major management challenges and program risks · efforts with the department of defense regarding...

United States General Accounting Office

GAO Performance and AccountabilitySeries

January 1999

Major ManagementChallenges and ProgramRisks

National Aeronautics andSpace Administration

GAO/OCG-99-18

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

Comptroller General

of the United States

January 1999

The President of the SenateThe Speaker of the House of Representatives

This report addresses the major performance andmanagement challenges that have limited theeffectiveness of the National Aeronautics and SpaceAdministration (NASA) in carrying out its mission. It alsoaddresses corrective actions that NASA has taken orinitiated on these challenges, including the progress theagency has made in evaluating its field centers’procurement activities based on international qualitystandards and its own procurement surveys. Since 1990,we have identified a number of significant managementproblems at NASA. These problems are the results ofserious deficiencies in financial management systems,continuing threats to the International Space StationProgram that translate into higher program costs, and alack of closure in the implementation of cooperativeefforts with the Department of Defense regardingaerospace test facilities.

To date, NASA has made progress in resolving thesechallenges. For example, in the contract managementarea—an important activity in light of the agency’s annualprocurement budget of over $12 billion—NASA has madeprogress in developing systems to correct contractmanagement weaknesses. However, NASA has notimplemented its integrated financial management system.Agencywide implementation is now scheduled for June 1,

2000. The agency recognizes that such a system must beimplemented to fix a number of problems, includingdecentralized, nonintegrated systems with policies,procedures, and practices that are unique to its fieldcenters. Consequently, until corrective actions arecompleted—such as a fully operational integratedfinancial management system—we believe that NASA’scontract management remains a high-risk area.

This report is part of a special series entitled thePerformance and Accountability Series: MajorManagement Challenges and Program Risks. The seriescontains separate reports on 20 agencies—one on each ofthe cabinet departments and on most major independentagencies as well as the U. S. Postal Service. The seriesalso includes a governmentwide report that draws fromthe agency-specific reports to identify the performanceand management challenges requiring attention acrossthe federal government. As a companion volume to thisseries, GAO is issuing an update to those governmentoperations and programs that its work has identified as“high risk” because of their greater vulnerabilities towaste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement. High-riskgovernment operations are also identified and discussedin detail in the appropriate performance andaccountability series agency reports.

The performance and accountability series was done atthe request of the Majority Leader of the House ofRepresentatives, Dick Armey; the Chairman of the HouseGovernment Reform Committee, Dan Burton; the

GAO/OCG-99-18 NASA ChallengesPage 2

Chairman of the House Budget Committee, John Kasich;the Chairman of the Senate Committee on GovernmentalAffairs, Fred Thompson; the Chairman of the SenateBudget Committee, Pete Domenici; and Senator LarryCraig. The series was subsequently cosponsored by theRanking Minority Member of the House GovernmentReform Committee, Henry A. Waxman; the RankingMinority Member, Subcommittee on GovernmentManagement, Information and Technology, HouseGovernment Reform Committee, Dennis J. Kucinich;Senator Joseph I. Lieberman; and Senator Carl Levin.

Copies of this report series are being sent to thePresident, the congressional leadership, all otherMembers of the Congress, the Director of the Office ofManagement and Budget, the Administrator of theNational Aeronautics and Space Administration, and theheads of other major departments and agencies.

David M. WalkerComptroller General ofthe United States


Contents

Overview 6

MajorPerformance andManagementIssues

11

Related GAOProducts

28

Performance andAccountabilitySeries

31


Overview

The National Aeronautics and SpaceAdministration (NASA) conducts research forthe solution of problems of flight within andoutside the Earth’s atmosphere anddevelops, constructs, tests, and operatesaeronautical and space vehicles. It conductsactivities required for the exploration ofspace with manned and unmanned vehiclesand coordinates the use of the scientific andengineering resources of the United Stateswith other nations engaged in aeronauticaland space activities for peaceful purposes.For example, in December 1998, NASA

successfully coupled in orbit the first twoelements of the International Space Station.Recently, NASA’s budget has been between$13 and $14 billion annually. NASA spendsmore than $12 billion annually for goods andservices, mostly on contracts withbusinesses and other organizations.

