Security Council Background

Guide

Note from the Director

Dear Delegates,

It is my pleasure to welcome you to the Security Council of the Inventure Model United Nations 2016. The SC has been the UN’s premier decision making body since its inception and has played a major role in solving world crises through concerted action and diplomacy.

The SC is an intense, fast paced committee buzzing with activity. To some this may seem rather daunting and rightly so. It requires extensive research and knowledge of foreign policy coupled with the ability to think and act on your feet. The SC may not be an easy committee but it shall certainly provide a great learning experience for all its delegates.

I hope delegates who choose this committee will work tirelessly towards acquiring information on the issues at hand and will actively participate to help create solutions to the pressing problems troubling the international community.

I wish you all the very best,

Sincerely,

Arincheyan Gerald, Director of the Security Council

Procedure of the Security CouncilMajority

Unless otherwise specified, no motions are debatable and all require a simple majority vote to pass.

Majority on Procedural Matters

In accordance with Article 27 of the Charter of the United Nations, all votes on procedural matters require a majority of nine (9) votes in favour.

Majority on Substantive Matters

All votes on substantive matters require a majority of nine (9) votes in favour, including the concurring votes of all Permanent Members. If one or more Permanent Members vote against a draft resolution, amendment or on any other substantive matter, the item that the Security Council is voting upon, fails. This is considered as a Veto.However the abstention of a Permanent Member does not block the approval of a motion.

Method of Voting

Each Delegate of the Security Council has one vote and must demonstrate his/her voting intentions by raising his/her placard at the Chair's request unless there is a Roll Call vote (see rule 17. Delegates must vote “in favour” or “against” on procedural matters and “in favour”, “against” or “abstain” on substantive matters. No Delegate shall vote on behalf of another Delegate

Directives

Directives are documents prepared and voted on by the entire committee that indicate committee-wide action. Similar to Resolutions, Directives are drafted by multiple delegates, debated, and revised accordingly. As the nature of crisis makes committee much more fast-paced, directives are often written in clear and plain language indicating actions the committee wants to take, though the UNSC will continue to adopt conventional Resolution formatting (i.e. Encourages that both countries open a certain section of the border for 10 days). Since the committee issues directives, they are able to take advantage of all powers at the UNSC’s disposal. A directive would most likely implement the committee’s decision in the situation described above.

Directives should be very specific and detailed, or they may backfire and be carried out quite contrary to what the committee had intended.

Portfolio Orders

Portfolio orders are actions taken by individuals that go directly to the crisis staff. Often, portfolio orders indicate actions that delegates want to take unilaterally and without the rest of the committee knowing. Portfolio orders tap into individual delegates’ portfolio powers, determined by their position (if you are a general in the military, you have access to soldiers and weapons). For example, a wealthy businessman may want to issue a portfolio order to conduct

a deal that may harm his standing in committee but tremendously benefits him privately. Portfolio orders are carried out by the crisis staff and often intervene with the overall crisis “arc” that carries committee forward – it is usually through portfolio orders that delegates individually and directly influence crises taking place, as opposed to directives, which require public and collective action. In other words, the delegate who conducted the deal secretly can contribute to a crisis update detailing the committee’s overall worsened economic situation. Delegates may take portfolio actions with other delegates in order to combine powers – a businessman may work with the Minister of Trade to make an international trade deal that they both benefit from. The highest quality portfolio orders are very specific and very detailed, including timelines for plans, what exactly is to be implemented, and are often addressed to a specific party.

Communiqués

A communiqué is a message written directly to another person, company, group, or country that does not exist in committee. Communiqués can be private (one delegate writes to another group) or public (the committee invites a representative to speak before them).

Topic A: Protection of civilians in Conflict ZonesConflict continues to have a devastating impact on civilians. There are approximately 59.5 million refugees, internally displaced persons or asylum seekers worldwide—the highest level ever recorded. At press time, the UN Refugee Agency estimated that more than 950,000 refugees and migrants had arrived in Europe via the Mediterranean Sea in 2015, with the “vast majority of those attempting this crossing in need of international protection, fleeing war, violence and persecution in their country of origin”.

Approximately 6.6 million people are now internally displaced in Syria, and approximately 4.3 million Syrians have fled to other countries. More than 250,000 people have died in the conflict since it started in 2011. In 2015, displacement, killings, sexual violence and other human rights violations continued to be features of conflicts in the Central African Republic (CAR), Darfur, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Iraq, Palestine, South

Sudan and Syria, among others. It is of utmost importance that the Security Council focuses upon ways to ameliorate the immense, prolonged suffering that millions of civilians face in such warzones.

Numerous conflict zones suffer from limited humanitarian access, attacks on humanitarian and health-care workers and facilities and the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, bureaucratic restrictions and interference in the delivery of assistance. People who inhabit such zones often have limited access to basic services and are at increased risk of discrimination and exploitation”, while “many lack legal documentation and struggle to find employment or reclaim property.

While there are myriad measures set forth in customary International Humanitarian Law, International Human Rights Law and the four Geneva Conventions, the implementation and observance of these laws are rarely done in warzones in the present day.

Protection of Civilians from Indiscriminate and Excessive use of Force

Throughout modern history there have been numerous instances wherein civilians have been subject to excessive, inhumane use of force – resulting in grievous injury and death. One of the most relevant examples today is in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, where - In response to both peaceful and violent demonstrations by Palestinians both within the Occupied Territories and Israel, Israeli Forces (IDF, police and border patrols) have used excessive force disproportionate to the threat faced. This has occurred repeatedly in different locations throughout the affected areas.

