march 21, [email protected] reserve base of gazprom: depleting low-cost production and new...

18
March 21, 2002 [email protected] 1 Reserve base of Gazprom: Depleting low-cost production and new high-cost fields The future bottlenecks in the pipeline system of Gazprom and security of supply Investment requirements versus the borrowing capacity of Gazprom Restructuring of Gazprom: Would it be better to break Gazprom? Delivery cost of Russian gas at the European border through 2015 Sustainability and Cost of Sustainability and Cost of Russian Russian Gas Exports to Europe Gas Exports to Europe

Upload: shawn-black

Post on 17-Dec-2015

213 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: March 21, 2002korchemkin@eegas.com1 Reserve base of Gazprom: Depleting low-cost production and new high-cost fields The future bottlenecks in the pipeline

March 21, 2002 [email protected] 1

• Reserve base of Gazprom: Depleting low-cost production and new high-cost fields

• The future bottlenecks in the pipeline system of Gazprom and security of supply

• Investment requirements versus the borrowing capacity of Gazprom

• Restructuring of Gazprom: Would it be better to break Gazprom?

• Delivery cost of Russian gas at the European border through 2015

Sustainability and Cost of RussianSustainability and Cost of RussianGas Exports to EuropeGas Exports to Europe

Page 2: March 21, 2002korchemkin@eegas.com1 Reserve base of Gazprom: Depleting low-cost production and new high-cost fields The future bottlenecks in the pipeline

March 21, 2002 [email protected] 2

Reserve Base of GazpromReserve Base of Gazprom• Low-cost Cenomanian –

“Soviet” giant fields – from $3.50 to $5.00/mcm– Urengoy, Yamburg, Medvezhye

• Mid-cost Cenomanian – from $5 to $10/mcm– Yubileinoe, Yamsoveiskoe,

West Tarkosalinskoe, North Urengoy, Komsomolskoe, Zapolyarnoe

• Astrakhan & Orenburg – from $10 to $15/mcm

• Neocomian - $15-$20/mcm– Urengoy & Yamburg,

Ybileinoe, Vuktyl

• High-cost remote reserves – over $20/mcm (today’s USD)– Yamal, Shtokman, Obskaya

Bay, Gydan Peninsula

Page 3: March 21, 2002korchemkin@eegas.com1 Reserve base of Gazprom: Depleting low-cost production and new high-cost fields The future bottlenecks in the pipeline

March 21, 2002 [email protected] 3

Reserves in Place as of 1.1.2002, TCMReserves in Place as of 1.1.2002, TCM

7.3

7.2

3.5

2.3

7.8

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

>$20

$15-$20

$10-$15

$5-$10

<$5

• The chart addresses proven reserves in place (A+B+C1 Russian categories)

• Our rough estimations for production cost are given in today’s dollars and are based on the today’s level of Russian costs (labor, domestic materials, etc) and imported materials

• Future investment costs and operation costs depend on the future Russian costs

– In 1992-98 the average hourly wage in Gazprom changed from $0.23 to $2.85

– In Jan-1999 it was $0.57– In Jan-2002 it was $3.00– Number of man-hours to drill

a 1-km well or to lay 1 km of pipe didn’t change that much

Res/Prod ~ 50 yrsRes/Prod ~ 50 yrs

Page 4: March 21, 2002korchemkin@eegas.com1 Reserve base of Gazprom: Depleting low-cost production and new high-cost fields The future bottlenecks in the pipeline

March 21, 2002 [email protected] 4

Future Bottlenecks, 2002-2020Future Bottlenecks, 2002-2020

A new 2,500-km line from West Siberia to the Russian border would mean too

high delivery cost of Russian gas

Competing projectsBased on Maximum Daily Flows

Page 5: March 21, 2002korchemkin@eegas.com1 Reserve base of Gazprom: Depleting low-cost production and new high-cost fields The future bottlenecks in the pipeline

March 21, 2002 [email protected] 5

Ukhta

YamalThe Yamal Connection:The Yamal Connection:Three OptionsThree Options

2x56” pipesFully loaded

Capacity = 1700 mmcm/dJan-02 flow = 1470 mmcm/d

16 x 56” pipelinesSpare capacity ~80 bcm/yrSecure supplies

Siberian“Interconnector”

