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Stewart, Bryce Donald orcid.org/0000-0001-5103-5041, Burns, Charlotte Jennie orcid.org/0000-0001-9944-0417, Hejnowicz, Adam Peter et al. (5 more authors) (2019) Making Brexit Work for the Environment and Livelihoods : Delivering a Stakeholder Informed Vision for Agriculture and Fisheries. People and Nature. pp. 442-456.

https://doi.org/10.1002/pan3.10054

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People and Nature. 2019;00:1–15.  | 1wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/pan3

Received:30November2018  |  Accepted:15August2019DOI: 10.1002/pan3.10054

R E V I E W A N D S Y N T H E S I S

Making Brexit work for the environment and livelihoods:

Delivering a stakeholder informed vision for agriculture and

fisheries

Bryce D. Stewart1  | Charlotte Burns2  | Adam P. Hejnowicz3  | Viviane Gravey4  |

Bethan C. O’Leary1  | Kevin Hicks5 | Fay M. Farstad6 | Sue E. Hartley7

ThisisanopenaccessarticleunderthetermsoftheCreativeCommonsAttributionLicense,whichpermitsuse,distributionandreproductioninanymedium,providedtheoriginalworkisproperlycited.©2019TheAuthors.People and NaturepublishedbyJohnWiley&SonsLtdonbehalfofBritishEcologicalSociety

BryceD.StewartandCharlotteBurnsarejointfirstauthors.

1DepartmentofEnvironmentandGeography,UniversityofYork,York,UK;2DepartmentofPoliticsandInternationalRelations,UniversityofSheffield,Sheffield,UK;3DepartmentofBiology,UniversityofYork,York,UK;4SchoolofHistory,Anthropology,PhilosophyandPolitics,QueensUniversity,Belfast,UK;5StockholmEnvironmentInstitute,DepartmentofEnvironmentandGeography,UniversityofYork,York,UK;6NorwegianEnvironmentAgency,Oslo,Norwayand7YorkEnvironmentalSustainabilityInstitute,UniversityofYork,York,UK

Correspondence

BryceD.StewartEmail:bryce.beukers-stewart@york.ac.uk

Funding information

EconomicandSocialResearchCouncil

HandlingEditor:JimHarris

Abstract

1. ThedecisionoftheUKtoleavetheEUhasfar-reaching,andoftenshared,implica-tionsforagricultureandfisheries.ToensurethefuturesustainabilityoftheUK’sagriculturalandfisheriessystems,wearguethatitisessentialtograsptheopportu-nitythatBrexitisprovidingtodevelopintegratedpoliciesthatimprovethemanage-mentandprotectionofthenaturalenvironments,uponwhichtheseindustriesrely.

2. This articleadvancesa stakeholder informedvisionof the futuredesignofUKagricultureand fisheriespolicies.WeassesshowcurrentlyemergingUKpolicywillneedtobeadaptedinordertoimplementthisvision.OurstartingpointisthatBrexitprovidestheopportunitytoredesigncurrentunsustainablepracticesandcan,inprinciple,deliverasustainablefutureforagricultureandfisheries.

3. Underpinning policieswith an ecosystem approach, explicit inclusion of publicgoodsprovision and socialwelfare equitywere found to be keyprovisions forenvironmental,agriculturalandfisherysustainability.Recognitionoftheneedsof,andinnovativepracticesin,thedevolvedUKnationsisalsorequiredasthenewpolicyandregulatorylandscapeisestablished.

4. Achievingtheproposedvisionwillnecessitatedrawingonbestpracticeandcre-atingmorecoherentandintegratedfood,environmentandruralandcoastaleco-nomic policies. Our findings demonstrate that “bottom-up” and co-productionapproacheswillbekeytothedevelopmentofmoreenvironmentallysustainableagricultureandfisheriespoliciestounderpinprosperouslivelihoods.

5. However,deliveringthisvisionwillinvolveovercomingsignificantchallenges.ThecurrentuncertaintyoverthenatureandtimingoftheUK’sBrexitagreementhin-dersforwardplanningandinvestmentwhiledivertingattentionawayfromfurtherin-depthconsiderationofenvironmentalsustainability.Inthefaceofthisuncer-tainty,muchoftheUK’snewpolicyontheenvironment,agricultureandfisheries

2  |    People and Nature STEWART ET Al.

1  | INTRODUC TION

ThedecisionoftheUKtoleavetheEUhasfar-reachingimplications,including the requirement to developnewagricultural and fisher-ies policies that could profoundly affect the livelihoods of ruraland coastal communities (Environmental Audit Committee, 2017;Phillipson&Symes, 2018).However,whileBrexit raises risks anduncertaintiesforbothsectors,italsoofferstheopportunitytore-formenvironmentalpolicies,makingthemfitforthechallengesofthe21stCentury.Futureaspirationsfora“GreenBrexit”weresetoutbytheUKGovernmentinits25YearEnvironmentPlan(25YEP;HMGovernment,2018a), its environmental governanceandprin-ciples consultation (Defra, 2018a), the Agriculture Bill (House ofCommons,2018a),inthewhitepaper‘Sustainablefisheriesforfu-ture generations’ (HMGovernment, 2018b) and the Fisheries Bill(HouseofCommons,2018b).Achievingthegoalslaidoutinthesedocumentswillbechallenging,whatevertheeventualoutcomeoftheBrexitnegotiations.Asuccessful‘reboot’ofUKenvironmentalpolicy requires recognition of thewider context, including issuessuchaslivelihoods,trade,tariffs,andmigration,theabilitytolearnfrompastpolicyfailuresand,asthe25YEPacknowledges,thede-velopment of more effective partnerships and engagement withstakeholders.

ThechangingUKpolitical landscapecoincideswith increas-ingrecognitionofthevitalroleplayedbybiodiversityandeco-systemservices in sustaininghumanwellbeing (e.g.Díazet al.,2018;Díazetal.,2019;Leviston,Walker,Green,&Price,2018),along with evidence that current environmental policies havefailed to halt the decline in habitat and species losses. Thereis consequently an opportunity to embrace the notion of ‘big-ger,better,andmore joinedupprotectedareas’thatecologicalscience suggests will help reverse these trends of habitat andspeciesrichnessdecline(Isaacetal.,2018;Lawtonetal.,2010;O'Learyetal.,2016).Inagriculture,thereisnowstrongevidencethatitispossibletomaintainorevenincreaseyieldswhilestop-pingdeclines inagro–ecosystembiodiversityanditsassociatedservices (e.g.Gemmill-Herren,2016;Prettyetal.,2018;Pretty&Bharucha,2014).Likewise,infisheries,furtheradoptionoftheecosystem approach could provide increased socio-economicbenefits,whileprotectingthewiderenvironmentthat fisheriesand many other marine-based activities rely upon (Prellezo &Curtin,2015).

