M A N :

N A T U R E , N U R T U R E , F U T U R E SOME ANTHROPOBIOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS O N

WORLD MODELS AND DEVELOPMENTAL STRATEGIES

Jan Wind

Reader at the Institute of Human Genetics

Free University Amsterdam, The Netherlands.

Reader a t the Department of Tropical Hygiene,

Royal Tropical Institute, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Consultant Ear-Nose-Throat Surgeon at the Hospitals of Naarden and Bussum, The Netherlands

This is a unpublished preprint. Copyright by the author.

June 1983

Author's address: Inst i tute o f Human Genetics Free Universi ty P.O. Box 7161, 1007 MC Amsterdam The Netherlands

CONTENTS

Preface

Ch.l The Problem

Ch.2 Human Ethology

Ch.3 L im i t i ng Population Growth

Ch.4 A i d t o Developing Countries

Ch.5 L D C Population Growth

Ch. 6 B ig Bang, Brains, and Boom

Ch.7 Western and LDC Cultures

Ch.8 Western Mater ia l Conditions for A l l Mankind?

Ch.9 Some Pol i t ical Implications o f the Biologicized Approach

Ch.10 The Economical and Social Vs. the Biologicized Strategies

Ch.l l The Future

References

Postscriptum: Some poetry

This booklet should emphatically begin w i th a warning against i tself: it is the result of naive, simplistic, and unorthodox thought- experimenting. O f course, one could we l l wonder whether similar qualif ications would not apply, then, to publishing the results o f such thought-experimenting. I t is my doubt about answering this question confirmingly which, I think, makes i t worthwhi le t o communicate those results nevertheless. Why? On the 'one hand, l clear ly trespass beyond the tradi t ional borders of my own pro- fessional realm (medicine and human biology). This trespassing w i l l undoubtedly lead the professionals o f other realms ( l ike economists, politicologists, social anthropologists, etc.) to at tach the above labels to my considerations. On the other, the gravi ty of the problems and my being unaware o f any similar a t tempt o f trans- disciplinary analyzing led me t o assume that such an approach might, nevertheless, be o f some use.

Issues l ike ethical questions and pol i t ical strategies, e.g con- cerning Less Developed Countries (LDCs), o f t en raise emot ional i ty rather than scientif ic discussions. This paper is a provisional at- tempt t o avoid such emotions. Yet, the basic reason behind these ref lect ions is largely emotional, i.e. m y observing environmental and social deter iorat ion i n the Western wor ld and the seemingly in- creasing suffering I encounter i n my medical work i n less developed countries. Even though this paper attempts to render a non- emotional approach towards these problems, it may regre t tab ly raise in tu i t i ve ly disapproving reactions.

I especially apologize, then, t o readers f rom LDCs who are more l i ke l y than others t o f e e l resistance to, o r even some of fence by, my approach o f the problems o f these countries. I would k ind ly ask them t o forget fo r a moment the i r present posit ion and imagine t h a t we are addressing-over the i r heads-their great-grandfathers prophecying t o the la t te r what the i r country would look l ike and the generation o f the i r great-grandchildren would experience some hundred years later, i.e. i n the la t te r decades o f the twen t ie th century. I f these ancestors had known these conditions they might have preferred some of the seemingly unacceptable options dis- cussed i n this paper, ra the r than the presently usual developmental policies.

F o r simplicity's sake, I have not mentioned throughout the paper tha t when I wro te "West" or "Western" I meant t o include ind icat ing other nations t h a t are usually classified as industr ial ized and whose main pol i t ica l object ives seem t o be similar t o t h a t o f the "West", i.e. t o obta in i t s mater ia l weal th and i t s health. That these object ives are at tempted to be reached through various pol i t ica l systems ( l ike capital ism or communism) appears i n the fol lowing considerations t o be of lesser importance. Similarly, l have hard ly or no t specif ied which nations I have classified as LDC – this crude classif icat ion being of suff icient heurist ic value t o function satisfactori ly i n my discussions w i thou t f requent ly men- t ion ing geographical, economical, political, etc. specifications.

This book is meant as a discussion paper, anti i t does no t render my f i rmly established convict ion, nor does it necessarily r e f l e c t the points of view of my university, nor is i t the resul t o f any pol i t ica l conviction.

A few people have b e e n s o kind as t o a t tempt fo l lowing my pecul iar ways o f reasoning by reading earl ier versions of the paper and by providing f r u i t f u l suggestions for which I am extremely grateful. Among these people are L. Bondestam, W. Byarugaba, R. Cliquet, V. Falger, Diana Grieser, Rober ta Hall, G.P.A. Joosten, F. Matter, C.O. Pannenborg, F, Seller, F.M. Shattock, R. Strijker, P.L. van den Berghe, and H. Wind. Needless t o say tha t the responsibi l i ty for a l l the statements I made in this book is ent i re ly mine.

C H A P T E R 1

T H E P R O B L E M A l l World Model makers and most po l icy makers seem t o be concerned about man's future. B u t what do they real ly wan t? This is rare ly specified i n the i r publications. What are we humans rea l l y a f ter? I s there rea l l y one universal human wish? I do n o t think there is, though most people w i l l agree w i t h "seeking a f te r a b e t t e r world". B u t "better" is an ambit ious concept meaning complete ly dif ferent things and strategies t o d i f ferent people.

The star t ing point o f discussions on L im i t s t o G r o w t h and World Models, Reshaping the In ternat ional Order, etc. therefore should be the above questions and the answer formulated i n terms t h a t are maximally manageable. I propose here t o use an u t i l i t a r ian answer and goal: "We, present humans, want t o live, and t o l ive as much as possible i n a s tate o f well-being". This is somewhat more specific than the WHO, R I O (Tinbergen e t al., 1976), "Nor th- South" (Brandt e t al., 1980:13), and Singer's (1981:103) philo- sophical " the good of al l" formulations or the humanitarian- egal i tar ian viewpoint o f Win ikof f (1978).

Various objections can be raised against such a proposition. ( i ) Exceptions to this goal are provided by human Individuals being unable to express themselves such as the mentally immature (most o f which, however, do show behavior that, anthropomorphically speaking, seeks to keep the individual alive and to guide i t towards adulthood, on a physiological rather than on a conscious level), the mentally retarded, and part ly the mentally depressed individuals. Most individuals of these three categories, however, are carefully kept alive because others want t o do so. ( i i ) Future generations seem to be excluded; bu t most present humans prefer their children and grandchildren l iv ing happily as wel l ( I assume that very few

individuals really extend their feelings towards much more than two or three generations; this is also voiced by Laszlo, 1974; Hardin, 1977; Pugh, 1978:407; Singer, 1981:79). But even assuming that, say, f ive future generations want to live, and to l ive as happily as possible, would no t substantially change the approach I shall propose here. (i i i) How do we define well-being, happy, e tc? This is a di f f icul t point and i t w i l l be discussed below; let us, however, for this moment assume that a definit ion can be given. ( iv) Does one reach an acceptable balance between individual and group Interests (Ruse, 1981:132)? With that question we arrive right in the middle of the problems resulting from jumping from scientif ic hypothesizing to ethical decision taking. We wi l l come back to that question later on as well.

Now, World Model problematics have h i ther to mainly been considered from economical, technological, demographical, polit ical, sociological and ecological points o f view. However, the very character of the problem, as explained above. suggests t ha t com- bining such approaches w i t h biological-anthropological ones may wel l assist i n solving the question, Accordingly, my approach w i l l mainly be based on such points o f view and on the evolutionary ones. To be sure, recent ly the la t te r have received renewed at tent ion i n relat ion t o economics (Boulding, 1981). b u t mainly by focussing on the analogies a t the leve l o f systems theory. Here, 1 w i l l ra ther a t tempt t o discover the d i rec t relevance of human evolutionary biology fo r global and developmental policies.

Intrinsically, World Models suffer from the future course o f several, if not all, parameters being unknown ( i f it were known, much less discussions would be necessary). Most e f fo r ts associated w i th studying the models are basically directed towards lowering the leve l o f uncertainty o f this course o f the parameters and of their interrelationships. The uncertainty leve l o f the economical

and ecological parameters l i ke food production, resources' magni- tude, and pollution, and t o a sl ightly lesser degree tha t o f techno- logical possibilities, for the t ime being cannot, and perhaps does n o t need to, be lowered much more. For a parameter t ha t is possibly more important-as wel l as more di f f icul t t o assess is human behavior and i t s relationship t o the other parameters. Accordingly. e f fo r ts directed towards assessing the contr ibut ion o f human be- havior may yield more useful information. Unfortunately, the study o f human behavior has not y e t come so f a r as t ha t o f animal ethology which of ten renders descriptions focussing not only on a phenomenological analysis b u t ( i n contrast t o the social sciences) also on an etiological one. Yet, i n view o f the importance o f the problem it seems worthwhi le t o evaluate the present knowledge of some relevant human behaviors and of their biological – e.g. genet- ica l and ecological – approach and t o see t o what extent it can be used for predict ing fu ture behavior in terms that can be more

easily be managed than the phenomenological ones commonly and necessarily used by the social sciences, preferable by means of mathematical symbols l ike numbers.

CHAPTER 2

HUMAN ETHOLOGY

Few scientists w i l l deny nowadays tha t man, being just one k ind of the l i v ing organisms o f this world, shares many properties w i t h other organisms, especially w i t h animals; and it is generally assum- ed t h a t we evolved f rom animal ancestors. While most people agree t h a t th is applies t o morphological characteristics, an increasing number does so concerning mental and behavorial characteristics. Indeed, properties t h a t are ra ther widespread among other l i v i ng beings can be recognized i n man's morphology and behavior. These Include the fol lowing three points.

( i ) Man, including his brains, is composed o f molecules whose chemical and physical properties and whose interact ions can theo- ret ica l ly be measured and described i n methematical terms, and hence are of ten predictable. The real izat ion o f these possibilities is increasingly becom ing l ikely due t o the progress of sciences l ike neurobiochemistry, neurophysics, the behavioral and many o ther sciences.

( i i ) L i ke animal, human behavior can --sometimes succesfully-- be at tempted t o be expressed i n terms describing i t s contribution, posit ive or negative, t o the survival o f certain genes (i.e. D N A sequences tha t determine the inher i ted characteristics), the indivi- dual, the population (when concerning an isolated group) or the species as a whole: posit ive and negative selective pressures. They are expressed i n numbers, e.g. those describing population size and their changes. Modern biology strongly suggests tha t a dr iv ing fo rce behind a l l animal (Wilson, 1975; Dawkins, 1976) and human (Chag- non & Irons, 1979; Wind, 1980a) behavior basically is the bio- chemically determined tendency of each gene t o spread as many copies o f i t se l f as possible.

( i i i ) Though t w o completely ident ical human individuals probably do not exist a l l humans share a set o f common traits. These can be considered as having a genetical basis (van den Berghe, 1979), or, rather, as being less environmentally dependent than other traits.

Now, genetical programming o f human individuals impresses us as being much less r i g i d than t ha t o f e.g. a tree, a bacterium, o r an insect. I n other words, human behavior appears t o be determined t o a greater extent b y environmental influences than t ha t o f other organisms. Yet, the contr ibut ion of universal mechanisms may be larger than is usually assumed (see e.g. HInde, 1974; Wilson, 1975, 1978). Once science would be able t o provide a complete descrip- t ion o f these universal properties predictions about human behavior would become less unreliable.

