managing fighting forces ddr in peace processes

7/28/2019 MANAGING FIGHTING FORCES DDR in Peace Processes

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Kelvin Ong

MANAGING

FIGHTING FORCES

DDR in Peace Processes


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Managing Fighting Forces


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PRENEGOTIATION PHASE

STEP 1: PREPARE TO ENGAGE

DDRisonlyonesecurityinstrument DDRisacombatantfocusedprogram DDRprogramsneedachievableparameters DDRprogramsmeetonlylimitedexpectations DDRprogramshavepotentiallydestabilizingconsequences DDRdenitionsareonlyaguide

STEP 2: ASSESS THE FIGHTING FORCES

Understandthestrategicobjectivesoftheconictparties Identifyandincludekeyarmedgroups Analyzecharacteristicsoftheghtingforces Maptheevolutionoftheghtingforces Assessrelianceonexternalsupport Understandweaponsownershipandotherculturalcues

STEP 3: DETERMINE A MEDIATION APPROACH AND STRATEGY

Adoptanapproachofnothingisagreeduntileverythingisagreed Findcredibleandappropriateinterlocutors Identifymethodsofcontactingtheghtingforces

Facilitatesafepassageandmovementfornegotiators

Considerwomensroles Adoptaproblem-solvingapproach Minimizeasymmetrybetweenparties Upholdinternationallaw Commencepreliminarydiscussions

STEP 4: LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR DDR NEGOTIATIONS

AvoidDDRasapreconditionfortalks LinkDDRtoothertransitionalsecurityarrangements Includekeyarmedgroupsinframeworkagreements

MANAGING FIGHTING FORCES


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NEGOTIATION PHASE

STEP 5: CONDUCT AND MANAGE THE NEGOTIATIONS

NegotiatekeyDDRdetails CommonnegotiatedoutcomesonDDR Anticipateandmanagethenegotiationtechniquesofghtingforces SellDDRcommitmentstothetroops

STEP 6: LINK DDR TO OTHER ASPECTS OF THE PEACE PROCESS

Cease-rearrangements

Politicalarrangements Economicreintegration Securitysectorreform

STEP 7: PUT DDR IN THE PEACE AGREEMENT

Craftaclearvision,approach,anddesiredoutcomefortheDDRprogram

DetailwhoandwhatarecoveredbytheDDRprogram Establishrealistictimelines SetouttheinstitutionalstructuresneededtoplanandimplementDDR

IMPLEMENTATION PHASE

STEP 8: FACILITATE IMPLEMENTATION

Includeimplementersinthenegotiationphase

Developamediationandfacilitationstrategytosupportimplementation AddressimplementationofkeypoliticalprovisionsbeforestartingDDR AnticipateandresolveDDRspecicproblems Buildlocalcapacityformediationandconictresolution

GUIDING PRINCIPLES

Buildtrustbutunderstandthatachievingabsolutetrustmaynotbepossible SensitizeandeducatepartiesonDDRissues Becontextrelevant Beexible Makerealisticassumptions Focusonimplementation Ensureadequateandtimelyresourcesforalldimensionsoftheprogram

QUICK REFERENCE


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United States Institute o PeaceWashington, D.C.

MANAGING

FIGHTING FORCES

DDR in Peace Processes

Kelvin Ong


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Te Peacemakers oolkitSeries Editors: A. Heather Coyne and Nigel Quinney

Te views expressed in this report are those o the authors alone. Tey do not necessarilyreect views o the United States Institute o Peace.

United States Institute o Peace2301 Constitution Avenue, NWWashington, DC 20037

Phone: 202-457-1700Fax: 202-429-6063E-mail: [email protected]: www.usip.org

2012 by the Endowment o the United States Institute o Peace. All rights reserved.

First published 2012.

o request permission to photocopy or reprint materials or course use, contact CopyrightClearance Center at www.copyright.com.

Printed in the United States o America

Te paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements o American NationalStandards or Inormation SciencePermance o Paper or Printed Library Materials,ANSI Z39.48-1984.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Ong, Kelvin.

Managing ghting orces : DDR in peace processes / Kelvin Ong.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical reerences.

ISBN 978-1-60127-133-4 (alk. paper)

1. Mediation, InternationalMethodology. 2. DisarmamentMethodology. 3. Peace-

buildingMethodology. I. itle.

JZ6045.O56 2012

327.17dc23

2011048543


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ContentsManaging Fighting Forces: Quick Reerence................................................ ii

Introduction.......................................................................................................5

Step 1: Prepare to Engage .............................................................................. 11

Step 2: Assess the Fighting Forces ............................................................... 15

Step 3: Determine a Mediation Approach and Strategy ........................... 23

Step 4: Lay the Groundwork or DDR Negotiations.................................. 35

Step 5: Conduct and Manage the Negotiations .......................................... 39

Step 6: Link DDR to Other Aspects o the Peace Process ........................ 47

Step 7: Put DDR in the Peace Agreement .................................................. 55

Step 8: Facilitate Implementation................................................................. 59

Conclusions: General Principles .................................................................. 65

Notes ................................................................................................................ 69

Acknowledgments.......................................................................................... 70

About the Author ........................................................................................... 70


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Introduction

Since the end o the Cold War, mediated settlements o intrastate conicts,codied in peace agreements, have included the disarmament, demobil-ization, and reintegration (DDR) o ghting orces. In these peaceprocesses, mediators have been conronted with intense negotiationsbetween governments and rebel ghting orces to control, disband, ordownsize their respective ghting orces; destroy collected armamentsand munitions; and provide transitional support or demobilized ghters.ransitional security provisions have built condence between ormerbelligerents and prevented the easy resumption o armed conict. Equallyimportant, the DDR o ghting orces has provided a conduciveenvironment or the implementation o vital aspects o a peace accord,such as the holding o elections; the (re)establishment o governmentalauthority and services; the return o displaced populations; thereconstruction o markets and inrastructure; and societal reconciliation.In turn, satisactory resolution o key conict issues, such as politicalpower sharing, constitutional reorm, wealth sharing, and redress orperpetrated crimes, have acilitated the willingness o ormer conict

parties to submit their orces to DDR programs. Tus, DDR programshave become central to the overall success o a peace process.

Yet there appears to be a knowledge decit in terms o how to managethe political dimensions o DDR in a mediation process. For mediators,this shortage has resulted in a compromised ability to manage themisperceptions about and ears o DDR held by armed groups and theirnegotiating representatives. Furthermore, mediators have sometimesailed to ully assess the interests and positions o negotiating parties andaccurately identiy the strategies and tactics conict parties employ toavoid disarming and demobilizing their ghting orces. An overtlyprogrammatic approachas opposed to a political oneby the mediator,coupled with unrealistic planning assumptions, have urther compromised


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the viability o DDR programs. For their part, conict parties plagued by a

lack o knowledge o this complex issue are insecure about negotiatingDDR issues. Fearul o making inadvertent concessions on their militarycapability, negotiating parties either play it sae by reusing to negotiatethe postconict management o their ghting orces or adopt hard-linepositions on DDR. Equally problematic, the lack o understanding oDDR issues has impeded the ability o negotiators to communicate theobjectives o a DDR program to armed groups (ghting orces andarmed groups are used synonymously in this handbook).

Tis handbook provides guidance on the mediation and negotiationaspects o DDR and proposes ways or mediators to establish appropriatelinkages between DDR and other aspects o a peace process. Althoughspecial attention is given to the mediation phase o the peace process,the need or continued acilitation and mediation throughout theimplementation phase is also emphasized. Tis handbook providesinsights on how DDR is understood by armed groups and the strategies(or countermeasures) that they might adopt to delay, avoid, or manipulate

the DDR program or political, economic, or security gains.

Tis handbook is intended or a wide range o mediators who play arole in addressing DDR issues in peace processes. External third-partymediators rom the United Nations, member states, and regional andsubregional organizations who continue to grapple with DDR issuesare the primary audience. Dierent thematic and process experts withmediation teams who are responsible or designing the mediation processand substantive issues such as transitional political arrangements, amnesty

provisions, transitional justice, and reconciliation will also benet romreading this handbook. It is particularly important or team members,working on these dierent issues, to have a common understanding oDDR and the overall mediation strategy toward it. Tis awarenesswill help avoid incoherence within the mediation eort itsel; suchincoherence can jeopardize the overall mediation strategy on DDRand the broader peace process.

