNavyCommendationMedalwithV.

Iraqi resistance was erratic. When A Company resumed its advance theyblundered into the flank of an enemy tank battalion. The LAVs destroyed adozen tanks before the enemy began to surrender. The dismounts shovedthermitegrenadesintotheguntubes,andthecompanymovedon.

WhenthecompanyencounteredanotherentrenchedunitaBMPstartedoutof its revetment.Buntin’s gunner firedbutmissed.27GunnerUke adjusted therange.TheBMPlurchedandrolledbackintothepit.Ukehadkilledtheenemyvehicleatanincrediblerange:3,500meters.28

To the west, Task Force RIPPER was engaged in clearing bunkers thatdottedtheal-JaberAirfield.At1400GRIZZLYwascalledforwardtoassist.

The Iraqi utilization of “environmentalwarfare”was highly visible and tosomeextenteffective.Vastpoolsofcrudeoil impededmobilityandchanneledattacks.Avastpallofoily smoke renderednightvisiondevicesuseless.Closeairsupportwasrestrictedbysmokethathungjustabovetheground.29

Asthe2ndMarineDivisionwiththeattachedTigerBrigadenearedKuwaitInternationalAirport,anIraqiarmoredforceemergedtofight.The“steel rain”ofthedivisionartillerysmashedtheattack.BravoCompany,4thTankpickedoff

singleenemyvehiclesinarunninggunbattleastheIraqisfled.Atday’sendthe2ndMarineDivisionhaddestroyed248tanksandcaptured

4,500prisoners,butwereaheadofthe1stMarineDivision,withtheirrightflankexposed.On the far right theJFCNforcehadmadeevenslowerprogress.TheMarines had also bypassed the large oil fields, and no one knewwhat lurkedinsidethoseinfernos.

TheMarines were well ahead of schedule, throwing the overall plan intodisarray.Schwarzkopfstarted theadvanceofVCorpsacross thedesert fifteenhoursaheadofschedule,ratherthanhalttheMarineadvance.

BusterDiggs:“BytheseconddayIcouldseethatweweregoingtowinthis.NowIdidn’twantanybodyleavingthiswarasabadfeeling.Itoldtheboys‘Igotplentyofammunition.Ifthere’sadoubt,shoot.There’snoquestion—shoot.Butifyouthinksomebody’sgonnasurrender,givethemthebenefitofthedoubt.I don’twant you to leave here thinking you’re a butcher. I don’twant you toleaveherethinkingyoubutcheredhumanbeings.’”

DAYTHREE:TUESDAY,26FEBRUARYRadio Baghdad announced at 0135 that Iraqi forces had been ordered towithdraw fromKuwait. The time for any sort of orderlywithdrawalwas longpast: communications were smashed, and Coalition forces relentless. For theIraqisitwaseverymanforhimself.

West of the cityB/4thTankwas positioned near a road intersectionwhenIraqi forces began their breakout attempt. The tankers slaughtered the Iraqis,destroyingnineT-62s, tenBMPs, threeBTRs, anMT-LB tracked carrier, andtrucks.30

AlphaCompanyofTFSHEPHERDwaspositionednorthof theal-Burqanoil field, facing northeast while the attached LAV-ATs faced back into thegloomoftheoilfield.Theheatoverwhelmedthethermalsights,andat0400aMT-LBtrundledundetectedrightintotheMarinelines.Fortunatelyitwasfilledwithdesertersandloot.Whenthecompanyresumeditsadvance,itwasquicklyoverwhelmedwithprisoners.Finallyanexasperatedartilleryobserver,CorporalReese, commandeered an abandoned bus and drove a load of prisoners to therear. In retrospectMichaels thought this took considerable courage, given theenthusiasm with which Marines and aircraft were shooting up “enemy”vehicles.31

AlliedcommandersdecidedtoblocktheretreatbybombingtheMutlaaPass,where themain highway passed through a low ridge.Aircraft pounced on the

hugesnarlofvehicles, andvehicles took to theopendesert,only toencountertheir own minefields. West of the city other forces tried to flee, only to besmashedbyMarinetankandinfantryfire.32

Task ForceGRIZZLY veeredwest to complete clearing the al-Jaber area,andcloseupwith2ndMarineDivision.TAROwouldlagbehindtocleartheAl-Burqanoilfield.ThebulkoftheMarineforcesheadedforKuwaitCity,impededbyhordesofsurrenderingIraqis.

Theadvancebeganatabout0700,hamperedbyamorningsandstorm.ThetankbattalionsutilizeddifferingmethodstodealwiththedozensofIraqitanksand armored vehicles that littered the landscape. Some tickled each enemyvehicle with machine gun fire, and then blasted any that responded. Otherssimplyshotupanythingthatlookedalive.

By1130hours3rdTankwasdrawnupalongaphaselinemarkedbyalineof electrical power pylons. Iraqi artillery began to lob single rounds at thestationary tanks. The rounds walked closer and closer, as Freitus repeatedlycalledina“Snowstorm,”thesignalforanartilleryattack.

WhenbattalionwasslowtorespondCaptainEdDunlap,theCOofCharlieCompany/3rdTank,tookituponhisownauthoritytomovepastthephaseline.Freitus,ontheextremeright,wasthelast tankout.Heduckedintothecupola,andagood-luckmedalliononachainaroundhisnecksnaggedinsidethecupola.As he tried to free the chain and stick his head back out, the tank lurchedviolentlysideways,andthenmovedon.Freitusfreedthechainandlookedbackasexplosionsdelugedthevacatedposition.Shrapnelhadshreddedtheright-sidesponsonboxes,thegearinthegypsyrack,andseveredcablesontheexterioroftheturret.Eerily,Freitus’sgrandfather,anArmytanker,hadbeensparedwhenthesamemedallionbecameentangledduringtheBattleoftheBulgein1944.33

ThirdTankmovedpastTheOrchard,atreefarmsouthoftheSeventhRingRoad encircling the city. A single road channeled the tanks. Gonsalves wasworriedthatitwastheperfectambushsite.“Justareallybadsituation.…Itwasprettymuchthemiddleoftheday,andyoucouldn’tseefifteenfeetinfrontofyou. Itwas pitch black.”The lead elements stumbled upon two Iraqi armoredvehicles in the gloom. The tanks engaged them at point-blank range, and themajordangerwasfromtheexplosionofammunitionintheenemyvehicles.34

CharlieCompanymovedup tohelp infantryclearTheOrchard.Kessinger:“FromaMarines’perspective,itlookedlikejustbeautifulfieldsoffire.Iftheyhadsetupanykindofdirectfiredownthose[rowsoftrees],itwasperfectlyflatground. You couldn’t tell from one row of trees to the next what you were

comingupon,orwhatyouweregoingaround.”OntheoutskirtsofTheOrchard,Mummey“Satthereandlookedofftothe

east, and all of a sudden ‘BOOM!’ I see this fireball come flying across theground.Iknewwhatitwasrightaway:that’saSagger.Ireacheddown…andIpoppedmy smoke.” Freitus heard Sergeant “Fritz” Fitzpatrick radio “Sagger!Sagger,”thecodewordforananti-tankmissilelaunch.

Mummey:“Intheconfusion“Abunchofpeoplesawthatsmokeandthoughtitwasachemicalattack.Allthesetankswerestoppingandguyswerethrowingontheirmasks.

“Mywingman,SergeantFitzpatrick,hewasonmyrightfrontrightnext tothisberm,andrightaboutthetimehedippeddown,thatmissilehitrightatthetopofthebermandexplodedandthemissilebucketwentflyingoverhisbackdeck.” Fitzpatrick began to back up in an effort to throw off the missilelauncher’saim.

“I started shootingHEAT andWooly Pete at these shapes that were overthere;Ididn’tknowexactlywhatwasoverthere.Thenallofasudden‘BOOM!’Here comes another fireball. It starts to go behindme, and it’s going towardLieutenant Freitus’s tank.” Freitus could clearly see the fuzzy fireball of thesecond oncoming rocket’s propulsion system, and the puffs of smoke thatmarked the operator’s course corrections. The tanks were now taking heavymachinegunfirefromtherear.35

Mummey: “He [Freitus] starts doing a backward stagger-dance, left-right,hanging on throttle, sharp turns.” Now two tanks were backing up and apotential danger was collision with other tanks still advancing. “I rememberwatchingthatmissilepassbehindmytank.Itjustnosedinthedirtinfrontofhistank,justafewmeters.Aboutthattimewehadthiskid—Iforgethisname—buthewastheFOonCaptainDunlap’stank.Iwaslike,‘Weneedimmediatesmokeontherightflank.’

“Allofasuddenthere’sthisbigcurtainofsmokefromalltheseWoolyPeteroundshitting.We’resittingtherehungup.There’sthisbigagriculturalorchard,sowe’re all cramped up.We got people shooting at us from the orchard,webeen taking these missiles from the right flank. Colonel Diggs decides to letOne-Sevenouttogoclearthewoods.Theygo!Thesegruntsbeenintheamtracsforthreedays,nowallofasuddentheyweren’tcomingback,man.

“Irememberhesaidontheradio‘I’veletloosethedogsofwarandIcan’tgetthemback!’”

Kessinger:“That’swhenColonelDiggsdismountedhisinfantry….Theyset

upoutinfront,andyoucouldheartherat-a-tat-tatofmachinegunfire,all thethingstheinfantrydoes.ColonelDiggshadhisheaddownandwasshakinghisheadbackandforth.Helookedupatmeandsaid,‘WhathaveIdone?’Heletthecrunchiesloose.”36

Contrary to Diggs’s fears, Kessinger said the infantry “… patrolled thewholearea.It’swhattheydo,andtheydiditverywell.Madesureweweresafe.Then they mounted back up and wemoved on through. There was really nootherwaythecolonelcouldhavegottenitdone.Atankcouldn’tdoit,andithadtobedoneonfoot.ButIknowhefeltlikehelostalittlecontrolwhenheletallthoseguysloose.”

The tanks were still taking small arms and machine gun fire, so Dunlaporderedthetanksforwardagain.Mummey:“Mygunner,Gilger,onceagainhepumpedsomeHEATrounds.Hemakes‘emstopwhatthey’redoing.LieutenantCroteau [1st Lt. Christopher Croteau, the leader of 1st Platoon, CharlieCompany] takes the lead.He punches through on the side of this agriculturalthing.Thegruntsareoverthereontheleft.They’regoingthroughsowe’vegottowatchout.Upaheadofuswedidn’tknowtherewereallthesepeopleheadingtowardIraq….”

WhenthelieutenantsawallthetrafficontheSeventhRingRoad,“Hestartslightingthemup.I’mthefourthtankback;I’mpullingdrag.Idon’tknowwhatthehell’sgoingon.Nobodydoes.

“Thenwepushedupthereandcontinuedshooting.Eventuallymostofthemjumpedoutoftheirvehiclesortheyjustkeptondriving.Itwasgettingdark….”

Theadvanceofthetankswasblockedbyanotherobstaclebelt.“Wehadallthese (burning) vehicles, and they’re starting to cook off and everything… .We’rewithinahundredmetersofthem,sowelikeneedtogetoutofthere.Butwehadtherestofthebattalioncomingupbehindus.SoScottMartininThirdPlatoon,hehadaplowonhistank….Hecameupandpushedthroughthatwiresowecouldgettotheothersideofthefreeway,whichwedidn’tknowwasalsoanIraqiposition,buttheyhadalreadyhauledassoutofthere….”

WhenMummeydrovepastMartin’stankhesawthat“…[barbedwire]wascaughtupinhismineplow,caughtupinhissprockets….Hewasstandingthere—he didn’t have his helmet on—he was just sitting there looking at hissprocketsallwaddedupwithwire,lookingallbummedout.”

Tothewestthe4thMarineDivisionandTigerBrigadewereclosingofftheIraqiescaperoute,destroyingtheoddIraqivehicle:ahalf-dozentanks,aBMP,moreMT-LBsandtrucksforBravo/4thTank.37

At 1400hours the 1stMarineDivision began the final advance onKuwaitInternational Airport, with Task Forces RIPPER, PAPA BEAR, andSHEPHERDarrayed fromwest toeast. Infantry forceswouldseize theairportproper, while SHEPHERD enveloped it from the east. During the night theinfantry-heavyTaskForceTAROmovednorthtotheoutskirtsoftheairportandpreparedtofinalizethecapture.

TheMarineunitsbegantoarriveatfinalphaselineslateintheday,securingthesouthernoutskirtsofKuwaitCityandamajorroadjunctionnortheastofthecity. Arab forces would enter the city proper, and premature darkness wasapproaching. General Walter Boomer ordered the 2nd Marine Division toreorientandsweepwesttocutoffanyremainingIraqiforces.

NearnightfallBusterDiggs’stankssightedastrongpointabout8,000metersout.TheIraqissentanemissarytonegotiatesurrender.“Hecametousandsaid,‘Listen,we’re honorablemen.We’re not gonna just surrender to you.You’vegottosendonetankouttheretomorrowmorningandshootatus,andthenwe’llsurrender.’

“I’mgoing‘Jeez,ifIsendatankoutthere,onlyonetank’sgonnago,it’sgotto be mine.’ And my tank commander’s gonna go ‘You gotta be shittin’ meRommel!I’mnotgoin’outthere!’

“So we started out the attack with Hellfire missiles downrange—we hadtacticalhelicopterswithusallthetime.Sowelased,andthentheysurrendered.

“Those peoplewould have done that; theywould have done exactlywhattheysaid.ButsomeIraqimothersdidn’tgettheirsons[back].Youknow,itjustdidn’tsoundright tome.Plus,remember,Ihadneverbeenincombat.Ididn’treallyknowhowthegamewasplayed,exceptyou’reonthissideoftheguntubeputyourhandsuporyoudie.That’sallIcoulddo.”

At1500hoursAlphaCompanyofTFSHEPHERDreceivedorderstoresumeitsnorthwardadvance.JustoutsidetheInternationalAirporttheleadingvehiclesencountered twoarmedpickuptrucks thatspedacross thefrontof thecolumn.Gunnersonmultiplevehiclesbegantoblazeawayatthetrucks,sendingtracerson all sides of the leadingLAVsuntil SergeantRamirez quelled the firing byshouting over the radio. The incident resulted in a thorough chewing out forgunnersandvehiclecommanders.

TheLAVs halted in defensive positions at a complex freeway intersectionwestofthecity.Theone-waylanesdividedbyconcretebarriersformedamazethrough which the vehicles could not find a clear path. Efforts to breach thebarriersfailed,andthepositionremainedinsecurethroughthenight.38

Marine reconnaissance units were steadily filtering through the collapsingIraqiunitsallalongthefront.AreconteamcontactedKuwaitiresistancefighterswholedthemintothecitytoreoccupytheAmericanEmbassy.Thisreportedlyenraged General Norman Schwarzkopf, who had organized a showpieceoperationtoliberatetheEmbassy.39

To3rdTank’sfront,theycouldheartheengineidlinginanabandonedtank.Kessinger:“TheColonelcalledReconandwanted…themtogooutandturnitoffsowewouldknowifitwasamannedvehicleornot.TheReconlieutenantsaid‘Idon’tknowhowtoturnatank[off]!’”

Several of the tankers had experience with Soviet vehicles. CorporalMullendorevolunteeredtogo.“Iturnedandlookedathim,andhelookedatme,andIsaid‘Didyoujustvolunteer?’”

The sheepish Mullendore replied, “‘That was the last thing my Dad saidbeforeIleft;don’tvolunteerforanything.’”

Kessinger: “We’re in the back of this Humvee, driving out toward thisengine noise, and they had a TOWvehiclewith them. Somebody thought thevehiclestartedmoving,andtheyjustlititupwiththeTOW.”

DAYFOUR:WEDNESDAY,27FEBRUARYKuwait International Airport is a sprawling complex with a huge multistorypassenger terminal. About 0330hours the LAV companies breached theperimeterfence.Scramblingtomovethroughthenarrowgaps,vehiclescollidedwitheachotheruntilcrewsplacedchemicallightsticksinthesidewindows.Theonly delay was when Alpha Company encountered mines along the westernperimeter.

InfantryfromTAROandtheLAVsfromSHEPHERDmovedoutacrossthegrounds. Nervous crews fired through some of the huge terminal windows,mistakingreflectionsofburningoilwellsformovementinside.TheLAIscoutshad to search the sprawling terminal building, and the airport was declaredsecureat0900hours.

To the north, theTigerBrigadewas the first ground unit to encounter thecarnagealongthe“HighwayofDeath.”Coalitionaircrafthaddestroyedsomeoftheleadingvehicles,andpouncedonotherstrappedinthejam.

Army Special Forces and Navy SEALs arrived at the American Embassyamid a flurry of helicopters and video recorders. TheMarine recon teamwaskept safely out of sight. The war was rapidly winding down. General ColinPowellwas trying to rein in Schwarzkopf.Orders at last came down to cease

offensiveoperationsasof0800,28February.

DAYFIVE:THURSDAY,28FEBRUARYArabCoalitionforcespassedthroughtheMarinelinesandintoKuwaitCity,toajoyouscelebration—andvengeanceoncollaborators.TheMarineshaddestroyedoverathousandtanks,aswellas600otherarmoredvehicles,andtaken22,308prisoners.Thecostwasfivekilledand48wounded.

Thereremainedafinal,potentiallybloody,“moppingup”phase.FifthMEBreceived orders to clear Iraqis isolated and bypassed in the Al-Wafrah Forestalong the Kuwait-Iraq border. Engineers and tanks had to breach anotherminefield to allow access. Sporadic and ineffective sniping delayed finalclearingoftheadjacentAl-Wafrahoilfielduntil3March.

Diggs summarized theMarines’part in theoperation. “Ididn’tknowwhatTenthCorpswas going to do by theway.Thatwas pretty compartmentalizedinformationIdidnotknow.Ididnotknowtheywantedustogetboggeddownin Kuwait. That was the plan for us to get bogged down… .We just didn’tcooperate.”

DennisBealthoughtthat“OneofthereasonstheygottheirasseskickedsobadwastheyfoughtthestandardlayeredSovietdefensewhereallthedecisionsaremade fromacentralcommand,and ifyoubreak thecommunications linesyoucouldn’ttalktoanybodyupthereandnoonecouldgetadecision.Becausenoone’sgonnadoanythingontheirown.MypersonalassessmentofallofthiswasthatupuntilthispointintimeIwasalwaysthoroughlyimpressedwiththeIsraelisandhowwell theydid.…Myfinalconclusionat theendof this thingwasthat theIsraelisneverwereall thatgood.TheIsraelisweregood,but theyweren’t as good as we thought they were, it’s just that these people were sowoefullybad.Shit, this is likeanNFLteamplayingahigh-school team.Thesepeople justdidn’tunderstandtheoperationalartofwar, theydidn’tunderstandcross-boundary fires, they didn’t understand fire and maneuver. They didn’tunderstandanyofthethingsyouneedtounderstandtobesuccessfulincombat.”

WINDINGDOWN

For a brief whileMarine units remained encamped inside Kuwait, sometimesunderbizarrecircumstances.BCompany,4thTankmovedsouthtoalocaletheycalled Pet Cemetery for the seventy or so carcasses of cows, horses, and—

inexplicably—zebras.Theyremainedamidthestenchfortendays.40One of the common observations was the extent and detail of the Iraqi

looting. Early in the fighting Sam Crabtree’s maintenance section hadestablisheditselfinasmallKuwaititown.“Wesetupinadefensiveline,andtomakesurethatthebuildingsnexttouswereclear,wewenttothehouses….Allthe electrical outlets had been removed by the Iraqis. There were vehiclesscattered. Ididn’t seeoneof them thathad four tires.They tookanythingandeverythingtheycould.”

Though units were officially forbidden to fly American flags, Kuwaitischeered the Marines’ “unofficial” displays of American and Marine Corpscolors. Third Tank remained in position for several days, then drove souththroughthecity,“Where theywere lining thestreets,wavingflags,andall thethingsyou’dloveto[see],”saidKessinger.

The 5thMEB re-embarked for a planned rescuemission in Addis Ababa,Ethiopia.Themissionnevermaterialized,andtheMEBwassoondispatchedtocyclone-ravagedBangladesh.41

“Weabandonedallofourequipment”explainedDiggs,“becauseweknewweweregoingtotransitiontoM1A1ssowedidn’twantthetanks.ThenFSSGcameinbigtime.Wehadammobrokenout,probablyfiredtenpercentoftheroundswehadinthetanks.”

MikeMummey:“Weweredownthereforfourorfivedays.Wehadtotakeallthereactivearmoroffthetanks,hadtolayalltheammooutontarps,countevery bullet, count every smoke grenade. Ammo techs would come by andclassifyit,thenwehadworkingpartiestakingit.”

TheM60A1swere left behind, but “Of coursewe’re taking our pet tankswithusnow.WegotapetT-72andapetBMPthatwe’retakingwithus….”

Kessinger“DidanLTIinspectionofthetank,signedoffonthelogbook,andwalkedaway.Thatwasareallystrangefeeling.You’vejustspenteightmonthsin that tank, andyou just turn andwalk away. Itwas a little surreal, actually.You just leave a little pieceof your life sittingback there.”Mummey said, “Iknow my tank ended up being a reef off the coast of South Carolina. Theydemil(itariz)editatAlbany(theGeorgiaMarinesupplydepot)anditgotpushedoffabargeoffthecoastofSouthCarolina….”

For theMarines therewere the same enemies that appear after everywar:resurgentbureaucracy,REMFs,andformerallies.FreituswasstoppedataSaudiNationalGuardroadblock,andanofficerbegantorantatFreitusabouthismanyshortcomings as an infidel. Freitus snapped. He jammed his pistol under the

man’s chin and suggested that he and his men ground their prominentlydisplayed weapons. Slowly backing away with the Saudi officer walkingalongside, pistol under his chin, Freitus put some distance between the otherguardsmen before speeding away. He expected repercussions, but none everarose.42

Anotherincidentcouldhavecomefromanywar.FreitusandothersventuredintothemesshallatCamp13—aparadisewithflushtoiletsandPX.43AseniorstaffNCO“lockedontous like aStingermissile… .”Berating the tankers fortheir raggeduniforms and slovenly appearance, and for carryingweapons in arear area, he concluded that theywere a disgrace to theCorps.Onlymidwaythrough his tirade did he sense that he had perhaps gone too far, and backedoff.44

AFTERMATH

The feared T-72 had proven to be a deathtrap. Lt. Brian Holmberg of AlphaCompany, 3rd Tank described the effect of the old M60A1’s 105mm: “One[sabot]roundhitthefrontalarcoftheturretonaT-72.Itwentthroughtheturret,engine, then out the ass-end.”45 Kessinger said that when a sabot roundpenetratesandfragmentsstrikehydrauliclinesandstoredammo.“…thingsstartcooking off, and as they’re cooking off there are little explosions. And thenthere’s the big one that usually sends the turret thirty, forty feet in the air,tumblinglikeahubcap.Thethingweighsseveraltons,comesdown,anditburnsforalongtime.”

One Marine Corps study rather dispassionately reported that Iraqi tanksstruck while in motion “… invariably had some amount of human remainscontainedwithinwhatwas leftof thecrewcompartment. Inalmosteverycasethese remainswere to be found in the driver’s area up under the front glacis.Inspectionalso revealeddismemberedbodyparts strewnabout thevehicleandwithin15–20meters.”46

Incontrast, forDiggs itwas“Nice togeteverybodyback,andnothave tolook atwives and stuff and say ‘I’m sorry.’ For a commander, that’s just thegreatestthingintheworld.

Marinesencountered theeffectsof the first“mediawar.”Kessingerwasathismother’shome.“HereIamatmywelcomehomeparty,butmystep-father—whowasaVietnamveteran—hadrecordedonVHStapeseverysinglehourof

CNNfromthewar.Ihadneverseenit.HereIamwantingtowatchthis,whileeverybody else is having a party!”Kessinger thought, “Itwas kind of nice tofindoutwhatweweredoing.”

Life returned to garrison routine. Charlie Company 3rd Tankwas quicklytrainedonthenewM1A1.“Wegotusedforeveryinfantryofficercourse,dogandponyshow,combinedarmsexercise,”recountedMummey.

Mancini thought that one of the legacies of the brief war was a betterrelationship between the infantry and tankers.Mattis requested that “his” tankcompany deploy back to theU.S.with the battalion. “That sent a very strongmessagethroughalltheranks,thattheinfantrywantstotakecareofus.”

Short-lived Operation PROVIDE COMFORT was an effort to providehumanitarianassistanceandstabilizetherestiveKurdishregionsofnorthernIraqintheaftermathofthewar.Isolatedwithintheland-lockednorth,everythinghadto be ferried in by heavy-lift helicopters or fixed-wing aircraft, including aplatoonofLAVs.47

There was considerable unhappiness about leaving Saddam Hussein inpower. In the following yearsmany—particularly theKurds, who had openlysided with the Coalition—would pay the price. The Iraqi chemical arsenalremained intact. Iran,withenormouspopulation,oilwealth,powerfulmilitary,and its unbending antipathy to the United States, was still a regional power.SaddamHusseinhadoncebeenacounterforceagainstIranianambitions,butthepetmonster had grown beyond control to itself become a threat. Themonsterwas temporarily prostrate, but all things considered, it was thought best thatSaddam remain in power. But like some monster in a low-budget movie, hewouldriseagain.

NOTES

1Cureton,InterviewwithmembersofOCDattached toCombatEngineerDetachment,TaskForcePapaBear. All quotes attributed to engineers involved in the breaching operations are from this groupinterview.

2Cureton,InterviewwithmembersofOCDattached toCombatEngineerDetachment,TaskForcePapaBear,p.ii;andBennett,BattlefieldBreaching:DoingtheJobRight,p.19–20.

3Bennett,BattlefieldBreaching:DoingtheJobRight,p.19–21.4Fahey,InterviewwithMajorTimFrank.5FreitusandFreitus,Dial911Marines,p.157–160;Lowry,TheGulfWarChronicles,p.100.6FreitusandFreitus,Dial911Marines,p.161–162.7Varioussourcescitedifferingtimesforthepassagethroughtheberm.Breachingassetsincludedeighteen

AAVswithroof-mountedMICLIClaunchers,22AAVstocarrytheengineersquads,39M59MICLIC

launcher trailers, and fifteen M9 Armored Combat Engineer (ACE) tractors. The supporting tankelementsincludedtwoM60A1bladetanks,fourM60A1withminerakes,16M60A1withmineplows,fourM1A1withmineplows,sixM1A1withmineplows,andfourarmoredbridgelayers(AVLB)builtontheM60A1tankchassis.Lowry,TheGulfWarChronicles,p.101.

8Michaels,TipoftheSpear,p.184–186.9Thefollowingaccountof2ndDivisionanddetailsofB/4thTank’stravailsisprimarilyfromBravingtheBreach(sidebar)inZumwalt,Tanks!Tanks!DirectFront!,p.75–77.

10Lowry,TheGulfWarChronicles,p.106.11Michaels,TipoftheSpear,p.186–188.12Ibid,p.192–202.13Moore,AlliesUsedaVariationofTrojanHorsePloy,p.103.14Dacus,BravoCompanyGoesToWar,p.11–12.15Zumwalt,Tanks!Tanks!DirectFront!,p.78.16FreitusandFreitus,Dial911Marines,p.167.17Ibid,,p.172–175.18Ibid,p.193,197–198.19Michaels,TipoftheSpear,p.188–190.20UnlessotherwisenotedtheaccountofthisactionisdrawnfromZumwalt,Tanks!Tanks!DirectFront!,

p.78–80.21GilbertandSwan,T-72TankinIraqiService,notpaginated.22Ibid.23ThisistheofficialcountaslistedinZumwalt,Tanks!Tanks!DirectFront!Thereissomeconfusionover

bothtypesandnumbersdestroyed.ThreeT-55s(asshowninZumwalt’smap),weredugintorevetmentsandnotpartoftheattackingunit.SomesourcesalsoincludeasingleT-62inthetotal.SeeforexampleAftermathoftheReveilleBattle,sidebartoDacus,BravoCompanyGoesToWar,p.14.

24TheaccountofthefightattheEmir’sFarmisdrawnfromMichaels,TipoftheSpear,p.207–211.Notethat there are serious discrepancies between this account and that provided byLowry,TheGulfWarChronicles,p.129–130.

25Battlesightisaquick-responsesightsettingthatassumesaflattrajectoryouttoabout1700meters.Athalfthatrangetheverygentlearcoftheroundswascarryingthemslightlyabovethetarget.

26Michaels,TipoftheSpear,p.209.27WiththeCOabsent,atthispointBuntinhadapparentlytakenoverthevehicle.28Ibid,p.212–214.29BattlefieldAssessmentTeam,Armor/AntiarmorTeam,Armor/AntiarmorOperatonsinSouth-WestAsia,

p.3.30Dacus,BravoCompanyGoesToWar,p.14.31Michaels,TipoftheSpear,p.215–219.32Lowry,TheGulfWarChronicles,p.140–141.33FreitusandFreitus,Dial911Marines,p.208,213.34Ibid,p.216–217.35Ibid,p.211–214.36Tankersoftenrefertoinfantryascrunchies—purportedlythesoundtheymakewhenyourunoverthem.37Dacus,BravoCompanyGoesToWar,p.14.38Michaels,TipoftheSpear,p.221–238.39Lowry,TheGulfWarChronicles,p.175.40Dacus,BravoCompanyGoesToWar,p.15.41Anonymous,5thMEBDeploymenttoSWA,unpaginated.42FreitusandFreitus,Dial911Marines,p.244–246.43Camp13,temporarilychristenedCampRohrbachbytheUSmilitary,wasaSaudifacilityneartheKing

FahdIndustrialPortbuilttohouseforeignworkers.Itwastakenoverbythemilitaryandhousedamong

other units two Naval Construction Battalions (Seabees) renowned for providing their own creaturecomforts.

44FreitusandFreitus,Dial911Marines,p.246–247.45Asquotedinhttp://www.qrmapps.com/gw1/day1.htm46BattlefieldAssessmentTeam,Armor/AntiarmorTeam,Armor/AntiarmorOperatonsinSouth-WestAsia,

p.18.47Corwin,BLT2/8MovesSouth,p.201.

T

CHAPTERFOUR

Intervallum

Thosewhohavecommittedthisevilactagainsttheinnocent,thewomenandchildren,tocreatethousandsofwidowsandorphans,donotdosointhenameofIslam.BythegraceofAllahtheAlmighty,mayjusticebeserveduponthem.—SyedAbbas,supremeleaderofnorthernPakistan’sShia,14September20011

HECOMMITMENTTOthewarinKuwaithadnotabsolvedtheCorpsofits numerous other global responsibilities, only stretched itthinner.Theburdenofmanyof thesemissionswould fallupon

thenewLAVunits,simplybecausetheywereeasiertotransportandsupportinfar-flungcornersoftheglobe.InApril1991AlphaCompany,3rdLAIBattalionwascalleduponforareliefoperationfollowingtheeruptionofMountPinatubointhePhilippines.

Mohammed himself had once issued a haditha proscribingMuslims fromwarring against Christian Ethiopians, who had once given refuge to his earlyadherentsdrivenoutofArabia.NeverthelesskingdomsinwhatarenowEthiopiaand Somalia descended into a prolonged period of reciprocal invasions andreligiouspersecutions.2LaterBritainandFascist ItalywarredoverSomalia. IntheaftermathofWorldWarIInoonequiteknewwhattodowithit,soItalianadministratorscontinuedtogovernuntilindependencein1960.

Bythelate1960sSomaliahadfallenincreasinglyundertheinfluenceoftheSoviets, who abruptly betrayed Somalia, shifting aid to rival Ethiopia. In theaftermath the country spiraled into civil war between rival clans. Foodwas aweaponwielded bywhoever controlled the ports. Famine claimed asmany as500,000Somalis,andthreatenedmanymorelives.AspartofaUNreliefeffort,theMarinesweresentintoprotectUNreliefefforts.

The inclusion of armor in a humanitarian mission was the subject ofconsiderableconfusion.Intheoriginalplanthetaskforcewastobebuiltaround

the 7th Marines, and would include 3rd LAI Battalion (-), and the 3rdAmphibiousAssaultVehicleBattalion(-).

At the lastminute1stMarineDivisiondeleteda tankdetachment from theoperation’strooplist,butBrig.Gen.JackKlimpwantedthetanks.AreinforcedplatoonoftanksfromCCompany,1stTankwasadded,butatfirstthefivetankssimply sat on the docks at Mogadishu.3 The tank officer in charge, MikeCampbell, had only oneNCO and four enlisted tankers, and shanghaied otherMarines to fill out four tank crews; the fifth tank would be a spare.Unfortunatelythe120mmammunitionhadalreadybeenloadedbackaboardshipandsentawaybyaconscientioussupplyofficerwhosawnoneedforitwithouttanks.Thetankerswereabletoscroungetwoboxesof.50caliberammo,and700roundsof7.62mmammofrominfantryandAAVunits.

Themissing ammo resulted in abizarre “battle”when the four tankswereorderedtosupportaraidonaclanmilitiaarmsstoragesitemountedinresponsetotheambushofaUNconvoy.ThirdLAIscreenedthesurroundingarea,andat0647 hours on 7 January theMarine tanks, supported byTOW teams, bargedinto the compound. The tanks faced off with six SomaliM47s. TheMarinesopened fire with machine guns; the Somalis thought the rounds were fromrangingguns,andsurrendered.

InanotherincidentMarinesheardengineandtracknoisesinanareabetweenthem and anArmy compound.Nextmorning therewere three T-55s and twoM47s in the field about 400 yards away.OneM47 slowly traversed its turrettoward theMarine tanks.Campbell ordered the crews to hold fire because heintuitedthatsomethingdidnotseemquiteright.Suddenlya“crew”ofchildrenbailed out and ran. TheArmy had towed confiscated tanks into the field as adumpsitewithoutinformingtheMarines,andthetankshadbecometoys.

For most of their tenure the Marines generally patrolled on foot, therebygainingcredibility in the localwarriorculture,but theavailabilityof the tankswas a reminder of the restrained power of the Marines. LtCol Malik of thePakistani 1st PunjabBattalion said that “If theMarine tankswere not alwayswiththeir infantry toat least intimidateandprovidepsychologicalsupport,butusuallytodrawawayhostilefire,theMarinecasualtieswouldhavebeenmuchhigher.”Inafewcasestanksdispersedhostilecrowdsinanovelway,directingthe1,500degreeF(816C)exhaustoftheturbineengineasasortof“non-lethal”weapon.4

By March 1993 a food distribution network was functioning, and theMarines were replaced by American soldiers and UN troops of several

nationalities.With theMarineswent theheavyarmor, and someanalystshavesuggested that the absence of a heavy armor reaction force, coupled withinsensitivity to the nuances of the local “warrior culture,” contributed to thedisastrous Battle of Mogadishu depicted in the book and film Black HawkDown.5

Wellbelowthegeneralpublic’sthresholdofperception,thevolatileMiddleEastandCentralAsiahadagainspawnedanotherstrangecoalitionofwould-betyrantswhousedreligiontocloakambition

Afghanistanwasalwaysmoreastateofmindthananation.SincethetimeofAlexander theGreat, centuriesbefore thebirthofMohammed, thehigh,bleakdesertsoftheregioncreatedafertileblendingofculturesandafiercelywarlikepeople.Theonlyunitybetweenwarringtribesandclanscamewhentheybrieflyunitedinthefaceofanoutsidefoe.

TheTreatyofGulistanthatendedtheFirstRusso-PersianWar(1804–1813)precipitatedacentury-longstrategicstruggleforcontrolofthecrumblingPersianEmpireandtheindependentKhanatesofCentralAsia.ImperialRussiasoughttoextenditsboundariessouthtosecureacovetedwarm-waterport,whileBritainwas desperate to forestall any Russian influence in India. In 1838 Britaininvaded Afghanistan and installed a puppet ruler, but by January 1842 theBritishwere forced to retreatbyunrelenting resistance. In thewithdrawaloverthesnow-cloggedpasses,allbutoneBritonandaservantwerekilled; the twowereallowedtolivetocarrythenewsofthedisasterbacktoIndia.6

Britain again invaded Afghanistan in 1878, garrisoned strategic sites, andforced the Afghans to cede territory to British India (modern Pakistan). Anuprising in Kabul in September 1879 killed the British Embassy staff andguards,andpromptedanotherpunitiveexpedition.Britainsubduedtherebellion,forcedtherulerYaqubKhantoabdicate,andmadehiscousinEmir.YetanotherrevoltwasputdownbytheBritish,whowearilydecidedtoabandonAfghanistantolocalrule,butretainedcontrolofAfghanistan’sforeignpolicyinexchangeforamonetarysubsidy.

AlarmoverthegrowinginfluenceofGermanyinIraqfinallybroughtaboutthe1907Anglo-RussianConvention,whichleftAfghanistaninBritain’ssphereofinfluence,anddividedupmoribundPersia(Iran).

The1917BolshevikRevolutionushered in an era ofSoviet expansionism,andtheassassinationoftheAfghanrulerbroughthissonAmanullahtopower.Amanullah immediately and rashly declared war on British India; wary ofanother entanglement, Britain conceded to let Afghanistan handle its own

foreign policy. Amanullah played the British and Soviets against each other,trying to regain lost territory and establish a greater Pashtun tribal state.Amanullah also tried to modernize Afghanistan along the lines of Ataturk’ssecularTurkey,butinJanuary1929wasforcedtoabdicatebyafundamentalistMuslimrevolt.

Amanullah’s cousin, Mohammed Nadir Khan, crushed the revolt, andreignedasaconservativereformeruntilhetoowasassassinatedin1933.HissonMahammadZahirShahascendedthethroneandcontinuedmanyofthefather’sreforms under the tutelage of his uncle, Prime Minister Sardar MohammadHashimKhan.

The outbreak of World War II brought about another uneasy agreementbetweenBritainandtheSovietUnion,withAfghanistancoercedintoexpellingalargeGermanexpatriatecommunity.

AfterHashimKhan’s successorwas forced to resign,ZahirShah institutedconstitutionalreformswhichunfortunatelypavedthewayforextremistparties,notably theCommunistPeople’sDemocraticParty ofAfghanistan (PDPA). InJuly1973formerPrimeMinisterMohammadSardarDaoudKhanseizedpowerinamilitarycoupandabolishedthemonarchy,buthisattemptsatreformfailed.

InApril 1978 a PDPA coup overthrewMohammadDaoud,murdered himand his family, and established a Communist “People Democratic Republic.”The PDPA attempted liberalizing reforms, predictably resisted by religiousconservatives in thesmall townsandcountryside, leading toa simmeringcivilwar.

Withviolencespiralingoutofcontrol,Soviet troopsentered thecountry inDecember 1979. TheUS, operating in part through Pakistan’s Directorate forInter-Services Intelligence (ISI), backed a loose coalition of proxy resistancemovementsknownasthemujahadeen,leadingtotenyearsofbrutalwarfare.

Averyminorplayer in thestrugglewasOsamabinMohammedbinAwadbin Ladin, minor son of a prominent Saudi business family. The young binLadin’sfatherdivorcedhismother,andhewasraisedbyastepfather.Likemanyof the leaders of such movements, bin Ladin never completed his religiousstudies,insteaddevelopinghisownevenmoreextremeversionofWahhabi,anultra-conservativeandmilitantstrandofSunniIslam.BinLadinsoonbrokewiththeorthodoxMuslimmembersoftheresistancetofoundhisownmilitantgroup,al-Qaedah(“thebase”)withavisionofextendingjihadbeyondAfghanistanandagainsttheWestingeneral.

The exhausted Soviets staged a much-publicized withdrawal from

AfghanistaninFebruary1989,butcontinuedtosupportthebeleagueredcentralgovernment. When the USSR collapsed, the Afghan government followed inApril1992.Themanyresistancefactionsfelltowarringamongthemselves,andthe Taliban—a coalition of fundamentalist scholars and formermujahadeen—ultimatelyseizedcontrolofmostofthecountry.DissidentsweredrivennorthtotheTajikistanborder.BlockedbyTajikborderguards,refugeeswereslaughteredbyTalibanwhoconvenientlyignoredIslamicprohibitionsagainstharmingnon-combatants.TheTaliban imposeda repressive religiousdictatorshipovermostofthenation.OilmoneybegantoflowinincreasingtorrentstofoundWahhabimadrassas (religious schools) throughout south and central Asia. These“schools”recruitedstudentsfromamongthepoor,andmany—thoughnotall—taughtonlyextremistjihad.7

Withoutacentralgovernmentandwithnolawenforcement,remote,chaoticAfghanistan soon became a haven for various terrorist groups. Bin Ladin hadbeen targeted for capture or death by Presidents Bill Clinton and GeorgeW.Bush; he and his followers had been harried from Bosnia and the Sudan. Incollusion with the Taliban, al-Qaedah worked to consolidate its Afghanistanposition. A necessary step was elimination of the Northern Alliance, a tribal-basedresistancemovement that theTalibanhadforcedintoaremotecornerofthe countrybut nevermanaged to eliminate.On9September2001al-Qaedahassassins posing as journalists murdered the military leader of the NorthernAlliance,AhmedShahMassoud.

From their landlocked haven al-Qaedah orchestrated the September 11attacks on the United States. The US was resolved to make an immediateresponsetotheattacks,buttheproblemwashowtostrikeintothisremotestofregions.Utilizinghastily-established stagingbases inPakistanandUzbekistan,special operations units from the various services worked closely with theNorthernAlliance.

The first conventional forces into the country were the Marines of twoMEUs, transported by C-130s and heavy lift helicopters. Staging through theportofPasniinPakistan,thefirsttaskon1DecemberwastosecureandimproveObjective RHINO, a dirt airstrip that would serve as a stepping stone to theprimaryobjective—thebigairfieldatKandahar.8

Afterdaysofroutinepatrolling,thefirstactionfortheLAVsincludedinthetwoMEUs began in the early evening hours of 6 December when observersnotedTalibanfightersprobingtheperimeteratRHINO.Theensuingfightwasindecisive,butresultedinincreasedpatrollingbytheLAVs.

The primary mission was to intercept Taliban fighters fleeing southwardaheadoftherapidlyadvancingNorthernAllianceforces.Effortson4DecemberbymechanizedTaskForceSLEDGEHAMMER(3/6reinforcedbysevenLAVs,a CAAT team, and fourteen Humvees) to shift north crosscountry to helpheliborneforcesinterdictthemaineast-westHighway1westofKandaharwereslowedbydeepsandandroughterrainthatpushedfuelconsumptionthroughtheroof.AfterfordingtheshallowArghandabRiverthevehiclesbecameentangledinasmalltownsurroundedbypaddiesandirrigationditches.

TheonlyincidentcamewhenaerialobserversdetectedthreemenarmedwithAK-47s riding in a pickup truck. They crept through the darkness into thevillage,dismounted,andwalkedaroundacorneronlytocomeface-to-facewithanLAV-25onfullalert.Themenboltedonfoot,andaccordingtooneofficer,“Idon’t think they quit until they were four or five miles away.” Local guideseventuallydescribedapath through themazeof thevillage,and the taskforcemovedontoblockHighway1.

The task force arrived in darkness, but in time to intercept a column ofTalibanfleeingwestwardoutofKandaharinanassortmentofstolenvehicles.InarunningnightbattletheMarinesclaimed50Talibankilled,butlocalvillagerslaterclaimedtohaveburiedasmanyas150bodies.9

On7DecembertheTalibanabruptlysurrenderedthecityofKandahar,andby10DecemberMarinesarrivedbyairtosecuretheembassyinKabul,closedsince January 1989. On 14 December a Marine task force including theubiquitousLAVsseizedamorepracticalprize,thebigairportatKandahar.

Thecostof seizingAfghanistanhadbeencuriouslycheap for theMarines,marred primarily by accidents. The Marines—and the LAVs—settled into aroutineofpatrolling,maderiskynotonlybytheTalibanbutbytheordnanceofapast war scattered liberally about the countryside. On 16 December eightdismounted LAV crewmen were providing escort for a team of engineersclearing expended ordnance from a dirt road on the Kandahar airfield. OneMarine stepped on an ancient mine. Three men were wounded—the firstcasualtiesforanyMarinesoperatingwiththeLAVs.10

ThefightinginAfghanistanshiftedeast,intothemountainsofToraBora,inearly December. Marine ground forces were already being drawn down. Buttheywouldreturn.

NOTES

1MortensonandRelin,ThreeCupsofTea,p.257.2 The history of Somaliland is long and complex. For a good summary, see

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Somalia3Estes,MarinesUnderArmor,p.192–193;Mroczkowski,RestoringHope: InSomaliawith theUnifiedTaskForce1992–1993,p.175.;Estes,interviewwithMajorMikeCampbell,December2013

ThefollowingsectiononthetankdeploymenttoMogadishuis takenprimarilyfromthesesourcesunlessotherwisenoted.

4Turner,TankswiththeMEU:ATeamforSuccess,p.41.5Forexample,Turner,TankswiththeMEU:ATeamforSuccess,p.39.6 The Great Game has been the subject of numerous books, most recently Hopkirk, The Great Game:Struggle for Empire in Central Asia. For a simplified summary, seehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Great_Game

7Forexample,MortensonandRelin,ThreeCupsofTea,p.238–243.8 Knowlton, Troops Seize Airstrip Near Taliban Base : Lowrey, From The Sea—U.S. Marines InAfghanistan,2001–2002,p.59.

9Lowrey,FromTheSea,p.157–165.10Ibid,p.188–190.

CHAPTERFIVE

T

IntoIraq

Fivedaysorfivemonths,butitcertainlyisn’tgoingtolastlonger.—DonaldRumsfeld

Mybeliefiswewill,infact,begreetedasliberators….Ithinkitwillgorelativelyquickly,…weeksratherthanmonths.—DickCheney

YourMajesty!TheHundredYearsWarhasstarted!—PurportedlyalinefromanoldHollywoodfilm

HE 11 SEPTEMBER 2001 attacks on the United States demandedretaliation, and it was clear that the parties responsible wereoperatingfreelyinthefailedstateofAfghanistan.By27October

BrigadierGeneralJamesN.Mattis, theseniorofficeratMarineForcesCentralCommand—Forward (MARCent-Forward) in Bahrain, was already planningraids into Afghanistan. However force caps imposed by inter-service rivalrieslimited the participation of theMarine Corps to twoMEUSOCs in the initialincursionsintoAfghanistan.Thebruntofthefightingwouldbebornebyvariousspecial operations groups and by allied forces of the indigenous NorthernAlliance.1

Byearly2002theattentionof theBushadministrationhad,forgoodor ill,becomefixedupon theBaghdadregime.Thedissentamongthegeneralpublicas to whether Iraq should be attacked was mirrored—albeit invisibly to thepublic—by disagreement within the military. Secretary of Defense DonaldRumsfeld was a great advocate of “transformation” and the use of small,powerfulforces.Wishfulconceptsthatunderpinnedthedrumbeatforwarweretheassumptionsthat theinvadingAmericanswouldbewelcomedasliberators,andthatanIraqiopposition(presumablyhighlyvocalandpoliticallyconnectedexileswaitingintheWest)wouldimmediatelystepintogovernthecountry.Itwastobeaquickin-and-outcampaign.Amorerealisticassessmentbymilitaryplanners was that the regime would simply collapse over night, leaving adangerouspowervoidinwhichthesmallCoalitionforcewouldbeinadequatetopolicethecountry.IraqcoldeasilybecomeanotherAfghanistan.

Even relatively simple planning was continually thwarted by the shiftingpolitical situation. Itwasuncertainuntil the lastminutewhetherBritish forces

would participate. Turkey at first refused passage to British forces, andeventuallytoUSforces;theentireoperationwouldhavetobemountedthrougha narrow corridor from Kuwait. There were the usual concerns over airoperations: the Air Force was confident that Iraq could be bombed intosubmission,whiletheMarinesdidnotwanttogivecontroloftacticalairsupporttotheAirForce.TheAirForcewantedalongpreliminaryairassault,whiletheArmy and Marines wanted a short air campaign to retain some element ofsurprise. Given the need to maintain a Pacific-based force for contingenciesthere, the Marine Corps forces would be cobbled together from variousformations.

DanielBenzhadbeenanenlistedmanintheArmyNationalGuardwhileastudent,wascommissionedin1995,andservedinanumberofbilletsincludingtank company commander in LtCol Mike Oehl’s 2nd Tank Batalion; inSeptember2002heassumedcommandof theH&SCompany.Oneofhis firstprioritieswas toestablishaSecurityPlatoon.“AlotofMarinesgetanattitudelike, ‘If our supply trains get attacked, our Marines will automatically knowexactly what to do because every Marine a rifleman.’ In my mind, that isbullshit.Riflemandoesnotequal infantryman.”Sixtymenwere ledbyasparelieutenant and an NCOwith an infantryMOS. Unable to do convoy securityexercisesonacrowdedbase,theunitcouldonlydo“walk-throughs.”

SomeMarines were baffled by the AVLB bridge layers assigned to eachcompany, but “What you find, though, is Iraq is totally crisscrossed withirrigationcanals,soitwasagoodthingwehadthem.”2

InDecember2002,1stTankBattalionconductedanelaboratefieldexercise—STEEL KNIGHT 03—to test concepts for a tank-heavy task force. Pre-deployment commitments of the 3rd AAV Battalion precluded theirparticipation.“Thisdashed thebattalion’shopesofworkingwithCaptainMattWatt’s Lima Company of the 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines in a mechanizedenvironment. First Tanks, based on the enemy and potential missions,anticipatedattachingLima3/4toform1stTanksintoaTankHeavyTaskForceforcombatoperations.”ThebattalionwashoweverabletointegratetwoReserveplatoonsfrom4thTankthatwouldbackfillforplatoonsafloatwithMEUs.3

GunnerySergeantTimmieL.Legetthadjustbeenreassignedfrom1stTanktotheI&I(Inspector/Instructor)staffat4thTank,andfoundhimselfrightbackin his old unit. “Activating I&I staff members for combat, when possible,greases thewheels andmakes possible a seamless integration of the reserves.Within a few days of arriving, my reservists were full-fledged, contributing

tankers,mechanics, andcommunicationMarinesof1stTankBattalion.”SomeoftheReservists, though,wishedformoreformaltraining.CaptainMichaelL.Ferrell was a former infantry officer, now the Executive Officer of DeltaCompany,4thTankBattalion.HewasassignedasPlatoonLeader,3rdPlatoon,CharlieCompany,1stTankBattalion.Ferrellhadattendedonly thebriefTankCommander’s course, rather than the more extensive Armor Officer’s basiccourse.4

AfterDesertStormMikeMummeywassenttotheSecurityForcesatMareIslandNavyYard.“JustmyselfandtwootherMarinesonthewholeisland.Thatwasprettynice.”EventuallyhebecametheS-4(logistics)Chieffor1stTankandparticipated in theBRIGHTSTAR exercises in Egypt,where he learned howlavishArmylogisticswereincomparisontotheMarines.