Some of the almost universal properties re levant here are: e f fo r ts f o r obtaining food; satisfying sexual needs; parental care; ge t t ing love or attention; ident i f icat ion w i t h other group members (such as belonging t o the same family, tribe, village, country, or race); greediness when perceiv ing neighbors having more (Western) mater ia l affluence or having more pos ib i l i t ies for raising more healthy children (Abernethy, 1979:31; Symons, 1979:126); and neu- r o t i c development due t o lack o f parental care ( f o r a discussion, see Laszlo, 1974).

The isssues discussed i n this paper, as seen from a biological- anthropological point o f view, include population growth, techno- logical optimism, Western mater ia l weal th f o r the whole world, and medical and food programs fo r the less developed countries.

CHAPTER 3

L I M I T I N G P O P U L A T I O N G R O W T H

Vir tua l ly a l l World Model makers (e.g. Forrester, 1971; Meadows, 1972; Lazlo, 1974; Mesarovic & Pestel, 1974; Ehrl ich, 1982) agree on one point, i.e. t ha t population growth should be limited; i f not, disasters are l ikely t o occur. Obviously, the aff luent Western societies consider themselves threatened by a shortage o f com- modities l i ke raw materials and o f energy resources and by envir- onmental deterioration, the developing countries b y lack o f food and o f energy resources due t o the decreasing quant i ty o f available f i rewood (Eckhoim, 1978; Gabor e t al., 1978; F.A.O., 1979:139) and the-- e x p e n s i v e ~ o i i (Dunker ley & Ramsay, 1982), and b o t h b y the violence tha t may result.

Now, how is population growth t o be l imi ted? I t is remarkable tha t science does not know exact ly which factors have actual ly caused the human population up till about one century ago t o remain constant o r a t least to grow much slower than i t does nowadays (Dumond, 1975; fo r reviews see Abernethy, 1979; Sipes 1980; and Hassan, 1981). Probably, g rowth was l imi ted mainly b y the interact ion of parasit ic and endemic diseases (McNeil l , 1977), food shortage (Hassan, 1980)- causing higher infant mor ta l i t y (e.g. Biel l ik & Henderson, 1981) and, probably l i t t l e (Bongaarts, 1980) , reduced f e r t i l i t y due to ovulatory inhibit ion and decreased l ibido (Frisch, 1978)--abortion/infanticide (Birdsell, 1972:356; Bates &

Lees, 1979; Dickemann, 1979), sex taboos (Abernethy, 1979), and postponed postpartum ovulat ion due t o prolonged lac ta t ion (Polgar, 1972; Skolnick & Cannings, 1972; Jeliffe & Jeliffe, 1975; Knodel, 1977; Winikoff, 1978; Konner & Worthman, 1980) (though the postponement's demographic impact and underlying mechanisms are s t i l l poorly known (Masnick, 1979). I t should be remarked here tha t breast- feeding duration globally seems t o be on the decline; Popkin e t al., 1982). Many more variables may have played a p a r t (see Sipes, 1980).

Whatever the explanation is, i n so-called "primitive", i.e. non-

technological, societies these factors were obviously very effective (and, apart from the f i rs t two, may have added t o intelligence; Zajonc, 1976). I n fact, it appears that human societies respond homeostatically t o population pressures (Abernethy, 1979) and tha t they have always-even i n the remote past-been subjected to resource stresses (Hardin, 1977; Colson, 1979; Hassan, 1981; Hay- den, 1981). I n modern Westernized, technological societies, next t o induced abortion, it is mainly contracept ive devices and oral ovulation inhibitors t h a t l im i t population growth. And for the time being no other ef fect ive possibilities are available.

Though i n some developing countries fer t i l i t y rates have la te ly dropped somewhat (Brandt e t al., 1980 ) and i n some oral contra- ception usage has increased (Morris e t al., 1981), i n most the Western methods, including vasectomy programs, have hitherto yielded some (Outr ight & Kelly, 1981) but Insuff ic ient results despite great ef forts spent on introducing them (Peel & Potts, 1977; Gulhati, 1977; Editorial, 1979; Bergström, 1980; Banerji, 1980) (paradoxically, the costs of family planning programms in LDCs may be much higher than those needed to raise food production; Bondestam, 1980; Sterkenburg & Luning, 1980). Consequently, the question arises: should we aim a t reimposing sex taboos and a t using diseases, starvat ion and abortion/infanticide to reduce pop- ulat ion growth i n these countries? Undoubtedly, most people asked would give a negative answer t o this question, arguing tha t these means are unethical, unchristian, etc. However, when aiming a t a scientific, biological approach t o these problems, or a t least basing ourselves on the presumption formulated i n the introduction, we should not a p r i o r i re jec t the idea to judge i n sober reason whether these seemingly unat t rac t ive measures or others could possibly resul t i n contr ibut ing t o survival of mankind in a state of well- being. Such an approach may assist i n redefining value premises underlying usual at t i tudes towards LDCs-the presently prevail ing one being the moral imperative of combatt ing disease and prevent- ing premature deaths (Myrdal, 1968:1496). Apparently, it is useful f i rst t o consider whether we can define, ob jec t i fy and possibly even quant i fy concepts l i ke ethical, decent, r ight, Christian, etc. behav- ior.

Evolutionary biology and anthropology of fer possibilities for such an approach. Long- lasting human behaviors are l i ke ly t o have had a posit ive selective value i n the societies i n which they occur (or, t o put i t sl ightly di f ferent ly, t o have added t o the fitness of the population concerned). F o r if such behavior had had a negative selective value o r a negative survival value the population and hence the behavior would probably have dropped out; this is what allegedly occurred to a part icular religious sect t ha t completely banned sexual intercourse (Ruyle, 1973).

Now, three points, as suggested by social anthropology, are relevant here: ( i ) ethica l rules-being essential and typ ica l for the cul ture in which they are operant and being incorporated i n religions, laws, taboos, etc.-are usually maintained during many more generations than codes regulat ing other human activit ies; ( i i ) ethical behavior is accepted and pract ised by more individuals and for a longer t ime than behavior that is or was re jec ted by contemporaneous ethics or t h a t has been rejected l a te r on; and ( i i i ) anthropological and histor ical data suggest that most ethical codes originated as a resul t o f experiences based on circumstances tha t determined survival o f the group concerned.

Therefore, behavior cal led ethical etc. most o f ten has a posi t ive selective value in the population i n which It is practised; and conversely, human behavior is l i ke ly t o be considered as ethical, humane, decent, etc. and as being i n accordance w i t h the ru les of Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, etc. when it has or w i l l have in the near future a posit ive selective value for the popul- at ion or society concerned. (This approach is discussed i n more detai l in Wind, 1973; 1978; 1980a; and in Alexander, 1980). I t should be remarked tha t this approach o f the desirabil i ty o f our behaviors largely coincides w i th that o f our common goal as rendered in the introduction. The intuitive--i.e. common g o a l – –approach and the biologicized one thus do not contradict, and may even support one another.

From such reasoning now, it follows ( i ) that human behavior and ethical values can ( theoret ical ly) be expressed i n numbers (i.e. i n fitness changes, e.g. population size or gene frequency changes), and ( i i ) t ha t not a l l ethical principles can be maintained eternal ly in the same form; for whether a given behavior is " r ightu or no t is determined by the interact ion o f the human genetical load (wh ich

is largely constant) w i th the environment, and the la t ter is chang- ing (and much more rapidly than the overall genetic properties do). Moreover, behavior tha t is considered ethical in one society may a t the same time be considered as unethical i n another.

Induced abortion and infanticide provide a clear example of this, as i t has been practised for many centuries in many societies as a sequel of (mainly religious) habits and taboos, e.g. i n South American Indians, Australian Aborigines, Eskimos, Bushmen and many others (Dickeman, 1975; Wind, 1978; Chapman, 1980, Fry, 1981). I n these societies induced abortion and infanticide were and are considered as ethical, legal and right; and as far as these societies are being reduced, induced abortion does not seem to have any influence a t all. On the other hand, in the less nomadic, agricultural and technological societies o f the Christians, that may have their roots as far back as 8 5 0 0 (Ferguson e t al., 1976) or even some 18,000 (Wendorf e t al., 1979) years ago, more respect for every living human being (or a t least being taught so) probably had adaptive value.

I n conclusion, i t is l ikely that (i) the biological sciences can offer some assistance in describing in quantifiable terms the desir- ability o f certain human behavior modes (including population growth control) and therefore also o f pol i t ical strategies, and (ii) the basic question and presumption mentioned in Chapter 1 can frui t ful ly be addressed by these sciences as they are used to describe the selective pressures that determine survival o f organ-isms.

CHAPTER 4

A I D T O DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Increasing westernization of the world is largely based on the above mentioned Christian opinion on ethics and on Western tech- nological and managerial performances (o f course, next to expans- ionism, colonialism, capitalism, etc.-Western interest often being basically self-interest; Myrdal, 1968:13). These, especially social modernization and public administration (McNeill, 1977; Powless, quoted by McCutcheon, 1979:32), resulted in a reduction o f endem- ic diseases (such as smallpox and malaria, and later bacterial infections as well), increasing agricultural production and urb- anization, and changing traditional behavior patterns, among which the traditional sex taboos, abortion/infanticide and the acceptance of a high infant mortality. The !Kung Bushmen may well i l lustrate the transition from a hunter-gatherer's l i fe to a sedentary, agri- cultural, and subsequently to an urban way of life-paralleling an increase o f fer t i l i ty (Anderson, 1983).

The main problems developing countries (and consequently the Western world and World Model makers) are facing now, include overpopulation and starvation, and, in addition, e.g. those asso- ciated wi th urbanization (Gosling, 1979). These are part ly (maybe even largely) due to this grafting of Western culture- including Christianity (Stipe, 1980; Whitten & Sardar, 1981) and colonialist agriculture (Franke & Chasin, 1980)--into non-Western societies thereby disturbing less disequilibrized relations between population size, food production, space, resources, etc. as maintained for centuries by local ethics and technology. Paradoxically, conco- mittant with the West's materialism, i t s ethics, next to other motivations, tells us to offer help, but by (at least, while) doing so we see an increase of Third World Problems. ( In fact, capital spent

b y Western countries as " a i d " p a r t l y o r completely flows back t o the donor countries, if only via the bra in drain; Broad, 1981).

L e t us take a closer look a t the typ ica l help as usually o f fe red t o LDCs, i.e. health care and food product ion programs. Three questions should be answered concerning such help: ( i) the basic question, i.e. does it have any effect on the all- important object ive W e , humans, want t o l ive and t o l ive as happy as possiblen?; ( i i ) if it does, is i ts contr ibut ion positive or negative?; and ( i i i ) which is the value o f this contr ibut ion (preferably t o be expressed i n select ive pressures)?