Another audience or this handbook is internal mediators (e.g., localleaders or representatives rom religious groups) and mediators romnongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Tese mediators are oen therst to respond to a conict but may mediate with less internationalsupport. For this category o mediators, it is worth pointing out that the


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Introduction

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United Nations has established a Mediation Support Unit (and its Standby

eam o Mediation Experts), which provides advisory support on DDRand other issues negotiated in a peace process.

Te inormation provided in this handbook is pertinent to the plethorao advocacy groups working on issues such as child protection, genderconcerns, and human rights. Advocacy groups, which perorm critical rolesalongside a mediation process, can benet rom a better understandingo the political and security perspectives o parties in a conict. Tisknowledge can help advocacy entities and mediation teams better connect

their respective eorts to attain a more coherent conict managementand resolution strategy. Issues that are particularly amenable to a closeconnection between advocacy groups and mediators are the earlydemobilization o child soldiers, the release o prisoners, the release oabducted and orcibly conscripted ghters, and the prevention o conict-related sexual violence. Although these are important goals in their ownright, agreement on these issues early in a mediation process has thepotential to enhance condence between negotiating parties. Where

appropriate, mediators can and should use their inuence to educatenegotiating parties and support adherence to international law andinternational humanitarian law. When these issues are prematurely and/or poorly managed, the peace process can be set back.

Regardless o its precise orm, a mediation process has three majorphases: the preparation and prenegotiation phase, the negotiation phase,and the implementation phase. Tese phases are neither linear nor strictlysequential in nature, nor do they contain predetermined time rames.

Mediators and conict parties constantly adjust their approaches andstrategies throughout these phases on both the procedural and thesubstantive dimensions o the peace process, making strict adherenceto templates or DDR negotiations unwise and unrealistic.

With these caveats in mind, this handbook lays out eight steps thatmediators can take as they address DDR issues. Te rst our steps broadlycorrespond to the prenegotiation phase, the next three to the negotiationphase, and the last to the implementation phase.

Step 1: Prepare to engage. Mediators should amiliarize themselves (andtheir teams) with a basic knowledge o DDR. Specic attention shouldbe given to understanding the aims o DDR in a peace process, as well as


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its potential and its limits in managing ghting orces and their

weaponry.

Step 2: Assess the ghting orces. Mediators should assess the nature othe conict and conict parties. Tis assessment provides importantinormation about the strategic objective(s) o the negotiating parties, aswell as the nature and composition o their ghting orces; the resultinginormation is vital to the ormulation o an eective mediation strategy.

Step 3: Determine a mediation approach and strategy. Mediators shouldorganize an eective mediation strategy. Mediation and negotiationtechniques that apply to DDR issues, such as timing DDR negotiations,establishing contact with credible interlocutors, and dealing with powerasymmetry between negotiating parties, are covered in this step.

Step 4: Lay the groundwork or DDR negotiations. Mediators shouldincorporate DDR in ramework agreements signed in the prenegotiationphase. Framework agreements should avoid insisting on DDR as aprecondition or substantive negotiations but should include all relevant

armed actors and establish appropriate linkages to other aspects osecurity arrangements.

Step 5: Conduct and manage the negotiations. Mediators should coverDDR issues throughout negotiations to manage and guide conictparties through the mediation process and help parties overcome anyreluctance to address DDR issues.

Step 6: Link DDR to other aspects o the peace process. Mediators shouldestablish linkages between DDR and related aspects o the peaceprocess, understanding that DDR cannot be addressed in isolation.Mediators must careully consider how negotiations on DDR issuesrelate to, and impact upon, negotiations on cease-re arrangements,security sector reorm, political arrangements, reconciliation, andreintegration issues.

Step 7: Put DDR in the peace agreement. Mediators should clearlyarticulate the agreed-upon vision, approach, and desired outcome or

the DDR program in the peace agreement.

Step 8: Facilitate implementation. Mediators should develop mediationand acilitation strategies to support the implementation o the DDRprogram.


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Introduction

99

The Peacemakers ToolkitThis handbook is part o the series The Peacemakers Toolkit, which is being

published by the United States Institute o Peace. The rst in the series,

Managing a Mediation Process by Amy L. Smith and David R. Smock, oers, as

its title indicates, an overview o the mediation process, and may be read in

conjunction with Managing Public Information in a Mediation Process.

For almost thirty years, the United States Institute o Peace has supported

the work o mediators through research, training programs, workshops,

and publications designed to discover and disseminate the keys to eective

mediation. The Institutemandated by the U.S. Congress to help prevent,

manage, and resolve international confict through nonviolent means

conceived The Peacemakers Toolkitas a way o combining its accumulated

expertise with that o other organizations active in the eld o mediation. Most

publications in the series are produced jointly by the Institute and a partner

organization. All publications are careully reviewed beore publication by

highly experienced mediators to ensure that the nal product will be a useul

and reliable resource or practitioners.

The Online Version

All the handbooks in The Peacemakers Toolkitare available online and canbe downloaded at www.usip.org. In the case o some handbooks, the online

version presents not only the text o the handbook but also connects readersto a vast web o inormation. Links in the online version give readers immedi-ate access to a considerable variety o publications, news reports, directo-ries, and other sources o data regarding ongoing mediation initiatives, casestudies, theoretical rameworks, and education and training. These links enablethe online Toolkit to serve as a you are here map to the larger literature onmediation.


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STEP 1

Prepare to Engage

Mediators should be amiliar with the concept and objectives o DDR.Te key contribution o a DDR program is its ability to open political andsecurity space or other (unarmed) actors to participate in the postconictpolitical process. By doing so, a DDR program establishes an environment inwhich ormer conict parties can make progress on more difcult politicalronts, in particular power sharing and constitutional reorm. Although aDDR program can make critical contributions to security and stability in

postconict situations, it ocuses on achieving limited objectives and isimperect in its implementation. Nevertheless, there is tremendous exibilityin DDRs terminology and application and, i it is managed properly, a DDRprogram can improve the prospects or a lasting peace. In this regard, sixdimensions o DDR are particularly important or mediators to understand.

DDR Is Only One Security Instrument

DDR is only one security instrument or conict parties to use to manage

their ghting orces. Others include cease-re arrangements, the earlydemobilization o child soldiers, priority release o abducted and orciblyrecruited combatants, co-option o armed opposition groups, disbandmento ghting orces (sometimes without support packages), integration intoexisting security orces, and broader security sector reorm (SSR).Depending on the conict, some or all o these activities may be necessary,and many are undertaken within the political and security rameworkestablished at peace talks by the negotiating parties. Other related programs

that address the collection o weapons at the community level and societalreconciliation may be established outside the ramework o the peaceagreement. Te selection o activities should be inormed by the objectiveso the mediator and the conict parties. For example, although cease-re


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arrangements may be a temporary measure to halt the ghting between

armed groups, they are unlikely to ully demilitarize any given situationmore comprehensive and longer-term measures are required.

DDR Is a Combatant-Focused Program

DDR is largely a combatant-ocused program, which is inextricably linkedto issues o power and politics. DDR eorts have our major goals: (1) toimprove the overall security situation (through the control and removal oweaponry) in a country; (2) to dismantle unit structures and loyalties o

nonstatutory orces to prevent rapid regrouping; (3) to provide alternativelivelihood opportunities through limited economic and social support;and (4) to contribute to the process o societal reconciliation. I a DDRprogram is attempted, mediators should strive or these goals whilepreserving exibly on the terminology, precise sequencing, and natureo each o the programs constituent elements.

DDR Programs Need Achievable Parameters

Troughout the last two decades, the ocus o DDR has been expandedgradually to include a wide array o unachievable objectives. In some cases,there has been a tendency to overemphasize the poverty reduction and socialcohesion dimensions o a DDR program. In reality, economic reintegrationprograms that were designed to retrain and revitalize ormer ghters intoproductive members o society oen ell short o goals in terms o ideas,unding, and options. Social reintegration programs designed to achieveorgiveness, reconciliation, and societal harmony were also easier to espouse

at the peace table than to implement. In some circumstances, mediatorshoped that DDR programs would guarantee community security by helpingghting orces put aside their weapons. Proponents o these schools othought placed their aith in the ull-edged and rapid transormation oormer belligerents into brethren as soon as a peace deal was struck. Many othese goals, while noble, have not been attained. Mediators are well-advisedto set truly achievable and realistic objectives or a DDR program.

