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Marine Corps AdvisorsThe SC MAGTF will significantlyenhance the options available tothe CCDR in seeking to meetBPC requirements. Thepersonnel, training, and logisticssupport enhancements resident inthe SC MAGTF will constituteversatile and potent capabilities.However, the Marine Corps willbe developing additional forcesspecifically trained and equippedto provide security assistance (SA) to selected partner nations.Security assistance is currently executed through SCETC and MarineCorps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM) with severalinitiatives focused on foreign military sales and specialized trainingprovided by these organizations. However, recent experiences in Iraqand Afghanistan have led to the recognition that a more robust SAcapability is needed within the Marine Corps. That increasedcapability will be addressed through the development of Marine Corpsadvisors.

A Marine Corps Training and Advisor Group (MCTAG) wascommissioned by the Commandant in October 2007. Initiallyestablished to address staffing and sourcing requirements foroperations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the MCTAG’s purpose is tosource the Marine Corps’ advisory capability to support missionrequirements that exceed those of SC MAGTFs. An embryoniccapability now, it will eventually grow to constitute a cadre of trainedadvisors organized into regional branches that deploy scalable teamsof Marine advisors to partner nations. Marine Corps advisors will alsofacilitate the development of critical relationships and enable civil-military operations and security cooperation opportunities by servingas an interface with partner nation military forces assisting regionalMARFOR interaction with select US and partner nation governmentagencies, including the US country teams and attachés.

Marine advisors will establish enduring relationships that facilitate theinteraction between the SC MAGTF and partner government agencies

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and security forces with whom they willbe working. Supportive to the efforts ofthe SC MAGTF, Marine advisors willconstitute a significant enabler thatenhances the effectiveness of the SCMAGTF in the future securityenvironment. Figure 7 depicts thecomplementary relationship of MarineCorps advisors and the SC MAGTF inBPC efforts.

When not deployed, Marine advisors will provide training to SCMAGTF and other units designated to conduct BPC events. Marineadvisors will be capable of supporting SC MAGTF pre-deploymenttraining programs as well as providing reinforcement to cultural andlanguage training provided by the CAOCL. Ultimately, the Marineadvisors will provide a critical continuity for Marine efforts to engageacross the shaping and deterrence phases of operations.

Figure 7

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Figure 8 provides a notional deployment scheme that illustrates howthe Marine advisors and SC MAGTF will work in a complementarymanner. The SC MAGTF will not be in the Marine advisors’ chain ofcommand, but SC MAGTF will nonetheless establish criticalrelationships with the Marine advisors. Based upon the CCDRsecurity cooperation plan (SCP), the regional MARFOR willcommand and control both Marine advisors and SC MAGTFs. Thedeployment schedule of Marine advisors and SC MAGTF will beoffset to ensure effective continuity of capacity building efforts withinthe theater of operation. The maintenance of relationships betweenUS forces and partner nation military leaders is thus enabled. Asignificant benefit of this offset in deployment schedules will be theability of the Marine advisors to facilitate the introduction of newlyarriving SC MAGTF elements into the theater. In order to preclude aloss in the persistent nature of this US presence, the MEU operatingin the region also will be available to conduct training while the SCMAGTF elements transition into theater.

Figure 8

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Guiding Principles for the Long WarIn conducting the kinds of missions required to effectively shape theenvironment and deter potential adversaries, our leaders will beguided by enduring principles that serve as touchstones to ourpersonnel in ensuring they are properly prepared for operationsagainst the irregular adversary. Marine operations will be planned andexecuted in accordance with the following principles:

Naval Character. More than everbefore, our linkage with the Navymust be firm and based on sharedunderstanding and vision. TheMarine Corps must maintain itsNaval roots to shape theenvironment and effectively deteradversaries. With the advent of ACooperative Strategy for 21stCentury Seapower, this includesrefining our relationship with theCoast Guard. In the future, more Marines than ever will be deployedaboard Navy and potentially Coast Guard shipping, either in GFSs andMEUs. Furthermore, amphibious forcible entry, long a hallmark Marinecapability, must remain both viable and potent as a means of projectingpower ashore at the time and place of our choosing.

Lethality. First and foremost, theMarine Corps is a warfighting forcewhose paramount task is to fight andwin our Nation’s battles. Marineunits must remain trained, equipped,and oriented toward engaging ourNation’s adversaries and achievingdecisive end states at the tactical andoperational levels in order to achievethe CCDR’s objectives across theentire range of military operations.