The d i f f icu l ty o f defining and measuring human well-being (see e.g. Cole, 1981:13) o r even "living standard" (Grant, 1978) as mentioned before, comes t o gr ief here. However, the basic po int l want t o make here is no t great ly a f fected b y this diff iculty. For the time being, the happiness or the state o f well-being of any human individual has necessarily t o be described i n subjective, phenomenological terms mainly as rendered by the individual him- self. ( I n a minor i ty o f the human population, including, for instance, mental ly defect ive and immature individuals, the state of well- being can only be estimated b y others). The level o f well-being could roughly be determined b y e.g. questionnaires and using a scale graded in to a number of categories t o be determined b y the testee. A much more manageable system would be one i n which the subject iv i ty could be reduced by using physico-chemical tests more object iv i ly indicat ing the s tate o f well-being o f the individual t o be examined. A t f i r s t sight, this may seem slightly far- fetched, and. admittedly, epistemologically the very--metaphysical, abstract-- character o f human feelings cannot be rendered i n physico-chem- i ca l terms. However, i n view o f the rap id progress o f the neuro- sciences, and the behavorial and social sciences, the neurophys- iological correlates concerned are l ikely t o become more clearly ( though probably always incompletely; Davis, 1982:5) recognizable and expressible i n physico-chemical units.

Whatever the possibilities for describing the s tate o f well-being are, l e t us for this moment, just f o r heuristic purposes, assume t h a t

there i s such a U n i t o f Well-Being (UWB) (Wind, 1980b). We now have t o deal w i t h t w o categories of UWB, i.e. UWB per caput (UWB/c) and the To ta l number of UWB i n a group, populat ion or mankind (TUWB) -- the l a t t e r more o r less corresponding t o Singer's (1981:103, 117) " the good o f a l l " concept. Similarly, l e t us assume a U n i t of Suffer ing (US), US/c, and TUS. Though the level o f UWB/c is undoubtedly fair ly d i f fe ren t in d i f ferent individuals, even i n the same mater ia l conditions, the existence of universal human properties as mentioned before allow the construct ion o f a crude model representing the level and the changes o f the average UWB/c, TUWB, US /c and TUS, e.g. as due t o overpopulation, starvation, wars, changes in parent- child bonding, unexpected loss o f close re la t ives and other neurot ic izing circumstances.*

Now, it may be t rue tha t many people (e.g. Sahlins, 1972:31) in tu i t ive ly tend t o believe tha t in the past there was l i t t l e suffering: the "Golden A g e " i l lusion (Williams, 1978). O f course,

* Preparing m y 1980b paper I was unaware o f three earl ier a t t emp ts

to achieve such a quanti f icat ion. The f i r s t was by Wagar (1970) expressing the "Qual i ty of L i f e " as a parameter o f popula t ion size without, however, elaborat ing it as I do. The second was by G r a n t (1978) and Morr is (1979) proposing the "Physical Qua l i t y o f L i f e indexn as resu l t ing from in fan t mortal i ty, i i f e expectancy, and l i teracy. While t he PQLI has the advantage of be ing measurable in many countr ies it does no t seem t o be representat ive o f the general qua l i ty o f l i fe or the UWB/c which are o f greater importance i n discussions on developmental strategies and World Models. Fo r instance, i t does n o t take i n to account the poss ib i l i ty

t h a t i n f a n t mor ta l i t y does lower the leve l of well-being i n modern Western societ ies more than i n developing countries; and t h a t increasing i i f e expectancy does cont r ibute less t o raising the leve l o f well- being i n modern Western societies than i n developing countries. Third, Easter l in (1974) has given a useful rev iew o f some socio-economical evidence resu l t ing f rom a number o f inquir ies i n to the personal happiness o f individuals i n some developed and some developing countries. interest ingly, it appeared t h a t in t ranat iona l l y socio-economic status was much more c lear ly associated w i th happiness than internat ional ly.

there must have been good as wel l as bad periods, e.g. due t o famines (Bryceson, 1981)- resulting mainly f rom cl imate irreg- u l a r i t i e s ~ , epidemic diseases and wars (Myrdal, 1968:1556). How- ever, a t issue here are the periods' length and the TUS values (Abernethy, 1979 gives some suggestions concerning cu l tura l de- terminants of this length). Observations o f modern hunter-gatherers and other populations usually cal led "primit iveu as we l l as histor ical accounts of e.g. missionaries suggest the unlikeliness o f a wide- spread and long- lasting high level of the above suffer ing i n our pre- industrial ancestors ( for this, for tha t matter, seems t o me, i n contrast t o Al land (1973:324), t o have a negative select ive value). Hence, i t may be assumed tha t the average UWB/c level was fa i r ly high i n pre-Westernized LDCs (e.g. L a p p é & Collins, 1 9 7 6 : 8 8 ;McNeill, 1977; Blackburn, 1979; Franke & Chasin, 1980; Hyden, 1980). This must par t l y have been due t c low population densities causing a lower incidence of infectious diseases than nowadays (asdiscussed by McNeill, 1977, and Cohen, 1980). (Remarkably, also the absence o f overnutr i t ion may wel l be associated w i t h a low frequency o f infect ious diseases; Mann, 1980). This combination is l ike ly t o have been common among pre-agricultural and pre- industrial populations l iv ing b y the grace of the carry ing capacity o f the environment, i.e. the ecological constraints (see e.g. Aber- nethy, 1979).

Now, in many parts of t rop ica l Asia, A f r i c a and L a t i n America after (and probably by) the introduct ion o f Western heal th care (Pannenborg, 1979), technology (Heilbroner, 1974), and ethics the UWB/c level dropped. This is due t o the in teract ion o f population pressures (see e.g. Hammond & Todd, 1975) w i t h the result ing increased incidence of diseases l ike malaria (Alland, 1973:305; Benett, 1976a:201; McNeill, 1977), starvation, disruption of trad- i t ional kinship and t r ibe systems and of taboos (Blackburn, 1979; Franke & Chasin, 1980; Hyden, 1980), disturbed ecological condit- ions (e.g. Eckholm, 1975; Ormerod, 1976, 1978; Franke & Chasin,

1980; Smith, 1981), and increasing urbanization (Mahler, 1980) (though no t necessarily crowding; Freedman, 1975, 1980). A l l these processes would seem t o increase neurotic --e.g. aggressive-- be- havior and t o some extent westernized materialism (Fig.l). Admit-

Fig. 1. Schematic representation of some human feelings present in the typical Less Developed Countries (LDCs). TUS represents the Tota l of the Units o f Suffering, i.e. the sum of al l the individual suffering in the country concerned. UWB /c represents the average level o f the number of Units of Well-Being per caput of the population. TUWB means the Tota l o f the Units o f Well-Being. The tota l of suffering has increased since Westernization began because the average level of individual suffering has risen (due to over- population, starvation, disruption of traditional social systems, etc.) and because the population has sharply increased. Extrapolating from the present trends the TUS is l ikely to increase sharply in the near future. The level o f UWB/c is l ikely to decrease further due to the same factors, while the TUWB ( tha t up t i l l now had probably not greatly decreased because the lower UWB/c was compensated by for the larger number of individuals) may decrease somewhat less. The values are entirely arbitrary- the use of the curves only being to i l lustrate the diachronic differences of some human feelings.

tedly, the TUWB may have remained about the same because of the larger number of individuals (Sanderson & Johnston, 1980). The TUS, however, has greatly increased as i s illustrated by similarly quantitative considerations concerning diachronical and internat- ional nutri t ional status (Mönckeberg, 1979). (For heuristic reasons, I have taken in Fig.l a "typical LDC", temporarily disregarding inter- and intranational, graded differences in development. Using Cole's (1981) global cells' classification would come closer to reality, but this would make the model much more complicated).

That roughly describes the present situation. But what should be the policy towards the future o f LDCs? The usual propositions imply increasing medical aid (e.g. McDermott, 1980, Gopalan, 1980; Brandt e t al., 1980) as well as the world food production- both almost axiomatically considered by most people i n the Western countries as self-evident necessities.

As far as food production is concerned the latter point can be illustrated-apart from the opinion of intergovernemental (e.g. F.A.O., 1979) and governemental (e.g. V.D.O., 1980:169) donor organisations-by a few issues of the authorative journal Science which, for some time, 1 happened to screen for this purpose: 186:870, 877, 1088, 1093, 1094; 188:509; 190:754; 194:497; 197:625, 630; 205:555, 206:419; 208:570, 1415; 209: 157; 217: 215; 218:967. The opinion of such economics and agriculture based authors is voiced by Borlaug (1983:692) stating: "World population growth dictates in large measure the increases needed in food production". Also others feel that world population growth has resulted in an increased need for food, e.g. those focussing on assisting LDCs (Myrdai, 1968: 1244; Tinbergen e t al., 1976; Mön- ckeberg, 1979; Brandt e t al., 1980), on biology (Handler, 1970), on nutrition (Pimentel & Pimetel, 1979:131), on systems theory (Han- sen, 1980:85), on grain policy (Barr, 1981), on LDC politics (Gandhi, 1982), on agribusiness (Spitzer, 1981), and on chemistry (Geissbühler e t al., 1982; Brady, 1982). Similarly, Berlinguet (1981) almost axiomatically propagates a maximal transfer of Western science and technology to LDCs.

Now, on the one hand, from a physical, technological point of view there seems to be no reason why the world should not feed many more people (McCutcheon, 1979; Gordon, 1979; Brandt e t al., 1980; Dando, 1980:185; Murdoch, 1980; Plucknett & Smith, 1982), and e.g. the Sahel famine did not clearly result from over- population --though i t was part ly man-made (Franke & Chasin, 1981) and part ly a sequel o f Holocence climate changes (Wendorf & Schild, 1980). On the other hand, however, there is the l imited availability o f arable land (Tinbergen e t al., 1976; Pimentel e t al., 1980; Barr, 1981), and the latter's decrease due to urban sprawl (Hulse, 1982)-next t o other factors (Gosling, 1979) responsible for the unsuccessful national resettlements (Smith, 1981).

Hence, global population control is ultimately the, or one of the, essential means o f diminishing malnutrition (Pimentel e t al., 1975; Brown, 1975, 1981; Brink e t al., 1977) which, for the time being, is on the increase (Hulse, 1982). No t only the replacement of traditional agricultural technologies by Western ones, as pro- pagated by Brandt e t al. (1980:161), is likely to offer only a seeming rel ief (Myrdal, 1968:696), but also new, promising LDC- adapted agricultural technology (as mentioned by Greenland, 1975; Vose, 1981; Sanchez e t al., 1982). For technical (e.g. distributional; Cole, 1981 :427; Barr, 1981), political, ecological (e.g. Smith, 1981; Shukla A Mintz, 1982-especially erosonial (Brown, 1981)--, finan- cial (Barr, 1981), managerial (e.g. post-harvest technological; Hul- se, 1982), jurisdictional (Barton, 1982), educational and institutional obstacles wi l l hamper agricultural development (Sanderson, 1975; Walih, 1983), such as by irrigation (Holdren e t al., 1980)--a problem which seems at this moment most threatening in sub- Saharan Africa (Franke & Chasin, 1980; Lele, 1981). While the High Yielding Varieties o f r ice have, in fact, in some countries, like Indonesia, increased the per head production they have also increased the social problems, e.g. by widening the gap between poor and r ich (Conway & McCauley, 1983). Also, such showpieces

of the Green Revolut ion requi re considerable quanti t ies o f pesti- cides which are increasingly threatening people, especially i n LDCs, n o t only b y the i r d i rec t l y in tox icat ing e f fec ts (Weir & Schapiro, 191) b u t probably also b y the i r increasing malaria (Chapin & Wasserstrom, 1981).