In the spirit of this approach, the Universities of York andQueen'sBelfastgathered75keyfisheriesandagriculturalstake-holdersfromacrosstheUKpublic,privateandcharitablesectors,toelicittheirviewsonkeyprioritiesforUKagri-environmentandfisheriespoliciespost-Brexit.Thesetwosectorsaresignificantinthatevenundera so-called ‘soft’Brexit (seeBox1), theUKwillneedtodevelopitsowndomesticagricultureandfisheriespoliciesto replace the EU’s Common Agriculture and Fisheries Policies.Moreover,while Brexitwill have several discrete effects on ag-ricultureandfisheries,manychallengesandaspirationswillcon-tinue to be shared, such as determining how to balance naturalresourceusewithmaintainingecosystem functionand integrity,andhowtoensureequitablesharingofthebenefitsfromacommongood.Thesesharedambitionsforthesustainableand integrated

isthereforeambitiousinvisionbutlightondetail.Fullcommitmenttoco-produc-tionofpolicywithdevolvednationsandstakeholdersalsoappearstobelacking,butwillbeessentialforeffectivepolicydevelopmentandimplementation.

K E Y W O R D S

agriculture,Brexit,co-production,ecosystemapproach,fisheries,publicgoods,stakeholders,sustainability

BOX 1 Brexit scenarios and implications for agricul-ture, environment and fisheries

Soft Brexit:ThiswouldseetheUKremaincloselyalignedwiththeEUeitherasamemberoftheEuropeanSingleMarket(likeNorway or Iceland) or in a close customs partnership. ThesecountriesarenotpartofCAPortheCFPandsohave limitedinput intopolicydesign,but thevastmajorityofEUenviron-mentalpoliciesapplytotheminexchangeformaintenanceoftradelinks.Hard Brexit:ThiswouldseetheUKsecuringalimiteddeal,likethe recent Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and TradeAgreement,whichcouldapplytogoodsbutnotservices.ThegovernmentproposalinitsJuly2018WhitePaperonthefuturerelationshipbetweentheUKandEUfellsomewherebetweensoftandhardBrexit.No‐deal Brexit: Upon which there has been increasing focus,giventhechallengestheUKPrimeMinisterfacesintheHouseofCommons,whichwouldseetheUKfailtosecureadealandfallbackuponWorldTradeOrganisation(WTO)tradingrules.Under this scenario, theUKwouldbe free to design its ownpolicies,butsubjecttointernationaltreatycommitments,WTOrulesandanytradedealsitstrikes.ThisscenariorisksdamagingfarmandfisherincomesassupportpaymentsmaybecutunderWTO rules, and tariffs and competition from other marketscouldharmprofitsandlowercurrentstandards.

     |  3People and NatureSTEWART ET Al.

managementofboth landandseaare recognizeddriversofcur-rentenvironmentalpolicyintheUK(HMGovernment,2018a).Acombinedanalysisof these issues consequentlyprovides anop-portunitytosharelessonsacrossbothsectors.Therefore,drawingupon insights from ourworkshops and the rapidly transformingpolicy landscape, we developed a ‘stakeholder-informed vision’foragri-environmental and fisheriespolicy reform,which identi-fiesmechanismstodeliverbothenvironmentalsustainabilityandenhancedsocio-economicbenefitsforruralandcoastalcommuni-ties.WealsoassesshowcurrentlyemergingUKpolicywillneedtobeadaptedandimplementedinordertoachievethisvision.

2  | MATERIAL S AND METHODS

We held workshops inMarch 2017with a range of agriculturaland fisheries stakeholders (seeTablesS2andS3).Wesought togain voices fromawide rangeof stakeholders fromacrossbothsectors.Priortothesessions,aquestionnairewassentouttobothAgriculture and Fisheries participants for respondents to com-pletewhichaskedthemtoidentifykeychallengesandopportuni-tiesposedbyBrexit,andwhatfuturepolicyprioritiesoughttobe(seeTableS1).Followingtheconclusionoftheworkshop,afeed-backquestionnairewasalsoissuedforparticipantstocomplete.

2.1 | Agriculture stakeholder workshop

Theagriculturestakeholderworkshopwasattendedby40peopledrawnfromfarmbusinesses,farmingorganizations,environmentaland land-use non-governmental organizations, policy-makers andacademics(seeTableS2).Thedaywasstructuredaroundshortpres-entationsfollowedby‘WorldCafé’styleworkinggroupscomprising4–6peopleaddressingkeyquestions (e.g.devolution,governance,trade,agriculturalsustainability,futurepaymentarrangements).Theviews from these small working groupswere collated and,wherepossible,additionalinsightsfromthepost-eventquestionnairewereincorporated.However,thestakeholdersfromtheagriculturework-shopwerenotselectedfromdefinedsectorsinthesamewayasthefisheries stakeholders (seebelow), and fewerquestionnaireswerereturned,sothekeydatadeployedfortheagriculturalstakeholderanalysiswerefromthediscussiongroups.Hence,wefeltthatquan-titative rankingofstakeholderpriorities,aswasdonefor fisheriesstakeholders(Table1),wouldnotbesufficientlyrobustinthecaseofagriculture.

2.2 | Fisheries stakeholder workshop and priority analysis

The fisheries stakeholder workshop was attended by 35 people,which included representatives from the catching and processingsectors, fisheries managers, academics, Environmental NGOs andnatureconservationadvisers(seeTableS3).Theadvancequestion-naire asked stakeholders to describe their priorities for fisheries

afterBrexit,howthesecouldbeachieved,andwhattheyperceivedtobethekeychallengesanduncertainties(seeabove).

Therewere18responsestothequestionnaire;11representingorganizationsandsevenfrom individualacademics.Theworkshopdayconsistedofpresentations(from12oftheattendees)and‘WorldCafé’stylediscussionsessionsontheabovethemes.Allrespondentsandparticipantsgavepermissionfortheirperspectivestobeanal-ysedinthisstudy.

In order to further broaden our analysis, we also used publiclyavailablepositionstatementsandother literature fromsixorganiza-tions (three representingcommercial fisheries,one representing theprocessingsector,onerepresentingrecreationalfishingandonerep-resentingenvironmentalNGOs)tosupplementourdataset.Threeoftheseorganizationshadattendedourworkshopandalreadyprovidedsomeinformation.Wecombinedstakeholderviewsfromthequestion-naireandworkshopwiththeseadditionaldata(seeTableS3)toillus-tratethekeyprioritiesofthedifferentsectors.Responseswerecodedasdifferentpriorities,asseeninTable1.Theprioritiesofeachsectorwerethenscoredusingthefollowingsystem:

1. Highlighted by 25% or fewer of respondents (i.e. included nomention).

2. Highlightedbybetween26%and50%ofrespondents.3. Highlightedbybetween51%and75%ofrespondents.4. Highlightedbybetween76%and100%of respondents (i.e. in-cludedunanimoussupport)

2.3 | Combined analysis

Theresultsfromourstakeholderengagementandanalysisofviewswerethencombinedwithananalysisofthedevelopingagriculture,fisheries and environmental policy framework in theUK andhowthismightaffectthefutureoftheagriculturalandfisheriessectors.Thisanalysiswasthenfurtherinformedbywiderliteraturetocon-structastakeholderledvisionofaframeworkthatcouldprovideasustainable,profitableandequitablefuturefortheUKagriculturalandfishingindustriesafterBrexit.