WhentheMarinetankerscouldnotgetfuel,heencounteredalieutenanthehadtrainedatthejointArmy-MarineArmorOfficerBasicSchoolatFortKnox.“Hesaid‘Rememberme?IwasinAOBsuch-and-such.’

“Isaid‘Idon’trememberwhoyouare,butIrememberteachingAOB.’Hegoes ‘Well here, bring your trucks over here. We got fuel for you.’” Suchrelationshipswouldpayhandsomedividendsinthenearfuture.“Mademelooklike I knew what I was doing; I go back to the tanks with all this fuel.”Mummey, now the battalion’smost experienced tanker, coordinated exerciseswithsmalllogisticssupportandmedicalunitsattachedtothebattalion.5

InlateJanuarytheMarinescommencedthedauntingtaskofmovingaforcearound theworld,only tohave theircarefulplans thrownacurvewhenMajorGeneral (commander of the 1stMarineDivision) demanded to know fromhisstaff“…whyheseesmoreinfantryarriving,whenweneedtankersoverhere.”6

The available forces would determine the plan. Army formations, thoughtheywouldconstitute themajorpartofbothcombatand logisticscomponents,were more suited to battle on open terrain. Army armored and mechanizedinfantry divisions had far fewer dismounts—infantrymen who could root theenemyoutofurban terrain—thanaMarineCorpsdivisionofcomparablesize.The Marines, with their amphibious vehicles, were also better suited tobreachingwaterobstacles.

Theultimateplanwasacomplexhybrid.Theaircampaignwouldbebrief.The Marine Expeditionary Force—a Marine Air-Ground Task Force builtaround 1stMarineDivision—would secure the oil fields of southern Iraq andpreventanotherenvironmentalcatastropheliketheonein1992.TheMEFwouldadvanceup thedenselypopulatedTigris-EuphratesValleywith itsmanywater

obstacles and towns. It was felt that the attention of the Iraqi military wouldquicklybecomefixatedontheMEF.AsmallerMEBfrom2ndMarineDivision,Task Force SOUTH (soon renamed Task Force TARAWA), would follow tosecurelinesofcommunicationandneutralizeanyforcesbypassedbytheMEF.Britishforces—the1stUnitedKingdomDivision(Armoured)andRoyalMarinecommandosaddedatthelastminute—andaMarineMEUwouldsecuretheal-FawPeninsulaandtheportofUmmQasrbetweenKuwaitandBasra.Themaineffort would be by the Army’s V Corps, moving across the open deserts ofwestern Iraq. Hard to reach northern Iraq would be the domain of specialoperationsunits,withairmobileMarinesoncall tosecure theoil fieldsaroundKirkuk. Major formations would converge on Baghdad, but uncertaintyremainedaboutwhowouldclaimthatprize.7

Theentireplanrevolvedaroundthewidelymisunderstoodconceptof“shockandawe.”Thephrase,catchierthanthepreferredMarineCorps“combinedarmseffect,”doesnotimplytheindiscriminateuseofoverwhelmingviolence.Infact,the sort of overwhelming violence practiced in Desert Storm would becounterproductive to thenation-building thatmust inevitably follow,alienatingthe Iraqi peopleby inflictingmassive lossof life, and crippling reconstructionefforts by destroying infrastructure. Combined arms effect was instead thejudicioususeofpsychologicallyparalyzing force.Theconcept, a sortof “newblitzkrieg,”wastoutilizebettercommunicationsandsuperiormobility,multiplelines of operations simultaneous with parallel attacks, to keep the enemy offbalance,presentinghimwithatorrentofirresolvabledilemmas.8

For theMarines a first prioritywas to seize thebigpumping station at al-Zubayr.Acadreof experts from theBritishMilitaryWorksForce (theBritishcompanyBPhadbuiltthefacility)wouldbeattachedto7thMarines.Itwouldbeasortofhostagerescuemission:oneill-placedroundcoulddobillionsofdollarsineconomicdamage,andproduceanotherenvironmentaldisaster.

Until the final moments, uncertainty reigned. The Coalition possessedunparalleledintelligenceastoIraqiequipmentandcapabilities.Whatremainedunknownwereintentions.WouldtheIraqisfight?Wouldtheyemploychemicalweapons? Did they even have a coordinated defensive plan?9 There was stillconcern over Coalition proficiency and towhat extent recent experiences hadactuallybeenabsorbed.DespiterecentexperienceinSomaliaandKosovo,mostMarineinfantryhadnopracticalexperienceortraininginworkingwithtanks.10

Over a period of weeks Marine Corps assets and personnel flowed in:amphibious task forces and chartered airliners from the United States, MPS

vesselsfromDiegoGarciaintheIndianOcean,andferriedaircraft.Experiencedtankerssuspectedthatsparepartswouldasusualprovetobea

limitingfactor.CaptainDaveBanningwasagraduateofROTC,andcommanderofAlphaCompany,1stTank.“Beforewedeployed,mymaintenancechief,whowasanoldcrustymastersergeantwho’dneverspentadayintheMarineCorpsawayfromatank,wasgoingtosquirrel-holealotofparts.Hewasn’tshyaboutit.Hekepteverythingoutintheopen.Hedidn’ttrytohideanythinglikealotofthe guys would. He laid them right out there and if it contradicted aMarineCorpsorder,hewouldask, ‘Doyouwant the tanks to runordoyouwant theordertobefollowed?’Initiallyweweretoldnottotakeanypartsbecausewe’dgeteverythingweneededin theater.Yeah,right.Thenwegotwordin the lastweekbeforeweleftthatweneededtobringeverythingwegot.SowetookourownM88andacoupleHumvees.Hejammedeveryparthecouldgethishandson into those vehicles and had them organized. Everything was verymeticulously labeled. When we were detached from our parent battalion, theonlythingthatsaveduswerethepartshehadsquirrel-holedaway.”11

Personnelwould be drawn fromboth the active duty andReserves,mixedwithin the same units as empty billetswere filled at the lastminute. In somecases personnel would join their units within days of the beginning of thecampaign. A Reserve unit—Major Bill Peeples’s Alpha Company, 8th TankBattalion—wasalltootypical.Peepleswascommissionedin1991;originallyinlogistics and maintenance, he left active duty in 1994. He did not become atankeruntil1998,andatankcompanycommanderin2000.

Roger Huddleston enlisted in 1977 and was an artilleryman, then was aTOW gunner in an Oklahoma Reserve unit and water treatment operator incivilian life. All his TOW sections were activated separately, and he wastransferredintoAlpha,8thTankatthelastminute.ThecompanyFirstSergeantbillethadbeenemptyforeightmonths.Peepleshad talked toHuddlestononlyonceonthetelephone,anddidnotmeethimuntiltheunitwasactivated.12

OrderedtoreporttotheirhomefacilityatFortKnox,Kentuckyon9January,thetankersdrovethroughthenighttoreporttoCampLejeuneNorthCarolinaat0700on11January.Manycriticalbillets,fromplatoonleaders tomaintenancepersonnel,remainedunfilled.

Atmanylevelstheplanningandpreparationswerefarfromsmooth.AlphaCompanyandtheTOWunitweretobeintegratedintoTaskForceTARAWA,thecobbled-together2ndMarineExpeditionaryBrigade.

OnthelongoceanvoyageAlphaCompanywassplitamongfourships,USS

Ashland (LSD-48),USSGunstonHall (LSD-44j,andUSSPortland (LSD-37),andtheUSSPonce(LPD-15).13Insomewaystheshipswereasdecrepitasthetanks;Portland’s propulsion system failed inmid-Atlantic, delaying its arrivalfordays.14

The company had left its own meticulously maintained M1A1 tanks inKentucky, and took over vehicles culled and left behind by the 2nd TankBattalionatCampLejeune.Onceaboardshipthecompanyfoundthatthetankswerewornandbeatenup;accordingtotheunitrecords,tenofthefourteenweredeadlined (inoperable). Peeples and his XO, Captain Scott Dyer, felt that theregularswhowereoverseeingthepreparationsforwarregardedtheReservistsaswhinersandcomplainers.15

MaintenancechiefSSgtCharlieCookeandhismenfoundtanksmissingkeycomponents, and cannibalized some to keep other vehicles in operation. OneReservist—LCpl Randy Whidden, a civilian electrician from Florida—was alast-minute addition to the unit who would prove invaluable. The ExternalAuxiliaryPowerUnits (EAPUs) inparticularwere inappallingshape.16Bulkygenerators mounted on the back of the turret behind the tank commander’sposition,theEAPUprovidespowertooperatecriticalsystemssuchasradiosandthermal gun sights without either consuming excessive fuel or draining thetank’sbatteries.

Despite their own problems the Navy came through again, manufacturingcriticalpartsintheship’smachineshops.“WespentalotofthetripoverwithalltheMarinesinthewelldeck,tryingtogetanideaaboutallthetanks.Wewerealittlenervousofcoursebecausewehadn’tseenthetanks.NoneofmyMarineshad been on them, seen them, or done anything with them.Wewere able tofabricatealotofpartsontheshipsthemselves,andfixthemupsomewhat.”

Huddleston was particularly impressed by the crew of theUSS Ashland:“Thecommanderthere,IbelieveitwasCommanderHoward,theship’sCaptain,theywasallfortheMarines.AnythingtheChiefscoulddoforusintheirshops,they did.” Upon arrival in Kuwait the company had fourteen mobile M1A1tanks.Withoutspecializedparts therepairswere limited,andmanytankswerestillnotfullyfunctionalwhentheshipdockedinKuwait.

TheKuwaitdocksweresocrowdedthateverythingwentashorebyLCAC,butonceashore theywereable toscroungecriticalparts fromotherArmyandMarinebattalions,andHuddleston“…couldhearthem(M)eighty-eightsgoingallnightlong.They’reworkingthroughthenightandthenduringtheday.”17

Early January of 2003 found Mike Mummey back in Kuwait, preparingvehicles from the MPS ships and the most critical Fly-In Equipment (FIE).Inexplicably, all the essential refueling trucks were missing; they eventuallyarrivedaftergearshippedmuchlater.18

Regular units like 1st Tank were better prepared than 8th Tank’sorganizationalorphans,butMummeyadmittedthat“Theonlyparts[things]thatsavedus,Ed,wasourmechanics—beforeweleft—theydidtherightthing.Theywerekeepingunofficialpartsonhand,and theyembarked themover there.Sowewerelivingoffthestuffweweren’tsupposedtohave.AndoffthestuffwecouldscroungefromtheArmy.”

SamCrabtree,nowaReserveStaffSergeantandseniorturretmechanic,hadgoneonactivedutyasanI&Istaffer,andwasactivatedtobackfilloneofH&SCompany,1stTank’semptybillets.Hearrivedtofindtanksalreadyashoreinastaging area. This time around, “We knew a couple ofmonths in advanceweweregoingtogetactivatedandgoto1stTanks.”

TheArmy’swell-stockeddepotsinKuwaitwereagodsendtotheMarines.Mummey went to the Army facility at Camp Doha: “They got civiliancontractors and Pakistani laborers in there working on these tanks for thatequipmentpoolthattheArmyhad.

“IgointhereandIsay‘Hey,myname’sMikeandI’mintheMarines,andblah,blah,blah.Ineedatwobreechoperatinghandles,Ineedafiringprobe—firecontrolstuff.They’relike‘Noproblem.HeyHabi,goopenupthelockerforthisman.Givehimwhateverhewants.’

“ThePakistanilaborer,heopensupthewalllockerandIjuststartgrabbingstuffIneed!”

Therewasnoaccounting.“Hesays‘No,man.Wegotstuffcomingoutourearsdownhere.Don’tworryaboutit.’”

This was in sharp contrast to the Marines, since “We couldn’t even getengineer stakes at first to set up [barbed] wire.We had to go down there toCampDohaandgetitfromtheArmy.”

Evenso,someotherunitswereenvious.DanielBenzrecalledthat“1stTankBattalion,theystartedoutwith66tanks.Normallythenumberis58.Somehowtheir S4 was slick enough to get them an extra eight tanks. Good for them,becausethingsbreak.”19

Like Task Force TARAWA, 1st Marine Division’s heavy armored punchwouldbeorganizedastwomechanizedtaskforces.TaskForceTANK(callsignTIGER)wasbuiltaroundCharlieandDeltatankcompanies,L/3/4infantry,with

Scout and TOW platoons in Humvees, and support units. A similar infantry-heavytaskforcewasbuiltaroundBravoCompanytanks,andthebulkof3/4’sinfantry.20

CaptainSethFolsom,theCOofDeltaCompany,1stLARhadjustreturnedfrom a lengthy Pacific deployment with an MEU, and believed that thefragmentationofthebattalion,withatleastonecompanyalwaysaway,harmedunit cohesion. In fact, thebattalionwouldgo towarwithoutAlphaCompany,already committed to an MEU deployment. Further, three companies (H&S,Weapons, andCharlie)would go by slow sea transport across the Pacific andIndianOceans,whileDeltaCompanywould fly toKuwaitandutilizevehiclesstoredaboardMPSships.ThirdLARwassimilarlyfragmented;BCompanywasonOkinawa,soB/4thLARwouldbeattachedandre-designatedECompany.

Thegrueling schedulewasbrutal on families.Folsomwouldbehome lessthanthreeweeksbeforeleavingagainforwar.21

Both active duty and Reserve Marines had to suffer through a batteringwhirlwind of last-minute minutiae: immunizations, replacing missing ordamaged 782 gear, naming insurance beneficiaries, drawing upwills, and theinevitablelast-minutemarriages.

Delays, confusion, and shortages still reigned after arrival in Kuwait. ForMikeMummey,“Theonlythingwedidn’thave—andit’sadamnshame—wastheparts….Wedidn’thavesparepartsforanything.

“AlotofstuffthatweshouldhavelearnedinDesertStorm,wedidn’tlearnforIraqiFreedom.Luckily,becauseofbeingatschoolswithArmyguys, therewere soldiers that I knew… . I could go find them, and theywere like ‘Here,Top, take this, take that.’You’dfillup the truckwithhydraulic fluid,or turboshafts,orgetanO-ringsetforthegunner’sfirecontrolhandles—whateverstuffyouneeded.Andthemechanicsweredoingthesamething.WewouldgodowntoKuwaitCitytotheArmybasethereandjustgointhereandbegandscroungeallwecould.”

Even basic functions like boresighting the main guns were limited byammunitionshortages—tworoundseachofsabotandthenewMPAT.

Yetdespitealltheproblems,Mummeyandmanyothersfeltthatthesituationwas vastly improved over the Desert Shield buildup, since “There was moreexperiencedpeople.JustlikeDiggssaid,‘Therewasn’tnobodyhaddonethedo’before;knewwhattoexpect.Thistimeweallknew.”

Peeples’s company from 8th Tank had at last put all fourteen tanks intorunningcondition,thoughfivestillhadnon-functionalfire-controlsystems,and

correctboresightcouldonlybeconfirmedfor ten.22LikemostunitsAlpha/8thTankhadtowaituntilheavytransporttrucksbecameavailableforthelongtripto the forward staging area. The Reservists whiled away the time begging,borrowing,andsometimesliterallystealingmorepartsinafinalattempttobringthe tanks to full operational condition. New personnel also continued to beintegrated.MajorScotHawkinswasaddedasaForwardAirController (FAC)andCaptainRomeoCubaswas brought in as PlatoonLeader for 3rd Platoon.This arrangement gave each company of the task force an artillery ForwardObserver(FO),butB/1/2wastheonlyelementwithoutaFAC,anarrangementthatwouldinadvertentlyleadtodisaster.

Peeples’ssignalsuccesswasinarguingtoorganizehistanksasasingleunitwith attached infantry within 1/2, rather than diluting the unit’s power byattachingaplatoonoftankstoeachinfantrybattalion.Thetankswereorganizedinto Team Tank (seven tanks plus a rifle platoon from B/1/2) and B/1/2 wasdesignatedTeamMech(fourtanks,plusthebalanceofB/1/2).All1/2infantrywasmountedinAAVsthatwouldhavetoserveaspersonnelcarriers;someofthe regiment’s remaining infantrywould ride in trucks, sandbagged toprovideminimalprotectionagainstminesandRPGs.23

UnitslikeFolsom’sLARcompanymighthavemadethetripinstyleaboardcharteredairliners,buttheyfacedproblemsthatwouldhaveseemedfamiliartoarmoredcrewmenofanypreviouswar.Unitswerereorganized,vehiclesstoredaboardshipshad tobeextensively refurbished, therewerenospareparts,newand complex gear like theMarine Data Automatic Communications Terminal(MDACT, a computerized battlefield mapping and display system) had to beinstalled and tested.A final indignitywas that after 18February the companyhad to share itsLAVswith thenewlyarrivedA/4thLAR,aReservecompanywithnovehicles.24

Withengineersstruggling tosupply thebasics, the troopswere left toshiftforthemselvesinmanyways,andmail-orderwasanewboon.DanielBenz:“…yougetoneofthosesolarshowers,andenoughpeoplebroughtthoseandwaterwasneveraproblem.Allthebottledwateryoucoulddrink.Theyalsohadwaterbuffaloesthatweretotallypotable,soweneverhadashortageofshowers.Weusedsomecratesandwhatnottomakeourown.”25

BillHayesenlistedinJuly2001.Allhisrecruiter’s infantryslotswerefull,so the recruiterunilaterally switchedhimover to tanks. “I alwayshadabitofwanderlust.I’mfromGeorgiaandeveryoneIknewwasgoingtoTheUniversityofGeorgia;itseemedboring.Ididn’treallyknowwhatIwantedtogotoschool

for….Ithoughtitmightbekindoffuntotravelanddoexcitingstuff.Igottodotheexcitingstuff.Didn’treallygettotravel.WenttoIraqafewtimes.Itwasalotmoreexcitingthangoingtoschool.”Hejoined2ndTankinMarch2002.“Eventhentherewasalotofcynicismaboutwhetherwewereevergoingtodoanything.”

Juniorofficerswereinnobetterposition.DanHugheshadintendedtojointhe Air Force straight out of high school, but the recruiter did not work onweekends.TheMarinerecruiterstruckupaconversation,and“…nextthingyouknowtheMarineCorpssoundsawholelotbetter.”In1995hisCOsuggestedhesign up for a program that offered enlistedMarines the opportunity to attendcollegeandbecommissionedasofficers.Atthirtyyearsold,andaformerLAVcrewman“…walkingdidn’t seem likeawhole lotof funanymore… .” sohewent into tanks.Uponarrival in2ndTankhefoundpreparationsunderwayfordeploymenttoIraq,butwasfortunatetohaveahighlevelofexperienceamonghismen.

As loader in Sgt Erickson’s tank, LCpl Bill Hayes was completely in thedark.“Theleadershipwaslike‘Oh,wemightbedoingsomething,guys!Ican’tsaywhatIknow,butwemightbedoingsomething.That’sallweheardforlikea month… . Then finally they’re acting all weird, then ‘Okay, guys, we gotorders todeploy.’Wekindagrabbedallourgear stuff andgotonaplaneandflewovertheretoKuwait.”

Arriving by aircraft before their tanks, “We just slept out in the Kuwaitidesertforafewweeks.Nothingtodo,novehicles.Veryprimitiveconditions.”Then“It’sbacktotheguessinggameagain.”

WhenthetanksdidarrivefromMPSships,DanHughesnotedthat“someofthemworkedprettygood,someofthemcouldn’tevenfireup.”

Gear continued to arrive until the last minute. Peeples: “Stuff seems toappearoutofnowhere….Allofasuddenstufflikemineplows,andairpanelsandall thoseother thingsjustseemtoappearoutofnowhere.Nothingthatwereallyaskedfor,stuffthathasjustcome.”

SomegearlikeBlueForceTrackerwasnotscheduledtobefieldedforyears,andtherewerenoinstallationinstructions.”InamanualtherewasapictureofaBlue Force Tracker in an M1A1, but the gear that we had gotten was notinstalledinthetank;itwasinstalledinthebustlerack….ItwillbeuseabletotrackmyXO’stankaroundthebattlefield….”buttheequipmentwouldbeofnousetothetankerssittinginabaginthebustlerack.Othergearwascobbledintothetanksthroughtheeffortsofcommunicationspecialists.

While the press and diplomats fulminated, themilitary planners knew thatwar was inevitable. As in August 1914, once commenced it was virtuallyimpossible to stuff thedjinback into thebottle.From15until19Marchunitsbegan to move into forward positions, and engineers were busy creatingpreliminarybreachesintheIraqiborderdefenses—ananti-tankditch,aten-foothighearthenberm,andanelectrifiedfence.A-Dayairattackswouldcommenceat2100hourson19March,withG-Daygroundattackson21March.26

ForMarineson theground, the first indication thatplanswereagaingoingawrycamewiththeimpactofaSCUDmissilenearCampCommandoinKuwaitat1045hourson20March.27

A series of chemical attack alerts followed.During one such alert Folsommadeanerrorofjudgment:heforgottospitouthischawoftobacco,andfacedanagonizingdecision.Unmask and risk chemical death?Swallow the tobaccojuiceandfacecertainsickness?Hefinallydecidedtospitintothemask,nearlydrowning in the process.With noway to verify that no chemical agentswerepresent,theMarinesfellbackonamethoddatingbacktoWorldWarI.Afewjuniormenwereorderedtounmask;iftheysurvived,theallclearwasgiven.28ThefrequentalertsexhaustedtheMarinesastheydonnedanddoffedthebulkysuitsandstiflingmasks.Manyceasedtotakethewarningsseriously.

Again,theplanchanged.Evenbeforetheassaultbegan,theinfamous“fogofwar”setin.At1845RIPPERCPinformed1stTankthattheRepublicanGuards’Medina Division with 180 T-72 tanks might have moved into position alongHighway 8. Battalion plannersworked frantically through the night to realignforces. 1/7 and 3/7 would hold at the Line of Departure, while Alpha Tanks(reassignedfrom3/7to3/4)wouldbreachtheborder,thenturnrighttotakeanysuchenemyconcentrationintheflank.29CouldtheMarinescommenceanattackon four hours notice? At 2127hours theMEF transmitted the order to invadeIraq.

BillHayeswasonnightguarddutywhenthebattalionMasterGunnercamelooking for the CO. “I knew right there something’s going down… . It wasliterallywithinanhourtheygoAlright,wakeeverybodyup.Let’sgo!”Wegotallthetanksreadytogoandgot’eminabigline.”

Attached toBLADE(3/7),CaptainDaveBanning, theAlphaCompany1stTankCO,“…hadjustleftthebattalioncommandpostwhereIhadreceivedthefinaloporderformoving.Igotbacktomycompanyassemblyareaandreceivedwordtosendmytanksuptothebermtoprovidesecurity.IhoppedonthetankandIsawmyTOWplatoontakeaprettygoodincomingbarrage.Ipulledthem

backbehind theKuwaiti sideof thebermandwedroveour tanksup there asquickly aswe could.”With no advancewarning, the companywas to providesecurityforbreachingoperationsbyKuwaitiengineers.30

Banningwastoldthat“…theywouldlikeasecurityblankettocoverthem.Weparked a platoonof tanks up on the observation berms.My companyXOandIwentupthereaswellrightasthesunwasgoingdownonthe20th.Therewasnothingwecouldreallydoforthemotherthanmoralsupport….”

In the rush there had been no time to put thermal viewers on, soBanningtook the opportunity to pass his viewer down to the driver, an operation thatnecessitated turningthe turret to therear,andelevatingthemaingunso that itwasnotpointedatfriendlytroops.

“Igotontheintercomtofindoutwhatwastakingmydriversolong,Iwasjustgettingbackupintheturretandthetankrocks.Iimmediatelylookedatmygunnerandaskedhimwhatthehellhewasshootingat.Itfeltlikethegunhadrecoiled.Ilookeddownandhesaiditwasn’thim.Ilookedaroundtheturretandeverythinglookednormalexceptthatmyloaderwasdowntherewithhisheadinhishands.IlookedoutonthebackdeckandIsawthatitwasonfire.Theone-in-a-million Iraqimortar shotgot lucky, I initially thought, andputone inourbackdeck.ThenIsawtheamountoffire,realizedthatitwasn’tamortarroundandtoldthecrewtoevacuatethetank.”

Sprintingfortherelativesafetyofsomeengineervehicles150meterstothefront,Banningcouldnotfindhisdriver.Hereturnedtotheburningtank,butthedriver’s“hole”wasempty.RunningbacktotheHumvee,helocatedthedriverand found a hectic scene: the engineer officer was screaming into the radio.Banningtooktheradio,“turnedittomycompanytacticalcommandpost(TAC)and told everyone that I was all right. Everyone was fine and no one wasseriouslyinjured.ItoldthemIwantedtheplatoonsergeant’stankof3rdPlatoontobereadytoexecutethebumpplan.Inthemeantime,Iwastalkingtobattalionandtherewassomeconfusionaboutwhethertheairwingknewweweredownthereandwhethertheythoughtwemightbeinanactivekillbox.WepulledallthetanksbackbehindtheKuwaitibermandItoldmymaintenancechieftogetreadytogorecoverthetank.”Hefoundthathisloader,alsotheartilleryforwardobserver,hadbeenslightlywoundedinoneeyebytheblast,butwasfitforduty.

AtthebattalionCP“WefoundoutthatwhathitmytankwasaHellfirefroma Cobra.We could hear the helicopters when they arrived on station andmyFACdidn’thavethetacticalairdirection(TAD)nets.FromwhatIunderstand,hehadbeen toldbybattalion that sincehewasn’tcontrolling theairhedidn’t

needtheTADnets,basicallystiff-armedhim.”Banningmadesurethekillboxwasturnedoff.“Weweretoldwehadabout

anhourwindowtotryandgorecoverthetank.Sowewentbackupandgotwithmymaintenancechief.Wetook3rdTankPlatoon,myrecoveryvehicleandtheJavelinplatoonandwewentbackup,establishedahastyperimeteraroundthetankandpushedtheJavelinsoutfarenoughsowe’dhavesomeearlywarningifanythingwasgoingtohappen.WegottheM88upthere,hookedupthetankandended up pulling it in a circle. One of the tracks was completely locked andwouldn’tturn.Atthispoint,weweregettingclosetoourhourtimelimitthatwehadbeforewehadtogetoutofthere.Thesoundofgunfirewasincreasingbutwe still weren’t taking any effective fire. We hopped on the tank, it wasn’tburninganymore, tookoffourhelmets,gasmasksandourweapons. Igotmyartilleryobserver’sradioandbinocularsandweleftit.Wewentbackandtaskedmy TOW platoon to maintain visibility on the tank. I didn’t want them tophysicallyoccupyitbutIalsodidn’twanttheIraqistobeabletogetdownthere,startcelebratingonitandturnitintosomesortofpropagandatypething.”

Toaddtotheconfusion,“…weweretoldthattheschemeofmaneuverhadchanged. Intel had reported that theMedinaDivision under the cover of a bigsandstorm had been able to move their tanks down around Safwan. Now wewere facingadivision-sizeelementofT-72s. I remember thinking, ‘Holyshit.Maybe these guys did learn something over the last 10 years.’” Now “…everythingwehadrehearsed—goingthroughSafwanandreducingtheobstaclesat the border crossing—was all out thewindow” and the task force had to bereorganizedonthefly.“Ileftmytankretrieverandtwoofmytankswithmineplows attached to 3/7. Everybody else ended up being attached back to 1stTanks. This was a huge emotional event. I had to pullmy tank platoon backfrom the infantry company that he was cross-attached to, give my infantryplatoonback,myTOWsbackandmyJavelinsback.Itwasahugehassle.”TheinjuredFOwenttotheXO’stank,andBanninggrabbedasparetankcrewmanasloader.

While Banning made another trip to battalion, refueling went ahead ofschedule,“SowhenIcamebackoutmycompanywasgone.Iwassittingtherein the desert with sand blowing all around me wondering where the hell mycompanywas. I looked around, got on the radio and got linked back upwiththem.I’mwritingout theoperationsorderandat thispoint itwasabout0200.Weweresupposedtomoveoutatfirstlight.Iremembersittingthereinmytankcommander’s hatch scribbling and the next thing I remember is my XO

knocking on the hatch asking me if I was okay. He was a lifesaver.We goteverybodyspunup,got thecompanystartedandwewere just followingalongbehindDeltaCompanylikeducksinarow.”

In Task Force TANK’s sector the Scout and TOWPlatoonsmoved up toprotectthebreachingoperation,butfoundtotheirsurprisethatthatbreachwasto be conducted by local civilian bulldozers. Sporadic Iraqi fire caused atemporarysuspension,butneverdeterredacrowdofcivilianswhogathered togawk. After repeated warnings by the Civil Affairs team, they were finallydispersedbynon-lethalfire.31

At other locations engineers began their own complex breaching drill, butfound the mines and defenses far less formidable than those encountered inDesert Storm. Reconnaissance units mounted in Fast Attack Vehicles movedahead to scout paths.The plan had changed at the lastmoment, and themainforcemovedthroughaheadoftheLARscreeningforce.TryingtostayoutofthepathofRCT-5andtheattached2ndTankBattalion,SethFolsommarveledatthesight as “score upon score” of infra-red beacons as the dark shapes ofM1A1tanks and AAVs thundered through the positions they had occupied onlyminutes before. First LAR’s movement was repeatedly delayed, and the mensleptunderaconstantroarofoutgoingartilleryandrocketfire.32

At2042thefirstMarinetankcrossedthebermintoIraq.33Bill Hayes’s B Co/2nd Tank was attached to 1/5, which exchanged an

infantrycompanytoformtwotaskforces.Whentheymovedout,“Itwasreallydark,andeveryonehadtheirIRlightsoneverything.”

Arrivingatthebreach,“TherewasjustlikeabreachlinerightoutofaCAXexercise.Theyhadgone in therewithbulldozers,and theyhadmarked itwithchemicalsticksoneachsidesoyouknewwheretherightsideandtheleftsideofthe road were… . You just drove across and you could see the internationalborder…wheretheIraqishadtheirhugetankditch.Itwashuge,anditdidn’treallydomuchtostopanyone.”

Hughes’CCompany,2ndTankwasassignedablockingpositionwestoftheRumallahoilfield,sotheinitialstagesoftheentryintoIraqwereanti-climactic.Thecompanyhadonetankdamagedbyaleftoverminefromtheearlierwar.

At 0900 on 21March 1stLAR at lastmoved through the breach and intoIraq. Among the units was a company-sized unit of LAV-AD air defensevehiclesunderMajorWilliamW.Johnson.Withlittleairthreatanticipated,thecompanycarriednoStingermissiles,onlyits25mmGatlingcannons.Thethreeplatoons,parceledoutamongthe1stMarineDivision’sRCTs,weredestinedto

seelittleaction,andtheLAV-ADwaslaterretiredfromtheMarineinventory.34ThereportofthemassiveforceofT-72sprovedtobearumor,andtherewas

only sporadic contact.Banning: “DeltaCompany ended up shooting someoldrustedT-55 somewhere aswewere going through.CharlieCompany engagedsomedug-intanksalongRouteTampaasDeltaCompanycameonlinetotheirsouth. When we came on line to Delta’s right (southern) flank along RouteTampa, itwas a nice, clear sunnyday andwedidn’t see theMedinaDivisionanywhere. Regiment decided that everyone would reattach in their previouslydesignated taskorganizationandcontinue theattackaspreviouslyplanned.Sonow, mid-stride, we are detaching from our battalion, reattaching to anotherbattalionand reintegratingallofourattachments thatwehadpreviouslywhilewewereonthemoveandpotentiallyincontact.Itwasprettychaotic.”35

Seizureof theAz-Zubayrpumping station, causeof somuchanguish,wasrelatively uneventful. Banning’s tanks “… ended up passing south of thepumping station andmeandering throughall these fields— tanks andamtracscrashingoverthesegiganticberms.Itwasarealratsinamazetypething.Iwastrackingthecompany’sprogressbetweenthemilitaryprecisionlightweightGPSreceiver(PLGR)andmyphotomapoftheAzZubayr.Ourroutewastracedoutin pretty explicit detailwherewewere going.Aswewere going up the roadtowardsthepumpingstation,myleadplatooncommander’stankallofasudden,the turret swings over, the gunmaxdepresses and fires, and destroys an Iraqitankabout20metersofftheroad.Thethingwasdugin.Youcouldn’tevenseeit.Theentiretankwasbelowgroundlevel.Youwouldhavehadtostepdowntosteponthetopofitsturret.Thetankrightbehindhimtraversesoverandwhacksoneon theothersideof theroad. I look tomyleftandtherewasanother tankabout 20 meters away. I didn’t shoot it because, at this point, the geometrywouldhavehadmeshootingstraightacrossourboundary into the flankof1stTanks.Given the friendly fire incident, Iwas very sensitive to angles of fire,geometriesof fireand theeffectsofweaponssystemspast theboundaries.MyXO,though,rightbehindmeendsuppoppingit.Sothere’sthistankcookingoffright next to me and two tanks cooking off in the front. The battalioncommanderwas on the radio screaming at us to hurry up.My concern at thispointwasthatwecoulddrivepastthesetanks,leavethemanditwouldn’tbotherusatall,buttheseT-55swouldteartheamtracsup.SoIjustdidn’tlistentotheradio, toldmyunit todoadetailedsearchand tomakesure therewasnothingelseouttherethatwasgoingtowhackthem.Ittookabout10minutesbutitfeltlikeaneternity.”36

Inthecaptureofum-QasrthetanksandinfantryquicklydevelopedadrillforattackingsturdymasonrybuildingsusingthenewMPATrounds.MajorBenT.Watson:

“Afewtimeswejusthadthetanksrunoverafewmachine-gunnestsandjustcross-steercrushingtheguysbeneaththem.ThenewMPATround,replaced the HEAT, is great for urban combat.We normally have thetankscreatebreachesforourasssaultcompaniestoenterbuildings.1or2MPATs will create a hole big enough that you can drive an IFAVthrough.WehavealsoconductedthenowpatentedTank/MSPFhardhitassault.IamsuretheguysatSOTGwouldbecryingbecausewebrokeall the rules.Wehad to takedown theBa’athpartyHQ inUmmQasr.Wediditwiththetankplatoon,forcerecon,andthetrailerplatoon.Weleadwith tanks, the four tanksgoton lineandblewthecrapoutof thebuilding with their main gun using MPAT and created two breaches.Once the trailers dismounted and moved abreast of the tanks theyswitched to 7.62 and .50cal hosing down the house.When the trailerswerereadytomoveforwardweshutthetanksoffandthetrailerssecuredthe perimeter of the house. Tanks were then again pushed forward. Asectioncoveringeachincomingroad.Theforceplatoonwentinsideandfinishedtheclearingoperation.ThebiggesttakeawaywasthetanksworkgreatinMOUT.”37

Atmid-dayA/8thTank took its turn tomove through theirassignedgap—without one tank (SSgt Jeffrey Filipowski’s)—that had broken down. Theinevitabledelaysinpushinganentiredivisionthroughthenarrowbreachesledtosuccessivedelaysasunitsweretoldtoholdinplace.

Withinelevenhourstheleadelement,the5thMarinesRCT,hadseizedmostofitsobjectives.TheIraqi51stMechanizedDivisionhadsimplyevaporated,andeven sabotage was minor. The first forces cleared the road north, and C/1/7passedthroughandsuccessfullyseizedtheal-Jubaylpumpingstation.

Theoverallplancalledforsomeunitstoscreenorholdinplace.ThirdLARwould feint, thenwithdrawandTeamMECHwithBanning’sAlpha,1stTankwas to occupy a large military compound and secure the road toward Basra.Afterseizingtheunoccupiedcompound,Banningwasconcernedaboutanopenflankandunsecuredareastohisrear.Buttheenemywasevenmoreconfused.

“About the timewestart taking fire from the rear, thedismounted infantry

platoonstartedreturningfireandwastryingtofigureoutwhereinthehellitwascomingfrom.IlookedatthemapagainbecauseIwasveryconcernedaboutthedirectionof fire. I didn’twant to shoot into friendly forces.My loader,LanceCorporalChambers,elbowsmeandsays,‘Sir,Ididn’tknowtheArmywasuphere.’Therewerethreeorfourtruckscominguptheroadandtwoofthemaretowing 57 millimeter anti-aircraft cannons. As I looked at these trucks, theylookedthesameasthoseflat-nosedArmytrucksbutinadifferentcolor.Iwassitting there thinking that theArmywasn’tsupposed tobehereanddidImisssomething in theplan. Idid themental run through tomakesure theyweren’tArmytrucks.Theyweren’tandsoIgavethefirecommandtomycompany;andassoonasIsaidfire,myfirstplatooncommanderhadasabotroundofflikeashot.Youcouldseeitstreakdownrangeandithittheleadtruckrightinthecab.Youseethesparkandalittlebitofsmoke.Alltheothertrucksbehindhimweregoingcrazy.Allmyothertanksopenedupnow,andinabout10secondsallthetrucksaresmokingruins.”

Iraqi soldiers spilled out of the trucks to shelter in bunkers, someoccasionally emerging to try and bring their cannon into action, “… and theywouldgetwhacked too.About this time, thebattalioncommander showedup.Myfirstsergeantwasputtingthecollarontheinfantryplatoonandtellingthemtobackoff.”Without adequate infantry, and facedwithanaggressive infantryofficer, Banning’smind kept going back to “… that book,WeWere SoldiersOnceandYoung,wherethatlieutenantchargesoffandgetshisplatooncutoff.Thatwasoneofmyoverridingconcerns.Ididn’twanttodriveupthereandgetembroiledinsomethingthatthebattalionwasgoingtohavetofigureouthowtogetmeoutof.”Afteramechanizedinfantrycompanyarrived,theMarinesseizedthe building complex without incident, and then sat through an on-again-off-againseriesofalertsaboutenemycounterattacks.“WewaitedfortheBrits,the7thArmoredDivision.Theywere coming in to do a relief in place (RIP).Assoonas thedangerofanykindofattackacross thecanalvanished,wedid thechangeover, we pulled back, refueled again and then got ready for the roadmarchuptothenextassemblyarea.Thatwasourfirstday.38

Thirtykilometerstotherear,TaskForce3/4,withCaptainBrianR.Lewis’sBravoCompanytanks,wasstrugglingtocatchupwiththemaintanktaskforce.Thetankswereinthelead.Lewis:

Westartedthemovementinastaggeredcolumnandfoundtheterraintoberestrictedenoughthatwewerebasicallyrestrictedtomovementonthe

hardsurfaceroad.Redplatoon,LtChadHall’splatoonwasinthelead,withHQ,Whiteandourinfantryplatoon,withourM-88A2,intrace.Redreportedthat“thingsaregettingweirduphere.”Beforehefinishedthatcall over the company net all hell broke loose, andmain gun, .50Cal,coax and loaders 240 all startedwithin a few seconds of each other. Ithinkwewere basically in a state of disbelief as towhatwe saw.Onesecondwehad negative enemy contact and the next therewere enemyforcesrunningaroundallovertheplace.

The task force had crashed head-on into a force of T-55 tanks, BMP-1s,French-madePanhardarmoredcars,andareinforcedinfantrycompany,stillfulloffight.

LtCol [Bryan]McCoy (the infantry task force commander)wasbehindmytankandmytankleaderwaswingingforhim.Iremembertellingmygunner [Sgt Hahn] to engage the dismounts he was observing to ourNorthern flank, I popped my head out to look south and saw theColonel’s vehicle stop the driver and Colonel jumped out and startedengagingdismounts15to20metersbehindmyturret.That’swhenIsawaT-55not15meterstomyflank.Itwascompletelyduginwithburlapcamouflage and itwas dug in to the point of not being able to engagewith itsmain gun.TheColonel fragged (hand grenaded) the tank afterfightingwith thehatch,whichwasapparentlycombat-locked.MymainconcernwasnotfortheMarinesengagingenemyforces;itwasafamilyofat least15civilianscaught inbetweenmy tanksand theenemy.Mytankswerefiringalloftheirweaponsystemsatseparatetargetsallalongthe company’s column.After severalminutes of firing, andmore thanoneradiocall towarn tankcommandersof the locationof theciviliansnowhuddledtogetherjustofftheroad,weranintoLimaCo3/4attachedto 1st Tank Battalion. Our fires and location prevented us fromdismountingourinfantrytocleanupwhatwasleftoftheenemy,soweturnednortheastalongRouteRedandpreparedforournextcontact.

Lewislatermusedthatthesituationwashardtoaccept“forabout1/10thofasecond,”butthat“…theMarinesinstinctskickedinandtheystartedkillingtheenemyaggressivelyandwithoutprompting.Seeing theirBattalionCommanderdismounted,killingtheenemywiththem,wasthefoundationthatcarriedBravoCompany through thewar.Aggressive bareknuckle, brute force and ignorance

carriedthedayandthewarforus.”39Thehastyattacknecessitatedleavingsomevehiclesbehindtorelievetheglut

along the routes of advance. Second Tank carried large rubber bladders filledwithfuelslungonthegypsyrack.Whentheinternalfuelcellswerenearemptythebladders couldbedropped to thegroundand the tankdrivenover them tosqueeze the fuel into the internal fuel cells. If a critical need arose, additionalfuel bladders could be slung beneath helicopters and brought to the tanks.Relying upon the Air Wing for support, the tank units left their fuel trucks,ambulances,andmostothersoft-skinnedvehiclesbehind.Breaking loose fromsupporttrains,2ndTankoutranevencommunications;theCO,LtColMikeOehlreliedupone-mailssentbysatellitephone.40

On the first night in Iraq the Marines briefly settled into night defensivepositions. Everyone’s nerves were still on edge. Bill Hayes: “There was likesome huge camel herd out there in themiddle of nowhere.One of our tanks,there was some small explosion or something had hit it. No one could everfigure out what that was. We ended up spending thirty minutes looking outthrough(sights)…Allyoucouldseewasthishugecamelherdoutthere.”

TheoriginalTARAWAoperationalplanhadcalledforanassaulttocapturean-Nasiriyah,buttherequirementhadbeendowngradedtoa“be-pre-pared-for”mission.41

Instead TARAWAwas to temporarily stand aside for the Army. Peeples:“They’re going to have to send their logistics train through Task ForceTARAWAareasowehave towait firstoff for that logistics train toclearourzone.”While establishing its defensive positions, TARAWA suffered its firstloss—self inflictedwhena tank,movingwithoutagroundguide, ranover twosleepingMarines.42CaptainCubasalso lostanotherofhis tanks tomechanicalfailure.

Inthe1stMarineDivisionsectortheLimaCompanyinfantryofTaskForceTANK,supportedbyaplatoonoftanks,foughtforcontrolofkeybridgesovertheSha’atalBasrawaterobstacle(Sha’atmeansrivermouthinArabic).

Inthemorninglightof22March1stTank’sleadelementsfoundthemselvesintermixed with the enemy.With TOW gunners engaging tanks on the northshore of the river, a stay-behind group scored an RPG hit on anM88 of theCombatTrains.CaptainRubenMartinez:

AsIcompletedshaving,IsawanRPGsmoketrailoutof thecornerofmyeyeoriginatingfromabout175meterstothesouthoftheM88.AsI

turnedtolookat theM88,IsawSergeantPercystandinginthevehiclecommander’scupola.Theexplosion rocked theM88,causinga fireballto come out of the vehicle and smoke to begin billowing from thevehicle.MasterSergeantMummey,walkingtowardthevehicle,alsosawtheRPGfiredandhitthevehicle.CorporalRugg,acrewmemberofthevehicle,begantoexittheM88,standingjustoutsidethehatchandturnedtoward Sgt Percy to ask what happened. Sgt Percy shouted that hecouldn’tsee.IcouldseeCplRugg’slowerlegsbadlyinjuredwithmanybleedinglacerations.CorporalRuggthenjumpeddownfromthevehicle,obviouslynot realizing theextentofhiswounds.He landedonhis feetandimmediatelyfelloveryelling“Ohmylegs!”AsIrantowardhim,Isaw Sergeant Jones running toward Cpl Rugg as well and I turned toretrieveastretcherfromBAS2.ChiefPettyOfficerLugodirectedBAS1 to park near the M88. Upon returning, Sergeant Villela, CorporalRodriguez, and Lance Corporal Burgos lifted Corporal Rugg onto thestretcher and I went over to assist Sergeant Percy off of theM88 andwalked him over tomy vehicle. I could hear sporadic small arms firefrom our Marines and fired at our position. After washing SergeantPercy’seyesoutwithwater,Icalledinthecontactreportandthenumberof injuredMarines. As I was on the radio, I observed Sergeant Jonespulling Master Gunnery Sergeant Denogean’s limp body out of theburning M88, assisted by Corporal Rodriguez. What we would laterlearn, thatChiefLugowas inside theM88passing theMasterGunnerySergeantoutof thevehicle….SergeantJones returnedandentered theburningM88 to removeAT-4missiles thatmighthavegoneoffdue totheheat.43

Thebridgeswerestillunderintensefire,preventingreconteamsandBritishSAS advance parties frommoving into the city. The SAS tucked in with thetanks, relaying information provided by an informantwith a cell phone insidethecityofBasra.Nevertheless,civilianscontinuedtomillaboutinthemiddleofthefighting.AplatoonoftanksfromDeltaCompanywasprovidingsecurityatoneofthebridgeswhenthreevehiclesapproachedfromthenorthbank.1stLt.VincentHogan:

Wefirstobservedthethreevehicleswhentheystoppedabout1500mtoourfront;theleadvehiclewasclearlyaMG-mounted‘technical.’Aswe

went to REDCON-1, we observed 10–12 armed personnel on the‘technical’; thegunnerput on agasmask.Suddenly theywerehaulingass towards our position. Red-2 shouted, ‘RPG!’ seeing one passengerliftanRPGoutofthevehiclebed.Weengagedwithcoaxand.50cal.Inaminute or so, two vehicleswere burning,with one remaining on theroad.Noonewasmoving.Acoupleminuteslater,peoplestartedpickingupweaponsscatteredfromthe‘technical’;wecontinuedtoengage.Thewholeengagementlastedmaybe10minutes.Afterthefight,someofthegunnerswereabletoobservethroughtheirpoweredsights‘TV’sloppilytapedon the sidesof theSUVs. I decided to inform theS-2 about thispotentiallyuseful,enemyvehiclemarking.Itdidn’tevenoccurtoanyofusthatjournalistswouldtrytoparticipateinanIraqisuicidecharge.”44

TheoccupantswereindeedthreejournalistsandatranslatoremployedbytheBritish Independent Television News.45 They paid the ultimate price for poorjudgment.

Theenemycontinuedtocounterattackpiecemeal.GySgtStevenHeath:

Isawtwo‘technical’vehiclescomeacrossthebridgewithaT-55.Onthenear side of the bridge, about 2700m away, the vehicles had formed awedgewiththetankinthelead,two‘technicals’flanking.Wesawthematanangle.Thetankhadguysridingalloverit,WorldWarII-style.Ourfirstshot,sabot,wentthroughthechestofatankrider,anddestroyedthe‘technical’onthefarside.Thetankstoppedandeveryonejumpedoff.Ifired the second shot: throughaberm, in frontof the tank, ahull shot.Then,aguyinblackjumpedinthedriver’sholeandstartedit.Therewasjustenoughtimetoseethewhitepuffastheenginestartedandthetankbegantomove.Red-3putashotsquareintheturret,causingimmediate‘secondaries.’Goodsectiongunnery.ItwasalmostliketheIraqistriedtoadaptSoviettacticsto‘technicals,’likeaCombatReconPatrol.Itwasn’tworkingouttoowellforthem.46

TheSASinformantrelayedinformationofanarmoredcounterattack,whichwasbrokenupbyhelicoptergunships.Theenemyhadonemoreweapon,onethat would have been familiar to Marines of six decades earlier—suicidebombers.CaptainGregPoland,theCOofDelta/1stTankwasprovidingsecurityforthegruntsofL/3/4intheblockingpositionsoutsideBasra.Thegruntspulled

amanoutofacar,andasPolandradioedasituationreporttobattalion“…theabandonedcarnexttomytankmadeaquickfizzlingsoundandthenblewup.Ionlyhadenoughtimetobucklemykneesanddropinsidethetank.Atthispoint,Iwasn’tboredanymore.Shortly following thecar explosion, severalburstsofsmall arms fire came across the top of my tank from the south, but it wassporadic and notwell controlled. The best part of the nightwas cross talkingwithCaptWatt.Atonepoint(afterthecarexplosion),wewereactuallylaughingwitheachotherontheradio.Astheenemyfirewasgoingonaroundus,Isaid,‘Hey Matt, getting shot at really IS kind of fun, isn’t it?’ He offered hisagreementandwecontinuedthroughthenight.”47

By1300on22MarchtheMarineswereturninglocalresponsibilityovertotheBritish,andTARAWAwasheadedwest.Theplanwastoout-maneuvertheIraqi resistancewith a fast advance and numerous feints,while theArmy’sVCorpsracedacrosstheopendeserttothewestandintoBaghdad.