Although there has been some limited use of firearms by Palestinians most violence has taken the form of stone throwing and (to a much lesser extent) the use of 'Molotov cocktails'. Despite the fact that where it was used - tear gas proved to be an effective method to halt violent demonstrations and lead

to a quick and sustained dispersal, its use has been very limited. Similarly, there has been no evidence of water cannons being used. Instead from a very early stage in the conflict Israeli authorities resorted to using a range of firearms and heavy weapons which have resulted in widespread death and injuries amongst the Palestinians. Such use has been wholly out of proportion to the threat faced as reflected in the casualty figures provided by the medical services and human rights organizations.In addition to so-called ‘rubber’ bullets (thinly coated iron balls or cylinders which can be lethal when fired at close range) live ammunition has also been consistently used – including, according to medical expertise, illegal dum-dum and explosive bullets. Heavy weapons normally reserved only for military warfare have also been deployed including machine guns, 9.6 mm high velocity ammunition and LAW rockets fired from Apache helicopters. Unsurprisingly, these have resulted in serious injuries and loss of life when used against not just violent demonstrators, but also peaceful protests and local residents.Peaceful protesters have been attacked whilst lying on the ground after being overpowered by Israeli security forces. In one case in Arrabe, Northern Israel, there was an execution of an unarmed protester by a single shot to the neck after being pursued and overpowered by two security personnel.

International Humanitarian Law specifically provides legal safeguards concerning such actions. Under Article 51(4) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, it is stated: “Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited.”

According to Article 85(3) (b) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, it is a grave breach of the Protocol to launch “an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population or civilian objects in the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects as defined in Article 57, paragraph 2 a) iii).

Deliberate Targeting of Civilians

Rule 1 of Customary International Humanitarian Law states that, “The parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants. Attacks may only be directed against combatants. Attacks must not be directed against civilians. ”

International armed conflictsThe principle of distinction between civilians and combatants was first mentioned in the St. Petersburg Declaration, which states that “the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy’’. The Hague Regulations do not as such specify that a distinction must be made between civilians and combatants, but Article 25, which prohibits “the attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which are undefended”, is based on this principle. The principle of distinction is now stated in Articles 48, 51(2) and 52(2) of Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions - to which no reservations have been made.

Non International armed conflictsArticle 13(2) of Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions prohibits making the civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, the object of attack. The prohibition on directing attacks against civilians is also contained in Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.

However there have been numerous violations of the aforementioned laws and protocols, particularly in Middle Eastern nations.

According to a UN report - the Saudi-led coalition fighting the Houthi rebel movement in Yemen has targeted civilians with air strikes in a "widespread and systematic" manner; the UN panel of experts said civilians were also being deliberately starved as a war tactic over the past nine months. More than 5,800 people have been killed in fighting since March, and more than 80% of the population is in dire need of food, water and other aid. The UN's experts documented 119 coalition sorties that violated international law, many of

which involved multiple strikes on civilian objects. They also found that civilians fleeing coalition air strikes had been chased and shot at by helicopters. The most famous incident of deliberate targeting of civilians is undoubtedly the My Lai Massacre. It was a Vietnam War mass killing of between 347 and 504 unarmed civilians in South Vietnam on March 16, 1968. It was committed by U.S. Army soldiers from the Company C of the 1st Battalion. Victims included men, women, children, and infants. Some of the women were gang-raped and their bodies mutilated. Twenty-six soldiers were charged with criminal offenses but only Lieutenant William Calley Jr, a platoon leader in C Company, was convicted.Similar incidents have also occurred in Iraq, namely the Haditha killings. During this massacre - 24 unarmed Iraqi civilians were killed by a group of US Marines on November 19, 2005 in Haditha, a city in the Iraqi province of Al Anbar. The dead included several children and elderly people, who were shot multiple times at close range. It has been alleged that the killings were retribution for the attack on a convoy of Marines with an improvised explosive device that killed Lance Corporal Miguel Terrazas.

Use of Civilians as Human Shields

There have been reports of civilians being used as shields against opposing forces by militias in various parts of the world. Most recently this gruesome tactic has been used by the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq.

ISIS Terrorists are using people as human shields and executing those trying to flee or surrender to slow down the Iraqi Army’s operation to recapture Fallujah. On May 2016, Iraq’s Foreign Ministry spokesman, Ahmad Jamal was quoted saying - “At the moment, the main difficulty lies in the fact that ISIS militants use residents as human shields. The greatest threat to the residents of the city comes first of all from ISIS militants whom the ordinary people have to deal with every day. It is no secret that extremists during their presence in Fallujah staged mass executions and made a number of other crimes against humanity.” Similar usage of civilians as human shields by the separatist group Hamas have been reported by Israeli Defence Forces in the West Bank and Gaza Strip regions. Rule 97 of Customary International Humanitarian Law states that - the use of human shields is prohibited. State practice establishes this rule as a norm of customary international law applicable in both international and non-international armed conflicts.

International and non-international armed conflictsIn the context of international armed conflicts, this rule is set forth in the Third Geneva Convention (with respect to prisoners of war), the Fourth Geneva Convention (with respect to protected civilians) and Additional Protocol I (with respect to civilians in general). Under the Statute of the International Criminal Court, “utilizing the presence of a civilian or other protected person to render certain points, areas or military forces immune from military operations” constitutes a war crime in international armed conflicts.

With respect to non-international armed conflicts, Additional Protocol II does not explicitly mention the use of human shields, but such practice would be prohibited by the requirement that “the civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against the dangers arising from military operations”.

Protection of Civilians from Sexual and Gender Based Violence

Gender-based violence (GBV) is a term used to describe any harmful act that is perpetrated against a person’s will, and that is based on socially ascribed differences between males and females. While men and boys can be victims/survivors of some types of GBV (particularly sexual violence) around the world, GBV has a greater impact on women and girls. Examples of GBV throughout the lifecycle include (but are not limited to): sex-selective abortion, differential access to food and services, sexual exploitation and abuse, including trafficking, child marriage, female genital mutilation/cutting, sexual harassment, dowry/bride price abuse, honour killing, domestic or intimate partner violence, deprivation of inheritance or property, and elder abuse.

