Managing Food Insecurity in Ethiopia

By

Teshome Erkineh, Ethiopia For

The Side Event at COP1210th November 2006

Nairobi, Kenya

CLIMATE RISK MANAGEMENT IN PRACTICE

Topic of Discussion

I Country profileII Climate change and its effect on

food securityIII Factors for success to avert major

famine in 2002/03 (Practical experience)

IV Current Response Strategies to Manage Food Insecurity

V Gaps and constraints in the use of climate information

VI ConclusionVII Recommendation

Topography: Complex feature with

Altitude ranges from a hight of 4620 mt. Above see level at mount Ras Dashen to as low as 110 mt. Below see level in the Dalol depression

A wide range of agro-ecology zones mainly:

Environment: diversified climate due to the above complex topographical feature with different patterns of rainfall distribution and temperature at different time of the year

Economy: dependant on agriculture and it is Major source of food and income

Food Security Situation

Food security is dependant on rain fed agriculture 45% of the population is food insecure An average of about 15 million are chronically food insecure An average of 6.3 million people are under food emergency between

1990-2004 consequently An annual of about 670,000 mt. Food aid was required at the same

period

I- Country Profile

II_ Climate Change and its Effect on Food Security

Rainfall variability is very high and its pattern is very complex Disaster is mostly due to drought resulting wide spread crop failure Recurrent drought resulted famine and alarming level of malnutrition

a) Major droughts years and their consequence during the last four decades

Year Affected Population Human Loses

1972/73 1.9 million 250,000

1983/84 8 million One million

1999/00 10.6 million No accurate recorded figure but excess mortality have

been reported

2002/03 Over 13 million No Major death

b) Major Factors for the deaths of people and existing opportunities

Year Opportunities Causes Policy Outcome

1973/74 Inadequate informationInadequate preparednessInadequate capacity

National Early Warning System established in 1976

1983/84 Early warning system existsInformation existsKnowledge about the disaster threats exists

Lack of good governanceInadequate preparednessDelayed response by the humanitarian community

Emergency Food Security Reserve established. A reserve that can provide emergency food for about 4 million people for three months

Year Opportunities Causes Policy Outcome

1999/00 EW informationAdequate emergency food reserveConducive policy environment available

Political influence on humanitarian responseReluctance by the Humanitarian community and wait and see policy

No major policy outcome

III_ Factors for Success to Avert Major Famine in 2002/03 Compared to Previous Years

(Practical Experience)

Climate information mainstreamed in disaster management and development

Multi-sectoral emergency response mechanism strengthened

Efficient and effective partnership established with all humanitarian partners

Timely and frequent situation monitoring and information sharing mechanisms established

a) Climate Information Mainstreamed in Disaster Management and Development

The capacity of National Meteorological Agency (NMSA) responsible for climate information improved

The Agency disseminate seasonal, monthly, 10 daily and three days and daily climate information to its users

Various communication medias such as radio, TV, newspapers, weather bulletins and workshop used

Climate information become one major component of the National Early Warning System and NMSA become one active member of the National Early Warning Committee

The system regularly evaluate the impacts of the agency's seasonal forecasts and other climate information on food security and advise the relevant institutions to take the necessary risk reduction activities

The National Early Warning System’s information on the other hand linked to the disaster management structure and become one of the most important tool for disaster management and response

b) Multi-sectoral emergency response mechanism strengthened

National Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Committee

•Top decision making body in any matter of disaster prevention, management and response

•Chaired by the D. P. Minister and Minister of MoARD

•Consists of various ministers as a member

Crisis Management Group

Responsible for day to day operational matters

Chaired by DPPA D/ director

Consists of members from MoARD, MoH, MoWD, DPPA & EWS

Four sectoral Taskforces (Health, Water, Agriculture & Food)

•Responsible for sectoral disaster management and response activity

•Each of them chaired by the respective ministry

•Humanitarian partners are members in their area of interest

c) Efficient and effective partnership established with all humanitarian partners

An Early Warning Working Group, a group that consists of all organization (UN Organization representatives, Donors & NGO’s) jointly closely monitor situations, conduct assessments, identify needs and feed information to the disaster management system.

The crises Management Group meet on a biweekly bases and work close together to avert the crisis

The Technical Taskforces (Health, Water, Agriculture and food) chaired by the respective ministries meets on a weekly base with humanitarian organizations (UN Organization representatives, Donors & NGO’s) and coordinate their efforts and works.