In themain body the advancewasmore likemilitary tourism.BillHayes:“BeingaloaderinOIF-Onewasoneofthebestjobsinthemilitary.You’rethedriver,youneedtobefocusedthewholetime.Ifyou’rethegunner,you’redownthereburiedinsidethetank.Therewasn’treallyalotofactioninOIF-One…Ifyou’re the tankcommander,youhavetheburdenofresponsibility.Theloader,hejustsitsontheloader’shatchalldaylong,kindofmindingmyownbusiness.Hadagreatviewofeverything.OncewestoppedIhadalotoftheworktodo,butaslongasthetank’smoving…Icanjustsitthereandenjoytheview.”

There was a prescribed drill at every stop. “You always checked thehydraulic fluid, the oil, and if you have enough time you want to check thetracks, drive the tank backward slowly to make sure none of the bolts oranything have fallen off.” The abrasive sand was brutal on the tank systems.“That track was just burning-up hot… . The track pads, you could tell werebeingpushedtothelimitsofarasheat.”

Afterweeksthecrewshadsettledintoliveinthetanks.“It’slikeyourhome,your RV. You got all your water and you got all your junk food that’s beenmailedtoyouallstashedeverywhere.Itwasn’ttoobad.Thepeoplewhohaditbad—IwouldnothavewantedtoridefromKuwaittoBaghdadinthebackofanamtrac, jammed in there with twenty people. You can’t see anything. Veryloud.”Whenatankcrewmangrewboredhecould“Seewhatwasgoingononthe various radio channels.We kind of have a nice view ofwhat’s going on,wherewe’regoing.”

Therapidpaceoftheadvancealsohaditsdownsideasnumbingfatigueset

in.Benz:

(On24March)Weputuptheradio.Myfirstsergeantisgettingacatnap.Andthebattalionwasallsetinacircle,allthetanksinacircle.Weheardabop-bop-bop-bop!First thing,wekindofhit thegroundand,cometofind out—and this is to give you sense of how tired your people aregetting—Delta Company, our Reserve company, basically a guy wasgettingoutofatankandreachesouttopullhimselfup,putshishandonthebutterflytrigger, .50cal.Thedamnthingwasnotonsafe.Worseofall, [inaudible], over the side to check on the engine, next tank over,there’saMarine(LCplEricOrlowski)standingontopofthetank,bop-bop-bop-bop!…Imean,justkilledhiminstantly.Thebadthingwasthatweweretheonestherefirst.Thenthetanksrolledin.Wehadacorpsmanbutthesurgeon,everybodyelse,isstilloutintheroad,amajorfrickin’traffic jam. First thing, stay calm, urgentMEDEVAC.Only amedicalofficercansaythisguyisdead.Buthe’sdead.Sothesurgeonandthe(S-)‘4 are in the same Humvee, and they’re freaking out on the radiobecausethey’recaughtintraffic.SoIcallthemback:“Hey,Idon’twantto get everyone else freaked out in the battalion. It’s a ‘routine’MEDEVAC.”“What?!”“Listen,it’sa‘routine’MEDEVAC.”Thethingwas,itdidn’treallygetinthebattalion’sloop.Iwaskindofshockedhowthe battalion commander—we had to be somewhere by 0600 the nextmorning.Igota30-minutecatnap.48

Backinthemassivetrafficjamtothereartherewaslittleenemyaction,sofatiguewas themajorproblem.Despitehisrank,SamCrabtreewasassignedafive-ton truck in the Field Trains, since therewere few licensed drivers. “Weweregoing so slow….Wewouldgo five, tenmilesanhour.” In themassiveconvoy“Alotofvehiclesweregettinginaccidentsbecausepeoplewerefallingasleep….Yougetbored.Youfallasleep.”

Onthelargescaleallwasgoingwell,withlessthanexpectedresistance.TheentireAmericancomponenthadcrossedona fairlynarrow front, restrictedbythelocalroadnetwork,andwouldcontinuetofollowtheroadsasfaraspossibletoeasepassage.Buttheplanswerebeginningtomorphwiththerapidadvance.Near the Euphrates River V Corps would swing west, and TARAWAwouldseizetheeasterncrossingsnearthetown,easingthewayforpassageofthe1stMarineDivision.Unfortunately themassive logistical trainsof theArmy’s3rd

InfantryDivisionofVCorpswascaughtinahugetrafficsnarlsouthofthemaincrossingsoftheEuphratesnearan-Nasiriyah,cloggingRoute1alongthesouthbank. The intersection of Routes 1 and 7 south of the city was chaos asTARAWA,withthemechanized1/2inthelead,foughtitswaythroughthejam.

Onamorepersonallevel,SethFolsomnoticedthattheIraqiciviliansmerelygawkedandwavedatthepassingparade.TheMarinestossedout“humanitarianMREs,” to the civilians,makingnote that adultswouldpush children aside tograbthepackages.49

Noonehadcausetosuspectthat,asoftenhappensinwar,erraticbehavioroftheenemy,andanavigationalerrorbyajuniorArmyofficerwouldresultinoneofthemostconfusedandsavagebattlesofthewar.

NOTES

1Reynolds,Basrah,Baghdad,andBeyond,p.4–11.2Galuzska,InterviewwithMajorDanielBenz,p.5.3Anonymous,OperationIraqiFreedomIraq—1stTankBattalion,p.3.4Ibid,p.3–4.5Ibid,p.4.6Ibid,p.6.7Reynolds,Basrah,Baghdad,andBeyond,p.38–39,66–67.8TheconcepthasitsmoderngenesisinUllmanandWade,ShockandAwe:AchievingRapidDominance.9Reynolds,Basrah,Baghdad,andBeyond,p.44–45.10Storer,Tank-InfantryTeamintheUrbanEnvironment,p.61.11Lessard,InterviewwithMajorDaveBanning,p.15.12 Bonadonna, Interview withMajorWilliam Peeples and First Sergeant Roger Huddleston. All direct

PeeplesandHuddlestonquotesarefromthisinterview.13AshlandandGunstonHallwerenamedaftertwooftheoriginalclassofLSDs(LSD-1USSAshlandand

LSD-5USSGunstonHall)thatsawserviceinWorldWarII.BothvesselsbearnameswithhistorictiestotheMarinetankunits.

14 Lowry,Marines in the Garden of Eden, p. 42. The unit record, Glover, H.,Command ChronologyReportforCalendarYear2003,CompanyA,8thTankBattalion,,reportsthattheunitwasdividedamongthreeships.

15Glover,CommandChronologyReportforCalendarYear2003,CompanyA,8thTankBattalion;Peeplespainted a much less critical picture in Bonadonna, Interview with Major William Peeples and FirstSergeantRogerHuddleston.

16Lowry,MarinesintheGardenofEden,p.35.17 Glover, H.,Command Chronology Reportfor Calendar Year 2003, Company A, 8th Tank Battalion;

Bonadonna,InterviewwithMajorWilliamPeeplesandFirstSergeantRogerHuddleston.18OperationIraqiFreedomIraq—1stTankBattalion,p.7.19Galuzska,InterviewwithMajorDanielBenzp.9.20OperationIraqiFreedomIraq—1stTankBattalion,p.8–9.21Folsom,TheHighwayWar,p.5–13.22 Glover, H.,Command Chronology Reportfor Calendar Year 2003, Company A, 8th Tank Battalion.

Boresightconfirmsthattheaimingpointandtheimpactpointactuallycoincide.23Pritchard,AmbushAlley,p.21;Lowry,MarinesintheGardenofEden,p.57.24Folsom,TheHighwayWar,p.23–30,44.25Galuzska,InterviewwithMajorDanielBenzp.15.26Reynolds,Basrah,Baghdad,andBeyond,p.62.27Becauseoffightingacross timezonesandnearly instantcommunicationsbetweenheadquarters in the

USandfightingintheMiddleEast,mostofficialrecordsandsomememoirsrecordeventsinZuluTime(GreenwichMeanTime).LocaltimeinKuwaitandIraqwasZulu+300.Herealltimesareconvertedtolocaltimeforclarity.

28Folsom,TheHighwayWar,p.38–42.29Anonymous,OperationIraqiFreedomIraq—1stTankBattalion,p.10–11.30ThefollowingaccountofthisactionisexcerptedfromLessard,InterviewwithMajorDaveBanning,p.

5–7.31Anonymous,OperationIraqiFreedomIraq—1stTankBattalion,p.10.32Folsom,TheHighwayWar,p.88–89.33Reynolds,Basrah,Baghdad,andBeyond,p.68–69.34Ives,InterviewWithMajorWilliamWJohnson,p.4,6.35Anonymous,Operation IraqiFreedomIraq—1stTankBattalion,p.12;Lessard, InterviewwithMajorDaveBanning,p.7.

36Lessard,InterviewwithMajorDaveBanning,p.7–8.37Watson,RamblingspartII,14April200338Lessard,InterviewwithMajorDaveBanning,p.8–9.39Anonymous,OperationIraqiFreedomIraq—1stTankBattalion,p.42–43.40 Landers,TheMarines’ 2nd Tank BattalionUsed Speed and Armor toMakeQuickWork of SaddamHussein’sRegime.

41Glover,H.,CommandChronologyReportforCalendarYear2003,CompanyA,8thTankBattalion.42Lowry,MarinesintheGardenofEden,p.109–110.Thedriverhassuchpoorvisibilitythatindarkness

orcongestedconditionsanotherMarinewalksinfrontofthetank,givingthedrivervisualsignals.43Anonymous,OperationIraqiFreedomIraq—1stTankBattalion,p.15.44Ibid,p.16.45ElliottBlairSmith,IntoIraq46Anonymous,OperationIraqiFreedomIraq—1stTankBattalion,p.16–17.47Ibid,p.17–18.48Galuzska,InterviewwithMajorDanielBenzp.20.49 Folsom,TheHighwayWar, p.108.HumanitarianMREs include only “universal” foods thatwill not

violatereligiousdietaryproscriptionsinmostpartsoftheworld.

TheoldM60A1wasthemainstayoftheCorpstankprogramthroughmostofthepost-Vietnamera.ThisoneispatrollingneartheBeirutInternationalAirportinApril,1983,priortotheOctobersuicidebombing.

—DefenseImagery

TheM60A1tanksinitiallydeployedtoSaudiArabiaarriverwithoutreactivearmorandpaintedin

“European”camouflage.Notethehastyre-paintingofsomevehicles,andthesandbagsasadditionalprotectionforthedriver.—SgtD.R.Renner,DefenseImagery

AnM60A1ofDeltaCompany,2ndTankBattalionfittedwithreactivearmorandanM9dozerkitrehearsesbreachingoperationsforOperationDESERTSTORM,lateJanuary1991.—SSgtM.A.Masters,Defense

Imagery

SauditroopsexamineanLAV-ATofH&SCompany,1stLAI.Thisisthetypeofvehicledestroyedinthefriendlyfireincidentduringthefightingforal-Khafji.AnLAV-25isinthebackground.—CplD.Haynes,

DefenseImagery

ThemoremodernM1A1equippedonlyselectcompaniesofthetankbattalionsinOperationDESERTSTORM.Thisone,equippedwithamineplow,ispassingawreckedIraqiArmytruckinKuwait,24

February1991.—SSgtM.A.Masters,DefenseImagery

TheIraqitankforcesquicklyprovednomatchforthebetter-trainedAmericanforces.ThisT-55wasabandonedintactinKuwait,1February1991.—DefenseImagery

Iraqianti-aircraftgunslikethisabandonedZSU-23–4(four23mmradar-controlledgunsonatrackedchassis)wereprioritytargetsbecauseofthethreattheyposedtolow-flyingaircraftinachaoticbattle.—

DefenseImagery

ThefearedT-72provedtobeapapertiger.Itsmaingunwasslowtoreload,anditoftenexplodedspectacularlywhenhit.Notethatonthisonetheturrethasbeenliftedupandbackbyaninternalexplosion.

—TSgtJoeColeman,DefenseImagery

M60A1tanks,Humvees,andanM88recoveryvehicle(background)pausenearaburningoilwellinKuwait,27February1991.—CWO2EdBailey,DefenseImagery

PROVIDECOMFORTwastheefforttosecuretheKurdishregionofnorthernIraqagainstSaddamHussein’sretaliation.TheMarinesdeployedtotheregionweresupportedbyair-portableLAVs.—PH3J.

R.Klein,DefenseInagery

AnM1A2,probablyfrom1stTankBattalion,maneuverswhilepassingthroughan-Nasiriyah,25March2003.TheauthorhaslocatednophotosofAlphaCompany,8thTankBattalion,fromthisbattle.—Defense

Imagery

ATOW-equippedHumveeoftheCAAT,TaskForceTARAWA,maneuversduringthefinalfightingforan-Nasiriyah,1April2003.—DefenseImagery

Conditionofthemainhighwaybridgewestofan-Nasiriyahwasthecauseofconsiderableconcerntoplanners.Itwasthedesiretobypassthisbridgethatinpartledtothefightforthecity.—DefenseImagery

Eastmeetswest;aheavily-loadeddonkeycartpassesaheavilyloadedMarineCorpstankinthestreetsofBaghdad,9April2003.—SgyP.L.AnstineII,DefenseImagery

Atankfrom1stTankBattalionwithgruntsfromthe3rdBattalion,7thMarinesinthestreetsofBaghdad,9April2003.—SgtPL.AnstineII,DefenseImagery

Aburned-outMarinetanksitsbesidethehighwaysomewheresouthofBaghdad,3April2003.—LCplA.A.Plaza,DefenseImagery

AnM1A1ofCharlieCompany,1stTankBattalioncrossesanoverpassalongHighway6enroutetothetankassemblyareaattheOlympicStadiuminBaghdad,12April2003.—SgtPL.AnstineII,Defense

Imagery

Atanksupports1stBattalion,8thMarinesinthestreetsofFallujah,9November2004.—LCplJ.A.Chaverri,DefenseImagery

ACharlieCompanytankmergesintothechaoticciviliantrafficonHighway8betweenBaghdadandKerbala,18April2003.—SgtP.L.AnstineII,DefenseImagery

Atankattachedto11thMEUinaraidontheMuqtadaMilitiaHeadquartersinal-Najaf,24August2004.Notetheabsenceofextragearonthistankoperatingfromabasearea.—GySgtD.J.Fosco,Defense

Imagery

AtankfromCharlieCompany,1stTankBattalioninthestreetsofBaghdad,14April2003.—SgtP.L.AnstineII,DefenseImagery

ThistankhasbrokendownthesideofaroadandslidintoanirrigationcanaloutsideFallujah.SeveralAAVsarehookedtothetankbytowbarsinanefforttoextricatethetank.Thedeepditches,softground,

andpoornarrowroadsmadethisaconstanthazard.—BillHayes

Atank-infantrypatrolinthestreetsofHaditha,27January2005.—GySgtK.W.Williams,DefenseImagery

Anengineer-armoredbulldozerflattensabuildinginFallujah.Thesearmoreddozersprovedinvaluableinreducingenemypositionsandclearingrubbleandobstaclesinanurbanbattle.—Hayes

AnLAV-25of3rdLARBattalionpatrolsnearal-Rutbah,1January2005.—LCplR.A.Hilario,DefenseImagery

DismountsfromDeltaCompany,2ndLARBattalionsearchanIraqifarmnearBalad,4August2008.Thedensevegetationofthefarmlandsintherivervalleyscontrastssharplywiththesurroundingdesert.—LCpl

A.L.Hunt,DefenseImagery

MarinesofDeltaCompany,3rdLARBattalionrepairadisableLAV-25ontheroadinAnbarProvince,17April2009.—LCplB.A.Kinney,DefenseImagery

MarinesandNavycorpsmenworktofreeanLAV-25boggedinsoftsand,NinevehProvince,13May2009.—LCplB.A.Kinnney,DefenseImagery

AnLAV-25attachedto12thMEU(SOC)patrolstheKandaharInternationalAirport.Theair-portableLAVswerethefirstCoalitionarmortoarriveinAfghanistan;phototaken15January2002.—CaptC.G.

Grow,DefenseImagery

Aheavily-loadedLAV-25fromAlphaCompany2ndLAI,attachedto26thMEU(SOC)patrolsinanAfghanvillageneartheairport,17January2002.Scoutsarestandingintherearhatches,andtherearethree

localsonboardasguidesandinterpreters.—CaptC.G.Grow,DefenseImagery

M88A2heavyretrieverswerebroughtinasutilityvehiclesbeforetanks.ThisoneishelpingrepairanABVengineervehicleinHelmandProvince,20March2011.—CplJohnMcCall,DefenseImagery

ScoutsfromCharlieCompany,3rdLARsearchforaTalibanmortarobserver,HelmandProvince,16March2011.—SgtJeremyRoss,DefenseImagery

TheAssaultBreacherVehicle(ABV)isanengineerassetbasedontheM1tankchassis.Thisvehiclefrom1stCombatEngineerBattalionisoperatinginsupportof3rdLAR,HelmandProvince,15March2011.—

CplJohnMcCall,DefenseImagery

InthelatterstagesofbothIraqandAfghanistanalltypesofunitsincreasinglyutilizedMine-ResistantAmbush-Protectedheavytrucks(MRAPs)liketheseinuseby1stBattalion,5thMarinesinAfghanistan,3

November2009.—LCplJamesPurschwitz,DefenseImagery

ThisM1A1fromAlphaCompany,2ndTankBattalion,isfittedwithacombinationmineplowandrake.HelmandProvince,11August2011.—CplMarcoSancha,DefenseImagery

T

CHAPTERSIX

BridgesintheDesert—An-Nasiriyah

Confusioninbattleiswhatpainisinchildbirth—thenaturalorderofthings.—GeneralMauriceTugwell,BritishArmy

WO CRITICAL PATHS of the invasion route brushed the grimy littleindustrialcityofan-NasiriyahbeforeswingingwestofBaghdadand into that city, respectively. The city consisted mostly of

slums,petroleumindustryfacilities,andmilitarycompounds.TheMarines were wary of going into any city. Urban areas entangle and

absorb military strength, pass the advantage to defenders who have intimateknowledge of the local terrain, and require slow and usually costly house-to-houseorevenroom-to-roominfantryfighting.IntheColdWareratheUSArmyhad made it policy to avoid urban combat. The Marine Corps—with Seoul(1950) andHue (1968) still fresh in its institutionalmemory—had trained forurban combat, andwasunder no illusions.The subject of an-Nasiriyahhad infact been the subject of considerable controversy in Marine Corps planning.Logistics routes for both the Marines and V Corps passed through thechokepoint of an-Nasiriyah.The3rd InfantryDivisionofVCorpswouldpassthrough the farwestern outskirts of the city alongRoute 1, but the final planplacedthecityfirmlyintheMarinezone.1

The Marines would have to go into the teeth of whatever resistance theregimecouldmuster.Route1wasthebesthighway,butitwasreservedfortheuseofVCorps.Route7branchedoffRoute8andcrossedtheEuphratesRiverandtheSaddamCanalinthecity,linkedwithRoute16northoftown,andthenveerednorthandwesttowardBaghdad.ThebridgeoverwhichRoute1crossedtheriverwasabout10kilometerswestofthecity,butitwasunderconstruction,narrow,andmightnotbearheavytraffic.TheMarineswouldneedtocontrolthemainbridgesinsidethecityandonthedirecthighway.

MAP2.Al-Nasiriyahandenvirons.

With a mostly Shi’a population, an-Nasiriyah was at the best of timesignored by the Saddam regime. At other times the populace was viciouslyoppressed. In the aftermathofDesertStorm theCIAhad encouraged a revolt.TheBa’athistregimehadunleashedterriblereprisals,anditwasstillgarrisonedby a force of regular Iraqi Army troops, fedayeen, al-Quds volunteers, andSpecialRepublicanGuards.

TARAWA’s planwas carefully rehearsed. Themain highway through thecentralpartofthecity—a4500mlongboulevardlinedwithlowbuildings—wasalready dubbed Ambush Alley. TARAWA would try to avoid becominginvolvedinstreetfightingbyveeringthroughtheeasternmarginsofthecity,butitwouldstillhavetocapturethecriticalbridges.AtthatpointRCT-1wouldpassthroughTARAWA’slinestocontinuetheadvanceonBaghdad.

Alpha Company infantry in AAVs would veer around the central city toseizethebridgeovertheEuphrates,BravowouldswingeastaroundthefringesofthecitytocapturetheSaddamCanalbridge,andCharliewouldmovenorthtocaptureakeyhighwayjuncturedubbedTheT-Intersection.Tankswouldprovide

mobilefirepowerto“shoottheinfantryontotheobjective.”Securingthecity—and theMainSupplyRoute through it—wouldhave towait until after the 1stMarineDivisionhadpassed.

On themorningof23Marchallwasgoingaccording to thisplanwhenat0500hourslocaltimeCharlieCompany,2ndLARrelievedArmycombattroopswestofthecity,andTFTARAWApassedelementsofthe1stMarineDivisionthatwerehaltedalongsidethehighwaysouthofthecity.2

MikeMummey,with1stTanks’trains,wascaughtupinthissnarl,withtwoM88s, fuel trucks, two thinly-armoredHumvees (“Weonly had those becauseour embark officer was really shit-hot, and arranged for us to fly in a [new]Humvee from theStatesand trade it to theMPSship forhardbackversions”),andheavytruckswithtrailersladenwith“whateverpartswehadscroungedup.Ihadenough…toresupplyonecompanyifneeded.Wewerealwaysafewclicksbehindthebattalionastheymoved.”

Mindful of the confusion in the first war, he organized his own securityteam. “I had anMTVR,which is that seven-ton truck, and I had a couple ofcooks,acoupleoftankmechanics,thegruntsgavemetwogruntstobeonit.”Also included was a TOW section, “So I had four gun trucks—four TOWlaunchers—andonehardbackvehiclewithahard-chargingsergeant….”Alltoldtherewereaboutthirty-fivevehiclesand120Marines.

Marinereconnaissanceunitscrossed theRoute8bridge in thewesternpartofthecityandpenetratedintothemaincity,butwithdrewafterbeingambushed.They reported toTARAWA that unlikemost Iraqi forces, theones in the citywereinamoodtofight.

Like most, personnel of the Army’s 507th Maintenance Company weresleep-deprived and exhausted by the heat. Several broken down trucks wereunder tow, and ten-ton wreckers towing broken-down HEMTTs with largetrailers still affixed, made for unwieldy tows impossible to turn around andpainfully slow to negotiate any sort of turn. The little convoy had fallen farbehind the rest of their parent convoy, as vehicles from various units becameintermingledinthevastnorthwardflow.The507thwassupposedtopasstothewest of the city, but had gotten off course taking a supposed shortcut. Theycould still have bypassed an-Nasiriyah if they turned left before reaching therivertofollowRoute8westofthecity,butnoneoftheofficersorNCOshadamap. All were relying upon GPS “waypoints”—satellite coordinates—for thelocationofturns.Asimplemapcouldhavepreventedtheensuingdisaster.

TheMarinesofTFTARAWAweredrawnupalongsideRoute8southofa

railwayoverpass,withanenormouslogjamofvehiclesbehind.Thecolumnforthe assaultwould haveTeamTANKand theCombinedAnti-ArmorTeam, orCAAT3 in the lead, thenBravo,Alpha andCharlieCompanies, 1/2. Peeples’ssmallcommandwasalreadyreducedbytwotanks;onehadtumbledintoaholeinKuwait, anotherwasbrokendownandunder tow far to the rear.Theworntankswerestillnotcompletelyfunctional.TheturrettraversingsystemonSSgtDominicDillon’stankin2ndPlatoonwasinoperableandtheheavyturrethadtobetraversedbyhand.

The tankerswerenothappywith the rubber fuelbladders thatencumberedtheirgypsyracks.Thebladdersextendedtherangeofthefuel-swillingtanks,butpresentedafirehazardandinterferedwithturrettraverse.4

The lead elements ofTARAWAcame undermortar andmachine gun firefrombuildingsoneithersideoftheroad,andCubas’stankbecamemiredwhileattemptingtomoveofftheroad.Thetankerswereengrossedinpullingitloosewith another tank under fire when the sixteen-truck convoy from the 507thstoppedtoaskdirectionsof1stLt.JamesReidofWeaponsPlatoon,C/1/2.TheArmyconvoytheninexplicablymotoredpastthestartledMarinesandacrosstheoverpasstowardtheriver.Atleastsomeofthesoldiersintheconvoywonderedwhytheywerepullingaheadofthecombattroops.TheywereobliginglywavedthroughanIraqiArmycheckpoint.5

The defenders of the city were probably more startled than the Americansoldiers. Not a shot was fired at the errant convoy, though there wasconsiderable dashing about by the defenders. It soon became obvious that theconvoy was seriously off course. A truck ran out of fuel and was quicklyrefueled, but turning the cumbersome tows around in narrow side streetsconsumedpreciousminutes.Timequicklyranoutforthe507th.

What ensued was more an urban gang fight than a battle. Iraqi irregularsdashedaboutwildlyfiringAK-47sandRPGsat the trucks.Somejuststoodattheroadsideandwildlysprayedroundsatthepassingtrucks.Othersblockedtheconvoy by throwing debris into the streets, or pushed vehicles into their path.Inaccurate as the fire was, there was lots of it, and American vehicles andsoldierswere inevitablyhit.Theconvoyquicklybroke into threeelementsandthefirsttwovehicles,onecarryingthecompanycommander,managedtospeedout of the trap. Occupants of four more trucks were fighting for their livesbehind.Attherearthelargestgroup,includingtheslowheavytrucks,wasinahopelessposition.Oneheavytruckranoffthenarrowstreetsandwasstuckwithitsrearintheroad;aHumveecrashedintothestalledtruck.6Weaponsjammed

fromaccumulateddustandfinesand,orranoutofammunition.TheIraqissoonoverranthesurvivors.

The Iraqisand foreignvolunteershad recovered from their surprise,andat0900 the advancing Marines of TF TARAWA were still under mortar,machinegun, and RPG fire from buildings in the muddy fields south of therailwayoverpass.JavelinandTOWgunnersoftheCAATengagedIraqitanks,destroyingnine.7

WhenPeeples’s gunner tried to traverse the turret on “WildBill,” the fuelbladderjammedtheturret.Peeplesleanedoutandslashedthelinessecuringthebladder,dumpingitintotheroad.Therestofthecrewsfollowedsuit.DyersawanAmericantruckthatcamesouthfromthedirectionoftheriver,thendoubledback.TheMarines had beenwarned of the potential for enemy soldiers usingAmerican trucks and uniforms as ruses.The tankerswere still unaware of the507th’s plight. The Humvee reappeared trailed by two more damaged trucksspewingsmoke.

The507th’scommander,CaptainTroyKing,made itbackacross the riverbridge in the Humvee. When Peeples dismounted and talked to the nearlyincoherent King he gained only a rudimentary picture of what was going onnorth of the river, but immediately headed north. Dyer found the radio netjammedbysuperfluouschatterwhenhetriedtoapprisethebattalioncommanderof what was happening.8With communications jammed, all the tanks headednorthinPeeples’swake.

PeeplessightedfiveburningArmytruckssouthoftheEuphratesbridge,withsurvivorsreturningfire.Deployedalongbothsidesoftheroad,thetanksopenedfirewithcoaxialmachineguns.MPATroundsfiredfromthemaingunssimplydisintegrated some of the buildings, aswell as aT-55 tank, anti-aircraft guns,andartillerypieces.

ThedecisiontocutthefuelbladdersloosecamebacktohauntPeeplesasthetanks ran low on fuel. His problems were compounded by Army survivorshuddled behind his tank, but an AAV appeared and they were hustled insidedespiteobjectionsbyArmyWarrantOfficerMarcNashwhowantedtogobacktorescuehissoldiers.9Unabletocallinartilleryoverthecloggedbattalionnet,Captain JimHawkins, theFAC riding in the loader’spositiononDyer’s tank,calledinanairstrike.Theaircraftreportedhundredsofenemytroopsinvisiblefrom the ground and at least one T-55 tank. Battalion chose that moment tobreak in and abort the air attackbecause artillery supportwasbelatedlyon itsway; the tankersseethedatyetanotherexampleofmanagement fromthe rear.

For their part the infantry were astounded that all the tanks had retreated torefuel.

The havoc wrecked the carefully rehearsed two-pronged attack plan. TheregimentalCOarrivedon thesceneandassessed thesituation.The1stMarineDivisionwasbreathingdownhisneck,anxioustocrossthebridge.Theoverallcommanderonthesceneacceleratedtheattack,makingacontroversialdecisionto sendBCompany across the Euphrates bridge to assume the tank companypositions.

Unaware of the change, Peeples and his tankswere in no hurry to return.Worse,thefueltankerhadonly1,000ofthe5,500gallonsneededbythetanks.Everyoneoftheelectricfueltransferpumpsmalfunctioned,sothatfuelhadtobetransferredbyhand.DyerinterrogatedsomeoftheArmysurvivors,whotoldhim it was poor terrain for tanks, with swampy ground and numerous bermsoutsidethetown,andthatthetowncontainedbunkersbuiltintothestructures.

LtColEddieRay,COof2ndLARofferedhisAlphaCompanytohelpwiththeattack into thecity,butColRonBailey (RCT-2)was forced todecline theoffer in the face of objections from Col Joe Dowdy, the CO of RCT-1, whocontrolledRay’sbattalion.ThesnapdecisionwouldcomebacktohauntDowdy.

At about 1100hours 1/2 started into the citywithout tank support, but theadvancefalteredwhentheAAVstopped therailwayoverpassandencounteredenemy tanks. The CAAT, infantry’s anti-tank weapons, and Cobra gun shipsdestroyed five T-55 tanks, but the infantry was unwilling to advance withouttank support. GySgt Randy Howard’s 2nd Platoon raced back north, and at1245hours led the attack across the river bridge, followed by CAAT, BravoCompany,andthebattalion’sForwardCommandElement.

On the northern bridge ramp the Marines were isolated amid swarmingfedayeen,andengagedinaclose-quartersbattleinwhichthemuzzleblastfromthe tanks’ 120mm guns was nearly as dangerous as the enemy. One hapless“technical”emergedfromanalleywayonlytobeobliteratedatcloserangebya120mmroundfromHoward’stankLucille2.

The attackers veered to the east, into narrow streets where tanks scrapedagainstthebuildingsandsnarlsofoverheadpowerlineswereaconstanthazard.The vehicles tried to crosswhat seemed to be an open area about 100meterssquare.Itprovedtobeasortofwasteoutfall,whererawsewagemixedwithoilformed a deep bog covered with a thin crust of driedmud. Three tanks, twoAAVs (including the AAV-C7 command vehicle), and several Humveesfoundered in the stinking mess, the tanks sinking up to their engine decks.

BehindthemtheHumveesoftheCAATweretrappedinthenarrowalleyways.Mendismountedtohookuptowcables,onlytoflounderintheslime.SSgt

AaronHarrelldugdesperatelywithanentrenchingtoolandhishandstolocatethe towing points on GySgt George Insko’s tank, but mud flowed back asquicklyasitwasdugout.Towingcablesandhooksbroke.Oncefreed,vehicleslurchedsidewaysandsankagain.TheMarinesdubbedtheplacetheshitbog.

InbothKoreaandVietnamthetankershadquicklylearnedthatVTRswereoften most needed up front, but the two M88s and four Humvees of themaintenancegrouphadbeenrelegatedtotherearoftheregimentaltrain.GySgtWrightandSSgtCookewere trying to rush forward through theheavy traffic,butprecioustimewasslippingaway.

TheinfantrymenofBCompanywerestrugglinginamazeofnarrowalleys.Behindthemfedayeenkeptappearingtofireatcrewstryingtorecoverthestuckvehicles. Communications, particularly the powerful radios in the commandtracks, were disabled when the long antennae struck dangling power lines,zeroing out the electronic encryption sets.10 The fight was degenerating intopreciselythekindofconfusedbrawleveryonefeared.

AlphaCompanyfollowedinthewakeofthefirstunits,butplowedintoafiresackatthenorthendofthebridge.DefendersrushedthecolumnandthegruntsfiredfromtheopenAAVroofhatches.FedayeentriedtoboardtheAAVs,onlytobecutdown. In theclosequarters fightinga track simply ranover anRPGgunner.Onetrackwashit;ammunitionstoredinsideignited,thevehiclestalledin the street, and AAVs behind stopped. The thinly-armored tracks soughtshelterbymovingasclosetowallsandbuildingsaspossible,whiletheinfantrydismountedunderahailofsmallarmsandRPGfire.Mostofthecompanywasnowspreadout along the first 500metersofAmbushAlley,with someas farnorth as the canal bridge.Defenders kept rushing out of doorways and alleys,tryingtoclosewiththeMarines.

IntheconfusionCCompanyhadbeenrelegatedtolastplaceinthebattalioncolumn,notfirstasplanned.CharlieCompany’stracksbarreledthroughAlpha’sfight,straightupAmbushAlley,andoverthecanalbridge,wheretheytoowerehaltedbyintensefirecomingfrombehindearthenberms.

Back at the refueling point Peeples was still unaware of the decision toaccelerateandradicallymodify theattackplan.Thecrewsof theHeadquarterstanks were absorbed in pumping fuel and 1st Platoon was dropping acumbersome bulkymine plowwhenMajorTuggle, the infantry battalionXO,appeared in a track, screaming for support. Alpha Company was clearly in

trouble, but even Tuggle was unaware of C Company’s plight or even itsposition.

Dyer made a snap decision and ordered Cubas’s 3rd Platoon (really onlyCubasandKemper)north;Peepleswasstartledwhenthetanksracedaway,butthesightindicatedsomeonewasindeeptrouble.Heorderedthebalanceofthetankstobreakoffrefuelingandheadnorthassoonaspossible,buthisowntanksufferedamechanicalmalfunctionforcinghimtoshifttoanothertank,addingtotheconfusion.

Bynowa runningbattlewas takingplace for several kilometers along thehighway.Dyer’stankshadjusttakenuppositionatoptherailwayoverpasswhena T-55 tank appeared. Four enemy tanks were destroyed, but when Hawkinsloaded anMPAT round, the casing refused to seat.No amount of hammeringwould drive it into the chamber. Finally a crewman dismounted to clear thejammed round with the rammer staff, and Dyer charged into the fight at thenorthendoftheriverbridge.

TheForwardCP,trappedwithBCompanyattheshitbog,hadonlyavagueideaoftherestofthebattalion’spositions.Grabowskihadreportedthecaptureofthecanalbridgetoregiment,butbetweenthechatterovertheradiosandthepoorreception,theForwardCPfailedtoreceivethemessage.

North of the canal C Company was taking heavy punishment. CharlieCompany had no FAC because it was supposed to bring up the rear, and themost advanced FAC was with B Company. This would lead to the greatesttragedyofthisconfusedbattle.BattalionhadissuedawrittenorderthatnoType3CloseAirSupportwouldbeemployedwithouttheexpressapprovaloftheCO,butthesystemfailed.11

Bravo Company’s FAC could see vehicles—the trailing elements of CCompany—andabortedairattacksnorthofhisposition.Assuredthattherewerenofriendliesnorthofthecanal,hefreedtheairsupport.12

MarkerrocketsfiredbytwoA-10swereinvisibletoBCompany’sFAC;theA-10pilotsmistookAAVs(vehiclesunfamiliar to thepilots) forIraqivehiclesforwardofBCompanypositions;BCompany’sFACandCOwerestillunawareofanyMarinesnorthofthecanal.

InfactCCompanywasfightingforitslife,unabletocommunicatewiththeartilleryor81mmmortars.Oneoftheunitsbadlyhitwasthecompany’s60mmmortarsection.TheAAVsweredrawnupmostlyalongthewesternsideofthehighway,facingtheheaviestfire.OneAAVC-205,tookonaloadofwoundedand broke free, heading south. All this commotion did not escape the A-10s

overhead.JustasMarinespiledintootherAAVs,thetwoA-10srolledinforrepeated

cannonandmissileruns.AsC-206crestedthecanalbridgeaMaverickmissileimpacted justbehind it; thedamaged rear rampdropped, spillingmen into theroadway. The vehicle kept going, dragging the ramp. C-208 took a direct hitfrom aMaverick, lifting the vehicle several feet off the concrete and blowingbitsofvehicleandpassengersintotheair.Thedriverandthevehiclecommandersurvived,shelteredbythemassiveengineandflimsyinternalpartitions.

AAVsC-201andC-203werehitbycannonfire.Redemergencyflaresfiredfromthegrounddidnotdissuadethepilots.C-201,inflamesandwithsteeringdisabled,crashed intoabuilding.Thegruntsspilledoutandwent toground innearbybuildings,butintheirhastesalvagedlimitedammunition,andnowater.Theironlysalvagedradiowasrendereduselessbydeadbatteries.Manyof thementookshelterontheroofofabuilding,sooncalledTheAlamo,ontheeastsideofthebroadboulevard,nearthesouthendofthecanalbridge.

The B Company FAC was finally able to abort further attacks, and thepuzzledpilotsflewaway.

The disaster had left less than a platoon of effectives north of the canalbridge.

Southwest of the city parts of VCorps and the 1stMarineDivisionwerecaughtinamassivetrafficsnarlalongRoute1.SethFolsomandtherestof1stLARcouldclearlysee thepillarofblacksmokerisingfromthecity,butwereunawareofthemagnitudeofthefighting.13

Atabout1400hoursPeeples,withfourtanksandagaggleofAAVs,arrivedatACompany’s position and dismounted to askwhatwas going on, orderingSwainandThompsonfartheruptheroad.Thosetankstookuppositionsfarthernorth with Alpha Company, blasting away at positions around the smallbridgehead.The tanksgave the hard-pressed infantry some respite, asmost ofthe fire was now directed at the tanks. The tanks’ heavy machine guns andcannon soon began to suppress the incoming fire.A helicopter pilot overheadreported“waves”ofIraqistryingtorushtheimmobilevehicles.

One of the two survivingCharlieCompany tracks,C-206, limped into theAlphaCompanybridgehead,trailingashowerofsparksfromtheopenrampasitdraggedalong thepavement. Just as it reached relative safety anRPGenteredthe open hatch, and itwas gutted by an ammunition explosion. C-210 veeredaround itandstopped in thestreet.AsquadofCCompanygrunts,mistakenlyembarkedintheconfusionnorthofthecanal,spilledout.

At thenorth endof the river bridgeDyer, exposed in theTC’shatch,wasblastingawayatenemypositionswhileHawkins leanedfaroutof the loader’shatch to coordinate air support. In the desperate fight Hawkins had to keepnumerous balls in the air: coordinating air support, loading themain gun, andfiring the roof-mountedmachine gun in front of his hatch. Rounds fired by askillfullyhiddensniperweresnappingaroundtheirears.AsbadasthingswereforthebeleagueredACompanygrunts,theywerenowtheonlyintactpartofthebattalion.

One C Company survivor, Sgt William Schaefer, tried unsuccessfully tosolicithelpfrominfantryofficerswhowerestillunderinstructionstoholdatthenorthendof theriverbridgeuntil relievedby8thMarines.The truck-mounted2/8darednottrytorunthegauntletoffire.TheMarinesdismountedtocleartheenemy from both sides of the highway,working north in a broadwedge, andwerestillentangledinfightingneartherailwayoverpass.SchaeferfinallyrantoPeeples’stanktoexplainthedisasternorthofthecanal.

Ataboutthesametime,DyerreceivedadisturbingradiomessagefromtheleaderofCCompany’s3rdPlatoon:“This isPalehorse3.Weneedassistance.We need tank support.”14 Normally platoon leaders do not transmit on thebattalion’s primary radio net;Dyer realized thingsmust be seriouslywrong atthecanalbridge. Just thenhespottedamuzzle flash in thedeepshadowsofawindow,andblewthebuildingaway.Thesniperfirestopped,butHawkinswascrumpledintheflooroftheturret.Dyerthoughthewaskilledbytheunexpectedmuzzleblast,butHawkinsstirredandgaveDyeradarklook.

PeeplesfelthehadtogotoCCompany’said;hedecidedtotaketwotanksnorth and leave two—Thompson and Swain—to help A Company. Schaeferorganizeda relief force,andwould follow inanAAVPeeplesandDyer racedthreekilometersupAmbushAlleyatover70kilometersanhour,soonleavingtheslowerAAVto itsowndevices.As the tanksblew through thesmokeandsparksofRPGrounds,Peeplescaught sightofanair recognitionpaneldrapedovertheroofparapetattheAlamo.Thetanksdidnothavetimetoinvestigate.

TothesouthF/2/8,closesttotheroad,wasorderedtoremountitstrucksandblastthroughtothepositionsnorthoftheriver,despitetherisk.Filipowski,histankrepairedat last,hadstruggled through themassive traffic jamsonly tobeappropriatedbystaffofficerswhowantedthetanktoescortsupplytrucksalongthe still dangerous highway. He could only listen to the radio traffic of thefight.15

EnemyfirecontinuedtosavageCCompany.Oneoftheremainingamtracs

was struckand set afirebyanRPG,andNavyHospitalmanLouisFonseca Jr.ranthroughthesmallarmsandRPGfire to thevehicle.Helpingfivewoundedintothemedicaltrack,heprovidedwhataidhecouldforthewounded,includingtwo men with severed legs. When another RPG disabled the medical track,Fonseca grabbednearbyMarines tomove four of thewounded, and slung thefifthoverhisshoulders foramaddash through intense fire toanothervehicle.FonsecawasawardedtheNavyCrossforhisactions.16

Peeples’s two tanks topped the canal bridge, and raced intoCCompany’sposition; the command track,with its distinctivediamond symbol,wasparkednear the foot of the bridge ramp. The company commander jumped ontoPeeples’s tank to direct fire, while Dyer continued another 500meters to thenorth to relievean isolatedplatoon.Hawkinswasnowable tobring inseveralflightsofCobragunships,andtheIraqifirebegantodiedownabit.Afterfiringafewrounds,Peeples tookhis tankbackintoAmbushAlley to investigate theairrecognitionpanel.

The Alamo had by now held out for over two hours, and the grunts hadsalliedout tosalvagewhat theycouldfromthedisabledAAVs:ammunition,abitofwater,anda fewdrainedbatteries thatallowed themtocommunicatebyclickingoncefor“yes,”twicefor“no.”PeepleshaltedhistankanddismountedtoconferwiththegruntsandhelplookforlostMarines.Heloadedthewoundedontheenginedeck,buttherestdeclinedhissuggestionthattheywalkoutunderthecoverofhistank.

The two reinforcing tanks from 3rd Platoon, Captain Cubas and GySgtKamper,hadalsoblundered into theshitbog.Kamper’sdriver tried to tellhimthathecouldnot see,butKamper thought theperiscopeswereobscured.Nowthedust-cloggedNBCfiltercaughtfire,fillingtheinteriorwithsmoke.17Asthecrew dismounted an Iraqi rushed out of a nearby building. The gunner, SgtAugust Nienaber, tossed his 9mm pistol to the driver. LCpl JoshuahMousercaughtit,andemptiedbothhisandNienaber’spistolsattheenemy.Unhurt,thestunnedIraqidroppedhisownAK-47andranforit.

Frustration continued to mount at the shitbog. GySgt Howard improvisedtowcables,andmanagedtofreebothInsko’sandDillon’stanksfromthemire.About 1600 the twoVTRs arrived, led through the fighting and chaos by SgtJohnEthington,whohaddismountedtoleadthevehiclesonfoot.Onesankintoahole,andhadtobepulledoutbytheother.EffortstoextricateHoward’stankled to the sinkingof anM88. Itwaspulled freeby a tank, but theotherM88founderedwhiletryingtorecovertheAAV-C7commandtrack.Attheendofthe

festivities,thesetworemainedstuckinthemirewithdarknessapproaching.Apprehensive of what could happen to small, scattered perimeters LtCol

RickGrabowskiwastryingtoconsolidatehisbattalion.Heorderedthevehiclesattheshitbogstrippedandabandoned.Aplatoonofinfantry,afewmenfromthecommandgroup,anda smalldetachment fromCAATwouldwatchover themwhile the balance of B Company moved up Ambush Alley to C Company’spositionnorthofthecanal.

AlphaCompany, still hard-pressed, formed up unto a convoy ofHumveesandAAVsandstartedupAmbushAlley.Theconvoysightedthepanelthathaddrawn Peeples’s eyes to the Alamo, and hurriedly dropped off what supplieswereathand:acanteen(empty)andsomeradiobatteries(thewrongsize).

Alpha Company arrived north of the canal, and parts of C Company andHumveesfromCAATreturnedtorescuethegroupatTheAlamo.Dyer,stilltheonly heavy firepower at the far northern point of advance, established aroadblocktointerceptenemyforcescomingfromthenorth.CubasandKamperarrivedamid theusual flurryofRPGs to findGrabowski’s commandgroupatthesouthendofthecanalbridge.Theconsolidatedgroupmovednorth,pausingonly to recover bodies and disable the radios in the abandoned AAVs. TheMarineswere at last beginning to establish a seriesof defensiblepositions forthecomingnight.

While all the mayhem was taking place in the city, 3/2 had seized theuncompletedRoute1bridgewestofthecitywithlittleopposition.

The most ferocious fighting in an-Nasiriyah died with the light, but thesituationremainedconfused.Withcommunicationsdisrupted,lossesin1/2werefeared heavier than theywere. Eddie Ray again offered the assistance of 2ndLAR;AlphaCompanywassentthroughtosupport1/2,withaplatoondetachedto support 2/8 south of the city. After nightfall a small party of BritishCommandos passed through the town headed west, but returned after beingambushedbefore reaching3/2’spositionat theRoute1bridge.When3rdLAIattemptedtomoveupRoute1northoftherivertheyencounteredawell-laidU-shapedambushwhichwasfortunatelytriggeredprematurely.Thebattalionwasabletodisengageundertheprotectionofairstrikes.18

TheMarines at the isolated northern perimeter were exhausted. Dyer wasbabblingnonsense.Peeplesfellasleepwhileclimbingaboardhistankandsleptontheenginedeck.19ThatnightaroadblocknorthofthecanalflaggeddownanIraqiambulancewithlightsflashing.ItprovedtobecarryingtheCOoftheIraqi23rd InfantryBrigade, disguised as aparamedicwithhisuniform,documents,

andalargeamountofUScurrencystashedinplasticbags.AllthroughthenighttheMarinesintheexposedpositionsheldtheenemyat

bay with sniper and cannon fire. To the south the staff and supply personnellabored toorganizea resumedattackanda supplyconvoy tobreak through toGrabowski at first light. In a gamble,Major Tuggle sentAAVswith suppliesracingdownAmbushAlley in the pre-dawnhours.Theywereunopposed, theenemystillasleep.

DaveBanning’sAlpha/1stTankwascaughtupintheenormoustraffic jamgeneratedby thebattle.“Wereallyneeded fuel.Theysenta refuelingelementback to us an hour later and I tried to figure out what was going on. Thedetachment commander for the refueling unit didn’t knowwhatwas going oneither.As soon aswe refueled,wepulled into the tail endof1stMarines andtheyhadpulledoffthemainMSR.ThemainMSRkindofbypassesNasiriyahtothe south. They were on theMSR that headed right to Nasiriyah. The entireregimentwasparkedalong this two-lanehighwayandnooneknowsanything.Theentireunitisjuststopped.The1stMarineshavenearly1,000vehiclesontheroadandthey’re juststopped.Wesit thereforabit tryingtofigureoutwhat’sgoingonandit’sstartingtoget later intheevening,sowedecidetomoveup.Westartgoingdownthemiddleoftheroadandeveryonepartsthewayforus.Aswe’removingupthere,everyoneisclappingandtakingpicturesandcheeringlikewe’reabunchofrockstars.WegetuptotheregimentalCPanditturnsoutthatTaskForceTARAWAhadbeenengagedinaprettystifffight.”

AtahaltBanningtriedtosleepontheenginedeck,but“Iwastoldtogettothe regimentalCP Iwent back up there andColonelDowdy tookme andwewentuptotalktoColonelRonBaileywhowasthecommandingofficeroftheinfantry regimentwithTaskForceTARAWA.Wewere trying togeta feelofwhatwasgoingon.TheTaskForceTARAWAguys looked like theyhad justhad their asses kicked. Everyone was walking around with their chinstrapsundone and they just looked like they had been hit hard. These two colonelsweretryingtofigureoutwhatweweregoingtodo.IrememberColonelBaileytellingColonelDowdythattheyneededtofigureoutwhattheMEFwantedallofustodo.Ican’timaginethestresstheymusthavebeenunder.ThepicturewehadofwhatwasgoingoninNasiriyahwasthatweknewtherewerefriendliesalongtheTintersectioninthenorth,friendliesalongthesouthsideoftheriverandnothinginthefour-kilometerstretchinbetween.”20

Atabout0430hourson24MarchtheMarinesbeganrealigningunitsforthepassageof1stMarineDivision.The3/2begantowithdrawbackdownRoute1

from thewestern bridge to clear that route for the passage of the 5th and 7thMarines.AtfirstlightCobragunshipsbegantoroamthebattlefield,shootinguptaxis that the fedayeen used as transports.North of the canal 1/2 expanded itsarea of controlwest to the T-intersectionwhereRoute 7 turns north from thecity, oneof its original objectives.EddieRaybegan topull backhis scatteredforce in preparation for moving through the city. The 1st Marine Divisionplanned to barge downAmbushAlleywith its combat components, but divertthe vulnerable logistical trains down the south shore and across the Route 1bridgewestofthecity.

DuringthenightTugglehadorganizedalargereliefconvoywithwhateverresources were at hand, throwing in Peeples’s repaired tank, the late-arrivingFilipowski,andaplatoonofLAVsforgoodmeasure.The155mmhowitzersof1/10swepttheconvoy’sroutewitharollingbarragetodiscourageinterference.

The staff officerswere still debating their plan for passageofRCT-1whenTuggle’s relief convoy rolled throughAmbushAlley.FoxCompany2/8andagaggleofstaffofficerswatchingfromthesouthernendoftheriverbridgecameunder fire from themain hospital compound on the north bank. TheMarineswere calling in artillery fire when they learned that prisoners from the 507thMaintenance Company might be held there. Suddenly Iraqis startedsurrendering;astreamoffedayeenbegantoflowwestoutofthehospitalgroundswhileadoctoremergedtoorganizethesurrenderofthefacility.