Gender-based violence is pervasive in times of peace. In times of crisis, GBV may become more extreme. In armed conflict, one form of GBV, sexual violence, can become so widespread and systematic that it is considered a method of war and can escalate into a crime against humanity, a war crime or an act of genocide.

Multiple instances of Sexual Gender Based Violence have been recorded in Chad by the UN. SGBV is argued to be among the main human rights challenges in eastern Chad, representing as much as 55% of reported human rights violations (UNSC, 2010a). Violence against women is committed commonly and daily by husbands and relatives, as well as by the ChadianNational Army (ANT) – and impunity is widespread. Female genital mutilation (FGM), early and forced marriages as well as rape are regularly reported.

Under International Humanitarian Law, Article 27, second paragraph, of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV provides: “Women shall be especially protected against any attack on their honour.

In addition, Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the 1974 UN Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict state:

4. All the necessary steps shall be taken to ensure the prohibition of measures such as persecution, torture, punitive measures, degrading treatment and

violence, particularly against that part of the civilian population that consists of women

5. All forms of repression and cruel and inhuman treatment of women -including imprisonment, torture, shooting, mass arrests, collective punishment, destruction of dwellings and forcible eviction, committed by belligerents in the course of military operations or in occupied territories shall be considered criminal

Protection of Civilians by Peacekeeping Forces

Over the last two decades, the world has witnessed armed conflicts marked by systematic violence and mass atrocities against civilians, and has increasingly looked to the United Nations, and in particular to UN peacekeeping operations, to prevent and or to halt such crimes. The failures of missions to provide security in complex crises such as Somalia, and to protect civilians from mass atrocities in Rwanda and Bosnia, tested the fundamental principles and capabilities of UN peacekeeping operations and demonstrated that reform was urgently required.Since then, notable efforts have worked to improve the overall effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations, including their capabilities to protect civilians. For a decade, the UN Security Council has also expressed its resolve to support

more effective missions, and to put a greater spotlight on the protection of civilians, as seen by its series of statements and resolutions, and the request that the Secretary-General issue regular reports on the protection of civilians in armed conflict. More tangibly, UN peacekeeping mandates have changed, as the Council has shifted peacekeeping well beyond its traditional role of monitoring the implementation of peace agreements over the last decade. Modern peacekeeping missions are multidimensional, addressing the full spectrum of peacebuilding activities, from providing secure environments to monitoring human rights and rebuilding the capacity of the state. Increasingly, such mandates also instruct peacekeeping missions to put an emphasis on the physical protection of civilians.

As part of this evolution, ten UN peacekeeping operations have been explicitly mandated to “protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.”3 The first mission provided with this explicit mandate language, the UN peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL, was authorized in 1999 inter alia “to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.”

By 2009, the majority of the nearly 100,000 uniformed UN peacekeepers deployed worldwide operate with such mandates. The link between the protection of civilians and peacekeeping mandates is central. First, the safety and security of civilians is critical to the legitimacy and credibility of peacekeeping missions. Missions rely upon their legitimacy with the local civilian population and external observers alike to help build peace and maintain political momentum behind the peace process. Moreover, wherever peacekeepers deploy, they raise expectations among the local population—and among those who view missions from afar—that the reason for their presence is to support people at risk.As seen in Rwanda, the Balkans, Sierra Leone, Haiti, DRC and Darfur, among others, peacekeeping operations that are ill-prepared to address large-scale violence directed against civilians will falter and may even collapse. While missions work to manage high expectations, they also need to address the security of civilians to build and maintain the legitimacy and credibility needed to carry out their other mandated tasks to assist with the political and local re-consolidation efforts and peacebuilding.

Of course, UN peacekeeping missions do not and cannot ‘own’ the concept of protection. They bring international civilian, military and police skills and assets to operational arenas in which other protection actors are present, including the host state, mandated UN protection agencies, non-governmental organizations and the International Committee of the Red Cross. It is essential that the actions are coherent and mutually reinforcing where possible.

Second, the protection of civilians is a critical component for a sustainable political peace. A peace agreement that does not bring a halt to armed violence, widespread human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law—or that tolerates continued violence against sectors of the population—cannot lead to legitimate governance. Where civilians remain at risk, efforts to establish governance, security, and the rule of law may flounder and be unsustainable. Neither a legitimate state nor efforts for a stable peace can be founded on a political settlement or government that leaves a population at risk of systematic or extreme violence.

Finally, the protection of civilians by peacekeeping missions is also central to the legitimacy and credibility of the entire United Nations system.These operations are among the most high-profile manifestations of UN action and their conduct has implications for the organization as a whole. Certainly the inability of peacekeeping missions to address violence against civilians in the past has damaged the standing of the United Nations and threatened to discredit the practice of peacekeeping in general Indeed, the challenge of protecting civilians cuts to the core of the UN purpose—‘to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.’ In an era of complex conflicts in which civilians continue to be targeted, the United Nations can neither avoid its duty to protect civilians, nor afford to be discredited by failing to live up to its own ambitions.

Human Rights Violations by Peacekeeping Forces

Despite the sound record of performance and the good intentions of peacekeeping missions, international peacekeepers have been associated with criminal misconduct, including sexual violence Crimes against women and children have followed UN peacekeeping operations in several locations, and

the UN reported that the entrance of peacekeeping troops into a conflict situation has been associated with a rapid rise in child prostitution.

Peacekeeping operations date back to the 1950s, but reports of abuse by such forces have occurred only recently; the first such report of sexual violence emerged in 1999, when Human Rights Watch reported on sexual exploitation in Guinean refugee camps. Since then, a stream of scholarship and UN activities have criticized and analysed the issue of peacekeeper accountability through the first decade of the 2000s. This work culminated with the recommendations of the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, a companion report from a group of legal experts, and a Draft Convention on Criminal Responsibility of Experts on Mission for the UN, all of which were completed between 2005 and 2006.