A Technical Information Management Exchange forum which involves all interested humanitarian agencies established and meet on a biweekly bases and discuss on the over all disaster management performance, constraints, bottlenecks and suggests solutions

d) Timely and frequent situation monitoring and information communication established

2002/03 Drought Information communication Timeline

Time Activity and eventsJanuary, 2002 Seasonal forecasts for the second rainy season (February-May) issued

by NMSA & disseminated to users

February, 2002

Both NMSA and the NEWS started monitoring the performance of the season against the forecastFirst signal of below performance observed from the beginningThis was critical time for planting in some parts of the country

March,2002 Improvement observed in the performance of the rainThis was anticipated to improve the agricultural activities

April, 2002 Below to much below normal performance rain reportedHighly drought and food shortage vulnerable parts of the country remained dryThe fist indication of the development of drought crisis reported by the NEWS

May, 2002 NMSA disclosed below to too much below normal rainfall in most parts The NEWS reported sever damage on short maturing crops, delayed planting and sever damage on early development stage of long cycle crops and unsuccessful efforts farmers repetitive planting EWWG carefully assessed the performance of the season since February and decided to launch rapid assessment through out the country to evaluate the impact of the failure of the season on food security

Timeline cont.Time Activity and EventsJune, 2002 Multi-agency food security assessment conducted

The assessment result confirmed the failure of the season and the livelihood of sever food shortage in 2003 NMSA issued its 2nd seasonal forecast for the main rainy season (June-September) and confirmed that EL-NINO event is developing The NDPPC advised to reactivate its regular meeting and take all necessary drought mitigation measures

July, 2002 NMSA and the NEWS continued monitoring the situation and reported poor performanceThe likelihood of disaster in 2003 became clearThe NEWS issued the first special alert and provided warning about the looming crisis in 2003Government and other humanitarian partners took some mitigation measures (provision of short maturing seed to farmers to plant as large area as possible using the main rainy season, advised farmers to use water more effectively etc.)

August,2002 Rainfall performance showed improvement but it was too late to save most of the cropsEWWG Reviewed the situation once again and launched a second round national assessment

Timeline cont

Time Activities and Events

Various international and local humanitarian organizations and individuals including the media visited the affected areasThe assessment mission predicted the magnitude of the problem and estimated the food need in 2003

Sept., 2002 The government prepared contingency plan to avert major crisis in 2003 and disclosed to the international communities The Govt. also launched an intensive awareness creation campaign side by side

Nov,/Dec, 2002

The EWWG conducted the final harvest assessment and confirmed that 2003 will be a major disastrous year The government launched its appeal to the international community to respond timely and adequately to avert major famine in 2003

Jan-April, 2003

Monitoring of food security situation continued by the EWSGovernment and the humanitarian community intensified their interventionReports of sign of malnutrition received and the food shortage problem reached at its pick in April

IV- Current Response Strategies to Manage Food Insecurity Until 2004 response to food insecurity (chronic and acute) was mainly

dominated by emergency food aid Response through emergency food aid helps to save lives but not

livelihood The 2002/03 drought and famine became a major turning point to shift

from emergency food aid to disaster risk management Current strategy to address food insecurity

Poverty reduction strategy:- Agricultural Development Lead Industrialization (ADLI)

Reduce chronic food insecurity through food security strategy which includes productive safety net, introduction of improved agricultural technology, emphasis on water development and harvesting, resettlement etc.

Acute food insecurity through emergency food aid and weather insurance

V_ Major Gaps & Constrains to Effectively Utilize Climate Information

Inadequate coverage of weather stations Poor capacities of existing stations Poor communication facilitates to collect timely

information from weather stations and to disseminate advisory services to end users

Highly centralized analytical capacity Lack of users capacity to process, analyze and

interpret climate information from various sources

Low level of end users involvement in the use of climate information

VI- Conclusion Drought is a natural phenomenon. It was there in the

past, It is still present and it will continue in the future

Drought is not a cause for famine development and human suffering but famine is a failure of human beings to act timely and adequately

Regular flow of climate information and its integration with food security monitoring and early warning is a prerequisite to address climate induced disaster

Early warning information alone cannot be a solution to any drought crises unless it is linked with decision making in disaster management and response.

Usually it is not a failure of EW information that leads to crisis but poor governance, a failure to respond timely and adequate, reluctance to act, the strategy of wait and see

VII_ Recommendations

Improve technical capacities of producers so as to increase the quality and credibility of Met. Information

Improve technical capacities of both producers and users

Expand meteorological stations and increase coverage

Strength the capacities of existing Met. Stations

Enhance communication infrastructures and expand the use of electronic media

Establish direct link with end users particularly the farmers and enhance their capacity to use Met. Information

Involve the media effectively in the dissemination of climate and early warning information

Thank You!!!