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Agility. With the defining characteristic of the future securityenvironment being uncertainty, our Marine forces must be a balancedforce that can be rapidly tailored to meet a diverse array of challengesand requirements. This ability to rapidly shift and adjust to changingbattlefield conditions includes being mentally, physically, and materiallyready for the unexpected and will place a great deal of responsibility onour junior leaders.

Deployability. Marine forces must be prepared for rapid, efficientmovement to distant operating locations. This requires Marines andMarine units that are properly trained and equipped to move by surfaceand air to reception areas for follow-on employment on the ground andin littoral areas. An expeditionary mindset on the part of our Marinesand families is a critical aspect of this deployability.

Self-sufficiency. In addition to being forward deployable, Marine unitsmust be capable of operating for extended periods in remote, austerelocations far from normal logistical support networks. This requirementfor self sufficiency will be especially critical in supporting thedisaggregated, distributed elements of the SC MAGTF as it performs itssecurity cooperation and BPC tasks in undeveloped areas. From robustorganic logistics support capabilities resident at the small unit level, toexisting intra-theater sustainment provided by the regional CCDR,logistical self sufficiency will be a paramount principle to maintain.

Adaptability. Working with partner nations possessing widely differentlevels of military capability, Marine forces must be able to adapt theirapproaches in a manner that provides the most reliable development andtraining value to the audience. In some cases, this adaptability will allowMarines to conduct civil affairs activities that strengthen the ties betweencitizens and responsive governments. In other cases, this adaptability willallow Marines to help professionalize a militia into a competent, capablemilitary force. In still others, Marines may participate in high spectrumtraining exercises with technologically advanced allies whose capabilitiesmatch or even exceed our own.

Interoperability. Marine forces must continue to maintain the ability tointegrate and operate with joint forces and interagency, non-governmental, and multinational partners. This interoperability denotessystems, capabilities, organization, and cultural awareness working inharmony across all elements of an operation.

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Foundations of MarineOperationsIn order to facilitate the application of the principles described above, theMarine Corps must reaffirm some foundational tenets of Marine Corps success,while implementing new ones. Successful employment of the operationalapproach laid out in this concept requires:

Leadership and Professionalism: This constitutes the paramountfoundation of Marine operations at home and abroad. This concept willplace an even higher premium on the requirement for effective leadershipand professionalism from our most junior leaders. With the increase indistributed operations, leadership and professionalism, particularly amongthe NCO ranks, will be critical tomission success. This requirement is notonly critical to the success of ourMarines themselves, but also in shapingthe environment and deterring potentialadversaries. In many cases, theperformance of Marines and theirleaders will prove to be the decisivefactor that shapes the environment anddetermines the future stability of acountry or region.

Maneuver Warfare: The Marine Corps’ enduring philosophy forwarfighting remains relevant and important to our success in the lowerintensity phases of conflict such as shaping, deterring, and enabling of civilauthority. Rather than wearing down the enemies’ defenses, maneuver

warfare strives to penetrate andtear down enemy systems. Theaim of maneuver warfare is torender the enemy incapable ofeffective resistance by shatteringhis moral, mental, and physicalcohesion — his ability to fight asan effective, coordinated whole.This approach is the moreeffective means of warfighting

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than the traditional approach that strives to physically destroy theadversary through the incremental attrition of each of his components.9Maneuver warfare is especially relevant in seeking to address the elusive,irregular foe that is emerging as the threat. By effectively shaping theadversary’s environment, the Marine Corps can leave the irregular foepowerless, vulnerable, and utterly lacking in popular support.

Task Organized, Combined ArmsCapable, Multi-Purpose Marines:Marines must continue to operate asscalable, task organized teamsfocused on bringing the synergisticeffects of the MAGTF to bear on ournation’s opponents. These effectsmay be as simple as two riflemensupporting one another or ascomplex as information operations in support of a MEF-level securitycooperation plan. The MAGTF concept is a proven formula that must bepreserved — an enduring legacy on which the Marine Corps and ourNation can depend. Marine forces will preserve their capability as generalpurpose forces. Although some missions traditionally associated with SOFwill be performed by Marine units, with capabilities that are more “SOF-like” in appearance, Marine forces will remain focused on a conventionalorientation that allows for employment in accordance with “traditional”Marine combat missions.