3  | RESULTS AND SYNTHESIS

3.1 | “Taking back control”: beyond EU Agriculture and fisheries policy frameworks

Despite ‘greening’ reforms, the EU’s Common Agricultural andFisheriesPolicies(CAPandCFP),remainfarfromideal(Khalilian,Froese,Proelss,&Requate,2010;Lightfootetal.,2017;Salomon,Markus, & Dross, 2014). Designed when increasing productionand incomes, andpromotionof trade and fair competitionwerepriorities, the drawbacks of the CAP and CFP have long beenapparent. Habitat and biodiversity loss, and unsustainable ap-proaches to offtake, still occur in many agricultural and marinesystems(Fernandesetal.,2017;Kleijn,Rundlöf,Scheper,Smith,&Tscharntke,2011;Figure1).

4  |    People and Nature STEWART ET Al.

F I G U R E 1  Reasonsforamoresustainableenvironmentalpolicy:UKandEUagriculturalandfisheriesenvironmentalstatistics

     |  5People and NatureSTEWART ET Al.

Furthermore, there are socio-economic and justice issues,inthatadisproportionatelylargeproportionofagriculturepay-mentscurrentlygotorelativelyfewlargelandowners(Allanson,Kasprzyk, & Barnes, 2017; Sorrentino & Henke, 2011), andlargeamountsofUKfisheriesquotasareconcentrated in justa few companies (Greenpeace, 2018).While further greeningambitionsfortheCAPhavebeenproposed,reformsofagricul-turalsubsidiesremainrelativelyminor(EuropeanCommission,2017). Likewise, EU fisheries catchquotas continue to be setabove scientific advice for certain stocks, and the reformedCFP’sstipulationtoallocatefishingopportunitiesaccordingtoenvironmental,andsocialandeconomiccriteriaremainspoorlyimplemented (Carpenter, 2017). Agreeing policies that prior-itize environmental and social sustainability over economicfactors isoftenpoliticallychallenging,particularly inthecon-text of highly variable socio-economic conditions across EUMember States. Consequently, Brexit does offer the UK theopportunity, in principle at least, to design policies that aresuitable for local and national circumstances. Nevertheless,thetransboundarynatureofagricultural,fisheriesandenviron-mentalissues(e.g.regionalclimatechangeeffects,distributionandmovement fish stocksacrossborders)means that contin-uedcooperationbetweentheUKandEUonthesematterswillberequired.

TheUKGovernment'scommitmenttoachievinga‘greenBrexit’willclearlybeshapedbytheoutcomesofitsnegotiationswiththeEU.ThepublicationoftheGovernment'sWhitePaperinJuly2018(HMGovernment, 2018c), suggested threemainBrexit options: a‘soft’Brexit,a‘hard’Brexitora‘no-deal’Brexit(Box1).However,theGovernment's inability tosecurepassageof thedraft ‘WithdrawalAgreement’ (HM Government, 2018d) and ‘Political Declaration’(HMGovernment,2018e)throughtheHouseofCommons,togetherwith the failureofParliament to agree an alternative approach, isprolonginguncertaintyandhasledtoadelaytoEUexit.Thecurrentdraft ‘WithdrawalAgreement’appearsclosertoa‘soft’Brexit,buta‘no-deal’Brexitremainsthedefaultoptionifadealisnotadoptedby31October2019.Theprobabilitiesofeachoutcomeremaininastateofflux.Whicheverscenarioweendupwith,theUKwillneedto develop and implement new agriculture and fisheries policies,evenifweadopta‘soft’Brexitand,forexample,jointheEuropeanEconomicArea(EEA),asthesepoliciesarenotcoveredbytheEEA.Moreover,thedifferentscenarioshavevaryingimplicationsforwhatkindsofsupportwillbeallowedforagriculturalandfisheriespoliciespost-Brexit(seeSection3.4).

3.2 | Putting sustainability at the heart of future policy

Likemany other countries, theUK is a signatory to several glob-ally important multilateral environmental agreements such as theConvention on Biological Diversity and the United Nations ParisAgreement,aswellasbeinganarchitectofandcommitted tode-liveringtheSustainableDevelopmentGoalsofAgenda2030.These

commitmentsprovideaframeworktounderpinthefuturedevelop-mentofUK’sagriculture,environment,fisheriesandmarinepolicies,particularlygiventhattheinterdependencebetweenenvironmentalandsocialdimensionsofsustainabilityisincreasinglyrecognizedattheglobalscale(Sachs,2015;Vince,2014),inrelationtoagriculture(Rockström et al., 2017), food production (FAO, 2014), fisheries(Galbraith,Carozza,&Bianchi,2017) and themarineenvironment(Lubchenco & Grorud-Colvert, 2015). This context of both envi-ronmentalandsocialaspectsbeingrelevanttofuturepolicyframe-workswas raisedbystakeholders (Stewartetal.,2019),whotooktheviewthatfuturepolicyshouldprotectandenhancelivelihoodsandcommunities throughagricultureand fisheriesoperating inanenvironmentally sustainable way (Gravey et al., 2017; Stewart &O’Leary,2017).

3.2.1 | Agri‐environment

TheEU’sCAP,iswidelyregardedasasub-optimalpolicythatwhiledelivering on some goals (intensive food production and stablefarm incomes) has led to widespread environmental deteriora-tion (Pe'eretal.,2014;vanZantenetal.,2014;asperFigure1).TransformingUK’sagri-foodpolicytoensureasustainableagri-en-vironmentfutureisthereforeurgentlyneeded,andtheadoptionofanewUKAgricultureBill,andsubsequentpiecesofdevolvedagriculture legislation,offersacriticalwindowofopportunitytoaffect profound policy change. In this regard, some have calledfora‘SustainableFoodSecurityStrategy’(Lang,Millstone,Lewis,&Marsden, 2018).While we agree that embedding sustainabil-ity in futurepolicy isofutmost importance, the stakeholders atourworkshopswereclearthattoachievethisoutcome,reformedpolicyshouldcomprisethreedistinctbutinterrelatedelements:

● ALand Use Strategy:inwhichagricultureisseenasacreativeforcein the formationof cultural andecological landscapes, focusingontheprovisionofecosystemservices,biodiversityandhabitatrestoration.

● AFood Strategy:whichemphasizesthequalityandwelfareofpro-duction, the sustainabilityof farmingpracticesandensures thebestdealforfarmers.

● A Rural Development Strategy: thatsupports rural inward invest-ment,businessinnovation,thediversificationofruraleconomiesandruralconservationactivities.

Thispolicyvisionisunderpinnedbyanexusapproachtopolicymaking,whichemphasizestheimportanceoftherelationalinterdependenciesbetween resource systems (e.g. Salam, Shrestha, & Pandey, 2017),andforgesanintegratedvisionofsocialandecologicalsustainabilitygroundedinagro–ecologicalprinciples(Gliessman,2011).Thisvisionreflects currentglobalmovements towards integrated foodsystemsor‘eco-agri-foodsystems’(TEEB,2018)anda‘people,planetandlive-lihoods’ethos(FAO,2018).Italsoechoescallsfortheredesignofag-ricultural systemsbasedon thepracticesandscienceofsustainableintensification(Prettyetal.,2018),andprovidesameanstoredirect

6  |    People and Nature STEWART ET Al.

environmental practices geared specifically towards the productionofecosystemservicestoachievewidersustainabilitygoals(Kremen&Merenlender,2018;Schröteretal.,2017).

