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Maimonides' Doctrine of CreationAuthor(s): Norbert M. SamuelsonSource: The Harvard Theological Review, Vol. 84, No. 3 (Jul., 1991), pp. 249-271Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Harvard Divinity SchoolStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1510019 .

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HTR 84:3

(1991) 249-71

MAIMONIDES'

DOCTRINE

OF

CREATION*

Norbert

M. Samuelson

Temple

University

Maimonides'

Guide of the Perplexedlis

among the most influential works

ever

written in religious

philosophy.2

It

occupies

a unique

place

in Jewish

religious

thought.

While the

majority

of

subsequent

Jewish

thinkers

have

criticized

what they

understood

of Maimonides'

text, they

have often

felt

obligated

to

struggle

with

his contentions.

This obligation

constitutes

the

highest

expression

of

respect

in Jewish

philosophy.

The Guide

also

is unique

in

its complexity.3

Most authors

clarify

their

intentions.

In Maimonides'

case the

opposite

is true;

Maimonides

intended

the

Guide

solely

for students

who were

committed

rabbinic

Jews,

who had

attained a professional knowledge in rabbinic texts, and who had a sound

intellectual

foundation

in what

were

then regarded

as the

standard

texts

in

general

science

and

mathematics.

At

the same time,

Maimonides

feared

that

FThis

articlewas

composed

on a Temple

UniversityFaculty

Research

Fellowship

during

the summer

of

1991.

lOriginally

called

Dalalat

al-Ha'irln,

this text

has been

translated

nto

many anguages.

Some

better-known

ranslations

are:

Moses

Maimonides,

MorehNevokhim

trans.Shmuel

IbnTibbon;

Vilna:Funk,

1904)

[Hebrew];

dem,

MorehNevokhim:

Dalalat

al-Ha'irl

n: Maqor

ve-targum

trans.

YosefQafah;

erusalem:

Mosad

ha-Rav

Quq,1972)

[Hebrew];

dem,Dalalat

al-Ha'irln:

TheGuide

of

the Perplexed

trans.Salomon

Pines;Chicago:

University

of

Chi-

cago

Press,

1963)[English];

dem,Le

guidedes egares

(trans.

Salomon

Munk;

3 vols.; Paris:

Franck,

1856-1866)

[French].

2For xample,

Maimonides'

Guide,

ogetherwith

Averroes' ommentaries

n the

works

of

Aristotle,were

the

majorsources

thatThomas

Aquinas

used to

translate

he Christian

view

of

the

universe nto

an Aristotelian

chema.

Similarly,

he

Guideplayed

a

major(although

often negative)

role

in forming

the beliefs

of Spinoza.

3Cf.

Leo

Strauss,Persecution

and theArt

of Writing Glencoe,

IL:Free

Press,

1952)38-

94;

andSalomon

Pines,"How

o

Beginto Study

The

Guideof the

Perplexed,"

n Maimonides,

Guide trans.,

Pines)xi-lvi.

While

myreading

of the

Guide s influenced

by

Strauss,

do not

advocatewhatis commonlycalledhis "esoteric"nterpretation.n this context,see Isadore

Twersky,Introduction

o the Code

of

Maimonides

Mishneh

Torah)

(New Haven/London:

Yale University

Press, 1980)

as

a corrective

o Strauss'

nterpretation.








250

HARVARDTHEOLOGICAL EVIEW

others, ackingboth the commitment nd the traininghe required,would be

attracted o the work becauseof his political and religious stature n world

Jewry.His concernwas that their gnorancewould cause them to misunder-

stand what he said and that their lack of commitmentwould lead them to

misuse their reading. Hence, more important o him than communicating

what he wanted to say to those qualified was to prevent the unqualified

from misusingthe Guide. How successfulMaimonideswas in saying what

he wanted to say is a matterof scholarlydebate.

Maimonides alled the subjectswith which he was concerned"secrets."

This article deals with the currentscholarlydebate about one of these-

namely, his theory of creation.My thesis is that Maimonideswas able to

affirm his rabbinicdogmaonly by placing t beyondthe limits of scientific

knowledge. arguenot only that he states this explicitly, but that this view

is in fact the most coherent nterpretation f everythingelse that he says

aboutcreation n the Guide.4First,I examinethe text itself. My conclusion

will be that Maimonidesadopteda Platonic interpretation f creation,not

because that is what reason demands,but because it is the most literal

interpretationf scripture. econd,I attempt o defendthis assertionagainst

different nterpretationsffered by contemporarycholars of the Guide.