I n general, i t appears t h a t development projects so f a r have of ten underest imated the value of t rad i t ional breeds o f plants (Nat ional Research Council, 1981) and c a t t l e (Jayaraman, 1982)- l i k e t h a t of other local, cu l tu ra l pecul iar i t ies (Lumsden & WilSon, 1981)- that resulted f r o m long-standing loca l experience and sel- ec t i ve domestication. T h a t circumstance therefore necessitates the conservation o f the germplasm concerned (Plucknett e t al., 1983).

There are some more problems w i t h the present boost ing of agr icu l tura l technology. Man-made albedo changes (Sagan e t al., 1979; but see Po t te r e t al., 1981) and increasing fe r t i l i ze r use (Power & Holenstein, 1976)--associated w i t h the Green Revolut- i o n ~ and especially the n i t rogen containing one, nex t t o other man-made chemicals (Maugh, 1979, 1980) , may be deleter ious f o r mankind, i.e. i n v iew of the result ing ecological, c l imato log ica l consequences such as athmospheric ozone dest ruct ion (Johnston, 1977; Whi t ten e t al., 1980; Ryden, 1981). I doubt whether the suggestion o f Wortman & Cummings (1978) and o f Spitzer (1981) of simply increasing L D C agr icu l tura l production- beit based on small scale uni ts b u t hardly tak ing i n t o account the cu l tura l background and ecological and social consequences - -wi l l cont r ibute t o solving the problem. Final ly, as t o fu tu re cl imate evolution, though pre- dict ions are d i f f i cu l t (Miles, 1978; Shuts & Green, 1978; Madden & Ramanathan, 1980; Wigley & Jones, 1981; Revelle, 1982) also c l imat ic deter iorat ion may very we l l hamper fu tu re food product ion (Matthews, 1976; Hays e t al., 1976; Power & Holenstein, 1976; Tinbergen e t al., 1976; Kukla, 177; Gabor e t al., 1978; Imbrie & Imbrie, 1980; Kuk la & Gavin, 1981). A t best, c l imat ic var iab i l i ty w i l l hamper food product ion increase (Barr, 1981).

Whatever t h e fu tu re prospects are, t h e puzz l ing po in t i n the present s i tuat ion is t h a t despite increasing food production, medical a id and other "modernization", the average UWB/c has n o t c lear ly increased i n the last decades, and i n many L D C regions i t has even decreased. This is, apar t f rom log is t ica l problems (Ghassemi, 1980) , mainly- not always (Franke & Chasin, 1980)- due t o populat ion pressures: the w o r l d heal th gap is enlarged b y the wor ld populat ion gap (Pannenborg, 1979). Obviously, cont inu ing such pol ic ies is l i k e l y t o maintain these pressures, a t least on a short term (Nag, 1980) .

Now, i t can be objected t h a t raising the mater ia l wea l th o r the Gross Nat ional Product (GNP) i n LDCs w i l l lead t o a reduct ion o f b i r t h rates, as e.g. proposed by Chancel lor & Goss (1976) and Bergström (1980). Wi th Teitelbaum (1975), T ink ler e t al. (1976) and McCutcheon (1979), however, it can be asked whether this would rea l l y work. We should n o t l u l l ourselves to sleep w i t h the te rm "demographic transit ion" suggesting t h a t it inev i tab ly accom- panies modernizat ion (Robinson e t al., 1980:92); fo r such p ro- ject ions o f data f rom more onto less developed countr ies has p i t fa l l s (Graham. 1971; Singer, 1980; Hyden, 1 9 8 0 ) ( i f only be- cause the speed o f the t rans i t ion is d i f f i c u l t t o predict) . F o r if such theor iz ing would, i n fact, hold a re la t ive ly simple cap i ta l t ransfer t o the LDCs --e.g. b y using defense (Leontief, 1980; Brandt e t al., 1 9 8 0 ) and space program b u d g e t s w o u l d be suf- f i c ien t f o r prevent ing disasters. To be sure, a re la t ion be tween the t w o phenomena been demonstrated, b u t this is just a s tat is t ica l one. Therefore i t can be asked whether there is a d i rec t relat ion, and if so, i n which direction.

CHAPTER 5

L D C P O P U L A T I O N G R O W T H

As mentioned before, i t i s s t i l l unknown what exact ly controls human fer t i l i ty , b i r t h ra tes and population growth. undoubtedly, ra t ional fami ly planning is o f t e n implemented b y the family itself, also i n LDCs (Bergström, 1980; Murdoch, 1980; D j u r f e l d t & Lind- berg, 1980). The question, however, is how o f t e n the probable, underlying motives, l i ke o ld age insurance (Banerji, 1980; Bonvin, 1982), cheap labor (Murdoch, 1980) , in t r ins ica l ly maternal happi- ness (Oppong & Haavio-Mannila, 1979:462), v i r i l i t y advert is ing (de l Quiaro, 1982), etc.-while understandable f r o m a h is tor ica l po in t o f view and desirable on t h e micro-group and - time level- lead t o desirable e f fec ts on the macro-group and - t ime level. E.g. the old- age-insurance mot ive by maximizat ion o f o f fspr ing may we l l have such an adverse e f f e c t (Pannenborg, 1979). Therefore, basing global, v i ta l strategies on extrapolations —like the demographic t rans i t ion theory- from the s tat is t ica l data o f some, industrialized, countr ies t o t h e LDCs is questionable (Myrdal, 1968:1509).

Indeed, there are h i the r to only a very few typ ica l LDCs whose b i r t h ra tes have decreased t o Western levels (Commoner, 1975), and I do n o t know o f any o f whose decrease has been shown t o have resulted f r o m a ra ised per caput income. Rather than the la t te r it is a very complex in teract ion o f cu l tu ra l (e.g. Wei tz e t al., 1978), ecological (e.g. rainfal l ; Jorde & Harpending, 1978), social, historical, ethnological, psychological, religious, medical, nutr i t ional. economical and other factors which explains the diachronic and in ternat ional b i r t h r a t e di f ferences (discussed e.g. b y Hassan, 1975; van den Berghe, 1979; Abernethy, 1979; Friedman, 1979; Sipes, 1980; Mauldin, 1982). This can be i l lus t rated by the la te ly high income/high b i r t h r a t e combinations of L ibya and Venezuela (Chan-

cel lor & Goss, 1976) and by the decreasing b i r t h r 'a te i n China (Chen, 1980) whose government appears t o have more con t ro l on the above factors than others (Fairweather, 1979) and whose per caput income lags f a r behind t h a t o f the Western countries.

Ult imately, it w i l l be the social scientists, ethologists and demographers who can assess the al leged universal i ty o f the GNP/ b i r t h r a t e relationship. The social and pol i t ica l sciences suggest t h a t it is ra ther a mat te r o f d is t r ibut ion o f the GNP than o f i t s absolute size (Rich, quoted b y Power & Holenstein, 1976:37; Lappé & Collins, 1977; Morris, 1979); and t h a t ra ther than the GNP alone, also the non-market labor, i.e. the house-hold, c i r c u i t or " fu l l product ionn should be taken i n t o account (Grant, 1978; Birdsal l e t al., 1979). Whatever t h e explanation may be, the L D C populat ion is l i ke ly t o keep on growing fo r some time- though admittedly, i n t h e l a t t e r years global populat ion g rowth has decl ined somewhat, and demographers now reckon w i t h the probabi l i ty o f wor ld populat ion being about 6 b i l l ion by the year 2 0 0 0 (WHO, 1 9 8 0 ) b u t ul t im- ate ly n o t exceeding 10 bi l l ion (Mauldin, 1980).

L e t us have a closer look a t t h e figures. It is remarkable t h a t the p a r t o f mankind considered t o be suf fer ing f r o m ma lnu t r i t i on has remained ra ther constant or has increased dur ing t h e las t decades, i.e. 1/4 (Mahler, 1 9 8 0 ) t o 1/3 o f the wor ld populat ion (FAO, 1952; Pimentel e t al., 1976; Gabor e t al., 1978; Brandt e t al., 1980; Wortman, 1980) . O f t h a t p a r t about 1 /8 is su f fe r ing f rom prote in malnourishment (Pimentel e t al., 1975; Mayer, 1976). Thus the wor ld food product ion can, since some decades, fo r 2/3 match wor ld populat ion growth; and unless s ign i f icant changes occur this is l i ke ly t o decrease (Wortman & Cummings, 1978). Hence, it is questionable whether t h e percentage o f i l l- fed people i n the LDCs would decrease whether more food would be avai lable t o them or not. This is suggested by the per caput agr icu l tura l product ion i n the LDCs having remained constant dur ing the las t decades (Graham, 1971; Poleman, 1975; Wortman, 1976; FAO, 1977; Gabor e t al., 1978; Wortman & Cummings, 1978; Brown, 1979; Johnston & Nicholson, 1979; K idwai , 1979; Murdoch, 1980; Wort-

man, 1980), and a decline i n t he per caput wor ld food production

is threatening (Brown, 1979; Barr, 1981). Similarly. there is a-–slightly- positive relat ion between GNP increase and population growth i n LDCs (Bondestam, 1980).

The crucial question, then, is: which mechanism has. i n this period, put a l i m i t t o population size i n these regions? The above mentioned constant r a t e o f 1/3 suggests t ha t it i s n o t t h e absolute b u t ra ther t he re la t ive quant i ty o f t he food, namely re la t ive to each individual (as has been asumed concerning hunter-gatherers demography by Hassan, 1975). I n other words, it is possibly n o t the size o f wor ld food product ion i tse l f which i n the last decades has l im i ted L D C population growth, b u t rather hunger and malnutr i t ion mainly ef fct ing on, i.e. killing, young children (some 15 mi l l ion each year; Labouisse, 1978) and other susceptible individuals. O n the other hand, nata l i ty during the last decades has probably risen somewhat (due t o disruption o f sex taboos). I n pre-westernized LDCs, next t o a sl ightly lower natality, mor ta l i ty has probably been as high as it has been dur ing the last decades, b u t it must have been largely due t o early in fant mor ta l i ty (as caused by infect ious diseases and infant ic ide) which plays a much more decisive ro le i n determining population growth than extending the l ives o f older people (Gwatkin & Brandel, 1982). Now, I presume that the average level o f US/+-both o f the relatives and o f the one dying –is lower i n this earl ier mode o f mor ta l i ty than it is i n the present one, a view shared by Pannenborg (1979), Barash (1979:Ch.4), and Singer (1979:118). I n conclusion, i t is possibly the sociocultural system, including education and poverty, e f fec t ing by malnutr i t ion t ha t causes the low levels o f average UWB/c and the high level o f TUS in LDCs.

C H A P T E R

B I G B A N G , B R A I N S , A N D B O O M

Technological optimists, l ike Kahn (Wade, 1975), Hueckel (1975) and Simon (1980) impress as believing tha t the gloomy predictions of World Model makers and L imi ts t o Growth supporters are false. Starr & Rudman (1973) basing themselves on sigmoid growth curves usually shown by technological developments conclude: "... tech- nology is a man-made resource whose abundance can be contin- uously increased". I think such a statement is qui te bold and optimistic, because two o f the determining parameters are more or less l imi ted or a t least show some constancy.