DDR Programs Can Meet Only Limited ExpectationsDDR programs are imperect. Disarmament programs rarely, i ever,collect allor even the most serviceableweapons in circulation.


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Step 1: Prepare to Engage

Wartime identities and loyalties are almost never totally dissolved but

rather are transormed into political and economic ties. Hard-core ghterstend to stay out o the early stages o DDR programs, while non-combatants are accepted into a DDR program at a high political, security,and economic cost. Moreover, a highly visible and resource-intensiveDDR program has the potential to create tensions within communities,which oen question the rationale o rewarding ghters or the mayhemthey created during conict times. Mediators should set out with limitedexpectations or a DDR program.

DDR Programs Have Potentially DestabilizingConsequences

DDR programs have some limitations that could have destabilizingconsequences or a peace process. During negotiations, unrealisticpromises and expectations may distract rom the real issues o negotiatingDDR while sowing seeds or uture conict. When DDR implementershave been unable to ulll program promises made in poorly craed DDR

provisions o peace agreements, riots and clashes among armed groupshave ensued. Mediators must take special care to avoid unrealistictimelines or DDR implementation.

DDR Denitions Are Only a Guide

In 2006, the United Nations released a comprehensive approach to DDRprograms called the Integrated DDR Standards. Tese standards, whichocus on the implementation dimensions o DDR, contain a set o

denitions that can be used as a reerence point (see the eature box DDRDenitions).

1In a mediation context, however, exibility is required in the

application o the actual term DDR and its precise denition. Dogmaticadherence to denitions or strict sequencing o DDR is unlikely to beacceptable to negotiating parties or helpul in advancing the peace process.


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Bearing in mind the above six considerations, mediators should avoidconcluding prematurely that a DDR program is (or is not) the mostappropriate means o managing ghting orces.

Approaches to this program, its terminology, and its componentstrategies should be context specic and based on a solid understanding omediators, negotiating parties, their ghting orces, and the broaderinternational and local community. Te multiaceted aspects o a DDRprogram may require the mediator to discuss DDR issues broadly and

with nontraditional political or security actors, including members o thecommunity to which ghters will reintegrate into. Te private sector,where it exists, may play a useul support role by providing incentives oradherence to a DDR program.

DDR Defnitions

Disarmamentis the collection, documentation, control, and disposal o smallarms, ammunition, explosives, and light and heavy weapons o combatants andoten also o the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the developmento responsible arms management programs.

Demobilization is the ormal and controlled discharge o active combatantsrom armed orces or other armed groups. The frst stage o demobilization mayextend rom the processing o individual combatants in temporary centers tothe massing o troops in camps designated or this purpose (cantonment sites,encampments, assembly areas, or barracks). The second stage o demobilizationencompasses the support package provided to the demobilized, which is calledreinsertion.

Reinsertion is the assistance oered to ex-combatants during demobilizationbut prior to the longer-term process o reintegration. Reinsertion is a orm otransitional assistance to help cover the basic needs o ex-combatants and theiramilies and can include transitional saety allowances, ood, clothes, shelter,medical services, short-term education, training, employment, and tools. Whilereintegration is a long-term, continuous social and economic process o develop-ment, reinsertion is a short-term material and/or fnancial assistance to meet

immediate needs and can last up to one year.Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status andgain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a socialand economic process with an open time rame, primarily taking place in commu-nities at the local level. It is part o the general development o a country and anational responsibility, and oten necessitates long-term external assistance.


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STEP 2

Assess the Fighting Forces

Once a mediator is ully amiliarized with DDR concepts and issues, heor she needs to develop a solid understanding o the ghting orces.Mediators should careully engage the negotiating parties on theappropriateness o DDR and/or other security issues to analyze thereactions o the negotiating parties and their ghting orces. By doingso, mediators will be in a better position to assess the best time andmannerin which DDR issues should or could be raised in the peace

process. Tis section outlines the key issues that need to be assessed, thepossible ways o engaging armed groups, and the strategies or exposingghting groups to the issue o DDR.

Understand the Strategic Objectives o theConfict Parties

Mediators should, at the outset, identiy the strategic objectives o theconict parties. Central to this inquiry is the study o the character o the

ghting orces themselves. What are the parties trying to achieve throughthe use o orce? Have these objectives been achieved? Why have theydecided to engage in negotiations now? Do they have a political platormor are they predatory in nature (i.e., are they exploiting the conict toprot illicitly rom the countrys resources)? Do they need assistance toarticulate the rationale or their armed struggle? Te objectives o thearmed groups will aect the manner in which the mediator will engagethem on DDR issues.

Te liberation movements in El Salvador, Namibia, Nepal, NorthernIreland, Mozambique, South Arica, South Sudan, and Zimbabwe all hadclear political objectives and were well organized. Tese characteristicsallowed mediators and their negotiating counterparts to engage the


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movements in substantive discussions regarding the political uture that

they sought or their countries. Conversely, in the east o the DemocraticRepublic o the Congo and in Darur, the wide array o armed groups,most o which have no clear political objectives, has conoundedcontemporary mediation eorts. o make matters worse, these armed

groups have the tendency to splinter into rival entities, oen based onpersonalities rather than on clear political objectives.

Even relatively well-organized armed movements are oen notmonolithic. Tereore, mediators should be sensitive to the power balance

within armed groups, specically between the political and the militarywings. Mediators should understand that some o the most difcultnegotiations will be within parties themselves.

Some armed groups may have connections to terrorist groups, whichcomplicates how mediators engage with these groups to assess their truepolitical objectives or participating in a peace process. (Some o thesegroups may be on terrorist lists, prohibiting some mediatorsrom thelisting country or organizationrom making contact with the groups.)Mediators should clariy i connections to terrorist groups are purely orlogistical and nancial support or i armed groups actually espouse theradical objectives o terrorist groups. Are there moderate elementswithin these armed groups that may be engaged, or is the entire groupcommitted to a terrorist agenda? Answers to such questions areimportant so that the mediator can ascertain i mediation andnegotiations are indeed appropriate means o engaging these groupsand addressing the conict.

Such dicult questions are at the heart o international mediation andnegotiation strategies involving the aliban in Aghanistan, the al-Shababand Hizbul Islam in Somalia, and the Abu Saya in the Philippines. Ineach case, mediators have been challenged in the task o ascertaining imoderate elements within these groups are viable partners in the search

or peace. Moreover, the covert nature o these groups has made it dicultor mediators and negotiators to be sure that they are in contact with

genuine elements o the ghting orces.Some armed groups have been established primarily or criminal

purposes. DDR programs are not the most eective means o dealing withthe security challenges these groups pose.


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Step 2: Assess the Fighting Forces

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In 2004, the United Nations Mission in Haiti (MINUSAH) established

a DDR program in an attempt to deal with street gangs, ormer soldiers othe Haitian National army, paramilitary groups, and private securityentities. In absence o a peace process, credible deterrent, or other critical

prerequisites, DDR implementers ound themselves negotiating withindividual armed gangs in an eort to persuade them to join the DDR

program. Te DDR program ailed to achieve its objective o reducingviolence in the streets o Port-au-Prince. In 2007, a new violence reduction

program, coupled with tougher police action (on the part o MINUSAH

and the Haitian National Police), made better progress in dealing with thecriminal gangs in Port-au-Prince.

Identiy and Include Key Armed Groups

A mediator must identiy and include in the peace process the key armedgroups needed to implement the peace agreement. Te absence o vitalgroups and their armed elements rom the peace process could result inthem becoming spoilers in that process.

In Aghanistan, while progress was made in dealing with the Aghanmilitary orces as part o the Aghanistan New Beginning (DDR) program,the most destabilizing illegal armed groups controlled by warlords anddrug lords, as well as aliban ghters, were not included in this process,which was established in the Bonn Agreement in 2001. Tese illegalarmed groups, estimated at 850 groups with more than 65,000 members,continued to be a destabilizing actor in the search or peace and securityin Aghanistan.

In contrast, the 2003 Accra Peace Agreement provides a positiveexample o including all major ghting orces involved in a confict. ocomprehensively end the Liberian civil war, ghters rom the governmento Liberia, Liberians United or Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD),and the Movement or Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) all agreed tosubmit their orces to the DDR program.