Says Gazprom

Page 6: March 21, 2002korchemkin@eegas.com1 Reserve base of Gazprom: Depleting low-cost production and new high-cost fields The future bottlenecks in the pipeline

March 21, 2002 [email protected] 6

Pipeline & Production Investment, USD Bn/yearPipeline & Production Investment, USD Bn/year“Business-as-usual”, in constant USD“Business-as-usual”, in constant USD

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2000 2005 2010 2015

Pipeline Production

Note the size and the riskNote the size and the risk

These are new projects onlyThese are new projects only

Page 7: March 21, 2002korchemkin@eegas.com1 Reserve base of Gazprom: Depleting low-cost production and new high-cost fields The future bottlenecks in the pipeline

March 21, 2002 [email protected] 7

Restructuring of Gazprom:Restructuring of Gazprom:CommentsComments

• Independent producers pay less taxes than Gazprom – all independents were exempt of excise tax by the old taxation, some still are by the new Tax Code

• Sales of transit services are taxed lower than export sales of gas

• Many publications and numeric illustrations of wrongdoings of Gazprom are misleading

Page 8: March 21, 2002korchemkin@eegas.com1 Reserve base of Gazprom: Depleting low-cost production and new high-cost fields The future bottlenecks in the pipeline

March 21, 2002 [email protected] 8

Typical Mistakes of Media AnalystsTypical Mistakes of Media Analysts

• Manipulate with price data of different months of 1998 and 1999

• Apply taxation rules of 2001-2002 to the situation of 1997-1999

• Assume that Gazprom had enough cash to develop new fields and to build new export lines simultaneously

• Forget that before Itera took the Ukrainian exports Gazprom’s collection rate was 38%

In 1998-1999 Russian ruble lost 78% of its value while the state-regulated gas price in rubles stayed flat.

Note that power plants and residential sector of West Siberia paid even lower price.

Wholesale Price of Gas for West Siberian Consumers

-

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Jan-98 Apr-98 Jul-98 Oct-98 Jan-99 Apr-99 Jul-99 Oct-99

USD/mcm

0

50

100

150

200

250RUR/mcm

Page 9: March 21, 2002korchemkin@eegas.com1 Reserve base of Gazprom: Depleting low-cost production and new high-cost fields The future bottlenecks in the pipeline

March 21, 2002 [email protected] 9

Exports to Ukraine (Yamalo-Nenets Deal)Exports to Ukraine (Yamalo-Nenets Deal)Before Itera – Export, and After Itera - TransitBefore Itera – Export, and After Itera - Transit

Export TransitPrice 50.00 - Transit tariff - 33.50 Gross revenue 50.00 33.50 Payment rate 38% 69%Gross receipts 19.00 23.08 Taxes:VAT (3.17) (3.85) Excise (4.51) - Export duty (0.79) - Other taxes (0.87) (1.06)

Total taxes: (9.34) (4.91) Net receipts 9.66 18.18 Debt 31.00 10.42

Gazprom receipts from:Export Transit

50.00 - - 33.50

50.00 33.50 100% 100%

50.00 33.50

(8.33) (5.58) (11.88) -

(2.08) - (2.29) (1.54)

(24.58) (7.12) 25.42 26.38

- -

Gazprom receipts from:

Sources: Annual Reports of Gazprom; Bond Prospectus; RF GAO Report on ITERA and Gazprom

Gazprom’s benefits also include tax paid to the Yamalo-Nenets government

Page 10: March 21, 2002korchemkin@eegas.com1 Reserve base of Gazprom: Depleting low-cost production and new high-cost fields The future bottlenecks in the pipeline

March 21, 2002 [email protected] 10

Restructuring of Gazprom:Restructuring of Gazprom:Business as UsualBusiness as Usual

• Gazprom stays as the monopoly in both gas production and transmission

• Gazprom remains the only exporter of Russian gas to Europe

• Gazprom develops new fields of Yamal, Obskaya Bay and Gydan Peninsula on its own or with a minority presence of third parties, Western or Russian

• Can Gazprom survive under reasonable assumptions of the Russian price at $50/mcm and European border price at $90/mcm?