MAIMONIDES'OSMOGONYN THETEXTOFTHEGUIDEOF THEPERPLEXED

Having demonstratedhat God exists, is one, and is incorporeal,5Mai-

monides set out to prove that angels exist and to demonstratehow the

universe was created.6 n the course of this demonstration,Maimonides

noted that Aristotlerejectedthe Pythagorean iew that the motions of the

spheres produce sound.7 Although he did not mention it by name,

Maimonidesmay also have had in mind Plato's heoryof celestial harmony

in the Timaeus.8 n any case, Maimonides xplicitly associatedthis view

with certain,unnamed tatements f the "sages" hakhamim).His intention

was to show somethingabout the relationshipbetween rabbinic radition

and science in dealing with cosmology: the early rabbis acceptedand re-

peated certain udgmentsaboutthe heavens,based on reasonable cientific

opinions of their times. However, where Maimonidescould demonstrate

these opinions to be false, as the Aristoteliansdid in the case of the

Pythagorean hesis of heavenly sound, he rejected the judgment of the

4Creations discussed directly in Maimonides,Guide 2.2-28.

fIbid., 1.71-2.1.

6Ibid., 1.2-12.

7Ibid, 2.8-

8Plato

Timaeus,35b. Also cf. Plato Respublica617b (The Myth of Er).








NORBERT

M. SAMUELSON

251

rabbis.Implicit

n this discussionwere

two ideas about

the relationship f

reasonand

revealed radition:irst, rabbinic

opinions

can be rejectedwhen

they conflict with scientificknowledge,and second, scientific opinionscan

be employed

to explicatereligious doctrines.

After stating

hat there s no inherent

onflict between

the cosmologyhe

summarized

nd the teachingof the Hebrew

scriptures,9 nd after present-

ing a summaryof the theory

of divine overflow as

a model for

causal

influence,10

Maimonides

urned rom cosmology to

cosmogony. He listed

four opinionsaboutthe

origin of the universe.

He identified he first

as the

belief of

"all who believe

in the Law of Moses"

the Jewish people.1l

According o this opinion,

the universe

was "absolutelynonexistent"

ha-

he'eder ha-gamur)and God brought t into existenceby an act of "will"

(ra$on) and

"volition" hefe$).Maimonides

explained that this statement

means that

God created

the world "fromno-thing"

(mi-lo davar). This

leads to the

conclusion that even time

itself was created.l2

Furthermore,

Maimonides

dentified his opinion as

a "basis" yesod)

of the Torah,sec-

ond in importance

nly

to the belief that God is one.

The second

opinion is

that of the "philosophers,"

which Maimonides

associatedwith the view

described n Plato'sTimaeus.13

he crucial

differ-

ence between

Plato and the

Torahview is that in the

Timaeus he universe

was not generatedout of "no-thing" nd that before creation it was not

absolutelynonexistent.

Maimonidescited no other

disagreementbetween

this opinion

and the Torahview. In

other words, both opinions seem

to

affirmthat God brought

he universe nto

being throughan act of

will and

. .

volltlon.

9Maimonides,Guide 2.11.

°Ibid., 2.12.

llIbid., 2.13; this opinion

will be referred o

as "the Torahview"from now on.

1244. . . timeitself being one

of the created hings.

Fortime is consequentuponmotion,

and

motion s anaccidentof what

is moved." Maimonides,

Guide 2.13, p. 281; page references

when necessaryare from Pines's

translation f

the Guide.) Note that later on in the

Guide

Maimonides

often says that according

o this view the universewas

"created n time"

(e.g.,

ibid., 2.17, p.

298). Clearly hese

two statementsare contradictory.

Admittedly am

simpli-

fying Maimonides'

osition, butmy reason for

preferringGuide2.13 is that this reading

s

more coherent

with everything

else Maimonides ays about his

Torahview thanis Guide

2.17. Furthermore,

uide 2.13 speaksdirectlyabout

his view, whereas n the later

passages

the reference

s a single line allusionto this position

in the contextof a direct discussion

of

the Aristotelian

eternity/necessity

account of creation. It is possible

to reconcile the two

contrasting laims by understandinghe secondset of passages as meaning hat in contrast

to the Aristotelianview, the

Torahview could

loosely be called "creation n time"

in the

sense that the universehas an

origin, albeit that

the origin, strictlyspeaking,does

not occur

in time.

l3Ibid.,2.13,

pp. 282-84.








252


The third opinion is that of Aristotleand his followers.l4 t denies that

the universewas generated.Existence nim$a')as such cannotbe generated.

Consequently,f anythingat all exists, then theremust always be something

that exists. The samejudgmentapplies to matter homer).Furthermore,he

Aristoteliansmaintainedhat it is not possible for the universe o come into

existencethrough n act of will and volition. A consequence f divine unity

is that God is in no way subject o change.Hence, eitherGod always wills

somethingor he never wills it, and if he always wills it then it is not proper

to call it an act of will. Rather, t would be more accurate o say that the

"it," in this case the existence of the universe, follows necessarily from

God's essence.