Analyze Characteristics o the Fighting ForcesA solid understanding o the characteristics o the ghting orces will helpthe mediator consider the appropriate approach to and ocus o DDRnegotiations, the type o DDR program that may be called or, and


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equally importantwho will be eligible or inclusion in the DDR

program. Some key characteristics o ghting orces include the type oghting orce in the conict (are they regular statutory orces, irregularorces, or guerilla orces?), their numbers,

2how they are organized, their

command and communication structure, where they are deployed, andthe requency o their engagement in combat.

As part o this analysis, mediators should assess the extent to whichghting groups rely on child soldiers, adult ghters, abductees, oreignghters, mercenaries, and the various roles women play in the ghting

orces. Tis inormation can be used by mediators to design their strategy(e.g., by identiying and engaging countries supplying oreign ghters),develop condence-building measures (e.g., through the release oabductees or a halt in orcible recruitment o child soldiers), and adopt agender perspective so that the DDR negotiations respond to the roles(ghting or support) that women play in the conict and support theparticular needs o emale ex-combatants, and support paralleldemobilization processes (e.g., release o child soldiers).

In strategizing about DDR in (North-South) Sudan, the mediatorconceived o three basic groups or planning purposes: the regular armed

orces, including the police and other security orces; paramilitary andsel-deense groups, including all groups under central or communitycommand; and other armed groups, including unstructured or illegal

groups. In addition, it was important to note that many o the ghters,especially in the South, joined the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/

Army (SPLM/A) on a seasonal basis and were in act based within their

communities. Cognizant o the numerous armed groups in the countryand their close connection to either the National Congress Party (NCP) orthe SPLM/A, the mediator was able to base negotiations between the twoSudanese parties on the act that the two negotiating parties representedall armed groups under their control.

In the Sudan peace agreement, the parties who were quietly aware thatthere would be no major DDR o the main North and South ghting

orces, beore the reerendum on the uture o South Sudan, prioritizeddemobilization o children, women, aged people, and veterans ascondence-building measures. Moreover, because o the overwhelmingnumbers involved in the DDR program in Sudan, responsibility or theDDR program was spilt by creating a North Sudan DDR commission and


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a South Sudan DDR commission. Finally, the seasonal and community-

based character o ghting orces in the south led the mediator and theparties to avoid a cantonment-based approach in South Sudan. Tecareully calibrated DDR agreement in the Sudan Comprehensive Peace

Agreement is an example o precise management on the part o themediator and his team. Te eort resulted in an agreement on DDR issuesthat was in sync with the political realities o the situation between Northand South Sudan.

Map the Evolution o the Fighting ForcesMediators should be aware that conict parties and their ghting orcesoen evolve over the course o a conict. Alterations may include theestablishment o new ormal or inormal security elements, changes insize and composition o ghting orces, changes in military strategies andtactics, and changes in support that orces command internally andexternally. Tese considerations will aect the appropriateness o a DDRprogram and the need or other connected programs such as SSR.

During the decade-old confict in Nepal with the Maoists, there was adramatic growth in the ranks o the Nepal army rom 46,000 to 96,000,which necessitated a considerable demobilization o state security orces

ollowing the signing o the peace agreement, especially because theexpanded military could not be sustained by the limited national budget.

Moreover, the Nepal armys close association with the monarchy and thegovernment led to a call or the Nepal army to be democratized as part othe peace process, in addition to the reduction to its numbers.

Postconict reductions in the size o state security orces and calls orproessionalization o state security orces will ultimately have consequenceson other peace implementation activities, such as reorm o the managemento the state budget as well as legislative and constitutional reorms thataddress democratic oversight and governance o state security orces.

Assess Reliance on External Support

Te extent o external support or ghting orces is another keyconsideration or mediators because it directly aects access to andcommunication with these orces and their willingness to engage in apeace process and discuss disarmament issues.


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Te case o engaging the Rwandese Interahamwe in the eastern Congo

is an example. In 1994, the members o the Interahamwe who carried outthe Rwandan genocide took reuge within the Forces Dmocratiques deLibration du Rwanda (FDLR) in the eastern Congo. Access to the FDLRand the Interahamwe was dicult to achieve and largely regulated byCongolese community-based militia groups (called Mayi-Mayi). Tissituation complicated the eorts o the UN Mission in the Congo(MONUC), which was responsible or negotiating the return o these

oreign Rwandan ghters to Kigali. Te limited access made it extremely

dicult or MONUC to communicate with the ghters (estimated tonumber between six and een thousand) and inorm them o theiroptions under the Rwandan DDR program as well as the details o the

justice and reconciliation program.

External support or ghting orces may include sae havens or restand recuperation rom ront-line ghting and lethal (arms) and nonlethalmilitary (communications, transportation and uel, unding) support.Armed groups beneting rom such support have demonstrated a

reluctance to engage in negotiations; i they are in negotiations, they areless willing to make concessions.

In the Darur confict, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM),which received critical support rom Chad and a rear operating base inChadian territory, was able to rerain rom engaging the Sudan

government in direct negotiations rom 2007 to 2010. Te 2010 Chad-Sudan rapprochement, which drastically reduced JEMs militarycapability and operating space, changed the equation. As a result, JEM

rejoined the Darur peace process in Doha, co-led by the United Nationsand the Arican Union.

Te assessment o the external support environment or ghting orcesshould be used to inorm the mediators strategy. Wherever possible,mediators should enlist international, regional, and local support or thepeace process, or at the very least mitigate the spoiling eects o externalsupport or ghting orces on the peace process. External actors may be

able to exercise considerable leverage through the use o carrots and sticksthat are unavailable to a mediator.

Realizing that the Unio Nacional para a Independncia otal deAngola (UNIA) rebels were using diamond prots to nance their


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weapons purchases, the UN Security Council imposed an embargo on

uncertied diamond exports rom Angola. In addition, a travel embargowas imposed on members o UNIA so that they were unable to gainsupport abroad. Te Security Council lied the sanctions when it saw thatUNIA was becoming engaged with the peace process.

Understand Weapons Ownership andOther Cultural Cues

Beore attempting to engage armed groups in discussions about DDRissues, mediators should understand the specics o the conict and therole that weapons play in the countrys history and society. For example,in some societies, weapons ownership is symbolic and associated withadulthood.Fighters rom societies like these are likely to resist eorts atdisarmament.

Te presence o a warrior culture in Aghanistan has been used toexplain the wide prevalence o weapons in that society. Tis recognition

led DDR planners to design a reintegration program that encouragesinsurgents to return to their communities without the need to ormallydisarm. Te reintegration program oers incentives to individualinsurgents and their communities to side with the government. Somearmed groups may have precise prohibitions about giving up theirweapons. In Northern Ireland, the constitution o the Irish Republican

Army (IRA) specically lists the use o violence as a means o urtheringthe IRAs struggle; this clause has been interpreted as prohibiting the

group rom accepting disarmament proposals.

In some societies, weapons are not held by individuals but arecommunally owned or the protection o tribes or clans. Communallyowned weapons are even more important in societies where the stateprovides little security, a situation that is particularly relevant or nomadicand pastoralist communities in Sudan. In such situations, it may beunrealistic or mediators to seek complete disarmament o communallyheld weapons. Mediators need to careully consider the use o weapons as

the only criteria or entry into a DDR program.In other cases, weapons are not individually held or owned jointly at

the community level, but are centralized under the control o individualcommanders.


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In Aghanistan, weapons that had been delivered to the mujahideen

during the jihad years were considered the property o commanders,rather than o individual ghters, and these commanders oen had moreweapons than they did ghters. Tis arrangement poses several threats orthe disarmament process. Some commanders have expressed concernsabout a redistribution o weapons aer the ocial disarmament processor about the power they will retain once their units are ocially disarmed.

Language also aects the conict parties perception o a DDR eort.Language in the dra Bonn Agreement threatened to derail negotiations;

some participants took oense at the word disarmament. Mediatorsshould understand the literal translation o the word disarmament indierent languages. Te Arabic translation o disarmament connotesorcible removal o weapons, a very dierent conception than thatembraced by a voluntary DDR program.

