The Changing Nature of Conflict Study Phase II

Final Report

October 2017 This report was produced for review by the United Agency for International Development. It was prepared by the USAID

Management Support and Technical Analysis Services (MSTAS) Project implemented by The Pragma Corporation and its partners in compliance with contract No. AID-OAA-M-13-00012.

MANAGEMENT SUPPORT AND TECHNICAL ANALYSIS

SERVICES (MSTAS) PROJECT

Changing Nature of Conflict Study

Phase II – Final Report

December 6, 2017

This report was produced for review by the United Agency for International Development. It was prepared by the USAID Management Support and Technical Analysis Services (MSTAS) Project implemented by The Pragma Corporation and its partners in compliance with contract No. AID-OAA-M-13-00012.

Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1

LIST OF ACRONYMS 5

1. INTRODUCTION 8

OVERVIEW 8 GOALS OF THE STUDY 8 DESCRIPTION OF THE RESEARCH PHASES AND TASKS 9

2. PHASE II TASK 1: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT TRENDS 10

2.1 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS METHODS 10 2.2 VARIABLES TO OPERATIONALIZE CONFLICT TRENDS AND KEY DEVELOPMENT TRENDS 12 2.3 COMPARING CONFLICT TRENDS 13 2.4 KEY FACTORS RELEVANT TO USAID PROGRAMMING 14

3. CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY 15

3.1 CASE STUDY SELECTION 15 3.2 LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS 16

4. COUNTRY CASE STUDY DATA: QUANTITATIVE SUMMARIES 16

4.1 KENYA 17 4.2 LIBERIA 17 4.3 NIGERIA 18

5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 19

LIMITED EXPLICIT CONSIDERATION OF KEY THEMES BY USAID MISSIONS 19 GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS 20 ETHNIC EXCLUSION 23 FORCED DISPLACEMENT 25 OTHER CASE STUDY CONCLUSIONS 26

6. PROGRAM HIGHLIGHTS 32

6.1 USAID/KENYA PROGRAM HIGHLIGHT 32 6.2 USAID/LIBERIA PROGRAM HIGHLIGHT 33 6.3 USAID/NIGERIA PROGRAM HIGHLIGHT 34

7. RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED 35

7. CASE STUDY RECOMMENDATIONS 36

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY USAID’s Africa Bureau requested that the Pragma Corporation research the changing nature of conflict in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The primary goals of the study were to develop a better understanding of the changing nature of conflict in SSA over the last 20 years and to highlight the relevance of this understanding in a useful way to USAID. The research seeks to understand if USAID Mission programming and strategy incorporates and addresses key factors associated with conflict and how these strategies and programming impact conflict. This effort began with a comprehensive literature review of conflict trends across the continent over the last 20 years in Phase I. Task 1 of Phase II used the conclusions of this review to conduct quantitative analysis through descriptive statistics and multiple regression techniques of these conflict trends across 45 countries in SSA. For Task 2 of Phase II, the Pragma MSTAS team (the team) conducted fieldwork with USAID Missions in Kenya, Liberia, and Nigeria on their engagement in conflict-affected contexts. This final report briefly combines both the quantitative analysis and case study research of Phase II in an accessible way for a general USAID audience. Quantitative Analysis of Conflict Trends

The quantitative study operationalized the main concepts from the Phase I literature review into 17 variables for quantitative analysis. The team examined these data and used regression analysis to assess relationships between variables. The main quantitative findings were that the median magnitude of violence in SSA conflicts increased between 1995 and 1999, declined until 2005, before increasing again since then. The coexistence of different kinds of violent conflict was readily apparent. Many of the conflicts in countries of the continent had several different groups of combatants that appeared to be fighting for different objectives. National-level conflict, often about control of or inclusion into the state, focused on national objectives. Many SSA countries in these types of civil wars simultaneously suffered from other conflicts, as other groups took up arms for local objectives. The coexistence of state-rebel violence and non-state conflict measured whether and how often countries had both state-based conflict and non-state conflict or conflicts. The number of states with more than one conflict varied from a low of two in 2010 up to eight in 2011 and 2012 before falling slightly. One-sided violence (OSV) fatalities, which are killings by governments or organized groups targeting civilians, declined between 1995 and 2010, before rising again between 2010 and 2014. OSV similarly had recurrent spikes of deaths in several countries. The strongest findings about relationships from the quantitative study included the following three factors:

(1) Countries with armed conflict of any type were systematically less democratic, and the more conflict a country had, the less effective its government was likely to be.

(2) Countries that have had conflict, including those that are post-conflict, were more likely to have an ethnic group that is excluded from political power. This was particularly notable for countries in long, ongoing conflicts, which were the most likely to have an excluded ethnic group.

(3) Conflict, as expected, drives forced displacement. The longer conflict has been ongoing, the more internally displaced persons are present in a country in a year. Countries in conflict also host more refugees on average than countries that are not conflict affected. Countries in conflict also create more refugees on average than countries that are not conflict affected.

Case Study Methodology

To triangulate findings from the Phase II Task 2 quantitative research, the team conducted interviews with USAID staff and implementing partners (IPs) in three countries: Kenya, Liberia, and Nigeria. The field research looked at Mission programming across sectors, spanning from 2011 to 2016. This case study approach was used to expand on the findings of the quantitative analysis and to also review recent USAID Mission strategies and approaches. The team worked with Mission staff to select eight programs with

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connections to these factors in each country for fieldwork. The final report draws conclusions about Mission strategies and programming focused on how these programs do or do not engage with factors of government effectiveness, ethnic exclusion, and forced displacement – and the implications of the study for USAID programming going forward.

Country Case Summaries

The case study research examined: 1. Whether and how USAID thinking and programming across sectors over the last five years has

considered government effectiveness, exclusion, and forced displacement; and 2. How USAID programming has targeted and affected government effectiveness, forced

displacement, and ethnic exclusion. Although the case studies focused on the three key factors described above, additional development and conflict trends raised by key informants were incorporated into the case study analysis.

Case Study Conclusions

The most significant finding is that Missions largely prioritize specific country context dynamics with a limited focus on government effectiveness. For this study, the team used the definition of government effectiveness’ from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) as USAID does not currently have a working definition of this term (see text box).1 Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance (DRG) programming targets government effectiveness, but there is limited explicit consideration of these factors in other sectoral programming. Due to its connections with armed and violent conflict, it might be beneficial to explicitly consider factors targeting government effectiveness in developing Mission strategies and programs with respect to armed and violent conflict. The DRG Strategic Assessment Framework, from 2014 is a useful resource for Missions seeking to apply these factors to other sectoral programming. Missions should strategically evaluate the most effective level of engagement in government capacity building based on available resources, national development priorities, and the capabilities of government partners to improve government effectiveness. Programming with development objectives beyond government effectiveness can play a role in improving perceptions of government effectiveness with proper project design and attention to detail in implementation. USAID Missions dedicated programming specifically to marginalized or excluded populations in each case study country, though programming specifically addressing groups excluded by ethnicity was minimal. USAID Missions should continue to mix approaches that target the population as a whole with ones that focus on specific marginalized or excluded groups. Given the nature of the relationship between conflict and ethnic exclusion, USAID Missions should explore supporting more programming that directly targets specifically excluded ethnic groups. USAID support can improve perceptions of government effectiveness and perceptions of political inclusion while enhancing quality of life and economic opportunity with continued inclusive programming. If presence countries have excluded ethnic groups, USAID Missions should consider approaches to address this exclusion not only because of equality considerations but also

1 For the definition and details on the components and sources used for the WGI, see https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/ge.pdf (accessed October 26, 2017).

Government effectiveness

captures perceptions of the

quality of public services,

the quality of the civil

service and the degree of its

independence from political

pressures, the quality of

policy formulation and

implementation, and the

credibility of the

government's commitment

to such policies.

Source: World Bank World

Governance Indicator (WGI)

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due to the important links between ethnic exclusion and violent conflict across SSA. Additionally, USAID Missions should consider the existing identity dynamics when establishing site selection so as to not generate the perception of favoritism. USAID Missions support displaced populations through inclusive service delivery, access to education, and job training. Given the rapid movement and potentially spontaneous nature of these populations, programming has been reactive rather than pre-emptive. Development assistance targeting forcibly displaced populations can strengthen government effectiveness when assisting displaced populations in accessing government services, and when facilitating country government response to conflict-affected displacement. The research also noted that conflict is cross-sectoral and the merits of a cross-sectoral approach. Missions have had to balance assistance for short-term service delivery and long-term capacity development as both approaches were needed in these cases. The fieldwork noted the importance and consequences of Mission choices of engaging with different levels of government counterparts through programs. USAID Missions also make different choices in terms of geographic prioritization, with consequences for the whole portfolio and engagement with factors of government effectiveness, ethnic exclusion, and forced displacement. The cases also suggest that USAID Missions can prioritize programming that enables host country governments to directly deliver services to their citizens, rather than having USAID directly delivering services – and that this approach benefits government effectiveness and thus is a stabilizing approach useful as conflict programming.

Program Highlights and Strategy Conclusions

The study highlighted selected aspects of each Mission’s portfolio relevant to the chosen development factors of government effectiveness, ethnic exclusion, and forced displacement. The three programs that are highlighted are USAID Kenya’s work on devolution through the Agile and Harmonized Assistance for Devolved Institutions (AHADI) program, USAID Liberia’s Forest Income for Environmental Sustainability project to reach marginalized rural Liberians, and USAID Nigeria’s Training of Leaders on Religious and National Coexistence (TOLERANCE) project which encourages inclusion through community dialogue despite the limits on government effectiveness evident in Nigeria. Recommendations and Lessons Learned

The quantitative analysis and case study research lead to recommendations for USAID, including:

• USAID Missions should consider explicitly including regional factors, including forced

displacement, in their situational or contextual analysis of SSA countries to ensure that Missions

systematically analyze and consider addressing factors with clear relationships to conflict across

the region that may be directly relevant in specific countries.

• USAID Missions should continue to assess the issues and challenges of government effectiveness

and to emphasize the importance of government effectiveness and perceptions of it as central to

development and country partnerships. This is particularly important because of the connections

between low government effectiveness and armed conflict in SSA.

• USAID Missions should continue to mix approaches that target the population as a whole with ones

that focus on specific marginalized or excluded groups.

• USAID Missions should continue to address the immediate needs of displaced populations – as

well as consider approaches to limit forced displacement in addition to reacting to it.

• USAID Missions in conflict-affected states benefit from conscious and comprehensive cross-

sectoral strategies specific to partner country needs.

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• USAID Missions must balance long-term institutional and human capacity needs with short-term

immediate service delivery.

• USAID Missions in conflict-affected countries should continue to strategically target the level of

partner-country government engagement that promotes stability, including by improving

government effectiveness, reducing ethnic exclusion, and reducing forced displacement.

• USAID Missions should continue to target support for development based on factors beyond

population density.