Page 11: March 21, 2002korchemkin@eegas.com1 Reserve base of Gazprom: Depleting low-cost production and new high-cost fields The future bottlenecks in the pipeline

March 21, 2002 [email protected] 11

Net Cash Flow, USD BillionNet Cash Flow, USD BillionGas Operations of Gazprom – Business as UsualGas Operations of Gazprom – Business as Usual

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2000 2005 2010 2015

Business-as-usual

Page 12: March 21, 2002korchemkin@eegas.com1 Reserve base of Gazprom: Depleting low-cost production and new high-cost fields The future bottlenecks in the pipeline

March 21, 2002 [email protected] 12

• Gazprom keeps all producing fields, including Zapolyarnoe (any breakup would create a huge problem for shareholders)

• Other new fields are developed by third parties with a minority interest of Gazprom

• Third parties can export all new production to Europe and FSU, which gives them the incentive to develop the costly fields

• Gazprom sells transit services to third parties and sells gas from its existing fields

Restructuring of Gazprom:Restructuring of Gazprom:Focus on Transit ServicesFocus on Transit Services

Page 13: March 21, 2002korchemkin@eegas.com1 Reserve base of Gazprom: Depleting low-cost production and new high-cost fields The future bottlenecks in the pipeline

March 21, 2002 [email protected] 13

Net Cash Flow, USD BillionNet Cash Flow, USD Billion““Focus on Transit” Vs “Business as Usual”Focus on Transit” Vs “Business as Usual”

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2000 2005 2010 2015

Business as usual Focus on transit

Page 14: March 21, 2002korchemkin@eegas.com1 Reserve base of Gazprom: Depleting low-cost production and new high-cost fields The future bottlenecks in the pipeline

March 21, 2002 [email protected] 14

Gazprom TowerGazprom Tower Shell CentreShell Centreas tall asas tall as

Page 15: March 21, 2002korchemkin@eegas.com1 Reserve base of Gazprom: Depleting low-cost production and new high-cost fields The future bottlenecks in the pipeline

March 21, 2002 [email protected] 15

Gazprom TowerGazprom Tower

Shell CentreShell Centre

Market Capitalization:Market Capitalization:Gazprom ~ 15% of ShellGazprom ~ 15% of Shell

Page 16: March 21, 2002korchemkin@eegas.com1 Reserve base of Gazprom: Depleting low-cost production and new high-cost fields The future bottlenecks in the pipeline

March 21, 2002 [email protected] 16

Focus on transitFocus on transit

Shell CentreShell CentreIn case of “focus on In case of “focus on transit”, NPV of Gazprom’s transit”, NPV of Gazprom’s cash flow increases 200%-cash flow increases 200%-300%300%

Business as usualBusiness as usual

““Business as usual” case Business as usual” case has 4-5 times lower value.has 4-5 times lower value.

Page 17: March 21, 2002korchemkin@eegas.com1 Reserve base of Gazprom: Depleting low-cost production and new high-cost fields The future bottlenecks in the pipeline

March 21, 2002 [email protected] 17

RAO = Russian Join Stock Co

OAO = Open Join Stock Co

1. To improve cash flow and to increase shareholders’ value

2. To hide the asset stripping

3. For no specific reason

In 1998 Gazprom has changed its In 1998 Gazprom has changed its name from RAO to OAO. Why?name from RAO to OAO. Why?

Former Gazprom’s CEO Former Gazprom’s CEO Rem VyakhirevRem Vyakhirev

Page 18: March 21, 2002korchemkin@eegas.com1 Reserve base of Gazprom: Depleting low-cost production and new high-cost fields The future bottlenecks in the pipeline

March 21, 2002 [email protected] 18

The Correct Answer is “1”The Correct Answer is “1”

By the Russian law, the use of word “Russia” or “Russian” in any company’s name was subject to a special tax of 0.5% of revenue (!)

The change of name has eliminated this tax and improved Gazprom’s cash flow.