In the Bonn Agreement example, eventually the word disarmamentwas removed and more acceptable (and general) language was inserted.Te nal reerence to disarmament in the Bonn Agreement reads: Uponthe ocial transer o power, all mujahideen, Aghan armed orces, andarmed groups in the country shall come under the command and controlo the Interim Authority, and be reorganized according to therequirements o the new Aghan security and armed orces.


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STEP 3

Determine a Mediation Approach

and StrategyA well-thought-out mediation strategy is essential i the procedural andsubstantive dimensions o a peace process are to be adequately addressed.Although DDR should not be raised as a precondition or peace talks,mediators should careully consider when, how, and with whom to discussthe uture management o ghting orces and their weapons. In addition to

poor timing, mediators oen make the mistake o imposing preconceivedDDR approaches and programs onto negotiating parties and their ghtingorces. Poorly prepared presentations about DDR are counterproductive andmay engender knee-jerk rejections rom negotiating parties and their armedgroups. Mediators should engage representatives within the conict partieswho are authorized to speak and to make commitments on behal o theghting groups. A well-thought-out approach and strategy or engaging theright interlocutors will go a long way toward minimizing distrust in thepeace process as well as acilitate implementation o promises made.

A considerable amount o work on DDR is inormal and done wellbeore negotiations ofcially begin. Tis section provides some guidelineson how the issue o DDR might be raised with conict parties and the typeo substantive issues that mediators can discuss with ghting orces.

Adopt an Approach o Nothing Is Agreed untilEverything Is Agreed

In many cases, DDR issues are not detailed in prior ramework agreementsand are not accepted as preconditions or the peace process by negotiatingparties. Tis omission underscores the sensitivity and importance o theissue or negotiating parties. Fighting orces, and their ability to intensiy or


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resume their military campaigns, represent considerable leverage or parties

at peace talks. Nevertheless, parties should be encouraged to deal with theissue o the uture management o their orces in the event that a ull-edgedpolitical settlement is reached. One way to approach such a discussion is orconict parties to agree that although they may discuss this issue, nothing isnalized until all aspects o the peace process are completed.

Under the guidance o Lieutenant-General Lazarus K. Sumbeiyo, themediator or the North-South Sudan peace process, the government oSudan and the SPLM/A addressed security issues up ront. Tis discussion

included the uture o both armies as well as questions o downsizing andDDR. Te 2003 security protocol was one o the rst substantiveagreements ollowing the ramework agreement o 2002. While broadlyagreeing to key security elements, the parties committed themselves toimmediately resuming negotiations on the remaining outstanding issuesand subsequently negotiating a comprehensive cease-re agreement. All

previously negotiated and signed protocols were to be valid only whenthere was agreement on all issues and a nal, comprehensive peace

agreement in Sudan was signed.

In other words, although both parties mapped out their thinking on keysecurity issues, nothing in the security agreement would be implemented untilall other outstanding issues were resolved and the nal cease-re negotiated.Te nal comprehensive agreement was signed on January 9, 2005.

Find Credible and Appropriate Interlocutors

In dealing with DDR issues, mediators should take great care that they areliaising with entities that have the authority to commit the military orcesto concessions made at the peace table. Some o the most difcultdiscussions on this issue may be between the political and the militarywings o the same movements. Understandably, military entities are oenextremely reluctant to discuss their disarmament and demobilization.

In the case o Northern Ireland, though Sinn Fin was the politicalrepresentation at the peace talks, it had no authority to discuss or commit

the IRA to any disarmament process. Te IRA insisted that any discussionon ghters and weapons had to be directly with the IRA.

Given the hard-line position that military entities tend to adopt, somemediators advise that extra eort should be made to strengthen the voice o


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the political wings o rebel movements and civilian members o govern-

ments within conict parties. However, mediators should ensure thatcommitments made by these political and civilian interlocutors during thepeace processes will be honored in the implementation.

In Nepal, in the lead-up to the 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement,negotiations were largely among political parties. Although the NepaliCongress was thought to have represented the interests o the Nepal armyand committed the Nepal army to an integration and rehabilitation

process with the Maoist army, this commitment was not ollowed through

in the implementation phase o the agreement.

Identiy Methods o Contacting the Fighting Forces

A key part o the mediation strategy is to gure out how to contactcredible interlocutors to commence discussion on the issue o ghtingorces and their weapons. Initial contacts are best made through discretemethods. Below-the-radar contacts allow mediators to engage the realdecision makers in political or armed movements. Tese approaches arerelatively low risk or mediators as well as or the leaders o armed groups(earing or their personal saety) and are good ways o testing thewillingness o ghting orces to engage in peace talks and to establish keyareas o concern.

In Northern Ireland, back-channel communications were used toinitiate discussions between British intelligence services and members othe IRA. Tese inormal communications continued even during periods

when the IRA abandoned its unilateral cease-res.Mediators have employed a variety o strategies or establishing contact

with those who wield the power to negotiate on hard-core security issues,including using go-betweens to establish a rapport with armed groups.

Tis tactic was done in the Sierra Leone peace process, where youngstaers were used by the mediator to establish contact with the Revolu-tionary United Front (RUF). Members o the RUF could identiy with

these intermediaries; this strategy acilitated a trusted channel ocommunication between the mediator and the RUF ghters.

Te use o amily networks to establish contact with ghters is atechnique employed extensively in the Nicaragua confict, where amily

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26

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members were used to persuade ghters to give up their weapons and

engage in dialogue. Yet another conduit or mediators is the diaspora,exemplied by the Aceh peace process: exiled leaders in Sweden were thecontact points or civil society actors and the Centre or HumanitarianDialogue in the mediation eventually undertaken by President Ahtisaari.

Where there are eld presences (be they o the United Nations, regionalorganizations, or member states), military or civilian eld-level assets canbe sources or establishing local contacts with relevant commanders o aghting orce. Tese contacts may also be a valuable inormation-gathering

source and two-way communication conduit or a mediator.

In the Democratic Republic o Congo, MONUC military observers andcivilian sta were used to liaise with Mai-Mai intermediaries to establishcontact with FDLR ghters to acilitate the repatriation o oreign ghtersas part o the DDR program.

Facilitate Sae Passage and Movement or Negotiators

Te mediation strategy should encompass the movement o rebel orcesto and rom a negotiation venue. I rebel commanders are limited tonegotiations only at the venue o the talks, their connection to their orceswill be reduced and their capacity to negotiate meaningully on behal otheir ghters will be weakened. Moreover, conict groups oen change thecomposition o their negotiating teams as the process evolves, reservinghard-core and more senior members o their delegations or later, moreserious stages o negotiations. Military commanders may be sent to

discuss security aspects while political actors may attend discussions onpower sharing. In addition, negotiators need to keep their constituenciesaware o progress in the negotiations so that supporters are prepared toaccept the eventual compromises that will be required. For all thesereasons, negotiators must be able to move back and orth between thepeace talks venue and the eld.

In the Aceh peace process (19992003), the Free Aceh Movement(Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) eld commanders were able to eed

inormation on and insights into the process through commander-to-commander meetings between GAM and the Indonesian military. Tesemeetings gave the parties opportunities to identiy and implement ways toreduce violence, establish zones o peace, and eventually implement the


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Cessation o Hostilities Agreement; the meetings also acilitated

negotiations on the disarmament components o the peace agreement.

In the 2003 Accra peace talks or the Liberia confict, the political andmilitary leadership o LURD and MODEL ailed to eectively keep intouch with their rank and le in the eld during and aer the peace talks.

As a result, their ghters were not well-inormed o the DDR program anddid not understand the actions that they were expected to take aer thesigning o the Accra peace agreement.

Tird-party (the mediator or another party) support is extremelyhelpul in acilitating such travel. Te assistance may include issuing traveldocuments, chartering aircra or other orms o transport, andguaranteeing sae passage and transit points. In many cases, restrictionson the movement o rebel commanders are lied on the condition thatthese commanders do not take advantage o their enhanced mobility toengage in hostile propaganda, und raise with diasporas abroad, or opennew supply lines or their ghting orces.

Consider Womens Roles

A gender-responsive approach should be built into all aspects o amediation strategy, including deliberations on DDR issues. Mediatorsshould ensure that the design o the mediation process acilitates theproper representation o womens needs, including through the directparticipation o emale representatives at the negotiations.

Negotiations on DDR issues should attend to the ollowing categories:

Female combatants: Women and girls who participated in armedconicts as active combatants using arms.