• USAID Missions should continue to use cross-sectoral programming, particularly in service

delivery, to build perceptions of government effectiveness and benefit underserved or excluded

populations.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS ABE Alternative Basic Education AfT Agenda for Transformation through Action AHADI Agile and Harmonized Assistance for Devolved Institutions AIDS Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome AMREF African Medical Research and Education Foundation AOR Agreement Officer's Representative APHIA AIDS, Population and Health Integrated Assistance AYP Advancing Youth Project CAR Central African Republic CARI Central Agricultural Research Institute CDCS Country Development Cooperation Strategy CEPPS Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening CLA Collaborating, Learning, and Adapting CMM Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation CNFA Cultivating New Frontiers in Agriculture COP Chief of Party CPFF Cost-Plus Fixed Fee CSA Civil Service Agency CVE Countering Violent Extremism CVA Conflict Vulnerability Assessment CEWARN Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism DAI Development Alternatives Incorporated DO Development Objective DRC Democratic Republic of Congo DRG Democracy, Human Rights and Governance EDC Education Development Center ECPN Engaging Communities for Peace in Nigeria ECR Education Crisis Response EWER Early Warning/Early Response FARA Fixed Amount Reimbursement Agreement FED Food and Enterprise Development FIFES Forest Incomes for Environmental Sustainability FSS Focus States Strategy FtF Feed the Future G2G Government-to-Government GDA Global Development Alliance GEMAP Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program GEMS Governance and Economic Management Support GON Government of Nigeria GOK Government of Kenya GOL Government of Liberia HDI Human Development Index HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus HICD Human and Institutional Capacity Development IDLO International Development Law Organization IDP Internally Displaced Person

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IEBC Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission IFES International Foundation for Electoral Systems IMC Interfaith Mediation Center IRI International Republican Institute IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development IMARISHA Integrated Marginal Arid Regions Innovative Socialized Health Approach IP Implementing Partner K-YES Kenya Youth Employment and Skills KCSSP Kenyan Civil Society Support KEAP Kenya Electoral Assistance Program Kenya-RAPID Kenya Resilient Arid Lands Partnership for Integrated Development KI Key Informant KII Key Informant Interview KIWASH Kenya Integrated Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene LADA Liberia Agribusiness Development Activity LASS Liberia Administrative System Strengthening LEAD Leadership, Empowerment, Advocacy and Development LEAP Local Empowerment for Peace LEPT Liberian Elections and Political Transitions LGA Local Government Authority LGSA Land Governance Support Activity LLA Liberia Land Authority LMWP Liberia Municipal Water Project LRA Land Rights Act LWSC Liberia Water and Sewer Corporation M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MACs Ministries, Agencies, and Commissions MOE Ministry of Education MOF Ministry of Finance MOH Ministry of Health MOI Ministry of the Interior MOJ Ministry of Justice MSTAS Management Support and Technical Analysis Services NCDS National Capacity Development Strategy NDI National Democratic Institute NEI Northeast Education Initiative NERI Northeast Regional Initiative NIWETU NiWajibu Wetu NRT Northern Rangelands Trust NRTI Nigeria Regional Transition Initiative OEG Office of Economic Growth OSV One-Sided Violence OTI Office of Transition Initiatives PEARL Peaceful Empowerment in Arid Lands PEPFAR President's Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief PPP Public Private Partnership PREG Partnership for Resilience and Economic Growth PROSPER People, Rules, and Organizations Supporting the Protection of Ecosystem Resources RAPID Resilient Arid Lands Partnership for Integrated Development

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REGAL-AG Resilience and Economic Growth in the Arid Lands – Accelerated Growth RTI Research Triangle Institute SACE Strengthening Advocacy and Civic Engagement SCORE Strengthening Community Resilience against Extremism SGD Small Group Discussion SIDHAS Strengthening Integrated Delivery of HIV/AIDS Services SOE State-Owned Enterprise SSA Sub-Saharan Africa TI Transparency International TOC Theory of Change TOLERANCE Training of Leaders on Religious and National Co-existence project UCDP Uppsala Conflict Data Program USAID United States Agency for International Development VE Violent Extremism WADA Water and Development Alliance WASH Water, Sanitation and Hygiene UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia

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1. Introduction The countries of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) continue to have multiple, complex and ongoing violent conflicts despite increasing democratization, continued development assistance, and sustained economic growth in many SSA countries. This study is the culmination of a multi-stage research project to investigate relationships between key development trends across SSA and ways that USAID can incorporate research from cross-national analysis and case studies into the design and implementation of programming in conflict-affected states. The research included a literature review and analysis of trends in violent conflict in SSA, a quantitative analysis of associations between development trends and conflict across SSA, and country case studies of recent USAID programming in Kenya, Liberia, and Nigeria. The quantitative analysis identified three key factors of interest to USAID that are statistically and substantively associated with conflict in SSA: government effectiveness, ethnic exclusion, and forced displacement. The final component of the research examined recent USAID Mission strategies and programming in three case study countries through a lens of government effectiveness, ethnic exclusion, and forced displacement. Fieldwork with USAID and implementing partners in Kenya, Liberia, and Nigeria examines the relevance of government effectiveness, ethnic exclusion, and forced displacement to their strategies, program design, and program implementation. Overview

USAID Africa Bureau requested, through the Management Support and Technical Assistance Services (MSTAS) contract, that the Pragma Corporation conduct a study on the changing nature of conflict in SSA. USAID envisioned several components to this research. First, for Phase I, USAID sought a comprehensive literature review of conflict trends across SSA over the last 20 years. Task 1 of Phase II used the conclusions of this comprehensive literature review to conduct quantitative analysis of these conflict trends across 45 countries in SSA. Based on key findings from the quantitative analysis, the Pragma MSTAS team (the team) conducted fieldwork for Phase II Task 2 with three USAID Missions (Kenya, Liberia, and Nigeria). This final report briefly combines both the quantitative analysis and case study research of Phase II in an accessible way for a general development audience. Goals of the Study

The primary goals of the study were to develop a better understanding of the changing nature of conflict in sub-Saharan Africa over the last 20 years and to highlight the relevance of this understanding in a useful way to USAID. The research seeks to understand if USAID Mission programming and strategy incorporates and addresses key factors associated with conflict and how these strategies and programming impact conflict. Research of this nature could facilitate the development and implementation of streamlined, strategic programming in conflict-affected SSA countries. The Phase I study reviewed literature on conflict in SSA, including reports and analysis from large data sets. The Phase II Task 1 included quantitative analysis of the trends analyzed in Phase I. Phase II Task 2 conducted field research with three USAID Missions and their partners to examine the connections between the main conclusions of the qualitative and quantitative research and Mission strategies and programs. The study demonstrates qualitatively and quantitatively that there are critical development trends in SSA that are important for understanding the drivers of conflict and pathways for mitigation of conflict. This report outlines findings from Phase II of the research to explore potential ways for USAID to improve programming in conflict-affected environments in SSA.

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Description of the Research Phases and Tasks

The Changing Nature of Conflict Study began in 2016 with Phase I, a literature review of conflict trends in SSA over the last 20 years. The literature review, which included analytic reports produced from multiple international geopolitical data sets on conflict across SSA, found that the fundamental nature of conflict has changed. The Phase I study found that violent conflicts in SSA are increasingly sub-national and the dividing line between armed conflict, organized crime and ideological extremist violence has become blurred. Although there has been a decline in interstate conflicts and civil wars over the period, there has been an overall increase in levels of violence. Violence in SSA has included an increase in intrastate conflicts, communal conflicts, and one-sided violence along with a diversification of conflict actors. The majority of conflict fatalities have been concentrated in just a few countries, such as the Central African Republic (CAR), Nigeria, and South Sudan. Countries with state-based conflicts additionally often simultaneously suffer from internal communal conflicts, indicating that communal conflicts appear to be exacerbated by national conflicts in countries such as Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mali, and Somalia. The Phase I study identified four key development trends that impact conflict dynamics in the region: (1) governance patterns, (2) youth population growth, (3) climate change, and (4) forced displacement. Despite investments by a range of international actors, including USAID, to address conflict in sub-Saharan Africa over the last 20 years, conflict persists with increasing levels of violence; a majority of conflicts are recurrent conflicts. Among other findings, the literature review highlighted regional trends in: (1) the coexistence of subnational conflict and national conflict within a country, (2) evolution in the concentration and magnitude of violence, and (3) a rise in one-sided violence.2 The conclusions of Phase I study were used to shape the quantitative analysis of Phase II Task 1. Phase II, Task 1 looked at the following interlinked questions:

1. How do countries vary over time in conflict categories? 2. How have conflict trends affected development trends across sub-Saharan Africa over 1995-2014? 3. How have development trends across Africa over the 20-year period shaped conflict trends?

The methodology section below briefly reviews the methods and findings of the quantitative analysis. Three of the strongest findings of the report were:

(1) Countries with armed conflict of any type were systematically less democratic, and the more conflict a country had, the less effective its government was likely to be;

(2) Countries with conflict were more likely to not include all ethnic groups in the country in governance services and processes; and

(3) Conflict and fear of conflict drive forced displacement, which can then be a contributing factor to conflict itself.

Case studies were used in Phase II Task 2 to examine in detail how some USAID Missions did or did not grapple with three key factors that surfaced during Phase II Task 1: government effectiveness, ethnic exclusion, and forced displacement. The staff of the Africa Bureau’s Office of Sustainable Development liaised with colleagues across Africa Missions to identify countries for brief case study research with

2 A separate report documents the findings from Phase I and can be found online at: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00MJ39.pdf.

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Mission staff and implementing partners. Missions in Kenya, Liberia, and Nigeria volunteered to host a two-person team for fieldwork in country that focused on Mission strategies, approaches to conflict, and whether and how recent projects across sectors of programming did or did not engage with the three factors of government effectiveness, ethnic exclusion, and forced displacement. The case studies also noted Mission engagement in conflict and development trends from the literature review and considered other conflict trends as appropriate.

2. Phase II Task 1: Quantitative Analysis of Conflict Trends 2.1 Statistical Analysis Methods

The methodology section briefly explains the processes used for quantitative data analysis in Phase II Task 1. The quantitative analysis team developed a set of 17 variables to operationalize the four development trends and the three conflict trends from the Phase I literature review. The team created a panel data set comprised of quantitative indicators for 45 sub-Saharan Africa countries over a 20-year period (1995-2014).3 The team began with summary, descriptive statistics and basic graphs for the variables to show variation over time and across countries. This set of analyses looked at variable distributions and means, along with their confidence intervals, over time and across countries. Country outliers, those that differ the most from the common SSA trend, were identified. The team then used ordinary least squares regressions to examine relationships between conflict categories and the conflict and development trends. This analysis made it possible to identify the effects of each conflict category on a development trend relative to all other conflict categories. Regression models examined how conflict trends affect development trends and vice versa, and the relationships apparent from the country-case years of potential SSA data, which spanned more than 800 data-years. To identify the direction of impact, independent variables were lagged one year and control variables thought to be theoretically linked to both independent and dependent variables were included. The models also included the lagged dependent variable, which accounted for problems of autocorrelation and treating the dependent variable as dynamic as a function of both of its prior value and variation in the development and conflict trends. In the quantitative analysis, the team used the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) definition for armed conflict: a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.4 The case study research allowed for a broader discussion of conflict with USAID staff and partners. Based on the UCDP definition, Phase II Task 1 divided 45 SSA countries in six different conflict categories for each year of analysis:

(1) “Long conflict” countries are in armed conflict that began more than five years ago. (2) “Short conflict” countries have armed conflict that began between one and five years ago. (3) “Recurring conflict” are countries currently in armed conflict; however, the country had enjoyed a

period of peace before a previous armed conflict recurred after less than ten years of peace. (4) “New conflict” countries were previously at peace but are now in the first year of an armed conflict.

3 Because it takes research organizations time to compile and assemble large, cross-national data sets, data used was not consistently available for calendar years 2015 or 2016. The data and analysis thus cover 1995-2014. 4 The Uppsala Conflict Data Program notes that “its definition of armed conflict has become the global standard of how conflicts are systematically defined and studied.” See http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/ (accessed October 26, 2017).

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(5) “Post conflict” countries experienced armed conflict in the past ten years but are not presently in conflict.

(6) “Not conflict-affected” countries have not had armed conflict for the past ten years or longer.

Figure 1 below illustrates the countries considered during quantitative analysis. SSA countries studied considered “not conflict affected”5 had a minimal presence of armed and violent conflict. SSA countries noted as “post-conflict” were countries at peace for ten or more years after violence. Fifteen “new conflicts” broke out over this 20-year period, 39 country years were classified as “recurrent conflict.” During the study period analyzed, there was a total of 70 country years of “short conflict,” and 90 country-years of “long conflict” (of which 20 were from Sudan; in active conflict over the entire period study period).

5 Note that “not conflict affected” countries do not imply an absence of any conflict, but rather countries that do not have conflicts that meet the definition of armed conflict used in the quantitative component of this study. Countries that have conflict that result in fewer than 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year or that do not involve the government fall in the category of “not conflict-affected” countries.