Instrivingtowardsthesegoals,theUKcandrawuponbestprac-tice from sustainable landmanagement initiatives around theworld(UNCCD,2017)andinnovativepoliciesfromacrosstheUKthatempha-sizeresponsiblestewardship,rural–urbaninterdependenceandsocio-economicandenvironmentalsustainability,suchastheScottishLandUseStrategy(ScottishGovernment,2016)andtheWelshWellbeingofFutureGenerationsAct(WCVA,2017).Crucially,larger-scaleandlon-ger-termthinkingishighlightedinthe25YEP,whichalsoemphasizesintegrationacrossbothlandscapesandsupplychains.However,whilethe25YEPhasloftyambitions,itremainslightonpolicydetail(Burns,Gravey,&Jordan,2018).AmajorfearisthatwithouttheEUactingasanexternaldriver,theUKGovernment'scommitmenttosustainabilitywillbemerelyrhetoricalandthatnewpolicieswillnotbesufficientlyintegratedorambitious.Moreover,competition fromglobalmarketsinthenewpost-Brexittradingregimemayleadtodownwardpressureonstandards,compromisingsustainability(Burns,Gravey,etal.,2018).WhiletheAgricultureBillisawelcomefirststep–proposingaLandUseStrategy focusedon thedeliveryofpublic goods– it isworry-inglysilentonRuralDevelopment(onlyconsideredapolicyobjectiveinWales,notinEngland)andonfood(Langetal.,2018;Petetin,Dobbs,&Gravey,2018).Hence,itappearsthatthisfirststeptowardschanging

agriculturalpoliciesafterBrexitfailstodevelopaproperlyintegratedpolicythatreachesbeyondagriculturetoencompasswidersocio-eco-nomicfactors.

3.2.2 | Fisheries

Thestakeholderanalysis revealedunanimoussupport forsustain-abilitytobeattheheartofanewUKmanagementregime(Table1,Stewart et al., 2019). Likewise, most sectors showed strong sup-port for robust governance, well-enforcedmanagement and eco-systemprotection(Stewart&O’Leary,2017,Stewartetal.,2019).Achievingthesemultiplegoalswillrequireanecosystemapproach.Encouragingly, the recentUKGovernment FisheriesWhite Paperand FisheriesBill promotes similar ambitions towards sustainabil-ity and an ecosystem approach (HMGovernment, 2018b; Houseof Commons, 2018b). However, although now commonly man-dated, anecosystemapproach is rarely implementedorpracticedeffectively(Linketal.,2018),inpartduetoseparationoffisheriesand environmental governance and legislation at national and in-ternational levels (Stewart&O’Leary,2017).Forexample, theEUHabitatsDirective isofteneffectively competingagainst theCFP(Leijen,2011).Furthermore,currentUKmarineenvironmentalleg-islationislargelybasedontheMarineandCoastalAccessAct(anddevolvedequivalents),while there isnowaseparateFisheriesBill

TA B L E 1  RankingofstakeholderprioritiesforUKfisheries,seafoodandenvironmentpost-Brexit,basedonstakeholderresponses

Sectors priorities

Commercial

fisheries

Seafood

processors

and suppliers

Inshore managers

(IFCAs)Recreational fisheries

Scientists/

academics

Environmental

NGOs

Sustainablefisheries 4 4 4 4 4 4

Stronggovernanceandwellenforcedmanagement

3 4 4 4 4 4

Ecosystemprotection 2 2 4 4 4 4

Reformedregionalandflexiblemanagement 4 2 4 4 3 3

Sharedmanagement/collaborationwiththeEU 2 4 2 3 4 4

Strongandwell-fundedscience 2 3 3 3 4 4

Accesstozero/lowtariffexportmarkets 3 4 2 2 3 3

Betterdealforinshorecommercialfisheries 3 2 4 2 3 2

UKexclusivezoneinside12m 4 2 3 2 2 2

FullcontrolofUKExclusiveEconomicZone 4 2 2 2 2 2

Increasedshareofquotas 4 2 3 1 2 2

ImprovedmarketingofUKseafood 3 3 3 1 2 2

ReplacementofEuropeanMaritimeFisheriesFund

3 2 2 1 2 2

Resolutionofdevolvedmanagementissues 2 1 2 1 3 2

Stricterrulesonforeignownedvessels 3 1 2 1 2 2

Accesstozero/lowtariffimportsofrawmaterials

1 4 1 2 2 1

ContinuedaccesstoEUlabour 2 4 1 1 1 1

Betterdealforrecreationalfisheries 1 1 1 4 1 1

Note: AdaptedfromStewartandO’Leary(2017).Prioritieswerescoredfrom1(lowestpriority/notmentioned)to4(highestpriority/unanimousagreement).SeeSection2andTableforfurtherdetails.

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to prepare for leaving the CFP upon Brexit (House of Commons,2018b).TheUKGovernmentcouldbemoreprogressiveandcom-binethesedifferentpiecesoflegislationwithinthenextdecadeintoanewNaturalMarineResourcesActcoveringallactivitiesalongourcoastsandinourseas(Stewart&O’Leary,2017).Toimplementthislegislationeffectively,theUKwillneedtodevelopflexiblesystemsthatdrawonglobalbestpractice,butthataretailoredtotheuniqueUK situation (Huggins,Connolly,McAngus,&Zwet, 2018). Thesecould include USA style statutory mandates to follow scientificadvicethatensurerecoveryandsustainability forallstakeholders(MethodJr,Tromble,Lambert,&Greene,2013),Australiancommit-mentstohabitatprotection(Grech,Edgar,Fairweather,Pressey,&Ward,2015),andaNorwegian-likeapproachthathassuccessfullyminimized fisheries discards (Diamond & Beukers-Stewart, 2011).Again,theUKFisheriesBillprovidesambitiononallofthesefronts,butitlacksdetailandimplementationandenforcementwillbekey.Forexample,theBill's“discardsobjective”isto“graduallyeliminatediscards,onacase-by-casebasis,byavoidingandreducing,asfaraspossible,unwantedcatches” (HouseofCommons,2018b).Thisobjectivewillapparentlybeachieved(inEnglandonly)bychargingfishermenforunwantedcatches.Thisapproachisactuallylessstrin-gentandcomprehensivethantheCFP’scurrentlandingobligationandsuggeststhatunlessitseffectivenessiscloselymonitoredtheUKmaytakeabackwardsstepondiscardswhenitdoesleavetheCFP.