Females associated with armed orces and groups: Women and girlswho participated in armed conicts in supportive roles, whether byorce or voluntarily. Rather than being members o a civiliancommunity, members o this group are economically and sociallydependent on the armed orce or group or their income and social

support (e.g., the emales serve as porters, cooks, nurses, spies,administrators, translators, radio operators, medical assistants, publicinormation ofcers, camp leaders, sex workers/slaves).


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Female dependents: Women and girls who are a part o ex-combatantshouseholds. Members o this group are mainly socially and nanciallydependent on ex-combatants, although they may also have othercommunity ties (e.g., wives, children, mothers, emale siblings, andemale members o the extended amily).

Careul consideration o these roles during the conict can contributepositively to eective implementation o the DDR program.A majorweakness o the ailed DDR attempt in Liberia in the mid-1990s was its ocuson gun-carrying combatants, which excluded many women (and children)

rom the process. DDR eligibility tests based on similar one man, one guntests or prociency in handling weapons may exclude many women andchildren rom entry into DDR programs. Te lack o adequate considerationo the needs and roles o women was a key cause o the limited eligibilitycriteria. Te second DDR process in Liberia (2003) was better atincorporating womens perspectives and needs. Mediators attempted toinvolve women in collecting relevant DDR inormation and paid greaterattention to women-specic inormation or program planning purposes.

Capacity building should be provided to emale representatives (ineeded) at peace talks to ensure that they can ully participate in DDRnegotiations. In cases where the participation o women is not possible,mediators should hold consultations with womens groups during thedierent phases o the peace process to ensure that the views o these groupsare represented at negotiation orums. o acilitate womens participation,the mediation teams should carry out a risk assessment to evaluate thethreat posed to women who assume a public role in the peace process and

the need to provide additional security to ensure their sae participation.

Mediators should be guided by the ollowing resolutions rom theUnited Nations Security Council when addressing the gender dimensiono the DDR issue:

S/RES/1325 (2000), which addresses the impact o war on women, theircontribution to conict resolution and sustainable peace, and thegender-related responsibilities o the international community in

dierent political and programmatic areas.

S/RES/1889 (2009). which emphasizes the need to increase womensparticipation and inclusion in peacebuilding and improve theparticipation o women in political and economic decision making.


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S/RES/1820 (2008) and S/RES/1888 (2009), which recognize the seriousthreat that conict-related sexual violence poses to international peaceand security, as well as S/RES 1960 (2010), which provides theaccountability architecture needed to list and de-list perpetrators, as wellas to report on patterns and trends in conict-related sexual violence.

Adopt a Problem-Solving Approach

Mediators should have a clear strategy or introducing the parties to theconcepts, approaches, and comparative experiences o how ghting orces

are managed in a peace process. Mediators sometimes incorrectly assumethat negotiating parties are well versed about the objectives, approaches,and terminologies o DDR and related security arrangements programs.Instead, mediators should assume that misperceptions and ears aboundabout the intent o the mediator and others who seek to take rom theparties a major source o negotiating leverage (i.e., their weapons). Tisear is especially the case where there is a legacy o ailed peace processesand DDR programs. Rather than ocusing on the need or a DDR

program, the mediator should adopt a problem-solving approach with theconict parties. Such a calibrated approach will also help the mediatorassess i a DDR program is indeed appropriate to the context at hand, andi so, how it should be designed and implemented.

In the Abuja and the Doha rounds o the peace talks on Darur, themediator embedded security arrangements experts with the Darurimovements negotiating teams. Tis approach provided members o themovement with a good understanding o the DDR issues so that they could

negotiate with condence rather than reject an issue because o a lack ounderstanding. Tese experts also provided in-depth capacity-buildingtraining and comparative models or representatives o the negotiationteams. Te close interaction between the mediation and the negotiating

parties had the salutary eect o building greater trust in the mediationprocess. Te eorts were welcomed by the delegation rom the governmento Sudan.

Negotiating parties should be asked to reect on some commondilemmas conronting political and military elites once a conict hasended. Tese include (a) how to disband and downsize a ghtingorce in a dignied manner that preserves respect or its wartimecontribution; (b) how the elites will provide some orm o personal


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and economic security once ormer ghters are discharged rom their

security roles (jobs) or i their primary means o ending or themselves(i.e., through the use o their weapon) are to be removed; (c) the specicexpectations midlevel commanders and the rank and le hold withregard to their postconict lie; (d) how the elites will manage the realitythat they have done well or themselves by achieving political ofce orsenior military position in the power-sharing deals struck at the peacetalks while the peace dividend or lower-level military commanders andtheir rank and le appears less attractive; (e) how ormer ghters will be

accepted back into their societies, especially i widespread violations ohuman rights and atrocities have been committed; () who will be heldaccountable or these crimes and violations and what the consequenceswill be; and (g) the uture unction, orm, and size o the countryssecurity orces.

Tis gradual problem-solving approach is especially useul whenmultiple related security issues must be synchronized in the peace process,such as reorm/transormation o the security architecture; reorm o the

security service; integration o dierent ghting orces into a separate ornew army, police, or other security orces; and vetting processes.

Minimize Asymmetry between Parties

Mediators should be aware that negotiations on DDR issues can have adirect impact on the condition o a mutually hurting stalemate; that is, theso-called ripeness or mediation that brought conict parties to the tablein the rst place. It is necessary to develop a mediation strategy and to

reach agreements on security issues in a way that does not adversely aectthe mutually hurting stalemate. I one party is relatively weak compared tothe other, the stronger party may assume that it can dictate agreementterms. In such cases, mediators should seek to reassert the benets omediation and to use other means to create power symmetry.

In the Guatemalan peace process, the United National RevolutionaryGroup (UNRG) was militarily weaker than the government. Seeing this

imbalance as a threat, mediator Jean Arnault used the voice o civil societyto bolster UNRGs power at the negotiation table.

O course, any orm o mediation support must be provided in amanner that has the consent o all negotiating parties. Te mediation


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eorts should not be interpreted as avoring one negotiating party at the

expense o another.

Uphold International Law

Mediators must careully structure their approach on issues governedby international law (see eature box International Legal Instruments),which may have been violated by the ghting orces. Te United Nationshas established clear principles or its mediators on the types o warcrimes or which there may be no amnesty: genocide, war crimes, and

crimes against humanity or gross violations o human rights. Being partyto a peace process does not in itsel protect negotiating parties romaccountability or these violations o international law.

In the 200608 Juba talks between the government o Uganda andthe Lords Resistance Army (LRA), the LRA insisted on the retraction oindictments issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC) againstLRA leaders or war crimes. Instead, agreement was reached on theestablishment o a special section o the High Court o Uganda to try thesecrimes. Unortunately, this agreement was not acceptable to LRA leader

Joseph Kony who insisted on immunity rom any prosecution.

Mediators should be aware that international law that prohibits therecruitment and use o child soldiers. Te recruitment and use o childrenunder the age o een is prohibited by the Conventions on the Rights othe Child,

3the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, and the

Rome Statute o the International Criminal Court. Tese rules apply

equally to international and noninternational conicts and to state andnonstate armed groups.

In 2006, the ICC issued an indictment against Tomas Lubanga Dyilo,a Congolese warlord, or allegedly conscripting children into his militia,while the Special Court or Sierra Leone convicted Alex amba Brima orthe recruitment and use o child soldiers during the Sierra Leone civil war,sentencing him to no less than orty-ve years o imprisonment.

Understanding this legal ramework, mediators must consider i therelease and demobilization o minors (appropriate in its own right) canhelp build condence between the parties, as might the release oprisoners and those orcibly conscripted into the armed group. However,


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care must be taken to assess the real intention o the armed groups to

genuinely end their use o children in their ranks rather than simplyre-recruiting new ones once existing ones are released. Te mediatorshould have a deliberate strategy on how eorts on these issues relate toother actors such as the Ofce o the High Commissioner on HumanRights, UNICEF, the Ofce o the United Nations Special Representativeo the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conict, and the UnitedNations Special Representative o the Secretary-General on ConictRelated Sexual Violence. Te listing and delisting by the UN Security

Council o armed groups using child soldiers (via Security CouncilResolution 1612/2005) and those engaged in conict-related sexual

violence (via Security Council Resolution 1960/2010) are instruments thatmediators should be aware o and employ as elements o incentives anddisincentives in the mediation strategy.