Of greatest relevance to this writing is the common unchallenged conclusion of these bodies: under the standard agreement between the UN and the troop-contributing state, the behaviour and punishment of military personnel are under the exclusive control of the troop-contributing state. Article 46 of the 1990 Model Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) provides that all UN peacekeeping staff are immune from legal process in respect to acts that they perform in their official capacity, while Article 47(b) provides that if the accused is a member of the military, he or she “shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective participating states in respect of any criminal offences which may be committed by them in [the host country or territory].” While these rules are among the most clear, the applicable law governing peacekeeping operations is a web of complex and often evolving interactions between domestic and international norms, with issues of privileges and immunities, extraterritorial jurisdiction, and the interaction of international human rights law together with that of humanitarian law and international or domestic criminal responsibility.

A notable example of violations by peacekeeping forces is by the African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM). Human rights monitors have reported a widespread risk of rape and sexual violence for displaced Somali women and children. The United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that sexual violence is a pervasive problem throughout Somalia and that oftentimes the attacks are carried out by armed men in

uniform. The UN reported that at least 1,700 people were affected by sexual violence in Somalia in 2012.

Questions A Resolution Must Answer (QARMA)● How do we create a monitoring mechanism to ensure civilians

are protected in warzones?● How do we prevent armed forces from attacking civilians –

both intentionally and unintentionally?● How do we hold those who violate human rights and

International Humanitarian Law accountable?● How do we safely ensure passage of Internally Displaced

Persons or Refugees to areas of safety without being abused/harmed?

● What further measures must UN and other peacekeeping operations take to ensure better protection of civilians

● How do we prevent Peacekeeping Forces from violating the Human Rights of civilians and ensure greater transparency?

● How do we ensure greater respect and protection for women and children in conflict zones?

● Is it possible to ensure respect for human rights and International Humanitarian Law from militias and armed separatist groups?

Note from the Executive Board

The examples provided in the background guide are by no means exhaustive, Delegates are strongly encouraged to conduct further research into the various ways civilians are targeted in war zones and also find examples of such violations.

The Background guide serves as a foundation for your research, upon which delegates must gather further, in depth information on the topic at hand.

Bibliography

Human Rights Violations by Peacekeeping Forces in Somalia by Richard J. Wilson* and Emily Singer Hurvitz

Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations – Successes, setbacks and Remaining Challenges by Victoria Holt and Glyn TaylorWith Max Kelly

Protecting Civilians against Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Eastern ChadBy Randi Solhjell, John Karlsrud and Jon Harald Sande Lie

ENHANCING PROTECTION for Civilians in Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence by the ICRC

http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/en/areas-of-responsibility/gender-based-violence.html

https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule97

Topic B: The Libyan Civil WarLibya is in a state of civil war, with rival militias battling for control of different parts of the country. A joint confederation of Islamist militias and their allies from Misrata, Libyan Dawn, took control of the capital, Tripoli, in late August after seizing the airport from its nationalist defenders. That day, they were hit by airstrikes launched by Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. Libya now has two governments, one in Tripoli and one in the east of the country, both battling for territory and the support of Libyan citizens. In the three years since Muammar Gaddafi was toppled by Libyan rebels and NATO airstrikes, fighting between theses militias has plunged the country into yet another civil war and seen Tripoli fall to Islamists. The involvement of Qatar, Egypt and the UAE aiding the various militias risks an even wider regional war.

Tripoli is in bad shape. Fuel supplies and electricity are petering out. Crime is rising; carjacking street gangs post their ransom demands on Twitter. In Fashloum, a rundown neighbourhood near the city centre, residents briefly erected barricades to keep out a brigade of Islamists.Meanwhile Libya’s ungoverned spaces are growing, and with some 6,000km of border the country’s problems are hard to quarantine. Each month 10,000 migrants set sail for Europe. Libyan arms in the hands of groups allied to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb triggered the collapse of order in northern Mali two years ago; some of those who subsequently fought against the French there have now returned to Libya, where they are reportedly running jihadist training camps. On January 3rd, IS claimed to have extended its reach to Libya’s Sahara too, killing a dozen soldiers at a checkpoint on a jihadist transit route to the Sahel. The conflict is as likely to spread as to burn itself out.

Despite that risk, the Western powers which assisted in Mr Qaddafi’s downfall have since been conspicuous by their absence. Chastened by failure in Afghanistan and Iraq, they have watched from the side-lines as things have gone from bad to worse. President Obama washed his hands of Libya after Islamists killed his ambassador, Chris Stevens, in Benghazi in September 2012.The Security Council is tasked with the daunting responsibility of seeking lasting solutions to resolve the conflict, reduce the numerous civilian fatalities and restore political stability.

FOR The First Libyan Civil War VIOLENCE

On February 15, 2011, anti-government rallies were held in Benghazi by protesters angered by the arrest of a human rights lawyer, Fethi Tarbel. The protesters called for Qaddafi to step down and for the release of political prisoners. Libyan security forces used water cannons and rubber bullets against the crowds, resulting in a number of injuries. To counter the demonstrations further, a pro-government rally orchestrated by the Libyan authorities was broadcast on state television.As the protests intensified, with demonstrators taking control of Benghazi and unrest spreading to Tripoli, the Libyan government began using lethal force against demonstrators. Security forces and squads of mercenaries fired live ammunition into crowds of demonstrators. Demonstrators also were attacked with tanks and artillery and from the air with warplanes and helicopter gunships. The regime restricted communications, blocking the Internet and interrupting telephone service throughout the country. On February 21 one of Gaddafi's sons, Sayf al-Islam, gave a defiant address on state television, blaming outside agitators for the unrest and saying that further demonstrations could lead to civil war in the country. He vowed that the regime would fight “to the last bullet.” Amid continuing skirmishes as rebel forces strengthened their positions outside Tripoli, Qaddafi invited a number of Western journalists to the city in an attempt to demonstrate that the situation remained under control in the capital. In interviews he continued to blame al-Qaeda and hallucinogenic drugs for the uprising. He claimed that Western leaders who had called for him to step down had done so out of a desire to colonize Libya, and he insisted that he was still well loved by Libyans.A rebel leadership council, formed by the merger of local rebel groups, appeared in Benghazi in early March. Known as the Transitional National Council (TNC), it declared that its aims would be to act as the rebellion’s military leadership and as the representative of the Libyan opposition, provide services in rebel-held areas, and guide the country’s transition to democratic government.