Since 1990, we have identified a number ofmajor management challenges at NASA.Currently, three challenges continue towarrant NASA attention.


Overview

The Challenges

Weaknesses inContractManagement

NASA’s contract management functionencompasses several processes, includingfinancial management and oversight. Both ofthese processes require accurate and reliableinformation. However, NASA lacks adequatesystems and processes to overseeprocurement activities and to produceaccurate and reliable managementinformation in a timely manner.

ControllingInternational SpaceStation Costs

Characterized as one of the most challengingengineering feats ever attempted, theInternational Space Station Program isexpected to culminate in 2004 in a footballfield-sized laboratory manned by up to sevencrewmembers. However, until the spacestation is completed, NASA will continue toface challenges in controlling the cost andschedule of the program. In May 1998, wereported that since 1995, the life-cycle costfor the station had increased almost$2 billion, to $95.6 billion. At the time of ourreport, the final assembly date of the stationhad slipped from June 2002 toDecember 2003.


Overview

Following Throughon Aerospace TestFacilitiesCooperative Efforts

NASA and the Department of Defense (DOD)agreed in 1996 to form joint working groupsfor aerospace test facilities to coordinateinvestments to avoid unnecessaryduplication, coordinate test schedules tospread workload across the facilities, anddevelop standardized business processes.However, the agencies’ promise of closercooperation and the development of anational perspective on aerospace testfacilities remains largely unfulfilled becauseNASA and DOD (1) have not convened mostjoint test facility working groups on a regularbasis, (2) have competed with each other totest engines for new rockets, and (3) havenot prepared a congressionally required jointplan on rocket propulsion test facilities.

Progress andNext Steps

NASA has made progress in meeting thesechallenges. In the contract managementarea, it has made progress in developingsystems to correct contract managementweaknesses. NASA still has not implementedits integrated financial management system.However, until NASA’s integrated financialmanagement system is operational, theagency’s contract management shouldremain a high-risk area. Regarding spacestation challenges, since our May 1998report, the final assembly date has slipped to


Overview

July 2004. The prime contractor’sperformance and Russia’s problems withfunding its portion contributed to the costincrease and schedule delay in the spacestation program. We are currently reviewingboth the cost of and Russia’s involvementwith the space station. As to the promise ofgreater cooperation and the development ofa national perspective on aerospace testfacilities, NASA and DOD have agreed to gobeyond cooperative working groups inaeronautics and jointly manage theiraeronautical test facilities. However, theyhave not reached agreement on key aspectsof a management organization.

NASA’s corrective actions on its managementchallenges should be viewed in the contextof its efforts to respond to the GovernmentPerformance and Results Act of 1993. In acase in point, our review of NASA’s 1999annual performance plan found that theagency did not recognize major managementchallenges and associated corrective actions.NASA has indicated that it will continuallyimprove the content of its annualperformance plan.

Key Contacts Louis J. Rodrigues, DirectorDefense Acquisitions Issues


Overview

National Defense and International Affairs Division(202) [email protected]

Allen Li, Associate DirectorDefense Acquisitions IssuesNational Defense and International Affairs Division(202) [email protected]


Major Performance and ManagementIssues

Over the years, we have documented majormanagement problems in NASA. This reportsummarizes our findings concerning severalweaknesses in NASA’s contract management,the challenges NASA faces controlling thespace station’s cost and schedule, and theefforts by NASA and DOD to coordinate theiraerospace test facilities.

Weaknesses inContractManagement

NASA spends more than $12 billion annuallyfor goods and services, mostly on contractswith businesses and other organizations. Toadequately manage these expenditures, NASA

requires systems and processes to overseeprocurement activities and to routinelyproduce accurate and reliable managementinformation. In 1990, we identified NASA’scontract management as an area at high risk.At that time, we began a special effort toreview and report on federal program areasthat our work had identified as high riskbecause of vulnerabilities to waste, fraud,abuse, and mismanagement. In 1992, wereported that the agency had ineffectivesystems and processes for overseeingcontractors’ activities and that NASA fieldcenters had failed to comply with contractmanagement requirements.