( i ) The f i r s t is our environment: our wor ld (or our solar system, our galaxy, o r the Universe) contains a f ixed quant i ty of mat ter and energy. This is the most basic physical law and it is i n accordance w i th the most probable explanation o f the Universe's origin, i.e. the Big Bang theory. Now, a l l technological g rowth ul t imately consists of creat ing new relations between parts o f this matter. Mathematically speaking it is therefore qui te impossible tha t technology can increase continuously, namely on account o f the sheer f in i te quant i ty o f mat ter as, f o r tha t matter, already concluded about one century ago by Nietzsche (Birx, 1972). The to ta l number o f nucleons (protons and neutrons) i n the Universe is about 1 0 t o the power 78 (Dirac, 1974); so, the t o ta l number o f possible relations between them is admit tedly formidable b u t f inite.

( i i ) Empirically and intui t ively speaking, as al l World Model makers and their c r i t i cs have t o do, i t is l ikely t ha t mater ia l and technological g rowth w i l l stop long before the quant i ty o f mat ter w i l l have made i t stop, namely by the qual i ty o f matter. Though science does s t i l l discover new physical properties, also the number of behavior modes o f mat ter is f inite, i f only because these cannot exist wi thout the presence o f matter which is, as we have seen, finite.

The technological optimists wi l l object that such hairsplitting philosophical reasoning hardly affects the practical points o f view. However, such reasoning is not entirely academical. For instance, physico-chemical properties o f our solar system have determined the origin of l i fe on earth, including human cerebral capacity, which is l imited l ike the matter it attempts t o influence. Even if on other celestial bodies matter configuration would be such that more intelligent "brains"are operating they would have a l imi t t o their capacities as well, because probably everywhere in the universe the basic sub-atomic elements and their properties are the same. Such reasoning st i l l holds when by genetic engineering human intellectual capacity would increase; and even if al l the atoms of the universe could be lumped together to form a giant super-brain i ts capacity would-mathematically speaking-be finite. Some problems are, in fact, known to be so di f f icul t to solve that even a computer containing more than 10 to the power 78 elements can hardly solve them (Stockmeyer & Chandra, 1979).

There are more reasons for assuming that the progress of science wil l slow down (Stent, 1978), and for the time being it seems more realistic to consider our present genetic m a k e - u p including our cerebral capac i t ies–as another non-variable para- meter in World Models, or a t least as a factor l imit ing tech- nological growth. And whether assisted by genetic engineering or by extra-cranial "brainsw l ike computers or not, there wi l l be a time when all thoughts resulting in new technological (and agri- cultural) growth wi l l have been thought. So, limiting ourselves to terrestrial matter, it is likely that technology wi l l not always continue growing like it has done up till now. (Moreover, the question can be raised why i t is impossible that during sigmoid growth no disasters, as predicted by World Model makers, can occur; the very disasters predicted by the pessimists are even likely to become the cause of the decreasing phase of future sigmnid growth curves).

Admittedly, extrapolation from modern technology suggests that, for the time being, some growth in technological knowledge

wi l l continue (Murdoch, 1980), but Its contribution to survival and TUWB of mankind may be less than assumed by the optimists because –as al l World Models ind icate– i t s application may be hampered by the l imited quantity of material, the exhaustion of energy resources (e.g. Hayes, 1979), and environmental deter- ioration (e.g. Watt, 1974); in addition, the 'populoptimists' tend to Ignore social factors (McCutcheon, 1979; Preston, 1982).

CHAPTER

WESTERN AND L D C C U L T U R E S

Many people concerned w i t h developing strategies- like probably some readers o f t he foregoing discussions-wonder: " B u t why are there such b ig differences between the Western and the L D C cultures, especially their technologies? And why do the less dev- eloped countries have so much d i f f i cu l ty i n adopting more Western, more developed, ways of l iv ing?" . Human biology possibly con- tributes t o explaining posing the questions as wel l as t o answering them.

Fi rst l e t us-maybe somewhat reducingiy--define t he concept "culture" as the result o f the human behavior/environment inter- action. Now, the present "nature-nurture" approach indicates tha t human behavior is determined by the human genes/environment interaction. Differences in human behavior must then be caused by differences (i) i n the genes, ( i i ) i n the environment, ( i i i ) i n both, or ( iv) i n the length o f the period o f tha t interaction.

(i) I s i t possible tha t the dif ferences between Western (or for simplicity's sake, Caucasian) and L D C behavior are only due t o differences between the genetical properties- largely coinciding w i t h the concept o f " racia l character is t ics"– of the populations concerned7 Behavorial genetics suggests tha t human behavior is determined by a great many genes, and there i s no clear evidence

tha t the few genes recognized so f a r and mainly determining the morphological and biochemical differences between the above t w o kinds o f human p o p u l a t i o n s - l i k e facial shape or hemoglobine struc- t u r e – d o greatly a f f ec t behavior. I n addition, there are Caucasian population+-genetically l i t t l e differing- that do show differences in behavior. Conversely, non-Caucasian individuals, e.g. Japanese, have shown t o have been able t o adopt i n a few decades' time many Western behaviors. Therefore possibility ( i ) cannot be re fu ted nor confirmed.

( i i ) What about environmental dif ferences determining t he be- havioral, and hence cultural, ones (as suggested by Birdsell, 1972: 525; Reynolds, 1976:199)? Many Caucasians i n a t ropical envir- onment do, i n fact, behave i n some respects i n a d i f ferent way than they do i n the country o f thei r ancestry. And, o f course, the same holds for L D C individuals in a Western environment. I n addition, nonhuman primates are shown t o display intraspecif ic behavioral dif ferences as determined by ecological factors (Bishop, 1979). B u t there are large categories o f people tha t even i n the same environment re ta in behaviors typical f o r the country of thei r origin or a t least d i f ferent f rom other racia l groups. And why is it t ha t the major i ty of the LDCs i s found i n t ropical areas and why did Western technology originate, and why does i t s t i l l mainly flourish, in the various temperate climate zones? On the other hand, no t in al l temperate zones, e.g. o f the Americas, Western-

l ike technologies have emerged. And e.g. the European Alpine and the Central Asian highland populations l ive in comparable geo- graphical and cl imate conditions, bu t their behavior and thei r cultures are different i n many respects. So possibility ( i i ) is no t very l ikely either.

( i i i ) The less l ike ly the f i rs t t w o possibilities are, the more is the third, i.e. a combination of genetical and environmental dif- ferences providing t he explanation. Unfortunately, i n the absence o f a possibility for assessing the re lat ive contr ibution of both

factors, this conclusion is o f heur is t ic ra ther than of p rac t i ca l use.

I n fact, it w i l l be ve ry d i f f i c u l t if n o t impossible to disentangle the t w o factors completely. ( F o r a more deta i led discussion, see Darl ington, 1978, and Alexander, 1979; for ( iv ) see Ch. 8).

Obviously, a ra ther confusing p ic tu re emerges f rom the above discussion, which is, o f course, a simpl i f ied account of a ext remely complicated process* However, analyzing the evolut ionary back- ground may possibly somewhat elucidate the problem. Evolut ionary biology indicates t h a t there is always a n in te rac t ion be tween the genes and the i r environment. The character o f the genes and the i r combinations, then, is mainly the resul t o f shaping b y the i r en- vironment. This equally applies t o man (though i n Homo sapiens the feedback inf luence by the genes on the i r environment has been greater and faster than i n most o ther species). E.g. the dark skin color o f races l i v ing i n t rop ica l areas is an adaptat ion t o t h a t environment (Brands & Eaton, 1978). l i ke many other rac ia l char- acterist ics -anatomical, physiological and biochemical- (Krantz, 1980), b u t also human social behavior is probably a resul t o f such a mechanism (Reynolds, 1976). The confusing examples above and the over- all genetic s imi lar i ty o f d i f ferent human races (Nei, 1975:183; Bodmer & Cavalli-Sforza, 1976:591) are compatible w i t h the view t h a t these show indeed a considerable overlap i n the genes deter- mining the i r behavior. Is there, however, a complete over lap? Wi th Wilson (1977:133) I doubt so.

L e t us have a closer look a t t h e or ig in o f Western technology. The l a t t e r is, among others, based on a combinat ion o f l a rge scale (and long- term) planning, manageing, cooperat ing and technological abilities, and on a sh i f t f rom famil ism (see e.g. D j u r f e l d t & L i n d b e r g 1980) and t r iba l ism t o nat ional ism and expansionism u n t i l recent ly hardly found elsewhere. Could these have been the resul t o f differences i n genetic make-up? The possibil ity cannot be denied. To mention one possible-and t o m y feel ing likely– sel- ect ive pressure hav ing shaped such a set o f genes, l e t us consider

an ecological one, i.e. the temperate and colder zones' c l imate: t h e a l te rna t ing seasons and especial ly the long w in te r periods se lected for long- term planning abi l i t ies (i.e. for housing, heating, s tor ing etc.). Similar pressures f rom t rop ica l d ry seaons impress as being less strong. While recogniz ing the existence of the chicken-egg quest ion is th is analysis, as we l l as i t s provisional ly hypo the t i ca l character, it can be s tated t h a t b o t h the Caucasian genes and the European environment- undoubtedly interacting- have caused the emergence of Western technology, e.g. via a s h i f t f r o m hunt ing /gather ing t o agr icultur ing. A n d anyway, the tropics' c l ima te is l ike ly t o account i n some way for wha t is cal led underdevelopment -which v iewpoint is neglected as a reac t ion t o earlier, s impl i f ied co lon ia l is t and geographical determinism (Myrdal, 1968:679).

Could the other races acquire simi lar behaviors? O n the one hand, i n pre- industrial condit ions a remarkable paral lel ism o r con- vergence is shown i n various populations, races and par ts o f the wor ld (Steensberg, 1980). O n the other, i n more r e c e n t t imes we f ind more pronounced differences. E.g. the Mongoloid race is t rad i t ional ly found i n v i r tua l l y a l l c l ima te zones, b u t so far, o f this race, l i k e f o r t h a t m a t t e r o f the other non-Caucasian ones, on ly a few groups, l ike the Japanese, have, part ial ly, adopted Western culture, main ly i t s technology. Therefore, the possibi l i ty should be considered t h a t a Western way of l i f e can more readi ly or ig inate in, or more easily be adopted by, Caucasian-and t o a lesser ex ten t by the Mongoloid- races l i v ing i n a temperate c l imate zone than in, o r by, others. A n d an impor tant issue here is the re la t i ve con- t r ibu t ion of genetic and " cu l tu ra l " changes, the l a t t e r occur r ing usually a t a far greater speed than the former. Social scient ists may be able, t o a ce r ta in degree, t o disentangle bo th (as has been a t tempted concerning Japan by Vining, 1982).