Cultural Awareness: In seeking to assure and support friends and allieswhile simultaneously deterring adversaries, Marines must continue tounderstand the critical importance of cultural sensitivity. Marines who areculturally and linguistically adept provide a significant force enabler to aCCDR. Conversely, failure to understand the critical importance of culture

and language in establishing andmaintaining foreign relationships canhave severely detrimental effects. Toinstill greater cultural awareness, moreemphasis will be placed on this enablerthrough increased cultural training andinitiatives designed to create a moreculturally aware and adept Marine Corps.

9 MCDP 1 Warfighting, (Washington DC: Headquarters Marine Corps) p. 73

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MethodsIn order to conduct the kinds of missions required to achieve successin the Long War, the Marine Corps will require innovative methodsand capabilities that enhance our ability to contribute to nationalsecurity. Some of the methods outlined below are traditional whileothers are emerging and require further refinement to be optimized. Inthe end, the goal that we seek is to achieve a globally deployable,networked Marine Corps focused on increasing the capabilities ofpartner nations while effectively deterring potential adversaries anddecisively defeating known enemies.

Navy-Marine Corps Team – With the sustainable, credible forwardpresence capability that amphibious shipping provides, the paramountjoint relationship that the Marine Corps will maintain is with the US Navy.This is a familiar relationship that harkens back to the founding of ourCorps. However, recent operations have seen an increased requirement forMarines to conduct sustained operations ashore. While it is clear thatMarines will be land-based for manyof the future distributed operationsand BPC missions that the MarineCorps will conduct, our navalcapabilities will continue to becritically important. Specifically, theability to be transported, sustained,and even protected through ourpartnership with the US Navy andCoast Guard will enable missionsuccess. The advent of the Navy’sGFS concept as a persistent sea base for operations is particularlyimportant and relevant to the Marine Corps. This relationship with theNavy includes an increased requirement for the operationalization of MPS.By enabling routine access to the equipment stored and maintained aboardMPS, the ability of our Marines to project a persistent presence ashore willbe significantly enhanced.

Distributed Operations – With advances in technological and logisticalcapabilities, Marine commanders are increasingly able to disaggregatetactical units to execute effective, decisive actions, activities and operationson the ground. Distributed operations is a technique applied to an

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appropriate situation wherein units are separated beyond thelimits of mutual support. Distributed operations are practiced bygeneral purpose forces, operating with deliberate dispersion,where necessary and tactically prudent, with de-centralizeddecision-making consistent withcommander’s intent to achievespecific advantages over anenemy. Distributed operationsrelies on the ability andjudgment of Marines at everylevel and is particularly enabledby excellence in leadership toensure the ability to understandand influence an expandedoperational environment. When facing irregular forces or forcesoperating in complex terrain, distributed operations may allow thecommander to expand his area of influence. During securitycooperation, shaping, and deterrence, the decentralized actionenabled by distributed operations will permit wider, more diverseapplication of power and influence. This same capability affordedthrough distributed operations can be leveraged to enable rapidre-aggregation or reinforcement where military power projectionmust be quickly applied.

Globally Networked – Forward-deployed Marines operating inremote locations will require robust information systemarchitectures to receive, disseminate, and transmit informationcritical to operational flexibility and global awareness. Theseinformation systems must appropriately safeguard sensitive orclassified information while being reliable, rugged, and capable oflong-range communications.

Adaptive Force Packaging – Marine forces will be tailored toprovide the right mix of personnel and equipment to conduct thetasks required. To achieve optimal objectives, this will requireincreased joint and inter-agency resources to provide efficient andeffective force packages tailored to specific missions.

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Regionalization – Cultural awareness and linguistic expertisewill be critical force enablers to Marine efforts at civil-militaryoperations, security cooperationand security assistance. Tofacilitate the concentration of theright skills in the right units,Marine units will be assignedspecific regional orientations thatfacilitate the assignment ofpersonnel holding the right skillsets. Furthermore, Marines willreceive specialized regionaltraining that is tailored to the assigned mission. Personnelassignment policies will be modified for FAO, RAO, linguists, andother personnel with specialized training or backgrounds in orderto maximize the full potential of such Marines in prosecutingMarine and joint missions. These changes in personnelassignment policies will focus on selected billets within units thatsource the SC MAGTF, while avoiding a wholesale restructuringof the tables of organization of these units.