Conditions in Libya worsened as the armed struggle continued, and thousands of people, mostly migrant workers from Egypt and Tunisia, fled toward the borders. Governments and humanitarian organizations began to organize efforts to address worsening shortages of food, fuel, and medical supplies throughout the country.

After the rebels succeeded in taking control of eastern Libya and a number of cities in the west, the conflict appeared to enter a stalemate. The Qaddafi regime still controlled enough soldiers and weapons to hold Tripoli and to stage fresh assaults, which rebel fighters, although poorly equipped, were largely able to repel. Most fighting took place in the towns around Tripoli and in the central coastal region, where rebels and Qaddafi loyalists battled for control of the oil-export terminals on the Gulf of Sidra.As the fighting continued, forces loyal to Qaddafi seemed to gain momentum, launching successful assaults to retake control in strategic areas around Tripoli and on the coast of the Gulf of Sidra. Attacking with fighter jets, tanks, and artillery, pro-Qaddafi forces had by March 10 driven rebel forces from Al-Zāwiyah, west of Tripoli, and from the oil-export centre of Ras Lanuf. Those gains highlighted the Qaddafi loyalists’ advantages in weaponry, training, and organization.

As Qaddafi appeared to gain the upper hand, the international community continued to debate possible diplomatic and military responses to the rapidly developing conflict. Countries worked to establish contact with the TNC, although only France granted it official recognition, announcing on March 10 that it would treat the council as Libya’s legitimate government. International condemnation of the Qaddafi regime continued to build, and, at an emergency summit on March 11, the EU unanimously called for Qaddafi to step down. However, the international community remained divided over the possibility of military intervention—most likely by imposing a no-fly zone over Libya, a measure long requested by the rebels to prevent Qaddafi loyalists from launching air attacks. Some countries, including France and the United Kingdom, signalled their support for such an operation, while others, including the United States and Germany, expressed their reservations, emphasizing the need for broad international consensus and warning against possible unforeseen consequences of military intervention. The African Union (AU) rejected any military intervention in Libya, asserting that the crisis should be resolved through negotiations, whereas the Arab League passed a resolution on March 13 calling on the UN Security Council to impose a no-fly zone over Libya.On March 15 Qaddafi loyalists launched a heavy assault on the eastern city of Ajdābiyā, the last large rebel-held city on the route to Benghazi. On March 17, as Qaddafi loyalists advanced on the remaining rebel positions in Benghazi and Tobruk in the east and Miṣrātah in the west, the UN Security Council voted 10–0—with abstentions from Russia, China, Germany, India, and Brazil—to authorize military action, including imposition of a no-fly zone to protect Libyan civilians. The Qaddafi regime responded by declaring an immediate cease-fire, although there were reports that pro-Qaddafi forces continued to launch attacks after the announcement and that heavy fighting continued in Benghazi.Beginning March 19, a coalition of U.S. and European forces with warplanes and cruise missiles attacked targets in Libya in an effort to disable Libya’s air force and air defence systems so that the UN-authorized no-fly zone could be imposed. Coalition missiles struck buildings in a compound used by Qaddafi as a command centre, and in eastern Libya warplanes attacked a pro-Qaddafi armoured column positioned outside Benghazi. Emboldened by the air strikes, rebel forces once again launched an offensive to challenge pro-Qaddafi forces’

hold on the oil centres on the coast. Qaddafi denounced the coalition attacks as an act of aggression against Libya and vowed to continue fighting international forces and the rebels.Coalition spokesmen announced on March 23 that the Libyan air force had been completely disabled by coalition air strikes. However, heavy fighting continued on the ground. Pro-Qaddafi units massed around the rebel-held city of Miṣrātah in the west and the contested city of Ajdābiyā in the east, shelling both heavily and causing significant civilian casualties. Attacks by coalition warplanes soon weakened pro-Qaddafi ground forces in eastern Libya, allowing rebels to advance west again.On March 27 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) officially took command of military operations previously directed by the United States, France, and the United Kingdom in Libya. The handover came after several days of debate between NATO countries over the limits of international military intervention; several countries had argued that the coalition’s aggressive targeting of pro-Qaddafi ground forces had exceeded the mandate set by the UN Security Council to protect civilians.On March 30 Libyan foreign minister Moussa Koussa defected, fleeing to the United Kingdom. The defection of Koussa, a former head of Libyan intelligence and a long-time member of Qaddafi’s inner circle, was interpreted as a sign that support for Qaddafi among senior Libyan officials was beginning to wane.As the fighting progressed, it began to appear that, even with NATO attacks on pro-Gaddafi forces, the Libyan rebels—a poorly armed and disorganized force with little military training—would be unable to oust Qaddafi or achieve decisive successes against Qaddafi’s professional troops. Diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis intensified, with an AU delegation traveling to Tripoli on April 10 to present a cease-fire plan to Qaddafi. AU representatives announced that Qaddafi had accepted the plan, although pro-Qaddafi forces continued to launch attacks on April 11. The plan was rejected by the rebel leaders on the grounds that it did not provide for Qaddafi’s departure from Libya.As the stalemate continued, the United Kingdom announced on April 19 that it would send a team of military liaison officers to Libya to advise rebel leaders on military strategy, organization, and logistics. The next day France and Italy announced that they would also send advisers. All three countries specified that their officers would not participate in fighting. The Libyan foreign minister