Admi t ted ly , m y above reasoning seems t o ignore any in t ra rac ia l differences t h a t may, nevertheless, be of some importance- the

NEGROID

Fig.2. Schematized representation of the behavioral and other differences between various groups of humans usually classified as races. I n most properties-behavioral and morphological- races are similar, and when clustered i n a Venn diagram there is a great deal of overlap. A t issue is assessing the size and importance of the non- overlapping areas. (For an epistemological discussion of the race concept, see Rosenberg, 1981:111).

race concept, of course, pr imari ly being typological and hence t o some extent arbi t rary as far as genetically and environmentally determined characteristics are concerned (see Fig.2). Accordingly, ethnographers and historians may wel l adduce some exceptions t o my hypothesis:. Yet, the l a t t e r seems t o be supported by ( i ) v i r tual ly none o f the other ethnic groups i n their original set t ing so fa r having shown such a development; ra ther they have, unt i l about a hundred years ago, in most instances for many centuries, retained their own cul ture wi thout much change; ( i i ) the exceptional social position usually held by the major i ty o f non-Caucasian i n Western

societies, a posit ion which cannot be stated t o be caused solely by social discrimination and racial prejudice.*

I n conclusion, we should a t least reckon wi th the possibil i ty t ha t the differences between tradi t ional LDC and Western cult- ures-usually impressing t o us as quite pronounced– are t r iggered by-what one usually calls – small-genetic (though not necesserily epiphenomenal) differences operating i n various ecological setting, the la t te r being more contr ibutory than the former (cf. Lumsden & Wilson, 1981 ).

I t should be remarked that assuming the existence o f a genetic co- determination of behavioral-next t o morphological and biochemical-differences between races and the recognition of ubiquitous interracial tensions (e.g. Gloor, 1981) has l i t t l e t o do with racism (Jensen, 1981:487) as suggested e.g. by Hauser

(1979:54), i.e. only as far as such assumptions are misused by racists. (Remarkably, such racism is more likely to result from Marxism than from Darwinism; Christen, 1981:75). Should the Bushman and the New Yorker disdain one another i f they appeared not adapted to each other's environment? (See also Fig.2).

Similarly, the average IQ--merely a rough, Western society's value judgment-of negroes consistently being found lower than that of Caucasians (Scarr, 1981) can possibly more frui t ful ly be considered as resulting, rather than from present-day social discrimination alone, also from former selective pressures in tropical Afr ican conditions; for these pressures may have acted also on the genotypes. (For a balanced discussion on the nature-nurture debate on interracial IQ differences, see Scarr, 1981). Analogously, i suspect ( in contrast t o Campbell, 1975:1122) that if the Bushmen or the Bantus had devised a test valueing individuals for their societies the average Caucasian could well score relat ively low. Social anthropologists more familiar w i th Central Af r ica wi l l undoubtedly be able-better than I am-to imagine what such a test would consist of. I mention here as an example a test for tackling t h e – i n our eyes-harsh environmental conditions of the savanna and desert; for prolonged running; for pol i t ical decisions being reached by discussion and conviction rather than by polarizing attitudes an voting; for open and friendly behavior– towards strangers and even more towards relatives-; and for other social contacts. (I even wonder whether the very possession o f the last mentioned properties could not explain why these Africans probably never devised such a test in the f i rst place). This reasoning does not deny an environmental influence on I Q as may explain the rising IQ among the younger Japanese generation (Lyn, 1982; but see Flynn, 1983; and Vining 1982, 1983).

( N o t e ctd.)

Also, the recognition of the difficulties in defining 'race' biologically, and of fashion-like trends –even among anthropologists (Littlefield et al., 1982)-in i t s various definitions does not detract from my above hypothesizing which resulted from a phenomenological approach based on statistical relationships. Again l want to stress here that all such interracial comparisons should be viewed in the light of Fig.2's approach, i.e. one should be aware of the similarities at a closer look usually being greater than the differences, and that at issue is an assessment of those differences.

HAPTER 8

WESTERN M A T E R I A L

C O N D I T I O N S

FOR A L L M A N K I N D ?

It may we l l be asked now what i s t h e relevance o f t h e above biological, genetical and ethnological digressions f o r the World Models and t h e L D C problems. Well, usually those having received a Western education ( including Marxism; Morris, 1979:22) axiomat-

ica l l y assume –as indicated by the very meaning o f the acronym's middle le t ter- that L D C people are i n the process of- inevitably

(Brand t e t al., 1980:172) –getting a more Western way o f l i f e or t h a t they should be assisted or even fo rced t o fo l low such a course ( I sense such sp i r i t i n e.g. Wortman & Cummings, 1978). B u t w i t h Hard in (1977:49) and Emlen (1980:142) I wonder: i s such a process biological ly possible and is it desirable? I f western izat ion were determined only b y genetical peculiarit ies, which as we saw above, is n o t very l ikely, t h e process' real isat ion would be im-

possible (unless large scale genetic engineering would be pract ised among the LDC peoples –an unl ike ly perspective). I f Western-

iza t ion were determined by ecological pressures only--which equal-

Iy appeared to be un l ike ly– i t s implementation would be very difficult because the LDC populations can hardly be provided with a westernized physical environment.

But what about the most likely explanation of Westernization's origin, i.e. the interaction of a number o f genetic properties and certain ecological selective pressures? The only rational reason Ican imagine the technological and developing optimists can adduce for continuing present westernization-centered LDC policies is that the European ecology would have been just a b i t more favorable for the emergence o f Westernization than the LDC 's one, that the LDC populations would basically have behavoriai genetics similar to the Caucasian ones, and that therefore they wi l l simply follow the Western world in due time. Unfortunately, science cannot (yet) give an exact assessment o f e.g. the extent o f overlap of the genes determining the behavior in which Caucasians presently differ from others, and hence of the optimistst reasoning.

For the time being, therefore, it is worthwhile to consider the possibility that the grafting of Western culture into LDCs wi l l remain a very difficult process, that only parts o f the graf t wi l l take, that many parts will, in fact, be rejected, and-to carry this medical metaphor somewhat further- that the rejection wi l l mainly be effected by a "host vs.. graft" reaction (of which the 1979 events in Iran may provide an example). i f so, a likely result of the grafting process wi l l be a diminished level of UWB/c both i n the Western world and the LDCs.

The "technological/planning genes" present in some human pop- u l a t i o n ~ may thus have been selected for by ecological pressures. If so, these genes originally had survival value. (They have enabled mankind to grow hitherto exponentially, and probably they are also capable of slowing down population growth so as to prevent an increase of TUS of the world population). However, their present possession by the Caucasians and other races does not imply that a decrease of Wesern materialistic wealth wi l l inevitably lead to a

lasting decrease of the average UWB/c I n the societies enjoying i t (see e.g. Chen et al. 1974). It is of course a classical commonplace to state that money does not make happy, an idea that-even i n the USA-has gained terri tory (Heilbroner, 1974). Yet, we better interpret this statement as meaning that every human being has to have some basic needs fulf i l led (such as love and attention from relatives, food, shelter etc.) t o maintain a level of UWB t o be able to survive. Preparing the wealthy societies for a reduction of materialistic prosperity is largely a matter of changing socio- cultural systems. Undoubtedly, this implies a considerable time lag, and therefore it should be started as soon as possible.

Apart from the above biological constraints, the World Models furthermore indicate that It is also economically and physically virtually impossible for all of the world's population to achieve the level of present Western materialistic way of living (e.g. Watt, 1974; Heilbroner, 1974, Cole, 1981 :438). A universal human charac- teristic which is relevant here is the propensity t o compare one's l o t in l i fe wi th that of others (Symons, 1979:126) and the ease by which virtually every human individual appears to be conditioned so as to wish the material wealth (and health care; Vuori & Rimpela, 1981:218) possessed by somebody else. Most of us, Westerners, are in such a condition, but the rest o f the world, including the LDCs (Laszlo, 1974; Pannenborg, 1979; Abernethy, 1979) is rapidly being brought into a similar condition, e.g. by the intensifying global communications-tending to (Peacock & Kirsch, 1980:127), but probably not resulting in (see above) one, greyish world culture. Most probably such conditioning i s much more easy to obtain than reversing the process, i.e. preparing people for a lower level of material wealth and health care in the near future. This even applies when this lower level may be similar to the one present only a few years before which resulted in a level o f UWB/c similar to that present during more material and medical prosperity.

It is likely that slowing down o f the increase o f health care in the developed world would be more contributory to raising the level o f UWB/c in the LDCs and o f world TUWB than i s often assumed. For such care is probably more manageable than tech- nology is (being often largely government directed) and i ts uses relatively large amounts o f national energy and money. E.g. in the Netherlands 1 0 % o f thelarge Gross National Product is spent on health care; in contrast, in various LDCs the per caput amount o f money spent on-Western-health care i s more than 1 0 0 times less.

What about the extent o f global conditioning towards Western standards of l iving? Admittedly, the widespread belief that most LDCs show a deeply fe l t drive towards modernization and dev- elopment-as voiced by the Brandt Commission (Brandt e t al., 1980:172)–may be false because in LDCs that drive may well be limited mainly t o the small (but powerful; Murdoch, 1980) group of e.g. –usually westernized– politicians and industrialists (as already pointed out by Myrdal, 1968:54-56) who seem insufficiently to perceive the rural poverty i n their own countries (Chambers, 1981). Reducing the LDC TUS can probably faster be achieved by focussing on these groups as targets for new developmental strat- egies than on the ultimate goal, i.e. the poor themselves. Hence, though for the time being westernization is likely to remain considered as the "LDC " goal i ts desirability-especially concerning the levels o f material wealth and medical ca re–can be questioned (see Ch. 9).

This, however, does not al l imply that the developed countries should or can increase or even maintain their present levels (Watt, 1974, 1978; Mönckeberg, 1979)-like for that matter population size (Pradervand, 1980). E.g. the per caput energy consumption in industrialized countries i n 1978 was 44 times higher than i n LDCs (Jain, 1981); and a workable solution has to be found for the international distribution o f rights to use fossil fuels that by their carbon dioxide production and greenhouse effect threaten mankind (Gordon, 1979:103; Kukla & Gavin, 1981)-even if it is provis-

ionally di f f icul t to detect (Wigley & Jones, 1981; Rycroft, 1982; Revelle, 1982; Thompson & Schneider, 1982), shows a time-lag (Bryan et al., 1982), and seems limited (Idso, 1980). Lowering the developed world's material wealth such as to maintain the present levels i n the LDCs would cause only a temporary, slight and reversible reduction of the average UWB/c in the Westernized World, whereas it might cause a stabilization of the average UWB/c i n the LDCs. If, on the other hand, LDC aggression against the developed countries would occur, a considerable decrease in their TU WB is likely to occur, i.e. i f only because o f the vuln- erability o f their food systems–these being heavily dependent on fertilizer, imported energy resources, complicated technology and, e.g. distributional, logistics ( in addition to its causing increasing erosion; Brown, 1981).

CHAPTER 9

SOME P O L I T I C A L IMPLICATIONS OF THE

BIOLOG I C I Z E D APPROACH

Jumping from observations and hypotheses to considering political options, as I have come to do in the last Chapter, has, of course, i ts pitfalls. While I recognize the essence of the naturalistic fallacy, i.e. that "ought" does not simply follow from "is", l consider al l the anthropological and biological considerations ment- oned before as remaining rather academical and sterile wouldn't l attempt to discover whether they might give some suggestions for developmental strategies. Even if this would lead to some far- fetched conclusions, such a provisional–seemingly sterile and de- humanized-attempt may be legitimate, i.e. in view of the alarming situation mankind i s presently facing and of i ts possibly easing of the decision making processes; a biological approach does not, as

suggested by Singer (1981:150) narrow the gap between facts and values for that gap is an epistemological, qualitative, and dimen- sionless one.