Therearealsofurtherrisks.HighexpectationsofincreasedUKcatch opportunities (quota shares) post-Brexit, were highlightedby industry representatives at our workshop (Table 1, Stewartetal.,2019)andalsopromotedbytheFisheriesWhitePaper (HMGovernment,2018b).AhardornodealBrexitwouldintheoryallowtheUKtoachievethesegoalsbyunilaterallygrantinghigherquotasharestoitsfishingfleet.However,thereisahighriskofoverfishingwhenthereisnotstrongcollaborationandagreementinthemanage-mentofsharedstocks(Carpenter,2017;Phillipson&Symes,2018).Moreover,theEUhasconsistentlyarguedforstatusquoonquotashares and access to the UK Exclusive Economic Zone, suggest-ingthreatstotradelinksiftheUKpushesforadifferentapproach(Stewart&O’Leary,2017,seeSection3.5).Thecurrent‘WithdrawalAgreement’and‘DraftPoliticalDeclaration’onlystatesthattheUKandEUwillendeavourtoreachanagreementonfishingopportuni-tiesandaccessduringthetransitionperiod,ideallybyJuly2020(HMGovernment,2018d,2018e).GivencurrentdelaysinpassingthesedealsthroughUKParliament,itseemscertainthatanagreementonfisherieswilllikewise,befurtherdelayed.

Yet,Brexitdoesprovideanopportunity for theUKandEU toworkmorecollaboratively(andinlinewithinternationalagreements)by, for example, jointly assessing the distribution of North EastAtlanticfishstocksandusingmoreevidence-basedapproachessuchaszonalattachmenttoallocatequotasofsharedstocks(Harte,Tiller,Kailis,&Burden,2019;Pinskyetal.,2018;Stewart&O’Leary,2017).Climatechange-inducedshifts infishdistributionwillundoubtedlyproduceincreasedconflictsoverresourceuseinthefuture,notjustintheNorthEastAtlantic,butalsoonaglobalscale(Pinskyetal.,

2018).TheUKcouldnowprovideamodelforbothsustainablefish-eriesmanagementandinternationalcooperationthataddressesthischallenge.ItisalsoessentialthatthestringentlegislationcurrentlyprotectingEUdesignatedMarineProtectedAreas(SpecialAreasofConservationandSpecialProtectionAreas) inUKwatersbemain-tained after Brexit (Solandt, Stewart, & Puritz, 2017). Effectiveenforcementoftheserules, forbothUKandEUfishingvessels, iscrucial for continueddeliveryof conservationbenefits (Stewart&O’Leary,2017).

3.3 | Policies need to be co‐produced: participation, deliberation and devolution

3.3.1 | Co‐production – challenges and opportunities

Theon-goingwranglingbetween theUKgovernmentand thede-volved administrations overwho has policy competence for envi-ronment, fisheries and agriculture policy highlights the politicalcomplexities of co-designing policies. The last two decades haveclearly demonstrated the importance of broad-scale stakeholderparticipationinenvironmentalpolicyanddecision-makingprocesses(Mauerhofer,2016).Themessagefromthisliteratureisclear:stake-holderparticipationiscentraltopromotingsociallearning,buildinginstitutionalaccountabilityandenablingaplatformofco-productionbetweenengagedactorconstituencies(Reedetal.,2010;Voorberg,Bekkers,&Tummers,2015).However,ensuringeffectiveandtimelydecision-making in circumstances inwhich cooperation anddelib-eration are of uppermost importance can be highly challenging(e.g.Birnbaum,2016;MacArthur, 2016;Pieraccini, 2015).DespiteDefra's rhetorical commitment to co-design, the experience ofdevolvednations,highlightedbyseveralstakeholdersatourwork-shop(Stewartetal.,2019),hasbeenthattheyaretreatedasanafter-thought,withlimitedopportunitiesforgenuineconsultation(Burns,Gravey,etal.,2018).

ThelackoffullGovernmentcommitmenttoco-designisnottheonlystumblingblock,afurtherimpedimenttostakeholderengage-mentistheattenuatedtimescalesofBrexit,whichlimitopportuni-tiesforgenuineandmeaningfulconsultation.AkeyriskaswemoveinexorablyclosertotheBrexitdeadlineisthatsuchconsultationwillberegardedasaluxuryratherthananecessity.Thisisparticularlyworrying because enabling public and stakeholder participation isnecessarytoensuredemocraticaccountabilityand legitimacy (e.g.Dryzek, 2006; Eckersley, 2004),which is especially critical to theimplementationofkeyelementsofGovernment's25YEP.Thesein-cludetheadoptionofaNaturalCapitalApproachfortheappraisalofUK’snaturalassets,andtheprincipleofenvironmentalnetgainwithregardsto landand infrastructuredevelopments.Onemeansofnegotiatingthisissueistoadvocatefor,andpurposelyengagein,deliberativeprocessesofdecision-makingasameansofpromotingthewidest inclusionofpeople'svaluesystemswithindecisionandpolicymakingfora (e.g.Kenter,Bryce,etal.,2016;Kenter,Reed,&Fazey,2016).

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TheUKGovernmenthasproposedthatagriculturalandfisheriespoliciesshouldbeunderpinnedbyUK-widelegislativeframeworks.However,whilemanyenvironmentalpolicieswouldbecoveredbypoliticalframeworks(e.g.air,nature)orfulldivergence(e.g.water),there is clear concern that environmental governance gaps willemerge across the UK (Brennan, Dobbs, Gravey, & Bhroin, 2018;Burns,Carter,etal.,2018).Thesevaryinglevelsofcooperationarelikely to hamper policy integration. This concern is reinforced byevidence demonstrating the implications of different democraticroutesthatScotlandandWalesfollowforfutureconstitutionalandlegislativedivergenceacrosstheUK(Mathews,2018).ForNorthernIreland, cooperation is needed not only across the UK, but alsowithIreland(intheEU),duetothesharedlandandmaritimeborder(Graveyetal.,2017;Stewart&O’Leary,2017).BoththeUKandEUhavepledgedtomaintainandstrengthencooperativecross-borderpolicy arrangements established by the Good Friday Agreement(whichincludesenvironmental,agriculturalandfoodsafetypolicy),eitherthroughthe‘Irishbackstop’oftheWithdrawalAgreement,orby a close future relationship between theUK and the EUwhichremainstobenegotiated.

Despitethesepracticalandpoliticalchallenges,theUKhassomeuseful initiatives to build on. In the case of the agri-environment,future partnerships can include insights from pioneeringUK pay-mentsforecosystemserviceprojectssuchasthePeatlandCarbonCode(IUCN,2017),aswellascurrentCatchmentBasedApproaches(Defra, 2013), and the pilot studies for a Results-based Agri-EnvironmentPaymentSchemebeingtrialledbyNaturalEnglandinWensleydaleandNorfolk (NaturalEngland,2017).Theseschemesmay facilitate themove to the so-called “publicmonies for publicgoods”approachadvocatedbythe25YEP(HMGovernment,2018a).Inaddition,Defrahasestablishedfour‘PioneerProjects’incontrast-inglandscapesindifferentregionsoftheUKtoaidthedevelopmentofthe25YEPandactastest-bedsforintegratedandinclusivemeth-odsofenvironmentalmanagementthatcouldbeappliedatthena-tionallevel.