Major Performance and Management

Issues

In July 1998, we reported that NASA wasdeveloping systems to provide it with theoversight and information needed toimprove its contract management. Inaddition, we reported that NASA had madeprogress evaluating its field centers’procurement activities based oninternational quality standards and its ownprocurement surveys. We also reported,however, that NASA had delayedimplementation of its integrated financialmanagement system and not implemented itsnew system for measuring procurementperformance.

NASA DelayedImplementation ofIntegrated FinancialManagement System

In its August 1997 Integrated FinancialManagement Project Management Plan, NASA

stated that its financial managementenvironment comprised decentralized,nonintegrated systems with policies,procedures, and practices that are unique toits field centers. NASA stated that for the mostpart, data formats were not standardized,automated systems are not interfaced, andon-line financial information was not readilyavailable to program managers. In addition,NASA pointed out, the cost to maintain thesesystems was high since both data andsoftware were replicated at each fieldcenter.



Issues

NASA’s new integrated financial managementsystem is intended to fix these problems. Itoffers the promise of providing reliable andtimely information. However, itsimplementation has been delayed. InMay 1998, NASA and its contractor, KPMGPeat Marwick LLP, signed a contractmodification delaying initial implementationof the financial management system atMarshall Space Flight Center and DrydenFlight Research Center from October 1, 1998,to June 1, 1999. The modification alsopostponed agencywide implementation fromJuly 1, 1999, to June 1, 2000.

According to a NASA official, KPMG has haddifficulties upgrading its software to supportnew technologies and to meet all federalrequirements. These difficulties have beenespecially prevalent in two systems that aredirectly related to contract management,namely, the core financial and procurementsystems. The core financial system,according to NASA, is the “backbone” of theintegrated financial management system andis to provide common processing routines,including budget execution and fundscontrol; support for common data for criticalfinancial management functions affecting theentire agency; and maintenance of therequired general ledger control over



Issues

financial transactions and resource balances.In addition, it is to provide data for themeasurement of financial performance,analysis, full cost management, financialreporting, and preparation of financialstatements. The procurement system,according to NASA, will support an end-to-endacquisition process. Specifically, it willprepare and track the status of procurementrequests, purchase orders, and contracts;record and validate the receipt of goods andservices; and provide information to the corefinancial system.

NASA IsImplementing ItsNew System forMeasuringProcurementPerformance

In response to our March 1997 report onNASA’s contract management and ourobservation on the agency’s need to produceaccurate and reliable procurement-relatedinformation, a NASA official stated in anAugust 27, 1997, letter that NASA was“actively working on performance measuresin order to determine our metric needs andhow best they can be used to measureperformance.” In an October 3, 1997, letter, aNASA official stated that NASA’s ProcurementQuality Assessment Initiative would involve“the development of measurableperformance metrics, the benchmarking ofthese metrics,” and the development of bothNASA Headquarters and agencywide



Issues

procurement customer surveys. Accordingto a NASA official, the purpose of the metricsinitiative is to determine a family ofperformance metrics that will helpprocurement managers measure andimprove the performance of theirorganizations. The purpose of the customersurvey is to periodically assess customersatisfaction with field centers’ procurementoffice support in areas of timeliness, quality,and service.

In May 1998, the NASA Headquarters Office ofProcurement forwarded a draft of customersurvey to the senior procurement officers atits field centers for comment. The finalversion of the survey was approved inOctober. The customer survey is presentlyundergoing in-house testing prior todissemination to the center procurementcustomers in early January 1999. A NASA

official said that the customer survey will beconducted annually.