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2.2 Variables to Operationalize Conflict Trends and Key Development Trends

The conflict and development trends from Phase I needed to be specified concretely to be measured numerically and used for quantitative analysis. The team operationalized each concept from the Phase I literature review (such as governance patterns) and refined them into variables measured in numerical terms. This specification often required more than one variable to describe and clarify a complex concept such as governance patterns. A total of 14 variables were used to accurately capture the concepts behind the development and conflict trends (please see Annex VIII for a list of the variables and the related data sources). Many of these variables are generally relatively static and typically slow in the rates that they change.

Control Variables

In addition to these 14 variables, the team included three variables found to be closely associated with conflict or its absence in Africa and around the world in other quantitative analyses. These three variables are: 1) a country’s level of development, population size and geographic size, which are conventionally measured as variables through infant mortality rates, 2) the number of people living in the country, and 3)

Figure 1: Source: Categories defined by the MSTAS team using data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program

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the total land area of the country. Including these variables ensured that the analysis could account for variations in development of particular SSA countries.

Conflict Variables

The three conflict trends identified in the literature review – 1) the coexistence of subnational-level conflict and national-level conflict within a country, 2) evolution in the concentration and magnitude of violence and 3) a rise in one-sided violence – were operationalized for analysis using annual data from UCDP. Examining these conflict trends in the quantitative study allowed the team to move beyond defining conflict as armed conflict between the state and opponents. Six country conflict categories were used to analyze this data: 1) conflict coexistence: the presence of subnational-level conflict and national level conflict in the same year in a single country; 2) conflict magnitude: the sum of conflict deaths in each year from different types of armed violence; 3) intrastate violence within a country; 4) interstate violence between countries; 5) state-rebel conflict or insurgency, and 6) one-sided violence: the number of fatalities resulting from the use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organized group against civilians. 2.3 Comparing Conflict Trends

The median magnitude of violence in SSA conflicts increased between 1995 and 1999, declined until 2005, before increasing again since then. The coexistence of different kinds of violent conflict was readily apparent. Many of the conflicts in SSA countries had several different groups of combatants that appeared to be fighting for different objectives. National-level conflict, often about control of or inclusion into the state, focused on national objectives. Many SSA countries in these types of civil wars simultaneously suffered from other conflicts, as other groups took up arms for local objectives. The coexistence of state-rebel violence and non-state conflict measured whether and how often countries had both state-based conflict and non-state conflict or conflicts. The number of states with more than one conflict varied from a low of two in 2010 up to 8 in 2011 and 2012 before falling slightly since then. OSV casualties declined between 1995 and 2010, before rising again between 2010 and 2014. OSV similarly had recurrent spikes of deaths in several countries.

Governance Patterns

Six variables were used to examine governance patterns. The first covered the form and structure of a country’s polity in terms of whether the polity is more authoritarian or democratic and the second whether there have been significant transitions over the period that have changed the regime type. The third variable characterized perceptions of government effectiveness, measured through the World Governance Indicators. Two other variables were used to explore the government’s engagement in particular issue areas associated with conflict – whether the country had suffered food price shocks and the incidence of recessions – since government policies have the potential to reduce the effects of these kinds of shocks. Whether the polity excluded any ethnic groups from power was the sixth variable.

Youth Population

The size of the youth population and its prevalence in a country are often linked to instability as young people may act or react with violence as they seek to find their place in the economy, society, and polity of their country. The Phase I study found that larger youth populations are linked to risks of armed conflict, especially with larger rates of poverty, urbanization, and unemployment among youth. The proportion of the population that is aged 35 years or less was used to assess the impact of having a youthful population on development and conflict. Across sub-Saharan Africa, populations are extremely youthful. The proportion of the population 35 years of age or younger was 77% across the 45 countries in SSA; the share of youth in the total population fell slightly between 1995 and 2014.

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Climate Change

Climate change proved difficult to operationalize because the climate has so many different impacts and attributes. For this study, the key interest was whether changing climatic conditions might potentially affect conflict (e.g., by adversely affecting livelihoods). The variable used was drought severity, which measures the proportion of a country experiencing drought conditions (a geographic area’s deviation from long-term normal rainfall during the rainy season). This is the best available measure to consider the effects of drought on livelihoods and conflict at the country level in SSA, because it measures whether or not enough rain falls to allow grass and crops to grow in the areas where people expect to graze livestock and farm. Drought is highly variable. The proportion of land under drought conditions was on average, about 7.8% of all SSA country land area in any given year from 1995 to 2014. Drought conditions were higher than the 20-year average in 2004, 2009, and 2010; and significantly lower than the 20-year average in 1996, 1999, 2000, 2008, 2011, and 2012.

Forced Displacement

Forced displacement, the fourth and final development trend, required three different variables to understand and measure three different forcibly displaced populations. All three were measured relative to the overall size of the country’s population. The three populations measured were: 1) the proportion of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in a country, 2) the proportion of the population that is made up of refugees that have fled to the country from other countries, and 3) the proportion of the population that are returnees to the country (who had previously fled from their country – but have now returned home). IDPs are the most numerous type of people forcibly displaced across SSA. The number of IDPs increased substantially after 2006 and increased in every year afterward. Refugees also grew in number, although on average were lower in terms of their proportion of the population compared to IDPs. The proportion of returnees grew after 2005 across SSA, but have remained smaller compared to refugees and IDPs.

2.4 Key Factors Relevant to USAID Programming

The quantitative study used descriptive statistics and multiple regression techniques to examine linear associations between the conflict and development trends as measured by all 14 variables, controlling for economic development, population size, and country size. To briefly summarize these data, from 1995 to 2014, SSA countries became more democratic during the study period. The character of regimes changed dramatically in ten countries, with nine becoming more democratic. Food price shocks were rare, with only four countries facing ten percent changes in staple crop prices between 2001 and 2014 (with Kenya facing shocks in two consecutive years). Recessions by contrast were common for SSA countries; however, the probability of recession fell from 1995-2014. Government effectiveness scores declined slightly but consistently between 1995 and 2014 across SSA. Ethnic exclusion from government was common and consequential. Over this twenty-year period, slightly more than half of SSA county years had one or more groups excluded from government power. Across SSA, countries at “peace” had approximately a 40% chance of having an excluded ethnic group. This compares to an 80% chance that a country in an “ongoing long conflict” had an excluded ethnic group The strongest findings from the quantitative study were:

• Countries with armed conflict of any type were systematically less democratic, and the more conflict a country had, the less effective its government was likely to be.

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• Countries that have had conflict, including those that are post-conflict, were more likely to have an ethnic group that is excluded from political power. This was particularly notable for countries in long ongoing conflicts, which were the most likely to have an excluded ethnic group.6

• The effects of conflict on forced displacement were clear. The longer conflict has been ongoing, the more internally displaced persons are present in a country in a year. Countries in conflict also host more refugees on average than countries that are not conflict affected. Countries in conflict also have more refugees on average than countries that are not conflict affected.

These findings led the case study analysis to focus on three development factors: 1) government effectiveness, 2) ethnic exclusion, and 3) forced displacement. Government Effectiveness

Government effectiveness or ineffectiveness was found to be closely associated with a country’s conflict status in SSA over the study period. The more persistent and pervasive a conflict, the less effective the country’s government was likely to be. The study looked retrospectively at relationships between government effectiveness and conflict. While the quantitative methods used cannot be employed to suggest that there are causal links between decreasing government effectiveness and the inception of conflict, the research showed a strong correlation between conflict duration and government performance. Because the link between being conflict affected and a lack of government effectiveness was so apparent in the literature review and the quantitative analysis, the team chose to analyze government effectiveness in mission strategies and programming in the country case studies.

Ethnic Exclusion

Countries that have had conflict, including post-conflict countries, were more likely to have an excluded ethnic group. Countries with long conflicts were the most likely to have one or more excluded ethnic groups. A causal relationship between ethnic exclusion and conflict in SSA is not clear from the methods used in the quantitative study. The case studies highlight this factor as part of exploring this relationship and its relevance in conflict countries in SSA. Forced Displacement and Migration

The longer the duration of conflict, the higher the population of internally displaced persons and refugees. For this factor, there is a strong theoretical argument that conflict causes an increase in displaced persons and refugees. In the case of conflict-affected countries hosting more refugees, however, the causal relationships are unclear. The persistence of issues of displaced populations across SSA countries indicates that this is an important aspect of analysis for USAID Missions in conflict-affected countries.

3. Case Study Methodology

3.1 Case Study Selection

The team conducted case studies using qualitative research techniques. The case study research built on the quantitative analysis by examining USAID’s strategies, approaches, and projects. The research could not cover all of the work of the Africa Bureau’s Missions. Instead, a sample of three Missions was considered from the list of countries with USAID Missions. As the team could not analyze all Mission programming, a sample of some of the most relevant projects was chosen from the portfolios of each of the three Missions. Although the case studies focus on three key factors in particular, additional development and conflict

6 Countries in an ongoing long conflict had an 80 percent chance of having an excluded ethnic group, compared to 40 percent for countries that were not conflict affected.

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factors raised by key informants have been incorporated into the case study analysis. The case studies focus on:

1. Whether and how USAID thinking and programming across sectors over the last five years has considered three factors: government effectiveness, exclusion, and forced displacement; and

2. How USAID programming has targeted and affected government effectiveness, forced displacement, and ethnic exclusion.

. Based on the findings of the quantitative analysis and the choice to focus on government effectiveness, ethnic exclusion, and forced displacement as critical to the incidence and character of conflict across SSA, the team and USAID Africa Bureau Office of Sustainable Development staff sought to identify USAID presence case study countries for fieldwork. USAID/Africa solicited Missions with variation on these criteria to volunteer to serve as case studies; USAID/Kenya, USAID/Liberia, and USAID/Nigeria were ultimately selected for fieldwork. The field research looked at Mission programming across sectors, spanning from 2011-2016. Full country case studies can be found in the annex section of this report (please see Annex I-III). 3.2 Limitations and Assumptions

Three country case studies were identified in collaboration with USAID Missions, USAID/AFR/SD staff, and the research team. The team proposed sample projects from the selected country portfolios, but ultimately projects were selected by the Missions. This became both an asset to the research and a limitation because from the outset it revealed the mission’s conception of the development factors and how they related to mission programming. The focus in the case study research was on the most recent strategy and the last five years or current programming. USAID Missions selected programs for review with the intention of including the three primary factors, but there may have been additional programming with links to these trends that the team did not assess because of programming cycle, the narrow five-year analysis, time constraints, or availability of key informants. The team sought to analyze one or more programs from each sector, for a total of eight programs per country. The team was only able to be in country for one week and interviews were exclusively with USAID staff and implementing partners. The intention of the research was to understand how the three development factors influence USAID programming or are influenced by USAID programming. The team approached this question through the unique mission strategies and specific programming based on the assumption that mission strategy reflects current country-specific theories of change. The conclusion and recommendations are based on analysis of specific Missions and their programs, and these conclusions and findings are not necessarily generalizable to other Missions or broader strategic approaches to government effectiveness, ethnic exclusion, or forced displacement across countries in SSA.

4. Country Case Study Data: Quantitative Summaries

This section briefly describes the context for each of the country case studies based on the quantitative data analysis from Task 1. This informs the diversity of conflict context as used during the qualitative case study research. For a more detailed description of country context, USAID/Mission strategies, and specific programming, see Annexes I, II, and III, the country case study documents.

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4.1 Kenya

The team’s coding of Kenya’s conflict trends over 1995 to 2014 for the quantitative analysis shows the country as “not conflict affected” in the mid-1990s. Casualties rose from armed violence which led to categorization as a “new conflict” in 1999, and then as a “recurrent conflict” in 2001, 2007, and 2011, after which the conflict has been defined as a “short-term” one over 2012-2014 based on continued significant casualties from armed conflict. The government effectiveness estimates used in the quantitative study range from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong); for most of the period 1995-2014, Kenyan scores are around -0.5 to -0.6, better than the performance of the mean SSA country of -0.81. Kenyan performance was seen to improve at the end of the period. In 2013-2014, scores improved to 0.33. Kenya is coded by the Project on Ethnic Relations (PER) as having excluded ethnic groups. The country hosts many refugees from neighboring countries, particularly Somalia; Kenya has also had forced displacement issues as electoral violence in 2007 led large numbers of Kenyans to flee. The case study research focused on eight programs from five sectors as well as two additional programs:

• Democracy, Governance and Conflict (3): 1. Peaceful Empowerment in Arid Lands (PEARL) (2015-2017); 2. Strengthening Community Resilience against Extremism (SCORE) (2014-2018); and 3. Agile Harmonized Assistance for Devolved Institutions (AHADI) (2014-2019).