Theprogressivecollapseof fedayeen resistancecaused1stMarineDivisiontoquicklyaltertheplanforpassagethroughthecity.SecondLARBattalionandtanks led the advance of the 1st RCT through Ambush Alley and on towardBaghdad,withlogisticaltrainsfollowing.

Banning:“Mysecondplatoonwasstillwith2ndLAR.3/1istoldtosetupapicket line between the north and the south bridge and provide security foreverybody else going through. My company was going to lead 3/1 into thistown.Weweregoingtogoinandmaketheinitialentryatnight.Ifwefacedanyresistance,weweresupposedtowhackitandmakethingspermissiveenoughforamphibious assault vehicles (AAVs) to come in, dismount the grunts andprovide theclose-insecurity.Aroundmidnight, I tookmycompany-minusandwerolledintotown.Wewentintothisbuilt-upareawithnoinfantrysupport.Ipersonallydidn’thaveasignificantproblemwithitbecauseasyoulookedatthemapyoucould see theway the townwas laidout and therewasa littlebitofspacebetweenthebuildingsandtheroad,alittlebitofstandoff.Iwasconfidentthat if we could get in there quick enough, we’d be able to destroy any

strongpointsbeforetheycouldmountanykindofcoherentdefenseagainstus.”21ByearlyeveningRCT-1hadreachedthewesternT-intersectionwestofthe

town, taking fire from both sides of the highway and replying with 25mmcannonfireandartillery.

TaskForceTARAWAretainedresponsibilityforthecityitself,butwiththechange in plans was ordered to secure the west side of Route 7 between therailwaylineandthenorthbankoftheriver.

Atabout2000hoursthe1stMarineDivision’sleadelementsbegancrossingintothecity,amidahugesnarloverwhohadpriorityofmovementthroughthechokepoints.The lead battalion of the 1stMarineswith two platoons of tanksattachedmoved across the river bridge and into Ambush Alley to establish apicketline.Thetankspeeledofftosecurekeyintersections.

Banning:“Sowegotinthere,itwasthemiddleofthenight,andtheIraqisdidn’t seem too interested in putting up any type of coherent defense. Thiscompanyisnowspreadoutalongfourkilometersstretchedoutthroughthetownandactuallybeinginthetown,withthebuildingsincloserproximitytotheroadthantheyhadappearedonthemap,makingmealittlenervous.Therewasalotofspaceinbetweentanks,notreallymutuallysupportingeachotheranymore….Therewasagapin3/1’sinfantrycompaniesastheyspreadoutand,asaresult,mycompanyXOandIdidn’thaveanyinfantryclosetoeitherofourtanks.Wespent all night watching each others’ backs and when the sun came up, 3/1pushedinthethirdriflecompanyandfilledinthemiddleoftheline.Ifeltalotbetterwithasquadofgruntsclosetothevehicle.Ourtankinfantrycoordinationwas a little ad-hoc. I basically hopped off the tank, grabbed the closest squadleaderandgavehimaquicklessononhowtousethegruntphoneonthebackofthetankandhowtotellifweweregettingreadytomovethevehicle.Asthesuncomesup,theIraqisfigureoutwe’rethereandstartshootingback.Thingskindof wax and wane during the course of the day, with the heavier fightingoccurringdowntowards thesouthernendof the town.Thereweresomeprettygoodfirefightsgoingon.Thebattalionswerejusttryingtogetthroughthereasfastastheycould.Ihadaconcernwiththefactthattherewasaprettysignificanttimegapbetweenonebattalion leavingand thenextbattalioncomingin there.Wewerebeginningtorunoutoffuelandweren’tgoingtobeabletositthereforthe rest of the daywhile these people dilly-dallied around outside the town. Iwanted them to get going. The rest of the regiment finally ended up gettingthroughthetownandIpulledthecompanyouttothenorth.”22

Fedayeenholdoutswerestillactiveand3/1began to laydownsuppressive

fire on itsway through the city, firingmostly to the east.At about 0330hoursGrabowski,at theT-intersectionnorthof thecanalbridge,grewalarmedatallthefiringas3/1approached.Hehadhismenmarkpositionswithchemicallightsticks,andwalkedoutintothehighwaytoblocktheconvoyandstoptherandomfiring.23

CharlieCompany,2ndLARsearchedabroadarceastofthecity,thenaboutnoonfollowed3/1whenthatbattalionbrokedownitspicket lineandfolloweditsparentregimentnorthalongRoute7.

Westof thecitymovementalongRoute1slowedtoacrawlwhentheleadbattalion,3/5,encounteredheavyresistance.Attemptsby1stLARtomoveofftheroadintofarmlandtotheeastendedwhenitbecameapparentthatthehighpaddydikeswithlimitedgapsrestrictedmovement.Bylateeveningthebattalionwasstilldrawnupbehind3/5.Tanks—withsuperiornightvisiondevices—werecalledupon to investigatemovement in thebrokenground to the eastbut sawnothing;theartillerysaturatedtheareawithHEandDPICM.24

As the division moved north TARAWA stayed behind to secure the stillhostile city and protect lines of supply and communication. They scourednumerous Iraqi military compounds, and searched the hospital compound butfoundnoAmericanPOWs.TheMarinesalsorecoveredremainsofthosekilledin the 507thMaintenance Company disaster, and the bodies of deadMarinesfromunmarkedgraves. InkeepingwithIslamicbeliefs,mosthadbeenquicklyburiedingravesduginbackgardens.

By 26 March platoons of LAVs from C/2nd LAR were still required toescortconvoysdownAmbushAlley.Civilians,withfedayeen intermixed,werefleeingthefightingacrossthewesternbridge,soPeeples’s3rdPlatoonassistedA/1/2byusingamineplowtopilewreckedcarstobarpassage.

Followinganunsuccessfulnightattackon2/8’spositions, inwhichMarineunits inadvertently fired on each other, 27 March was spent sweeping thesprawling old part of the city west of Ambush Alley. On 28March AmbushAlleywasopenedtounescortedconvoys,thoughthewesterndistrictswerestillunderfedayeen control. The task force distributed flour confiscated from IraqiArmywarehousestostarvingcivilians.

LocalresidentscontinuedtorelayrumorsofAmericanprisonersbeingheldin the city, and on 29March the Marines received credible intelligence of afemaleprisonerattheSaddamHospitalintheunsecuredpartofthecity.Askedto provide tank support for a high-priority mission, Peeples selected Cubas,Kamper, andFilipowski.The tankswere sent to thewesternbridge to support

TaskForce20,composedofNavySEALsandArmyRangers.Aroundmidnight, under cover of a noisy diversion of artillery fire and air

strikes,helicoptersswoopedintothehospitalcompoundfromthewestandnorthandspiritedJessicaLynch,amuch-celebratedsurvivorfromthe507th,tosafety.Farfromthespotlight,Kamperusedthemineplowonhis tanktosmashasidetheblockagehehadcreatedonthewesternbridge,andthetanksfollowedTaskForce20threekilometersthroughthecitytothehospital.ThetanksandRangerssecured the hospital grounds, and conducted a detailed search for any otherprisoners,orremainsofanydead.

On3AprilTaskForceTARAWAfinally left thecity, andbegan topatrolthelineofsupplythroughsouthernIraq.

NOTES

1Reynolds,Basrah,Baghdad,andBeyond,p.79.2Ibid,p.74.3TheCAATwasahighlymobileunitmountedinlightlyarmoredHumvees,andarmedwithadiversemix

ofTOWmissiles,lightandheavymachineguns,andMk1940mmautomaticgrenadelaunchers.Theirjobwasbasically to look for trouble.MarineCorps tankplatoonsconsistof fivevehicles,andcanbetacticallysubdividedintoalightsectionoftwotanksundertheseniorNCOandaheavysectionofthreetanksundertheplatoonleader.

4Pritchard,AmbushAlley,p.24.5ThegeneraloutlineofthefollowingsectionistakenfromGlover,H.,CommandChronologyReportforCalendarYear2003,CompanyA,8thTankBattalion;Reynolds,Basrah,Baghdad,andBeyond,p.75–85, and Pritchard,Ambush Alley.Where significant discrepancies exist, the Glover account is givenpriority.Somesourcesindicatethe507thMaintenanceCompanyconvoyhadeighteentrucks;RichardS.Lowry,TanksintheGardenofEden.

6DrivenbyPFCLoriPiestewa(diedofinjuriesincaptivity),wascarryingMasterSergeantRobertDowdy(killedinstantly)andPFCJessicaLynch(injuredandcaptured).Fartotherear,publicaffairsofficialsand the press made much of Lynch’s supposed heroics, actually the deeds of PFC Patrick Miller(captured).Tohercredit,Lynchconsistentlystrove todisabuseothersofanynotionsofher supposedheroics.The lead elementof the convoyacted according todoctrine, that anymobilevehicles shouldmoveoutoftheambushkillzone,thenattempttoassaulttheambushersfromoutsidethekillzone.Ofcoursethe507thwasnotspecificallytrainedorequippedtoassaulttheambush,andtherewereinanycasetoofewofthemtotakeonhundredsofambushers.

7Dunfee,AmbushAlleyRevisited,p.44.Dunfeestronglydisputes theaccountof thebattlepresentedbyBingandWest,TheMarchUp.

8 Pritchard, Ambush Alley, p. 31. The tank unit commanders thought the battalion staff tried tomicromanage the action, and therewas a constant radio chatter thatoftenprecludedcriticalmessagesfromgettingthrough.

9Lowry,MarinesintheGardenofEden,p.145–147.10Dunfee,AmbushAlleyRevisited,p.45.11Type1andType2CASaredirectlycontrolledbygroundobservers.UnderType1CASthetarget is

clearlyvisibletotheobserver,underType2thetargetisknownbutnotdirectlyvisible.Type3grants

pilots thediscretion toattackany targetwithinageographicarea, turning it intoa free firezone.TheMarineCorpsseldomutilizesType3.

12Lowry,MarinesintheGardenofEden,p.202–203.13Folsom,TheHighwayWar,p.120.14AsquotedinPritchard,AmbushAlley,p.264.15Lowry,MarinesintheGardenofEden,p.212.16RaymondL.ApplewhiteandEricSchwab,untitlednewsrelease,unpaginated.17Lowry,MarinesintheGardenofEden,p.199–201.NBC:Nuclear,Biological,andChemicalWarfare.

The charcoal filter is designed to trap particulates, finely-dispersed fluid droplets, and large-moleculechemicalsbeforeairisblownintothecrewspace.

18Folsom,TheHighwayWar,p.134.19Lowry,MarinesintheGardenofEden,p.269–273,281.20Lessard,InterviewwithMajorDaveBanning,p.10.21Ibid,p.11.22Ibid,p.11.23Lowry,MarinesintheGardenofEden,p.314–316.24Folsom,TheHighwayWar,p.134–142.

CHAPTERSEVEN

A

TheLowRoadtoBaghdad

“Speedisoftheessenceinthisendeavor.”—LtColMikeOehl,2ndMarineTankBattalion1

STHE1STMARINEDivisionstruggledtocrosstheEuphratesontheeveningof24Marchthe1stTankBattalionsufferedoneofthenon-combat losses that the volatile mix of numbing fatigue,

poorconditions,andpowerfulmachineryseemtomakeinevitable.2CharlieCompany tankswereordered tohalton thesouthernapproaches to

the uncompleted Route 1 Bridge and await instructions. Some had justcompleted an arduous refueling, squeezing fuel from thehuge rubberbladdersintotheinternaltanks.Manycrewmendozedoffduringthelonghalt.Thetankswereunderpressuretopickupthepace,soat0100hoursthecompanywasgiventheordertomove,onlytohaltonthebridgewhentheTOWplatoonreporteditwasunable toreconnoiteraclear routeon thefarshore.TanksC-23andC-24didnotheararadiomessagetomovetothesideofthebridgetoclearatrafficpath and the CO, Captain Brendan Rodden, walked forward and relayed theorder.

Just after 0300hours new orders came; the drowsy drivers cranked theengines, and the company moved out. Captain Rodden lost sight of the tankahead,andinstructedhisdrivertospeeduptoclosethegap.Thecolumnspedonthrough thenight,each tankfollowing themarker lightsof the tankahead.Anhour laterRoddendiscovered that hewas following thewrong tank.Repeatedradio calls failed to contact the missing tank,Harvester of Sorrows. Roddenhopedthatthetankhadonlygottenlostinthedarkness,butthetankanditscrewhadsimplydisappeared.

MAP3.MarineCorpsAreaofOperations,SouthernIraqandBaghdad.

Fivedayslaterthemissingtankwasfoundsubmergedintheriverbelowthebridge.Apparentlywhenthedrivermovedtotherighttoclearthetrafficlane,hedrove through a gap where a sidewalk was under construction. The exposedreinforcing bar crumbled under the weight, and snagged the tank tracks as ittumbledovertheside.Thetankflippedover,strikingthewaterupsidedown;noescape was possible. FourMarines died in the sunken tank, SSgt. Donald C.May, Jr., Corporal RobertMarcus Rodriguez, Lance Cpl. Patrick O’Day, andPFCFranciscoMartinezFlores.3

Northofan-NasiriyahRoute7pinchesdown to two lanes; the1stMarinescontinued north along that highway, while 5th and 7th Marines swung west,following themain highway,Route 1.On 25March the leading element, 2ndLAR, gingerly picked its way through a litter of wrecked and abandonedvehicles along Route 7, victims of Coalition air strikes. Behind were the 1stMarines, clogging the roadwith another hundredAAVs, a company of tanks,andinnumerabletrucks.Theadvancewasfurtherslowedbypettyambushes,butno onewants to be killed in a petty ambush; eachwas laboriously cleared by

tankfireorsmallinfantryassaults.The Route 1 axis of advance was clogged by 3/5 as they rooted out the

survivors of the previous days’ fighting. The battalion decided to launch aDragonEye to checkout the roadahead,butwhenahelicopterMEDEVAC’sflightpathpassed through the area the littledronewasdeliberately crashed. Itflewapartasdesigned,butthewindscatteredthelightweightpartsalloverthedesert—notasdesigned.4

DanHugheshadbeentoldhewouldbeattachedto3/5forthepushtowardBaghdad,undervagueorders.“Itwaskindoflike‘Okay,listenlieutenant,here’swhat Iwant you to do.You’re gonna be in front of the battalion, and you’resimply gonna drive down the highway.’” Colonel Mundy had assembled theofficersanddescribedthedebacleinan-Nasiriyah:“Thatwasthetimewhenhesaid ‘Make surewegotourheadson straight thatweare in awar.We’renotdoin’aroadmarch.Thisisawar.’”

Thenextday the task forceapproacheda largeairfield,andnoticedamanwrapped in a blanket; they thought it odd, but kept moving. The lead tanksreportedarmedenemy,andwereclearedtoengage.“IcouldseehisvehiclegethitbyacoupleofRPGs.TheRPGhitsoutinfrontofmytank.It’srightinthefront,basicallytheloader’ssideoftheturret….Westartengaging,andatthattimewehadthismassivebermonthesideoftheroad.Theywereessentiallyontheother sideof theberm,shootingdownon topofus.”The tanks firedmaingun rounds into the berm, and Hughes called for infantry. The CAAT teamarrivedandmaneuveredtheirHumveesupandovertheberm.

Flanked, the Iraqiswere trapped.“Someof them tried togoover thebermandwere engaged bymy section of tankswith coax.Now they’re kind of introuble.” As the CAAT team cleared the enemy, Mundy kept pushing forHughestomoveonupthehighway.

Abouttwokilometerssouthofacompoundnearthehighwaythetaskforce’sleadelementscameundermortarfire,andreturnedfirewithmaingunandcoax.

WhilefightingwasstillgoingoninthelateafternoonNatureachievedwhatthe Iraqi Army could not. While Hughes’ tanks were waiting for additionalinfantryandairsupport,“That’swhenthatduststormfromhellshowedup.Thatkindofsquashedallthat.”

The dust, whipped by 50mph (80kmph)winds, caused a “brownout.” Theadvance ground to a halt and the mechanized units went into huge defensivecoils. Darkness brought a chilling hour-long rainstorm, starting at about2130hours.Therainflusheddustfromtheairtofallasarainofmud,followed

bysleetand thenhail.MikeOehlwascaughtat the5thMarinesheadquarters,26kmfromhisownheadquarters.Unabletoseeanythingintheblackness,OehlnavigatedbyGPS,andshoutedinstructionstohisdriveroverthestorm’sdin.

MassivetrafficcongestionalongthelimitedroadnetworkwascausingmoreproblemsthanthecollapsingIraqimilitary.CaptainDaveBardorfwasinchargeof2ndTank’s combat trains, andhadnot slept indays.Peering throughnightvisiongogglesheshoutedinstructionstohisdriveruntil theexasperateddriver“shookmyshoulderandtoldmewe’dbeenstoppedforfiveminutes.”Bardorfcollapsedintoastuporandsleptthroughthenight.5

Thetryingconditionsofthe“OrangeCrush”demonstratedtheutilityofbothdesignfeaturesandpersonalinitiative.Benz:“Marinetankshavethisdevicethatblows theairbackwardforacoupleofseconds tocleanout theair filters. I’mobsessive compulsive. We had lots of toilet paper. I was a big Nazi aboutcleaning windshields.When you finally clean your windshield, you feel like,‘Wow, you can really see a lot better.’ You see a lot of other units drivingaroundwithorangemud,thentheyturnonthewindshieldwipersandjustsmearit.‘Hey,asshole,you’rejustbeggingforanaccident.Howcanyouseethebadguys?’ Stupid little things like we put pantyhose over all the air intakes. It’ssimple.It’sdiscipline.It’sgive-a-shitfactor.”6

Bythemorningof26Marchtheinfantrywerereducedtolivinglikepigsinwallows.Inthevehicles,dustandwind-drivenrainwaterhadinfiltratedthrougheverycrevice,fillingeverythingwithsoupymud.Weaponsandammunitionhadtobelaboriouslycleaned,part-by-partandround-by-round.

TheadvanceupRoute1continuedtobeaninfantryslog,clearingnumeroussmall ambushes in the advance toward the next objective, ad-Diwaniyah. Thecityitselfwasofnotacticalvalue,butthemilitaryairfieldatHantush,northofthecity,wasneededasaForwardArmamentandRefuelingPoint (FARP) fortacticalaircraft.NeartheairbaseRoute27branchedtotheeastandthecityofal-Kut,onthe1stMarines’axisofadvance.TheoverallplanwastofeinttowardBaghdadfromad-Diwaniyah,butfortheentireMEFtoshifteastontoRoute6andapproachBaghdadfromtheeast.

SamCrabtree remembered theFieldTrains as beinggenerally safe, but hewaslucky.Theonlyambushoccurredwhilehewasinthefieldrepairingatank.SecondLieutenantAaronKleinwas theLegalAdjutant for 1stTank: “Out ofnowherewestart takingsmallarms fire,andmortar rounds,andsomeRPGs.”Theenemywasbehindabermabout160metersoffthehighway.TheMarinessuppressedtheenemyfire“Aswegotbacktotheroad,itstartedfromtheother

side.Apparentlytheyhadbeenwaitingforus,orrealizedwehadhalted,andsetup somekindof ambush there.”Eventually thebattalion sent tanks andTOWcarriersbacktoeliminatetheenemy.7

Stress and fatigue are the constant enemies of those on night watch on abattlefield.About0430hours the2ndPlatoonofFolsom’sD/1stLARreportedmovement to its front. Other platoons verified the observation, reportingmenandvehicles, and figures settingup and firing amortar in plain view.Folsomwas puzzled.Why would the enemy be moving about so boldly? Finally the81mmmortars fired an illuminationmission, but themenonwatch still couldnot get a good visual identification. One of the platoon leaders reported theywere“…pickingupspeed.Headedrightforus.”

Folsom quickly moved forward, trying to assess the situation. At last hisnight vision glasses revealed a small herd of camels. Folsom instructed hiscompany“Justdon’tengagethem.”8

Ontheeasternaxis1stMarinesandtheirattachedunitsadvancedtowardas-ShatrahwithAlpha/1stTankinsupportof1/4.Atthesmalltownofan-Nasr2ndLARbecameembroiledinaheavyfirefightwithIraqiArmyunits;whenDaveBanningarrivedwithhistankcompanyhefoundaconfusedsituationwhere2ndLARwas trying to bypass the town.Wary of getting his tanks snarled in thenarrowstreets,hesentonetankacrossthelongbridgeovertheGharrafCanal.Discovering four enemy tanks milling about, the platoon leader called inartillery.The forcedroppedoff infantryelements to securevarious towns,andbyevening2ndLARwasat theQalatSukarAirfield intersectionwhereRoute17, themaineast-westaxisconnectingthetwoseparatedcolumns,branchedtothewest.9

Bythemorningof27Marchthe1stMarineDivisionwasarrayedinabroadnorth-facing arcwith two regiments alongRoute 1, the other onRoute 7, butseparatedbyabroadexpanseofuncontrolledgroundalongRoute17.Theplanwasnowforthe1stMarinestocontinuetheiradvancealongRoute7towardal-Kut. The other two regimentswere positioned for a strike alongRoute 8 pastancientBabylonandintosouthernBaghdad,butthatprizewasreservedfortheArmy. Instead, theMarineswould swing back east alongRoute 27, jump theTigrisRivernearan-Numaniyah,andswingwestwiththeTigrisprotectingtheirleftflankinthefinalapproachtoBaghdad.

ThediehardshadnotgivenupresistingtheAmericanadvance.AaronKlein,onRoute1:“Wehadseenthesamevehicleseveraltimesdrivingpast”andatahalt the vehicle approached again. “Some shots were fired… .We ended up

gettingtheguysout.Oneofthemembersintherehadbeenshot—Idon’tthinkbyus—washit in the leg.Weendedup searching thevehicle, finding severalRepublican Guard identifications, a tracking device … as well as severalweapons. I thinkwe found seventeenAK-47s, RPGs, some small sidearms, aknife,bayonets….”10

The5thMarineswerealready inpositionalongRoute27when logistics—thetruebaneofmilitaryoperations—haltedthedivisionyetagain.TheArmy’sVCorps,thedesignatedmaineffort,hadlurchedtoahaltfromlackofadequatetransport.

The Marines had pared down their logistical transport requirements byleaving most gear behind, dragging along only essential bulk commodities,reducingrationstotwoMREsperday,andairliftinginabsolutelycriticalitems.DanHughesexplainedthatthebladderfuel“wasenoughthatifyouweregettingrightontheedgeofyourrange,it’llgiveyouthatlittleextratoeitherkeepyouinthefight,ortoextendyouuntilyoucoulddoadeliberaterefuel….Weneveruseditunlessweactuallyneededto.”

MikeMummey, said that asS-4, “Iwasa cat-herder… .Wehadbattalioncombattrains,sowehad…thebattalionrecoveryvehicles,themedicalteam—ambulances, communicators, we had truckloads of ammunition, fuel, chow,water… .” Combat trains was a forward “emergency” element. “They wouldnormallygettheirresupplyfromtheirLogisticsPackage—theirLogPack.TheirTank Leader (typically a master Sergeant responsible for company supply)wouldbringthatLogPack,”adailyallotmentoffuel,ammunition,andsupplies.“ThoseLogPacksweregenerallykeptbackwiththebattalionfieldtrains,whichis where the main battalion maintenance was, BAS (Basic Allowance forSubsistence), supply; they were in a separate group farther back. They wereabout twenty-five clicks back. Iwas anywhere from six to twelve clicks backfromthebattalion.”Resupplyhadbeenintensivelypracticedintraining.

Delta Company/1st LAR was better prepared than most, thanks to theforesight of SSgt Jason Kappen. He had packed the company’s LAV-Ltransports with all the MREs he could lay his hands on, and continued toaccumulatemoreeachtimethelogisticaltrainsshowedup.Thecompanyendedup passing out crates of meals to the infantry, who were completely out ofrations.11

MikeMummeyalsorecallednoshortageoffoodin1stTank.“Ihearstoriesofpeoplesaying,‘Oh,yeah,wewerestarving.’Wehadtoomuchofthatstuff.Ithinkitwasbecausetheirlogisticspeopleweren’toutlookingforit.”

Problemswerebynomeanslimitedtofood.Vehicleswerecannibalizedtokeepothers running, anddeadvehicleswere towed along as rolling junkyardsforspareparts.CWOJerryCopely, themaintenanceofficerforFolsom’sLARcompany,tradedacovetedpornographicmagazineforspareparts.LtGenJamesConway, the MEF commander, was startled to see mechanics perchedprecariouslyatopanAAVattachedtothe5thMarines,workingonitas itwastowedalongatforty-fivemilesanhour.Hethoughttohimself“Nowthat’sgottobeasafetyviolation.”12

Tankstoowerecannibalized.MikeMummey:“AlphaCompanyhadatankthatwentdown.13Theyendeduptakingitapartforparts,andthencalleduptheCombatLogisticsBattalion18andsaid‘Hey,wegotatank.Youcancomepickitupatsuchandsuchagrid.Andgoodluckmovingitbecauseit’smissingroadwheels, it’smissing track… .,” a lengthy laundry list of parts. Even the headcount“wasalwaysinflux,becauseyou’dbeevacuatingsomethingback,orhadcommtechs,somesupplyguys….”

Theareas to therearwerestillseethingwith fedayeen.On29MarchDeltaCompanytankswereassignedtoescortacriticalsupplyconvoyforRCT-1.14

Toavoid revealing theplan,5thMarineswereobliged topullback towardad-DiwaniyahonRoute1.MuchwasmadeinthepressofhowtheMarineswerehalted,andthendrivenback,byferociousresistance.

Commanders inevitably worry whenever their forces are divided andvulnerable to being surprised by enemy forces lurking in the spaces between.TheMarinestookadvantageofthehalttopushinfrombothsidesalongRoute17, theonlymajorroad thatconnected thedivision’s twoaxesofattack.Fromthe west 3/4, supported by Captain Brian Lewis’s B Company, 1st TankadvancedtowardthepredominantlyCopticChristiantownofAfak.

The civilians greeted theMarines, pointing out the direction that fedayeenhad fled. As the column sat in the town square and conversedwith the townleaders, sporadic sniper fire came from the northern part of the town. Theinfantry battalion commander sent Kilo Company and a platoon of tanks toenvelop the snipers from thewest,while the remainderof the tanks saton theroad, ready to lay down a base of fire. The tanks surprised the insurgents,machine-gunning ten in the open. Disposal of captured enemy weapons wasalways a problem, one which the infantry solved by tossing them under thetreadsofthetanks.Theinfantrycommanderwassopleasedwiththistacticthathe dubbed it the Afak Drill, a tactic he would utilize repeatedly in comingdays.15

By late afternoon the task force reached the next major town, al-Budayr,whose residents also held little affection for the Saddam regime. Led by thetanks,MarinesinAAVsbargedintothetownsquare,whiletanksenvelopedthetowntocutoffescape.Inthesquarethelocalsurgedanimmediateattackonthelocalpolicestation,butafterblowingaholeinthewall,theMarinesfoundthatthepolicehadfled.

Ontheeasternsideoftownthetanksonoverwatchspottedfourarmedanduniformedmenmixingwiththemarketcrowd650metersaway.Thegunnerofonetankpatientlywaitedandwatchedthroughhislong-rangesightuntilhehada clear shot, then killed one of themenwith a single round from the coaxialmachinegun.Thecrowdscattered,thenreturnedtodragthebodyaway.Afewminutes later the remaining three soldiers reappeared, and the gunner killed asecond. Some in the crowd waved at the distant tank, but the other twouniformedmenneverreappeared.16

Along theRoute1axis fedayeenholdoutswerestillattackingunitsas theymovedpast,andD/1stLARwasorderedbacktohelpK/3/5clearthesiteofthepreviousnight’sbattle.Theenemyfled,butcrossingthebrokengroundoneofthe dismounts, Cpl Jesus Suarez del Solar, stepped on one of the DPICMbombletslitteringtheground.

SSgt Kappen quickly brought one of the LAV-Ls designated as anambulance, dumping a load of supplies and evicting reporterBobWoodruff’snewscrewtomakespace.AstheMarineswaitedatthedesignatedlandingzonefor the evacuation helicopter which had been delayed by mechanical failure,Woodruff asked to borrow Kappen’s personal camcorder to replace one leftbehind where the film crew was evicted. Furious, Folsom—who had neverwantedWoodruffalong—forbadeKappen toallowanyone to film thestruggletosavedelSolar’slife.Afteratwo-hourdelay,itwasdecidedtocarrydelSolarto the aid station by ground transport. After he watched the ambulance driveaway, Folsom absent-mindedly wiped his grimy face and tasted blood—delSolar’sblood.Thecorporaldiedenroute.17

Despitethehalt,theMarinesdidnotsitinplace.PatrolsweresentupRoute1andasfaraspracticalintothemarshygroundoffthehighways,withCharlieCompany/1stTanksupportingtheLAR.18

On31MarchtheMarinesresumedtheiradvancebackupRoute1towardad-Diwaniyah, but the Iraqi resistance had stiffened as the fedayeen bullied theremainingmilitiamenwith threats to the livesof themand their families.Firstand 3rd LAR were leading the 1st Marine Division, seizing the airfield at

Hantush.Fartherbackalongthelineofsupply,3rdTank’ssecurityelementwaskeptbusy.

On the morning of 1 April the same infantry-heavy task force that hadcapturedAfakandal-Budayr—K/3/4,BCompany,1stTank,andaCAATwithHumvees—hadwithdrawnwestandwerepoisedontheeasternoutskirtsofad-Diwaniyah.Reconnaissancesuggested that Iraqi tankswerepresent in thecity,andinthemarshygroundheavyvehicleswouldberestrictedtothehard-surfaceroads.Thebattalioncommander,LtColBryanMcCoy,decidedtousehisAfakDrill,with a tank-heavy force as a base of fire and an infantry-heavy force toenvelopthetown.19

Lewispositionedhistanksatopahighwayoverpassabout1500meterseastof the city, the only commanding terrain in the otherwise flat alluvial plain,whilemost of the infantry inAAVs and a platoon of tanks continued on to atraffic circle closer to the town. The Iraqis mounted a typically disorganizeddefense. The tanks on the overpass began to exchangemachine gun firewithpositions dug into earthen berms north of the highway, in a large palm grovenorthof thehighway, and inhouses surrounding anearby factory complex.Abus raced toand frobetween the townanda trafficcircleat theedgeof townuntilthetankersspottedarmedmenexitingthebusanddestroyeditwithamaingun round.The tankoptics could clearlypickout the fedayeen, dressed in theblackclothingandskimasks that theMarinesscornfullycalled“ninjaoutfits.”They melted away in the face of the gunfire, and the infantry gathered in afrightened militiaman who explained that the fedayeen were mainly shootingmilitiamenwhodeclinedtofight.

Thetanksontheoverpasswerestillfiringintothegrove.Lewiscomplainedthat“Theypopupeveryfewminutes,likewhack-a-moles.They’reoutthereallright,onlythey’reduginliketicks.”20

KiloCompany’sAAVs and accompanying tankswere herringboned alongthesidesofthehighwaynearthetrafficcircleasdismountedMarinesbegantosearchthebuildingsnearthehighway.Asinglerecoillessgunroundimpactedinthe road, and thevehicles scattered for cover,with the exceptionof the tanks.Theysimplysat“asthoughitwerebeneaththeirdignitytomove,”andsearchedfortheoffendinggununtilordereddownofftheexposedroad.21

A platoon ofMarine infantry attacked the palm grove (joined by CaptainLewis and his First Sergeant on foot), while the tank platoon near the trafficcircle positioned themselves to cover the ground between the grove and thetown.Mostofthedefendersfledoutthefarside,onlytobecutdownbylong-

rangetankfireintheopenfields.Thetanksthenmovedfartheralongtheroad,gatheringupprisonerssentoutbytheinfantry.Mostwerelocalmilitiamen;thefedayeenhadasusualescapedatthefirstshots.

Inariskynightmarchthedivision,withthe5thMarinesinthevan,swungnortheastalongRoute27andawayfromBaghdad.ThenextmajorobjectivewastoseizeacrossingovertheTigrisatan-Numaniyah.The2ndTankBattaliontaskforcewith thebulkof5thMarineswould try toseize thebridge in thecity;asinsurance,2/5ledbyD/1stLARwouldturnleftandheadupthewestbankalong“RiverRoad,” trying to findasite forapontoonbridge ifneeded.RiverRoadbranchedoffofRoute27 in thecity, so thebattalionwouldhave tocutcross-country to intercept the road. The 7thMarineswould exploitwhichever forcesucceeded.

As the Marines probed for a crossing point, they began to encounterproblemsthatwouldbeleaguerthemforyearsintheMesopotamianvalley.The1/5 mechanized infantry team was anticipating being one of the first intoBaghdad.Hayes:“Wegetthereandapparentlyitwasn’tabigenoughbridgetosupportthetanksandallthevehicles.Somebodysaiditwasjustsomewoodenbridge.Weendeduphavingtoturneverybodyaround…

“ThatwasprobablyoneoftheworstdaysinBravoCompanyhistory.”Firstonetankandthenanotherbecamemired,thentheretrieverboggeddown.“Thatwasthedaythatmytankwentdown.”Thetankwouldnotstart,and“Itwasnotaverygoodtimetofixit.Afterafewhoursweabandonedallthosevehicles.Wedidn’t blow them up.We took all the weapons, sabotaged them to the pointwhere theywere justvehicles sitting there, tookout the radios, took the firingpin out, burned all the maps, and took all our gear.” Hayes ended up in aHumvee with a sniper team, and in the confusion left a prized pair of oldsandals.

Ontheeasternaxis1stMarinesfinallyresumeditsadvancenorthofal-Haywhere Marine artillery was “pounding the living hell” out of the BaghdadDivisionatal-Kut.Banning’sAlpha/1stTanksweretoldtobacktracksouthandattachthemselvesto2ndLARfor thepushthroughal-KutandontoBaghdad.Outsideal-KuttheLAVsencounteredaroadobstaclethatturnedouttobeonlybarbedwire, butBanning said, “My lead platoon commander called back andsaidhethoughttheremightbeminesupaheadbecausehisdriverwasreportedlyseeinghotspotsinhisthermals.WeherringbonedandtheXOpreparedsomeon-call targets in casewe started taking fire.Wecalled the engineersup and thisarmoredcombatearthmover(ACE)drivesrightthroughourlines.Wehadtold

themthatmytankwastheonewiththebigsixspraypaintedonthepanelonthebackoftheturretandthatheshouldstopthere.Buthedroverightthroughourlinesandright intothis thing.Sureenough,hehitsamineandblowshis trackoff.Icouldn’tbelievethatthatjusthappened.TheguystartsjockeyingaroundinhisACEandmyplatooncommanderistellingmeontheradiototellhimtostopbecausehewaschewingupmoremines.Sureenough,youlookupthereandashistracksweremovingthereweremoremineskickingup.Itwasamiracletheguywasn’tkilled.Sowegethimtostopandgethimoutofthere.Webringtherestoftheengineersuptoblowtheseminesinplace.Ittook40minutes;itwasexcruciatinglyslow.”22

On2Aprilthemainforceof2ndTank“bounced”theTigrisbridge,seizingitwithonlyminordamagebyRPGsanddestroyingseveraltanksandBMPsinthestreets.The3/5heldanarrowpassagethroughthecitytoallowthetanksandLAVsof1stLARpassageandmaintain themomentumof theattack.The7thMarinesquicklycloseduptosecurethecitywhile5thMarinespressedonwardwith2ndTankinthelead.

By 3 April the main body of the 5th Marines had turned west towardBaghdad.Themainpushwastobealongthehighwaynorthoftheriver.The1stMarines, along with two battalions of RCT-7 (1/7 and 3/4) surrounded theBaghdadDivision at al-Kut from the south andnorth, respectively.Al-Kut satastride Route 7, potentially themain supply and communications axis for thedivision,betweenan-NasiriyahandSaba.Intheinterimunitsweresuppliedwithfuelbroughtintothecapturedairfieldatan-NumaniyahbyC-130transports.

DaveBanning’scompanywasspreadupanddowntheeasternhighway,withonlyoneplatoonand theheadquarterssectionsouthofal-Kut.“Istart togetalittlenervousbecausethetownwasgettingmorebuiltupandwehadnoattachedinfantry. I had the attached LAV platoon but still no dismounted infantry. Iradioedbacktotellthemwewereheadedintoabuilt-upareaandthatIneededsomeinfantryreadytodosomething.”Heknewthat7thMarinesweretoattackfromwestofthetown,butcouldnotcontactBCompanytanks.Seniorofficerswere conferringnearby, soBanningwalkedover to eavesdropwhen “All of asudden,thisinfantrybattalionblowsrightthroughusanduptowardsthisurbanarea.InAlKutthereisthisbigmilitarycompoundinthesouth,whichiskindofopen,butthenyoucanseethetypicalIraqitownhousesandallthatstuff.Thingsgotmorebuiltuptowardsthenorth.Theseinfantryguysstartedheadingpedaltothemetal into thisurbanarea. Ihoppedbackonmy tankand toldmyguys tostand by. Sure enough, as soon as they turned the corner there was a hail of

gunfire.IpunchedmyfirsttwotanksouttheretogoreinforcethembutIdidn’twant to leave the intersection unsecured.”When an LAR company arrived tosecuretheintersection,Banningheadedhissmalltankforceintothetown.

“My lead platoon commander was whacking these Iraqi reinforcementscoming over this bridge. They were just streaming over this bridge like theywere completely oblivious to the fact that there were two tanks sitting at thebottomofit,justkillingthemlikecancer.Thiswentonfor10or15minutesandtheneverythingquieteddown.Therewas this lull in thebattleandwe figuredwe’ddriveoverthebridge,golinkupandheadout,butthenwegetthewordtowithdrawtothesouth.Sowewithdrawbacksouth,gettheorderthatnowwe’regoing to march down around Numaniyah and we’re going to link up inNumaniyahwiththerestofthedivision.”

Captain Brian Lewis’s B/1st Tank was ordered not to enter al-Kut, butprovided long-range fire support. However, Lewis was shot in the hand inanother of the random ambushes outside the city—what he called “a cheaplessoninhowtheenemywasoperating.”23

Thedelayinclearingal-KutandbringingRCT-1acrosstheTigriscausedthedivisioncommander,MajorGeneral JohnMattis, toconclude thatColonel JoeDowdy, theCOof the regiment,was not being sufficiently aggressive.Mattisliterally “kicked him upstairs”; Dowdy was made senior officer airborne tocoordinateactivities fromaspeciallyequippedP-3Orion, replacedbyColonelJohnToolan.24

Parts of theRepublicanGuardal-NidahDivision chose tomake a stand atthe townof al-Aziziyah, astrideRoute 6 about 60 kilometers northwest of thejunction with Routes 7 and 27 at Sabat. Tanks from A Company, 2nd TankBattalion underCaptain Todd Sudmeyer (a former enlistedMarine) shot theirway through enemy fire and along themain highway that bypassed the townproper,but the longcolumnsofAAVsandsoft-skinnedvehiclesbehindcouldnotbravethefire,inaccurateasitwas,comingfromthetown.

Long-range RPG fire also came from behind a taxi parked near the canalsouthof town, skipping across the roadnear thehaltedAAVs.MajorAndrewBianca,theXOof2ndTank,hadhisgunnerfireonthetaxi.Thehigh-velocityroundtorethroughthetaxiwithnoapparenteffect,butthefireceasedandafewmoments later the car burst into flame.25 Meanwhile Sudmeyer’s tankscontinued forward, quickly overrunning an Iraqi military post after a brieffirefight.

Now3/5hadtodismountandclearthetown,supportedbymortars,artillery,

AAVs,andair strikes.As in somany incidents, the residents told theMarinesthattheIraqisoldiersfledatthesightofMarinescrossingthebridgethatledintothe town. The infantry went door-to-door, clearing the city. The 1st LARscreened the exits from the city, trying to intercept fleeing enemy. WarrantOfficer Mike Musselman, the crew chief for Lt. Col. DuffyWhite’s vehicle,spotted several Iraqis shucking off their uniforms about 1500meters from theroad. When one ill-advisedly fired at the LAY the return 25mm cannon firemade him turn “kind of misty.” The others surrendered to the platoon’sdismounts.26

Thetinytownprovedtobefatefulfor2ndTank.DanielBenz:

“…ourscoutplatooncommandergotwoundedandabunchofscoutsgotwounded.WetookourTOWplatooncommanderandputhiminchangeof the scouts. Ihad trainedhimonallof the scoutplatoon tasks.Theyhave the scouts out front,which in retrospect is, “What the fuckweretheythinking?”Ascoutplatoonisnormallylike,let’sseekopportunities,but it’s already a predetermined course of action. And what can thescoutsseethatatankcan’tsee?Thescoutplatooncommandergetsshotin the head. KIA instantly… first day on the job. Thenwe had threeotherKIAsthatdayinthebattalionandreallyalotofWIAs.Oneofourcompanycommanders,his tankgotshotandwasonfireandtheammocookedoff.Hebailedoutof the tanknoproblem.Buthegetshalfwayacrossthestreet,he’srunningforsomeothertank,realizesheforgothismap, so he runs back across the street, climbs up in the tank, gets hismap, gets down, gets shot right—it was one of those weird things:ricochetedoffhisshoulderblade,wentupthroughhismouth,cameout,bounced off a board, down throughhis throat.Whatever.He lived.Hewas okay. He went home. It was probably the worst day for thebattalion.”27

SouthoftherivertheMarinesencounteredresistancefromfedayeenfleeingthefightinal-Aziziyah,buttheRiverRoadmissionturnedouttobemisguided.Thelongcolumnstruggledinamazeofsingle-laneroads.AyellowpickuptruckturnedtorunfromtheLAVs,butatarpoverthecargobedblewoffrevealingamounted heavy weapon. Two LAVs opened fire, and Lt Brandon Schwartzrecalled the look of fear on the driver’s face, and seeing him blown into thepassenger’s lapby the impactof the25mmrounds.The truckburst into flame

andcareenedintoadrainagecanalparalleltotheroad,wherestoredammunitionbegantocookoff.28

Thecolumn,ledby3rdPlatoonoftheLARcompanyapproachedanamelessvillage,simplyaplacewheretheroadmadeabendawayfromtheriver.Mostofthecrewshadbeenlulledbyheat,tedium,andfatiguewhensuddenlysmallarmsfireandRPGsbegantoimpactallaround.Theplatoonwastoocloselyengagedin the L-shaped ambush for air or artillery support, and backed down theroadway, hammering away at trees and buildings that sheltered the attackers.Twomore platoons of LAVs came forward, and the 81mmmortars began todrop rounds on the retreating fedayeen. Within minutes artillery, Cobragunships,andF-18sarrivedtoaddtothedestruction.

InexplicablyanIraqifamilyinasedan—awhiteragtiedtoanoutsidemirror—drovethelengthofthecolumnofLAVsandcontinuedonintotheambushsitebefore seeing the volcano of dirt and debris rising from the village. Pulling aquickU-turn, theyracedbackdownthefiringlineandoutof thebattle.Whileassessingthefight,Folsomreceivedorderstobacktrackandcrosstheriveratan-Numaniyahthatnight.29

ThepathtoBaghdadwasafour-lanedividedhighway,andthe5thRCTwith2ndTankBattalion,tookthelead.FirstSergeantEdward“Horsehead”SmithofF/2/5toldBingWestthat“…we’regoingbysofastthatthetanksareshootingonlyatenemymainsystems,likeothertanks.”Hewentontoexplainthatitwashardtokeepuphismen’smorale,sincethetanksweretakingalltheshotsandthe infantry was cooped up in vehicles.30 The main problem, as usual, wassupply since the logistical units were fighting a different kind of war againstdistanceandtrafficjams.

At 1100on themorning of 4April the double columnmovedout,withBCompany 2nd Tank on the left side of the highway median, followed by ACompany, a column of 34 tanks. To the right an equally powerful column ofCAATHumveesadvancedinparallel.Remnantsoftheal-NidahDivisionwerestillentrenchedinbunkersdugintobermsalongbothsidesoftheroad,andthecolumn was under steady fire from small arms and the occasional anti-tankmissile.31

Mostofthefightingwaswithmachinegunsandrifles,thoughoccasionallythetankswouldfiretheirmaingunsatparticularlytroublesomepositions.AfewtanksandBMPsweredestroyedsittinginplaceorfleeingthearea,butthemainobstacleswereburningvehicleshitbyaircraft.

About35kilometersupthehighway,nearTuwayhah,thehighwaynarrowed

and the tanksmovedon in a single column,withCharlieCompany taking thelead.Al-Nidahmighthavecollapsed,butthefedayeenwerestillfulloffight.Oldvehicleswere stacked as barriers, and anoil-filled trenchwas set afire: itwasmoreapsychological thenphysicalbarrier,but2ndLieutenantAdamMarkleystillfoundit“scaryasshit.Ididn’tknowwhatwasontheotherside.”32

Withsomanyroundsflyingthroughtheair,theIraqiswereboundtoscoreafew lucky hits. The heaviest fire was falling on company XO 1st Lt CharlesNicol Jr’s tank. “”He’s got five or six antenna on his tank—it’s like having agiant‘shootmehere’sign,”Lt.Markleysaid.33

One hit ruptured a fuel bladder hanging from the turret rack of the tankbelongingtoCaptainJeffreyHouston,theCOofACompany.Itstartedaminorfire,andfuelfloodingintotheairintakesstalledtheengine.Houstondismountedandrantoanothertank,wherehecouldusetheradiostocontrolhiscompany.The driver, LCpl BillyW. Peixotto, dismounted to activate the external fireextinguisher.Moreenemyfirepoureddownonthetanks,Humvees,andAAVs.Ariflemanwasseriouslywounded,andthecommanderoftheScoutPlatoon,Lt.BrianMcPhillips,waskilledbyaroundtothehead.34

Mostpeoplethinkthattankersarealwaysprotectedbytheirthickarmor,butsince the earliest days tankers have realized that their best protection isawarenessoftheenemy’sposition.Usuallythetankcommanderfightsstandinginhisopenhatch,andinarunninggunbattlelikethatalongRoute6theloaderswere using their roof-mounted machine guns to protect their tanks. A fewkilometersfartheralongarandomRPGhittheopenloader’shatchofMarkley’stank.Theblastdeflecteddownward,mortallywoundedCplBernardG.Gooden,and disabled the tank’s radios. The blast disabled the turret traverse, stunnedMarkley,andknockedhisportableGPSunitoverboard.Intheensuingconfusionhemissedaturn,andheadedintoamazeofnarrowroads.Therestofthelongcolumnfollowed.

TheMarinesquicklyrealizedtheproblem,butthe15-kilometerlongcolumnwasshorteninglikeanaccordionasmorevehiclespushedintothejam.Markleyhad another tank commander plot their location; when gunner Corporal JulioCesareMartinezrestoredtheradios,henotifiedNicolofthemistakenturn.Theunwieldycolumnwouldhavetobeturnedaroundonitselfinthenarrowstreets,underheavyfire.Martinezwentbacktowork, traversingtheheavyturretwiththehandcrank,andfiringthecoaxialmachinegunwiththemanualtrigger.

CaptainSudmeyerveeredoutof thecolumnandraced to thefront, turninghistankbroadsideintheroadtoprotectothervehiclesastheymadetheriskyU-

turn.AninfantrymaninoneoftheAAVswashit.CaptainDavidBardorfracedup with an ambulance to evacuate the casualty, adding more unavoidableconfusion.35

BackonRoute 6Peixottowas trying to restart the tank engine, but it stillwould not start, so he climbed out again into the small arms fire and RPGssweeping the road. Gunner Cpl Alfredo Ramirez and the loader manned theturret roofmachinegunsandreturnedfire.The loader’smachinegun jammed,soCplMichaelAckermanusedarifleandpistoltoholdthefedayeenatbay.

Houstonranbacktohistankandgotonthetank-infantryphoneattachedtoits rear. A random round struck him in the jaw and he collapsed in the road,bleedingprofuselyfromaseveredartery.Peixottoracedtohisside.“Becauseofthewayyou train as aMarine, you don’t think about yourself.Youbasically,youthinkaboutothers.Youseesomebodydownlikethat,Imeannomatterwhoyouare,youthinkaboutyourselfforabriefsecond,andyoudecide,yougodoit.”36

Ramirez and Ackerman dismounted to help Peixotto and cut loose thetroublesome fuel bladder. They tossed Peixotto all the extra clips of pistolammo,andfirstaidcompresses.

Encouraged by their modest success, fedayeen and soldiers hiding in theditchesandbermsrushedthetank,closingtowithin20meters.

PeixottodraggedHoustonupagainstthesideofthedisabledtank,where“Itfeltlikebeinginsideabuildingduringathunderstorm.It’sscary,butyoureallydon’tthinkaboutit.TherewasanotherMarinedown,andIdidn’twanttobetheone who could have helped him and didn’t.” Holding a battle dressing toHouston’sshatteredfacewithonehandandfiringhis9mmpistolwiththeother,PeixottotalkedoveraradioheldtohisfacebyanotherMarine,coordinatingtheprotectionofhis tankandcaptain.37Heemptiedclipafterclipofammoat theenemy.

Colonel Joe Dunford’s regimental command group arrived at the scene,adding theirmodest firepower andpositioningvehicles tohelp shieldHoustonandPeixotto.TheubiquitousBardorfarrivedwith theambulanceandbattalionsurgeonNavyLt.BruceWebb.AsthecrewhelpedHouston—barelyconscious—intotheambulance,thedriver,CplLukeHolden,wasshotthroughthehand.NavycorpsmanThomasSmithsomehowdrove,heldacompressoverHolden’shand,andfiredanM-16outthewindowastheyracedbackthroughtheambush.The ambulance drove a short distance north out of the main firefight to apositionwhereamedicalevacuationhelicoptercouldsafelyland.Butsafetywas

arelativething;Holdenwasshotthroughtheotherhandatthelandingzone.BythistimeCobragunshipswerestrafingandrocketingtheenemypositions

in the fields on either side of the road. Dunford ordered 3/5 to dismount andclearthefields,sendingIndiaCompanytothesouthside,Limatothenorth.Theinfantrybattleamongtheditchesandbermsconsumedthenextthreehours,butby 1600hours the remnants of the al-Nidah Division and fedayeen had beeneliminated.DunfordorderedPeixotto,Ramirez, andAckerman to abandon thestill-smolderingtankandleavewithhiscommandgroup.