In August, the agency circulated a draftmetrics report for review and comment byNASA’s senior procurement officials at itsfield centers. The final metrics report wasapproved by the Acting AssociateAdministrator for Procurement onNovember 19, 1998, and transmitted to the



Issues

centers’ senior procurement officials thesame day. In the transmittal memorandum,he said that the revised system ofprocurement measures will be implementedeffective fiscal year 1999.

NASA Has MadeProgress inEvaluatingProcurement at ItsField Centers

NASA requires a quality management systemfor itself and its suppliers that, at aminimum, complies with the InternationalOrganization for Standardization (ISO) 9000series of standards, which includes astandard for purchasing. The ISO 9000 seriesconsists, in part, of 20 quality managementand assurance standards. The generalpurchasing standard states that the supplier(for example, NASA’s field centers’procurement offices) shall establish andmaintain documented procedures to ensurethat purchased products conform tospecified requirements. To this end, NASA hashired contractors to annually evaluate itsfield centers’ compliance with thesestandards.

To prepare for ISO 9000 certification, the fieldcenters’ personnel conduct internal audits,including audits of the centers’ compliancewith the purchasing standard. To date, NASA’scontractors have certified Johnson SpaceCenter, Johnson’s White Sands Test Facility,



Issues

Marshall Space Flight Center, and KennedySpace Center as having complied with the ISO

9000 standards. All field centers are to becertified by the end of fiscal year 1999.

NASA Headquarters also conductsprocurement management surveys of itsfield centers’ procurement activities. Before1998, such surveys were performed inaddition to the field centers’ ownprocurement self-assessments, which arenow being replaced by the ISO 9000-relatedinternal audits. NASA plans to survey eitherGoddard or Johnson field center each yearbecause each of these centers has the largestamounts of procurement activity and tosurvey other centers at least once every 3 years. NASA Headquarters completedsurveys at Dryden, Goddard, Langley, andStennis field centers in fiscal year 1997 andat Johnson, Lewis, and Marshall field centersin fiscal year 1998. Also, the Langley fieldcenter was resurveyed in fiscal year 1998.

In April 1998, NASA’s procurement officersagreed that a combination of ISO 9000external and internal audits andprocurement surveys should providesufficient confidence in the soundness ofNASA’s procurement system. They also agreedto periodically sample for review a random



Issues

number of procurement actions. OnSeptember 30, 1998, NASA’s Acting AssociateAdministrator for Procurement issuedguidance to the procurement officers for therandom reviews. The guidance stated that, ata minimum, the random reviews should beperformed semiannually.

ContractManagement ShouldRemain a High-RiskArea

NASA has made progress in correctingweaknesses in contract management.However, a critical component of evaluatingNASA’s ability to manage contracts is theestablishment of a financial managementsystem and its integration with full costaccounting. Until the financial managementsystem is operational, performanceassessments relying on cost data may beincomplete. Because implementation of thefinancial management system has beendelayed, we believe that NASA’s contractmanagement should remain a high-risk area.We will continue to monitor NASA’s futureprogress in the contract management area.

ControllingInternationalSpace StationCosts

NASA and its international partners—Japan,Canada, the European Space Agency, andRussia—are building a space station as apermanently orbiting laboratory to conductresearch on materials and life sciences, to



Issues

observe the earth, and to provide forcommercial purposes under nearlyweightless conditions. In December 1998,NASA astronauts successfully coupled in orbitthe first two elements of the space station.

Since the space station project was firstapproved in the mid-1980s, NASA has had toredesign the station several times to meetdecreasing budgets. The most recent majorredesign was in 1993. At about the sametime, the Russians became a partner in theprogram. Since 1993, NASA and its partnershave made progress in developing andconstructing space station elements, andearly flight hardware has been delivered toU.S. and Russian launch sites.

In September 1997, we reported that the costand schedule performance of the station’sprime contractor had continued to steadilyworsen and that program financial reservesfor contingencies had deteriorated,principally because of program uncertaintiesand cost overruns. We also reported thatNASA had questioned the accuracy of theprime contractor’s reported estimate of acost overrun at completion. On the basis ofan internal review, the prime contractormore than doubled its estimate of the totalcost growth at contract completion, from



Issues

$278 million to $600 million. We alsoreported that NASA had become concernedwith Russia’s ability to provide steady andadequate funding to meet its commitments.