Before I render my seemingly dehumanized approach, I would like to stress that I very well realize that this is only one possible way o f analyzing, and, subsequently curing, the unfortunate position in which a larger part of mankind finds itself a t present. And I hope i t w i l l be understood that the mere dare to formulate such seemingly paradoxical, stone-hard and inhumane propositions in- dicates the very opposite o f these qualifications which just has been the motor behind my attempting an objectified approach.

I n Ch. 5 we have seen that possibly LDC population growth as well as the magnitude of starvation in LDCs is a sequel o f their sociocultural system-among others, leading to a rather constant, and to Western standards low, availability o f food and medical care per caput. I f these mechanisms do indeed operate in LDCs, one is forced to consider the-paradoxical and seemingly cruel-option o f stopping food aid and food production expansion: for this would decrease population growth but also the growing number of starving individuals and hence the increasing TUS, while for the time being the average UWB/c might remain about the same. Subsequently, the socio-cultural systems could be changed more easily due to the decrease of population pressures (which up till now have usually overtaken all such efforts) and hence lead to a decreased natali ty (the lat ter has, e.g., been shown in some LDCs to be negatively correlated with literacy rates). Only then, the food per caput rat io could safely rise implying present Western-and previous "LD"C- UWB/c levels.

A similar conclusion is reached by Abernethy; on the basis o f her historical and ethnographical studies she suggests (1979:140, 176) that human populations tend toward adjustment o f their numbers to the carrying capacity o f their environment (not to their density; Freedman, 1980:206) and that famine i s consonant wi th a

realistic perspective on resources whereas emergency rel ief may perpetuate the myth o f unlimited abundance. Also others discussing developmental strategies have, for that matter, considered similar, seemingly cruel, options (see Myrdal, 1968:1497, for some examp- les).

With westernized health care things seem to be similarly puzz- ling. Keeping it on its present level or decreasing it would undoubtedly contribute t o slowing down LDC population growth, especially by raising infant mortality. But this, i n itself, gives only a moderate and short-time rise o f TUS (as we discussed i n Ch. 6). This would even apply when the reduction o f health care would include stopping vaccination and anti-malaria programs: while other nonimmune individuals are l ikely to suffer increasingly, this would, again, only occur temporarily, i.e. unti l the endemic immunity incidence would have returned to i ts previous, higher values (An- derson & May, 1982). Furthermore, maintaining the per caput level of LDC medical care is much easier to imply and cheaper than increasing food production. It is therefore conceivable that main- taining the present level o f health care (or focussing it on population control; Pannenborg, 1979) for some time would not lead to a substantial short-term rise of TUS, and that it even con- tributes to a lowering o f the TUS in the future. Only after-or by (Watson et al., 1979)-medical care having become incorporated into a new socio-political system it may increasingly benefit the LDCs, a conclusion equally reached by the socio-economical studies o f Myrdal (1968:1618) and the sociopolitical studies o f Power & Holenstein (1976) and Pannenborg (1 979).

The traditional and the above discussed alternative develop- mental strategies are graphically pictured in Fig.3.

Fig. 3. Schematic representation o f the relation between population size and the quantity of food available in a typical Less Developed Country (LDC). Prior t o Westernization food production could probably match population size, whereas after Westernization began a divergence came into being implying that about 1/3 o f the population is malnutritioned. When present trends continue, this rat io is likely to remain constant implying a rise o f TUS (the Total of Units of Suffering). When, however, food availability and medi- cal aid would not be increased, population growth would possibly slow down or stop, and TUS would rise temporarily and slightly, while ultimately it would decrease, i.e. when effective b i r th control due to changing socio-cultural systems wi l l be possible. A t that time an increase of food and medical aid would not result i n an increase of TUS but rather in a decrease. The values are entirely arbitrary-the use of the curves only being t o illustrate the diachronic differences o f some human feelings.

CHAPTER

THE ECONOMICAL A N D SOCIAL VS. THE

B I O L O G I C I Z E D STRATEGIES

The above simplified, somewhat myopically biologicized, approach leaves us wi th some unresolved hot issues. Apart from the in- tuitively puzzling ethics following from its casting doubts on the usual aid and development programs, how can that strategy become implemented? And, more importantly, wi l l it, i n fact, lead to our goal?

What about the political implications, e.g. the social-psycho- logical consequences o f not increasing the quantity o f food avail- able in LDCs and the consequent, though probably temporary, rise of TUS? There i s a possibility that the majority of the LDC population would fatalistically, more or less, accept a further period o f food shortage (Dirks, 1980) as they are in many regions already used to it.

However, it is equally possible that, due to the famines and the resistance to and by the present wealthy classes (dependent on commerce, large scale industry, landlordism, etc.), intra-population aggression would increase (Johnston & Nicholson, 1979:209). I n the latter case the TUS of other, including Western, countries may substantially Increase, and thereby that of mankind as a whole. But remember that such events are quite possible anyway, and that ostrich policy now may lead to their later occurrence on a much larger scale causing an even larger TUS for mankind (cf. Martin, 1975; Benett, 1976a:195; Calhoun & Ahuja, 1979). In addition, it should be remarked that this strategy is not similar to the life-boat strategy of Paddock & Paddock (1967) and Hardin (1974). This, for

that matter, should be assessed according to the above biologicized approach rather than be refuted a priori on traditionally ethical grounds as done e.g. by Nicholson (1979:47) or on its weakly metaphorical basis (Gordon, 1979:77).

Now, from a more purely socio-political viewpoint in the latter years proposals for a new developmental strategy are emerging based on rational observations rather than on an a priori extra- polation from traditional Western capitalist or Marxist ethics (see e.g. Power & Holenstein, 1976; Lappé & Collins, 1977; Bondestam & Bergström, 1980; Franke & Chasin, 1980; Lappé e t al., 1980; Murdoch, 1980; Pearse, 1980; Wallerstein, 1980). They al l boil down mainly to the conviction that it i s basically the political an social structures in and between the LDCs and the other countries that cause the problems, mainly effect ing by the inequality of incomes within the LDCs. And though the evidence is not always convincing (Spitzer, 1981; Plucknett & Smith, 1982) it appears, then, that agricultural development, food aid programs, and large-scale and agribusiness based cash cropping so far have often resulted from, as well as have led to, political structures maintaining and even increasing LDC poverty. I n fact, according to the "Matthew principle" (Boulding, 1981 :75) international income inequality ap- pears to be maintained by the present world economic system (Nolan, 1982), and the intranational LDC inequality has lately even increased (Griffin, 1981). The above proposals, then, recommend, among others, that poverty and intra-LDC inequality should become decreased because a more egalitarian structure would lead to a reduction o f population growth. Le t us now consider to what extent such a scenario would agree wi th the, seemingly contradictory and seemingly more cruel, biologicized one.

Both strategies overlap in (i) the rejection i f boosting the usual food aid and global food production programs; ( i i ) the assumption of the presently alarming population growth being dependent on socio- political structures; and ( i i i ) the rejection o f simply transferring capital t o the LDCs or increasing their GNP. It is mainly in the

underlying arguments tha t both strategies differ- the mentioned authors1 ones mainly being based on economical considerations. While these impress largely as being quite sound they do leave some questions unanswered.

(1) Admittedly, rat ional fami ly planning does o f ten occur, bu t how of ten? I n what percentage o f couples, even if some planning were intended, newborns do i n f a c t add t o the population pressures due to ignorance, inter fer ing Western ethics, or disruption o f tradit ional kinship and other social systems? (2) What about the t ime lag and systems' iner t ia inter fer ing w i th the introduction of the egalitarian development strategy? I n other words, does mankind have suff icient t ime t o adopt t ha t strategy? (3) A r e there suffic- ient arguments i n favor of the global universality o f the re lat ion between decreasing inequali ty and decreasing populat ion growth? Have the differences i n culture as wel l as i n genetic properties suf f ic ient ly been taken in to account? (see Ch. 7). (4) What about the impact o f Western(ized) health care or rather " iat rocracy"? This is o f ten ignored i n the usual developmental discussions. Acc- ording t o the demographic- transition supporters, lowering infant morta l i ty would result i n a reduced b i r t h ra te (Commoner, 1972); and increasing l i fe expectancy may, t o be sure, favor other developmental modalities (Schultz, 1979). Again, however, we are l e f t w i t h the question whether this works in a l l human populations (Graham, 1971). There could equally wel l be a feed-back loop operating i n LDCs just the other way around, i.e. decreased infant morta l i ty –> increased population growth –> increased starvation

increased i n fan t mortal i ty, thus implying an increased TUS ( fo r a discussion, see Benett, 1976a:113; and Pannenborg, 1979). (5) D o societies tha t have, in fact, adopted a more egali tarian pol icy bear out the theory by showing a reduced population growth? Does e.g. Tanzania conform to the theory? I think there are reasons t o doubt it (see also Hyden, 1980).

i t seems useful to consider t h e – g e n e t i c a l l y and sociobio- logical ly understandable-wide-spread phenomenon o f kinship-based economy and nepotism (e.g. Van Den Berghe, 1979; Wind, 1980a), presumed to be an early stage i n the development o f nation-sized states (Alexander, 1980:249), and t o be correlated t o the primi- tiveness o f a society (Barkow, 1982) as one o f the stumbling blocks, if no t the most important one, u l t imately causing so o f t en developmental policies so far t o fail. Hence, it is o f crucia l importance to assess the balance exist ing between the individual's biological selfishness and his/her environment including other in- dividuals. I n d i f ferent geographical environments this may wel l mean size differences i n cooperative groups, i.e. a more or less f inely grained society. The above authors1 findings tha t people on their own small plots produce more per acre than on large, mechanized farms is i n agreement w i t h the sociobiological view.

Biologically, the achievement of a permanently completely egal- itarian, nation-sized society seems dif f icult , i.e. i n view o f the individuals1 differences i n genetic make-up and environment (as seems t o be borne out, for tha t matter, by pol i t ica l history).

i n conclusion, neither of the t w o scenarios- the biologicized nor the egalitarian-are, for the t ime being, able t o o f fe r a clear- cut alternative solution t o the developmental problems ( fo r there is no easy or clear solution; Hauser, 1979:652, even though optimists l ike Ridker, 1979:122 feel tha t draconic measures l i ke the "biologi- cized" ones are not needed). E.g. it is unclear what po l i t i ca l leverage can most f ru i t fu l l y be used fo r tak ing a new course, i.e. result ing i n a minimum o f global TUS during the transit ion period. On the one hand, the biologicized scenario may overemphasize the re lat ive quant i ty o f food actual ly being outside the LDC peoples' own contro l (and both scenarios, for tha t matter, the governe- ments' manipulating abilities; e.g. Hyden, 1980; Bryceson, 1982); also, simply returning t o subsistence agriculture does probably no t solve the food problem (Huddlestone, 1981:276). On the other, the biologicized strategy, viz no t increasing food avai labi l i ty and West-

ern health care, may even become used as an anti-elitist tool leading t o a more egalitarian society via revolutionary movements. Anyway, developmental-policy making obviously has t o f ind new strategies without, however, forcing thim into preconceived cap- i ta l is t or socialist paradigmatic frameworks (Hyden, 1980).

