Managing spent fuel in the United States:The illogic of reprocessing

(report on www.fissilematerials.org)

Frank von Hippel, Princeton UniversityCo-chair, International Panel on Fissile Material

Carnegie Endowment; Washington, DC; May 22, 2008

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How it started: U.S. nuclear utilities wanted Department of Energyto start removing spent fuel from reactor sites and sued to recover

their extra costs for storage since 1998 ($0.3-0.5 billion/year)

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Transuranics

Spent LEUfuel storage

ReprocessingPlant

Other radioactive waste

Fuelfabricationplant(s)

40-75 1000-MWe liquidsodium-cooled fast-neutron reactors

Reprocessing plant(s)

Cs-137, Sr-90 storage(200-300 years)

LEU Fuel100 water-cooled

reactors

2006: DOE proposed a program to subsidize construction of a reprocessingplant and fast-neutron reactors to fission transuranics (mostly plutonium).Would have cost $billions/year but would provided a place to ship spent fuel .

Reprocessing plantwould becomecentralizedinterim storagefor radioactivewastes

$0.3-0.5 billion/yr

$20+ billion+$1+ billion/yr?

$40-150 billionsubsidy?

Cs-137, Sr-90 storage(200-300 years)

Other radioactive waste

[Interim storage DOE style]

Transuranics

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MOX Fuel

DOE now appears to have accepted AREVA’s view that U.S. should separate &recycle plutonium once in “mixed oxide” (MOX) fuel and

store the spent MOX fuel at the reprocessing plant -- as in France.It is cheaper and shifts the radioactive waste problem to a central site.

Spent LEUfuel storage

.

ReprocessingPlant

Spent MOXfuel storage

MOX Fuelfabrication plant

plutonium

Water-cooledreactors

Radioactivewaste

Spent MOXFuel

LEU Fuel

Centralized Interim storage, French styleDoubled estimated disposal costs

(Report to the Prime Minister, 2000)

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Challenge is to reduce stocks -- not separate more!(Global stocks of separated plutonium, metric tons, end 2005, Global Fissile Material Report, 2007)

U.S. excess plutonium will cost >$10 B to dispose

Being recycled To berecycled

Legacies of civilianreprocessing to fuelbreeder reactors

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5 kg Pu. Lethal dose in half hour at 1 meter50 years after discharge.

20-ton container to transport & reprocessingbehind thick walls to recover.

PWR Spent fuel assembly(500 kg and 3.7 m long)

Separated plutonium

2.5 kg Pu in light-weight container. Can beprocessed in a glove box. 3-4 cans enoughfor Nagasaki-type bomb.

(Mayak Reprocessing Plant, 2004)

Separated plutonium can be carried away easily.Spent fuel is self-protecting for more than a century.

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U.S. nonproliferation policy on reprocessing

Since India used its first separated civilian plutonium to make abomb in 1974, U.S. policy has been:“We don’t reprocess. You don’t need to either.”No additional non-weapon states have launched “civilian” reprocessingin the past 30 years and several have stopped.

The new GNEP policy on reprocessing:“The weapon states and Japan will do it for you.”Negative reactions. Result has been to increase interest in reprocessing inSouth Korea at least.

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Merchant Reprocessing has failed in any caseCustomer Countries that have

not renewed their reprocessing

contracts

Nuclear generating

capacity

(billions of Watts )

Countries supplying

the reprocessing

serv ice

Armenia 0 . 4 Russia

Belgium 5 . 8 Franc e

Bulgaria 2 . 7 Russia

Czech Republic 2 . 6 Russia

Finland 2 . 7 Russia

Germany 20 .3 France and UK

Hungary 1 . 7 Russia

Slovak Republic 2 . 5 Russia

Spain 7 . 6 France and UK

Sweden 8 . 9 France and UK

Switzerland 3 . 2 France and UK

Ukraine 13.1 Russia

Total 71 .5

Only the Netherlands has renewed its reprocessing contract (one old, small reactor).Japan has built a domestic reprocessing plant. UK is quitting. AREVA is in trouble.

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Spent fuel will have to be removed from reactor siteseventually. But no reason to panic.

•Only 5% of U.S. spent fuel is not atsites with operating reactors.

•All U.S. nuclear power plant sitescan accommodate spent fuel from60 years of operation.

•Dry cask storage is safe.Consequences of accidents andattacks would be orders ofmagnitude less than from attacks onreactors or storage pools.

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Summary

Reprocessing:

• Exchanges interim, on-site storage of self-protecting spent-fuel for interim stockpiling of plutonium-containingmaterial that is easily carried and from which plutoniumcould easily be separated.

• Cost much higher than on-site storage.

• Provides cover for countries to develop nuclear-weaponoptions.

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Growing Skepticism in Congress June 2007: House Appropriations Committee Report on House FY08

Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill,(Report 110-185, 11 June 2007, pp. 66-68)

• “aggressive program proposed by the Department is at bestpremature.”

• “Embarking on a costly process leading to major newconstruction projects is unwise, particularly where there is nourgency.”

• “before the Department can expect the Committee to supportfunding for a major new initiative, the Department must provide acomplete and credible estimate of the life-cycle costs of theprogram.”

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December 2007: Rush to build a U.S.reprocessing plant stopped by Congress

DOE: Hoped by end of Bush Administration to letconstruction contracts for a reprocessing plant and a fast-neutron reactor.

Congress: “no funds are provided for facility constructionfor technology demonstration or commercialization.”

--Statement accompanying FY2008 Appropriations bill