• Education (1): 1. Kenya Youth Employment and Skills (K-YES) (2015-2020).

• Health (1): 1. AIDS, Population and Health Integrated Assistance Plus Integrated Marginal Arid Regions

Innovative Socialized Health Approach (APHIA IMARISHA) (2012-2017).

• Environment (1): 1. Climate Resilient Community Conservancies Program (2015-2019).

• Economic Growth (2): 1. Kenya Resilient Arid Lands Partnership for Integrated Development (Kenya-RAPID) (2015-2020);

and 2. Resilience and Economic Growth in the Arid Lands – Accelerated Growth (REGAL-AG) (2012-

2017).

• Additional Programming Reviewed:

1. Kenya Electoral Assistance Program (KEAP); and 2. Kenya NiWajibu Wetu [Kenya It’s our responsibility] (NIWETU).

4.2 Liberia

Liberia, under the categorization used in this study was “post conflict” until the civil war broke out as a recurring conflict in 2000. During the twenty-year period of this study (1995-2014), Liberia experienced a “recurrent” and “short conflict” from 2000 to 2003. Liberia became post-conflict with the successful ceasefire and 2003 Accra Peace Accord. The team’s coding categorizes Liberia as “not conflict affected” starting in 2014 (although the case study research found several ways that the legacy of conflict continues to impact Liberia). In terms of government effectiveness, on the -2.5 to 2.5 scale used by the World Governance Indicators, Liberian marks rose from -1.72 1996 to -1.17 in 2012 before declining slightly in 2013 and 2014. However, Liberia’s scores continue to fall below those of the median SSA country. Liberia is coded by PER as not having an excluded ethnic group. UNHCR data notes over 2011-2014 that the country continues to host refugees, particularly from neighboring Ivory Coast, but at this point has no IDPs.

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The team reviewed eight projects in four sectors:

• Democracy, Governance and Conflict (3): 1. Liberia Elections and Political Transitions (LEPT) (2014-2019); 2. Governance and Economic Management Support (GEMS) (2012-2017); and 3. Land Governance Support Activity (LGSA) (2013-2018).

• Education (1): 1. Advancing Youth Project (AYP) (2011-2016).

• Health (2): 1. Support to the Ministry of Health for the Implementation of Liberia’s 2011-2021 National Health

and Social Welfare Plan and Policy, Fixed Amount Reimbursement Agreement (FARA) (2016-2021); and

2. Liberia Municipal Water Project (LMWP) (2016-2020).

• Economic Growth (2): 1. Forest Incomes for Environmental Sustainability (FIFES) (2015-2020); and 2. Liberia Agribusiness Development Activity (LADA) (2016-2021).

4.3 Nigeria

For the quantitative analysis based on Uppsala’s definition of armed conflict, the team coded Nigeria as a new conflict in 2004 for the conflicts between the Government of Nigeria and Ahlul Sunna Jamma (Followers of the Prophet), which was seeking the creation of an independent Islamic state in Northern Nigeria, and Government of Nigeria and the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Defense Force (NDPVF), which sought Ijaw self-determination and benefits from the oil resources in the Niger Delta. In 2009, a conflict between the Government of Nigeria and Islamic sect Jamaatu Ahlis Sunna Liddaawati wal-Jihad (which “appears to have similar origins as the group Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa” and a “stated goal to topple the government and set up puritanical Islamic rule.”7) began. After a year of relatively limited violence (with less than 25 battle-related deaths), the conflict “recurred” in 2011 and has persisted since. Conflict then recurred in 2009 and again in 2012. This coding captures intra-state conflict between groups against the state from ethnic exclusion and violent extremism, which are related to Nigeria’s complex governance patterns, intricate ethnic dynamics, and historical patterns of economic exclusion.8 Nigeria scores below the overall 1995 -2014 median SSA country value for government effectiveness. Nigeria’s ratings fluctuate between around -1.2 and -1 in the last four years of the series. Nigeria, over the last five years, stands out for the large magnitude of forced displacement based on the conflict with Boko Haram, which has led to many IDPs within the country and Nigerians fleeing the country to neighboring states. UNCHR statistics note almost 1.2 million IDPs in 2014. The team reviewed eight projects in five sectors:

• Peace, Democracy and Governance (4): 1. Engaging Communities for Peace in Nigeria (ECPN) (2015-2017); 2. Leadership, Empowerment, Advocacy, and Development (LEAD) (2009-2017); 3. Strengthening Advocacy and Civic Engagement (SACE) (2014-2019); and

7 “Government of Nigeria - Jama-atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad,” Uppsala Conflict Database Project, http://ucdp.uu.se/#/statebased/640. 8 The definition and coding does not encapsulate the numerous and on-going violent conflicts between groups in Nigeria such as farmer-pastoralist fighting that is not directed against state forces.

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4. Training of Leaders on Religious and National Coexistence (TOLERANCE) (2012-2017).

• Education (1): 1. Education Crisis Response (ECR) (2014-2017).

• Health (1): 1. Strengthening Integrated Delivery of HIV/AIDS Services (SIDHAS).

• Water (1): 1. Water Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) (2009-2014, 2015-2020).

• Office of Transition Initiatives (1): 1. Nigeria Regional Transition Initiative (NRTI).

5. Conclusions and Recommendations

The conclusions presented are drawn from the research conducted with USAID Missions in Kenya, Liberia, and Nigeria. The case studies focused on factors of government effectiveness, ethnic exclusion, and forced displacement, which were identified as key factors of importance for conflict in SSA countries from the Phase II Task 1 quantitative study. The case study research focuses on USAID strategies and programming in the three countries. The conclusions and recommendations from these cases may be relevant to other missions or country contexts; however, extension of conclusions and recommendations to other countries and Missions may require additional research. The following section synthesizes conclusions from the three case studies as broad recommendations for USAID strategy in conflict-affected environments in two parts. First, there is an overview of how USAID case study Missions approached each of the three key factors. Second, this section examines how key programmatic considerations intersect with these three factors. Limited Explicit Consideration of Key Themes by USAID Missions

Conclusion #1: USAID Missions prioritized their specific country contexts and situational analysis of

countries in formulating their strategies and programming. This system of priorities and analysis may

not adequately consider broader themes and regional trends that are associated with violent conflict, in

particular factors of government effectiveness, ethnic exclusion, and forced displacement.

The most significant finding is that while three factors of government effectiveness, ethnic exclusion, and forced displacement were strongly associated with conflict across SSA and apparent in the three country cases examined, USAID Missions largely prioritized other specific country dynamics in their programming in these countries. However, much of the programming the team analyzed had links to government effectiveness, with more tenuous links to ethnic exclusion, and/or forced displacement. These linkages existed because aspects of the specific country contexts required that USAID address them - not because of explicit identification of these trends and conscious, strategic integration into Mission programming, but because there is a contextual knowledge of the role these factors play in country dynamics. This research suggests that it might be beneficial to explicitly consider incorporating the factors of government effectiveness, ethnic exclusion, and forced displacement in the analysis of country contexts. Recommendation #1: USAID Missions should consider explicitly including regional trends and these three

themes in their situational analysis of SSA countries to understand potential conflict risks and consider

interventions targeting government effectiveness, ethnic exclusion, and forced migration because of their

relationships with conflict across the region.

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Government Effectiveness

Government Effectiveness Conclusion: USAID Missions in case study countries incorporated

government effectiveness as a critical factor in their analyses and developed targeted approaches to

supporting government effectiveness based on specific country contexts.

Government effectiveness stood out in the research as the one factor that was addressed consistently across the three case study country programs. USAID, through Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance (DRG) programming, addresses government effectiveness to the extent that government effectiveness is a critical aspect of good governance. Though each country program addressed government effectiveness, the strategic and programmatic approaches varied based on the specifics of the country context. Programming explicitly linked to government effectiveness was primarily confined to DRG sector programming with tangential links across other programming sectors. Kenya’s emphasis on devolution is designed to increase local government capacity and lessen the stakes for national political competitions, which have been conflict triggers in the country. USAID/Kenya has supported devolution by increasing government capacity through several programs at varying levels. In Liberia, perceptions of government effectiveness are perceived to be critical to sustaining peace. USAID/Liberia thus has supported Government of Liberia (GOL)-led service delivery and enhanced GOL capacity as a comprehensive approach. In Nigeria, corruption issues at the national government level are seen to inhibit effectiveness and inclusion. USAID/Nigeria strategically chose to work with local-level political champions in strategic focal states rather than with national government institutions. Each mission’s strategy included approaches to improve government effectiveness and multiple programs at different levels of engagement with host country national, regional, and local governments to increase government effectiveness and support governments in promoting peace. From the programs analyzed that explicitly target government effectiveness, programming at the local or county level more efficiently and sustainably achieved development gains. Human and Institutional Capacity Development (HICD) programming in Liberia was perceived to be unsustainable without continued, extensive long-term investment, while more immediate shifts in perceptions of government effectiveness were noted in local-level Nigeria programming across sectors. The strategic approach by the country missions was embedded in the Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS). In Kenya, the ambitious goal of the CDCS was “governance and economy sustainably transformed.” The CDCS was based on three key themes – equity and equality, participation, and empowerment – and five principles – youth, devolution, resilience, peace and security and gender.9 The links of the CDCS goals to government effectiveness emphasize the role that governance plays in Kenya’s stability. After 2007’s election violence, Kenya chose to revise the constitution to deconcentrate power from the central government to the county level. Devolution was seen as promising for better governance and an approach to break the pattern of electoral violence. The USAID/Kenya strategy recognizes that the Mission should work to help Kenyans build the political will needed to successfully carry out key national initiatives like devolution. Mission programming has focused on building government effectiveness to mitigate conflict risks and support good governance in the key area of electoral management through work with civil society and government institutions. At the sub-national level, USAID/Kenya has also geo-targeted some aspects of programming, including work developing local government effectiveness in the Northern Arid Lands.

9 USAID Kenya Country Development Cooperation Strategy 2014-2018. USAID, May 2014, p. 4-5.

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Whereas previous USAID/Liberia strategy prioritized stabilization and post-conflict recovery, the current CDCS mirrors the national Agenda for Transformation (AfT) to generate sustainable long-term development. The overall strategic goal for the end of the CDCS period in 2018 was Strengthened Liberian Institutions Positioned to Drive Inclusive Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction. The USAID/Liberia Mission noted two broad categories of obstacles to development in Liberia in the CDCS: institutions and capacity. These two categories framed the challenges for Liberia to launching and sustaining a long-term development process as:

● Institutional: overcoming the fundamentally unchanged extractive, non-inclusive social, political, and economic systems of the past; and

● Capacity: addressing the shortage of educated, trained Liberians from this legacy of exclusion and destruction of the educational system in the conflict.