The safety features built into theM1 tankswere glaringly obvious in thisincident. Dan Hughes, still attached to 3/5, “… didn’t notice any explosionsfrom the tank. It basically just melted down.” Hughes was told to drop thebladdersfromhistanks.

Despite thebesteffortsof theembeddedreporters, theconsequencesof themedia’s insatiable desire for “breaking news” could be agonizing for familymembersathome.Peixotto:

Whenithappened,Iwrotemydadalettertellinghimnottotellmymomoranything.Theyhadtoldmenottodoanythingstupid,andIdid.

Beforetheygotthelettertheyfoundoutaboutit.Iactuallyhadbeenpronouncedkilled in action over the radio. I think thewhole crewhadbeen.Nobodyknewwherewewere.Mymomcalled,andallawomanwouldsaywas that theyhadno information. Itwasabout threeor fourdaysofaboutpurehellformyparents.

IfIcoulddoitoveragain,I’dtellhim[Houston]tostayinthetank.38

JimLandersoftheDallasNewsreported:

“Therewereenough rifles,RPGs,andother smallarms in that town tooutfit an entire Marine division—15 buildings’ worth,” said Lt. Col.Mike Oehl, 2nd Tank Battalion’s commanding officer. “These wereIslamic Jihadguys fromall over theArabworld.Wehave intelligencereports that they’ve been staying at the Sheraton in downtownBaghdad.”39

Thenextday,nowfartothedivisionrear,Folsom’sLARcompanystruggledthrough the usual traffic jam, and was eventually assigned to investigate andclearweaponsdepotsandmilitaryfacilities.Engineersweredestroyingmassive

quantities of weapons, and the LAVs disabled parked armored vehicles withcannonfire,buttherewasjusttoomuchammunitiontobesafelyorpracticallydestroyed.

Securing the “rear areas” was a foretaste of things to come in a countrywhere everyone seemed to own an AK-47. Mike Mummey said, “When thetankswouldmovethrough,itwaslikepartingtheRedSea.Theywouldallfallback,butthenassoonasthetankslefttheywould…startshootingagain.”Thesecurity platoon did little fighting, but “Thatwas the first time I saw a TOWmissilebeingusedforananti-personnelweapon.OneofourTOWguys, therewasaguyshootingatus,andhejustdecidedtogoaheadandletamissilefly.Itstoppedhimfromshooting.”

SecuringtherearprovidedastrangeculturalshocktoFolsom’smen.His1stPlatoon was positioned near a factory where a dog was caught and crushedbetweenan irongateandaconcretewall.Finally theMarinesdecided toburythe stinking, maggot ridden carcass. The local idlers would only look on inamazement and contempt for those who would stoop to bury an uncleananimal.40

Bynowtheunrelentingactionhadbeguntotakeatollonmachinesaswell.Banning’s companywas towing two disabled tanks and anM88 on a 250kmroad march. “By the time we limped into an-Numaniyah, we were hurting. Ireported in when we got there and the regimental commander looked at hiswatchandtoldmewewerecrossingthelineofdeparture(LD)fortheattackin20minutes. I asked ifhe reallyneededus.At thispoint, twoother regimentalcombatteamshadalreadypassedthroughthearea.Isaidifheneededuswe’dgobut,bythetimewe’redone,hewouldonlyhavethreefunctionaltanks.Ihadtried everything, every communication pipe available, to get a replacementengine for that tank. Itwas very frustrating becausewe saw a helicopter landnexttooneoftheinfantrybattalionsandsomebodyhopsoff,deliversanammocantooneoftheMarinesandwecanseethemdelivering.50caliberparts—withahelicopter to this infantrybattalion. Iwassitting therepullingmyhairout. Iwas towing a tank! Thiswas one-thirteenth of theirmajor combat power andthey couldn’t get me an engine for this thing? I thought that was crazy.Welinked up with the support guys and explained the situation. The lieutenantcolonelinchargepointstothisrowofCONEXboxesonthebackoftrucksandtoldusthepartswereintheresomewhere.Super.Whatabighelp.Wetookthetankthathadtheworstsuspensionandropedittotheground.Wespent24hoursplaying parts swap games and got the rest of the tanks in the company fully

missioncapable.Bythetimeweleftinthemorning,wehad12tanksfullupandreadytogo.”41

NOTES

1AsquotedinLanders,TheMarines’2ndTankBattalionUsedSpeedandArmortoMakeQuickWorkofSaddamHussein’sRegime.

2Intheaftermathofthisincidentseveralconflictingaccountswerepublished.Thisaccountisdrawnfromthemostreliable,Anonymous,OperationIraqiFreedomIraq—1stTankBattalion,AfterActionReport.

3Livingston,AnNasiriyah,p.176–177.4Folsom,TheHighwayWar,p.145–146.5 Landers, The Marines’ 2nd Tank Battalion Used Speed and Armor to Make Quick Work of SaddamHussein’sRegime.

6Galuzska,InterviewwithMajorDanielBenz,p.24.7Harris,InterviewwithSecondLieutenantAaronKlein.8Folsom,TheHighwayWar,p.158–159.9Lessard,InterviewwithMajorDaveBanning,p.12.10Harris,InterviewwithSecondLieutenantAaronKlein.11Folsom,TheHighwayWar,p.163.12Ibid,p.163–164.13A-41,thetankhitbyfriendlyfire.14Anonymous,OperationIraqiFreedomIraq—1stTankBattalion,AfterActionReport.p.25.15WestandSmith,TheMarchUp,p.90–93.16Ibid,p.95–96.17Folsom,TheHighwayWar,p.170–179.18Anonymous,OperationIraqiFreedomIraq—1stTankBattalion,AfterActionReport.p.26–27.19Thefollowingaccountofthean-DiwaniyahactionisdrawnprimarilyfromWestandSmith,TheMarchUp,p.113–123.

20WestandSmith,TheMarchUp,p.118.21Ibid,p.117–118.22Lessard,InterviewwithMajorDaveBanning,p.13.23Anonymous,OperationIraqiFreedomIraq—1stTankBattalion,AfterActionReport.p.29.24WestandSmith,TheMarchUp,p.149.25 Landers,TheMarines’ 2nd Tank BattalionUsed Speed and Armor toMakeQuickWork of SaddamHussein’sRegime.

26WestandSmith,TheMarchUp,p.151,172.27Galuzska,InterviewwithMajorDanielBenz,p.28.28Folsom,TheHighwayWar,p.224.29Ibid,p.230–241.30WestandSmith,TheMarchUp,p.154–155.HorseheadSmithwaskilledinactionon3April.31Ibid,p.151,157.32Thefollowinggeneraldescriptionoftheactionandquotations,unlessotherwisenoted,aretakenfrom

Landers,AmbushCostlyforMarineBattalion.33Landers,AmbushCostlyforMarineBattalion.34WestandSmith,TheMarchUp,p.159–160.35Theriflemanlaterdiedofhiswound.Ibid,p.160–161.36Youngquist,PulledThroughbyHisBuddies.

37QuotedinSteinkopffFiveMarinesHonoredForServiceinIraqWar.PeixottowaseventuallyawardedtheBronzeStar.

38Youngquist,PulledThroughbyHisBuddies,Winston-SalemJournal,September26,2009.39Landers,AmbushCostlyforMarineBattalion.40InIslamthedog,likethepig,isuncleanbecauseofitshabitsofeatingcarrionandexcrement.Folsom,TheHighwayWar,p.251.

41Lessard,InterviewwithMajorDaveBanning,p.13.

N

CHAPTEREIGHT

ThePrize

Hell,theseareMarines.MenlikethemheldGuadalcanalandtookIwoJima.Baghdadain’tshit.—MajorGeneralJohnF.Kelly,USMC

OW ONLY THENAHRDiyalaRiver,with a deep channel and high,steepbanks,stoodbetweentheMarinesandBaghdad.Withthedivision cut loose from any continuous logistical train,

Houston’scrippledtankwasdestroyedinplace.Theremnantsoftheal-Nidahwerealesseffectiveobstacle.Shortlyafterthe

5th Marines went into defensive circle for the night three 122mm rocketsexploded harmlessly within the position. They were answered by six dozenrounds from the 11th Marines’ 155mm guns, dumping nearly 8000 DPICMbomblets on the firing site detected by counter-battery radar. There were nomorerockets.1

Aftertwoandone-halfhoursofsleepFolsom’sD/1stLAR,joinedbyA/4thLARwho had finally received their vehicles and caught upwith the division,was ordered to join the rest of the battalion at the front of the division. TheLAVs inched theirway through themassive jamalongRoute6;vehicleswereparkedhaphazardlyandexhaustedmenweresleepingeverywhere,evenonthepavement.2

Noenemyarmoredthreathadmaterialized,andfortheassaultonthecitythetankswerebrokendownevenfurther.“Tiger”(1stTank)wouldgiveuponeofits two remaining line companies, Charlie, to be split between operationalcontrolof1/7and3/7. In returnanadditional infantrycompany,A/1/7,wouldpasstocontrolofthetankbattaliontocreateaninfantry-heavymechanizedtaskforce,TaskForceMECH.3

On themorningof 5April 3/4, supportedbyB/1stTank, attacked straightintothebuiltupareaontheeastshoreoftheriver,advancinguptothefour-lane

highwaybridge.Whilehighercommandsweredebatingthecaptureofthebridgeand how it fit into the larger plan, the Iraqis blew the center span. Thedemolition engineers were inept, and although it was impassable to vehicles,infantrycouldforceacrossing.

LtColDuffyWhite’s1stLARhadalreadybeenunleashedtoperformoneofits primary tasks, to search for a suitable crossing point over the river if theIraqisblew themainbridge.Each companywas assigned a sectorof the riverbank,andDragonEyeswerelaunchedtospeedthesearch.

As theMarineswaited,BingWestandRaySmithwalkedover towhereacrowd had gathered. A T-72, fleeing the previous afternoon’s fighting, hadforcedabusintoadrainagecanal,thenitselfoverturnedintothecanal,drowningthecrew.TheMarinescalledupanM88toextricatethebus,tothedelightoftheowner-driver.4

SelectionofabridgingsitewasdelayedastheLARcompaniesstruggledinthemazeof animal paths andpoor roads in the river plain, and engaged Iraqiunitsonthefarsideoftheriver.ThefrustratedreconnaissanceMarineswerenomore pleased when two Navy F-14s made a visual pass over the WeaponsCompany, thendropped twolargebombswhichfortunatelywerewideof theirtarget.5

Bylateafternoon threebattalionswere in theeasternoutskirtsofBaghdad.Task Force MECH, led by L/3/4, would cross at the southern bridge. Thesupportingtanksprovidedcoveringfires,anddestroyedoneBMP-2.6

Bridgingassetsweresentfivekilometersnorthof themainbridgetoasiteselectedbyTaskForceBLADE(withDaveBanning’sA/1stTankand3/7), incase it proved necessary to repair a destroyed bridge. The plan was for thehighly-visible tanks to fix the enemy’s attention while the infantry forced acrossingelsewheretosecureabridgesite.

On the morning of 6 April K/3/4, supported by a platoon of C Companytanks,madefinalpreparationstorushapedestrianbridgenearthecrateredspan.As the155mmhowitzers fireda“dangerclose” firesupportmission the Iraqisreturnedartilleryfire,leadingtoconfusionwhentheMarinesthoughttheirownartillerywas fallingshort.The infantry rushed thebridgeandquickly forcedacrossing, throwing a large metal gate and planks across a gap blown in thebridge.Withinminutes IndiaandKiloCompanieswereclearing thewarrenofhousesthatnearlyoverhungthesteepbank.7EngineersrepairedthebridgeatthealternateBLADEsite,apontoonbridgecapableofcarryingheavyvehicleswasquickly built near the damaged highway bridge, and the highway bridge itself

wasunderrepair.TheMarinesnowhadthreebridgesites.Engineers,creepingthroughadrainagetunneltoapositionunderthebridge,

determinedthat thehighwaybridgeatTaskForceMECH’scrossingsitecouldbeused. Ineptenemydemolitionshadcratered thedecking,but the supportingsteel stringers were intact. On the morning of 7 April tanks that had beensuppressingfirefromthefarshorebackedofftomakewayforanAVLB.Theartillery smoke fire mission, intended to obscure enemy observation, wasabruptlycalledoff,butmortars tookup the slack.TheAVLBmovedonto thebridge,andquicklyemplaceditsspan.

Thoughthiscrossingwasintendedasafeint,LtColJimChartierde-manded—andreceived—permissiontomakethiscrossingsitethemainpushtowardthecity.8

By1230hoursDeltaCompanytankshadencounteredanddestroyedtwoT-72s, but enemy resistance was collapsing. The main hindrance was theubiquitousmines.Theremainderofthedaywasspentsecuringobjectivesintheoutskirtsof thecity,and trying todealwith the floodof refugeesandheavily-burdenedlootersflowingaroundandthroughMarinepositions.

WithmajorCoalitionforcesnowarrayedaroundthecity,itwasnolongeranoption to ignoredisagreementoverhow to control a city the sizeofBaghdad.TheUSArmy,thefirst toarrive,hadalreadycommenceditsvaunted“thunderruns” into the city. Heavily mechanized but short on infantry dismounts, theconcept was to send powerful armored columns into the city, shoot up anyresistancethatrevealeditself,andthenwithdraw,repeatingtheprocessoverandover.The ideawas simply to inflict casualtieswith thehopeofwearingdownany resistance in thecity.Theproblemof coursewas that thecitywas fullofinnocent civilians, many of whom would inevitably become casualties. Theirfriendsandrelativeswouldthenbecomenewenemies,fuelingtheveryguerrillamovementtheCoalitionhopedtoavoid.

AttheotherendofthespectrumweretheBritish.BuildingonexperienceinNorthernIreland,theirmodelwasmoreakintopolicethanmilitaryaction.Theywanted to encircle the city and carefully—if slowly—build relationships withlocalresidents,identifyenemyleaders(manyofwhomwereatthispointeitherBa’athistdie-hardsorforeignersnotmuchbelovedbythelocals),anddecapitatetheresistancewithselectiveraids.

In the middle were the Marines, who also wanted to build upon priorexperience.Theirplanwasavariantofthe“spreadinginkblot”approach,whichinsomecircleswasheldinillreputeafterbeingprematurelyabortedbyWilliam

Westmoreland in Vietnam. The idea was to forcefully seize and hold criticalpositions inside thecity,destroy insurgentswhowould inevitably flow towardthesecenters,andthengraduallyextendcontrolovertheremainingpartsofthecity.Thefirststepwouldbetoadvancealongthemainstreetsfromsoutheasttonorthwest,throwingaloosenetoverthecentralpartofthecity.

TheproblemfortheMarineswasthatneitherelectronicintercepts(ELINT)norhumanintelligence(HUMINT)couldidentifyanyrealcentersofresistance.There were no centers of organized resistance. The regime had suffered acatastrophiccollapse,andthefedayeenwereinherentlydisorganized.

While the planners deliberated on 8 April, the Marines paused to tightentheirringaroundeasternBaghdad.

Likemost cities,Baghdadpresenteda spectrumof faces.Atoneendweretheaffluentareasofofficebuildings,walledresidences,andpalatialhomes,allsetalongbroadboulevards.Attheotherswerewarrensoftinystreets,ancientormodernslums,somewithoutbasicutilitiessuchascleanwaterandsewers.Bothshelteredenemyfighters.

When theymoved into the city on 9 April, “We had probed the southernedgeofBaghdadthedaybeforewiththeTOWplatoonanditseemedasif theciviliansweremoreorlessdisinterested,whichwehopedwouldprecludeattheleasttheunrestricteduseofciviliandwellingsforambushsites.Ofcourse,thisturned out to be the case exactly. You really can’t fight a guerilla war if thelocals don’t like you, and we found out pretty quickly during our attack thatmostIraqicitizens thought‘Saddambad!Bushgood!’”(MajMikePurcell,1stTankBattalionOperationsOfficer).9

FirstTank’sTaskForceMechfounditselfnearalargeamusementpark,andtheMartyr’sMonumenttothehalf-millioncasualtiesofSadaam’swarwithIran.Criticswould later charge that theMarines looted themonument, but reporterElliottBlairSmithsaid,“AsthefirstAmericaninside,Icansayitalreadywastrashed.” Looters had even brought their own transport.When LtCol Chartierfiredhispistolintotheairinavainattempttodissuadelooters,nervousgruntswhirledandfiredonhim.“Igetpepperedaroundmyhead.Apaintchipgoesoffmynose.”10

The infantry divvied the city up into battalion sectors, each with a fewsupporting tanks. Mike Mummey: “I’d end up running parts or personnel todifferentunits….Takeafueltruckoverthereto(re)fuelthem.OncewegottoBaghdad they chopped up the tanks. The grunts needed tanks, so hell, there’sheadquarterssections—aCOandanXOofacompany—workingseparatefrom

theircompany.Yougotalance-corporaltellingthemwheretogo.”Mummey’sjobwas now to sendhis vehicles, usually unescorted, to assist the small unitsscatteredaboutthecity.”

He quickly found that “Grunts aren’t very good at logistics.”When tankswere attached to infantry “Pretty soon, ‘Hey, Top. We need fuel for theseamtracs,’ because they weren’t getting support.” With even the headquarterselementsoftheAAVunitstiedupincombatmissions,supportforthetanksandamtracs fell to the infantry battalions, who were not equipped to handle theadded load. ‘You say you need fuel, and they’ll bring you a five-gallon can.WhatamIsupposedtodo,lightthetankonfirewiththis?”

The logistics chief for an infantrybattalion: “…allof a suddenhe’sgot acompanyofamtracs,thenallofasuddenhe’sgotaplatoonoftanks,andprettysoonthey’reoverwhelmed.”

Advancing along the main streets and securing the dominating buildingsmeant days of slow, hot, boring and occasionally terrifying work as vehiclesstoodguardinthestreetsandinfantryworkedtheirwayhousebyhouse,scalinggarden walls, smashing through gates and doors, climbing stairs, searchingrooms.NeithertheIraqiArmynorthefedayeenhadorganizedthemselvesinanyway to defend the city, but any random close-range encounter might be witheitherinnocentciviliansortheoccasionalfanaticwhowantedtokillyou.

WestandSmithwitnessedonesuchinexplicableeventasanondescriptcarapproachedatanksitedtocoveralongboulevard,andthegunnerfiredseveralwarningshots.RatherthansteerawaythecaraccelerateddirectlyatthetankasMarinesscrambledforcover,assumingitwassuicidecarbomber.Thetankanda nearbyAAV raked the car withmachine gun fire, and everyone cringed inanticipationoftheexplosion.

Engineerssearchingthecarfoundonlytwodeadmiddle-agedmenindenimwork clothing.Had the driver simply panicked at the sight of the tank or thegunfire?Itwasjustoneoffartoomanysuchincidents.11

But therewere fighterswhomade even themost routine activities fraughtwithdanger.One tankcommanderdismountedandwalked intoavacant lot toansweranurgentcallofnature,onlytocomefacetofacewiththreearmedmenwho popped up from among the litter. He bolted—or rather waddled at highspeedwithhistrousersdown—backtowardthetanksshouting“Shoot!Shoot!”Thestartledloaderemptiedamachinegunandthenhispistolkillingoneofthemen.Nearbyinfantryeventuallyhunteddownandkilledtheothers.12

Aprizeawarded to1/7was tosearchapeninsula formedbyabendof the

Tigris,whichheldseveralofSaddam’spalaces,theembassydistrict,upperclasshomes, and Baghdad University at the tip. The shape resembled a cartoonscrawled on a men’s room wall, so the staff planners discreetly dubbed thepeninsula The Snoozle. CIA intelligence suggested that the University wasoccupiedbylargenumbersoffedayeen.13

Theinfantry-heavytaskforce—1/7,ledbyCCompanytanks—moveddownthebroadstreetsthroughtheembassydistrict,peelingoffplatoonstosecurekeyintersectionsandobjectives.Thetanksmotoredthroughtosecure thebridgeatthetipofthepeninsula,andtookupfiringpositionsonthebridgeramps,fromwheretheycoulddominatethenearbyUniversitycampusandblockanyescaperoutes. Infantry cleared the campus, which harbored only a few die-hardfedayeen.

Other battalions pushed northwest and deeper into the city. Firdos Square,dominatedbyahugemetalstatueofSaddamHussein,layinthepathof3/4.Thefall of the statue, pulled down by an M88 from 1st Tank in front of newscamerasandcheeringIraqis,quicklycametosymbolizethefalloftheregimetomost of the world. Patrols fanned out through the city to search palacesbelongingtoleadersofthefallenregime,wherenecessaryusingtankstoknockdowntheheavyirongatesthatbarredentrancestopalacecompounds.

TheCIAbelievedithadcredibleintelligencethatSaddamhimselfwasintheAlmilyahPalace,onthegreatbendoftherivernorthofTheSnoozle,so1/5wasassigned to storm the huge compound, actually six palaces and sprawlinggardens. A platoon from 2nd Tank was first in, smashing down the massivegates,andtheAlphaCompanyinfantryspreadouttosearchthegrounds.IntheclosequartersonetanksufferedanRPGhitinthetransmissioncooler—theonevulnerablespot—andquicklygroundtoastop.

Once again, themodular construction of the tank proved its worth. Benz:“WehadanothertankfromAlphaCompanywentintoanirrigationcanal.Andone ofmy bestmomentswas seeingmymaintenance guys—they pulled bothenginesandsatthemonahighway.Withinfourhoursfromthetimewhentheypulledthosetanks,theyputthewettransmission,whichstillworks,intheblownuptank.Thatonewas toast.Butwithinfourhours, theyhadacombatcapabletankbackinthefight.Thatwasprettycool.”14

The entire district proved to be crawling with fedayeen. The tanks andinfantry fought their way toward the Hanifah Mosque, the tanks blastingbuildingswith 120mm cannon fire and the riflemen rooting out any survivorswhodidnotflee.

BackontheeasternbankoftheNahrDiyala,withnorealroleinthestreetfighting,1stLARstewedanddisciplinesuffered.ThatnightFolsomspottedanorange flame in the back of one of his mortar vehicles, and found the crewcookingonagasstoveamidthestoredammunition.Nosoonerhadhefinishedlighting into theplatoonsergeantwhen thesoundfromaSAWripped throughthe position. On another mortar carrier an accidental discharge wrecked theengineandsentshrapnelintooneofthecrew.TheexasperatedFolsomrelievedtheplatoonleader.15

FirstLARfinallyinchedacrosstheundulatingribbonbridge,onevehicleatatime,andwasassignedtosendapatrolnorthofthecity,withstrictorderstoreturnbeforedarkness.

By10AprilArmyGeneralEricShinseki’sassertionthatmoretroopswouldbe needed to control the country than to capture it was validated: infantrybattalionswerebeingsucked into thevacuumofBaghdad.16FirstLARhad toassume partial responsibility for isolating the sprawling capital. The battalionwasassignedabroadarcnorthof thecity,between theTigrisand theDiyalahandborderingthevastslumknownasSaddamCity(latertobeknownasSadrCity). The area was littered with abandoned weapons from small arms toartillery and tanks,with dangling electrical lines thrown in for goodmeasure.Thetankbattalion’sM88sdraggedawaynumerousarmoredvehicles.17

MoreMarineunitsmovedintooccupythecity.BillHayeswasnowjustapassengerinaheavycargotruck.“WedrovetoBaghdadandmetupatthisbiguniversitythere.”DrivingintoBaghdad,theMarinesweregreetedasliberators.“These people were ecstatic. You could tell. You can’t fake that emotion.”Nevertheless,leaderslikeDanHugheswerewarningtheMarines,“Don’tgettoofriendlywith them… . Don’t be hostile, but keep them out of our area, keepthemagoodsafetydistanceaway,don’tletthemcrawlonyourvehicles.”

Hayesthoughtthewholeaffair“Kindofanti-climactic.Ikindofengagedtheenemy, Iguess.Goodenough.”Hayescouldnothaveanticipatedwhatwas tofollow.“Ineverinamillionyearsthoughtwe’dhavegoneback,that[it]wouldhave lasted I guess eightmore years.”Hayes and others sat at theUniversity,then at a new base nearby, while the policy makers tried—like the dog whochasedcars—todeterminewhattodowithIraqnowthattheyhadit.

As theMarines transitioned to security duties, they found that locals hadoften taken neighborhood security into their own hands, and welcomed theMarines’ efforts. In a peculiarity of the rules of engagement, Marines wereallowed to fire upon such friendly “neighborhood watch” groups, but not at

unarmed looters. Efforts to get such necessary functions as governmentministries running again were equally chaotic. (1st Tank’s Field Trains wereresponsiblefortheimportantMinistryofOilbuilding.)18

On 12 April the 1st Marine Division organized Task Force TRIPOLI tosecure Saddam Hussein’s reputed birthplace, Tikrit. This expedition wouldextend the division’s area of responsibility significantly inland.Thebest routefor the advancewould require passing across the rear of twoArmy divisions,thusdelaysinmassivetrafficjams.Thealternative,fromeasternBaghdadwouldrequire the task force to negotiate a maze of small roads scouted by SEALteams, and numerous bridges of dubious capacity. Themechanized task forcethereforereliedentirelyuponwheeledvehicles.BuiltaroundanentireregimentofLAVs(1st,2nd,and3rdLAR),theforceincludedGCompanyandtheCAATfrom3/23,artillery,andthedivisionJumpHQ.

On13AprilthenewTaskForcereceivedcredibleintelligencethatAmericanprisonerswerebeingheldinSamarra,andaraidwashastilyorganized.AfterabriefbattleontheoutskirtstheLARbattalionssurroundedthetownandinfantryrecovered seven POWs—two helicopter pilots and five survivors of the 507thMaintenance Company captured in an-Nasiriyah. A local policeman used aportableGPStomarkthehousewheretheprisonerswereheld,andtheprisonersthemselvespersuadedtheirguardstofleeattheapproachoftheMarines.

ThirdLARwas left to secure the townwhile the restpushedon.Scatteredbandsof fedayeen stagednumerous small ambushes. In one encounterFolsomwatched as a large group of civilians and a few soldiers caught between theMarinesandfedayeenmilledaboutasifuncertainwhattodo.OnesoldiercametowardtheMarines,handsintheair.Gunfirescatteredthecivilians,butthelonesoldiertookaroundorbitofroadsurfacethrownupbythefiring,andcollapsedspewing blood from a head wound. The dismounts grabbed him and draggedhimtothemedicalevacuationpointastheLAVsanddismountssweptpast.

A military truck screeched to a stop and disgorged men clad in civilianclotheswhomadereadytofireontheMarines,onlytobecutdownbysheetsoffire from the LAVs. Three survivors fled into a culvert under the highway.Dismountssurroundedthemouthsof theculvert, tossingthreegrenadesinside.Folsom arrived and ordered the scouts to toss more grenades inside. Still theIraqisheldout.

FolsomdismountedandtookovertheM240turretroofmachinegunthathadbeenpassedtothemenontheground,butwhentheytriedtomakeaconcertedrush, the weapon misfired. Two more rushes fell back as the machine gun

repeatedlymalfunctioned.Afterthethirdrushthefedayeeninsiderepliedwithagrenade,woundingonescout.Someoneinthetunnelshouted“Goaway”and“Ithrowbomb”repeatedly.

The Marines could see into the culvert, where two fedayeen were down,badly wounded or dead, and a third was slumped against the wall holding agrenade.Themanrefusedtosurrender.Folsomshothimwithhispistol,andhecollapsed against the floor. After making sure the three men were dead, theMarineswithdrew back up to the road,where the LAR and infantry battalioncommandersweretryingtoestablishwhatwasgoingon.

FolsomwaslaterconfrontedbyhisFirstSergeant,RubenGuzman,whotoldhim,‘“Yougottastopthisshit,sir.Yau’regonnagetyourselfkilled.”Guzman,better than Folsom, realized the implications of having the CO killed orwounded.19

In Tikrit heMarines fanned out to secure various objectives with far lessresistance than expected.DeltaCompany, 1stLARdrew a plumprize, one ofSaddam’spalacesperchedonabluffoverlookingtheTigris.Orderedtosecurethe area and wait for Special Forces, the Marines grew bored. Guzman andFolsom searched the palace, then watched in amusement as heavily armedSEALs“assaulted”thedesertedstructure.20

It quickly became apparent that the threat to Tikrit and nearby areas wasnotfedayeen,buta largeKurdish forcepressing in from thenortheast, eager totake revenge on Saddam’s home town. The prospect of tangling with theMarines led the Kurds to abandon their campaign, but a very peculiar threatarose.AdelegationofeldersfromBenji,25kilometersnorthofTikrit,metwiththeMarines to voice their concerns over prowlingAmerican attack and scouthelicopters.Whenthe4thInfantryDivisionsentanofficer toshareplansforamajor raid onBenji, theMarines instead took him for a tour of the town andlunchwiththelocals.21

ThemajortaskoftheMarineswastorestoreorder,sincetheBa’athistpoliceandsecurityforceshadcollapsed.Theprocesswashamstrungbytheinabilitytoscreenapplicantsforpositionsonthenewpoliceforce.

On21April thetaskforceleftTikrit,andwasdisbanded.OneofFolsom’slastactswastovisitthesitewherehehadkilledthemanintheculvert.Thebodywasgone,but theplace stankofdeath, andFolsomhadnightmaresabout thatday.22

FirstTankwasamongtheunitsscheduledforearlywithdrawal.On20AprilitturnedoveritsresponsibilitiestotheArmy’s3rdBattalion—69thArmor,and

marchedsouthtoDiwaniyah.On2MayTaskForceTRIPOLIwasreconstitutedandassignedtoscreenthe

Saudi border, reportedly amajor transit route for foreign fighters.After a fewdays the task force was dissolved, as there was no credible intelligence ofinsurgentactivity in thearea.Senior leaders foresawno role for tanks inwhatwasanticipatedasarapidtransitiontoIraqiself-rule.

All things considered, the large Marine force was shipped home withconsiderable alacrity. Dan Hayes and his comrades spent idle weeks at theUniversity, thenreturned toKuwait.“May thirdwas thedaywe jumpedon theHETTsanddroveback[toKuwait].”Hefound that“Somebody, Idon’tknowwho, maybeMSSG or something, went and picked up all those [abandoned]tanksup,and theywere sittingdown there inKuwait.”When theyopened thetanks,“Youcouldtellithadbeenkindoflooted,stolealltheMREsandallthatstuff.Nobodytookmysandals.Theywerestillsittingthereinthebottomofthetank.”

When the Army took over the compound where Crabtree’s maintenancegroupwasbased,“Wewentdowntoadump.Itwasafilled-indump.Wejustlaidoutthereforawhile.”Afterseveralsuchmoves,“WegotthewordtostartrollingbacktoKuwait”insmallconvoys.

In the temporary camps, age-old problems again surfaced. Daniel Benz:“Anotherbig thing Igot topointout is field sanitation. Iworkedveryhard toenforcedisciplinefor,here’swhereweshit.Don’tshitanywhereelse.Ihatetotake a negative—I always preface everything. They called me Mr. Caveat.Anyway,aseven-tondrives through thearea;he’sgothisheadlightson.Whatdoesitdo?Itilluminatessomeguy’sbuttcheeks.He’stakingashitrightinourarea.I’djustgooverandlight theguyup:‘Youstupid,selfish,-‘Ididn’t talklikethat.Idon’tuseprofaneorabusivelanguagetalkingtoourMarines.Butyouseethatalot.Whathappenedwasalotofpeoplestartedgettingsick.Wecalledit the‘asspiss’whenpeoplevomitandshitat thesametime,uncontrollably.Iwouldsayprobably80percentofthebattaliongotitatonetimeoranother.Butthecompanyheadquartersgroup,noneofusgotsick.Someguyswouldgetsickandthengetbetterandgetsickagainandthey’dgetbetter.Wealwayshadalotofpeopleseriouslysick.”23

MikeMummey: “Wewere out of there byMemorialDay. Iwent back toTwentyninePalms.TherestofthebattaliongotstuckontheUSSBoxer—ontheprisonshipBoxer.Theydidn’tgetbackuntilJuly26.WhenIgotbackmyjobwas to turn the battalion back on… . We had sealed everything up, turned

everything in, shut off water, lights, power.” The advance party consisted ofselectedMarines from each company and those due for transfer or discharge,andreplacementshadtobeintegrated.

NOTES

1Folsom,TheHighwayWar,p.261–262.2Ibid,p.261–262.3Anonymous,OperationIraqiFreedomIraq—1stTankBattalion,.p.30.4WestandSmith,TheMarchUp,p.172–173.5Ibid,p.179–180;Folsom,TheHighwayWar,p.267–275.6Anonymous,OperationIraqiFreedomIraq—1stTankBattalion.p.32–33.7WestandSmith,TheMarchUp,p.200–205.8Anonymous,OperationIraqiFreedomIraq—1stTankBattalion,.p.35.9Anonymous,OperationIraqiFreedomIraq—1stTankBattalion.p.39.10Smith,BaghdadandBeyond.11WestandSmith,TheMarchUp,p.213.12Ibid,p21613Ibid,p.219.14Galuzska,InterviewwithMajorDanielBenz,p.26–27.15Folsom,TheHighwayWar,p.291–294.16Shinseki’sadamant insistence thatmore troopswouldbeneededforoccupationdutywasnotpopular

withhisciviliansuperiors,andwasamajorfactorinhisdismissal.17Folsom,TheHighwayWar,p.303–342.18Anonymous,OperationIraqiFreedomIraq—1stTankBattalion.p.39–41.19Folsom,TheHighwayWar,p.327–339.20Ibid,p.347–348.21WestandSmith,TheMarchUp,p.251.22Folsom,TheHighwayWar,p.366–369.23Galuzska,InterviewwithMajorDanielBenz,p.31–32.

“N

CHAPTERNINE

ReturntoIraq

HeshotatthestrongandheslashedattheweakFromtheSalweenscrubtotheChindwinteak:Hecrucifiednoble,hescarifiedmean,Hefilledoldladieswithkerosene:Whileoverthewaterthepaperscried,“Thepatriotfightsforhiscountryside!”ButlittletheycaredfortheNativePress,*[Or]Thewornwhitesoldiersinkhakidress….(*localmilitia)—RudyardKipling,“TheBalladofBohDahThone,”1888

ATION BUILDING,” the messy reconstruction of a collapsed society—afailedstateintwenty-firstcenturyjargon—wasscornedbytheneo-conservativeswho had planned and successfully conducted the lightning war against Iraq.Meantime the Marines had been tasked with nation-building for well over acentury. Though they might not welcome the role, they at least had someinstitutional experience in this most difficult of tasks. Not so their civiliansuperiors. Their planwas to rapidly stand up a new Iraqi government, and towithdraw from Iraqi cities bySeptember 2003.1Dissenting voices like that ofArmyGeneralEricShinseki,whoraisedthewarningthatlargerforcesmightberequiredtoexploit thevictorysoeasilywon,werenonetoosubtlystifled.TheonlysavinggracewasthatthevariousIraqifactionsventedmuchoftheirenergyin internecine warfare and ethnic cleansing, without mounting a trulycoordinatedanti-Coalitioninsurgency.

Coalition forces (predominantlyAmerican) found themselves inpossessionof a nation wracked by civil war in all but name. Not only central and localgovernmentrule,butevenbasicservicessuchasdrinkingwaterandelectricity,hadcollapsed.Vaststoresofweaponsandmilitarysupplieshadfallen into the

hands of unrepentant Ba’athist loyalists, international terrorists who hadgravitated to this new front against America, fundamentalist religiousparamilitaries,tribalmilitias,andcriminalgangs.

Theproblemwasexacerbatedbytheinsistenceupon“de-Ba’athification,”apurgeofanywhohad served the former regime.No lessonsweredrawn fromexperience in the occupation of Nazi Germany or Imperial Japan after theircollapse. The insistence upon de-Ba’athification disqualified most of theexperiencedcivilservants,police,andotherswhohadservedtheformerregimeonly as uncommitted functionaries, but in fact possessed all the experience inoperating thediverseandfractioussociety.Novicepoliceandotherunitsweregiven cursory training, and expected to stand up to fanatical—and oftenexperienced—-jihadis who flooded into the country, and equally fanaticalmilitaryandpoliceoftheformerregime.

Facedwithincreasingviolence,twoAmericanArmydivisionsscheduledformuch-needed relief, and a shortfall of Coalition troops, the Joint Chiefsconcluded that theArmyandMarineCorpswouldneed toprovideat least sixfreshbattalionseach,plusadivisionalsupportinfrastructure.2

ThoughCommandantGeneralMichaelHageeandhis staff anticipated thisnew mission, it was hardly welcome. Wars deplete supplies and wear outequipmentataphenomenalrate,andlogisticianscannotsimplyreplenisheitherfromthe localbig-boxstore.Plannersdidnotanticipate reconstitutionofMPSstorespriortoearly2004.Thenewmissionwouldrequireevenmoreutilizationof Reservemanpower, and utilization of stores and equipment from bases onOkinawaandelsewhere.3

Afterseveralchangesduringtheplanningprocess,theforcewassettleduponas a division-scaleMarineExpeditionaryForce (MEF)with the usual aviationassets. The force would be built around the 1st Marine Division and wouldconsist of: Regimental Combat Team (RCT) 1 of three infantry battalions, anArmy motorized battalion, and a recon battalion; RCT 7 of three infantrybattalions and an LAR Battalion; the Army’s 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1stInfantryDivision of oneMarine and twoArmy infantry battalions (oneArmybattalionwasconvertedfromarmor,andretainedafewtanks),andanartillerybattalion.DivisiontroopswouldincludeareserveMarineinfantrybattalion,anartillery battalion as provisional MPs, and one company each of tanks andAAVs;twobatteriesofMarine155mmhowitzerswouldeventuallybeadded.Tofullyreconstitutethisforce,theCorpswouldstripassetsfromotherunits.4

Themissionwasunenviable.TheIMEFwouldhavetocontrolal-Anbarand

northernBabilProvinces,one-thirdofIraq’stotal landareathatstretchedfromthe suburbs of Baghdad across a vast expanse of river bottoms, desert andgrazing land to the borders of Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. It was amicrocosm of Iraq’s problems, with a large Shi’ite population in the east(heavilyinfiltratedbyIranianagentsandwithorganizedreligiousmilitias),andalargelySunnipopulation in thewest (with regime loyalists and ties tomilitantSaudi-basedWahhabi fundamentalists).This desperately poor region had beenlargely bypassed in the original invasion that concentrated on occupying theeconomic and population centers, leaving old regime units and arms cacheslargely intact. Through the area ran the “rat lines”—infiltration paths thatbrought foreign fighters along centuries-old smuggling routes.With only oneoverstretchedArmycavalryregimenttopatrolit,limitedcontactsledtheArmytounderestimateresistance.Theregionhadbecomeadefactoenemysanctuary.5

Theworst troublespotbyfarwasFallujah, the“cityofmosques.”Thesitehadamilitaryhistory reachingas farbackas thewritingsofXenophon.Morerecently aBritish force savagelyquelled a revolt in1920, at the cost of1,000Britisharmyand10,000Iraqidead.EventheruthlesshandofSaddamhadlainlightly on Fallujah, a lawless city whose main industry was smuggling. Theresidents of the citywere already ill-disposed toward the Coalition forces; anerrantBritishbombhadstruckamarketplaceinthe1991war,killingmany.6

The82ndAirborneDivisionwas thefirstofseveralunits toberesponsiblefor the city. Trained for aggressivemilitarymissions, not peacekeeping, therewasnonation-widecivilaffairsprogram;suchprogramswerehandleddivisionby division, with civil affairs officers seldom having the ear of seniorcommanders.7 Assured that a new Iraqi government would be quicklyestablished,mostcommandersprobablysawlittleneedforsuchprograms.

The first hostile incident occurred on 28 April 2003 when soldiers,confrontedwith anunruly crowdand theusual celebratorygunfire, fireduponthecrowd.Otherunitsrotatedthroughtheareabutthesituationdidnotimprove.The return of the 82ndAirborne in Septemberwasmarred by a shootout thatkilledeightpolicemen,thekillingofaJordanianguardatanearbyhospital,andthe killing of a teenage member of a wedding party. The division eventuallyestablishedastrongcivilaffairsprogram,but theinsurgencywasalreadywell-entrenched.AtfirsttheinsurgencyinandnearFallujahwasnotasingle,simpleresistance organization but a devil’s brewof hard-coreBa’athists,Abu-Musabal-Zarqawi’s“al-QaedahinIraq,”andoutrightcriminalgangs.8

Al-Zarqawi, bornAhmadFadil al-Khalayla,was a Jordanian alcoholic and

pettycriminalwho turned to radical Islam inprison.After fightingagainst theSovietsinAfghanistan,hereturnedtoJordanwherehewasjailedforadvocatingoverthrow of the monarchy; a violent prisoner but charismatic in the CharlieManson mode, he developed his following in prison. After release he driftedthrough Europe, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, where he considered Osama bin-Laden too willing to compromise with the West. Returning home, he wasarrested in early 2001 but jumped bail; he was convicted in absentia andsentencedtofifteenyears,andlatertodeathformurder.

AfterSeptember2001heturnedupinAfghanistan,willingtoworkwithbin-Laden against a common foe.Wounded in an American air strike, he fled toIraq, where he fought against the Kurds. After the fall of Baghdad heorchestratedbombattacksonShi’itesinIraq,andagainsttheWestinSpainandKenya. Kidnapping and beheading, both of Iraqi leaders and foreigners likeNicholas Berg, became the trademark of his followers; some were political,othersstrictlycrimesforprofit,andallviolatedIslamiclaw.InlawlessFallujahZarqawiconspiredwithhard-lineclerics(afterkillingafewmoderates)tosetupa sort of hard-line Islamic state, though even the other resistance movementssought to distance themselves fromhis reignof terror.Theworld hadno ideahowbad thingswere tobecome in the “Islamiccity state.” Insurgent rulewasparticularly odious to the Sufi Muslims, who were forbidden to pray by thegravesoftheirancestors,andallmenwererequiredtogrowbeards.TheMarineswould later find grisly “slaughterhouses” with mutilated and dismemberedbodies, and announcements and documents decreeing death for such diversecrimesasnotremovingmarketstallsfromsitesnearthelibraryand(forwomen)notcoveringthemselvesfromheadtotoe.9

OnthewholetheexchangeofMarineforArmyunitswentsmoothlywiththeexception of minor ambushes when theMarines made incursions into formersanctuaries,andabriefexchangeoffirewithSyrianborderguards.

TheUSArmy divisions that theMarines replaced had relied upon “heavysweeps,”incursionsbylargeheavilyarmedforces.TheMarinessoughttoshiftthe emphasis from confrontation to pacification, though as early as 29March,2/9begansmallraidsintothecitytodefineinsurgentstrongholdsthatwerethesourceofattacksonforcesoutsidethecity.Withlittleperceivedneedforarmorin the tactical environment, the singleMarine tank companywas patrolling inHumvees.10

The Marines never got the chance to implement their own civil affairsprogram.BlackwaterSecuritywasoneofnumerouscontractorsoperatinginthe

country;housedaboardaUSbaseoutsidethecity, theirdetachmentsoftendidnotcoordinatewiththeUSmilitary.On31Marchinsurgentsambushedatwo-carBlackwaterconvoy,killingfourguards.Thebodiesofthreeweremutilated,burned, and twowere hung from a bridge inwesternFallujah; the fourthwasdismembered. The atrocity, in direct contravention of a Muslim tradition ofrespectforthedead,eventhebodiesofslainenemies,horrifiedmanycitizensofthecity.

Thoughsuchatrocitieswerehardlynewin thehistoryof irregularwarfare,coverage by news crews fanned the flames. SeniorMarine officers argued forpatiencetoavoidstokingthefiresevenhigher.DespitethequieteffortsoflocalIraqicommunityleaderswhoriskedZarqawi’swrathtorecoverthebodiesanddefuse the situation, there arose a clamor for vengeance. Some advocateddestruction of the city; there was significantly less appetite for destructionamong thosewhowould actually have to go into it.On 3AprilArmyLtGenRicardoSanchez,afterconferringwithPresidentBushandSecretaryofDefenseRumsfeld, orderedOperationVIGILANTRESOLVE, the cordon and forcefuloccupationofthecity.

Fallujah, with a population of some 300,000 persons covers 30 squarekilometers,andisamazeofstreetsanddead-endalleysboundedbymultistorymasonrybuildingswithflatroofs.Frontandbackgardensaretypicallyenclosedbymasonrywalls,withbarredwindowsandheavydoorstodeterintrusion.

The Marines’ resources were inadequate for such an operation, butcommanders were confident of success provided the city could be effectivelycordoned off to prevent the insurgents from receiving support andreinforcements. The operation would follow an established pattern. Forceswould cordon off the city, launch raids to reduce strongpoints and reduce theenemybyinflictingcasualties,thensystematicallyseizeandholdsectorsofthecity.Engineersconstructedanearthenbermaroundthesouthsidetointerdicttheflow of traffic in and out of the city, while 2/2 and D Company, 1st LARestablished the cordon. In a throwback tooldMarinepractices aplatoon fromCaptainMichaelD.Skaggs’CCompany,1stTankwouldbeattachedtoeachoftheassaultbattalions,fourtanksplusaheadquarterstankto2/1andafourtankplatoonto1/5.Thethirdplatoonwasattachedtothe7thMarines.11

On6AprilMarineincursionsfromthenorthwestandsoutheastquadrantsofthe city touched off six days of ferocious urban combat. Even before thebeginningofVIGILANTRESOLVEthenorthwesternJolanDistrictofthecity,withitsslumsandsouk(marketdistrict)wasaflashpoint.Aircrafthadreceived

andreturnedfire,settingpartsofthedistrictablaze.TheMarinessystematicallyfoughttheirwayintothecity,usingtankfireto

selectively destroy strongpoints. Rules of engagement prohibited the Marinesfrom firing upon mosques or medical facilities, both of which the insurgentsusedfreelyasarmsdepots,commandposts,andfiringpositions.

NickPopaditch,recentlypromotedtoGunnerySergeant,hadvolunteeredtoreturn to IraqwithCCompany,1stTankandwasnowaplatoonsergeant.OnTuesday,6Aprilhistwo-tanksectionwassupportingF/2/1inJolan.Thetankswaited in reserve until summoned by the call “Roll tanks, roll tanks.” Aninfantrypatrolhadbeenambushed.12

RPGs thatwere the insurgent’smost common anti-tankweapon could notpenetratethecompositearmorofthetanks,butlikemosttankersPopaditchwasfightinghistankstandingintheopenhatchforbettersituationalawareness.Themaincannonwasusedagainstimprovisedpillboxesbuiltintothegroundfloorsofheavybuildings,butagainstmosttargetstheheavymachinegunsmountedonthe roof were more useful and could be aimed and fired more quickly. Oneinsurgent stepped out and fired an RPG that detonated harmlessly against theturret face, and ducked back inside a masonry building. Popaditch simplychewed through the wall with the .50 caliber machine gun. Popaditch laterrecalled the feeling of power and elation that that he felt, maneuvering thepowerful tank in battle. The only real obstacles to the tanks were grids andstrandsofwirestrungfrompoles,andpotentialstreetsidebombs.

After dismounting to conferwith an infantry officer, Popaditch decided toreversetheusualpracticeinstreetfighting:thelessvulnerabletankswouldleadtheway,whiletheinfantryprovidedoverwatchforsnipers,themainthreattothetankcommandersandloaderswhomannedthesecondturret-roofmachinegun.

Thanks to the technology of infrared targeting and aerial observation, thefightingcontinueduntil0400onthenextday,whenthetankspulledbackforabriefrest.Inthepre-dawngloomtheinfantrygunneddownthreeinsurgentswhotriedtocreepuponthesleepingtankers.

Atdawnthetankswerebackatwork.Aradiomessagesummonedthetanks,andtheyweresoonflushinginsurgentsdownthenarrowstreetsandalleyways.AsPopaditch’stank“Bonecrusher”passedtheopeningtoasidealley,hespottedaninsurgenttakingaimatthetankwithanRPG.Assessingtheman’scalmnessas he took aim, Popaditch knew thiswas no amateur. But the real threatwasbehindhim,outofhisfieldofvision.

The unseen gunner loosed anRPG round that probably struckPopaditch’s

helmetaglancingblowanddetonated.Hefeltnopain,onlyamassiveblowtothehead,ablindingwhiteflashthatquicklyfadedtoblackness,andan“electrichumming”inhisears.TheshapedchargeexplosionhadundoubtedlyventeditsmainjetpastPopaditch’shead,buthadrippedthroughhishelmet,destroyedhisright eye, and sent a dime-sized piece ofmetal sideways through his skull tolodgeagainsttheopticnervebehindhislefteye.Othershrapnelrippedintothegunner, Corporal Ryan Chambers and the loader, Lance Corporal AlexHernandez.

Blindanddeaf,Popaditchstruggledbacktohisfeetinthecupola,obliviousto thechaosaroundhim,unaware that theexplosionhadset fire to thegear inthegypsyrack.Thedriver,LCplChristopherFrias,quicklymovedthetankbackandbeganamadraceoutof thecity, through the twistingstreetsandover theberm.

A news crew at the assembly area recorded the arrival of the tank—Popaditch upright and bathed in blood, bloodied Chambers vainly trying toextinguish the flames in the gypsy rack with his water bottle. Navy medicalcorpsmen swarmed over Popaditch. One kept asking annoying questions towhich he already knew the answers—among them Popaditch’s blood type,whichwasbothonhis identity tagsandwrittenonhisarmoredvest. In realitythe corpsman was trying to assess brain damage and make sure he was notslippingintoacoma.FinallyPopaditchpukeduphismostrecentmealalloverthe troublesome corpsman. Proceedings were interrupted by a mortar attack;corpsmen stripped off their own body armor and draped it over Popaditch toprotect him.At last, hewas anesthetized,waking up on amedical evacuationflighttoGermany.