Commence Preliminary Discussions

Early substantive discussions may ocus on issues that do not immediatelythreaten the power base or vital interests o the parties. Gradual progresswill help build condence as well as momentum on the issue o DDR.Armed groups may require an overall vision o what their uture looks likebeore they are willing to commit to negotiating DDR. In the meantime,

International Legal Instruments

Key international legal instruments that mediators should be aware o when acili-

tating negotiations include the ollowing:

International Humanitarian Law

The our Geneva Conventions (1949) Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions (1977) Rome Statute o the International Criminal Court (1998) Customary international humanitarian law

International Human Rights Law

Convention on the Rights o the Child (1989) and its optional protocols (2000) UN Declaration o Human Rights (1948) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1966) Regional human rights instruments


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however, symbolic agreements may be negotiated to put a certain number

o weapons and combatants under some (regional or international)monitoring regimes. An alternative interim step is to attain agreement toDDR on a small portion o the ghting orces, including women, children,

veterans, and the disabled.

Gradual introduction o related processes such as reconciliation issues,economic opportunities, and livelihood considerations into discussionsshould commence at this stage. Tis evolutionary approach may be helpulin establishing linkages to broader elements o the peace agreement.

Dialogue on the uture o combatants may ensue in relation to theuture shape and size o the countrys security orces or the economicrevitalization o the community. Increased discussions on DDR andweapons control issues are desirable. Te more sensitized the parties areto related elements and concepts, the greater the prospect o coherentprovisions in the nal agreement, including on DDR issues.


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STEP 4

Lay the Groundwork for DDR

NegotiationsTe preparatory, or prenegotiation, phase o a peace process sets the stageor substantive discussions. In step 4, mediators should prepare themselvesand negotiating parties or both the procedural and the substantivedimensions o the peace process. Tis preparatory phase may result in aramework agreement between negotiating parties. Framework agreements

come in many orms, but their main purpose is to detail the undamentalso the peace process, such as who the negotiating parties are, who themediator will be, what role the mediator will play, where the peace processwill take place, the extent to which civil society may or may not beincluded, and, most important, the key issues to be discussed.

Avoid DDR as a Precondition or Talks

Framework agreements can be used to list the principles upon which

negotiations will be based. At this early stage o the peace process,trust between parties is likely to be tentative and condence in theprocess is likely to be shaky at best. It is important or mediators tostress that trust is not a prerequisite or negotiations. Te possibilityo the resumption o open conict is high because the parties have yetto commit ully to achieving their political or economic ends throughpeaceul means. Because substantive issues remain unresolved, theconict parties are not likely to engage in discussion about the nal

status o their ghting orces and weapons. Tus, it would be a mistaketo predicate continued engagement in the peace process on the DDRo the armed groups in the conict. Tis approach is neither politicallynor programmatically realistic.


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In 2009, ollowing a setback in its drawn-out peace process with the

Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo o the Philippines decided to reocus any new phase o negotiationswith the MILF within the context o DDR. Tis policy, combined with adecision to shi dialogue to communities instead o MILF commanders,stalled the peace process or a considerable period o time.

In contrast, Senator George Mitchells (1996) six principles or theNorthern Ireland peace process, which were broadly accepted, did notprecondition participation in the talks on complete disarmament prior to

negotiations. Instead, parties had to commit themselves to a uture totaldisarmament o all paramilitary organizations; such disarmament mustbe veriable to the satisaction o an independent commission. Sinn Finsacceptance o the principles was strongly criticized by more hard-lineRepublicans and led to resignations within the party.

Link DDR to Other Transitional SecurityArrangements

In some circumstances, transitional security arrangements (such as thecessation o hostilities, unilateral cease-res, or monitored cease-rearrangements) may be in place; these can acilitate ramework agreements.However, these kinds o arrangements are not prerequisites or progress atthe peace talks.

During the El Salvador peace talks, the Frente Farabundo Marti para laLiberacin Nacional (FMLN) requested that negotiations ocus on political

objectives beore the cessation o hostilities. Te government agreed to thisrequest despite its overriding objective o the cessation o ghting. Te rstissue negotiating parties dealt with was the uture role o the countrysarmed orces. Te FMLN adopted the view that all other discussionswould be utile without agreement on the uture o the armed orces.

Include Key Armed Groups in FrameworkAgreements

Mediators should be cognizant o the need or key armed groups to beinvolved in the negotiations; thereore the participation o armed groupsand the consideration o their issues should be incorporated into theramework agreement. Mediators must approach this issue o inclusion


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Step 4: Lay the Groundwork for DDR Negotiations

extremely careully. Parties possessing a critical power base but le out o

the peace process may obstruct progress in the peace process or render anagreement meaningless simply by their lack o participation. Armedgroups with such power must be accommodated in some manner.

Critical armed groups were missing rom the United NationsAricanUnion managed Doha peace process on Darur between the governmento Sudan and the Liberty and Justice Movement. Te JEM, a militarilysignicant armed group, and the Sudanese Liberation Movement (AbdulWahid) reused to participate in the many rounds o negotiations in the

Qatari capital. Moreover, there was little clarity with respect to how thegovernment would deal with the issue o the janjaweed, the government-allied ghting groups in the Darur confict. Te absence o key armed

groups rom Doha undermined the credibility o the process until the JEMjoined the talks in December 2010.


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STEP 5

Conduct and Manage the

NegotiationsIn this step in the peace process, the mediator oers negotiating partiesan opportunity to establish a new vision or the country and society;mediators should encourage conict parties to comprehensively addressthe undamental causes o the conict. In dealing with their ghtingorces, conict parties need to take a long-term view o how security will

be established in the country as a shared responsibility among ormerenemies. ransitional support or the disbandment o ghting orces andissues relating to accountability or wartime crimes (i any) will be majorthemes o the negotiation phase. Tis section outlines key DDRprogrammatic details that should be developed, discusses the majorapproaches to negotiation that have been used, and provides insightsinto common negotiation techniques employed by conict parties.

Negotiate Key DDR DetailsOnce it becomes clear that a DDR program is indeed desired and has beenaccepted by the conict parties, mediators should commence discussionsabout the DDR program. Parties should consider the number o ghterswho will be in the DDR program, the specic number o weapons thatneed to be surrendered and destroyed, and the relationship between theDDR program and other security programs.

Key programmatic elements that should be discussed at this time

include the eligibility criteria or entry into the DDR program (whicharmed groups and which government orces will participate; how tomanage noncombatants; whether or not to create a separate program orchildren and women; which ghters rom which conicts in the


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countrys history can be accepted; and whether cross-border combatants

will be accepted into the national programme or simply repatriated totheir home countries), as well as the weapons acceptance policy or theprogram (relating to small arms and light weapons, heavy weapons,ammunition, and the like). Equally important is the discussion oimplementation. In some peace agreements, implementation annexesare developed that codiy agreements on the above issues, the role oimplementers, and the DDR rameworks required.

Considerable exibility and creativity are needed on the terminology,

scope, and models used to accomplish the objectives o DDR programs.Four major approaches have been attempted by mediators, each with itsown desired outcome: simultaneous DDR, regular integration ollowed byphased demobilization, cantonment prior to urther negotiation, andDDR synchronized with key political milestones. Te problem-solvingmethodology discussed above should inorm the approach taken or eachconict; there are no one-size-ts-all situations.

Common Negotiated Outcomes on DDR

Simultaneous DDR

Te rst approach seeks an outcome in which all ghting orces submitto a DDR process and undergo the program simultaneously. Tisapproach works best when parties eel that key political issues have beensatisactorily managed or resolved in the peace agreement. Tis outcomeoccurs when condence in the implementation o the agreement is high,

and the presence o an international security guarantor o the peaceprocess (either a peacekeeping mission or an international orce) canensure security or all parties as they submit their orces or the DDRprocess. Te key advantages o this approach are the reduced likelihood orenewed hostilities between ghting orces that may negatively impact thepolitical process and a better chance or a resh start to the SSR process.However, experience has shown that problems on the political ront mayquickly be imposed upon the DDR program, which could stall the entire

DDR process and threaten the security situation.In the Accra Peace Agreement (2003), it was agreed that all ghting

orces o the government o Liberia, LURD, and MODEL wouldsimultaneously be submitted to a DDR program. Te agreement called


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Step 5: Conduct and Manage the Negotiations

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or the establishment o a new Liberian Armed Forces, but there was no

ormal connection between the DDR program and the new armed orces.