During Liberia’s post-conflict reconstruction period, donors have provided most of the resources for re‐building infrastructure and providing basic public services. Donors, including USAID, have also provided assistance to help fill key capacity and human resources gaps. USAID/Liberia programming is concentrated on balancing institutional and capacity gaps with a long-term Human Institutional Capacity Development approach. Government effectiveness programming in Liberia works at the national level, with a long-term trajectory. The research found benefits of working with political parties and politicians as the key actors identified as potential mobilizers for conflict in the country, particularly in some parts of the electoral cycle. Despite highly successful USAID support for GOL capacity development and effectiveness, Liberia still does not have the kind of effective government institutions or staff that it needs. USAID/Liberia needs responsible and accountable GOL counterpart institutions that can own and sustain project successes, including in human and institutional capacity development for government effectiveness. For example, the Governance and Economic Management Support (GEMS) project works to improve technical and institutional capacity within GOL. However, sustainability of the GEMS gains in transparency, capacity, and accountability are uncertain. The GEMS mid-term evaluation noted an organizational obstacle in that there is no single GOL counterpart (i.e., task force, or institutional anchor) to which GEMS can seek support and guidance.10 This limits the durability of these programmatic gains as, once the programming cycle is complete, there is no central national institutional conduit for continued dissemination of information and best practices. Additionally, this hinders the legitimacy and national ownership of these institutional development gains. The final evaluation concluded that, although policies, processes, procedures and systems are in place in the Central Management Agencies (CMAs), human and institutional resources to implement these innovative systems are lacking. This not only potentially limits the gains to the life of the project, it is a major impediment to expansion in other CMAs without extensive technical support. In this sense, GEMS has become a capacity substitution program, rather than a capacity building program, bringing technical support without the ability to durably transfer skills, knowledge, and procedures. Undertaking HICD is undoubtedly a long-term process that requires consistent financial, technical, and strategic commitment. HICD also necessitates organizational collaboration with GOL to plan in advance for continuity within national institutions. Beyond HICD programming that explicitly targets government effectiveness in Liberia, other programming could achieve gains in perceptions of government effectiveness by combining institution-building with more direct delivery of services. For example, piloting health service provision through the GOL appears to have helped raise the profile of the government in service delivery, albeit with challenges. The Mission

10 USAID. 2014. DRG Learning, Evaluation, and Research Activity: Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of the Liberia Governance and Economic Management Support Program. September 2014. P. 3.

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has additional promising approaches that work with government institutions on service delivery through methodologies that bring private sector actors and communities into provision. This includes project implementing partners for agricultural extension and community leaders for water and sewerage. These indirect approaches of enhancing government effectiveness were notable in their efficiency relative to programming emphasizing long-term HICD for GOL. The current USAID/Nigeria CDCS Strategy Goal is “Reduced Extreme Poverty in a More Stable, Democratic Nigeria.” Though the goal of USAID/Nigeria’s activities is the reduction of extreme poverty, the approach is dictated by endemic national governance obstacles, which exacerbate chronic and imbalanced poverty for Nigerians. Three key components of the USAID/Nigeria CDCS contribute to effective operations in conflict-affected Nigeria:

1) Working with reform-minded “political champions;”11 2) Implementation of the focus states strategy and clustered programming; and 3) Cross-sectoral coordination of IPs within a geographic area.

USAID/Nigeria’s CDCS notes that conflict in Nigeria can largely be traced to challenges in governance. The USAID Cross Sectoral Conflict Assessment (2014) found that conflict in Nigeria can be linked to resource conflict and the government’s ineffective distribution and utilization of Nigeria’s natural resource wealth. Ineffective governance drives USAID/Nigeria’s strategic approach across sectors. USAID/Nigeria’s Focus States Strategy (FSS) concentrated efforts in two states to increase local state capacity and service delivery. The effectiveness of this approach led USAID/Nigeria to expand on this geographic concentration of programming to other states and local government areas where health, education, and poverty indicators are poor. Strategically, USAID works at the sub-national level in Nigeria, engaging with state and local governments and communities. This enables USAID to target “reform-minded officials and institutions” with a commitment to improving service delivery.12 USAID also focuses its activities in the northern part of Nigeria, where poverty rates are particularly high and service delivery is weak. One idea behind this cross-sectoral approach is that these wraparound services will increase local government transparency and the accountability of resource management. In the absence of a clear political champion, USAID/Nigeria has even innovated programming that empowers citizens to replace ineffective governance through the TOLERANCE program and its community education and mediation programming. Strategically, USAID/Nigeria has isolated a conflict driver (a lack of government effectiveness) and implemented a conflict-driven provision to work within this obstacle. This approach also indirectly engages ethnic exclusion and displacement, as the more poverty-stricken northern states also represent states with marginalized ethnic populations, as well as conflict-displaced transitional Nigerians. USAID resources in health and education are large and financially dwarf other USAID programming in Nigeria. Health and education programming can be related to improving service delivery and perceptions of government effectiveness across Nigeria. Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) in the Strengthening Integrated Delivery of HIV/AIDS Services (SIDHAS) project noted that presently, there is not an efficient means of replacing sites with ineffective state leadership. Unless sites with ineffective state leadership are dropped from programming thereby motivating reform-minded local government authorities (LGA) representatives, there is no present potential for the project to impact governance drivers of conflict.13

11 USAID/Nigeria. 2015. Country Development Cooperation Strategy, 2015-2020. P. 25. 12 USAID/Nigeria. 2015. Country Development Cooperation Strategy, 2015-2010, p. 25. 13 This is not to suggest that the benefit of providing needed health services is negated; merely that auxiliary gains in government effectiveness are minimal without this consideration.

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Additionally, USAID provision of HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis (TB) programming needs mechanisms to get the government engaged towards taking technical and financial responsibility for critical healthcare services across Nigeria to increase perceptions of government effectiveness, while demonstrating ethnic equality in service delivery. Programming outside of the DRG sector can play important roles in government effectiveness, but project design and implementation are critical to achieving these additional program benefits.

Government Effectiveness Recommendation: USAID Missions should continue to assess the issues and

challenges of government effectiveness as central to development and country partnerships with USAID.

An additional reason for focusing on this area is the demonstrated link between government ineffectiveness

and violent conflict in SSA. Missions should strategically evaluate the most effective level of engagement

in government capacity development based on available resources, national development priorities and the

capabilities of government partners to improve government effectiveness. Programming with development

objectives beyond government effectiveness can play a role in improving perceptions of government

effectiveness with proper project design and attention to detail in implementation.

Ethnic Exclusion

Ethnic Exclusion Conclusion: USAID Missions dedicated programming specifically to marginalized or

excluded populations in each case study country, though programming specifically addressing groups

excluded by ethnicity was minimal.

All three case study countries had programming intended to improve inclusion or connect marginalized and excluded populations to service delivery and civil society. Though this demonstrates each mission’s commitment to improving the lives of marginalized groups within case study country populations, programming specifically targeting ethnic exclusion was limited, and instead programming focused on exclusion more broadly, including geographic, economic, political, age, religious, and other identity and livelihoods variables. The strategic approaches taken varied by country based the context of exclusion within each country and the intentions of specific programs. The three general categories of programming that engaged excluded groups were: 1) vocational training and economic empowerment, 2) basic service delivery, and 3) community-level conflict mediation and mitigation. With each program, the development objectives are not exclusively tied to exclusion, but target several key development objectives. In Kenya, programming in northern arid lands supports historically marginalized populations. Other USAID/Kenya activities focus on youth vocational training improves opportunities for economic inclusion for young people. In Liberia, work in community forestry empowers historically marginalized rural populations and job training programming increases opportunities for youth. In Nigeria, health and sanitation programming in northern underserved regions improves perceptions of inclusion and service delivery, and community conflict mitigation and prevention programming enhances dialogues between local conflict actors including farmers and pastoralists, and Muslims and Christians. Vocational training has the benefit of improving economic and political opportunities while assuaging grievance. Community conflict mitigation and mediation programming could have countering violent extremism (CVE) implications, depending on the country context. USAID/Kenya’s CVE projects include explicit consideration of ethnic and religious exclusion as well as the broader sense of marginalization by vulnerable populations in the coastal region. The specific focus on the Northern Arid Lands was determined by the choice to focus on a marginalized geographic region and the ethnic groups that are the majority of the population in these counties who had seen limited gains from national development and who are or are perceived to be isolated from government services. It is unclear whether their exclusion is resultant from ethnicity or from geography, or other factors relating to Kenya’s

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development and service delivery. Kenya’s youthful population is both an opportunity for development and a risk factor for conflict; youth were pulled into the violence in 2007 as both victims and perpetrators and social perceptions of youth are equally mixed. Engagement with youth, as done through the prior Yes Youth Can project, can develop forums that youth appreciate and use to avoid violence. While young people need employment (and the skills to gain employment), projects that work with the youth in Kenya should retain components that focus on breaking perceptions of exclusion and supporting peace. In spite of Liberia’s conflict history and the legacy of the longstanding exclusionary social, political, and economic systems, which allowed resource capture by a small privileged elite of Liberians (largely of Americo-Liberian extraction) and excluded the overwhelming majority of the population from most development, ethnic exclusion does not seem to be a prominent factor in Liberia’s development challenges. However, other exclusion dynamics play out in Liberia, particularly with the very large youth demographic. Mission staff noted Liberians often had a negative view of youth, with the large numbers of young people in the country frequently seen as a risk factor for instability and conflict rather than as a resource for development. Liberia’s education system is plagued by inequitable access to education based on geography, poor provision of services, low quality facilities and poorly trained teachers (including “ghost” teachers who do not teach but receive salary, and teachers who are not paid who are teaching). Strong politicians are seen as able to slant the distribution of education resources towards their constituents. This was not seen to be a system based on unequal access based on ethnic criteria, but rather on geographically-based politics with individual elected politicians. Youth remain conflict-affected; the need for local employment opportunities and pertinent vocational training, especially for young men, remains an important priority for development and to avoid conflict risks associated with youth marginalization, under-education, and underemployment. USAID/Nigeria has addressed the pressures of ethnic exclusion across several aspects of programming, though no programs reviewed targeted ethnic exclusion as a primary development objective and some programming, which was not designed to have an identity element, became charged along identity. USAID/Nigeria concentrates resources and programs in select northern states where there are more marginalized ethnic populations. In projects such as Engaging Communities for Peace (ECPN), USAID/Nigeria has attempted to combat local ethnic exclusion by proactively bringing together diverse stakeholders at the community level. This pattern of proactively inclusive development programming is representative of the extent to which missions reviewed have addressed exclusion and marginalization in all of its aspects. Interviews indicated, however, that there are some ethnic groups who feel more stigmatization related to HIV/AIDS programming, resulting in inequitable access of health services, in spite of the intention of inclusive service delivery.14 As in the case of HIV/AIDS sensitivities with regards to specific ethnic groups, cultural traditions associated with ethnicity may require distinct programming approaches in order to achieve equality in access to services. In certain contexts, perceptions of ethnic exclusion are easily exacerbated through service delivery inequality resulting from site selection or geo-targeting. Conflict in Nigeria related to WASH is an issue of access to services; this is not necessarily a product of exclusion, but an overall shortage of services.15 However, there is high prevalence of exclusion because of historic and existing identity tensions. WASH sector services disproportionately disadvantage vulnerable groups, including women and children.16 Lack of national planning combined with population growth has created aquifer contamination and infiltration,

14 KII FHI 360. 15 USAID. 2015. Sector Assessment Summary: Nigeria. USAID WASH Sector Status and Trends in Water and

Development Strategy Priority Countries. Tetra Tech. Final Report, June 2015, p. 6. 16 KII IP WCP.

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making planning for expanded WASH infrastructure challenging. Site selection for new or improved infrastructure can then be perceived as favoritism or exclusion, especially depending on the religious, geographic, or ethnic identity of the LGA representative implementing the improvement.

Ethnic Exclusion Recommendation: USAID Missions should continue to mix approaches that target the

population as a whole with ones that focus on specific marginalized or excluded groups. Given the nature

of the relationship between conflict and ethnic exclusion, USAID Missions should explore supporting more

programming that directly targets specifically excluded ethnic groups. USAID support can improve

perceptions of government effectiveness and responsiveness/inclusion through programming that enhances

the quality of life and economic opportunity for the broadest representation of people throughout a

community. Varying groups of people may be marginalized: women; youth; the elderly; particular groups

based on ethnicity, religion, or political affiliations; rural communities; lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender

and intersex (LGBTI) people; indigenous people, and persons with disabilities. USAID Missions should

explicitly consider how certain ethnic groups or other key marginalized populations are excluded and what

is needed to ensure they equally benefit from the opportunities for prosperity and security given to people

across the population. If countries have excluded ethnic groups, USAID Missions should consider

approaches to help end this exclusion not only because of equality considerations but also due to the

important links between ethnic exclusion and violent conflict across SSA. Additionally, USAID Missions

should consider the existing identity dynamics when establishing site selection so as to not generate the

perception of favoritism.