condemned the decision to send military advisers, saying that such aid to the rebels would only prolong the conflict.NATO attacks continued and targeted a number of sites associated with Gaddafi and members of his inner circle, such as the Bāb al-ʿAzīziyyah compound in Tripoli, drawing protests from Libyan officials who charged that NATO had adopted a strategy of trying to kill Qaddafi. His son Sayf al-Arab and three of Gaddafi's grandchildren were killed in a NATO air strike in April. In June the ICC issued arrest warrants for Qaddafi, his son Sayf al-Islam, and the Libyan intelligence chief, Abdullah Senussi, for ordering attacks against civilians during the uprising. Some observers expressed concern that the ICC’s proceedings against Qaddafi would discourage him from relinquishing power voluntarily. In spite of pressure from NATO attacks, rebel advances in the eastern and western regions of Libya, and the Qaddafi regime’s international isolation, Qaddafi continued to hold power in Tripoli.After months of stalemate, the balance of power once again shifted in the rebels’ favour. In August 2011 rebel forces advanced to the outskirts of Tripoli, taking control of strategic areas, including the city of Zāwiyah, the site of one of Libya’s largest oil refineries. Rebels soon advanced into Tripoli, establishing control over some areas of the capital on August 22. As rebel fighters battled pro-Qaddafi forces for control of Tripoli, Qaddafi’s whereabouts were unknown. The next day rebel forces appeared to gain the upper hand, capturing the Bāb al-ʿAzīziyyah compound, Qaddafi’s headquarters. Rebels raised Libya’s pre-Gaddafi flag over the compound as jubilant crowds destroyed symbols of Qaddafi. Fighting between rebels and loyalists continued in a few areas of Tripoli.By early September rebel forces had solidified their control of Tripoli, and the TNC began to transfer its operations to the capital. Qaddafi, effectively forced from power, remained in hiding, occasionally issuing defiant audio messages. Rebel forces focused their attention on the few remaining cities under loyalist control, attempting to use negotiations to persuade loyalist commanders to surrender peacefully and avoid a bloody ground assault. When negotiations failed, rebel troops began to push into the cities of Surt and Banī Walīd, engaging in heavy fighting with loyalists. The TNC achieved new international legitimacy on September 15 when the UN General Assembly voted to recognize it as the representative of the Libyan people in the UN. On October

20 Qaddafi was discovered and killed by rebel fighters in his hometown, Surt, as they fought to solidify their control of the city.

Situation from 2011-2014After the overthrow of Gaddafi, the rebel run Transitional National Council (TNC) gained administrative control and power over Libya, claiming to represent the people's interests. Recognised abroad, popular at home and enjoying the benefits of healthy oil revenues (97% of the government’s income), the TNC was well placed to lay the foundations for a new Libya. But the judges, academics and lawyers who filled its ranks worried about their own legitimacy and feared confrontation with the militias which, in toppling Qaddafi, had taken his arsenals for their own. By the time the TNC chairman, Mustafa Abdel Jalil, arrived in Tripoli, militia leaders were already ensconced in the capital’s prime properties.

The TNC presided over Libya’s first democratic elections in July 2012, and the smooth subsequent handover of power to the General National Congress (GNC) revived popular support for the revolution. But Islamist parties won only 19 of 80 seats assigned to parties in the new legislature, and the process left the militias on the outside. The Homeland party, founded by Abdel Hakim Belhadj, a veteran of the Afghan jihad and prominent rebel emir who ran Tripoli’s military council, tried to advertise its moderation by putting an unveiled woman at the head of its party list in Benghazi: even so it won no seats.

Hopes that an elected government might use its political capital to rein in the militiamen were quickly dashed. The incumbent prime minister, Abdurrahim al-Keib, a university professor who had spent decades in exile, fretted and

dithered. He bowed to militia demands for their leaders to be appointed to senior ministries, and failed to revive public-works programmes, in full swing before the revolution, which might have given militiamen jobs. Many received handouts without being required to hand in weapons or disband, an incentive which served to swell their ranks; when the colonel was killed the number of revolutionaries registered with the Warriors Affairs Commission set up by the NTC was about 60,000; a year later there were over 200,000. Of some 500 registered militias, almost half came from one city, Misrata.

When Mr Keib or the elected parliament balked, the militias simply raided their premises. “The war wounded closed a parliament session for six weeks until we passed a law rewarding them,” recalls Mustafa Abushagur, then Mr Keib’s deputy. In May 2013 the militias forced parliament to pass a law barring from office anyone who had held a senior position in Qaddafi’s regime after laying siege to government ministries. That October militiamen briefly kidnapped Mr Keib’s successor as Prime Minister, Ali Zeidan.

In February 2014, the GNC refused to dissolve after its term expired and Khalifa Haftar, the head of the Libyan National Army declared the GNC suspended. In the spring of 2014, Khalifa Haftar, forcibly tried to dissolve the GNC and re-establish himself as the armed forces’ commander-in-chief in an operation he called Dignity. The elections which followed were a far cry from the happy experience of 2012. In some parts of the country it was too dangerous to go out and vote; in the rest most chose not to anyway, seeing a process now dominated by bullets, not ballots. Such retrenchment has been particularly noticeable among women. In 2011 they created a flurry of new civil associations; now many are back indoors.

Turnout in the June 2014 elections was 18%, down from 60% in 2012, and the Islamists fared even worse than before. Dismissing the results, an alliance of Islamist, Misratan and Berber militias called Libya Dawn launched a six-week assault on Tripoli. The newly elected parliament, called the House of Representatives, decamped to Tobruk, some 1,300km east. Militias backing the

parliament, fled to the Nafusa Mountains south-west of the city. Grasping for a fig leaf of legitimacy, Libya Dawn reconstituted the pre-election GNC and appointed a new government.