Additional infantry battalions were committed to the city, leading to athrowbackto the“badolddays”ofVietnam.Platoonsweresplit into two-tanksections thatoperated independently,butSkaggs successfully resistedattemptstohavetanksoperatesinglyinsupportofcompanies.Inthenarrowstreetsalonedisabledtankwouldhavebeenasittingduck.13

TheMarines had to relearn some old lessons, and Skaggs later noted that“Whilemostunderstoodmutualsupport,fewunderstoodwhatitactuallylookedlike.Theinfantryman’sunderstandingofsecuringatankwastoremainbesideit.Thispositionprovidedlittleactualsecurity.”Forinfantry,beingtooclosetothetanks is fraughtwith danger, since they are “firemagnets,” and the protectinginfantrywasdriventocover.TheMarinesquicklylearnedtosendasmallpartyof infantryaheadof the tankunderprotectionof the itsguns,withmostof the

infantry following at a small distance to protect the tank from attack directedfrom the flanks or above. Target designation by infantrywas also a problem,since the targeting systems sit ten feet above street level. The tankers learnedthat a sequence of infantry marking the target with tracer, followed by aconfirmingstreamfromthecoaxialmachinegunbeforethemaingunwasfired,workedbest.14

Fightinginothertownsstretchedresourcestothebreakingpoint.Whilethemedia was fixated on Fallujah, the battles to isolate the city, with their ownhazards,wentunnoticed.On8AprilinsurgentsambushedMarinesnorthofthecity; as two of Skaggs’ tanks maneuvered to support the infantry, one brokethrough the right side of a small road and slidmajestically down into a deepirrigationcanal,buriedtothetopofitshull.Effortstorecoveritresultedonlyinthe unit’s M88—inexplicably missing some of its critical cables—becomingmired. TheM88was freed by another retriever the next day, but the strickentankwasquicklybecominga liability,withReconMarinesandMPspinnedinplacetoprotectit.

Requests todestroyandabandonthetankweredenied:GeneralMattiswasintentondenyingtheinsurgentsapropagandavictoryiftheyclaimeddestructionof the tank. Additional earthmoving equipment fromCombat Service SupportCompany-221failed to free the tank, and its defenders spent a second nightimmobilized in hostile territory. The following morning the second tankdeparted;itwastoobadlyneededinthecity.

OnthethirdmorningtheMarinesawoketodiscoverthatallthevehicleshadsunkintothesoftgroundovernight.Theywerelaboriouslydugoutbyhand.Atankmechanic, LCpl Robert F. Beard, suggested the time-honoredmethod oflayingdownapathoftreebranches,andtheM88wasfreed.Thedamagedcanalwasfloodingthearea,sodrainageditcheshadtobedug.Therescuerssettledinforanothernightunderrocketandmortarfire.

Thenextdayinvolvedmorediggingtolevelthetank,andconstructionofaroad of logs andgravel across awheat field.The trackswere cut off, and thetank dragged out. The tank sank one final time, but after twelve previousexcavations,theMarinesmadeshortworkofthefinalrecovery.

“There were tears of joy when theMarines pulled that tank out. It was ahappymoment” saidCWO2WalterA.Harris ofCSSC-221.15 Itwas just onemoreinvisiblemission.

The successes of the Marines in Fallujah were destined to be undone bypolitics; they had scarcely established footholds in the city when the Iraqi

ProvisionalCouncilprevaileduponAmbassadorPaulBremerIII tonegotiateacease fire. Insurgent demands focused on withdrawal of Marine snipers andtanksfromthecity.16Thedemandwasevidencethattheinsurgentsrealizedthethreat posed by the tanks. The Marines were clearly reaching the sameconclusion, as B Company, 1st Tank was dispatched to reinforce the assaultforce,butwouldnotarriveuntiltheendofthemonth.17

The Army’s General Abizaid unsuccessfully argued against the truce, butelectedtobreakthebadnewstoMattisinperson.Mattiswaslate.Hiscommandgrouphadjustbeenambushed,andhearrivedatthemeetingspatteredwithhisdriver’s blood. When Abizaid told Mattis he had to break off the offensive,Mattis exploded. “If you’re going to take Vienna, take fucking Vienna!” heparaphrasedNapoleon.18

Bremerhadmeantime ill-advisedlydeclared theShi’ite leaderMoqtadaal-Sadran“outlaw,”promptingmoreoutbreaksoffighting,fromwhichmostofthepainfullycraftedIraqigovernmentforcesfled.El-Sadr’sMahdiArmymilitiainBaghdad and southern Iraq threatened I MEF’s supply and communicationslines.Havinghandedtheinsurgentsapropagandavictory,Bremerdepartedthecountry.Aspartof thesettlement the Iraqiprovisionalgovernmentcreated theFallujahBrigadetocontrolthecity.

DaveBanning had transferred over to 1stMarines, andwas impressed byGeneralMattis’sinteractionswiththeIraqiofficerswhoweretryingtoformtheFallujahBrigade.“Hewasverycagey.GeneralMattisisdefinitelynotnaïve.Hewasoptimisticbutnotnaïve.GeneralLatifwouldcomeinandsay,‘Theyoungmenarevery concerned.They see these tanks.’”Therewas always this roundand round aboutwhowas going to dowhat forwho first. Like a good pokerplayer,GeneralMattisknewwhenhecouldgiveabitandwhenhecouldn’t.Hewouldgoaheadandmovethetanksback200meters,makeabigdealaboutit,butinrealityitdidn’treallymatter.Wecouldstillwhackpeoplejustthesame.Theywereneverabletoproduceanyweaponsthatweren’trustyandoutofdate—clearlynotthestufftheywereusing.”19

The Fallujah battle had been a public relations disaster. TheMarines lostcontroloftheall-importantpublicitybattle,whiletheinsurgentsmadeexpertuseofbothtelevisionandcomputer-generatedpropaganda.BoththeArab-languageandWesternmedia eagerly relayedunverified reportsofMarine atrocities andmasscasualtiesofcivilians.The insurgents trumpeted theirachievement to theworld, but drew fatal conclusions. Al-Zarqawi’s followers now believed theycoulddefeattheAmericans,andfailingthatcouldmanipulateinfluentialSunnis

toforceafavorablenegotiatedsettlementtoanyfuturebattle.20Zarqawiquicklyrenegedontheagreement,stagingattacksoutsidethecity,

andhandingoverafewdecrepitweaponsandcorrodedammunition.The thwarted Marines reverted to interdicting the rat lines, sweeping the

roads, and training Iraqi forces. TheMarineswere also diverted to the south,whereal-Sadr’sMahdiArmyhadseizedcontrolofan-Najafandothertowns.

The al-Sadr family had provided many distinguished Shi’a clerics, butMoqtadawasa ruthlessopportunistproducedby the ruined society.Hisgreat-uncle founded theDawamovement tocounter theBa’athistsandCommunists,and was murdered by the Saddam Hussein regime in 1980. His father—MohammadSadiqal-Sadr—waskilledonSaddam’sordersin1999.

Moqtada later tried to assume the mantle of his dead father, but theestablished Shi’a clergy rejected the thirty-year-old firebrand who had notcompleted his religious studies, and blocked his appointment to the IraqiGoverningCouncil.He acquired his greatest following amongdisenfranchisedyouth in the slums, quickly building his own militia, the Mahdi Army. Hismovementwasnotsomuchreligiousaspersonal.

The Mahdi Army clashed with American troops in August 2003, butMoqtada was still primarily engaged in a power struggle within the Shi’itecommunity. His great foes were the elderly Iranian-born Grand Ayatollah al-Sistaniandhisadherents,whoadvocatedaparliamentarydemocracy.InOctober2003 a warrant was issued for Moqtada’s arrest for complicity in theassassination of the Ayatollah Abd al-Majid al-Khoei, but Ambassador PaulBremerelectednottoenforcethewarrant.21

Stymiedinonepowergrab,Moqtada’sfollowersflockedtoan-Najaf,siteofthe Imam Ali Shrine.22 Moqtada’s followers allegedly assassinated a leadingcleric,seizingcontrolofthephysicalkeystotheshrine.23

Thetermsofatrucenegotiatedbyal-SistaniinMaygrantedthemilitiasso-calledexclusionzonesaroundtheImamAliandKufuMosques,whichbecamehavens for militia activities. The Mahdi Army was better organized andequipped than the government troops and police, and with Coalition troopsexcludedfromthecitytheyattainedeffectivecontrol.Theygrewboldenoughtoraidpolicestations.Onepolicemanwascapturedand tortured, theproceedingsbroadcastliveonagovernmentradiofrequency.24

In June the political situation changed with the entry of a whole newleadership team in Baghdad: Iyad Allawi became PrimeMinister of the new

government, John Negroponte replaced Paul Bremer as Ambassador, and thenewcommanderoftheMulti-NationalForcebecameGeneralGeorgeW.Casey.ViolencebetweentheIraqipoliceandtheMahdiArmyescalated,andthe11thMEUwasmovedtotheregion.

Thenew11thMEU,builtaround1/4,replacedArmyAirborneunits,butitwashardlya smooth transition.Armyguides ledadvanceMarinedetachmentsinto zones that Coalition troops had avoided, leading to confrontations. TheMEU’sCAATwasfiredonwhilemovingintothearea,andexperienceditsfirstambushwithintenminutesofarrival.25

Tensionscontinuedtoescalateuntilapatrolinvestigatingpossibleweaponsstorage sites observed militiamen moving heavy weapons in the Sadr familycompound east of the ImamAliMosque, a flagrant violation of the truce.Anaccidentalshot,probablyfiredbyanIraqigovernmentsoldier,triggeredanopenbattleandtheMarineswithdrew.Inthepre-dawnhoursof5Augustthemilitiaslaunchedthefirstoftwoattacksonapolicestation,triggeringanotherbattleinwhich the LAV-25s served as pickets, controlling the open ground ofRevolutionary Circle between the mosque and the Sadr family compound.Fightingescalatedwhenahelicopterwasshotdown;theCAATandLAVsracedtorescuethecrew,andthetankplatoonassignedtotheMEUwascalledin.Thesingle casualty of the crash was treated by an Iraqi physician from a nearbyclinic,andthecrashedhelicopterwasrecoveredbyanM88toavoidpresentingapropagandaprizetotheMahdiArmy.

TheMEUcommander sought tocreateabufferzone toprotectcivilians—andthebeleagueredpolice—fromtheMahdiArmybycontrollingthesprawlingcemeterynorthofthemosque.TanksandCAATHumveespatrolledtheadjacentareas, and the LAVs and AAVs supported the infantry by firing into thecemetery. Air Force AC-130 Spectre gunships and vehicles with night visiondevicescontinuedtofireintoenemy-controlledareasthroughoutthenight.

At 0500hours on 6 August the Marines resumed their assault into thecemetery,arandommazeofundergroundtombsandstonecryptsthatstooduptothreemetersabovegroundlevel.Inplacesthecryptsweresocloselypackedthat Marines could not squeeze through the gaps. The tanks supported theinfantrybyfire,movingupthewindingroadthatbisectedthecemetery.

Thebrutalheat—115F(46C)—wasevengreaterinsidetheclosedtanks.Theleader of the tank platoon’s light section succumbed to heat exhaustion anddrove his tank to and fro on one of the main traffic arteries “in an erraticmanner.”ThePlatoonLeader,Lt.RussellL.Thomas,prevailedupontheMEU

commandertoallowhimtorelayhistanks,sendingsometothereartoreplenishammunition and allow crews to recuperate. Thomas recalled that athletessometimes used intravenous fluids to avoid dehydration, and had his Navymedical corpsman administer fluids, often leaving the IV lines in his men’sarms. In the following days thiswould become a feature of the tank fighting,with crewmenhavingup to three IV linesdangling from their arms, and fluidbagsslungfromtheturretceiling.26

LimitedforceseventuallyaccomplishedwhattheMahdiArmycouldnot;theUSArmynotifiedtheMEUcommanderthatrequestedreinforcementswouldnotarrive for days. The Marines broke off the offensive at 0700 on 7 August,withdrawingfromthecemetery.

The Iraqi government’s negotiationof a suspensionof theoffensiveon11August emboldened the militias. The Marines, and the newly-arrived 2ndBattalion,7thCavalryand1stBattalion,5thCavalry,continuedtolaunchraids,airstrikes,andartilleryfireagainstthemilitias.Oftentheraidswereruses:whenthemilitiasopenedfireonthegroundtroops,theywereimmediatelyinundatedbyartilleryfire.

Thenewly-arrivedArmybattalions,withfewerinfantrydismountsandnewtotheurbanterrain,sufferedmost.On15Augustamilitiamanleaptatopatankand fired into the open hatches, killing the tank commander and gunner. Thequick-thinking driver threw the tank into reverse and crashed into a building.The building collapse buried the tank, but killed the attacker. After severalconferences,Marines were assigned as close protection to some of the Armytanks.27

In the close-quarters fighting theMarines learned to take advantage of thetanks’reputationas“bulletmagnets.”Theinsurgentsquicklylearnedtofearthedistinctive engine drone of the AC-130 gunships, but could not resist thetemptationtofireattanks,revealingtheirpositions.28

On21August theMarines raided theoccupiedKufapolice station, on theeastsideofthecity.Thetanks,supportingtwoplatoonsofinfantry,wereunderordersnottousetheirmaingunsasanearbymosquewasinthelineoffire.Theplan was for the tanks to lead the advance, draw fire, and call air support.Instead, the tanks found themselves under heavy fire and closely-pressed bynumerousmilitiamen, and Lt Thomas feared his small groupwas about to beoverrun.GySgtPhilleyfiredtwomaingunroundsandstruckthemosque.29

By late August the Coalition forces leadership and the provisional Iraqigovernment had grownweary of themilitia’s intransigence and brutality. In a

finalassaultthreeAmericanbattalionsandsupportingarmswouldbearthebruntof the fighting. Four Iraqi infantry battalions and the 36CommandoBattalionwouldconductcombatoperations,butmostimportantlywouldconductthefinalassault on the Imam Ali Mosque. Polish commandos and various supportingarmswouldroundouttheforce.

On 24 August tanks led the seizure of a staging area between RoutesCORVETTEandCAMARO,parallelbroadboulevardsthatledfromthewesternside of the “ring road” toward the front of the mosque. They were closelyfollowed by engineers to clear obstacles, mines, and IEDs, then infantrymounted in AAVs. Army and Marine tanks blasted away at strongpoints,expendingtheirinitialloadofammunitioninthefirsthalf-hourofcombat.

On 25August the temperature soared to 130F (54.5C) as the soldiers andMarines fought to clear thewestern approaches, slogging through the built-upareabetweentheboulevards.Tanksservedasdirectfireartillery.Inoneinstancesupportingarmswereunabletosuppressfirefromastrongpointunderneaththeoverhang of a large building. A single round from a tank brought the entirebuildingcrashingdownuponthedefenders.30

Bydays’ end the defenderswere painfully aware that the battle could endonlyoneway, anddesperately sought a negotiated truce.Unwilling to grant aceasefirethatthemilitiascouldagainturntotheiradvantage,Coalitionleadersand the Iraqi government declined to negotiate, relentlessly pressing thedefenders back toward the mosque. On the afternoon of 26 August, with thepower of theMahdi Army conclusively broken, the government negotiated aceasefire.

NOTES

1 Kenneth R. Estes,USMarine Corps Operations in Iraq, 2003–2005, p.10. Much of the backgroundinformationforthischapterisdrawnfromthissource,evenwherenotspecificallycited.Notethatpagereferencesrefertothereviewmanuscriptcopy,andmaynotmatchfinalpagination.

2Ibid,p.7.3Ibid,p.7–9.4Ibid,p.13,15–16.5Ibid,p.14,26,35–39.6JohnR.Ballard,FightingforFallujah,p.1–4.7VincentL.Foulk,TheBattleforFallujah,p.10–11.8JohnR.Ballard,FightingforFallujah,p.4–8.9VincentL.Foulk,TheBattleforFallujah,p.47–61,154–156,217–219.10JohnR.Ballard,FightingforFallujah,p.12;KendallD.Gott,TanksInTheCities,p.94;MajorRobert

J.Bodischinterview,April2012.

11Skaggs,Tank-InfantryIntegration,p.41.12The accountofPoaditch’s final action inFallujah is abridged fromNickPopaditch andMikeSteere,OnceAMarine,p.3–15,274–286.

13Skaggs,Tank-InfantryIntegration,p.41.14Ibid,p.42–43.15Valliereetal,CSSB-1helmsmissiontounearthsunkentankinnorthernFallujah16JohnR.Ballard,FightingforFallujah,p.122.17 Chang, Tao-Hung, The Battle of Fallujah: Lessons Learned on Military Operations on UrbanizedTerrain(MOUT)inthe21stCentur,p.33.

18Cloud,David,TheFourthStar,p.153.19Lassard,InterviewwithMajorDaveBanning,p.18–19.20JohnR.Ballard,FightingforFallujah,p.12.21VincentL.Foulk,TheBattleforFallujah,p.118.22TheImamAliShrineisthetombofAli,grandsonofMohammedandhislastmaleheir.23JohnR.Ballard,FightingforFallujah,p.29.24FrancisX.Kozlowski,TheBattleforAn-Najaf,p.2.Thegeneraloutlineofthefightingforan-Najafis

drawnfromthissource.25Ibid,p.3.26Ibid,p.24,41.27Ibid,p.31.28SattlerandWilson,OperationAL-FAJR:TheBattleofFallujah—PartII,p.12.29FrancisX.Kozlowski,TheBattleforAn-Najaf,p.34–35.30Ibid,p.40.

R

CHAPTERTEN

TippingPoint:TheSecondBattleofFallujah

Youcanfeelatankcomingdownthestreet,youcanfeelthestreetrumbling.InAnNajafthat’swhatcausedalotofthem(insurgents)topullback.—Lt.Col.BartS.Sloat,CommandingOfficer,1/41

Weneedtocleanoutthatrat’snest.Thelongerwewaitthestrongertheyget.—AnonymousMarineCorpsofficer,August20042

OBERT J. BODISCH GREW up as the son of a Vietnam-era Marine,joined theReserveasanenlisted infantryman in1991,andwascommissionedin1996.ArmorwashisfirstchoiceoutofOfficer

Basic School, and he joined 1st TankBattalion in January 1990 as a PlatoonLeaderinBravoCompany.AfterattendingIntelligenceSchoolhewasassignedto Third Army in Kuwait in 2002 as a targeting office for OperationANACONDA inAfghanistan.GregPolandmanaged to get him transferred toGroundOperations for the remainderofhis tour.He joinedCharlieCompany,2ndTank in early July of 2004 andwas told he had threemonths to train hiscompanybeforegoingtoIraq.“Prettymuchimmediately,withinaweekorso,Iwasinthefield….”Bodischalsofoundtimetoreadeverythinghecouldfindontank-infantrycombatinHueCity,1968.3

There was a huge personnel turnover, but “Luckily for me theMarines Iinherited,aprettygoodpercentageofthemhadbeenveteransofthefirstOIF.Iinherited the First Sergeant who had been the First Sergeant and the TankLeader,andalotofthekeybilletholderswereallveterans….Thatincludedacoupleofmyofficers.”

One of themenBodisch inheritedwasBillHayes, transferred fromBravoCompany.“IrememberaskingtheMasterGunneratthetime,‘ManIhavegotto

go.Icannotsithereboredoutofmymind….’”HayesthoughtBodischwas“asmartguy”but“alittlerustywiththetank”

afterhisintelligencetours.Stillnewtothecompany,Hayeswassurprisedtobeassigned to the CO’s tank. “For the CO, you want to make sure his gunnerknowswhat’sgoingon….Iwant tomakelifeeasyfor theCO,becausehe’sgonnabeprettybusy.”

Bodisch had been in contact with Mike Skaggs, never imagining that hewould someday replace him. As the result of Skaggs’s experience, additionaltrainingwasfittedinwhereverpossible.

“Whilewewereatthegunneryrange,anykindof‘whitespace,’anykindoftime between actual gunnery training qualifications, I always hadmyMarinesrotate throughdifferent trainingpackages.Convoy, livefirecourses,getoutofvehicles anddo fire andmovement.Basic infantry tactics.Things that tankersdon’tliketodo.Infact,therewasadayouttherewhereIalmosthadamutinyby my gunnery sergeants, my platoon sergeants. They were significantlyquestioningmytrainingprogram.LuckilymyFirstSergeant,whowasaheavyhammer,wasabletonipthatinthebudandgetthosegunnysonboardwithmyplan.Ibasicallyhadtosellthattothem,getthemtobuyoffonit,andtheydid.”

CaptainChrisMeyersofAlphaCompanyhadbeenfortunateenoughtogetto Iraq andgoover the groundwithMikeSkaggs. “He just seemed to have alittlemorepreptimeforhiscompany.WhenIgotthereitwasprettymuchballs-to-the-wall.”

Coalitionactivitiesnationwidewerecurtailedby the force rotationof July-October 2004.Coalition forces slowly regained somemeasure of control overpopulous areas, but Fallujah remained a festering sore. Insurgents mountedattacksonCoalitionpositionsinthecity,fireduponaircraft,andlaunchedterrorcampaignsagainstlocalssidingwiththeCoalition.

Theinsurgentsdidnotwastethetimegrantedthem;theybuiltupassetsandmanpower, and prepared a defense in depth. There were hardened positionsinsidebuildings, fallbackpositionsandweaponcaches, andpreplannedescaperoutes.Foreignfighterswerepouringinfromallquarters.“I thinktheyhadallMujahedeen [sic] fighters represented except for Filipinos and Indonesians”notedonetankcompanycommander.4

The overextended 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division washamstrungbylimitedcivilaffairssupportandmanpower.Thevaunted“thunderruns”were completely ineffectual for controlling the insurgency, and inflictedcasualtiesmainlyon teenagerswho roamed the streets.Daylight incursionsby

troopers escorting humanitarian assistance convoys were ambushed. All wasgristfortheinsurgentpropagandamills.5

WhentheyarrivedtheMarinesinitiallyleftthecitytotheFallujahBrigade,limiting themselves to occasional forays into the city for meeting with localleaders,andprotectingsupplyconvoysthatmovedalonghighwaysthroughthecity.The insurgents feltnosuchconstraints,extending their reignof terroroutinto the countryside. Through September and October the Marines andinsurgentsplayedadeadlygameof tit for tat:carbombsandambushesversusairstrikes,artilleryandtankfire,andsnipers.

In September Bodisch’s Charlie Company and Meyers’ Alpha Company,2nd Tank landed at Taqaddam Airfield. Bodisch: “Just on the drive intoFallujah…ourconvoywasreceivingsmallarmsfire.Thatwasinteresting.Guyswhohadnever seen combat, sitting there in thevehicle that youdon’t controlbecausesomebodyelseiscontrollingtheconvoy….Thatisdefinitelyawakeupcall.Wide-eyed, lookingaroundandthevehiclesarejusthaulingassasfastastheycantoget throughthesmallarmsfire.Rightoff thebat itwashot.”Onlytwoweeksearlieroneoftheplatoonleadersinthecompanyhewastoreplace,LtAndrewK.Stern,waskilledbyanIED,andboththeoutgoingandincomingcommandersoftheRCTBodischwastosupporthadbeenwoundedinarocketattack.Intheturnover,thearrivingcompaniessimplytookoverthedeparting1stTank’svehicles.6

Aspartoftheweek-longturnover,thetankcompanycommanderhewastorelievetookBodischonanorientationride,withBodischasloader.Bodischwasaccustomedtothetankcommander’sviewofthebattlefield,but

Asaloaderyoudon’tseeanything.Allyou’redoingistakingcommandsfrom the tank commander. Iwas in that situationwhere I had no ideawhat was going on aroundme. I knew he was obviously firing at theenemyandthat therewererocket-propelledgrenadesflyingtowardsus.Hewascommunicatingwith the regiment;hewascommunicatingwithhisadjacenttankplatoons,aswellastheothertankcompanyandcallingin [artillery] fire. I remember thinking as Iwas playing the role of theloader “OhmyGod, I can’t believe this guy is this good.He’s really,reallygood.”

In combat the loader’s position on the company command tank would beoccupiedbyaReserveartilleryforwardobserverandhighschoolmathteacher,

CplChrisAkridge.AkridgehadreportedtoParrisIslandin1998,thedayafterhis high school graduation because “… if I ever got into a combat situation Iwanted aMarinenext tome.”ServingwithMikeBatteryof the14thMarineswhileheattendedcollege,hewasactivatedbeforehissenioryear,andarrivedinIraq in September. Trained as a Forward Observer he was the Fires Chief,responsible for coordination with units the battery was supporting. “CaptainBodisch…went tomycommandingofficer,CaptainParsons, and said that ‘Ineed a Forward Observer to go.’” The FOs were already attached to 3/1, soAkridgewastheonlyqualifiedFO.

“Theyputmeoutonthetankfarm,andwhentheyweredoingmaintenanceonthetanks,Iwasdoingmaintenanceonthetanks.TheyletmesetupmyownlittleFOradio tocommunicatewith. Igot trainedprettyquick.”Onedayonatraining range familiarized himwith the tank’sweapons and systems. “How Icouldhelpoutifweneededtorepairatrack.Mostlyitwaslearningwhichtooltograbiftheyneededit.”

BillHayeswaspromoted tosergeantsoonafterarrival.AsanNCO,“Thatmade that whole deployment about fifty million times better” since he wasrelievedofthingslikeguardduty.

Oneofthe“enduringmissions”thecompanyassumedwasrotatingthetankplatoonatTrafficControlPointOne,themostforwardpositioninsidethecity.“Just about on a daily basis those tanks would be engaged in some sort offirefight. You had a lot ofjihadists that would constantly test and probe thatbattleposition.”Itwas“thefirefightthatneverended.”

Bodisch: “The snipers were such a problem… that Third Battalion, FifthMarines constructed a concrete tower probably about two and a half storieshigh… . They also had some bunkers adjacent to that tower, and then tankswouldcomeinfrontofthattowerandestablishafixedsupport-by-fireposition.”Twoweeks later, “A lucky [mortar] shot landed right on topof the turret andinjuredhim[PlatoonLeaderLtJoeBuffamante]andhisloader….BothMarineswouldendupgettingpatchedupandrefusingtogohome,andreturnedtofightinFallujahthreeweekslater.”

After an-Najaf,with the regionmarginallymore secure, theCoalitionwasready to address the Fallujah problem. The 1st Infantry Division’s OperationBATONROUGE(1–4October)inSamarrawouldprovideatemplate,withcivilaffairs teams moving in close on the heels of combat troops to secure theirgains.7

Counting on support from Sunnis in parliament, civic leaders in Fallujah

proposedyetanotherpermutationof theFallujahBrigade.On21October theypresented parliament with their final demands but got no support from theShi’ites, who had struck a separate power deal with Chaldean Christianfactions.8

ReturningtotheirrootsintheManualforSmallWars,theMarinesthistimewould carefully split the insurgents from their civilian support, and carefullyminimizedamagetothecity.Theinsurgencywasrifewithselfservingfactions,sointelligenceinformationgleanedfromprisonerswasusedtodirectprecisionattacks, with the additional benefit that the insurgents, suspecting treachery,begantoturnoneachother.9

Mindful of the earlier public relations disaster, the Marines carefully“shaped” the battlefield. Prime Minister Allawi declared martial law. Watersuppliesweresevered.Leafletsandloudspeakersurgednon-combatantstoleaveor at least seek shelter; an estimated seventy-five to ninety percent of thepopulationdeparted.10Mediaaccesswouldbecarefullymanaged.

In Operation PHANTOM FURY, soon to be re-designated AL-FAJR,11Armyunitswouldcordonthecity.TwoMarineRCTswouldsweepfromnorthto south through thecity.Sixof themore reliable IraqibattalionswouldenteralongsidetheMarines,policingtheclearedsectorsofthecity.Thistimeairandartillery support would be overwhelming, though carefully coordinated tominimizedamage.

Because the Coalition had to telegraph its intent in order to evacuatecivilians, US Army and Iraqi units would create a noisy diversion to drawinsurgents toward thesouthside; themainassaultwouldcomefromthenorth.RCT-1,consistingof3/1and5/3,C/2ndTank,theArmy’s2/7ArmoredCavalryand an Iraqi battalion would seize the western part of the city. The RCT-1commander, Col Michael Shupp, a former amtrac officer and LAR battalioncommander, had a better understanding of mechanized units than most, andarrangedbrieftrainingexerciseswithtwoofhisinfantrybattalions.12

RCT-7, consisting of 1/8 and 1/3, reinforced by the Army’s 2/2 MechInfantryandtwoIraqibattalionswouldattacktheeasternhalfofthecity.Forceswouldadvancenorthtosouth,aligningatPhaseLineFRAN,abroadeast-westboulevardwhereRoute10passedthroughthecity.OtherIraqibattalionswouldenter the culturally sensitive mosques. Upon reaching Phase Line JENA, thesouthernmargin of the city, the forceswouldwheel about and sweep the cityfromsouthtonorth.13

Bodisch’sHeadquartersPlatoonandatankplatoonmadeanobservationtripto the north side of the city near JolanCemetery, unescorted by infantry, andwithacolonelunknowntoHayesridingasloaderintheXO’stank.Akridge:“Ihadapreplannedtargetsetupforasmokemissionincasewestartedgettinghit,andweneededtogetoutofthere.”Hayes:“Thiswasmyfirstexposuretoreallygettingupclosetothecity.Theseguysjustcameoutofthewoodwork;startedrunningaround,lobbingmortarsatus,you’dseethemrunningaroundwiththeirAKs.Itwaskindofsurreal,like‘What’sgoingonhere?’Theseguysarereallymad.” He recalled thinking how strange it was to see insurgents using gravemarkersasprotection.

Akridge called in a firemission, and “… theywere spot-on. They startedrollingupintheselittlecarsanddoingsomersaultsout,shootingatus….Iwassittingupoutsidetheloader’shatchwithmybinoculars,tryingtomakesurethesmokemission came on right.One of themortar rounds hit near us, the sandblastedourface.”Thetanksloosedoffafewmaingunrounds.Hayes:“Weleft,andthatwasthat.Kindoflikefortheseniorleadershiptofigurewhatwasgoingon.”

At2207hourson7November theIraqi36CommandoBattalionanda taskforcefrom3rdLARswoopedintothebendoftheEuphratesRiverwestof themaincity,occupyingtheFallujahHospitaltopreventfightersfromoccupyingit.Theassaultforcefoundevidenceitwasalreadyusedasacommandcenter.Thehospitalwouldcontinuetoserveasanevacuationcenterforciviliancasualties.Themovegarneredgrudgingpraisefromthemedia.

ThirdLARalso seized the bridges and established checkpoints.Boat unitspatrolled the river, and the Army’s Blackjack Brigade moved into positionssouthandeastofthecity,closingthecordon.RCTsOne(supportedbyBodisch)and Seven (supported byMeyers)moved to assault positions. Akridge “did acouple of preparation hits in areas we thought the enemy might be.” Hayes:“Theyhadsomanyconcretebarriers”usedasobstaclesthat“wespentmostofthenightdrivingaroundkindofblowingthoseup.”

MAP4.Fallujahandenvirons.O=Old(“Green”)Bridge;N=NewBridge;H=Hospital;CEM=JolanCemetery.

Engineers severed the city’s electrical supply, and aircraft blew breachesthroughtheisolatingbermwithlargebombs.The1stMarinesmovedintoseizetheShaklawyiahApartments,highrises thatoverlookedtheJolanDistrict.TheMarines went door to door, paying the residents $200 to “sublet” theirapartmentsforthedurationofthebattle.Theoperationdrewheavymortarandrocketfire.14

LateinthedaytheMarinesseizedthetrainstation,jumpingoffpointforthemainassaults.At1926hours3/5moved through theirbreachpoint to join3/1andBodisch’stanks.

Aboutanhourafterenteringthecity“Ourdriverwas[shouting]RPG!RPG!…Therewas this oldguyhehad like the robeon, not like a twenty-year oldinsurgent.”Hayessawhim“justashelowersthisRPG,andrunsbackbehindthebuilding.”Hayeswasstartled.“Whatwasthatallabout?”

Hayes was still confused, because “My advice to anyonewho’s ever in awar, ifyou’rean infantryman, ifyourenemyshowsupwith tanks, justget thehell out of there.Don’t fight them, don’t shoot at them, don’t let them know

whereyouare.Run!“Doesthisguynothaveanyideawhatthistankcandotohim,andhe’sjust

gonnalobanRPGatitandhopetogetlucky?He’sadeadmanwalking.”Bythemorningof9NovembertheMarineshadsecuredtheexpansiveJolan

Cemetery and Iraqi Special Forces secured the Hadrah Mosque. This rapidpenetrationintowhattheinsurgentsperceivedastheirmainpositionofstrengthand final defensive area would profoundly affect the rest of the battle. TheCoalitionhadachievedatacticalcoup,unhingingtheenemy’sbattleplanfromtheverybeginning.15

Unhingedornot,theinsurgentscouldstillbiteback.TheassemblyareausedbyBodisch’sCharlieCompanytankswashitbyarocket.“Thevehiclenexttome,whichwas an amtrac, gothit andkilled aMarine andgravelywoundedacouple of other Marines from that vehicle.” Bodisch admired the Reutersphotographer attached to his company, and thought she had taken “incrediblepictures.”Butwhentheamtracwashit“Shewasrighttheretoseeit,andIthinkshegotshockedbyitandendedupbeggingtoleave.”16

Withutilitiesandcellphoneservicesinterrupted,theinsurgentshadtroublemounting coordinated attacks, despite using mosque speaker systems forcommunications.White surrender flags were common as ruses.17 There weremanysuchviolationsoftheRulesofLandWarfare.

The Army units used their heavy armored firepower to advance quicklyalong the streets that constituted axes of the attack, preventing the insurgentsfrommountinganorganizeddefense,buthadtoofewinfantrydismountstoclearbuildings.MarinesandthebestoftheIraqibattalionssweptinasabroadwedgebehind thearmoredshockforces,clearingbuildingsandreducingstrongpoints.TheotherIraqibattalionsfollowedintrain,searchingthewarrenofbuildingsforbypassed insurgents. In their sectors theMarineswould establish contact, andthen back off to wait for tanks, artillery, and air strikes to reduce strongpositions. In the process “Bulldozers and tanks had turned entire squarekilometersintorubble.”18

Bodischwitnessedfirsthandtheutilityofthehugedozersinurbancombat:

Therewereyoung lancecorporalsdrivingD7dozers.Wetooka lessonfromtheIsraelistobringdozersintothecitiestoreducethestrongpointsthatmy tankmain gun rounds or the infantrywould have a hard timeclearing.OneofthemoreinterestingobservationsIhadwaswhenaD7operatorwas reducing a building thatmywingman and I had shot six

maingunroundsinto.Theinfantrymenhadgoneintoclearit,buttheywerestillbeingfireduponfromtherubbleandtheycouldn’tgointheretoclear it. I rememberLieutenantColonelBuhl from3rdBattalion,1stMarines called that dozer and said, “Hey.Go up there and reduce thisthing. Just take it down.”The dozer operatorwent in there and startedchoppingawayat thebuildingwith thebigbladeof thedozer and justbroughtitdownonthehouse.Ashedidthat,wejustwatchedwhatwasgoingon.Itwasanothersurrealscene.Acoupleofguysjustpoppedoutof the rubble. They literally popped out of the rubble, gray from therubbleanddust, and theystarted to shoot theirAKs rightathim,pointblank.Hewasn’tarmedbecausehewasinadozeroperatingapieceofmachinery. We could see the glass and it must have been ballisticbecauseitwastakinghitsanditwasspidering.Hehadasplitsecondtomakeadecision:eitherhewasgoing toget theheckoutof thereorhewas going to do something about it. He turned his dozer towards theenemy, raised the blade and just dropped it on top of the insurgent. Idon’t mean to be gory but it was weird to see a human being justpancaked under a blade. He took the threat out and luckily theinfantrymenwere able togo in there and finish the clearing anddidn’thaveanyinjuries,sohedidhisjob.IhadcapturedthatobservationandsentittotheregimentandthatyounglancecorporalendedupgettingaBronzeStarwith‘Vforhisactionsthatday.19

This tactic was in response to the inevitable casualties of urban clearingoperations.Hayes: “Guyswere getting killed left and right running into thesehouses.IneverheardcasualtyreportscomingovertheradiolikethatfirstweekIwas in there.Theywere havingguys getwipedout left and right, ‘TwoKIA,threewounded,’Thena fewhours later, ‘Wegot threeKIA, twowounded.’ Itwaslike‘Wow!Thisisreallynotgood!’”

The infantry eventually began to decline rushing buildings until they hadbeen‘prepped’bythetanks.Hayes:“Wewouldjustpulluptoit,putaboutthreetankroundsintoitandthentheD-9swouldbulldozeitdown.”

Thedenseurbanterrainhighlightedanage-oldproblemfortanks;thetankscouldnotsufficientlyelevatetheir120mmmaingunstofireatpositionsontheupperfloors.AlthoughHayes—agunner—disagrees,somesourcesstatethatthetankswould typically operate in two “waves,” one group leading to draw fireand engage positions in the ground floors and basements, while following

vehiclesheldbacktofireintohigherfloors.20Aspecialround,theHEAT-OR-TdevelopedbytheArmyforurbancombat,

provedlesseffectivethantheolderHEATrounds.Thelackofacanisterround,which had proven so useful against enemy ground troops fromWorldWar IthroughVietnam,wasalsosorelyfelt.Tankswerefiringatrangeslessthanthesafety-arming range (30–40m)of themaingun rounds. “A lotof thewayswewere getting kills from those roundswas from the over pressure of the rounditself coming out of the gun tube and the shock from the round itself,” saidBodisch.21

Akridge:“Wemostlyuseda lotofmortars,becauseour friendlieswere soclosetowherewewereshooting.Theone-five-fiveswouldhavebeenalot.Theinfantry forward observers, First Sergeant Bayne and Lance Corporal Brooks,theyusedMikeBatteryquitealot.”

Sincehewasnotatanker,Akridgewasmoreawarethatitwas“hotashell”insidethetank.Thefirstthreeorfourdayswhenwehadtosleep,allofus,inthetank.Thatsucked.Iguessthatwaswhatlifeinatankwasallabout.”Onedayheofferedsomedriedapricotstotheothercrewmen,and“Theireyesgotallbig.”He had violated the longest-standing tanker superstition. “You can’t haveapricotson the tank.Mygrandmasentmeapackage, so thegunner (SergeantMattingley)onthetankthatwasourwingman,hethrewthemawayforme.”

Bodisch found that his new tankswere equippedwithMDACT (MountedDigital Automatic Communications Terminal), a Windows™-based systemusing EPLRS (Enhanced Position Location and Reporting System); SIPRNet(SecureInternetProtocolRoutingNetwork)allowedcommunicationsthatweremore reliable than the line-of-sight radios, and near-instantaneous over hugedistances.“Iwasactuallychattingwithmycolonelback inCampLejeuneanytimeIhadabreak.Icouldusechattocommunicatetotheregimentandsomeofthe battalions. It was very useful because a lot of those radio nets were justclobbered.It’salreadyhardenoughtobeontheradiowiththeregimentandallofthebattalionsandthenthrowthecombatfactorontopofthat.Theradiowasconfusingtousesohavingthatcomputerwithchatonitwasprettyamazingandalmost surreal.” Bodisch would later find that the system worked even whennormalradioswereoutofrange.22

Second Lt Jeffrey T. Lee, in command of 3rd Platoon, A Company 2ndTank,supported1/8throughnumerousheavyfirefightsinthecity.Shotthroughthe arm, he declined evacuation until theMarines had reached their assignedobjective,thenremainedintheopentohelpdrivebackinsurgentcounterattacks.

JeffreywasrecommendedforaSilverStarforhisactions.23This time the public relations battlewas far better-managed.With too few

IraqiMuslimstoclearthemanymosquesinthecity,theMarinesoftenletIraqitroopsenterfirst,andthenclearedthemosquesthemselves;themedia“seemednottocarethatmuch.”AclamorbySunnivoicesfellupondeafShi’iteears.TheGrandAyatollahal-Sistaniponderedthepleas,andwaiteduntilneartheendofthebattletocallforpeace.24

Despite heavy fighting, the sweep through the city proceeded ahead ofschedule:bylateafternoon2/7thCavalrylinkedupwith3rdLARatthebridgesspanning theEuphrates.By2200hours thecavalrymenhadsecuredJolanPark,andreachedPhaseLineFRAN.

Mostof thefightingwasat rangesfarshorter than theMarineshad trainedfor.Bodischsaidthat“Alotofmyengagementsweremaingunroundsagainstpeople targets within thirty feet of the tank.” His gunner, Hayes, said that intraining “… it’s always like marksmanship, tank gunnery, can you hit thatmovingtargetatfifteenhundredmeters?OverthereduringtheFallujahbattleIdon’tknowif…anyofthetankgunneryskillswereeverreallyputtothetest.Especiallywhenyou’reputtinganMPATroundthroughahouse,and the tankbarrelisliterallytenfeetfromthedoor.”

At0100hourson10November1/8,supportedbytanks,LAVs,andAAVs,attacked south from the HadrahMosque toward Phase Line FRAN. By noonthey had seized theGovernmentCenter administrative complex, but spent theremainder of the day rooting out die-hard snipers. Marines being Marines,psychological warfare units celebrated The Birthday by playing the Marines’Hymnattopvolumethroughloudspeakers.

An assessment on 11 November suggested that the quick progressnecessitated a change in plan; spearheaded by the Army cavalrymen, theMarines continued to attack due south through the city, and by afternoon hadcrossed Phase Line FRAN. The southeast corner of the city had the mostdefensivepositions.Mostfacedsouthandweretakenfromtherear.25

By12NovemberCoalitionforcescontrolled80percentofthecity,butatacost.

Bodisch’s personal log recorded that they had cleared as far as MSRMICHIGAN,aneast-weststreetthatdividedthecityintohalves.ThetankswereleadingtheentireRCT-1advance,andtheHeadquartersSectiontanks,precededbytwoothertanksfromLtJoeBuffamante’splatoon,headedeastandthensouthonPhaseLineHENRY.TheretheyencounteredArmyvehiclesforthefirsttime.

Bodisch: “Becausewewere theMarine tank company,wewere theonly tankcompany that would get broken down and attached to the various infantrybattalions. Two-seven Cav, they stayed organic: they didn’t break theirformationsbelowtheirbattalion.Itwasinteresting…toseethestarkdifferencesbetweenhowaMarinetankcrewfights,andanArmytankcrewfights….

“Wedon’thavemanytanksintheMarineCorps,period,sowe’rewillingtooperate, echelon, at the section level. The Army never operates below theplatoonlevel….TheotherkeydifferenceisthefactthatourMarinetankswerethe ones that did all the detailed clearingwith our rifle companies. TheTwo-Seven Cav never broke their formation … and their mission was more of a‘thunderrun’,thekindoftacticthattheyhadperfectedinBaghdadandan-NajafsomeofthoseareasbeforecomingtoFallujah.”

Bodischthoughtthetacticwaseffectiveforshort-termurbanoperations,butless effective for longer, clearing operations. The Army’s most importantachievementwas that“Theywereable toseize themost importantnorth-southline of communication, Phase Line HENRY, right through the middle of thecity.”Thisprovidedareasonablysecuresupplyroute.“Everynight[when]wewentfirm,Iwouldsendmytanksbackthroughthatroute…togetbacktotherear and get refueled and whatnot. The drawback was that because they arebasicallyoutpostingoneroadthosetanksarenotinplay.They’renotprovidingcombatpower.They’rejustdoingguardduty.”

AnotherdoctrinaldifferencewasthattheArmyvehiclesoperatedbut-toned-up.“Oursituationalawarenessisouteyeballs.Everytimewewentthoughthatline of communications outposted by those M1A2 tanks and Bradleys, youdidn’tseetheirturretmoving,youdidn’tseethemmoving.Theyalmostseemedlike‘Well,justabunchoftanksouthere,andI’mnotsurewhatthey’redoing.’

“Butitdidmakeusfeelsafer,thattheywereoutthereholdingthatroad.”The insurgents made little use of IEDs, but the Marines shredded any

abandonedvehicles,justincase.JustafterturningsouthonHENRY“Allhellbrokeloose.His(Buffamante’s)

tankgotstruckbysniperfire,andhisloader,whowasalsothesamekidthatgotinjuredwhenthatmortarroundhitontopof theturret,hegotshotright inthehand.Itwastheonlypartofhisbodythatwasexposed…holdingontotheslip-ring,withhislefthandwhilehewasinsidetheturret….”

Akridge: “I heard on the radiowe’re going through a kill zone. I had theloader’shatchopen.Itwassohotweusuallykeptitopen.Ireacheduptopullitdown.Before Icould latch itwehad threeRPGshitus rightoff thebat…. It

blewthehatchbackopen,soIhadtogetoutthereandcloseitbackdown.“Something happened to the hydraulics or something on the turret, we

couldn’treallyturnasmuchaswecouldhave.Welostcommunicationorsightwithourwingtank.Kindascary.I thoughtthat timewemighthavebeendonefor.SergeantHayesgotabiggoofygrinonhisface,andwestartedgettingthetank[turret]toturn,andwestartedloadingmaingunrounds.”

Hayes:“Ourwingmantank—theXOtank—wasbehindusandhewas like%uguys justgothit.’And itwas like ‘Hitbywhat?’”Smithley replied that itwasanRPG,andsaidthey’dbeenhitagain.

Bodisch:“ThatwasthedaymytankgotstruckbythreeRPGs,oneofwhichwedgedonthesideofmyskirt.Theactualroundwasstillstuckinthesideoftheskirt.Whenweweredoneattheendoftheday,Ididn’tevenknowitwasstillthere‘tiloneoftheMarinesattherefuelpointpointeditout.”

Herecalledthat“[Smithley’s]tankhadalsoreceived,justashit-tonofRPGfire.Icouldseethat this tankthatwasimmediately infrontofme,Icouldseethe holes getting punched in the side of the sponson boxes… . They werereceivingwithsomuchfire,andthey’redealingwithacasualtythatmeandmyXOendeduptakingthelead.AswewereattackingsouthIwasintheleadtank,andLieutenantSmithley,mywingman,XO,wasrightbehindme.IusedtojokewithSmithleyallthetimethatI’mgetting’struckbyalltheseRPGteams.I’mnot able to take themout because they’re attacking immediately onmy flank.He’s able to pick these guys offwhen they reveal their positionswithmuzzleflashesfromtheirRPGs.

“He’sjustwhalingaway.Hewasdefinitelyamachineofdeath,ifyouwill,goingdownthatroad.Iwasdrawingallthefireandhewasgettingalltheglory,gettingallthekilling.”

Monitoring Kilo 3/1’s radio net, Bodisch heard that an attached team ofSEALsnipersridinginaHumveehadalsobeenhit.“Thelogicalguesswasthatthesamesniperhadengagedthetankloaderandthetwosnipers….”Itwasanactionfraughtwithalltheconfusionandhazardsofurbancombat.

“Icouldseetwoinsurgentsinanapartmentcomplex…twohundredmeterstomy southeast. Iwent aheadand requestedpermission to fire. It tooka longtimetogettheclearanceduetobeinginacross-boundarysituation.IbasicallygrewimpatientbecauseaMarinehadbeenstruck,thesniperwasstillengaging.Icouldseetheflash,wecouldseethebodies,inthethermals,oftheinsurgents.IcouldclearmyownfiresbecauseIknewwewerealreadyaheadoftheadjacentregiment,andIwentaheadandengagedthetarget.”

Hayesthoughtthatviewingthebattlethroughhisopticswas“…likeanout-of-body experience,” and likened it to a video game. Hayes recalled anotherlong-range engagement, pouring main gun rounds into a high-rise. Bodischrequestedanairstrike,onlytobetoldnoassetswereavailable.Hayes:“Weputafewtankroundsintoit,andsprayeditwithmachinegun.TheCO[says]“Youseeanything, just squeeze that trigger’.Wehada tank round in the thing. I’mwatching this hole in the side of the building that I just put in there.All of asuddenyouseethismovement;Irememberseeingthisguyrunfromtherighttotheleft….Assoonasheexposedhimself,itwasjustpullthetrigger.Allofasuddenthat’ssmokinghole.”

Amuch-reported incident on 13November brought home to Bodisch thatrapid global communicationswere amixed blessing. Inside a smallmosque areporter filmed a Marine rifleman killing an insurgent who he believed wasfeigningdeath,acommoninsurgenttactic.TheReutersreporterembeddedwithBodisch’scompany(thepartneroftheshell-shockedphotographer)couldnotgointo the city, but asked aMarine (who also had not been into the city) for areaction,and theMarine replied“Iwouldhavedone thesame thing.”BodischfoundhimselfcalledonthecarpetbylongdistancetelephonefromtheStatesforallowinghismentocomment.Theincident—andothers—ledtotheremovalofthereporter.26

NearthesouthernmarginofthecityBodischwassupportingIndia3/1.“Myleftflank,totheeast,wasRCTSeven.Icouldseethetanksectioninthatfight… . He was so close we could just basically shout at each other. That wasLieutenantJeffLee….”

The two officers talked face-to-face, confirming the attack plan. At 0730Bodischstartedsouth,but“Inoticedhistanksdidn’trollwithme….I’myellingathim‘Welllet’sgo!’Probablysaidsomeprofanewordstohim.Helookedatme and said he couldn’t roll.” Lee had not been given the clearance by hissupportedunit.

“AtthatpointIknewweweren’tgoingtostop.InowhadthisexposedleftflankI’mveryconcernedaboutit.”Thisraisedrealproblemswithcoordinatingfires.“Sureenough,rightasthat’shappeningIgetacallfrommyXO.Hesays‘Hey, sir, I don’t know what happened, but the infantry Marines, they juststopped.’