Forced Displacement

Forced Displacement Conclusion: USAID Missions support displaced populations through inclusive

service delivery, access to education, and job training. Given the rapid movement and potentially

spontaneous nature of these populations, programming has been reactive rather than pre-emptive.

Of the three factors, forced displacement was the most difficult to track programmatically in this study. Kenya is host to a large number of refugees and economic migrants, but USAID/Kenya does not have an explicit approach in its strategy on migration or forced displacement. Though the counties in the North host many of Kenya’s refugees where many of USAID/Kenya’s Northern Arid Lands programming is concentrated, USAID Mission programming has not focused on the displaced populations that reside in camps. More than a decade into the implementation of the peace accord that ended the Liberian civil war, Liberia no longer has a substantial problem with forced displacement – although non-forced economic migration is substantial and poses many challenges. USAID/Liberia’s work on youth vocational training and urban service delivery programming has effects on the large rural to urban migration apparent in the country, especially among the youth. Nigeria has several conflicts that drive forced displacement in the country and region. Although USAID programming in many of Nigerian states affected by conflict is difficult if not impossible because of security concerns, some programs were developed to focus on supporting Nigerians forcibly displaced by the conflict with Boko Haram. USAID has worked with IDPs and host community populations, but USG assistance to refugee populations is often delivered by other USG agencies. Of the programming reviewed across the case studies, only USAID/Nigeria’s Education Crisis Response programming was developed in direct response to the challenges of reaching forcibly displaced youth populations. During the course of programming, non-displaced local communities sought the educational services provided to IDP children, and the program was expanded to include non-IDP community children as well. Given the complexities of conflict-driven displacement, USAID Missions have had difficulty strategically planning programming around these populations.

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Several other aspects of programming may have the effect of reducing the pressures that lead to forced displacement. USAID/Kenya environmental programming to support conservancies may reduce forced displacement risks through a focus on conflict prevention and management. USAID/Nigeria’s community conflict mitigation program, TOLERANCE, empowers communities to effectively mitigate and manage religious conflict, which has been an important catalyst for forced displacement in Nigeria. USAID/Nigeria, by concentrating programming in northern states where populations of displaced Nigerians are higher, indirectly addresses forced displacement by providing inclusive programmatic service delivery. In both case studies, thorough knowledge of the historic, local conflict patterns have generated programming with the benefit of mitigating conflicts that drive displacement. As an extension, forced displacement can be conceived of as a consequence of conflict, and therefore conflict management and mitigation programming indirectly targets forced displacement. Forced displacement emerged in the literature research as a critical factor in conflict and was substantiated in the quantitative analysis of this research. However, forced displacement was a minor aspect of programming in the case study analysis. This is because development assistance has a minimal role to play in mitigating the global humanitarian problem of conflict-affected displacement. Development assistance instead can support host country governments in managing their national responses to displaced populations. USAID can assist governments in identifying marginalized groups, conflict-affected displaced populations, and can assist host country governments in providing services for those populations including integration of populations into host communities and/or access to government services. USAID focus for related development assistance programming should be on conflict-affected displaced populations that have a tenuous relationship to government. As in the case of Nigeria, ethnic marginalization from national government may have played a role in the government’s relationship with displaced populations, necessitating intervention through USAID to support these populations in accessing government services. For example, there are some IDP communities who feel excluded from health services because of ethnic identity, and generally, there have been no services for IDPs within host communities, and the only health services have been basic services provided through IDP camps.17 Beyond facilitating IDP population-government relationships and responses, USAID can continue to be consciously inclusive of forcibly displaced populations in extant programming. Forced Displacement Recommendation: USAID Missions should continue to address the immediate needs

of displaced populations to the extent that the country strategy allows and to the extent that complex

humanitarian crises command. When establishing a crisis response program targeting a displaced

population, program length should take into consideration the migratory nature of fleeing populations.

Forced displacement could be conceptually conceived as a consequence of conflict and programming could

strategically focus on limiting displacement rather than reacting to it. Development assistance targeting

forcibly displaced populations can strengthen government effectiveness when assisting displaced

populations in accessing government services, and when facilitating country government response to

conflict-affected displacement.

Other Case Study Conclusions

This section presents conclusions regarding the case studies broadly based on the team’s fieldwork on Mission strategies and specific programs. Where links are evident to government effectiveness, ethnic exclusion, and forced migration, conclusions are linked back to these three factors in the case studies. However, since Mission strategies and programming focus on specific country contexts not these themes, many aspects of Mission strategies and programming are not explicitly linked to these factors. Longer, more

17 KII FHI 360.

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comprehensive discussion of mission strategies, approaches and specific programs are included as Annexes I, II, and III on Kenya, Liberia, and Nigeria.

Conflict is cross-sectoral and the key factors are cross-sectoral

Conclusion #1: A cross-sectoral strategy aids in maximizing the peace gains between programs in

conflict-affected countries. Cross-sectoral programming in targeted geographic priority areas can be

utilized to enhance perceptions of government effectiveness by generating improved capacity and service

delivery.

Although USAID Missions are organized by sector, conflict affects countries and missions across sectors. Nigeria, whose subnational conflicts are stimulated by government ineffectiveness, ethnic exclusion, and forced displacement must contend with the consequences of conflict economically, socially, and politically. Kenya, whose government effectiveness needs substantial reinforcement to maintain peace, also requires programming across sectors to curb national and regional instability. Liberia, where the civil war has been followed by a decade of international interventions in security and development, needs economic programming with a cross-sectoral approach to support the GOL and its citizens. Because of unique conflict contexts in each case study country, USAID Missions have approached cross-sectoral development needs in different ways. USAID/Nigeria explicitly integrated its cross-sectoral strategy within the CDCS, USAID/Kenya applied its PREG approach, and USAID/Liberia has implemented cross sectorally through a focus on HICD. The case studies revealed the importance of a cross-sectoral approach. For example, USAID/Nigeria’s cross-sectoral approach in combination with the predecessor Focus States Strategy has generated increased perceptions of government effectiveness at the local level by consolidating service delivery within targeted geographic priority areas. The co-location and co-implementation of programming within USAID/Nigeria was possible because of the strategic choice to work with specific LGAs. USAID/Kenya and USAID/Liberia lack the level of geographic focus, though USAID/Kenya has some efforts concentrated in the Northern Arid Lands. USAID/Kenya and USAID/Liberia have implemented their cross-sectoral approaches with less concentration, geographic or otherwise. Programming such as USAID/Liberia’s Liberia Municipal Water Project or USAID/Kenya’s AIDS, Population and Health Integrated Assistance Plus Integrated Marginal Arid Regions Innovative Socialized Health Approach, which combine service delivery for basic needs with increased perceptions of government effectiveness, are good examples of cross-sectoral programming that net peace dividends. Recommendation #1: USAID Missions operating in conflict-affected countries would benefit from a

conscious and comprehensive cross-sectoral strategy specific to the host country needs. Programming that

targets the drivers of conflict can come from any sector of USAID programming. An effective cross-sectoral

approach can improve the efficiency and comprehensive benefits of individual programs. A cross-sectoral

approach combined with geo-targeting could impact relevant conflict factors by increasing local

perceptions of government effectiveness through improved service delivery, mitigating exclusion and

targeting forced displacement through inclusive programming.

Balance short-term service delivery and long-term capacity development

Conclusion #2: USAID Missions have attempted to balance long-term institutional strengthening with

short-term service delivery in a way that strategically maximizes the needs of the host country.

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USAID Missions in all three case study countries have had to make strategic choices balancing support for long-term capacity development with assistance for immediate service delivery needs. Particularly in Liberia, where the 14-year civil war dramatically reduced the technical and professional human capacity of GOL staff, capacity needs are tremendous. Additionally, the conflict left a generation of Liberian youth without a formal education. To strengthen GOL’s institutions, long-term human and institutional capacity development is a USAID/Liberia priority. Long-term support for HICD of the government must be balanced with supporting meeting the immediate needs of Liberian citizens, who require functional, competent institutions to deliver basic services. USAID/Liberia has approached these competing needs in a synergistic way. To the extent possible, USAID/Liberia has designed programming that combines short-term service delivery with long-term institutional strengthening. This has the benefit of increasing perceptions of government effectiveness through service delivery, while increasing government effectiveness for years to come. This approach might be applicable in other contexts where the conflict has eroded government effectiveness, leaving it insufficient to meet citizen demands for services. A key component of any approach relying on a long-term HICD strategy is comprehensive monitoring and evaluation (M&E), which can monitor and learn from modest but significant changes in institutional and human capacity as they happen. USAID/Liberia has used analysis well to support learning, including on human and institutional capacity development. USAID/Nigeria has addressed similar issues of developing institutional capacity alongside service delivery. However, because of corruption at the federal GON level, this USAID/Nigeria work is nearly exclusively in under-served northern LGAs. Because of the strategic concentration of resources in focus LGAs, human capacity has not been explicitly programmed to a great extent as a strategy, but is rather a positive consequence of working with local “political champions” within target LGAs. In this sense, USAID/Nigeria has strategically prioritized short-term service delivery while simultaneously strengthening community ties to supportive local government officials. USAID/Kenya has focused on supporting Government of Kenya (GOK’s) devolution programming and focused on supporting local government in anticipation of greater responsibility. USAID/Kenya’s work with peace committees through the PEARL program strengthened local government capacity while mitigating local level conflict. The flagship devolution program, AHADI, works with local counties to strengthen governance, particularly in the focal arid regions where USAID/Kenya has prioritized service delivery. Recommendation #2: An emphasis on long-term institutional and human capacity development is

compatible with support for development through assistance on immediate service delivery in a context that

has undergone a substantial government overhaul or is rebuilding after a period of conflict. Short-term

support for service delivery should continue to be linked to longer-term assistance on sustainable

institutional and human capacity development.

Level of Host Country Government Engagement

Conclusion #3: USAID Missions have targeted the level of host-country government engagement that

maximizes development gains. This level of engagement with host-country governments dictates the scale

of any institutional changes that may occur.

In part because of the importance of government effectiveness for maintaining peace, USAID Missions engage with host-country governments. The three case studies have different levels of USAID engagement with host-country governments as a result of different country contexts. USAID/Kenya has supported GOK’s interest in devolution by supporting specific county governments. USAID/Liberia has focused on

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strengthening GOL at the national institution level to rebuild the country after the conflict. USAID/Nigeria has prioritized work with specific LGAs with a high need for service delivery and proven will to govern transparently for their constituents. These three levels of engagement balance host-country priorities and national needs. Only USAID/Liberia works primarily with federal institutions at the national level. All three approaches serve to improve government effectiveness. Each of these levels of engagement has consequences for implementation and results. In Nigeria, programmatic interventions are not scalable to the national level, nor are they likely to be institutionalized at the federal level without a seismic shift in national government. While investments at the local government levels are laudable and may have lasting impacts within targeted communities, these investments may not extend beyond these communities. In Kenya, support at the county level supports the GOK’s national agenda for devolution, so local level work supports national government effectiveness because local level empowerment is a national government priority. In Liberia, work with the GOL in national institutions runs risks of becoming capacity substitution, as interventions may support reforms that GOL institutions are unable to maintain beyond the life of the program. Smaller scale programs with local governments might be more sustainable, but GOL’s national needs are of such a scale as to necessitate intervention at the federal level. Recommendation #3: USAID Missions in conflict-affected countries should continue to strategically target

the level of host-country government engagement that improves government effectiveness, reduces ethnic

exclusion, and reduces forced displacement. Understanding the national government and its role in

mitigating or exacerbating conflicts is critical in designing a strategy for development initiatives with host

country governments.

Geographic Prioritization

Conclusion #4: USAID Missions in conflict-affected countries prioritize programming with different

geographic strategies.