Similarly, for UK fisheries, the priority ought to be enablinggreater and more diverse stakeholder involvement, especially infundamentalmanagement decisions such as the redistribution offishingopportunities,withagoaltoreduceenvironmentalimpactsbutmaximise socio-economic benefits (Stewart&O’Leary, 2017;Tiller&Richards,2018).Givinggreatervoicetoinshorefishingcom-munities,whichmake up the bulk (approx. 75%) of theUK fleet,is essential, particularly when addressing the current imbalancein fishing quotas (Davies, Williams, Carpenter, & Stewart, 2018;Stewart&O’Leary,2017).TheFisheriesWhitePaper impliesthattheinshorefleetwillonlyreceivenewquotaifmoreisgainedfromtheEUduringBrexitnegotiations(HMGovernment,2018b),whilethe Fisheries Bill does not provide any obvious mechanism forthis tooccur (HouseofCommons,2018b).Asdiscussedabove, ano-dealorhardBrexitmaymakeiteasierfortheUKtogainextraquota,butifincreasesweremadeirresponsiblythiswouldleadtoamultitudeofdetrimentaleffectsthatwouldquicklyoutweighanygains.However,ourstakeholderinformedviewisthatregardlessof

theoutcomeofnegotiationswiththeEU,are-distributionoffishingrightswithintheUKislongoverdue.Furthermore,giventheinter-nationalnatureoffisheriesandmarinemanagement,especiallyforthe100plusfishstocksthattheUKshareswiththeEUandnon-EUstatessuchasNorway,relevantstakeholdersarenotrestrictedtotheUK.ReconcilingUK’saspirationsforgreaterindependencere-quirescarefulnegotiation,notjustatthehighestlevelsofgovern-ment,butalsoamongstfishingindustryrepresentatives,NGOsandscientists fromacross theUK,EU,andother relevantNorthEastAtlantic countries (e.g. through theNorth East Atlantic FisheriesCommission), to influence decision-making processes (Stewart &O’Leary,2017).

3.4 | Fairer, appropriate and effective funding

Brexit presents considerable risks to future income among bothfarmingandfishingcommunities.Developingreplacementfundingmodelspost-Brexitthatarefairerandmoreeffectiveshouldthere-forebean immediatepolicypriority.Critically, thesenew fundingmodelswill alsoneed tobe compliantwithWTO rules.TherearealsoconsiderablesectoralandregionaldiscrepanciesinincomesandlevelsofsupportpaymentsacrosstheUK;thesedifferencesneedtobeborneinmindinthedevelopmentofnewfundingmodels(Graveyetal.,2017).

The UK farming income varies significantly by geography andsector. The latest figures for England indicate a mean farm busi-ness incomeacrossall farmingtypesof£38,000pa (Defra,2017),exceeding that of Scotland (£35,400; ScottishGovernment, 2019)andsubstantiallyoutstrippingWales(£24,500;WelshGovernment,2017)andNorthernIreland(£21,928;DAERA,2018).DairyremainsthemostprofitablefarmingsectorwithameanfarmincomerangeacrosstheUKof£68,140to£119,700,whilegrazing,especially inleastfavouredareas,hasthelowestfarmprofitability,rangingfrom£17,725to£28,300.However,takenintheround,incomeaveragesmasksignificantdegreesofpoorfarmincomes.Notably,in2015/16,overhalfofUKfarmsearnedlessthan£20,000,with42%offarmsmakingnoprofitatall.Inaddition,manyfarmsareentirelyreliantonsubsidy-basedincome;in2016,forinstance,87%oftotalUKfarmincomecamefromCAPsubsidies(Lightfootetal.,2017).However,thedistributionofthesesubsidiesisalsohighlyskewed.Forinstance,inEnglandin2016,thetop10%offarms(intermsoffarmincome)received 47%of the £1.65 billion direct payment budget (approx.£45,000each),whereasthebottom20%offarmsreceivedonly2%(approx.£2,500each;Defra,2018b).

This seemingly counterproductive system is not unique to theUK;butrather,isindicativeofthewiderglobalchallengeofreform-ingdomesticagriculturalsupportpoliciesthattotalledUS$228bil-lionacrossallOECDcountriesin2016(IFPRI,2018).Thepersistenceofsuchsubsidiesalsohasnegativeimpactsontheagriculturalsec-torsoflow-andmiddle-incomecountries,andinthecaseoftheCAP,becausePillar1moniessequester77%oftotalfundsthenthereisonlyasmallamountavailableunderPillar2toinvestinenvironmen-talmanagementactivities(Devlin&Wheatley,2017;Helm,2017).A

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fundingmodelthatendsthe‘welfarization’ofagriculturalpolicy,re-wardsfarmersforstewardshipoftheenvironmentandencouragesfarmdiversificationand resilience (Weltinetal.,2017) isessentialfor long-termenvironmental sustainability (Hill,2017;Lightfootetal.,2017).

The stakeholders at our workshops recognized this and indi-catedthatcurrentincome-supportmodelsshouldbereplacedwithanalternativeandprogressivesystembasedonprovisionofpublicgoods(i.e.towardsthegenerationofsocietal-wideenvironmental,social,culturalandhealthbenefits)andsectoralresearchanddevel-opmentandtrainingandskills(Graveyetal.,2017;Lightfootetal.,2017, Stewart et al., 2019). Both the 25YEP and theAgriculturalBill support this ‘publicmonies forpublicgoods’approach,basedaroundasuiteofpublicgoodsprimarily focusedon ‘environmen-tal enhancement’ (HMGovernment, 2018a; House of Commons,2018a).Suchanapproachtofuturelandmanagementcouldbede-signedaroundapaymentforecosystemservicesmodel (Bateman&Balmford,2018)andaResults-basedAgri-EnvironmentPaymentSchemeswherefarmersarepaidforproducinggoodswhichben-efitnatureiscurrentlybeingtrialled(seeabove).However,suchamodelwouldneed to ensure compliancewithWTO rules andbegivensufficientandsecurelevelsoffunding.In2017,totalsubsidiesonproduction in theUKwere£3.25billion, including£2.7billionindirectpayments (Defraetal.,2017).Giventhis, recentanalysissuggests that funding UK’s environmental land management pri-oritieswill costat least£2.3billionperyear, activities thatcouldbefinancedbyredirectingmoniescurrentlyallocatedunderPillar1oftheCAPandcomplementedbylocalandregionalfundsco-fi-nancedthroughpublic,privateandcivilsocietysectorpartnerships(Rayment,2017).

However,transitioningtoapublicgoods-basedagriculturalsys-tem will result in both winners and losers (Bateman & Balmford,2018).Insomecases,farmbusinessesmaynolongerbeviable,whilstforothersthechangesmayprovideadditionaloralternativeincomestreams–increasingon-farmdiversificationorenablingsomefarm-ers(e.g.inUplandareas)tocontinuetooperateinunproductivere-gions (Gawith&Hodge, 2017).Consequently, the current subsidyregimeshouldbegraduallyphasedoutwithsupportarrangementsand compensatory payments (where necessary) to aid transition(Lightfootetal.,2017).Indeed,theUKGovernment'semergingpol-icysuggeststhat,inEnglandatleast,theywilladoptan‘agriculturaltransition’phaseinwhichfarmerswillbeabletocontinuetoaccessbasic payment scheme funds, probablyunder tapering conditions.Thepublicationof theUKGovernment'sAgricultureBill indicatesa7-yeartransitionperiodbeginningfrom2021(HouseofCommons,2018a).