Integration Followed by Phased Demobilization

In the second approach, the aim is to integrate ghting orces into anenlarged national army beore a phased demobilization programcommences. Tis approach may be an option i participation orrepresentation in the security orces (oen the military) is a key cause othe conict and a more representative security service is a required

outcome o the peace process. In this scenario, a two-stage process maybe envisaged: rst, the amalgamation o ghting orces in a nationalarmy or security orce, while details on the size and composition (e.g.,ethnicity) are negotiated; then, a plan or a gradual DDR or downsizingo the enlarged national security institution to an acceptable andaordable security sector. Key to this approach is the ability to nanciallysustain a large orce structure until downsizing occurs.

Te peace process in Burundi adopted this approach to the issue oghting orces. In Burundi, the government decided to expand the militaryin order to integrate ex-combatants with the intention o downsizing themilitary in a gradual manner later on. Tis approach allowed the

government to provide ex-combatants a stake in the peace process and ameans to a livelihood, while buying time to establish the vetting

procedures or uture downsizing. Te approach also allowed or thecreation o training programs and jobs to absorb those who le themilitary during its downsizing process.

Tis approach has the benet o being able to control most, i not all,ghting orces in a single process. It can be helpul in containing a securitysituation when the political process is stalled; difcult decisions ondownsizing issues can be deerred to a time when the political andeconomic situations are better. Disadvantages o this approach include theupront high cost o cantonment o an enlarged orce structure, high (andoen unrealistic) expectations among combatants o their uture in thesecurity services, intensive planning and logistics or the process o assemblypoints and merging o ormer enemies into barracks or cantonment sites,and potentially contentious discussions on rank harmonization issues(especially i rebel orces are integrated with a regular army).


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Peacemakers Toolkit

Cantonment Prior to Further Negotiation on New Security

ArchitectureTethird approach leads to an outcomewhere conict parties agree toseparately canton their ghting orces while they await decisions aboutnational security structure and resolution o key political issues. Tisapproach has been considered when the undamental issues relating to theconict have yet to be resolved because it maintains some oversight over(some o the) ghters and (some o their) weapons while the politicalprocess continues.

Te 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Nepal included a processin which the rst security phase was a cantonment o the Maoist army(with a certain amount o their weapons), while the Nepal army wasconned to its barracks. Tis arrangement was lightly monitored by theUnited Nations as an interim measure, while longer-term processes likethe integration and rehabilitation o the Maoist army and thedemocratization o the Nepal army were implemented.

Some advantages o this approach include a demonstration o somecommitment, on the part o negotiating parties, to the peace process asexhibited by the cantonment o their troops (especially under internationalmonitoring) and the enhancement o condence in the process, which mayacilitate political progress. Tis approach provides the internationalcommunity with an early opportunity to commence preparatory DDRactivities such as verication and mapping processes, while allowing timeor planning on reintegration issues as well as or dealing with difcult SSR

questions (e.g., rank harmonization, eligibility criteria). However, there islittle guarantee that those cantoned are the real ghters, and there is a highchance that a large number o serviceable weapons remain outside theprocess. Tis approach can be expensive to maintain or a lengthy period otime and does not contain a clear exit strategy rom temporary cantonmentsites as long as there is no resolution on outstanding political issues.

DDR Synchronized with Achievements o Key PoliticalMilestones

Some peace processes synchronize security arrangements dealing withghting orces with political milestones. Such a phased approach is useulor enhancing condence in the implementation o the agreement and is


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useul when trust among the parties remains low. It provides sufcient

time to plan and implement the DDR program and provides opportunitiesto make programmatic adjustments as required. However, such a phasedapproach may require longer cantonment o ghting orces and oenbrings problems related to the lengthy encampment o troops.

Te Salvadorian peace negotiations, which culminated with the signing othe El Salvador Peace Accords on January 16, 1992, are an example o thisapproach. Te accords specied a complex timetable or the implementation oDDR provisions, linking institutional reorm measures with the reintegration

o FMLN ghting orces into civilian society. Such synchronization can beexplained by the strength o the FMLN (both militarily and politically)throughout the negotiations; the armed group was unwilling to commit to anyDDR program that would not be implemented alongside other political andsecurity-related agreements.

Anticipate and Manage the Negotiation Techniqueso Fighting Forces

Regardless o the appearance o progress made at the negotiating table orthe negotiated outcomes, mediators should be aware that parties hedgetheir bets when discussing DDR issues. Several tactics should be expected.

Delay Tactics

Negotiating parties oen delay a commitment to DDR as they rely ontheir military assets or leverage (i.e., the threat o a return to armed

conict) in the negotiating process. On the one hand, i a party is makingprogress on the battleeld, it may not wish to reduce the momentumgained by prematurely discussing DDR issues. On the other hand, a partymay seek to delay discussions on security issues (especially DDR) i it hasrecently suered a deeat on the battle eld. In this situation, the partymay want to regroup, rearm, and be resupplied in order to consolidate itsposition on the battleeld and strengthen its position at the negotiatingtable. Other causes o delay in discussing DDR include the lack o internal

control over ghting orces, internal discord over how to negotiate thisissue, and a lack o inormation about ones own orces structure,composition, location, and weaponry. Tis latter point is particularlysalient or poorly organized armed groups with weak command andcontrol structures.


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Peacemakers Toolkit

Infating Troop Strength

At the outset o the process, negotiating parties are likely to inate thenumbers o their ghting orces so as to enhance their bargainingposition. Te creation o ghost soldiers and the use o orcibleconscription to boost the number o ghters are not unusual tactics.Most,i not all, o the Cambodian actions involved in the countrys civil war arewidely believed to have exaggerated their orce numbers by about two-thirds.

Parties also inate their troop strength because they anticipate that the

DDR process will coner benets on all those who participate in it. Whilenegotiations were ongoing in the North-South Sudan peace process, theregional black market value o serviceable and unserviceable AK-47sincreased rapidly. Tis rise was traced to the expectation that a large DDR

program was being planned and that an AK-47 was likely to be the ticketto participation in that program.

4

Moreover, negotiating parties sometimes manipulate entry into a DDRprogram to reward supporters, regardless o whether these supporters are

actual combatants. Mediators should be attentive to the spontaneous demob-ilization or release o ghters (primarily children and women) by armedgroups, who may work to replace released ghters with noncombatants close tothe political or military elites. For some or all o these reasons, negotiatingparties are likely to resist a mediators requests or the parties to provide lists othe names o their ghters or to submit to verication processes to ascertaintroop strength or the combatant status o individuals within the ghting orces.

Hiding Real FightersWarring parties may conceal their hard-core ghters rom any actualdisarmament and demobilization regimes in the early stages o a peaceprocess to protect themselves rom peace process ailure and enable arapid return to conict i necessary.

In Aceh, GAM claimed during negotiations that it had a orce o 3,500ghters. It was discovered later that GAM had 10,000 ghters. In Nepal,some observers are skeptical that that the 19,602 Maoist combatants being

cantoned in the previously UN-monitored cantonment sites are allhard-core ghters. Some assert that the real Maoist ghters have been sentout o these sites and have been reorganized as members o the YouthCommunist League, which has been used to disrupt the peace process.


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Hiding Violations

A party in conict may be reluctant to provide inormation on thecomposition o its ghting orce, an account o its conduct during theconict, or access to its ghting orces because such inormation couldprovide evidence that the party has violated international law and thuscompromise its ability to negotiate amnesties during peace talks.

On November 12, 2006, LRA leader Joseph Kony in a meeting with UNunder-secretary-general Jan Egeland stated, We dont have any children.

We only have combatants. In September 2009, aer a period o stallednegotiations, Kony indicated a willingness to resume negotiationsprovided that he was granted immunity rom prosecution by the ICC,which had charged him with thirty-three counts o crimes againsthumanity and war crimes, including the use o child soldiers, murder,enslavement, sexual enslavement, and rape.

Te reports o the UN Secretary-General on Children and ArmedConict provide an authoritative account o armed groups that system-

atically recruit and use child soldiers. Tese reports, and the relatedresolutions o the UN Security Council, may be used by mediators bothas a source o inormation and as a source o l

managing fighting forces ddr in peace processes

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