In May 1998, we reported that the life-cyclecost estimate to develop, operate, anddecommission the station had increased byabout $2 billion since 1995, to about$95.6 billion. The major component of thisincrease was in the development cost of thestation, which increased from $17.4 billion to$21.9 billion. The increase in developmentcost was offset by a dramatic reduction inNASA’s estimate of the shuttle support costsfor the station. We also reported that thefinal assembly date of the station had slippedfrom June 2002 to December 2003 and anumber of potential program changes couldfurther increase costs, including additionalschedule delays and the need for moreshuttle launches. In addition, we continuedto report that station financial reservesmight be inadequate, considering that thedevelopment phase was still about 6 yearsfrom completion.

Since May 1998, the program has continuedto face cost and schedule challenges and theeffects of funding shortfalls in Russia. NASA

continues to identify cost growth and limited



Issues

reserves as major program concerns and isnow giving added attention to problems withcontractors other than prime contractors.Regarding the prime contractor’sperformance, its latest estimate of a costoverrun at completion has increased from$600 million to over $780 million. In addition,the concerns we expressed in May 1998regarding potential threats to the programhave, in fact, occurred. For example, inOctober 1998, NASA and its partners revisedthe official assembly sequence, addingadditional shuttle flights and extending thefinal assembly date of the station toJuly 2004.

Regarding Russia’s funding shortfalls, inSeptember 1998, NASA sought congressionalsupport for its plan to transfer $60 millionfrom within the agency to the Russian SpaceAgency in return for goods and services, tohelp ensure the timely completion of Russiancomponents. NASA also said that the RussianSpace Agency could need an additional$600 million in funding transfers. As anadded consequence of Russia’s fundingproblems, NASA has identified more than$500 million in new U.S.-built hardware andshuttle modifications to lessen dependenceon Russia during station assembly andoperations. The total amount of U.S. funds



Issues

that will ultimately be needed to supportRussian participation is uncertain at thistime.

With the exception that NASA assumes thespace station partners will meet their ownschedules, the agency’s performance planresponding to the Results Act does notexplain how NASA will address externalfactors that could affect performance. This isparticularly important for budgetaryprogrammatic priorities, such as the spacestation, which could consume a large portionof future resources and affectimplementation of other NASA programs.

On the basis of a request from the Chairs ofthe Senate Committee on Commerce,Science, and Transportation and theCommittee’s Subcommittee on Science,Technology and Space, we are pursuing boththe cost of and Russia’s involvement withthe space station program.

FollowingThrough onAerospace TestFacilitiesCooperativeEfforts

NASA is cooperating with DOD to addressissues of mutual interest regardinginvestment in, and use of, aerospace testfacilities. This cooperation was initiatedunder the auspices of the joint NASA/DOD

Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating



Issues

Board. In April 1996, NASA and DOD agreed toform joint working groups, called alliances,for six types of major test facilities: windtunnels, aeropropulsion test cells, rocketengine test stands, space environmentalsimulation chambers, arc-heaters, andhypervelocity gas guns and ballistic ranges.The working groups were formed tocoordinate investments to avoid unnecessaryduplication, coordinate test schedules tospread the workload across facilities, anddevelop standardized and common businessprocesses. In September 1996, the Congressadded to this effort by requiring NASA andDOD to prepare a joint plan on rocketpropulsion test facilities.

In March 1998, we reported that theagencies’ promise of closer cooperation andthe development of a national perspective onaerospace test facilities remained largelyunfulfilled because NASA and DOD (1) had notconvened most test facility working groups,(2) have competed with each other to testengines for new rockets, and (3) had notprepared a congressionally required jointplan on rocket propulsion test facilities. Wealso reported that although NASA and DOD hadagreed to go beyond cooperative workinggroups in aeronautics and jointly managetheir aeronautical test facilities, they had not



Issues

yet reached agreement on key aspects of amanagement organization.