During and after the transition period some relief can be obtained by (national and international) food redistribution (Gor- don, 1979); development ( i f limited, Jensen, 1978) o f agricultural technology (Bassham, 1977; Day, 1977; Wortman & Cummings, 1978; Marx, 1979; Epstein e t al., 1980; Spitzer, 1981; Borlaug, 1983; Barton & Brill, 1983) including plant genetics (Boyer, 1982); cult ivating hitherto underused land (Wortman & Cummings, 1978; Murdoch, 1980); properly organized application o f energy use by photosynthetic processes (Hall, 1979; Smith, 1981); improved en- zymological biomass (i.e. cellulose) refining (Bungay, 1982); cult- ivating fish (Lovell, 1979); developing animal agriculture systems (Ward e t al., 1980; Spitzer, 1981); a shift from cult ivating cash crops and livestock feed grains t o subsistence crops Lappé & Collins, 1977; Pimentel e t al., 1980; Murdoch, 1980)-though its results are often overestimated (Spitzer, 1981:33,184); modifying culturally determined food preferences (Dando, 1980:91,165); and carefully planned population redistribution (Gosling, 1979). Also direct food aid can be used for implementing other development projects (Dustin & Lavoipierre, 1981; F.A.O., 1979:204).

Decisions concerning technological development i n LDCs should be dependent on their contribution t o l imit ing population growth.

The various possibilities discussed in the preceding chapters are schematically pictured in Fig. 4.

Fig. 4 Schematic representat ion o f the evolution o f the re lat ionship between some parameters o f the World Models discussed i n the text. Population size i s p lo t ted horizontal ly. Ve r t i ca l l y p lo t ted are the levels o f ind iv idual Well-Being UWB/c, and the levels o f Medica l Care MC and technological/material wea l th TW indicated b y the empty bars. The l e f t rectangle i n each box represents the Western world, t h e r i g h t one the t yp i ca l LDCs ( fo r heur is t ic puposes the in termediate countries are omitted). The surface o f each rectangle therefore represents the To ta l o f t he Un i t s o f Well- Being which is assumed n o t t o increase when the present trends continue. The l a t t e r process is more l ike ly t o resul t i n war and a subsequent smaller T o t a l o f Well-being than the a l ternat ive t rend (i.e. n o t increasing medical and food aid) does (do t ted l ine) because, a lower l eve l o f UWB/c more easily leads t o neurot izat ion and violence. The values are in t i re ly arbitrary- the use o f t he curves only being t o i l lust rate the diachronic d i f ferences o f some human feelings.

Preindustrial era 1

Present situation X

..:...> :<.:.:.: ... :.;.::.:...: Population Size Developed World

Less Developed Countries

M C = Medical Care

Units of Wellbeing per Capita T W = l Technological Material Wealth

CHAPTER 11

T H E F U T U R E

Evolutionary biology and anthropology may shed some new l igh t on global problems of economics (Boulding, 1981) and those concerning l imi t ing population growth and obtaining material equilibrium. For a t issue here is no t the re lat ively simple question "What is the physically possible maximum o f global food production and techno- logical development?" Rather it appears relevant t o ask some other questions: ( i ) What basic, ult imate goal do most humans share7 (il) What is the maximum o f global production o f food and other basic commodities, and o f technological development as determined by the-broadly defined-physical (e.g. environmental) and by the anthropobiological –e.g somatical, psychological, physiological, and social-possibilities and constraints7 ( i i i ) How does t ha t production re la te t o (i), especially as far as i t s national and international distr ibution is concerned7

Formulating such questions more clearly and attempting t o answer them w i l l have t o become incorporated i n to the tasks of

politicians. This would imply assistance by anthropologists (see also Belshaw, 1976; Benett, 1976). For instance, considering Question ( i ) is l ike ly t o lead t o the convict ion tha t developmental problems bet ter no t be formulated only in-preconceived, rigid, Westernized, paradigmatic- politico-economical terms l ike socialism, capitalism, GNP or even poverty. Rather they should also become formulated by reducing them to more basic modalities l ike human survival and well-being. This means tha t the basis o f establishing new dev- elopmental strategies may become broadened by the inclusion of

analyses concerning the selective (or survival) value o f part icular human behaviors-similar t o the analyses biologists are used to handle concerning nonhuman organisms (even though there are embarassing differences i n t ime scales and levels o f causality).

Such analyses need knowledge o f the organism/environment Interaction. Therefore, i t appears tha t we urgently have t o f ind out what behavioral t ra i ts are shown by humans i n what environment and which ones are shared by a l l human individuals. For this eases the predict ion of human behavior i n the future (Irons, 1979:509), and i t assists us t o assess whether ethnic dif ferences i n behavior may be due to differences of genetic make-up, and i f so, which ones are responsible. A number o f these common t ra i ts are already known and have been catalogued (e.g. Murdock, 1967; Deuel, 1971), while efforts should be made i n looking for more o f these universal behavioral properties. Human ethology is therefore going t o be o f increasing importance. From a sl ightly d i f fe ren t viewpoint, this has already been stressed e.g. by Mead (1975) ( fo r some reviews, see Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1975, and von Cranach e t al., 1979). Nex t t o ethnology, historical studies (Bock, 1980), chi ld psychology, and sociobiology are most l ike ly t o provide clues for f inding these universal human properties.

As human well-being cannot exactly be quantified, estimations of i ts size should be handled. When considering strategies for survival o f mankind such estimations concerning present humans should be weighed against those o f future generations the number of which should be taken i n to account i n those considerations.

For the establishment o f future strategies i t is necessary tha t a common goal for a l l mankind i s formulated by some world-wide authority (Laszlo, 1974) l i ke the UN. Among others, because of the growing inter-dependence-or rather inter-existence (Laszlo, 1978) - of a l l peoples, such an establishment may be hampered by-and must be i n balance with– the counteracting lack o f cross-national

identificatory forces apparent in the widespread occurrence of familism, tribalism and nationalism (Heilbroner, 1974) and ex- plicable by behavioral genetics (Dawkins, 1976; Wilson, 1978; Alex- ander, 1980; Wind, 1980a).

Some polit ical options seem provisionally to emerge from such a biologicized approach. Developmental strategies should focus on attempts to obtain adjustments o f the socio-cultural systems lead- i n g to a reduction of population growth. Hence, social scientists should spend efforts to f ind and describe the mechanisms determ- ining that growth in LDCs especially those operant on the indiv- idual level. Slowing down of LDC population increases seems t o be achievable by changing current developmental and intra-LDC poli- cies rather than by maintaining them. The changes, then, should be directed a t reducing global as well as intra-LDC income differ- ences-possibly next t o or even by not increasing food production and medical care. The possibility of this resulting in, national or international, violence seems to contraindicate such a policy. But more violence and suffering is likely i n the future (Hauser, 1979: 654) if mankind does not invest this temporary rise of suffering now. And the argument of those pro food production increase that such increase a t least buys time (Plucknett & Smith, 1982:219) may well prove to be ostrich policy by only o f f the evil hour.

There is another mechanism providing an argument in favor of the above considered reduction of food production and medical care. Concomittant with the LDCs' population growth, their dep- endency on the industrialized nations-especially the latters' tech- nology--increases. The above reduction, now, may well provide the least evil way to break this dangerous vicious circle.

As a matter of fact, other developmental strategies aimed at reducing population growth should not be discontinued, i.e. socio- economic as wel l as bir th control programs (Cutright & Kelly, 1981; Bonvin, 1982). But also these strategies can probably more fruit-

fully be formulated in terms reducing the goals to basic modaiities like human well-being than t o the traditional developmental ones like modernization, technological deveopment, food production or per capita income.

A crucial question to be solved is: t o what extent is the realisation of the socio-cultural adjustments dependent on pop- ulation size and health? On the one hand, such adjustments are di f f icul t t o obtain when part of a population is starving and ill; on the other hand, however, they appear (so far) to be impossible in a rapidly growing popuiation (among others, because the general health situation Is probably as bad as i n a non-increasing one). Traditional behaviors like inducing abortion-even in the USA (Watt, 1974)-, sex taboos and infanticide should not be prohibited, and other means of limiting population size, maybe even for the time being government-imposed, should be considered. The power o f technocracy and " ia t rocracy" should be l imited especially in their conditioning of individuals, in the developed as well as in the developing countries, for wishing ever-increasing material wealth and westernized medical care. Whether this should be effected, e.g. by simply prohibiting advertisements and technological production or by higher prices (and taxes), is a question to be solved by social scientists and politicians.

The lat ter two groups should furthermore focus on ways to prevent traditional LDC social systems from further crumbling away as a result of off-handedly graft ing of Western ways o f living, especially the above mentioned conditioning. A careful evaluation i s needed before traditional systems are going to be changed (see e.g. Grijpstra, 1976; Franke & Chasin, 1980, and Whitten & Sardar, 1981 for agricultural change; and Simoons, 1979 for the desecration of the Indian cow). This prevention and maybe even some restoration o f traditional social systems implies a reduction o f modernization including two major causes and effects of this crumbling-away, i.e.

urbanization and large-scale industrialization, and (re-)aiming a t a subsistence economy, a t least i n the less developed countries.

While my considerations may impress as suffering from the 'fallacy of post-industrial romanticism" (Ruse, 1981:175) they actually result from attempts t o rationalize world problems. I donot refute technological development as a means but as a goal.

Finally, the establishment o f new developmental strategies by a world-wide organization similar t o the U.N. rather than by smaller scaled groups, including national governments, as suggested above, is the more urgent because the individuals having t o implement the strategies cannot a l l be expected readily to adopt them, and intenslve information campaigns w i l l be needed. E.g. as far as the egalitarian strategy is concerned, the present LDC elites as well as many Westerners w i l l probably only reluctantly take a step back- ward feeling that they would in such a way dig their own grave. And as far as the biologicized strategy is concerned, Western(ized) development workers in the LDC field (including the present author) can hardly or not avoid the drive imposed by Western-and other-ethics implying intuitively offering help-beit short term- to their fellow humans. However, our emotions and our ethics were shaped by and geared to a world quite different from the present one; and when we wi l l appear to be unable t o overrule them by reason mankind may face a large scale classic Greek tragedy, i.e. an inescapable self-sacrificing mass suffering and destruction.

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LDCs: WHO CARES?

LDC: = Less Labeled Logically Luckily Lynching Legitimately Lately Later Lunatically Lasting

WHO = World Whose Wrong Western

Western Western World Worldwide Worldwide WHO Why We Well-being

Developed Developing Developed Developed Developing Developed Developed Developed Developed Development

Countries, but they are just Countries by us. They were Countries and are now decreasingly Countries. We may be busy Countries who basically were Countries. Thus. both these Countries and we-in many respects Countries–may become Countries instead of Countries.

Health Health Health Hospital

Health Health Helping Human Hunger Hatches Health Have Heeding

Organization. But Organized it? Is it not the Organization? While not being anymore Obsessed it promotes–even by primary

health care- Output and therefore can better be called Organization. Is it a Organization? It added to Over-population and thus to Originating. Does not Ostrich policy? Objectives only? Maybe, Omitted in our plans that WHO should be a Organization?

CARES = Concise Acronym Repealing Evocative Script

Reprinted from 'Perspectives i n Biology and Medicine', vol.24, No.2 (1981), p.188.