To: Craig Thomas From: Ken Mullins Re: Management-Based Governance for Massachusetts’ Toxic Use Reduction Act Date: February 29, 2016 ______________________________________________________________________________ The Massachusetts’ Toxic Use Reduction Act (TURA) was enacted in 1989 due to a cluster of childhood leukemia in the small town of Woburn, Massachusetts (Coglianese and Nash, pp. 9). The Act requires facilities that use large quantities of specific toxic chemicals to analyze the use and flow of toxic chemicals throughout their facilities, develop plans to reduce their use of these chemicals, and submit reports of their planning to the state every two years (Coglianese and Nash, pp. 10). In examining the pros and cons of management-based processes, this report provides arguments in favor of and against the effectiveness of the Massachusetts’ TURA. Arguments in Favor of Management-Based Governance for TURA The arguments in favor of using management-based processes for TURA are: ●   Regulation by credible regulatory agencies; ●   Reduced toxic chemical use, byproduct release, and on-site releases; and ●   Flexibility for facilities.

Regulation by Credible Regulatory Agencies Mandates supported by government agencies have a greater impact on a firm’s performance compared to strategies that only encourage firms to improve their environmental management (Coglianese and Nash, pp. 252). The Massachusetts’ TURA supports this argument, where it is implemented by the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (MassDEP), the Massachusetts Office of Technical Assistance and Technology (OTA), and the Massachusetts Toxic Use Reduction Institute (MURI). The Act also requires a state-authorized pollution prevention planner to certify that each facility meets the criteria in TURA for a toxic chemical use reduction plan. If facilities are unable to meet this criteria, they are issued a fine. Reduced Toxic Chemical Use, Byproduct Release, and On-Site Releases Facilities subject to management-based regulations experience greater reductions in toxic chemical releases than they would have in the absence of these regulations (Coglianese and Nash, pp. 255). Empirical evidence demonstrated by TURA exemplifies this argument. After the enactment of TURA in 1989, the use of toxic chemicals in Massachusetts fell drastically. From 1990 to 2013, Massachusetts companies subject to TURA reduced their toxic chemical use by 48%, byproduct use by 77%, and on-site releases by 94%. Compared to other facilities not subjected to TURA, these facilities reduced their use of toxic chemicals by nearly 60,000 pounds. Flexibility By focusing on what goes on inside organizations, management-based strategies provide firms the flexibility to develop their own plans, solutions, and measures to reduce environmental impacts (Coglianese and Nash, pp. 6). Under TURA, facilities conduct a systematic review of how and why they are using toxic chemicals. Without strict guidelines for how to conduct this review, facilities can identify opportunities to adopt safer technologies or processes. As

evidenced by reduced toxic chemical use, byproduct release, and on-site releases in Massachusetts, TURA is an example of an effective management-based strategy. Arguments Against Management-Based Governance for TURA The arguments against using management-based processes for TURA are: ●   Requires no specific outcomes or performance targets; and ●   Lack of incentives.

Requires No Specific Outcomes or Performance Targets Management-based strategies influence the attention, information, authority, and financial resources of managers toward the achievement of environmental improvements (Coglianese and Nash, pp. 12). However, management-based strategies do not necessarily require managers to achieve any specific outcomes. This flaw is exemplified with TURA. Under TURA, facilities are not required to make any particular change in their operation or to meet any individual performance targets. Rather, managers are only required to make a “good faith” effort by studying their use of toxic chemicals and engaging in a planning process to identify strategies for pollution prevention (Coglianese and Nash, pp. 10). Since strategies that require firms to engage in specific management practices, whether imposed by the government or the private sector, have the strongest effects (Coglianese and Nash, pp. 252), requiring specific outcomes or performance targets would make TURA more effective. Since TURA only applies to facilities that use large quantities (defined as 10,000 pounds per year) of toxic specific substances, it excludes smaller facilities that use multiple chemicals. The definition of specific chemicals is also important because large facilities may easily switch to using toxic chemicals not defined under TURA. By focusing on more facilities, TURA can better reduce the release and use of toxic chemicals in Massachusetts. Lack of Incentives Successful management-based strategies provide incentives for managers to invest in the collection of information (Coglianese and Nash, pp. 18). Empirical evidence demonstrated by the National Environmental Performance Track defends this argument. Initiated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 2000, the National Environmental Performance Track posts participating facilities names on their website, invites them to talk with high-ranking EPA officials, and offers exemptions from routine agency inspections and certain regulatory requirements (Coglianese and Nash, pp. 12). However, facilities subject to TURA are not provided any incentives. Rather, they are forced to pay a fee for noncompliance. Without proper incentives, facilities are not encouraged to gather the necessary information needed to identify opportunities for environmental improvement (Coglianese and Nash, pp. 253).