“We were going pretty slow, definitely creeping along, but in an urbanenvironment you go fifty feet, that’s a horrible distance to go without yourprotectiveinfantryenvelope.AtthatpointIwasgettingreallynervous,because

now it’sme andmywingman kind of alone and unafraid.We’ve got nobodyelse.

“Right as I’m realizing this feeling, I look tomy left and I see agroupofaboutthirtyinsurgents….Thisisnodoubtthisisthelaststandoftheseguys.”Many surviving enemy had been cornered, with their backs to open terrainoutside thecity.“They’re justnowrealizing that there’s tankscreeping towardthem… . Theywere nomore than a hundred feet away fromme, and they’reraisingtheirrifles,RPGs,someofthemarerunningintootherbuildings.Itwasjust a moment that was seared into mymind. It was surreal. I hadn’t seen aformationoftheenemythatbiguptothatpoint.

“I’mtryingtoyelltomygunner‘Traverseleft!Traverseleft!’Inthaturbanenvironmentyou’resousedtomakingsmalltraversesthathedidn’tunderstandthatIneededhimtotraversehardleft.AtthatpointIjusttooktheTCoverride,and I’mmoving the turret as fast as I can tomy left.”Bodischdroppeddownintotheturrettousehisownsightextension.“AtthatpointI’mjustlettinglongburstsofcoaxintothisformationofpeople.”

Certaindetailsofthechaoswereunforgettable.“ThefirstguythatIhadhitwith thatburstofammo, it looked like Ihadhithim right in the legwithoneround,andthatguydroppedimmediately.Deadcold,withoneroundtotheleg.ThesecondguyIputprobablyagoodfifteenroundburstintohistorso,andyethewas still able to somewhat standup, andhewasyellingatme, shakinghisweaponbeforehehit theground.It’skindofinterestingtomehowthehumanbodyreactedsodifferentlytousreturningfire.”

Bodischwassurprisedthat“Theenemywasn’trunningaway.Theenemyinfactreinforcedthemselves,andstartedchargingtowardthetank.Wepushedthemaingunat thispoint,andwe’re justblastingawaywithmaingun,coax,andfifty-cal. It was like a shooting gallery. They were able to close the distancebetweenshootingandloadingamaingunroundandbringingsmallarmsfireonthem.Butwewereabletoprettymuchobliterateeveryoneofthem,exceptforonesthathadmanagedtogetaway.”

Akridgewas in the turret sorting out the locationwhen “Captain Bodischjumps down and starts cussing and I realizewe’re under attack… .”Bodisch:“Wewereabletocallafiremissionontheareawherewethoughttheinsurgentshaddisplaced.Theyactuallywentjustontheothersideofthesouthernmostwallof the city.”Akridge “Theywent behind this berm, so I called in an air-bursttype thing… .At the same time,while Iwas coordinating the fire, Iwas alsoloading the tankmaingun roundsbecause theywereallover theplace. Itwas

oneofthosethings…itwasjustperfect.”ThefiremissionwasfilledbyArmyheavymortars;thefirstroundwasontarget.Bodisch:“…wejustdidafireforeffect, and we just kept repeating it and repeating it. Third Battalion, FirstMarines later on that day would find twelve bodies on the other side of thatwall.”

On 15 November the various forces aligned on Phase Line JENA andpreparedtoturnaboutforthefinalsweepthroughthecity.

On 16 November the city was declared secure, though sporadic firefightseruptedthrough20November.Patrolsscouredthecity.Muchof theresistanceseemedtobeencounteredintheeasternhalfofthecity,wherefightingwithairstrikes and tank support continued through 11December. Hayes: “Frommid-November tomid-Decemberwedida lotof theback-clearing.Theywere stillfindingguys….Incombatit’salwaystheintenseboredom,andthenyougetthecall over the radio,we’ve been clearing houses and then the twentieth house,there’stwentyguysinthere.”

Akridge was returned to his artillery battery job, replaced by acommunicationsspecialist.

Detailed search operations later revealed numerous weapons caches inmosques,crudechemicalweaponslabs,andmanualsforpreparinganthrax.TheMarines organized tours of these discoveries for the media, and the pressvideotapedwelcomingcivilians.27

In late December civilians who had fled the city were allowed to return,thoughMarinepatrolswerestillencounteringoccasionalresistance.Civilaffairsteams moved in to help make reparations for battle damage, and to restoreutilitiesandinfrastructureasquicklyaspossible,allapartof“PhaseIV”oftheoperation—“transition to an interim emergency government.” Reconstructionwas hampered by the recovery of the dead. Though the Coalition forces hadestablished joint mortuary affairs teams to recover and inter dead insurgentsaccording to Islamic practices, the insurgents had no qualms about booby-trappingtheirowndead,adesecrationcontrarytoIslamiclaw.28

The operationwas an overall success, thoughAbuMusabAl-Zarqawi andmostofhisforeignfightersfledpriortothebattle,leavinglocalfighterstofacetheoffensive.Effortstoreconstitutetheinsurgencywithinthecitywereatfirstunsuccessful, given stringent local security procedures. Though the battlesignificantlyweakened the insurgency in this Sunni stronghold, an immediateeffect of the death and destruction was to strengthen Sunni politicalintransigence. They boycotted the January elections, a move which backfired

whenShiafactionsgainedincreasedpowerinthegovernment.The brief but violent battle for Fallujah had upset some long held beliefs

abouttheutilityoftanksinurbanbattle.SinceWorldWarIItheUSmilitaryhadstressed avoiding urban warfare. For some, the Russian debacle in Chechnyareinforcedthatmaxim.InFallujahthearmoredvehicleshadproveninvaluable.Protected by sufficient infantry, they provided enormous firepower to reducestrongpoints, andwere far less vulnerable to IEDs than infantry in the narrowstreets.29

Evaluations of the second Fallujah battle were and still are mixed. Inretrospect, the battle was a clear moral victory, eliminating the odious “citystate” created by al-Zarqawi’s adherents. They had failed to inflict massivecasualties and thereby salvage strategic victory from tactical defeat byconvincing the American public that the war was unwinnable, as theCommunistshaddonewiththeTetOffensiveof1968.Buttenaciousinsurgentsimmediatelybegantoflowbackintothecitywiththereturningcitizens.Therewasstillalong,longwaytogo.

For the tanks, the lesson was that specialized protection was needed forurban combat; the Army developed the Tank Urban Survival Kit (TUSK) toprovidebetterprotectionforcrewmenusingturret-topmachineguns,andbetterelectronicimaging.

NOTES

1AsquotedinJimGoodwin,MarinetankunitcrucialtostabilizationofIraq,unpaginated.2Foulk,TheBattleforFallujah,p.124.3Fike,InterviewwithMAJRobertBodisch,p.3–5.4Ibid,p.11.5Foulk,TheBattleforFallujah,p.126–128.6Author,MajorRobertBodischinterview,April2012.7Foulk,TheBattleforFallujah,p.151.8Ibid,p.205–207.9SattlerandWilson,OperationAL-FAJR:TheBattleofFallujah—PartII,p.14.10Foulk,TheBattleforFallujah,p.210–211;Gott,TanksInTheCities,p.95.11Operational-Fajriscalledal-Fahrinsomesources.Thewordmean“Dawn.”12Fike,InterviewwithMAJRobertBodisch,p.5.13Gott,TanksInTheCities,p.95–98.14Ballard,FightingforFallujah,p.55–56.15Estes,USMarineCorpsOperationsinIraq,2003–2005,p.91.16Fike,InterviewwithMAJRobertBodisch,p.7–8.17Foulk,TheBattleforFallujah,p.214.18Ballard,FightingforFallujah,p.56.

19Fike,InterviewwithMAJRobertBodisch,p.10–11.20Gott,TanksInTheCities,p.98;Ackerman,RelearningStormTroopTactics:TheBattleforFallujah,p.

54.21Fike,InterviewwithMAJRobertBodisch,p.6.22Ibid,p.6–7.23Estes,USMarineCorpsOperationsinIraq,2003–2005,p.83.24Foulk,TheBattleforFallujah,p.215–217.25Ballard,FightingforFallujah,p.64.26Fike,InterviewwithMAJRobertBodisch,p7.27Ballard,FightingforFallujah,p.77;Foulk,TheBattleforFallujah,p.219.28SattlerandWilson,OperationAL-FAJR:TheBattleofFallujah—PartII,p.23.29Ballard,FightingforFallujah,p.101–104.

CHAPTERELEVEN

I

HarryingtheInsurgency

Icomeinpeace.Ididn’tbringartillery.ButI’mpleadingwithyou,withtearsinmyeyes:Ifyoufuckwithme,I’llkillyouall.—GeneralJamesMattis,USMC

NTHETRANSITIONTOcounterinsurgency(COIN)operations,theMarinescoordinatedwith theUSArmy,newly raised Iraqi formations, andtroopsoftheBritishBlackWatchtolaunchpursuitandexploitation

operations intended to keep the insurgents off-balance and on the run. Townssurrounding Fallujah were cordoned and swept, even as the effort to rebuildFallujahcommenced.

Inside the city the Marines still conducted sporadic assaults on insurgentstrongholds,andthetankswereoftencalledupontohelpwithprecisionfire.Atthe first opportunity to gather his company together, Bodisch and his FirstSergeant “… kind of talked them up a bit.We said ‘Things have to change.You’renotkillingthefirstpersonyouseenow.Thatstuffisover.Nowwehavetoshiftbacktohelpingthesepeople.’Iwasactuallyprettyproudthatthoseguyswereabletomakethatshiftsoquickly.”1

Hayesrecalledabriefperiodofdoing“ClassicMarinestuff: tryingtolookbusy.”Then theCOof 3/8 gaveBodisch a section of amtracs, a rifle platoonfrom India Company, an engineer section, and occasionally a HumanExploitationTeamand translator, toestablisha rovingmechanized force.“Weweredoingeverythingtheinfantryguysweredoing.Weweredoingcordon-and-knock, we were doing snap vehicle control points, and we were doingmechanizedpatrols.Inthefourweeksthatweoperatedlikethat,weuncoveredmoreweaponscachesthananyofhisriflecompaniesdid.Theywerenew,justgettingthere,tryingtofigurethingsout.Myguyswereprettyseasonedbythatpoint.”

LtColS.M.Neary’sinstructionsweresimple:“’Iwantyoutogoinmyareaofoperations,andIwantyoutorunamok.Iwantyoutodowhatyouthinkyouneed to do. Iwant you to uncoverweapon caches. Iwant you to get into thepopulated areas, search these homes, search for insurgents, and develop someintelligence.’Andthat’sexactlywhatwedid.ItwasprobablythebestmissionatankcompanycommandercouldhaveinthatCOINenvironment.”

In general, there was little fighting: a few small IEDs, and one nightSmithley’stankhitalargemine.Hayesrecalledonlyoneunusualincident,when

yetanotherroadedgecollapsedunderthetank.Lookingoutthroughhisopticsataruralroad,Hayesthought“Thisisnotagoodidea.Thatstupidcanaljuststartstogiveway, and… the tankbegan to slide to the right. I sprintedout of thattank.Beforeitevensettled,Iwasout.Acrosstheloaderandgotoutofthetankandjumped.Iknewthesecondthatthingsstartedtoturn‘I’mgettingthehelloutofhere.Fast.’”Thetanksettledwithaforty-fivedegreelist,andpartiallythrewa track,blocking thenarrow road.The tankhad tobeextricatedbycabling tofouramtracs.Theroadcontinuedtocollapse,andSmithley’stankalsohadtobeextricated.

In April the company’s deployment was over. Bodisch: “Captain MattYoungbloodcameintoreplaceme,fromSecondTank,andforhissevenmonthshebasicallydidalotofthosetypeoperations….BasicallyeverytankcompanycommanderaftermedidprettymuchtheCOIN-typeoperations.”

All these effortswere geared toward both supporting the 30 January 2005elections,andpreventingtheenemyfromexploitingtherelief-in-placeofIMEFby IIMEF in the first quarter of 2005.The rotation and scale-downof forceswouldbring2ndLARBattalion,andanumberofsmallmechanizedunitstobeco-locatedwith 1/8 atCampFallujah:BCompany, 2ndTank, anATPlatoonfrom 2nd Tank, Scout Platoon of 8th Tank, and B Company, 2nd AAVBattalion.2

JohnPolidoro,thesonofauniversityprofessorandaschoolteacher,attendedAnnapolis “because it was free and it was hard to get into,” then chose theMarineCorps commissioning path because “it kind of suitedmypersonality.”Thoughatankofficerbytraining,mostofhiscombatassignmentswerewiththeLARunits.

Polidorohadjoined2ndLARastheExecutiveOfficerinJune2004:

…we spent the next sevenmonths hearing “You’re going. You’re notgoing.You’regoing.You’renotgoing.”Itwasn’tuntilJanuary2005thatweactuallygotnotificationofourdeploymentinMarch.3

Pre-deployment training includedgunnery,MilitaryOperationsOtherThanWar,urbanoperations,andathree-weekcombinedarmsexerciseatTwentyninePalms, but none of the training was specifically directed toward the specialconditionsinIraq.Culturaltraininggotlostinthepre-deploymentrush.Polidorocontinued:

I thinkwewere focused toomuchon theconventional fightanddidn’tspend enough time preparing for the cultural differences between theWestern mind and the Arab mind. We could have done a lot betterinteractingwithpeopleifwe’dhadmoretraininginthat.Wecouldhavefoughtconventionallyagainstanybodyintheworldatthattimebecausewewerewellprepared,butwedidn’tendupdoingthat.Wewerealittlebitoffthemark….4

The real problems of the rotation came not from the insurgents, but fromwearandtearonvehiclesneverdesignedformonthsofcontinuouscampaigningin a brutal environment. In January 2nd AAV Battalion sent a reconstitutiondetachment to evaluate and refurbish—where possible—the vehicles in place;halfofthe84vehiclesincountryhadtobereplacedwithvehiclesshippedfromCampLejeune.ThefollowingmonththeevenmorebadlyworntanksandVTRswerereplacedbyvehiclesfromMPSstores.Someunitslike2ndLARbroughttheirownequipmentfromtheUS.

WiththeeliminationofthemajorenemystrongholdinFallujah,themissionevolved to apacificationof the countryside, counter-sabotage, and interdictionoftheever-presentratlines.Wherefeasible,tanksandAAVssupportedinfantrysweepstoclear insurgentstrongholds,andeitherkill insurgent leadersorforcethemtorelocate.

Polidoro found that the mission was multi-fold: “We had acounterinsurgency role, a route security role inwestern Iraq from just east ofHadithaouttothebordersofTribil,downinJordan,andWalidupinSyria.Sowe basically had about ten thousand square miles to cover, and about sevenhundredmilesofroadthatwewerecontinuallypatrolling,andthensomemajorurban centers, the town of Akashat (in NW al-Anbar Province), and Riphah,whichisaboutthirty-fivethousandorsopeople….Weweredoingbothclearingoperations,targetedraids,andconstantpatrollingandconvoyescortaswell.”

MAP5.MarineCorpsWesternIraqOperationalArea.ParallelhighwaysRoutes10and11paralleltheEuphratesRiver;themeanderingrivercourseisomittedforclarity.

Convoy operations were a continuing burden, particularly given theinsurgents’ increasingutilizationofroadsideIEDs.TheLAVsproveduseful inthis role, one of their spectacular achievements being the escort of amassive“Mother of all [electrical] Generators” from the Jordanian border to Mosulwithoutincident.5

Other missions were not so placid, and it did not take Polidoro long toreceivehiswelcomemessage.“March17,20005,myfirsttimeoutofthewire,Igotblownup….”

InthenewoperationalareatheMarineswerespreadthin.SecondLAR,withanartillerybatteryservingasinfantry,wasbasedatCampKoreanVillage.Thisforcewas responsible for securing some 10,000 squaremiles of nearly emptycountry with 387 miles of road, a handful of towns with populations up to35,000 residents, and twomajor border crossings atWalid (Syria) and Trebil(Jordan). Trebil was the crossing point for the critical Main Supply RouteMOBILE,a six-lanehighwayalongwhich threeconvoysperdaybrought fuelandothersupplies.Therewerejusttoofewmentoadequatelypatrol—letalonesecure—suchavast region.Polidoro:“At first,90percentofwhatwefocused

onwastryingtomakeitabetterplaceforthepeople.Aroundthethirdorfourthmonth, though,weweretoldtoknockitoff,sowebackedoffonthat towardsthe end.” Thereafter the battalion’s efforts concentrated on keeping the mainroadsreasonablysecure.6

PatrolsorconvoyescortintheLAVswasbetterbecause“TheLAVisalittlebit more spacious than a tank, and you can get away with a lot more ‘causethere’sstorageinthearea,butitisdifficulttokeepyourselfclean….Anythingwith fluids,yougetalloveryouall the time.Youget that,andyouget rotalloveryou.Justthenatureofthebeast….Whenyou’rerollingat115degrees,it’srealtough.”Sanitationconsistedofa40mmammunitioncanwithaplastictrashbagasadisposableliner.

Polidoroalso found that theLAVwasnot aswelldesigned forbasiccrewsafetyasthetanks.Theturretbasketisnotself-containedasinatank,and“…there’sbeenmultipletimesIalmostlostafootinthisthing,becausewhereit’scomfortabletome—behindtheseat—there’snoguardthere.”

On the patrols, some of which lasted sixteen hours, “Finding a positionwhere I could sitor standand see,but stay lowenough toprotectmyselfwasdamnednear impossible.Theseat—ifIsiton it I’mtoolow, if IstandupI’mtoo high.What I would do is there’s a little shelf—and by shelf Imean fourinchesofoverhang—behindtheseatofthevehiclecommander.I’dwedgebuttinto that thing, as much as I could, and then there’s sights right above theposition.I’dputawaterbottlenexttothatsight,andthat’dbemychinrest.I’drestmychinonawaterbottleandhavemyM4(carbine)upontopoftheturret,withmyfingeronthatthingwiththeseven-six-two[machinegun]aheadofthat,with my hand on the water bottle looking UNDER the machine gun, so ifsomethinghappenedI’dgetupandmanthegun.”

Polidorothusfoundhimselfintheclassicseniorofficer’sdilemma;washisjob to fireaweaponordirect the fight?“TheM4was forclosed-bolt shotsasyour first escalation of force if you’ve got a vehicle or something coming foryou,youuseaclosed-boltweapon—oneshotatatime.Ifthatdidn’twork,youwere supposed to move up to the machine gun, which was your open-boltweapon,tostopandwarnthatcar.Andthenthe25mmofcoursewasfordirectcontact… . Thatwas just toomuch forwhatwewere doing.Wewere takingbuildingsdownwiththe25mmchaingun….”

Korean Village was not supported by the usual civilian contractors, butoperated byMarines andNavySeabees,withAlbanians contracted to providesanitationservices.Theborderpostswereevenmoreisolated.

“It wasn’t as bad, though, as it was at the border sites, because we hadMarinesresponsibleforWalidandTrebil.Thosewereservicedbyourlogisticsunits,ourbattaliontrainsifyouwill.Onceaweekwe’dsendthemouttheretotakecareofthoseguys.”

At the isolated posts “We got rocketed quite regularly. I wouldn’t sayeffectively.” The attacks inflicted only oneKIA, butwere a constant risk. Toavoidaresponse,theinsurgentswouldtriggertherocketswithwashingmachinetimers,and“They’dpointitinthegeneraldirectionofthecamp….”

Counter-battery fire, the usual reaction to such attacks, had to be usedsparingly.Polidoro explained that “Weonlydid it twice that I can thinkof intwoyears,becausethecollateraldamageconcernsweresignificant.Mostlytheycameoutofneighborhoods….Shota lotof illum[ination]wasreally theonlything. Our primary response was patrol. Patrol, patrol, patrol, patrol, all thetime.”

Westernal-AnbarProvinceremainedaninsurgentstronghold,andOperationMATADOR (8–19 May, 2005) was to be the first of several designed tograduallyclearandsecure theregionwhere therat linescrossedfromSyria. Itwas also typical of the combined arms operations in the sparsely populatedwesternregion.

On7Aprilinsurgents,thoughttobedirectedbyal-Zarqawi,seizedcontrolofal-Qa’im, a city just east of the Syrian border, driving out Iraqi soldiers andpolice. From there they launched attacks—including firingmissiles—at CampGannon, located in an abandoned warehouse complex in nearby Husaybah.ThoughtheregionnorthoftheEuphrateswasknowntobelargelydominatedbyal-Qaedah, the townofUbaydion themoreaccessiblesouthbankof the riverwas thought to be relatively secure. TheMarines of RCT 2would secure theregion aroundUbaydi, cross the river on a bridge constructed by the Army’s814thBridgeCompany,andscourthenorthbankforinsurgents.

CompanyB,2ndLARand tanksquicklyseizedcontrolof theoldRamanaBridgesite(thebridgehadbeendestroyedtohamperinsurgenttraffic)tocovertheArmybridgingoperation,buttheMarinesquicklycameunderunexpectedlyheavyattack.Thistriggeredafiercebattlefor“NewUbaydi,”atownwithpavedstreetsandone-tothree-storyconcretehouses,builttohouseworkersatanearbyphosphateplant.WhiletanksassistedtheinfantryinclearingNewUbaydi,otherinfantrycrossedtheriverinAAVstobeginscouringthenorthshore;becauseofaccidents and other delays the ribbon bridge did not become operational untillateinthedayon9April.

Mines were as always the primary threat to tanks, and when a tank wasdisabled by amine on 9April it triggered heavy fighting.A recovery convoywas dispatched from the al-Qa’im base, but 7 km to the east plowed into anelaborate ambush. One Humvee was hit by a roadside bomb, and insurgentsattackedwithRPGs, small arms, and two suicidebombvehicles.TheMarinesfoughtclearofthekillzone,buttheM88senttorecovertheoriginaltankwasitselfdisabledbyamine.AtanktowedtheM88backtobase,andthedisabledtankwaslaterrecovered.7

OnthenorthshoretheMarinesswepttothewest,clearingcavesandlocatingweaponcaches.On14MaytheMarineswithdrewtothesouthbank,endingtheoperation. InMATADOR the insurgents displayed atypical organizational andtacticalskills,andsomewereequippedwithuniformsandbodyarmor.Asistheunfortunate case with many counterinsurgency operations, the overstretchedMarineshadnoway to secure theclearedarea, and insurgentsquickly filteredbackintothevoid.8

MATADORwasimmediatelyfollowedbySQUEEZEPLAYintheenvironsofBaghdad,andthenon24–30MayHadithawassubjectedtoNEWMARKET,asweepbyinfantrysupportedbytanks,AAVs,andLAVs.

More operations, often transitioning to “cordon and knock,” followed inquicksuccessionas theMarinesstrove togaincontrolof theEuphratesValleyanditsratlines.InatypicaloperationtanksandLAVswouldsweepintocordonatownorarea,andinfantrywouldsweepforinsurgents.Many,suchasCLEARDECISION(30April-5May),wereintendedsimplyasclearingoperations,butfollowingOperationSWORD(Saif,28June-6July),Hitbecamethefirst towntobepermanentlygarrisoned.

A nagging problem, as in Vietnam, was the manpower consumed bymaintainingandprotectinglogisticalroutes.TheMarineshadtosecurehundredsof miles of roads through hostile territory, and the LAVs of 2nd LAR weretasked with protecting both convoys and the Army engineers in their never-endingroadmaintenance.

Cooperation between Marines and the Army had become far morecommonplacethanindecadespast,butpolicystillinterfered.AnArmyinfantrybattalion was attached to the logistical command for escort and security.Polidoro:

Theywere sickof doing convoy security all the time.We said “We’regoing to do a raid. We’ve got some great intel. We need some more

people. Do you guys want to come and play?” They really wanted tocomewith us.We asked, “Do youmind if we take these infantrymenwhoknowhow to do thiswith us on our raid?”The answerwas “No.They’reArmyguys.”Itwasn’ttheirmissionorrole,sotheywouldn’tletthemdoit.9

CLEAR DECISION (30 April-5 May, 2005) was a typical example of a“cordon and knock” operation. Tanks and AAVs moved into positionsurroundingal-Karmahat0300hours,followedbyCH-46Ehelicoptersdroppingleafletsadvisingthecivilianpopulationwhattoexpectandhowtocooperate.At05303/8beganthedoor-to-doorsearch,whileelementsof3rdReconnaissanceBattalionscouredthesurroundingcountryside.On13MaythetownwasturnedovertoIraqigovernmentforces.

TheSyrianbordercontinuedtobeatroublespot,andelementsof1stTankBattalion,2ndLAR,and2ndand4thAAVBattalionsparticipatedinOperationSPEAR,clearingthetownofKarabilah.

RCT8was responsible fora large swathofcountrynorthofFallujah, andoperational units built around elements of the mechanized units, TeamBRAWLERfromBCompany,2ndTankandTeamGATORfromBCompany,2nd AAV Battalion conducted operations over the region. The two teamssupported1/8inOperationKHANJAR(Dagger)inthesouthernLakeTharthar(Buhayrat ath Tharthar) region, uncovering weapons caches and trainingfacilities.10

TheCoalitionforcesmight tosomeextentcontrol theoperationalpaceandsetting by launching operations designed to clear the Euphrates Valley andprevent insurgents from taking advantage of the impending force rotation, buttheinsurgentswerebynomeanscowed.NearHaditha3/25hadbeenengagedinfighting enemy units using mortars and small arms. On 1 August insurgentsstruck two scout-sniper teams from3/25nearBarwanah,northwestofHadithaontheleftbankoftheEuphrates.Theyquicklyoverwhelmedtheteams,killingfiveandcarryingawayasixthmanwhosebodywasfoundthefollowingday.

Forces allocated for Operation LIGHTNING STRIKE II were quicklyreallocatedtoQUICK(3–11August,2005),alargecordonandsearchcenteredon the villages of Haqlaniyah (where the body of the abducted Marine wasfound)andBarwanah.Inacommonpattern2ndLARestablishedaloosecordonaround the area, infantry and tank unitsmoved in, and ForceRecon providedraidingpartiesandsnipersupport.Theheaviestlossoccurredonthefirstdayof

the operation, when a roadside IED struck an AAV carrying Marines fromL/3/25.ThehugeexplosionblewtheAAVontoitsside,killingfifteencrewandpassengers.

On4Augusttwocompaniesfrom3/2,supportedby2ndPlatoon,A/1stTankmoved north through Barwanah on the north bank of the river, while twocompaniesfrom3/25,supportedby3rdPlatoonandtheHeadquartersSectionofthetankcompanymovedinparallelthroughHaqlaniyahonthesouthbank.TheMarinesencounteredonlylightresistance,buttheheavylossoflife-particularlyamongaReserveunit-attractedconsiderablemediaattention.

By now the fighting had settled into the seemingly interminable series ofclearingoperationsthatcharacterizeanycounterinsurgencycampaign.ThetaskwasmadeparticularlycomplexbystandingupthenewIraqimilitaryandpoliceunits, Operation GUARDIAN SHIELD (a blanket operation to cover anotherforce rotation), andOperation LIBERTYEXPRESS (protection of the pollingplaces foraconstitutional referendumon15Octoberandnationalelectionson15December).Sunnimoderatefactionshad“satout”thepriorelections,butthisprotesthadbackfired,concedingcontrolofthecentralgovernmenttoShi’iteandKurdishfactions.Inthiselectioncyclethefearwasthatextremistswouldonceagain discourage Sunni participation, creating a permanent split among thevariousfactionsvyingforcontrolofthenewIraq.

TheMarinesestimated thatdespitediversecommitments, theycould retainthe initiative and disrupt insurgent efforts. The Multi-National Force blanketoperation,SAYAIDII,wouldestablishindigenousforcesinal-Anbar,securetheregion along the Syrian border, and interdict insurgent activities all along theEuphrates River valley. Many local operations would exploit sweeps byestablishing permanent presences in an increasing number of towns, and civilaffairs programswould concentrate upon encouraging anti-insurgent sentimentamong the Sunni leaders and populace. Forces were still inadequate to eithercontroltheSyrianborderortoadequatelycontrolthelargeregionalongtherivervalley. Part of the effort to restrict insurgent traffic was to destroy selectedbridges across the Euphrateswith air strikes andArmyMLRS rocket attacks,andtoestablishrandomcheckpointsalongmajorroadsonthesouthbank.

Thus far the Marines had concentrated on securing the more denselypopulated Euphrates Valley and the crossings into Syria. The huge, emptyexpanses of desert south of the river bordered by southern Syria, Jordan, andSaudiArabiaistraversedbyonlyonemajorhighway,Route10,whichcrossesfrom Jordan near Tribil, passes through ar-Rutbah, and joins Route 12—the

main road that parallels the river valley—near ar-Ramadi.The logical units topatrol and secure this lengthy and desolate highwaywere theLARbattalions,buttheyhadbeencommittedtoalmostconstantactionalongthehighwaystothenorthandsecuringlogisticalroutes.

The only consistent American presence was at Camp Korean Village, orCampKV,adesolateoutpostnearar-Rutbah,thenexusofmostofthesecondaryroads with Route 10.11 Camp KV was regularly resupplied by convoys, butlivingconditionsforthetroopsstationedthereremainedbleak.

In the pre-dawn hours of 11 September 2nd LAR established a cordonaround ar-Rutbah, the beginning of Operation CYCLONE (Zoba’a). Infantryforces swept through the town from two directions, the north (Marine ForceReconandIraqiSpecialForces)andthesouth(K/3/6supportedbyAAVsandaplatoonfromCCompany,2ndLAR),targetingpre-selectedhouses.Thiswastobe2ndLAR’sfinalsignificantoperationbeforerotatingoutinSeptember.

ByOctoberreliableIraqiunitswerearrivinginsomestrength,tosecuretheSyrianborderandtogarrisontownsbeginningwithHit,Hadithah,andRawah.To draw insurgent attention from this movement and preparations for majoroperationsyettocome,between1and8Octoberthenewly-arrived3/6executedOperationIRONFIST(KabdabilHadid),asweepofSadah,a townof20,000persons about 12km from the Syrian border, and the eastern sector of nearbyKarabilah.

On 2 October three rifle companies from 1/3moved through the town ofSadah, supported by platoons of tanks and AAVs; resistance was atypicallydirect,withinsurgentsattemptingcounterattackswithsmallarmsandRPGandvehicle-mounted squads, as well as the usual roadside bombs. In at least onecase tank fire was used to destroy a car bomb.12 Considerable propagandaalways resulted from civilian injuries, as in one casewhere insurgents forcedtheir way into a building still occupied by civilians. Probably unaware of thenon-combatants, theMarines used a round from anM1 tank to demolish thebuilding, wounding five civilians.13 After securing Sadah, the Marines andsupporting soldiers blocked roads connecting the two towns, and set updefensivepositionsinawadibetweenthetwo.

ThefightingprovedmuchheavierinKarabilah,wheretanksandairstrikeswereused toblast insurgentpositions.14Again the insurgentsalong theSyrianborderwere heavily armed,withmortars and other heavyweapons, andmoreproficientthantheirbrethrenaroundBaghdad.OneNCO,aSergeantLybarger,remarked,“Theywereasgoodasourguyswere. Iwanted tokill thembefore

they teach all the other guys how to do that.”15 Three days were required toreduceKarabilah,andsporadicfightingbypatrolscontinuedforweekswhileapermanentbasewasconstructed.Evenwhile thisoperationwasunderway, theMarines returned to another chronic sore spot. The large Operation RIVERGATE(BawwabatuAnna-her,October2005)centeredonHaditha,Haqlaniyah,andBarwanah,andwasdesigned topave thewayforapermanentpresence inthis troublesome region. In a large and complex operation Iraqi special forcesunits provided a broad screen. The Army’s 3rd Battalion, 504th ParachuteInfantry, transported by Marine helicopters and supported by 3rd Platoon, BCompany, 1stTank and Iraqi units occupiedHaqlaniyah.The 1st Platoon andHeadquarters of the tank company supported 3/1 and Iraqi units in theoccupationofHadithah.1stLARoccupiedBarwanah.

Thisareaprovedtobepartofaninsurgentbasearea,withnotonlytheusualbombfactories,butalargepropagandamillequippedtoproducevideotapesandCDs in quantity. After the operationMarine engineers moved in to constructpatrolbasesinallthreetowns.

TheMarinesprovidedbothprotectiveand limited logisticalsupport for theconstitutional referendum, and took preemptive measures such as placingindirectfireonlikelylaunchpointsformortarorrocketattacks.

Asmore Iraqi units became available they were increasingly incorporatedintooperations,provingparticularlyusefulinidentifyingforeigninsurgentswhowere otherwise invisible toAmerican troops. InOperation STEELCURTAIN(al-Hajip Elfulathi) a combined force of Marine Corps (including 1st LAR),Army,andIraqitroopssweptfromwesttoeastthroughHusaybahbetween1and3November.ThetaskforcecontinuedeastthroughWesternKarabalah,thenonto again clearUbaydi. This time a permanent presencewas established in theclearedtowns.

WiththecompletionofLIBERTYEXPRESS,intheNewYearthemissionshifted to outright suppression of the insurgency. In January throughApril of2006IMEFrelievedIIMEF,coveredbyanumberofsmalloperationsdesignedto prevent insurgents from taking advantage of the relief. 1st LAR assumedresponsibility for the ar-Rutbah region, and from18 to 25 January prosecutedWESTERNSHIELDtoclearandsecurethetown.Aspartoftheprocessatwo-meterhighearthenbermwasconstructedaroundthetown,withonlythreetrafficcontrolpointstoprovideaccesstothecity,thusdenyingittotheinsurgencyasalogisticalbaseandtransitpoint.

Astheheaviestfightingwounddown,anincreasingnumberofMarineCorps

units found themselvesservingasprovisionalmilitarypolice.Artilleryunits inparticularwerediverted,startingin2004withtheentire3/11howitzerbattalion.Mummey’snephewdidtwotours.“Hewasagun-bunny,butheneverpulledalanyard.Hewasalwaysdoingconvoysecurity,orworkingwithanIraqipoliceteam.Hesaid‘UncleMike,it’shard.Youcomebackinandallofasuddenyougottarelax.Yougot the internet,yougotyour little iPod™youlisten toyourmusic, and go over to the phone center andmake a phone call. Then all of asuddenyougotothemissionbrief,andyou’regearingup,checkingyourgun,makingsureyougotthecall-signs,gotyourmedicalkitfittogo,andthenyoujumponthisconvoyawaytogetblownup,youknow.”

Lineandheadquarterscompaniesfromboth4thTankand4thAAVReserveunits would serve as provisionalMPs, while small boat detachments for damsecuritywouldbeprovidedbyAAVandLARunits.Theothershortagewasincivil affairs specialists. The two existing units were grossly overburdened bycontinuousrotations,sotwoprovisionalgroupswereformedbyretrainingotherspecialists.Theinsurgencyalsoshiftedtactics,relyingincreasinglyuponIEDstodisrupt civil affairs efforts and attack individual vehicles and convoys,increasingthedemandforengineerandEODspecialists.

Gunnery Sergeant Michael Martinez of Bravo Company, 4th Tank wasuniquely qualified for MP duty. Without the inclination or money to attendcollege,hedecidedasahigh-schoolfreshmantojointheMarines,andbidedhistimeuntiloldenoughtoenlist.Afteractivedutyintheinfantry,hebecameaUSMarshallandaReserveMP,andthenwenttoanLAVunit.In1998theMarshallServicetransferredhimtoWashingtonState,sohebecameatankcommander.

Following notification in mid-2004, the tank company, with a platoon ofReserveMPs,wasformedintoaProvisionalMPCompany.MartinezsaidofheandanotherGunnywhowasincivilianlawenforcement,“Betweenuswecameupwitha trainingschedule. InOctober throughDecemberdidawholeother’syears worth of drills… .” Martinez included both military “lessons learned”materials and training from his civilian job and “We put together a bunch ofclasses on clearing buildings, clearing rooms. Some basic stuff on patrollingpackages, driving, a little convoy stuff.” Drills included reaction to IEDs andsmall arms attacks, and casualty evacuation. In contrast, language and culturaltrainingwas“wasprettyrudimentarystuff.Itcertainlywasn’tindepth.”

TheUSmilitarywasstill feeling itswayinto thestrangeenvironment,andtrying to incorporate models from other occupation experiences. The tankerstrainedinBritish-stylesatellitepatrollingonfoot.“Insteadofjustgettingintoa

column-of-twosandwalkingthroughtown,it’ssortofadecentralizedpatrol isthebestwaytoput it.You’reflowinginandaroundobjects insteadofstayingone behind the other walking like ducks in a row… . You try not to puteverybodyonthesamepath,sothatyoureducevulnerability.”

Martinez’s Provisional MP Company was based outside Fallujah. Livingconditionswere good,withmostmen housed in ametal buildingwith indoorplumbing and air-conditioning that “mostly worked.” “Chow was way tooplentiful.Itwasn’toverlygood,buttherewasalotofit.”

The company’sprimarymissionwas to escort convoysover a vast region.“WealsodidprisonerreleasesfromAbuGhraibuptoRamadiprettyfrequently.Thoseweredaytimemissions, thoseandescortmissions for inductees into theIraqiNationalGuard.”

The first incidentwas near the prison. “Itwas in a place thatwas heavilyIED’ed….Thisoneturnedouttobeadud.Thekickerchargewentoff,anditwasenoughtothrowtheone-five-fiveroundsuponthetarmac.Westoppedandcordonedit,andnobodywashurt….”16

Ontheconvoys,“UsuallywewereescortingTCNvehicles—ThirdCountryNationaldrivers—logisticalconvoys.Therewasamarshallingyardprettyclosetothebuildingweweresleepingin.Wewouldgooverthereandmeetwiththeguy that ran that.Hewould tell us howmany vehicleswewere taking.” Theconvoysmovedatnightsincethecurfewallowedtheconvoystoavoidciviliantraffic.“Andat that timetherules,keepingcarsawayandrunningcarsoff theroad, thatkindofstuff,wasstillheavily ineffect,andtheyjustdidn’twantusrunningthoseroadsduringthedayandimpactingthelocals.”

Thenighttime runsminimizedattackson theconvoys, since the insurgentsweredisorganizedandmostattacksoccurredduringtheday.“TheypoppedIEDsonusacoupleoftimes.Noneofthesmallarmsfirewaseverreallydirectedatus.Wewerejustkindofinthearea.Thewayweranwasblackedout,andthenthesemis(contractorcargotrucks)hadlights.”

Theusualconfigurationwasforatwo-vehicleleadelementtoproceedabouttwo kilometers ahead of the main body. “We got hit with IEDs on fouroccasions.Theyalwayshitourleadvehicle.”

Onedaytheescortbecameseparatedfromtheconvoy,aresupplyrunforaJordanianfieldhospitalwithdoctorsandnursesaboard,intheKoreanVillage—ar-Rutbah region. “I told everybody to stop so we could get everybody backtogether, and they stopped right adjacent to that fifty-five gallon drum, and itblewup.Center-punchedthevehicle….”Theexplosionflattenedthe tiresand

toreawaycoolanthosesandotherengineparts.“We had one Marine that got wounded, took a piece of shrapnel to his

forehead….ThatwasthefirstMAKvehicleourunithad….Everybodyinsidewas fine.Thekid in thegunner’s turret caught apieceof shrapnel… . I thinkthey said it was three one-hundred-twenty-two millimeter rockets that werebundled,andtheywereprettymuchrightnexttoitwhentheywentoff.Itwasinafifty-fivegallon[drum]bythesideoftheroad.”

NeartheJordanianborder“Itwasprettydesolateoutthere….Theyhadjustpassed througha little settlement, itwasn’t reallyevenenough tobeavillage,justacoupleofhouses.Thetriggermanwasinoneofthosehouses.”

Martinez,incommandoftheconvoysincethePlatoonLeaderwasawayatabriefing,wasridinginatruckjustbehindtheleadelement.Theusualdrillwastokeeprolling,buttheimmobilizedvehicleandacasualtyhaltedtheconvoy.“Irolleduptherewithmyseven-ton,weattachedtheseven-tonontotheHumvee,dragged it about four-hundred yards down the road just in case they had anydaisy-chains waiting to hit the rest. We got down there, we assessed thewounded,gothimontheroadwiththecorpsman.Thenwechangedthetiresonthatvehicle.BythetimewegotthetireschangedIrolledupmyvehiclesfromthe rear. We set a perimeter and we started clearing everything immediatelyadjacenttowheretheexplosionhadhappened.

“Wecaughtsomeguyswhowerepeekingoutatusthroughsomewindowsinsomebuildingsthatwereacoupleofhundredmetersaway….Wedetainedthree, twoadultsandajuvenile,allmales.”Theprisonerswerequestionedandreleased at Korean Village. The provisional MPs learned that 2nd LAR latercapturedorkilledsomeoftheactualtriggermen.

By2006Iraqiforceshadassumedmuchoftheresponsibilitiesatar-RutbahandCampKV,graduallyreplacingtheMarinesof2ndand3rdLAR.

MajorJohnPolidororeturnedforasecondtourinAugust2006,stillasXOof2ndLAR.Hefelt that this timetheunitwasfarbetterprepared,withbetterArabic language and cultural awareness training, and three weeks training inurbancombataspartof theMOJAVEVIPERprogram.Uponarrival,PolidorofoundthatthebattalionwastobesplitbetweentwoseparateAreasofOperation.Thebulkofthebattalion—twoLARcompanies,mostoftheH&SCompany,anattached infantry company, and a section of artillery—went to Rawah in theEuphratesvalley.Polidoro tookonecompany, a companyofMPs, andpartoftheH&SCompanybacktoKoreanVillage.Again,Polidorofoundhimselfinan“economy of force”mission, trying to control border crossings. Too fewmen

meantthathecouldsetuptrafficcontrolpointsaroundthebermedtownofar-Rutbah,butcouldnotadequatelypatrolthetown.17

LivingconditionshadactuallydeterioratedatKoreanVillage.CaptainJasonGaddyhadservedasthebattalionH&SCompanyCOonthepriortour,andhadencountered problems with contractor services. “It was worse than the firstdeployment,asfaraslogistics.Marineswerestill livingintents.Therewasnorealelectricalgrid.Thekitchenwasbarebones.Thecookshadtwoburnersandagriddleandhadtocookfor900people….Idon’tknowifitwasbecausewhentheStrykerspulledouttheytookalloftheirstuff.ThirdLARcameupandtheywereonlythereforlikeamonth.”18Gaddyfacedacontinuinguphillbattlewithlogistics,dealingwiththeArmy,contractors,andNavySeabees.

Despitethelimitationsofmanpower,theforceatKoreanVillagewasabletofocusmoreoninteractingwiththelocalsandexploitingintelligence,ratherthanroadsecurity.CooperationwiththeArmyinfantrybattalionintheregion,andalocalmilitiagroup,wasfarbetter,butthemissionwasstilljustto“keepthelidon.”Polidorocouldobserveinsurgentactivityinthetown,but“…justbecausewe saw something in town didn’tmeanwewere going to run in therewilly-nilly.”19

Still, “… itwas ugly, very, very ugly,” said Polidoro. “Thatwas complexambushes,complexIEDchains….andtherewasalotoffightinggoingon.”InNovember“wehadaboutthirty-fiveorfortyinsurgentsopenuponacheckpointintothetownofRiphah.WehadaMarineshotintheneckintheopeningstagesof thatone,andwehad tomovesomesignificant forcesdown there tohandlethem….”

IEDsremained theweaponofchoicefor the insurgents,andfor thepatrols“Routine usually meant they’d go out and somebody would get arrested orthey’dgetinafirefightorblownup.Adaydidn’tgobywhentherewasn’tsometypeofactivity….Iwouldsaytheaverageincidentratein2005wasaboutthreeevents a day, which was either an IED find, an IED explosion, or … (we)detainedsomebody.In2006–2007weaveragedclosetosix.”

Suicide vehicles remained a threat, and the problem of defending againstthem was exacerbated by the appalling driving habits of the Iraqis, whoblundered into roadblocks and vehicles. “Nine times out of ten this wasn’tintentional.TheMarineswereconvincedthattheIraqisweredrunkallthetime,orthey’reblind.”Theuseofpenflares,pocketsizeddevicesthatcouldbefiredatinattentivedriverswasonesolution.Polidororecalledonlythreeincidentsofactual insurgent attacks using vehicles, and one was a vehicle caught at a

roadblock.20 Usually the Marines would simply move off the road to avoidpotentialthreats.

Despite the improvements Polidoro concluded that if struck by an IED hewouldratherbeinanup-armoredHumveethananLAV.“They’renotthatthick.Theonethingyou’vegotinyourfavoristhey’reveryhighofftheground.Whenyou’reuphighit’snottoo,toobad.It’sbasicallylikebeingintheLibertyBell,andyouhititwithahammerreally,reallyhard.Itreallyshakesyouprettywell.Significantlyloud.Ilostalotofhearingbecauseofthesethings.

“Thefirstresponseis‘Whatthehelljusthappened?’Thesecondresponseis‘Is anybody hurt?’ The third response is ‘I’m gonna kill the guy that just didthat!’”

That effort was usually fruitless. “We captured a bunch of guys, but younevercanproveexactlywhotheywere.Yougottafindthesmokin’gun.”

Casualtieswereusuallyminorshrapnelwounds.“Thebiggestproblemwiththe LAV in an IED blast is that tires are solid rubber. So they catch on fire.When the tirescatchonfire,youcan’tget themout.So the thingburns to theground,anditbecomesalow-riderprettyquick.Andthenit’sacatastrophiclossofthevehicle.”

Gaddy’slogisticianscontinuedtoimprovise:

TheCOPwasinsuchcloseproximitytoRawahthatwepushedhotchowouttotheMarinesouttheretoo.Iworkedmycooksprettyhardandtheydidn’thavealotofequipment.OneofmyfavoritethingswaswhentheArmylieutenantcameforThanksgivingandsaid,“Hey,sir.Igotus60Turkeys for Thanksgiving.” I was like, “60 whole turkeys?” He said,“Yeah.”Hewasexcited.HewasagreenlieutenantandIhadnopatience.I was like, “60 birds. That’s great. How are you going to cook them?How do you think we’re going to cook them?” He just looked at medumbfoundedandsaid,“Sir.Igotus60turkeys.”Iwaslike,“Haveyouseenanoven?EvenifIhadanovenIwouldhavehadtostartlastweek.Idon’thaveturkeyfryers….

Iwasgetting ready to send thecrapbackand say, “Thanks,butnothanks.” The battalion maintenance chief, Master Gunnery SergeantTooth(sp?),waslike,“Heysir.Don’tgetridofthem.We’llfigureoutawaytocookthem.”Isatdownwithmychiefandstartedgoingthroughwaysofhowwecouldcookturkeys.Iwaslike,“Okay.We’renotgoingto get an oven. We’re not going to get turkey fryers.” Finally, I

remembered,“Hey. I’vesmokedabird.” Icalleddown tomybattalionmaintenance officer and said, “Hey Mike. Send me Staff SergeantDelany.”StaffSergeantDelanywastheweldingchief.HecameupandIsaid,“Heyman.Ineedahero.”Hesaid,“Whatdoyouneed?”Isaid,“Ineedasmoker.Canyoubuildasmoker?”Wedrewitoutonpaper,ItoldhimwhatIneededandthreedayslaterthetram,whichisa10,000poundforklift,bringsupthismonsterofasmoker….

We fit them all in there and about 30 hams aswell.We used thatthing quite frequently. It had the fire boxes down below and it wasvented.Itwasabsolutelyawesome.Itwasaboutseven-feettallbyabout10-feetlongandthree-feetdeep.Ithadfourtrays.Itwasawesome.TheMarinesgotturkey.21

In December most of 2nd LAR (less one company that stayed in KoreanVillage)wasreunitedinRawah.BythistimetheslowandoftenpainfulprocessofbuildinganIraqiforcewasbeginningtopaydividends,withdevelopmentofanaggressiveIraqiArmybattalioncommander,andahundred-fold increase inthe number of local policemen. Nevertheless, the local politics could beByzantine.Marines of the LAR line companieswere quarteredwith the localSunnipoliceandthoughtthemquiteprofessional,buttheShi’aArmybattalionthat had occupied the areawas prone to prisoner abuse.A new battalionwasmoreprofessional,butmutualtrustwiththecivilianswasslowtorecover.22

Harassment continued, and “We were rocketed quite regularly,” saidPolidoro, “usually about five o’clock at night, usually by about the sameguy,whichwas reallydisruptiveof our chowpattern.Kindof pissedusoff a littlebit.”Counter-batteryradarhasdifficulty indetecting low-trajectoryprojectiles,sotheresponsewaslimited.

TheMarinesestablishedapermanentpresencewithtrafficcontrolpointsandbases inside Rawah, and patrolled aggressively. Intelligence, always a primefactor incounterinsurgencyoperations,wasbeefedupandpusheddown to thecompanylevel,withgoodresults.Polidoro:“Ononenightalonewerolledup27guys.Wehadafirefightthatdayandcapturedaguywhowasamessengerforoneoftheheadinsurgentsintown.Hegaveupalotofinformation,soweactedonthatandwereabletosnatchupallthoseguys.Theindicationwehadthatthatworked out was that before we snatched up all those guys, there were deaththreatsout thereagainstwomeninAnahthatsaidif theydidn’twearveilsandallthatotherstuff,theywouldbeshot.Well,werolledalltheseguysupandthe

nextdayallthegirlswereintheirjeansandtheyhadmakeupon.”Suchwasthepeculiarmeasureofsuccess.23

Thedownsideofthenewoperationalprocedureswasthatwoundstendedtobe more severe since much of the patrolling was on foot, and the men werevulnerabletosnipersandIEDs.Medicalcorpsmenwereamuchmorepervasivepresence thaneverbefore.“Wewouldputonecorpsmanoutperplatoon”saidPolidoro. “We tried to roll five per company, which would be HeadquartersPlatoon plus the three [line platoons] plus a company corpsman. We had abattalionaidstationrunbyaNavylieutenant….Thesecond[battalionsurgeon]was fantastic, a guynamedDrewBailey.Hewas phenomenally good.Heputthirty-sevenpintsofbloodthroughonekid;kepthimalive.”Lt.AndrewKinard“Steppedontwoone-five-fives[rounds],whichtookhimapart.Heshouldhavediedonthetable,noquestionaboutit.”