The level of engagement with host country governments also plays a role in how USAID Missions choose to concentrate resources geographically. Geographic priorities can be based on population density or the weaknesses of existing service delivery in projects whose primary objective is service delivery in areas such as health, education, or water and sanitation. USAID/Liberia has opted for high population density priority areas, focusing on the six most populous counties. This population density approach is compatible with USAID/Liberia’s strategic approach of national HICD. While DRG sector programming operates with the federal government, other sectors operate largely within the six priority urban areas to maximize service delivery to the most people possible. USAID/Nigeria, because of the strategic focus on some LGAs, concentrates almost all programming across all sectors in these LGAs. Though this could have a negative impact on LGAs that are not receiving services, it also consolidates and maximizes the local impact across sectors for the underserved regions of Nigeria targeted. Locally improving access to services, education, and infrastructure runs the risk of increasing inequality locally, and site selection must be chosen so as not to exacerbate any latent identity or resource conflicts locally. USAID/Kenya has tried to strike a balance of supporting devolution by concentrating on counties with pre-existing conflicts and supporting the Northern Arid Lands regions where service delivery needs are most immediate, however the Mission should consider expanding this approach to areas of the country that are prone to violent extremism, including the Northeast and the coastal region. Prioritizing remote, underserved locales can have the unintentional consequence of appearing inefficient in terms of service delivery. Sub-national conflicts in Nigeria, combined with poor infrastructure, led several

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IPs to cite logistics as a pre-eminent challenge to their implementation. Similarly, in Kenya, the remote arid regions in the north that are low population density areas are also difficult to access, making the cost of providing services high. In Nigeria, remote northern areas also border areas where violent extremists seek to expand. Providing services is a potential way of mitigating the economic appeal of crime or violent extremism. In Kenya, the arid northern regions are areas where light arms trade and cattle rustling exacerbate insecurity. Again, service delivery could help stem the spread of these forms of criminality, which aggravate local conflicts. USAID/Kenya has had to balance security needs with implementation, particularly with the APHIA Plus program -when security does not permit international staff and even non-local staff to be deployed to some communities. In HIV/AIDS programming, USAID/Kenya made decisions not to prioritize through PEPFAR metrics for identifying target geographic areas based on health needs but rather choose to focus resources in the sector to complement other programming in the Northern Arid Lands as generally excluded regions. This choice resulted in relatively lower numbers of beneficiaries for the level of spending compared to countries that focused PEPFAR resources on regions with the highest incidence of HIV/AIDS. These remote regions also face other conflict factors such as ethnic exclusion and forced displacement. In Nigeria, work with IDP youth in remote northern regions addresses both ethnic exclusion and forced displacement. And, work in Kenya with northern tribes or coastal communities improves perception of government effectiveness for these groups that feel excluded from development. Mission strategies in conflict-affected countries may need to prioritize engagement on other criteria besides population density. This can include considering the dynamics and aspects of exclusion and displacement and their roles in prolonging or aggravating conflicts. Climate change and resource conflicts also drive site selection and geo-targeting by missions. USAID/Kenya Mission developed a substantial resilience portfolio in 2011 as a response to the recurrent problems of drought in Northern Kenya.18 The Mission thus convened all program teams to think through their approaches, analyses, and resources to contribute to addressing the consequences of recurrent drought and support resilience. The Mission brought together all staff, including staff from the Africa Bureau and the Bureau for Food Security, to consider how to modify approaches and break through stove piped programming through joint planning cells. This process led to the geo-targeting of the Northern Arid Lands in the USAID/Kenya Mission. The Mission sought to ensure that the substantial work planning joint resilience modalities for the Northern Arid Lands would have enduring effects. To do so, the Mission developed new innovative approaches to avoid the tendency to return to conventional models of implementation by continuing to bring IPs together and ensuring that collaboration and cooperation continues across partners. More recently, with devolution, West Pokot County and Turkana County were expected to need more capacity to manage their increased responsibilities. And work in the area was even more important with the start of exploitation of oil deposits in West Turkana on the border between the two counties and the resource competition that has resulted. Kenya also continues to experience more “traditional” forms of conflict such as violence surrounding cattle raiding and land use conflict between farmers and pastoralists. In Nigeria, land and water conflicts, including pastoral-farmer conflicts, are pervasive. Climate change and shifting precipitation patterns as well as displacement from extremism lead to more land conflicts, which play out along religious and ethnic lines. Conflict in Nigeria related to WASH is an issue of access to services; this is not necessarily a product of exclusion, but an overall shortage of services.19 However, there

18 USAID KII. 19 USAID. 2015. Sector Assessment Summary: Nigeria. USAID WASH Sector Status and Trends in Water and Development

Strategy Priority Countries. Tetra Tech. Final Report, June 2015, p. 6.

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is high prevalence of exclusion because of historic and existing identity tensions. Site selection for new or improved infrastructure can then be perceived as favoritism or exclusion, especially depending on the religious, geographic, or ethnic identity of the LGA representative implementing the improvement. Recommendation #4: USAID Missions should continue to prioritize development gains based on a variety

of factors - not simply population density - particularly in cross-sectoral programming. In the case studies,

programming in more isolated regions of countries reduced conflict by targeting excluded communities or

communities with existing communal conflicts. Although population density as a strategic priority may

serve a country such as Kenya, Liberia, and Nigeria benefit from programming in more sparsely populated

areas to strengthen peace and counter violent extremism. Local dynamics around natural resources should

also be primary considerations of site selection as resource conflicts can exacerbate or exaggerate other

forms of identity-based conflicts, which have historically escalated rapidly in the region.

Service Delivery to Enhance Government Effectiveness

Conclusion # 5: USAID Missions work to balance support for immediate service delivery needs with

improving government effectiveness through host-country service delivery. Perceptions of government

effectiveness could be increased by combining institution-building with more direct delivery of services As conflict is cross-sectoral, programming with the primary objective of supporting efficient, equitable service delivery such as health programming, can play an important role in netting peace dividends. To the extent possible, USAID Missions can prioritize programming that enables host country governments to directly deliver services to their citizens, rather than having USAID directly delivering services. This has the triple impact of enhancing government effectiveness, improving perception of government effectiveness, and providing needed services to people. Depending on the geo-targeting approached used by the mission, this can also lessen ethnic exclusion and provide services to displaced populations. When service delivery is implemented through host country government, accessing IDPs and other marginalized populations, these benefits are stretched further. This is important in the case study countries, particularly in Kenya and Nigeria, because earmarked health programming dwarfs the rest of the USAID budget. If USAID can benefit by using large health expenditures cross-sectorally, the peace dividends of programs such as PEPFAR could extend beyond the service delivery aspects themselves. USAID/Liberia has had a unique approach through its emphasis on HICD. Programming attempts to balance improving capacity and institutions while delivering basic services – which has been difficult to implement. To measurably achieve service delivery results through GOL, USAID risks supporting capacity substitution in order to deliver. A long-term HICD strategy may be required for lasting capacity building gains for service delivery. USAID/Liberia may not have had enough time to implement this strategy, and results may be premature. A geographic focus facilitates service delivery through host country governments within USAID Missions. USAID/Nigeria, and its local government level emphasis, has the advantage of delivering services in coordination with strategically selected LGAs. This approach, while necessary given the state of federal corruption in Nigeria, isolates local level programming to the LGA in which it is implemented. Given the present state of government effectiveness in Nigeria and little anticipation of institutional changes at the national level, investments are necessarily local and focus on increasing stability for these vulnerable areas. Devolution in Kenya is intrinsically a conflict mitigation strategy to empower local communities and reduce the stakes of national level politics. USAID/Kenya’s strategy to work with national institutions, civil society and county authorities through AHADI serves both the national-level agenda and local-level capacity while

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enabling communities to meet their specific needs. Service delivery programming in USAID/Kenya in remote regions could improve perceptions of local government effectiveness through continued emphasis on devolution and the empowerment of local communities in their own governance. This could also increase inclusion for under-represented communities of rural Kenya, were it more of an explicit focus. Recommendation #5: USAID Missions should continue to emphasize the importance of government

effectiveness and perceptions of government effectiveness because of its importance to stability. Improving

government effectiveness should be a strategic goal in any conflict-affected country, at whatever level of

engagement is appropriate. USAID Missions should then prioritize service delivery that can be facilitated

through host country governments in such a way that perceptions of government effectiveness are enhanced.

6. Program Highlights This section highlights one specific USAID program from each case study country that broadly encapsulates each USAID Missions’ strategy and explains the program’s relevance to the factors of government effectiveness, ethnic exclusion, and/or forced displacement. The three programs were selected because of their strong links to one or more of these factors. USAID/Kenya’s work supporting devolution through the AHADI program shows the Mission’s focus on improving government effectiveness by enhancing capacity at the county level. USAID/Liberia’s Forest Income for Environmental Sustainability program focuses on excluded populations by working to improve the livelihoods of these rural Liberians by enhancing their knowledge of and control over community forests. This addresses economic conflicts over concessions in Liberia, as well as supports the inclusion of rural Liberians, who are frequently absent from land use agreements. USAID/Nigeria’s work through the Training of Leaders on Religious and National Coexistence project highlights USAID/Nigeria’s local strategy, promotes peace by encouraging community dialogues across religious divides, and improves inclusion. This demonstrates USAID/Nigeria’s recognition of the limitations of the GON and the need for improved community-level conflict mitigation. Program Highlights Conclusion #6: USAID Mission programming in the case study countries that most

comprehensively addressed the government effectiveness, ethnic exclusion, and forced displacement

incorporated strategies of geographic targeting, service delivery, and community ownership.

6.1 USAID/Kenya Program Highlight

Agile and Harmonized Assistance for Devolved Institutions

The AHADI project was set up to support implementing the devolution processes of the 2010 Constitution that promise to fundamentally restructure governance in Kenya. The five-year $49.4 million project implemented the State University of New York (SUNY) Center for International Development has three objectives:

1. Targeted counties provide higher quality services through improved governance; 2. Improved representation of citizen interests and oversight of targeted county government

performance; and 3. Functionality and effectiveness of the devolved system increased through improved intra-

government engagement and cooperation. AHADI has also been funded by the British Department of International Development (DFID). The project is coordinated with the World Bank and UNDP who have devolution support programs that cover other counties. AHADI operates in 22 of the country’s 47 counties, including all six counties of the Northern

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Arid Lands. USAID selected these counties in coordination with UNDP and the World Bank based on the potential for AHADI to leverage resources and results from other USAID programs. The project was developed from concerns about conflict, exclusion, and government effectiveness. Kenya undertook devolution in order to address the problems of the concentration of political and economic power at the central government level, which made national elections so important and contributed to the violence around elections. One of the other effects of this concentration was that while electoral victory empowered some ethnic and political groups, others were excluded. Kenyan frustration with both violence and the lack of inclusion were designed to be addressed through devolution under the new Constitution, which began to be implemented in 2013. Devolution shifted responsibilities and resources for service delivery to the counties. The GOK and USAID recognized county authorities needed capacity development to support these added roles and manage civil servants shifted from federal to county oversight. The SOW for the program noted that “while devolution is intended to bring government closer to citizens, and hence make it more transparent and accountable, it also provides new entry points and opportunities for corruption, and could easily replicate old National patterns of obfuscation, unresponsiveness and unaccountability at the local level.20 USAID noted that exclusion might be shifted to the county level, and that studies had found that more than 90 percent of county civil servants came from the dominant ethnic groups that reside in the county; minority groups also complain about this marginalization in terms of service delivery.21 While the project does not have direct programming on inclusion at the county level, AHADI supports work on accountability as part of addressing this inclusion challenge and requires public participation, making sure that this is sufficiently inclusive. The implementation of devolution was expected to be controversial and lead to potential conflicts, particularly between counties and the national authorities. The project’s support for intragovernmental relations and engagement was developed to support peaceful devolution. Uncertainty about the challenges and opportunities in the rollout of the devolution process led the Mission to build a program modifier/rapid response mechanism into AHADI to potentially use $5 million to respond to unanticipated events.