Science and Technology (S&T) Investment — The task oftraining and equipping the force to meet the above objectives willrequire continued research and development of technologies thatfacilitate application of the right force at the right time. The S&Tinvestment will enable US Marine units to operate moreeffectively in a resource constrained environment to accomplishboth traditional and non-traditional missions. Investments will bemade that will cover the spectrum of weaponry, languagetranslation, personnel protection, mobility, command and control

support systems, ISRcollection and fusion, non-lethal technologies, logistics,medical, informationoperations and virtualtraining environments.Experimentation with usingthe products of the S&Tefforts will be used towarddeveloping partner capacity.

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End StateThe net effect of the implementation of this concept will be a MarineCorps that is better positioned to address the challenges of anuncertain security environment. Through the increase in forwarddeployed, task organized Marine units operating afloat and ashore,CCDRs will have greater flexibility in how they choose to shape theenvironment and deter enemies in their AOR. These Marine units willprovide a more persistent presence aimed at deterring and defeatingour nation’s adversaries, while providing a uniquely tailored capabilityto invest in our regional partners and allies with the training andadvanced capabilities to enablepartner militaries to manageinternal and regional instability.If efforts to shape theenvironment and deter threatsfails, our full spectrum capableMarines will be well positionedto transition to high spectrumcombat operations to defeat ourNation’s adversaries.

This concept features subtle differences from previous concepts.Marines will preserve the capabilities as general purpose forces thatfight and win our Nation’s battles. Marines will continue to deployaboard Naval shipping for service in the world’s littoral areas.However, some new initiatives including the SC MAGTF and Marineadvisors will better prepare Marines for working with foreign civilauthorities and militaries in a manner that builds credible, capableforeign governments and security forces in countries aligned with theinterests of our country.

For the individual Marine, this operating concept will present manychallenges and opportunities. The demands inherent in engaging anirregular enemy will require Marines to be both agile and flexible intheir mindset, prepared to adapt quickly based on changes in theenvironment. Our Marines will require a greater understanding of theimpact that cultural norms and political structures have on operationswithin the regions in which they are operating. Initiatives such asregional specialization, cultural training, and enhanced training

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focused on civil-military operations and security cooperation willprepare Marines to meet these demands while presenting uniqueopportunities to broaden themselves on both professional andpersonal levels.

For Marine families, this force employment concept will provide relieffrom the operational tempo that has been the norm over the pastseveral years. The 1:2 deployment-to-dwell rotation cycle combinedwith the increase in overall Marine Corps force structure will providea flexible and sustainable operational tempo for the future whilesignificantly reducing the strain on our Marines and their families.The ultimate goal remains a return to a 1:3 deployment-to-dwellrotation cycle. This goal will be realized as conditions around theworld permit. Our families remain stalwart contributors to the successenjoyed by our Corps. Ensuring we support our Marine families iscritical to our continued success.

This increase in deployment-to-dwell rotation cycle combinedwith the Marine Corps’ growthin force structure will result inthe ability to train to fullspectrum operations whileprojecting Marines to locationsacross the globe where they canprovide the most lasting effect.As a result of this persistentMarine presence and increase inforeign civil authority andsecurity force capabilities, ourirregular adversaries will be denied the safe havens from which theyhave been able to previously operate. Extremists, terrorists, insurgents,and trans-national criminals that had been previously operating withimpunity in under-governed spaces will come under increasingpressure from legitimate regional stakeholders capable of taking thenecessary measures to deter or reduce these threats.

Ultimately this concept represents a continuation of the enduringlegacy that has seen Marines most ready when the Nation is leastready. Forward-deployed with our Navy partners in the unstable

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regions of the world, our Marines will bring the fight to the enemy,through effective deterrence and decisive engagement, whileempowering our friends with capabilities that support US efforts tobring economic prosperity and freedom to regions of the world thatyearn for these opportunities.