In early 2007 the Marines finally withdrew, but they would soon return.ThirdLARwouldreturn to thisstompingground inOctoberof thesameyear.ForyearstheLARbattalionswouldrotateinandoutofIraq.

PromotedtoGunnerySergeant,SamCrabtreehadassumedtheseniorroleofTank Leader for Delta Company, 4th Tank. “The tank leader always knowswhat’sgoingon.He’sinchargeofmakingsureeverythinghappens….Beans,bullets and band-aids.” Duties are all-encompassing, from coordinatingcommunicationstodeliveryofLogisticalPackages—standardizedissuesoffuel,food,water,ammo,andeverythingelsetheformationneeds.

“Being the Tank Leader, I got to go over with the CO and the XO for aPDSS(Pre-DeploymentSiteSurvey)toseewhatwasgoingoninIraqbeforewedeployed.”This included tours of the future operational area, and conferenceswith the personnel they would replace. “What are you guys really doing?…Whatdidyouthinkwasgoingtohappenandyouweretotallywrong?Whatcanwe do so we don’t go through the same problems?” The main body of thecompanydeployedinOctober2007.

The three tank platoons of Delta Company were immediately scattered inwidely separate areasof al-AnbarProvince. “Wehadoneplatoon inRah, oneplatoon inHaditha, andwe had another platoon inHit. Each platoon of tankswaschopped(placedundertheoperationalcontrolofanothercommand)tothatarea, to whoever was in charge, which was generally a grunt battalion. Theywould do whatever they needed to do.” The platoons would provide QuickReactionStrikeforces,coversniperteams,andprovideconvoysecurity.

“Headquarters, we would do what was called Team Tank… . Regiment

wouldpickanarea,andwewouldtakeninetypercentofHeadquarterswithourseven-tons,Humvees,HETTsfromtheArmy,andsearchthemforweaponsorjustammo.Anythingthatwecoulddo.”In theemptydesert“Sometimeswe’dgo for two or three days and wouldn’t see any structures, just roads, palmgroves,or something.”“Ifwesawvics,we’d roll ‘emup, snap ‘emup,check‘em out.” Interpreters were attached, and personnel had been trained ininterrogationtechniques.

“Itwascalled‘Everybody’sacollector.’We’daskthem,‘Haveyouseenanyofthebadguys?Whereareyougoing?Howareprices?Hasthepriceforwatergone up?’ Just general questions, to try and get a feel forwhat’s goin’ in thearea. ‘Where’dyoucomefromandwhereyougoin’?’”The teammight spendweeks checking past insurgent weapon cache sites, and the local caves forevidenceofactivity.

Afterweeksofsuchactivity“EvenwhenyougetbacktotheFOB,yeah,it’snice.Yougetgoodchow,getcleanedup,butattheendofthedayyou’restillinIraq.Yousleep,butyoudon’tsleep.”

To keep contactwith the isolated platoons, “Me and theCOwould try tovisitthe[platoons]everyothermonth….We’dgothere,seehowthey’regoin’,anyproblems they have.Also to get a feel for how’s their equipment holdingup… . How’s hygiene? How’s morale?” Conditions were different at eachposition. “DownatHit theywouldgoout all day long, but comeback all thetime.AtHaditha…theywerecoveringthesniperteamswhiletheyweretryingtogetintopositionorout.Sometimestheywouldsittherefortwodays….Justscanthedesertforhoursatatime.”

One relief from the sameness was the assignment to protect the annualShi’itehaj,orpilgrimage.“WehadtogodowntosomeFOBandwe’dprovidesecuritynotontheroads,butoutawayfromtheroads.”

This tour coincided with the introduction of the MRAPs, Mine-ResistantAmbush-Protected armored trucks. In addition, “We also had a roller thatmounted on the front of a seven-ton that we’d put in front of the convoy.”Various vehicles—mostly tanks—were struck by IEDs that “Beat some guysaround. But no serious injuries.” To counteract the new command-detonatedmines triggeredbycellphones“Wehad jammersonourvehicles.”Otherage-oldprecautionswerestilleffective:varyingroutesandroutines,avoidinglikelyambushsites.

CrabtreeendedupoperatingoneofthenewMRAPsasmorewereissuedtotheregiment.“TheintentwastophaseouttheHumvees.It’scomfortablewhen

it’snotmoving.It’sgotalotofcoolstuff,(stowage)boxesandeverything.ThetroubleisyougooffroadinthoseversionsoftheMRAPs,itbeatstheshitoutofyou.Theyputtheseven-tonsuspensionontheMRAPs.Ifyou’regoingtenmilesanhouroff-road,you’rehaulingass. Ididn’twantanMRAPIwanted to staywithmyHumveebecauseitwasmoremaneuverable,anditcouldholduptothespeeds.

“[TheMRAP]wasawesometolivein,becauseithadACthatworkedreallygood….ThenicethingabouttheMRAPtooisyou’rehigherup,soyourgunnerup tophecanseemoreofwhat’sgoingon.Moresituationalawareness thanaHumveeturret.

“Buteveryopwewenton,webrokeone.Thesuspensionbrokerealeasy.Itwasn’tdesignedtoholduptowhatweweredoing.”

Crabtreethoughttheseven-tonwasthebestvehicle.“Itrarelybrokedown.Ithadgoodsuspension,andofcourseit’sjustaflatbed.Youcanconfigureitlikeyouwant.It’skindoftall,sohigh-visibility.Withhigh-visibilityyou’remoreofatarget,butifIcanseeyousooner,Icankillyousooner.

“Whenyou’reallbuttoned-up in theMRAP thecommsystemdidn’tworkverywell.Itwashardtohear,andyougotallthatarmoraroundyou,youcan’tseeasmuch….Ihadtroubleseeingthroughthebullet-proofglasswithNVGs[NightVisionGoggles]on.”

RoutineCOINoperations like convoyescortwould consumeprogressivelygreaterportionsofthetanker’seffortsuntiltheendofthedeploymentinMarch2008. As theMarine presence wound down, the tank units were increasinglydeployedinsuchrolesasProvisionalMPsandmanyotherroles.Becausethat’swhatMarinesdo.

Anotherofficernew to IraqwasMarcTucker.Hehadwrestled incollege,butdamagedhiselbow,and“IjustfinallycametotheconclusionthatIwasinschooltowrestleversusbeinginschooltobeinschool.”Heworkedforhalfayear, and then joined the Marines. “I knew that being a Marine was what Iwantedtodo,andthatwasit….IknewthatIwantedtobeaninfantryman,andaninfantrymanonly….”Afternearlyfouryearsintheinfantry,hewasselectedtobeaninstructorattheOfficer’sBasicSchool,andthreeyearslatersignedupfortheMarineCorpsEnlistedCommissioningEducationProgram(MECEP)andgraduated from college.By 2007 hewas back atBasic School, this time as acandidate. Tucker’s performance was sufficient to win him the single tankschoolslotupongraduation,over100orsootherapplicants.

After tankschoolhebecameaveryjuniorstaffofficerin1stTankinearly

2008,sincehisassignedcompanywasinIraq.Tuckerwasabituneasy;thoughexperienced,hewas“uncertainwhatthefutureheld”inarmor.“Itwasexcitingandnerve-wrackingatthesametime”sincetheexpectationsforformerenlistedmenweresohigh.Afterafewmonthshewas“offeredtheopportunity”togotoIraqaspartofaMilitaryTransitionTeam.Aftermonthsof trainingat the lastminutehewasinsteadhastilytrainedbytheUSBorderPatrol,andassignedtoaPortofEntryTeam,trainingIraqistorunoneofthemajorlogisticalentrypointsfrom Jordan. Most of the original personnel were from 1st Tank. “We werehandedabunchofreferencesandtoldtogoforthandprosper.”Majorproblemsincluded smugglers bringing in copper used as a liner in shaped charges, andinitiationdevicesforIEDs.“Wehadtofigureoutveryquicklythattherewasacertainacceptable levelofcorruption….What ismorallyandethicallycorrectinsidetheUnitedStatesdoesn’tnecessarilyplaythesamewayinIraq.”

Any romanticnotionsofbattleswith smugglers soonwere replacedby thetedium of routine border patrols in Humvees, and training Iraqis. On borderpatrols,“Itcouldtakeusadaytogettothefarthestoutpost….We’dspendtwoorthreedayshittingallthespecificposts.”Intheopendesertitwassimpleforthesmugglerstoevadethepatrols.“Justaswestartedfiguringitoutitwastimeforus to leave, time for a freshcropofbright-eyedbushy-tailed, (an)unjadedteam,toheadinandspendthenextfewmonthstryingtofigurethingsout.”

NOTES

1Fike,InterviewwithMAJRobertBodisch,p.82Estes,USMarineCorpsOperationsinIraq,2003–2005,p.110.3LawrenceLessard,InterviewWithMajorJohnPolidoro,PartI,p.3.4Ibid,p.4.5Estes,USMarineCorpsOperationsinIraq,2003–2005,p.115.6Lessard,InterviewWithMajorJohnPolidoro,PartI,p.5–7.7http://mypetjawa.mu.nu/archives/081669.php8http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Al_Qaim9Lessard,InterviewWithMajorJohnPolidoro,PartI,p.10.10NotethatthisoperationnamewasalsousedinAfghanistanin2009.11Thecamp reportedlyhousedKorean laborerswhoconstructed thehighwayduringSaddamHussein’s

reign.ThefacilitywasestablishedasFOBBUZZbyArmycavalrymenwhomanneditfromtheinvasionuntiltheywererelievedbytheMarines.NooneknowswhocoinedtheKVname.

12http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=1817413http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/oif-iron-fist_2005.htm14http://newsblaze.com/story/20051007094130nnnn.nb/topstory.html15http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2005/10/operation_iron.php#ixzz0l3vIXeNk&c16ProbablyactuallyoldIraqiArmy152mmrounds.

17Lessard,InterviewWithMajorJohnPolidoro,PartII,p.4–6.18Fike,InterviewwithMajorJasonGaddy,p.12.19Lessard,InterviewWithMajorJohnPolidoro,PartII,p.7.20Author,Polidorointerview21Fike,InterviewwithMajorJasonGaddy,p.13.22Lessard,InterviewWithMajorJohnPolidoro,PartII,p.9–10.23Ibid,p.8.

A

CHAPTERTWELVE

Afghanistan—WindingDown

Thereisanopponentinawar,soonecannotprogressjustasonewishes.—AdmiralMatomeUgaki,ImperialJapaneseNavy

Nowarisoveruntiltheenemysaysit’sover.Wemaythinkitover,wemaydeclareitover,butinfact,theenemygetsavote.—GeneralJamesMattis,USMC

S THE U.S.WAR EFFORT was redirected in 2009, PresidentObamaauthorized a controversialmajor troopbuildup inAfghanistan.As part of the surge in troop strength,DCompany, 2ndLAR

and a headquarters detachment were assigned to 2nd MEB, in centralAfghanistan. In early June conditions were typical. The battalion commanderwrotetofamilies:

Hello from Central Afghanistan, where we are in the “Season of 120DaysofWind.”Ifyouarewonderingwhatthisseasonmeans(no,it’snotwhenCongressisinsession!)foryourMarineorSailor,itisduststormsor ‘brown outs’ almost daily beginning at about 1430. The dirt iseverywhereand ineverything. Ithas tobeconsidered inouroperationsas well. Another unfortunate impact is that our showers are notcollocatedwithourtents,soit’snotuncommontoseeaMarineorSailorreturningfromtheshowerdirtierthanwhenhewentasthedirtstickstohimonhisreturntrip;pictureapowdereddonut.1

AfirstmajoractionwasOperationKHANJAR(SwordStrike), insouthernHelmandProvince.Theavowedpurposewastosecurethelargeareatoallowformeaningful participation in the national elections ofAugust 2009. The regionwas also a transit point formuch of the opium that funds theTaliban, and an

infiltration route for foreign fighters seeking to avoid Coalition troops on theborderwith northwest Pakistan. Infantry battalionswere assigned to themoreruggednorthernpartoftheoperatingarea,whileLtColTomGrattan’s2ndLARwas assigned to the southern district.British troops andDanish tankerswouldcoordinatetheiractivitiesinsurroundingareas.

On9JulyMarine infantrybeganmovingonsuspectedTalibanstrongholdsin the province, exercising tactical restraint to avoid civilian casualties. Theinfantry battalionsweremetwith varyingdegrees of resistance, from roadsidebombs toambushes.On9 July2009a seventy-vehicleconvoy from2ndLARarrivedoutsidethevillageofKhanashin,thecapitalofthesouthernRigDistrictclosest to theborderwithPakistan’sBaluchistanProvince.The townhad longbeen a Taliban stronghold, and Coalition forces had never succeeded inestablishingabasenearby.

Thebattalionmetwithonlyoneincidentofsniperfire.TheMarineschosetonegotiateratherthanforceanentry;villageleadersurgedtheMarinestooccupythetown,butthelocalsstayedindoors,waryofpossiblefighting.2

The Marines settled in for months of patrolling, trying to interdict drugtrafficking, and occasional IED and mortar attacks that inflicted deaths andinjuries.On10Julyan IEDdetonatedbesideanLAYkillingMSgtJeromeD.Hatfield, the Delta Company operations chief, and crewman LCpl PedroBarbozaflores.On23Julymortarfireon theECompanycompoundkilledSgtRyanLane.3

For theMarines inAfghanistan, themission remained one ofwinning thetrustandacceptanceof thepeople,who in this regionofAfghanistanhavenotseenrepresentativesofarealgovernmentindecades.On29Julyalargepatrolmoved toward another village, seeking a site to establish an Afghan SecurityForcepost.Marinessoughtoutvillageelders tonegotiateasite—whichwouldinevitablymeanlossoffarmingland.Inexchange,smallgesturesmeantagreatdeal.FirstLieutenantJosephR.Gazman:

Evenwhenwecameintothetown,oneoftheelderswasconcernedthatour presencewas scaring the children. TheMarineswere instructed topositionthemselvesinlessvisibleplacesinthetown.Theelderswanttomake sure it is a peaceful coexistence.Many of the people here havebeendetachedfromthepresenceofgovernmentforsuchalongtime,sothey haven’t really seen a large [military] presence. For someone likethat,thissituationcanbeunderstandablyintimidating.4

Theperiodjustpriortothe20AugustelectionssawtheinevitableupsurgeinTaliban violence, but theMarines preemptedmanyof their efforts, preventingtheenemyfrommovingmortarsandrocketswithinfiringrangeofpollingsites.Attacks by 2nd LAR killed Taliban leaders, but they lost an EOD technician(GySgtAdamBenjamin)attachedtoCharlieCompanytoanIED.5

On3SeptemberDeltaCompanymovedintooccupyacompoundformerlyoccupied by the Taliban, and slated for use by Afghan security forces. AconcealedIEDdetonated,killingLCplChrisBaltazarandHM3BenCastiglione;LCpl Christopher Fowlkes later died his wounds. Corpsman HM2 TommyPetersonandLCplChristopherGisbrechtwerewoundedintheblast.6

BenjaminP.Castiglione:

“Themilitarylifeisnoteasy,”Castiglionetoldanewspaperlastwinter,“but I believe that I am a stronger person for it. The hardships I havedealtwithwereworthwhatIhavelearnedandthebondsIhavewiththeMarinesinmyplatoon.WhenmyplatoonandIhavedowntimeandtalkand mess around with each other, it’s like one big hilarious,dysfunctionalfamily—andit’sablast.Wetakecareofeachother.”7

From the earliest days the US military resisted sending tanks intoAfghanistan, thoughNATO forces deployed tanks in the country beginning inDecember 2006. There were two NATO tank units, a five-tank platoon fromDenmarkandafifteen-tanksquadronfromtheCanadianLordStrathconaHorse(RoyalCanadians)attachedto1stBattalion,PrincessPatricia’sCanadianLightInfantryand1stBattalion,TheRoyalCanadianRegiment.

Danish tanks of the first battalion, Jysdske Dragonregiment (JutlandDragoons Regiment) operated in support of British and Danish forces inHelmand Province, typically as two-tank sections. BothDanish and Canadiansources emphasized that contrary to the expectations of “experts,” the localpopulation supported theutilizationof tanks. In a5 January2008 engagementwith strong Taliban forces, three Danish tanks “… reduced the need for airsupport.Tankfire,whichisfrightenly(sic)accurate,pentetrates(sic)wallsbutusuallydoesnotlevelamud-brickcompoundthewaylargebombsdroppedbyaircraft can. Thismakes reconstruction in the area far easier once theTalibanhavebeenremoved.”8

In the Canadian experience, “… suggestions that the use of tanks hasalienated the local populace more than other weapon systems have proven

completelyunfounded.Sincecommencingcombatoperationsninemonthsago,CanadiantankshavekilleddozensofinsurgentsinbattlesthroughoutKandaharProvince,yet therehasbeennosuggestionofciviliandeathsattributed to tankfireduringthisentireperiod.Equippedwithafirecontrolsystemthatallowsoursoldierstoacquireandengagetargetswithprecisionanddiscrimination,bydayandbynight, theLeopard tankhas inmany instances reduced the requirementfor aerial bombardment and indirect fire, which have proven to be bluntinstruments.”Theanalysisdetailedhowtankscouldbeusedeffectivelynotonlyinopenterrain—wheretheTaliban’seffortstoconfrontthemprovedsuicidal—butinthepopulousareas.9

Tanks of course also prove far more resistant to the IEDs so favored asweaponsbytheTaliban.ADanishtankstruckalargeIEDinJuly2008,killingthedriverandwoundingthreeothercrewmen.IEDstrikesonatleasttwootherDanishtanksresultedinnocasualties.

The Marine Corps originally deployed only two M88 retrievers toAfghanistan,asnorecoverywheeledvehiclecouldtowtheheavyMRAP(MineResistantAmbushProtected)trucks.TheMRAPprogramcameaboutthroughacold, Defense Department calculation: “… the real dollar costs of care andreplacement—adjusted for enlisted casualties average $500,000while officers,dependingupontheirmilitaryoccupationrangefromonetotwomilliondollarseach. This meant the average light tactical vehicle with one officer and fourenlistedpersonnelwasprotecting2.5milliondollarsoftheDOD’sbudget.”10

The 2nd Combat Engineer Battalion deployed the new Assault BreacherVehicles(ABV),basedontheM1tankchassis.TheABVwasdevelopedbytheMarineCorpsfollowingthecancellationoftheArmy’ssimilarGrizzlyengineervehicle program. Based on a refurbished M1 tank chassis, the vehicle isequipped with plows, line charges, and is capable of remote-controlledoperation;itisstrictlyanengineerasset.Ironically,thistypeofvehiclewasfirstproposed by one of the Corps’ farsighted armor advocates, Col. Arthur “Jeb”Stuart,in1949.11

Another factor that deterred the use of tanks was transportation. MikeMummey explained, “Word is theArmywon’t give up the [air] lift.You canonlymoveone tankat a timeonaC-17.Therearegonnabe some tankersgooverthere;they’regonnabeonMRAPs.”

In late 2010 Major General Richard P Mills of Regional Command—Southwest requested tanksupport.PentagonspokesmanCol.DaveLapancited“…increasedmobility,theincreasedfirepower,[and]becauseoftheopticsthe

tankshave.”Hewentontoexplainthat“Tanksaremoreaccuratethanartillery,mortars or aerial bombardment.”12 The US commander, General Petraeus,approvedthedeploymentofacompanyoffourteentanks.

Asif toprovethat theghostsofVietnamwerestillnotfullyexorcised, theAmericanmilitaryremainedsensitivetoanymediaassertionsofan“escalation”of thewar;Lapanwenton to explain that “These thingshappenall the time.”TherewerealsoconcernsthatAfghancitizensmightviewtanksastoomuchliketheSovietoccupation,solocalcommandersworkedwithlocalleadersandshura(aconferenceoflocalleaders)tominimizeconcerns.13

After leaving Iraq Robert Bodisch served in intelligence billets, includinganti-drugoperationsalongtheMexicanborder,andattendedtheCommandandGeneralStaffCollegeatFortLeavenworth.Inearly2010hewasassignedto2ndTankastheXO,thensenttoAfghanistanasaplanner.ManyMarineshadbeenbaffledby the refusal todeploy tanks,given their force-protectionadvantages:“When R[egional] C[ommand] South, the Army command, was seeing howsuccessfultheMarinetankswere,theydidsubmitarequestfortankforces.Butby that time point ISAF had reached the US force-manning levels, the forcecap….”Planswereunderway to fly inarmor,but“Inearly2011 thedecisionwasmadethattheArmywouldnotbringtanksin.”

Thedecisionwasadisappointment,since“Wewerelosingsomanypeople,andtheseMRAPsandtheseothervehicles,althoughmuchmoresurvivablethananyotherwheeledvehiclewehad,it’sjustnotthesameasatank.”

BodischwentontoagreewiththeDanishanalysis:“BackinIraq,weweretheweaponofchoice,ineveryaspect,becausewewereaprecision-fireweapon.Youwereabletolimitcollateraldamage,andyouwereabletoprovidepinpointfiresinexactlytheareastheriflemen,theinfantry,onthegroundwanted….InAfghanistan,inwhichcollateraldamagewasprobablyevenmoresensitivethaninIraq,youdon’thavethatcapability.”

After fourteenmonthsMarcTucker returned toBravo,1stTankas the3rdPlatoon leader, then was moved to Scout Platoon and sent to Romania andBulgariatotraintroopsforAfghanistan.Theninlate2010TuckerfoundthatthebattalionwouldstandupaDeltaCompanyundernow-MajorDanHughes,withhimasXO.

Hugheshadfilledanumberofbilletsincludingrecruitingofficercandidates,and a staff position in Afghanistan in 2009–2010. “Colonel Barett pulled measideandsaid‘HeyDan,they’regonnasendatankcompanytoAfghanistan.It’sgonnabeyourcompany.Wegotsomeworktodo.’”Deltawasarumpcompany

that normally provided tanks for the MEU deployments, not a fully trainedcompany.MarcTuckerwasputinchargeoftraining.

Hughes’primaryconcern,given theenvironment,wascombat readinessofthe trains. Counter-IED and counter-ambush exercises were conducted atTwentyninePalms,thefirstsuchtoinvolvetanks.Additionalemphasiswasontrainingthesupportpersonnelininfantryskills.

Considerable horse-tradingwas involved in acquiring personnel, includingexperiencedinfantrytoprotectcompanytrains.Tucker:“IknowDanwon’ttellyou this, but Dan was loved, absolutely loved, by every single one of thoseMarines,becausehegave themexactlywhat theywanted.Theywanted tough,realistic, and hard training.Theywanted to go down-range and fight forwhatwasright.[What]Dannotonlypromisedthem,butgavethem.”

Thebiggestproblemwasdefining themission:“Thatwasneververyclearwhatsoever….Ifyoucangivemesomekindofguidance,thenwecangofromthere.Wehadvery,verylittlesofarassomethingthatwashard….Asthetankswerebeingflowninto[Camp]Leatherneck…wewerestilltakingcareoflooseends.”TheadvancepersonnelwereflowninafterChristmas,2010.

Lookingback,TuckerthoughtthatLtColThomasJ.Gordonhad“inculcatedhisMarineofficerswithanideathatweneedtobeprepared.HedidwhatIthinkgreat leaders do, which is they prepare you without you really know you’rebeingprepared.”

AlwaysforemostinHughes’smindwas“We’rethefirsttankcompanytogotoAfghanistan.Weneedtodothisright.Wecan’tshowupblowingeverythingup.Wecan’tgothereandnotbeabletobeused.Ifwegothereandwecan’tbeused,andwe’realwaysbrokendown,andwenevercanhelptheinfantry,wellwhen’stheinfantryevergonnawantyou?”

UponarrivalinAfghanistaninlate2010Hugheswaspleasedtofindthattheinfantry staffwas receptive to suggestions about how the tanksmight best beused.Tucker:“Themissionwasstillkindofmurky….”althoughthebattalionstaff had considered possible roles. Tucker was surprised at how quickly thetactical potential for tanks was forgotten in light of Fallujah and other recentexperiences. “Their initial impressionwas ‘Well,we could use you guys as aQRF (QuickReactionForce)… .whichwas exactlywhatweweren’t trying todo.That’sveryreactive,versusbeingveryproactive.”Thetankerspreferredtoembed platoons where “We could provide overwatch, we could provideinterdiction.”When small sub-units are attached to larger units, “You run therisk of thosemembers kind of being outcasts, being on the outer circle.With

BLT3/8itwasnothingofthesort.”Inanoddreversalofthesituationthathadcausedsomanyproblemsfortanksinthepast,DeltaCompanyhadbroughtitsorganic logistical support,while 3/8—whichhadbeen flown in froma ship—was short of vehicles and other necessities. “So we pushed all the logisticcapabilityouttoeachoneofhislocations….”

Hughes’companywasattachedtoRCT-2,whoplacedoneplatoonindirectsupportof2/4.Hughes:“Theremaining ten tanksand the trainsweregoing tooperateindirectsupportofThree-Eight.”Thetankswerefurtherparceledouttosupport the scattered 3/8 companies who were tasked to protect road crewsimprovingandpavingRoute611, amajornorth-south roadplaguedbymines,IEDs, and ambushes. CAAT teams and a 2nd LAR platoon (mounted inMRAPs)escortedconvoyson the road.Tucker: “Anybodyandeverybodyhadsome pretty significant and intimate meet-and-greets with IEDs… . It didn’tmatter if you were a logistics convoy, it didn’t matter if you were route-clearance,itdidn’tmatterifyouweretanks.Thewholeideawastoblowpeopleup….”

The CO of 3/8, LtCol Farrell Sullivan, had been Tucker’s platoon leaderfromhis days in 3/8 inKosovo, and the tank companyCO,DanHughes, hadalso worked with Sullivan when he was a sergeant involved in the much-publicizedrescueofUSAFCapt.ScottO’GradyinBosnia.

The various tank platoons were soon split among various operating areas,particularlyprotecting the roadcrewsandwithKilo3/8 to the leftbankof theHelmandRiver,anavenueofapproachforTalibanandforeignfightersfromthenorth.Hughesnotedthatthiswasthefirstsectiontobeinsteadycontactwiththeenemy.“TheHeadquarterstanks,weoperatedwiththeScoutSectiontogivetheBLTcommanderanadditionalmaneuverelement.”

Hughesassignedamechanicasaloaderineachsectiontodoquickfixes,apracticethatpaidoffwhensomeofhistanksectionsweredeployedinisolationforuptoninetydays.

Theimagingcapabilitiesofthetanksprovidedlong-rangeobservationintheopen terrain, and tanks worked in cooperation with scout-sniper teams anddrones. The combo allowed the Marines to both covertly observe enemymovementandcall inartilleryorairassets farbeyond the rangeof theirguns.Tankersandscout-sniperscouldcovertlyobserveroutineactivitiesintownsandvillages. Hughes said that the Marines “… used the SIGINT to monitor the[enemy] chatter to see how they responded.Obviously they didn’t like it.Butwhat it showed themwaswecould take these tanksandmove themanywhere

wewantedto.”A cat-and-mouse game ensued as the insurgents tried to assess the new

tanks.“Afteraboutaweekofthis,theyfinallyfiguredoutthatthesethingscankind of see you anywhere. And they can kind of shoot a long ways.” TheAfghansprovedfarmorecannyfightersthantheIraqis,andonlyoneincidentofmindlessbravadostoodoutinHughes’smind:“WedidhaveonethatcameoutofacompoundandtriedtoshootatatankfromthebackofamotorcyclewithanAK-47.Thatdidn’tturnoutsowell.”

Thevariousinfantrycommanders“owned”theirbattlespace,andatfirstthetankers with experience in Iraqwere taken aback at the rules of engagement.Fires had to be approved at higher echelons, with the inevitable delay inresponse time. Tucker said that in Iraq “… there reallywas no restraint otherthanthatofficerwhowasonthescene.Ioriginallytookitalmostlikeayounglance-corporal that doesn’t understandROE.Like ‘This isBS’.”However, “Itwasoneof thechecksandbalances thathad tohappen.”Timeandexperiencewiththeobservationcapacitiesanddirect-fireaccuracyofthetanksledtosomerelaxation,and“Veryquicklyweweregiven theabilityand theflexibility thatweneededtooperateaseffectivelyaspossible.”

IEDsweretheinsurgents’weaponofchoice.Hughes:“Oneofthebigthingsthat I thinkwas a psychological blow [to the enemy]… .When tanks did hitIEDs,whatwealwaystriedtodowasfixthetankanddriveitaway.”Damageusuallyinvolvedonlyroadwheelsorsuspensionarms

On 6 March 2011 the Headquarters Section of two tanks was providingsecurity for a logistical convoy and visit by the MEU commander to KiloCompanypositionsonthewestsideoftheHelmandRiver.Tucker:“Theterrainwas such that therewasoneway inandonewayout,” ideal conditions foranambushalongatwoorthreekilometerstretchofdirtroad.“Theyknewthat,andweknewthat.Justabouteverytimewewentupinthere,somebodygotblownup.”Headingbackout,“Weknew,obviously,thatwehadbeeninthisarealongenoughthatthereweresomefolksouttherewatchingwhatwasgoingon.”DanHughesledtheconvoyonthereturntrip,alongtheroadtheyhadtraversedaboutanhourearlier,withTuckertrailing.

TheypassedanAirForceRouteClearanceTeam,andassumedtheroadwassafe.Theconvoystopped,andTuckerleanedinsidethetanktoradiotheMEUthattheywereleavingtheirbattlespace.

Hughes:“Wehad justcomearoundacorner,and I turnedaroundandsawthefrontofhis[Tucker’s]tankcomebehindmeandassoonasIturnedaroundI

heardthis‘THOOM’,andyoucouldfeeltheblast….Apieceofhistrackhadblownclearthroughthetopofthefender.”Hugheswatchedasthreesetsofroadwheelswereblownuptoeightymetersaway.

Tucker: “About a two-hundred-pound directional IED blew up.Unfortunatelymyleftarmwasexposedovermycaliberfiftyandtookapieceofshrapnel,whatwethinkwasanendconnector.Itblewthroughmyarmandtookoutabouta two-and-a-half inchpieceofmyradialboneandmyradialartery.”Theimpactcauterizedtheartery“…soIdidn’thaveanyinitialissueswiththepotential for bleed-out. I didn’t even know I was hit for about the first fiveminutes.”

Tucker’s ignorance of his injury resulted from a flap of loose fabric thatclosedbackoverthewound.“Wecheckedthecrew,andeverythingappearedtobe fine.” Tucker oriented his gunner to search for possible attackers withmachine guns orRPGs. “Soon thereafter I realized that I didn’t feel so great.AftermakingsuremyMarinesweretakencareof,Ididlikeafull-bodysweepand kind of pulled back this old tin-can type tear in the top of my CVCs(coveralls)overmyleftforearm.Ipulleditback,andwhatIsawkindofblewmymind.I’mlookingataboutasoftball-sizedholethroughmyforearm.Icalledoverthenet,calledDanandlethimknowwhat’sgoingon.”

HughesbackedhistankagainstthefrontofTucker’s,“Andbythattimetheywereliftinghimoutoftheturretandhadatourniquetapplied.Youcouldseehisarmwasprettymuchwideopen.”Hughes loadedTuckeronto thebackofhisturretandtoldhisdrivertoheadfortheclosestsiteforahelicopterlandingzoneatthetopofanearbyhill.

“Iwas talking tohim,askinghimhowhe’sdoing, andhe says ‘How theygonnadoamanlikethis?I’mnotgoin’outthisway.’”

Theproblemwasnot somuch fearof additional attack. “Our little convoyhadnocorpsmanwithus.Itookonelookathisarmandsaid,‘Thisguyneedsacorpsman’.”

Tucker: “The Brits flew a [CH] forty-seven in and evaced me out of thebattlespace.”

The planning for various contingencies paid off for Tucker. “I believe thetotal[evacuation]timelineformewasthirty-sevenminutes.”

Afterashortride,“Rightbeforethelightswentoutwiththeanesthesia,theBritish doctor looked at me and told me that when I woke up I probablywouldn’tbethere.Definitelyencouragingwords.Loandbehold,Iwokeupandstill hadmyarm.”Notwanting to leave, “Between fightingandpleadingwith

the [medical] staff there, to keepme in country, they prettymuch laughed atme.” Heavily sedated, Tucker was flown to Bagram and two days later toLandstuhlforseveralsurgeries,thentoBethesdaforafourandahalfmonthstayandfourteensurgeries.

The small convoy had no recovery vehicle, and the recovery team cameunder attack. Hughes: “My Forward Air Controller, Captain Theissen, startedengagingwith the [M]-240, and one ofmy scouts, Staff SergeantEchols, hadjumped into thevehicle and startedusing theTC’s fifty-cal.”Additional tanksbegantoengagetheinsurgentsfromnearbyhighground.Thetank,burdenedbyits additional belly armor to protect against mines and with missing wheels,proveddifficulttobudgeupthesteepgrade.

One tank hooked a cable to the front, and another pushed with a towbar.“Youhada lieutenant in thefrontpullingandacaptainintheback.Onethingyoudon’twantrunningtheshowrightnowisacoupleofofficers….”so twoseniorNCOs tookover theeffort.The tankwasdragged to the topof thehill,and recovered the next day with an M-88 protected by a Force Recondetachment.

ActivitylulledduringtheAprilpoppyharvest,andBLT3/4begantoreplace3/8.MostofthetankswereredeployedtooperateoutofSalaamBazaarnearthemarket town ofNowZad, to give 3/4 time to familiarize themselveswith thesituation. Hughes found that many of the junior enlisted men had littleexperienceworkingwithtanks,soheassignedexperiencedinfantrymenfromhisScoutSectiontoactasliaisons.“Whenyouneededatank,heknewhowtotalktank.Heknewhowtopaintthepicturethatthetanksneeded,sotheycoulddowhat needed to be done for that infantry squad.” Captain Theissen also wentwithfootpatrolstocoordinateairsupport.Thetankspatrolledasavisiblethreat,whichtheinsurgentstendedtoavoid.

HughesthoughtthattheAfghanshadneithertheexperiencenortheweaponsto effectively fight tanks, and “The bite you got back wasn’t worth it.” ThetankersworkedoutatacticofsendingasectionoutintotheOperatingAreaandsetupasurveillanceposition.“Theywouldjustmoveit,andasthepatrolswentout theywereable tooverwatch. It tookawhile,buteventually they’regonnashoot at somebody. They’re gonna take their chances, and thenwe’re able toaffectthemthatway.”

TankswerealsoabletoobserveinsurgentsplantingIEDs.“Theyweretryingtodriveaway,butthetankscouldgoanywherethatmotorcyclecouldgo,sothetankswouldstopthemandbringupamountedelementtoactuallydetainthem.”

ThegreatlessoninHughes’mindwasthatthetank’ssensorsystemswereofparamount importance. “Even ifwe don’t fire a single round for you, the far-targetlocatorandourabilitytoacquireatargetandacquireagrid[location]outtosixthousandmeters, thatalonebringsyouatremendouscombatmultiplier.”Coupled with this was the tank’s value as a sort of “forward deployed quickreactionforce,”whosefirepowerandmobilityallowedittobequicklypulledoffonemissionandassignedanother.

Atthebitterendofalongsupplyline,thetanksweresometimesnotintiptopcondition,butwere“stillbetter thananything the infantryhad.” Insomecasestankswerereducedtoconditionswhere theengineandarmamentcouldnotbeoperated simultaneously: the tankcouldeitherdrive,oroperate the turretwiththe auxiliary hydraulics. “Then when that went out, the gunner was hand-crankingit[tomovetheturret].”

In1August2011Hughes’scompanyleftAfghanistanaspartofthenormalforcerotation,replacedbyCaptainMatthewSteiger’scompanyfrom2ndTank.

Byyear’sendthewarhadsettledintoadeadlyroutineasMarinesrepeatedlysweptthecountrysideandstalkedinsurgents.Asalways,troopsmadetheirlivesascomfortableaspossibleinthecircumstanceswhiletryingtointerdicttheflowofbulkopiumdowntheHelmandValley.The“WarPigs”ofCCompany,3rdLARweretypical:notonlyMREs,butluxurieslikecampstoves,cookingpots,weightliftingequipment,andastashofCajunspicesbelongingtoSSgtGarretteGuidry,CCompany’smaintenancechief,clutteredthevehicles.“Ijusthopeallthis doesn’t spoil my love for camping,” said company First Sergeant JustinOwens.14

The LAR units would patrol and provide armored security for the“defensive” civic action programs through mid-2012. Offensive actions weresmarter versions of the old “search and destroy” sweeps of the Vietnam era.Emphasis was on intelligence gathering, observing the Taliban for monthsbeforetank-infantrysweepslikeOperationJAWSinlate-Mayearly-June,2012.The payoff was lopsided victories, in this case 50 insurgents killed, with noMarinecasualties.15

There was a price to be paid for this success; unending maintenance.Personnelwererotated,buttheunitsusedthesametanksandLAVs.Theflour-fine abrasive “moon dust” seeped into everything, and the jolting of the tankmoving over the rugged terrain was brutal on the complex hydraulics andelectronics. Mechanics like LCpl Lucas Walsh discovered that “Finding a[hydraulic]leakislikefindinganeedleinahaystack.”Electronicswereworse.16

Theprimaryroleforthetankscontinuedtobecooperationwithscout-sniperteams. In September 2013 LtGen John Toolan noted that in a ten-day period,“The tank and sniper teams have contributed to about 50 enemy insurgentskilled, using the snipers as sharpshooters and the tanks for the surveillancecapability.It’sreallyagreatcombo….”

ButlikeallMarines,thedaysofthetankswerenumbered.ThelasttankunittowithdrawfromAfghanistanwasDelta,2ndTankBattalioninlate2013.TheLAVswouldsoonfollow.

NOTES

1Grattan,BattalionUpdates,June1,2009.2Anonymous,OperationKhanjarrestoresgovernmentcontrolinKhanNeshin;Chandrasekaran,MarinesMeetLittleResistanceinAfghanPush.

3 Anonymous (Staff Report), 2 staff NCOs among latestMarine casualties; Anonymous (Staff Report)LejeuneNCOsdieinAfghanistan.

4Curvin,2ndLARMarinesinteractwithlocalsinsouthernHelmand.5Grattan,MessagefromtheCO—August31,NewsFromAbroad6Grattan,.UpdateFromOurCommandingOfficer,September11,20097Anonymous,Corpsmanwith2ndLARkilledinAfghanistan.8Reinhold,Christian,DanishTanksinSeriousFire-FightinAfghanistan9Cadieu,Trevor,CanadianArmorinAfghanistan,p.10,19–20.10GlobalSecurity.org,MineResistantAmbushProtected(MRAP)VehicleProgram11Estes,Kenneth,MarinesUnderArmor,p._________.12Col.DaveLapan,citedinGaramone,Jim,“U.S.TanksEnRoutetoSouthwesternAfghanistan”13Ibid.14Ross,Jeremy,WarPigHomes:CrammingComfortIntoLifeOnTheRoad15Lamothe,Dan,MarinesattackinsurgentsinZamindawarareaofAfghanistan16Buckwalter,Brian,TanksSupportInfantryMarinesInAfghanistan

A

Epilogue

Wesleepsafelyatnightbecauseroughmenstandreadytovisitviolenceonthosewhowouldharmus.—attributedtoGeorgeOrwell

LTHOUGHTHELASTMarinesarescheduledtoexitAfghanistaninlate2014, this isanunfinishedstory.Thepessimistwouldsay thatgivenhumannature,itwillforeverremainunfinished.

In theclosingdaysof the IraqoccupationMikeMummeyobserved,“Nowthey’vegottorelearnhowtodothebigbluearrowfight….Butthey’restartingtorelearn.WhenIwasouttheretwoweeks,thekidwhowasthecolonelofthebattalion—Iwashisfirstplatoonsergeant—he’sgettingthebattalionbackintothe big blue arrowmentality. They’re going out and doingmaneuver warfareagaininsteadofconvoys,oroperatingoutofFOBs,stufflikethat.”

Yet the “big blue arrow” of mechanized maneuver warfare may again bewithering.Themantraof“lightness” isever recurrent in theCorps.AsDennisBeal points out, “Going back to aMEU size operation, that’s our pedigree.”Indeed,the“TheMEUisthebasisforouroperationalconcepts….Theygoinanddowhattheyneedtodo,andthenwefollowinwitheitherabrigadeortheArmy follows on, or whatever. That’s not gonna change. That was the casebeforetheninety-onewar,andbeforethe…twothousandandtwowar.”

Thevisionof itselfasa light forcedesigned toseizeadvancedbases,or toforceanentryintoenemyterritoryandleavetheheavylandfightingtofollow-onArmyforces,isacherishedself-imagethatdatesbacktotheAdvancedBaseForce concepts of the 1930s. The only problem is that it has almost neverworked.Politiciansandveryhigh-levelmilitaryplannersalikehaveassuredthattheMarineshavealltoooftenbeenaskedtoassumetheoneroletheyhaveneverwanted,actingasa sortofadjunctarmy. In fact,only twice in its institutionalhistoryhastheCorpsfunctionedinits“forcedentry”roleandthenbeenrelieved

for prolonged operations by the US Army or allied forces: the Bougainvillecampaign of 1943–1944, and the ill-fated Operation RESTORE HOPE inSomalia, 1992–1994.An added complexityof the early twenty-first century isthateventhemostpettyofdictatorscan—andforreasonsofprestigeandpowermust—maintainanarmoredforce.ThelessonofhistoryisthattheCorps,ifitisto be a true force in readiness, must in turn maintain the capability ofundertakingmechanizedlandoperations.

Theemphasison“lightness”inevitablyleadstoreconsiderationoftheroleofthetank.RobertBodischamongmanyothersisconcernedabouttheseeminglycyclical decline in the understandingof the role of heavy armor in theCorps’primarymission.“TheCommandantissuedaguidancelastyearaboutlighteningtheMAGTF (MarineAirGroundTaskForce).A lotofpeople that are in thatprocessoffiguringoutwaysoflighteningtheMAGTF,oneoftheeasiestwaysistogetridofthetanks….Inthearmorcommunityperspective,that’snotwhatwethinktheCommandantmeans.TheCommandantmeansgetridofthebloatedC-Two (Command and Control) structure that keeps growing and taking upvaluableshipspaceattheexpenseofcombatpower.”

Bodischwrotearesponsepointingoutthat“…theMarineCorpsistheonlyforce in theword thathas an expeditionary armor capability.Nobodyelsehasarmorforcespre-boatedthatcangointoanamphibiousenvironment.”Butthatcapability comes at a price in support personnel, logistical complexity, andsimpledeckspace thatMEUplannersandcommandersarealwaysreluctant toaccept.ThatistheoverwhelmingreasonthattheLAVhasreplacedthetankasthe armoredvehicle of choice in theMEU: five of the lighter vehicles can betransportedandsupportedintheplaceofonetank.

Sowhat is the future of armor—particularly heavy armor—for theMarineCorps?

Ever since the ill-fated development program for an “expeditionary tank”producedtheMarmon-Herringtontankettesofthe1930s,theCorpshasadoptedand usedArmy-designed tanks, despite fundamental differences in operationalrequirements.Thelong-cherishedideaofatrueamphibioustankhasrepeatedlyfounderedon thefundamental fact thatheavyarmoredvehicles justdon’t floatverywell.

In the short term improved versions of theM1 series are the only viableoption. Dennis Beal believes that despite their age the M1 series tanks willsoldier on for decades, at least twenty to thirtymoreyears. “Youpay a lot ofmoneyforthesethings….It’snotacaryoudriveforthreeyears,andyouputit

up and buy another one. These things are five million bucks apiece… . Youupgrade ‘em,youmod[ify] ‘em,…youproduct-improve ‘em,youdoall that.Butwhataboutthenextgeneration?”

Amodern complication is that technological complexity, and its attendantsoaringcosts,havedoomedrecentattemptsbythechronicallyfiscally-strappedMarineCorps to acquire newmission-fundamentalweapons systems, even forwell-established mission requirements. One recent victim was the AdvancedAmphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV), a complex housesized “swimmingBradley.”Armedwitha30mmchaingun,theAAAVwastobeasortofmilitaryTransformer,™capableofchangingitshullshapetocarryasquadofMarinesathigh speed fromships far out at sea andyet stand somechanceof survival inlandcombat.

In the end the AAAV program was victim to the seemingly inexorablefeedback loopofconstantlyevolvingdesignandsoaringcosts.Therehasbeennorecentnationalemergencythatwouldprovidemotivationtoshort-circuitthisescalating spiral toprovideaweapons system that, like theAmerican tanksofWorldWarII,wouldnotnecessarilybethetechnologicalbestbutaffordableandadequateforthemission.

The conundrumof a future expeditionary tank that balances the three tankfundamentals of armoredprotection, firepower, andmobility is for theMarineCorps farmore complex.Since themid-twentieth century themainbattle tankhasinmostarmiesevolvedintoamachinededicatedtokillingitsownkind.FortheMarineCorps the expeditionary tankwill likely remainwedded to itsdualroleofnotonlykillingenemytanks,butprovidingprecisiondirect-firesupportfortheinfantry.AsretiredArmyLieutenantColonelandmilitarytheoristRalphPetershaspointedout,theCorpswilllikelyfinditselfincreasinglyembroiledinurbancombat,thetypeofbattleforwhichthemainbattletankmaybelesswell-suited,butforwhichsomesortofprotecteddirectsupportweaponssystem,i.e.,aspecializedfuturegenerationtank,willbeessential.1

Technologicaladvancesmakeitincreasinglylikelythatthegeneration-after-nextmainbattletankwillfurtherevolveintosomethingoutofasciencefictionnovel, poweredbyas-yetunprovenpropulsion technologies, andarmedwith afuturisticweaponsuchasahypervelocityrailgunthatkillsatfantasticrangesbypure kinetic energy. Of course the problem for the Marine Corps, with itsrequirementforinfantrysupport,isthattheexpeditionarytankwillstillrequireaweaponcapableof reducinghardenedenemydefenses—that is,onecapableoffiringachemicalexplosive/fragmentationround.Thisdualityofmissionmayat

lastforcethedevelopmentofthelong-dreamtofspecializedexpeditionarytank.FortheMarineCorpsofthefuturethetankisnotdead.Butitsurelywillbe

nearlyimpossibletovisualize.

NOTES

1Peters,OurSoldiers,TheirCities.

WhereAreTheyNow?

CHRIS AKRIDGE completed his enlistment, returned to college for his lastsemester, and became a high-school teacher for four years. He returned tograduateschoolandin2012earnedaMaster’sDegreeinsocialwork,withtheintentiontoworkwithveterans’services.

DENNISBEALworked in development of future armor for theMarineCorpsbefore his retirement. He is now a program administrator at Texas A&MUniversity.

MAJORROBERTJ.BODISCHisstillonactiveduty.

MASTER SERGEANT SAMUELCRABTREE served as provisional companyXO, and served an additional deployment to Romania. He found a directapplicationofhismilitaryskillsasaheavymobileequipmentmechanic,andiscurrently a crew leader for theUSgovernment, refurbishing tanks. “I actuallyhavetogetdirtyandwork,whereintheReservesI’mnotoutonthetanks.”

BUSTER DIGGS retired in 1995. “Once you make Colonel, that’s it in theMarineCorpsintanks.”LikeasurprisingnumberofMarines,Diggsbecameamiddle-schoolteacher,andisnowasubstituteteacher.

TIM FRANK attended college, and became aMarine aviator, flying F-18s inOIF-1.

JAMES GONSALVES left the Corps after ten years, but applied forreinstatement after 9/11.He served two tours in Iraq, in a composite engineergroupandas aCivilAffairs team leader supportingLARbattalions atKoreanVillage.HeisintheITindustry.

BILLHAYES regretted not seeingmore action inOIF-1, but after Fallujah “Itwas ‘Okay, I rated the Combat Action ribbon. Let’s kind of EAS out of theMarines,andjustbegladIdidn’tdie.’”Heattendedcollege,worksfortheStateDepartment,andisingraduateschool.

DANHUGHESwasassigned toFortBenning,Georgia as an instructor in theCaptain’sCareerCourse,teachingtacticsandleadership.

KEVINKESSINGERwentonrecruitingduty,thenlefttheMarinesafterthirteenyearsandenteredgraduateschool,eventuallybecomingamechanicalengineerinspecialtyplasticsmoldingandsales.“Ididn’t reallymiss theMarineCorps,butImissedthepeople.Imissedthequalityofpeople,really.”

RICKMANCINI served four tours in tanks (“a real anomaly”) including thecommandof1stTank,atHeadquartersMarineCorps,andretiredasacolonel.HeworkedasasecurityconsultantinAfghanistan,andnow“semiretired,”runshisownsecurityconsultingcompany.

MICHAELMARTINEZ becameaMasterGunnerySergeant (E-9), thehighesttechnicalenlistedrankintheMarineCorps.HeiswiththeUSMarshallServiceand is now a Reserve instructor in theMarine Corps Tactics and OperationsGroup. He occasionallyworks in Afghanistan under the auspices of the StateDepartment.

MIKEMUMMEYretiredinJune2004.Heworksintheconstructionindustry,insales,scheduling,andmaterialsacquisition.

KEVINMORONIwasinjuredinalow-speedmotorcycleaccidentafterleavingtheCorps,withresultingclosed-headtrauma.

JOHNPOLIDOROwaspromotedtoLtColonel;heisstillonactiveduty.

MARC TUCKER recovered about eighty per cent use of his arm: “This isprobablyaboutasgoodasit’sgonnaget.”HewentbacktotheOfficer’sBasicSchoolyetagainasaninstructor,“totakealltheexperiencesIhadintheMarineCorpsandgivethembacktopeoplewhoweregoingtogooutanddo.”

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