From a fisheries perspective, the UK sector has benefitedfromproportionallysmaller,butnonetheless important, levelsofsubsidiesfromtheEuropeanMaritimeandFisheriesFund(EMFF;Stewart&O’Leary, 2017). Previously considered a harmful sub-sidy, recent EMFF reforms refocused it more towards support-ing communities and improving sustainability.Continuing suchamodelafterBrexitwouldbebeneficial.TheFisheriesBillallowsfor

agrantschemetoreplacetheEMFF,butonlyforEngland(HouseofCommons,2018b).Further,itdoesnotstipulatethesizeofthefund,butitdoesappeartohaveawideremit,coveringeverythingfrom marine conservation to aquaculture and commercial andrecreational fishing.Apriority shouldbe to further support anddevelop fisheries–sciencepartnerships to improveknowledgeofstocksandmarineecosystems,particularlyfordata-poorinshorespecies,andtoimprovetrustbetweentheindustryandscientists(Daviesetal.,2018,Ford&Stewart,2019).Financialsupportforboth fisheries and agriculturewill need to be carefully targetedand subject to rigorous evaluation of ‘value for money’ and toavoidunintendednegativeconsequences,forexample,ondown-streamareasonlandorfoodwebintegrityatsea.

The cost ofmanaging fisherieswill increase significantly post-BrexitastheUKtakesontaskspreviouslysharedwiththeEU.Thereisgrowinginterestinrecoveringsomeofthesecoststhroughataxonlandings,asoccursinNewZealand(Carpenter,2017).TheFisheriesWhite Paper and Fisheries Bill suggest that the UK Governmentmay be open to greater cost recovery, but gives little detail (HMGovernment, 2018b;House ofCommons, 2018b). Such a schemewouldneedtobephased ingradually toreducetheeconomic im-pactsonfleetsconcurrentlyadaptingtootherchangespost-Brexit.However,inthelongterm,itwouldfurtherembedthefishingindus-tryintothescienceandmanagementregime,andtherebyimprovecompliancewithregulations.

3.5 | Compatible and consistent trade arrangements and regulatory systems

The final UK–EU trading relationship has yet to be negoti-ated, though both sides have acknowledged that they want tomaintain a close relationship, especially on trade in goods (HMGovernment, 2018d). Unsurprisingly, theUK agri-food, fisheriesand seafood sectors are heavily integrated with the EU systemin termsofmarkets, supplychainsand labour (Bellora,Emlinger,Fouré,&Guimbard,2017;Graveyetal.,2017;Stewart&O’Leary,2017).Infact,60%ofUKexports,and70%ofitsimports,offood,feedanddrinkarewiththeEU(Downing&Coe,2018).Hence,thenature of the future trading relationship and the levels of tariffandnon-tariffbarriersthattheUKisexposedtoafterBrexit(seeBox1)willhavesignificantimplicationsforjobs,profitabilityandthe continuedoperation of those sectors (Hubbard et al., 2018;Jafari&Britz,2018;Lightfootetal.,2017).Recenteconomicmod-elling suggests that across different Brexit scenarios, from vari-ousfreetradeagreementoptionstonodeal,socialwelfarelossesfrom−2.63%to−4.78%areincurred(Jackson&Shepotylo,2018).Further analysis suggests that the UK economy may shrink by2.3%,withEUexports to,and imports from, theUK in theagri-foodsector likelytobothdeclineby62%invalue (Belloraetal.,2017).

Thisisnosmallmatterastheagri-foodsectorisworthapproxi-mately£108billionofGVA(Graveyetal.,2017).Thefuturetradingpartnership also has significant implications for food security and

10  |    People and Nature STEWART ET Al.

labouravailability.ChangesinthebalanceofUK’sfoodimport/ex-portarrangementsanditslevelofself-sufficiency(in2017theUKwasonly60%self-sufficientacrossallfoods;weimport~85%ofourfruit;Defraetal.,2017;Langetal.,2018)couldresultindifferentialimpactsacross farmingsectorsand increasing foodprices (AHDB,2019;Downing&Coe,2018;Langetal.,2018).Moreover,UK’sag-riculturalandfood-processingsectorsareheavilydependentonEUmigrantlabour.Forexample,98%ofthe80,000seasonalworkforceinhorticulturearefromEUMemberStates,andBrexitalreadyseemstobehavinganimpactwitha17%reductioninseasonalworkersin2017(Downing&Coe,2018).

Thetrade implicationsforfisheriesandtheseafoodprocess-ing industry may be equally as stark: the seafood processingindustry has an annual turnover of over £3 billion and employsover 13,500 FTEs, including a significant proportion from theEU (Seafish, 2017; Stewart&O’Leary, 2017).Key players in theUK seafoodprocessing and retail sectors have publicly stressedthereputationalimportanceofmaintainingstandardsinfisheriesmanagement and seafoodproduction afterBrexit (WWF,2018).Securingsector-friendlytradedealsisthereforecriticalforfutureUKeconomicprosperityandfoodsecurity.Inthisrespect,ahardor no-deal Brexit could be very damaging (Gravey et al., 2017;Stewart&O’Leary,2017;Symes&Philipson,2019).Forexample,assumingreciprocalarrangements,theimpositionofWorldTradeOrganisation rulesunder ano-dealBrexitwould result in tariffsof7.5%to24%onseafoodexported to theEU (Seafish,2019a).

Perhapsmoresignificantly,additionalpaperworkandquarantinechecks (non-tariffmeasures) imposed under this scenariowouldlikelydelaytheactualprocessofexport,degradingthequalityandthereforepriceofseafood,whichisoftensoldfreshorevenalive(Seafish,2019b).

New analysis demonstrates the substantial risks posed to keyenvironmentpolicyareassuchashabitats,birds,waterandnitratesthrough to agri-environment, food and welfare and fisheries andmarineprotectionbydifferentpost-Brexitpolicyscenarios (Burns,Gravey, et al., 2018).Outside theEU, theUKwill have tomeet arangeofproductstandardstotradewiththeEU,whilesimultane-ouslyfacingpressuretolowerthosestandardstobecompetitiveinothermarkets.Our stakeholders generally agreed on the need toavoida‘racetothebottom’andthatmaintaininghighenvironmen-talprotectionsandanimalwelfarestandardsoughttobeapriority(Graveyetal.,2017,Stewartetal.,2019).

3.6 | Framework for a Stakeholder‐led Vision

Basedonouranalysisofstakeholderperspectives,policydevelop-mentsandthewiderliterature,wehavedevelopedaframeworkfordelivering our ‘Stakeholder-led Vision’ (Figure 2). The frameworkproposes an integrated approach to policy development acrossagri-environment, fisheriesandmarinepolicysectors, leading toabundleofbenefitsthatunderpinavisionforsustainableprosperity.Thisintegratedapproachisbasedonafive-pillarplatformfinanced

F I G U R E 2  Post-BrexitUK-widevisionforasustainableenvironmentalpolicyframework.Adaptedfrom(Graveyetal.,2015)

     |  11People and NatureSTEWART ET Al.

throughacombinationofpublic,privateandcharitablesectorpart-nerships.Thegovernancethatsupportsthisnewpolicyarrangementisbuiltonmulti-stakeholderdecision-makingacross local, regionalanddevolvedadministrationstoensuremorelocallyappropriateandinformedpolicymakingandmanagement.