NASA and DOD took 20 months to negotiateand sign agreements formally establishingthe six test facility-related cooperativeworking groups. During that time, only thespace environmental simulation workinggroup met regularly and conducted business.The already established rocket propulsionworking group met only once during thisperiod, despite a desire by some members tomeet regularly. NASA and DOD officials did notregularly convene the other four workinggroups in the absence of approved charters.Since our March 1998, report, according to aDOD official, a joint meeting attended byrepresentatives of all the NASA/DOD testworking groups, except the wind tunnelworking group, was held in May 1998 at theAir Force’s Arnold Engineering DevelopmentCenter. The wind tunnel working group heldan organizing meeting on June 30, 1998, andits first full meeting on August 5, 1998. Inaddition to the joint meeting, a NASA officialsaid that the rocket propulsion test and thespace environmental simulation workinggroups met on a quarterly basis in 1998.

Despite the formation of the rocketpropulsion working group, NASA and DOD



Issues

have competed against each other to testengines for new rocket programs. Aprincipal arena of competition is the nextphase of the Air Force’s Evolved ExpendableLaunch Vehicle Program. In particular, theAir Force spent millions of dollars toupgrade a test stand on the assumption thatit, not NASA, would test the new launchvehicle’s engines.

On November 19, 1998, a NASA official saidthat DOD and NASA has still not prepared thelegislatively mandated joint plan tocoordinate rocket propulsion test facilities.However, he added that the rocketpropulsion test working group is performingjoint planning and preparing guidance toensure the best use of each agency’s testfacilities.

In October 1997, NASA and Air Force officialstook a step toward creating a nationalperspective on test facilities in theaeronautics area. Specifically, they reachedan understanding on the scope and approachfor joint strategic management of theiraeronautical test facilities, including a newmanagement organization to be called theNational Aeronautical Test Alliance.However, as of our March 1998 report, theyhad not resolved basic issues, such as the



Issues

organization’s structure and authority. OnDecember 9, 1998, a NASA official said thatNASA and DOD expect to establish the newalliance soon because NASA has signed thecharter for the alliance and DOD currently hasit in final review. He added that once thecharter is signed, the wind tunnel andaeropropulsion test working groups willmerge into the new alliance. Ultimately, ifthe National Aeronautical Test Alliance issuccessful, its adaption to other types of testfacilities could be considered.

RelationshipBetween NASA’sCorrectiveActions and theResults Act

NASA’s corrective actions on its managementchallenges should be viewed in the contextof its strategic and performance plans. Theagency pursued strategic planning prior toits being required by the Results Act.However, our review of the draft strategicplan NASA submitted to the Congress inresponse to the Results Act showed that theplan did not fully address all key elementsrequired by the Act. Also, the plan did notdiscuss major management challenges andproblems, such as a long-standing weaknessin contract management and the lack of afully integrated accounting system, thatcould affect NASA’s ability to fulfill itsmission. Our review of NASA’s 1999performance plan found that it also did not



Issues

recognize major management challenges andassociated corrective actions. Further, theperformance plan should better linkperformance goals and measures to theprogram activities in the agency’s budget andshow that NASA coordinated the plan withagencies having complementary activities. Inresponding to our review, NASA stated that itwill continually improve the content of itsannual performance plan.


Related GAO Products

ContractManagement

NASA Procurement: Status of Efforts toImprove Oversight (GAO/NSIAD-98-198R, July 13,1998).

NASA: Major Management Challenges(GAO/T-NSIAD-97-178, July 24, 1997).

High-Risk Program: Information on SelectedHigh-Risk Areas (GAO/HR-97-30, May 16, 1997).

NASA Procurement: Contract ManagementOversight (GAO/NSIAD-97-114R, Mar. 18, 1997).

NASA: Procurement Assessments(GAO/NSIAD-97-80R, Feb. 4, 1997).

NASA: Contract Management (GAO/NSIAD-96-95R,Feb. 16, 1996).