Figure 9

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Glossaryadvanced logistics support site—(NWP 4-01) A location used asthe primary transshipment point in the theater of operations forfleet logistic support. Also called ALSS.

aviation combat element — (DOD) The core element of a Marineair-ground task force (MAGTF) that is task-organized to conductaviation operations. The aviation combat element (ACE) providesall or a portion of the six functions of Marine aviation necessary toaccomplish the MAGTF's mission. These functions are antiairwarfare, offensive air support, assault support, electronic warfare,air reconnaissance, and control of aircraft and missiles. The ACE isusually composed of an aviation unit headquarters and variousother aviation units or their detachments. It can vary in size from asmall aviation detachment of specifically required aircraft to one ormore Marine aircraft wings. The ACE itself is not a formalcommand. Also called ACE.

catastrophic challenges — (NDS) Catastrophic challenges involvethe acquisition, possession, and use of WMD or methods producingWMD-like effects.

civil affairs– (DOD) Designated Active and Reserve componentforces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically toconduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-militaryoperations. Also called CA.

civil-military operations — (DOD) The activities of a commanderthat establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations betweenmilitary forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilianorganizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in afriendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitatemilitary operations, to consolidate and achieve operational USobjectives. Civil-military operations may include performance bymilitary forces of activities and functions normally the responsibilityof the local, regional, or national government. These activities mayoccur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. Theymay also occur, if directed, in the absence of other militaryoperations. Civil-military operations may be performed by

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designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combinationof civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO.

combatant command — (JP 1-02) A unified or specified commandwith a broad continuing mission under a single commanderestablished and so designated by the President through theSecretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commandstypically have geographic or functional responsibilities.

combatant commander — (JP 1-02) A commander of one of theunified or specified combatant commands established by thePresident. Also called CCDR.

conventional forces — (DOD) 1. Those forces capable ofconducting operations using non-nuclear weapons. 2. Those forcesother than designated special operations forces.

cooperative security location — (NDS) A diverse array of austerefacilities. They have little or no United States personnel assignedand are intended for contingency access, logistical support, androtational use by operating forces. Also called CSL.

crisis — (DOD) An incident or situation involving a threat to theUnited States, its territories, citizens, military forces, possessions, orvital interests that develops rapidly and creates conditions of suchdiplomatic, economic, political, or military importance thatcommitment of US military forces and resources is contemplated inorder to achieve national objectives.

disruptive challenges — (NDS) Disruptive challenges may comefrom adversaries who develop and use breakthrough technologies tonegate current US advantages in key operational domains.

foreign area officer — (USMC proposed) Commissioned Marineofficers who, through a combination of graduate education,language training, and in-country training or significant languageand cultural experience, attain regional, linguistic, and culturalexpertise in specific geographic regions.

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foreign internal defense — (DOD) Participation by civilian andmilitary agencies of a government in any of the action programstaken by another government or designated organization to free andprotect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.Also called FID.

forward operating sites—(NDS) Scalable facilities intended forrotational use by operating forces that can support a range ofmilitary operations on short notice. They may have a smallpermanent presence and often house pre-positioned equipment.Also called FOS.

global commons — (SHDCS) International waters and airspace,space, and cyberspace.

ground combat element — (DOD) The core element of a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) that is task-organized to conduct groundoperations. It is usually constructed around an infantry organizationbut can vary in size from a small ground unit of any type, to one ormore Marine divisions that can be independently maneuvered underthe direction of the MAGTF commander. The ground combat elementitself is not a formal command. Also called GCE.

information operations — (DOD) Actions taken to affectadversary information and information systems while defendingone’s own information and information systems. Also called IO.

irregular challenges — (NDS) Unconventional methods to counterthe traditional advantages of stronger opponents.

irregular warfare — (JP 1-02) A violent struggle among state andnon-stateactors for legitimacy and influence over the relevantpopulation(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetricapproaches, though it may employ the full range of military andother capacities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence,and will. Also called IW.

logistics combat element — (DOD) The core element of a Marineair-ground task force (MAGTF) that is task-organized to providethe logistics support necessary to accomplish the MAGTF mission.The logistics combat element varies in size from a small detachmentto one or more Marine logistics groups. It provides supply,

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maintenance, transportation, general engineering, health services,and a variety of other services to the MAGTF. The logistics combatelement itself is not a formal command. Also called LCE.

major combat operations — (MCO JOC) Large-scale operationsconducted against a nation-state(s) that possesses significantregional military capability, with global reach in selected capabilities,and the will to employ that capability in opposition to or in amanner threatening to US national security. Also called MCO.