WhataretheimplicationsofdifferentBrexitoutcomesforrealizingthisstakeholder-ledvision?Atonelevel,giventhegovernment'srhe-toricalcommitmenttodeliveringa‘green’Brexitandmovingtoapublicmoneyforpublicgoodsethostounderpinagriculturalfarmpayments,thevisionshouldberealizableunderallversionsofBrexit.However,asourdiscussionillustrates,theno-dealscenarioposesparticularissues.First, itmayresult inpressurefor theUKtoenter intotradeagree-mentswithcountriesthatrequiretheUKtoloweritswelfareandfoodproduction standards with negative implications for both domesticproducersandtheenvironment.Second,there iswidespreadagree-mentthatano-dealBrexitwillleadtoadeclineineconomicgrowth–underthosecircumstancestheresourcesandpoliticalwillrequiredtorealizethisstakeholder-ledvisionmaybeinshortsupply.

4  | CONCLUSIONS

Ouranalysishasprovidedlessonsforreformofagriculturalandfisher-iesmanagementbothintheUKandotherareasoftheworldtoenhancetheirfuturesustainabilityandresilience,particularlyimportantinthefaceoftheincreasingvulnerabilityduetoclimatechange.Wearguethatpost-Brexitenvironmentalpolicy shouldencouragedeliberativeprocessesofengagementtocreaterepresentativeandworkablemulti-stakeholder and cross-sector partnerships (Wildlife & CountrysideLINK,2017).Thesepartnershipswill beessential if the25YEP is tomeettheconsiderablechallengeofsecuring‘therightmixofpublicandprivate fundingand financing forprojects thatprotectandenhancenaturalassets'andtomeetthestatedaimof‘publicmoneyforpublicgoods’(HMGovernment,2018a;HouseofCommons,2018a).

Eventhoughourstakeholderscamefromdifferentbackgroundsandrepresenteddifferentgroups,therewasahighlevelofconsen-sus that Brexit could, in principle, deliver a sustainable future foragriculturalandfisheriespolicies,at least inthelonger-term.Theirviewunderpins our recommendations to provide a roadmap for asharedandsustainablevision forapost-Brexitenvironmentalpol-icy.TheUKhasarareopportunitytorewritetherulebooktofocusoneffectiveagricultural,environmentalandfisheriesmanagement,andindoingsotodeliverontheGovernment'sstatedambitiontobecomeaworldleaderinthesespheres.Wesuggestthatenviron-mental sustainability, an ecosystem approach, explicit recognitionofpublicgoodsprovision,andsocialwelfareshouldbeattheheartofUK environmental policy post-Brexit. Collectively, these priori-tieswill fundamentally improveUK’sability toachievesustainableprosperityandmeet its internationalenvironmentalcommitments.With stakeholders central to the management of environmentalresources,webelieveour findingsdemonstrate thevalueof “bot-tom-up”approachesinkick-startingmoreenvironmentallysustain-able agricultural and fisheriespolicies.Here,wehave laidout the

processesforachievingthisvision,includinghowemergingUKpol-icyneedstobedevelopedandadapted.

Atthesametime,werecognizethatachievingthisvisionwillnotnecessarily be straightforward, and indeed, reaching such an out-comecannotbeassumed,butmustbepurposelysought.Clearly,thestakeholder-informedvisionwehavedevelopedthroughoutthispaperishighlycontingentonbroad-scalemacro-factorssuchasUK’sgeo-politicalandeconomicandtradepositionfollowingtheconclusionoftheBrexitnegotiations,aswellasmicro-factorssuchastheimpactsofBrexitontheviabilityofdifferentagriculturalandfisheriessectorsandthewayinwhichDefradesignsandimplementsthepoliciesunderpin-ningthe25YEP.ThecurrentuncertaintyoverthenatureandtimingofUK’sBrexitagreementhindersforwardplanningandinvestmentwhiledivertingattentionawayfromfurtherin-depthconsiderationofenvi-ronmentalsustainability.Inthefaceofthisuncertainty,muchofUK’snewpolicyontheenvironment,agricultureandfisheriesisthereforeambitiousinvisionbutlightondetail.Fullcommitmenttoco-produc-tionofpolicywiththedevolvednationsandstakeholdersalsoappearstobelacking,butwillbeessentialforeffectivepolicydevelopmentandimplementation.Ultimately, achievinga setofoutcomes thatmovesbeyondtheunsustainabilityofthepast,promotesstakeholderdemo-craticaccountability,enhanceslivelihoods,deliversfairerfundingmod-elsandpro-environmentalandanimalwelfaretradepolicies,requirestheUKtomovebeyondthecurrentstateofuncertaintytowardsavi-sionthatallofsocietycanrecognizeandinvestin.

ACKNOWLEDG EMENTS

ThisworkwaslargelyfundedbytheEconomicandSocialResearchCouncilthroughtheirIAABrexit/IndustrialStrategyChallengeFund.A.P.H.andS.E.H.arealsogratefulforthesupportoftheCentreforComplexityAcrosstheNexus,anESRClargecentre(ES/N012550/1).OurmethodologyreceivedethicsapprovalfromtheDepartmentofEnvironment and Geography at the University of York. Informedconsenttoparticipateinthisstudywasobtainedfromallhumansub-jects.Wethankalloftherespondentstoourquestionnairesandat-tendeesatourworkshopsandlauncheventforgivingtheirtimeandviewssogenerously.Special thankstoPeterDaviesfortakingde-tailednotesatourfisheriesworkshopandalsotoGriffinCarpenterforreviewingtheresultsofthefisheriesstakeholderanalysis.

CONFLIC T OF INTERE ST

Theauthorsdonothaveanyconflictofinteresttodeclare.

AUTHORS' CONTRIBUTIONS

B.D.S. and C.B. conceived the ideas and led the design of themethodology.Allauthorshelpedcollectthedata;B.D.S.,C.B.,V.G.andA.P.H.analysedthedata.B.D.S.,C.B.,A.P.H.,V.G.andS.E.H.ledthewritingofdifferentcomponentsofthemanuscript.Allau-thors contributed critically to full drafts andgave final approvalforpublication.

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DATA AVAIL ABILIT Y STATEMENT

DatausedinthisstudyhasbeendepositedintheDryadrepositoryand is freely available at the following source:Data from:MakingBrexit Work for the Environment and Livelihoods: Delivering aStakeholder InformedVision forAgriculture andFisheries, PeopleandNature,DOI:https://doi.org/10.5061/dryad.8g69b06(Stewartetal.,2019).

ORCID

Bryce D. Stewart https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5103-5041

Charlotte Burns https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9944-0417

Adam P. Hejnowicz https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7832-6172

Viviane Gravey https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3846-325X

Bethan C. O’Leary https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6595-6634

Sue E. Hartley https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5117-687X

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How to cite this article:StewartBD,BurnsC,HejnowiczAP,etal.MakingBrexitworkfortheenvironmentandlivelihoods:Deliveringastakeholderinformedvisionforagricultureandfisheries.People Nat. 2019;00:1–15. https://doi.org/10.1002/pan3.10054