6.2 USAID/Liberia Program Highlight

Forest Incomes for Environmental Sustainability (2015-2020)

USAID developed the FIFES project to continue to support the development of community forests in Liberia. Liberia has 44 percent of the West Africa region’s tropical forests. Timber was an important resource used to finance the civil war; at the end of the war, international sanctions had halted timber exports as a successful part of the effort to end the conflict. Support for community forest management reduces risks of conflict within communities over forest resources. The FIFES project, implemented by ACDI VOCA, built upon the People, Rules, and Organizations Supporting the Protection of Ecosystem Resources (PROSPER) project that ended February 2017, which developed eight community forests. FIFES began in November 2016 to allow for potential overlap with the Tetra Tech team from PROSPER. Funding cuts have reduced what was designed as a $22.9 million project to $16 million. The main focus of the project is on community governance of forest resources. The controversial Land Rights Act (LRA), a bill that has been in legislative process since 2014, delineates different categories of land ownership, attempts to combat land conflict, and tries to protect community and rural interests in natural resources. The LRA would essentially turn forests over to communities, a possibility that could

20 USAID. 2013. AID-615-C-14-00002 Agile and Harmonized Assistance for Devolved Institutions (AHADI) Section C – Description/Specifications/Statement of Work, p. 11. 21 USAID DRG KII.

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create poorly managed forests and fuel conflict, or has the potential to increase inclusive community economic opportunities through land rights and careful land use planning. If the LRA becomes law, community knowledge, education, and empowerment are essential requirements for successful implementation. FIFES, and PROSPER both generated important lessons learned for more successful community forestry. Aspects of the program such as capacity development through the US Forest Service and the Forestry Training Institute improve the likelihood of success with community ownership. FIFES works to increase government effectiveness through capacity development and technical assistance of the Forestry Development Authority, whose successful management and support is needed for community forests to succeed in conserving biodiversity. The project also supports research to understand the benefits of biodiversity for Liberia. FIFES is another example of the CDCS two-track approach, with direct service delivery of knowledge, ownership, and economic opportunity to Liberians, combined with capacity development for GOL institutions. The 11 community forests in the FIFES project are in more sparsely populated areas of the country. As the forests are owned by communities, the project works with the whole community to the extent possible, minimizing any ethnic exclusion issues, though the community forest areas generally represent a single ethnicity. Beyond ethnic exclusion, economic marginalization and disempowerment of rural Liberians is combatted through a rural initiative such as FIFES. Forced displacement was a feature of the civil war but not present today. Lack of rural livelihoods and the very high youth population has driven a massive shift in Liberian demography towards urban environments. In addition to rural poverty, economic and resource displacement is recognized to affect forest communities; concessions or mining can disrupt traditional livelihoods and stimulate displacement. Improving economic opportunities in forested communities, particularly for youth, could stem the urban economic migration. 6.3 USAID/Nigeria Program Highlight

Training of Leaders on Religious and National Coexistence

TOLERANCE, the first USAID/Nigeria project with a Nigerian prime IP, the Interfaith Mediation Center (IMC), promotes peace across six northern states. The IMC has more than 20 years of experience engaging in inter-faith dialogues in Kaduna state. TOLERANCE supports community-based peacebuilding by enhancing the capacity of religious leaders, traditional leaders, youth organizations, women’s organizations, government officials and civil society. The project combats localized conflict drivers and enhances understanding within and across communities. IMC’s operational model consists of trainings in conflict intervention, prevention, and mitigation plus media platforms for inter-faith dialogues. Community-based training has created a cohort of Community Peace Observers (CPOs) who have successfully intervened in different types of conflicts including Muslim-Christian conflicts, inter-ethnic conflicts, and gang violence. Through media dialogues, IMC has gained a reputation as an effective conflict mitigating organization. The development of a conflict early warning system has also been an important conflict-mitigation tool in these communities. The 2015 mid-term Evaluation of TOLERANCE pointed out key gaps in capacity for IMC.22 These capacity gaps included staff capacity development, strategic use of media, and more effective tracking and application of impact indicators and outcomes. TOLERANCE, with a modest $4.6 million budget over five years, has achieved broad results with potentially long-lasting impacts.

22 USAID/Nigeria. 2015. Training of Leaders on Religious and National Co-existence Project, Mid-Term Evaluation Report.

August 2015. The Mitchell Group, Inc. (TMG). P. 20.

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The program has directly addressed all three key factors: government effectiveness, ethnic exclusion, and displacement. The GON’s responses to violent conflict that comes out of religious tensions have been largely punitive, inconsistent, unsustainable, and have thus done little to address the underlying drivers of conflict. By empowering citizens and communities with tools to internally mitigate these conflicts, TOLERANCE compensates for the absence of an effective government response. Through incorporating the needs and concerns of communities, the sense of exclusion is mitigated through the conflict resolution process. And finally, in the absence of an escalating violent conflict, citizens are unlikely to be forced to leave their homes; without forced displacement, negative follow-on effects on conflict from displacement are minimized. Proactive engagement of youth as volunteers in TOLERANCE has empowered youth. In several cases, this engagement has led to a youth economic empowerment program. Economic opportunity for youth reduces rates of urban migration and reduces youth participation in conflict.

Program Highlight Recommendation #6: USAID Missions should continue to develop and implement

programming in conflict-affected contexts with multiple impacts on host country populations. To the extent

possible, programming should be cross-sectoral in nature, include service delivery that improves

perception of government effectiveness, and target underserved or underrepresented populations.

7. Recommendations and Lessons Learned Case study research focused on some key findings of the literature review and quantitative analysis for closer examination through fieldwork with USAID Missions and implementing partners. Each country context is unique; USAID Missions must respond and react to changes in context strategically. During the period that the case study considers, Liberia especially underwent severe and lasting changes that required shifts to USAID Mission approaches, budget, and priorities. A crisis the magnitude of the Ebola virus disease in Liberia will have durable impacts on Liberians and on the economic, political, and social fiber of the country for years. USAID Mission strategies need to be targeted to the country context but maintain flexibility if that context changes. This is a difficult balance; Mission Directors serve important roles in facilitating communication, collaboration, and strategy between the diverse stakeholders in any context. Factors Recommendation: USAID Missions should consider explicitly including key factors such as government effectiveness, ethnic exclusion, and forced displacement in their situational or contextual analysis of SSA countries to ensure that Missions systematically analyze and consider addressing factors with clear relationships to conflict across the region that may be directly relevant in specific countries. The relevance of these evidence-based factors should be checked in each USAID presence country. Evaluating these factors may lead to programming that directly targets drivers of conflict.

Government Effectiveness Recommendation: USAID Missions should continue to assess the issues and challenges of government effectiveness as central to development and country partnerships with USAID. An additional reason for focusing on this area is the clear links between government ineffectiveness and violent conflict in SSA. Missions should strategically evaluate the most effective level of engagement in government capacity development based on available resources, national development priorities, and the capabilities of government partners to improve government effectiveness.

Ethnic Exclusion Recommendation: USAID Missions should continue to mix approaches that target the population as a whole with ones that focus on specific marginalized or excluded groups. Given the nature of the relationship between conflict and ethnic exclusion, USAID Missions should explore supporting more programming that directly targets specifically excluded ethnic groups. USAID support can improve

perceptions of government effectiveness and responsiveness/inclusion through programming that enhances

the quality of life and economic opportunity for the broadest representation of people throughout a

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community. Varying groups of people may be marginalized: women; youth; the elderly; particular groups

based on ethnicity, religion, or political affiliations; rural communities; LGBTI people; indigenous people,

and persons with disabilities. USAID Missions should explicitly consider how certain ethnic groups or

other key marginalized populations are excluded and what is needed to ensure they equally benefit from

the opportunities for prosperity and security given to people across the population. If countries have excluded ethnic groups, USAID Missions should consider approaches to help end this exclusion not only because of equality considerations but also due to the important links between ethnic exclusion and violent conflict across SSA. Additionally, USAID Missions should consider the existing identity dynamics when establishing site selection so as to not generate the perception of favoritism.

Forced Displacement Recommendation: USAID Missions should continue to address the immediate needs of displaced populations to the extent that the country strategy allows and to the extent that complex humanitarian crises command. When establishing a crisis response program targeting a displaced population, program length should take into consideration the migratory nature of fleeing populations. Forced displacement could be conceptually conceived as a consequence of conflict and programming could strategically focus on limiting displacement rather than reacting to it. Development assistance targeting forcibly displaced populations can strengthen government effectiveness when assisting displaced populations in accessing government services, and when facilitating country government response to conflict-affected displacement.

7. Case Study Recommendations

Cross-Sectoral Recommendation #1: USAID Missions operating in conflict-affected countries would benefit from a conscious and comprehensive cross-sectoral strategy specific to the host country needs. Programming that targets the drivers of conflict can come from any sector of USAID programming. An effective cross-sectoral approach can improve the efficiency and comprehensive benefits of individual programs. A cross-sectoral approach combined with geo-targeting could impact relevant conflict factors by increasing local perceptions of government effectiveness through improved service delivery, mitigating exclusion and targeting forced displacement through inclusive programming.

Balance Long-term and Short-term Recommendation #2: USAID Missions have had to balance long-term institutional and human capacity needs with short-term immediate service delivery. Distinct country contexts lead to prioritizing one need over the other. Emphasis on long-term institutional and human capacity development is compatible with a context of substantial government overhaul or rebuilding after a period of conflict. Prioritizing immediate service delivery is compatible with a country context where services are inequitably distributed and service delivery strengthens perceptions of government effectiveness. Regardless of context and approach, service delivery should be provided with the eventual intention of improving government effectiveness. The eventual goal should be service delivery through the host country government because of the importance of government effectiveness in stability. To the extent possible, development programming should improve government effectiveness and perceptions of government effectiveness. Host Country Government Engagement Recommendation #3: USAID Missions in conflict-affected countries should continue to strategically target the level of host-country government engagement that promotes stability, including by improving government effectiveness, reducing ethnic exclusion, and reducing forced displacement. Understanding the national government and its role in mitigating or exacerbating conflicts is critical in designing a strategy with the host country government. Because of the importance of government effectiveness in maintaining peace or exacerbating conflict, USAID Missions should continue to strategically assess the most effective level of government with which to work. The case

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studies show three different levels of host country government engagement; Missions chose these levels based on strategic reasons to maximize development gains and support peace.

Geo-Targeting Recommendation #4: USAID Missions should continue to prioritize development gains based on factors beyond population density, including to mitigate exclusion and displacement, particularly in cross-sectoral programming. For example, it may be useful to focus resources on areas prone to violent extremism so that the multitude of grievances that facilitate recruitment can be addressed in a more holistic, sustainable way. In the case studies, programming in more isolated regions of the counties reduced conflict by targeting excluded communities or communities with existing communal conflicts. While population density as a strategic priority may serve a country such as Liberia, Nigeria and Kenya benefit from programming in more sparsely populated areas to strengthen peace. In conflict-affected contexts, geographic prioritizes should be decided on based on conflict drivers, regardless of whether the primary objective of programming relates to conflict. Local dynamics around natural resources should also be primary considerations of site selection as resource conflicts can exacerbate or exaggerate other forms of identity-based conflicts, which have historically escalated rapidly in the region.

Service Delivery through National Government Recommendation #5: USAID Missions should continue to emphasize the importance of government effectiveness and perceptions of government effectiveness in the establishment and maintenance of relative stability. Improving government effectiveness should be a strategic goal in any conflict-affected country, at whatever level of engagement is appropriate. USAID Missions should then prioritize service delivery that can be facilitated through host country governments in such a way that perceptions of government effectiveness are enhanced. Immediate service delivery can be a critical priority in USAID Mission countries. But, in the longer-term, service delivery should be facilitated through the host country government. This has the better chance of impacting conflict in that government ineffectiveness, as perceived through inequitable or inadequate service delivery, is a primary driver of conflict.

Recommendation #6: USAID Missions should continue to develop and implement programming in conflict-affected contexts with multiple impacts on host country populations. To the extent possible, programming should be cross-sectoral in nature, include service delivery that improves perception of government effectiveness, and targets underserved or underrepresented populations.