Marine expeditionary brigade — (JP 1-02) A Marine air-groundtask force that is constructed around a reinforced infantry regiment,a composite Marine aircraft group, and a brigade service supportgroup. The Marine expeditionary brigade, commanded by a generalofficer, is task-organized to meet the requirements of a specificsituation. It can function as part of a joint task force, as the leadechelon of a Marine expeditionary force, or alone. It varies in sizeand composition and is larger than a Marine expeditionary unit butsmaller than a Marine expeditionary force. The Marineexpeditionary brigade is capable of conducting missions across thefull range of military operations. Also called MEB.

Marine expeditionary force — (JP 1-02) The largest Marine air-ground task force and the Marine Corps’ principal warfightingorganization, particularly for larger crises or contingencies. It istask-organized around a permanent command element andnormally contains one or more Marine divisions, Marine aircraftwings, and Marine force service support groups. The Marineexpeditionary force is capable of missions across the range ofmilitary operations, including amphibious assault and sustainedoperations ashore in any environment. It can operate from a seabase, a land base, or both. Also called MEF.

Marine expeditionary unit — (JP 1-02) A Marine air-ground taskforce that is constructed around an infantry battalion reinforced, ahelicopter squadron reinforced, and a task-organized combatservice support element. It normally fulfills Marine Corps forwardseabased deployment requirements. The Marine expeditionary unitprovides and immediate reaction capability for crisis response andis capable of limited combat operations. Also called MEU.

maritime prepositioning ships — (JP 1-02) Civilian-crewed,

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Military Sealift Command-chartered ships that are organized intothree squadrons and are usually forward deployed. These ships areloaded with prepositioned equipment and 30 days of supplies tosupport three Marine Expeditionary Brigades. Also called MPS.

operational preparation of the environment — (JP 3-13) Non-intelligence activities conducted to plan and prepare for potentialfollow-on military operations. Also called OPE.

regional affairs officer — (USMC proposed) CommissionedMarine officers who, through graduate level education orexperience, have attained regional/cultural expertise in specificgeographical regions.

seabasing — (Seabasing Joint Integrated Concept v 1.0) The rapiddeployment, assembly, command, projection, reconstitution, and re-deployment of joint force combat power from the sea, whileproviding continuous support, sustainment, and force protection toselect expeditionary joint forces without reliance on land baseswithin the Joint Operations Area (JOA). These capabilities expandoperational maneuver options, and facilitate assured access andentry from the sea.

security cooperation — (DOD) All Department of Defenseinteractions with foreign defense establishments to build defenserelationships that promote specific US security interests, developallied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense andmultinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetimeand contingency access to a host nation. Also called SC.

security assistance — (DOD) Group of programs authorized by theForeign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms ExportControl Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by whichthe United States provides defense articles, military training, andother defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales infurtherance of national policies and objectives. Also called SA.

traditional challenges — (NDS) Traditional challenges posed bystates employing recognized military capabilities and forces in well-understood forms of military competition and conflict.

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ReferencesEngland, Gordon. Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support,(Washington DC: Department of Defense, June 2005)

FY-08 Marine Corps Security Cooperation (SC) ImplementationStrategy

Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Militaryand Associated Terms (Washington DC, Department of Defense, 12April, 2001)

Joint Publication 3-0, Operations (Washington DC, Department ofDefense, September 2001)

Joint Strategic Assessment (Washington DC, The Defense IntelligenceAgency, September 2006)

Marine Corps Operating Concepts for a Changing SecurityEnvironment, Second Edition (Quantico VA: Concept and PlansDivision, Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, Marine Corps CombatDevelopment Command, June 2007)

MCDP-1, Warfighting, (Washington DC: United States Marine Corps,June 1997)

MCIA-1586-001-05, Marine Corps Midrange Threat Estimate: 2005-2015 (Quantico VA: Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, August 2005)

Multi-Service Concept for Irregular Warfare (Quantico VA: MarineCorps Combat Development Command and US Special ForcesCommand Center for Knowledge and Futures, August 2006)

Rumsfeld, Donald H. National Defense Strategy of the United States,(Washington DC: Department of Defense, March 1, 2005)

Seabasing, (Quantico VA: Marine Corps Combat DevelopmentCommand, August 2006)

Joint Strategic Assessment 2006-2026, (Washington DC, The DefenseIntelligence Agency, September 2006), p. 3

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