Recent Situation in LibyaLibya is bitterly split. It has two opposing governments, parliaments and fighting forces, intent on seizing the country's power and assets. There is former Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thinni's Tobruk-based government and House of Representatives, backed by General Khalifa Haftar and his "Operation Dignity" or "al-Karama" military campaign. Although the Libyan Supreme Court ruled this parliament to be illegal and unconstitutional last November, it is recognised by the US, the European Union, Egypt and the UAE. In August 2015, Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thinni resigned on 11 August 2015, over a year into the Second Libyan Civil War, saying his "exit is the solution.

Their opponents are Islamist, Tripoli-based National Salvation government - formerly known as the General National Congress (GNC) and the "Libya Dawn" or "Fajr Libya" forces, who seized control of Tripoli after fierce fighting for control of the city's airport last year.

Ignoring the diverse makeup and increasing splits within each political coalition, Operation Dignity simplistically brands its Fajr Libya opponents as "Islamic extremists", while the Fajr Libya alliance wrongly condemns all foes as

"former Gaddafi loyalists". They are fighting each other in Benghazi, the Sidra oil basin, the west and, by proxy, the southern town of Ubari.

The UN estimates 400,000 Libyans have fled their homes to escape the fighting, while the unofficial website Libya Body Count estimates 2,825 people were killed last year.

Complicating Libya's political landscape further are armed groups claiming allegiance to ISIL leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, including the fighters controlling the eastern town of Derna. Fighters claiming affiliation to ISIL have taken control of key assets in Sirte, Gaddafi's old hometown.

The emergence of ISIL has had some effect in Libyan militant circles It is causing tensions within those groups aligned with al-Qaeda, like Ansar al-Sharia in Benghazi, Derna and Sirte, as some youth are peeling away from these groups and joining ISIL.

Since last summer, some opponents of the Libyan Dawn coalition have tried to paint it as in cahoots with ISIL. This has fed the tendency for Fajr Libya to deny or downplay ISIL involvement, as they see it as a political tool to smear them. Meanwhile, the real threat is growing. Libya's political power struggle is complicating efforts to address the threat.

Many Libyans considered the UN-brokered peace process, initially based in Geneva, as the only alternative to the prolonged fighting, but a weak one. The fragmentation of the two opposing factions at the Geneva talks undermined the dialogue. The negotiating parties discussed the issue of legitimacy of both governments and to come up with an agreement. They also discussed what powers a Libyan head of state will have, which include the armed forces.

With nearly all of Libya's oil fields and terminals attacked or closed, the country is producing an estimated 160,000 barrels of oil per day, down from its post-revolutionary peak of 1.5 million barrels per day, according to analyst Richard Mallinson of the UK-based consultancy Energy Aspects.

The country is importing around 75 percent of its fuel for domestic use, and chronic cash shortages, unpaid government salaries, electricity cuts and soaring gasoline and food prices are exacerbating miserable living conditions for Libyans. The threat to the oil infrastructure is dramatically worsening at a rapid pace.

Meanwhile, for the badly battered eastern city of Benghazi, off the international community's radar, the war grinds on while its residents live in abject misery. Medical workers estimate 600 people died in the past three months.

On March 30, 2016, the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) arrived in the Libyan capital of Tripoli. The group of Libyan lawmakers, led by Fayez al-Sarraj, had previously been based in Tunisia. On April 7, the rival Tripoli-based National Salvation government, or former the General National Congress (GNC), rejected the GNA’s transition, contradicting its earlier acceptance of the new government taking over. According to the international community and the UN, Fayez al-Sarraj is now the new internationally recognised prime minister of Libya.

The formation of the GNA was the result of UN talks, held initially in Geneva, to find a resolution between the warring factions and to create a unity government. UN Envoy Martin Kobler later facilitated a series of talks in Morocco and Tunisia with the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) and its rival, the Tripoli-based General National Congress (GNC). The principle obstacles to the success of a unity government continue to include the HoR’s concerns about GNC politicians' links to Salafist militias and demands by GNC allies to exclude Libyan Army General Khalifa Haftar, a Tobruk-backed former Qaddafi loyalist, from the new government. The unity government, whose leaders arrived in Tripoli last month, is designed to replace two rival administrations that were set up in the capital and the east in 2014.But the new government has moved cautiously as it seeks to secure the backing of numerous armed factions that have exerted control over politics in

the capital since the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011.

Speaking at an event to mark the handover of the foreign ministry, Mohamed al-Ammari, a member of the new government's leadership, or Presidential Council, said the transfer of power was "going well". The other ministries that have been handed over to the Government of National Accord (GNA) were housing and public utilities, transport, social affairs, local government, youth and sports, and Islamic affairs, he told Reuters. The planning, labour, and education ministries would be handed over in the next few days, he added.

The Presidential Council was forced to arrive in Tripoli by ship after the self-declared National Salvation government, which previously held power in Tripoli, closed down the airspace to prevent them from flying in. The GNA has so far failed to obtain a vote of confidence from Libya's eastern-based, internationally-recognized parliament - the House of Representatives which had supported the Tobruk based secular government formerly headed by Abdullah Al-Thinni. Earlier the National Salvation Government (The former GNC) has also rejected the legitimacy of the UN elected GNA government.

Militias in LibyaLibya Dawn

Libya Dawn, or Fajr Libya, is a coalition of militias principally from Misrata but also from Tripoli, Zawiya, Zuwarah and Gharyan. They see themselves as the inheritors of the 2011 revolution and banded together in 2014 after the Muslim Brotherhood was defeated in legislative elections. Misrata, from which most of Libya Dawn originates, endured the worst violence of the 2011 war against Gaddafi and emerged as one of the most powerful military forces in Libya following the revolution. Libya Dawn and the Misrata Revolutionary Council battle against Islamic State to the east and Libyan Army brigades to the

west. They have support of the Islamist leaning National Salvation government - formerly known as the General National Congress (GNC).