NASA Budgets: Gap Between FundingRequirements and Projected Budgets(GAO/NSIAD-95-155BR, May 12, 1995).

InternationalSpace Station

Space Station: U.S. Life-Cycle FundingRequirements (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-212, June 24,1998).

International Space Station: U.S. Life-CycleFunding Requirements (GAO/NSIAD-98-147,May 22, 1998).



Space Station: Cost Control Problems(GAO/T-NSIAD-98-54, Nov. 5, 1997).

Space Station: Deteriorating Cost andSchedule Performance Under the PrimeContract (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-262, Sept. 18, 1997).

Space Station: Cost Control Problems AreWorsening (GAO/NSIAD-97-213, Sept. 16, 1997).

Space Station: Cost Control ProblemsContinue to Worsen (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-177,June 18, 1997).


Space Station: Cost Control DifficultiesContinue (GAO/T-NSIAD-96-210, July 24, 1996).

Space Station: Cost Control DifficultiesContinue (GAO/NSIAD-96-135, July 17, 1996).

Space Station: Estimated Total U.S. FundingRequirements (GAO/NSIAD-95-163, June 12,1995).

NASA and DODAerospace TestFacilities

Aerospace Testing: Promise of CloserNASA/DOD Cooperation Remains LargelyUnfulfilled (GAO/NSIAD-98-52, Mar. 11, 1998).



Best Practices: Elements Critical toReducing Successfully Unneeded RDT&EInfrastructure (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-98-23, Jan. 8,1998).


NASA Facilities: Challenges to AchievingReductions and Efficiencies(GAO/T-NSIAD-96-238, Sept. 11, 1996).

NASA Infrastructure: Challenges to AchievingReductions and Efficiencies (GAO/NSIAD-96-187,Sept. 9, 1996).


Performance and Accountability Series

Major Management Challenges and ProgramRisks: A Governmentwide Perspective(GAO/OCG-99-1)

Major Management Challenges and ProgramRisks: Department of Agriculture(GAO/OCG-99-2)

Major Management Challenges and ProgramRisks: Department of Commerce(GAO/OCG-99-3)

Major Management Challenges and ProgramRisks: Department of Defense (GAO/OCG-99-4)

Major Management Challenges and ProgramRisks: Department of Education(GAO/OCG-99-5)

Major Management Challenges and ProgramRisks: Department of Energy (GAO/OCG-99-6)

Major Management Challenges and ProgramRisks: Department of Health and HumanServices (GAO/OCG-99-7)

Major Management Challenges and ProgramRisks: Department of Housing and UrbanDevelopment (GAO/OCG-99-8)



Major Management Challenges and ProgramRisks: Department of the Interior(GAO/OCG-99-9)

Major Management Challenges and ProgramRisks: Department of Justice (GAO/OCG-99-10)

Major Management Challenges and ProgramRisks: Department of Labor (GAO/OCG-99-11)

Major Management Challenges and ProgramRisks: Department of State (GAO/OCG-99-12)

Major Management Challenges and ProgramRisks: Department of Transportation(GAO/OCG-99-13)

Major Management Challenges and ProgramRisks: Department of the Treasury(GAO/OCG-99-14)

Major Management Challenges and ProgramRisks: Department of Veterans Affairs(GAO/OCG-99-15)

Major Management Challenges and ProgramRisks: Agency for International Development(GAO/OCG-99-16)



Major Management Challenges and ProgramRisks: Environmental Protection Agency(GAO/OCG-99-17)

Major Management Challenges and ProgramRisks: National Aeronautics and SpaceAdministration (GAO/OCG-99-18)

Major Management Challenges and ProgramRisks: Nuclear Regulatory Commission(GAO/OCG-99-19)

Major Management Challenges and ProgramRisks: Social Security Administration(GAO/OCG-99-20)

Major Management Challenges and ProgramRisks: U.S. Postal Service (GAO/OCG-99-21)

High-Risk Series: An Update (GAO/HR-99-1)

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