Libyan Army

The Libyan Army is a rough amalgamation of battalions and brigades which defected from Muammar Gaddafi, revolutionary militias which joined its ranks and new recruits trained abroad. They are commanded by divisive former Gaddafi General Khalifa Haftar who led a splinter military group under the banner 'Operation Dignity' in a bid to rid eastern Libya of powerful Islamist militias. He was widely condemned at the time and accused of plotting a coup. However, Haftar and his forces were reabsorbed into the army by Thinni and the House of Representatives in March. In the west of the country brigades from the mountain town of Zintan fight against Libya Dawn under the auspices of the Libyan Army. They support the secular leaning House of Representatives that backed the Al-Thinni Tobruk based government.

Islamic State

The offshoot of Islamic State in Libya is the most recent major force to exert its power in the country. The first Islamist brigade to formally pledge its allegiance to Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi was the Shura Council of Islamic Youth in Derna, in June last year. Islamic State has taken control of most of Derna and is in the ascendency in Sirte where it claims to have taken complete control, following victories at the Qardabiya air base and the town's power station. Islamic State in Sirte operates under the banner of the Islamic State province of Tripoli and its influence extents from Sirte some 150 km to the east, along the coastal road to the town of Nawfliyah. The militant group has also expanded its influence into Benghazi at the expense of Ansar Al-Sharia.

Ansar Al-Sharia

The rise of Islamic State in Libya has been at the expense of the al-Qaeda-inspired Ansar Al-Sharia which previously held the balance of power in Libya's

second city of Benghazi. The group is classified as a terrorist organisation by the US and UN and is believed to be responsible for the US consulate attack which killed US Ambassador Chris Stevens in 2012. It is still powerful in Benghazi where it fights alongside Islamic State and it also has presence in Derna.

Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade

Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade, named after one of the worst atrocities committed by Muammar Gaddafi in against inmates at Abu Salim prison, has also diminished with the advent of Islamic State. Before the arrival of the offshoot in Libya the al-Qaeda linked group was the dominant force in Derna. The brigade comprises of a number of Libya's stalwart Islamist militants from the Libya Islamic Fighting Group which engaged in clashes with Gaddafi forces during the 1990s and made a failed assassination attempt on the former leader in 1996. Two senior figureheads in Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade were killed recently in an ongoing power struggle with Islamic State in Derna.

Tuareg Militias of Ghat

Tuareg militias of Ghat are ethnic Tuareg tribal militias, operating in South-West Libya desert. The militias rose to prominence in the district of Ghat, which has a Tuareg majority. Gradually, the Tuareg forces expanded their hold also into neighbouring districts. The Libyan Tuaregs are supported by Tuaregs of Mali and groups like Ahmed al-Ansari, with support from the Misratan Libyan Dawn forces and the militias often utilize the Berber flag.

Toubou Militias

The Toubou Front for the Salvation of Libya is an ethnic nationalist group created during 2007 to defend the rights of the Toubou people in Libya. It is led by Issa Abdel Majid Mansur, a Libyan Toubou tribal leader. The group participated in the Libyan revolution against pro-Gaddafi forces and was disbanded during August 2011. The group was re-organised during March 2012, with the aim of protecting the Toubou ethnic group, following clashes between Toubou and Arab militias in southern Libya for control over smuggling networks to Chad and Sudan.

Humanitarian Situation in LibyaIncreased fighting in Libya since the start of the year had led to almost a doubling in the number of displaced people in the country to more than 434,000 from an estimated 230,000 last September, the UN refugee agency reported on Tuesday. UNHCR said the numbers could in fact be higher because the agency has limited access in the country and is running its operation there by remote management.

Current figures on internally displaced are made up of 83,697 families. These are calculated on the basis of countrywide data collected by UNHCR and its partners from local crisis committees, municipalities and non-government organizations (NGOs) directly involved in providing assistance to IDPs, including distribution of food and non-food aid. With sporadic fighting in the south and a resumption of tribal tensions between the Toubou and Tuareg communities, the displacement situation threatens to become protracted with many IDPs unable to return or returning to unsustainable conditions such as in the border province of Awbari.

Access to southern Libya and delivery of relief items remains a challenge because of conflict and disrupted supply chains. The situation of IDPs continues to be highly fluid in most areas, but particularly around Tripoli and Warshefana, where the destruction of homes prevents the return of IDPs and remains a critical concern.

About a quarter of the IDP population (105,000), the largest bloc, is located in the eastern city of Benghazi, where UNHCR has been working with the municipality as well as local and international NGOs to distribute items such as mattresses, blankets and kitchen sets to some 6,000 of the most vulnerable IDPs between March and June. The main areas of concern in Benghazi relate to the collapse of the health sector, the closure of more than 60 schools as well as universities, criminality stemming from the absence of rule of law, and

frequent reports of civilian casualties as a result of fighting in the coastal city, landmines and unexploded ordnance were an additional hazard.

Conflict in Libya has also undermined the security of civilians and prevented the safe return of IDPs in Misrata, Tripoli, Warshefana and the Nafusa Mountains in the west, and Awbari in the south. IDPs and host communities in these areas have also been equally affected by diminishing access to education, affordable health care, electricity and other key services.

Living conditions for IDPs vary from area to area, but remain tough for many, particularly in the south. IDPs are staying in shelter ranging from rented accommodation to schools, factories and empty buildings. In the southern desert border town of Ghat some IDP families live in empty water tanks.

UNHCR is also providing medical assistance to refugees and asylum-seekers in urban areas and financial support to the most vulnerable in Tripoli and Benghazi where there are almost 28,000 registered refugees and some 8,900 asylum-seekers. It is also helping people of concern being held in detention centres.

Questions A Resolution Must Answer (QARMA)

● How do we counter the rising threat of ISIS and other terrorist organisations in Libya?

● How do we reach a consensus as to who legitimately runs Libya, Can we convince the two parliaments to accept the UN elected General National Assembly?

● How do we improve the humanitarian situation in Libya and ensure safety of IDPs?

● How do we manage the various militias in Libya and bring them to a consensus?

● How do we stop the continued fighting that has been occurring throughout Libya

● Can the international community offer economic aid to Libya?