The final opinion which Maimonidesassociatedwith Epicurus,asserts

that the universecame aboutthrough hance (miqreh).lsThis view was not

just that of Epicurus; t was the dominant ccountof the universe ound in

the writingsof most of Plato'spredecessorsn Greekscience, as well as the

claim of the Greek and Roman atomists who succeeded both Plato and

Aristotle.l6"Through hance"does not mean what today we would call "by

accident."Rather,the claim of these philosopherswas that the universe

was generated hrougha motionof "conjunction nd separation,''l7he gov-

erningprinciplesof which are purelymechanical.WhatMaimonideshad in

mind here is the following claim: the randommotion of elementarypar-

ticles producedcollisions that in turn resulted n a vortex motion. Within

the vortexs ike particles ombined nd unlikeparticles eparated. he denser

compounds,meetinggreater esistance o theirrandommotion,becamecon-

centratedat the center of the vortex. Conversely, ess dense compounds

meeting ess resistance preadout along the periphery f the vortex. Quali-

4Ibid.,p. 284.

Ibid., p. 285.

I6Multiple ersionscan be found n Greekand Latinscience. Of these the most important

were writtenby the sixth-century CEMiletians viz., Thales [624-546 BCE], Anaximander

[610-545 BCE],andAnaximenes diedca.525 BCE]),Heraclitus 540-475 BCE),Empedocles

(ca.500-430 BCE),Anaxagoras ca.488-428 BCE),the atomists Leucippus f Miletus 332-

262 BCE),Democritusof Abdera ca. 460-370 BCE),Epicurus f Samos(341-270 BCE),and

Lucretius ca.95-55 BCE)],the Stoics [Zenoof Cition,Cyprus ca.332-262 BCE),Chrysippus

of Soli, Cilicia (ca. 280-207 BCE), and Posidonius of Apamea, Syria (ca. 135-51 BCE)1,

Aristarchus f Samos (310-230 BCE), Archimedes 287-212 BCE), Seneca (ca. 3 BCE-65

CE)Plutarch ca.46-120 CE)andPtolemy ca.150 CE).Cf. MarshallClaggett,GreekScience

in Antiquity (London: Collier Macmillan, 1955); Benjamin Farrington,Greek Science

(Harmondsworth,Middlesex:Penguin, 1944-1949); Olaf Pedersonand Mogens Phil, Early

Physics and Astronomy New York:AmericanElsevier, 1974) GeorgeSarton, ntroduction

to the Historyof Science (Baltimore:Carnegie nstituteof Washington,1927); and Gregory

Vlastos, Plato's Universe(Seattle: Universityof WashingtonPress, 1975).

17Maimonides, uide 2.14.








NORBERTM. SAMUELSON

253

tative differences n the presentuniverseare explainedby mechanical aws

that govern the ratio of elements in a compound.Differences in the ele-

ments are reducibleto their differentdensities, and differences n density

are a consequenceof the rotationof the original vortex.

Maimonides reated his view less seriously than he did the first three.

In fact, the chapteronly designates three opinions. This fourth view ap-

pearsas an afterthoughtn Maimonides' ummary t the end of the chapter.

What seems to separate t from the other three is that its believers "have

no knowledge of the existence of God.''l8

The issues involved n these four opinionsare the following: (1) Has the

universe always existed, or was there a time at which it came into exist-

ence? (2) Can the universebe said to have an origin in some nontemporal

sense? (3) Does God play a role in the origin of the universe? 4) Given

that God does, what kind of role is it? (S) Do the principles hat account

for the origin of the universe nvolve intention kavanah),necessity (hEyuv),

chance (miqreh),or some combinationof those? (6) What was the nature

of the universeprior to its origin?

Concerning he first question,the Torahview and Aristotleboth claim

that the universe always existed. Since, as Maimonidesexplicitly said,

creationout of absolutelynothingentails that time itself is somethingcre-

ated, creationcannottake place in time. In other words, according o these

two views it is impossible to claim that there was a time before which

there was no universewhatsoever.While both the Platonicand Epicurean

views could entail a temporalorigin to the universe, n fact neitherdoes.

Both Plato in the Timaeus and the Hellenistic atomists, as Maimonides

presented hem, claimed that their principlesprovide a conceptualmodel

for understandinghe present universe;they did not give a historicalac-

count of how the universebegan. Consequently, one of the four opinions

mentionedactuallyclaims that there was a time before which the universe

did not exist. Similarly, n answer o the secondquestion,all four views are

attempts o give a nontemporal xplanationof the universe'sorigin.

The third question, regardingGod's role in the origin of the universe,

points out the critical difference between the Epicureansand all of the

others. According o the fourth opinion, the origin and natureof the uni-

verse can be explainedby mechanicalprincipleswithout any reference o

a deity. Again, what "chance"means is that there are only materialprin-

ciples. None of the alternatives onsidereddenies that such principlesare

necessary.Rather, he issue is whether hey are sufficient.What the views

of the Torah,Plato, and Aristotle share is that a sufficient accountof the

l8Ibid.,2.14, p. 285.








254


origin and nature of the universe requires in addition to efficient causes a

kind of causal activity that is appropriate to deity. Maimonides judged the

error of the so-called Epicurean position to be too evident to require con-

sideration in his Guide.

The first real issue is the fourth question above: given that God does

bring the universe into existence, what kind of role does he play? Accord-

ing to the Torah view, he brings the universe into existence by an act of

will and volition; according to Aristotle, God acts from necessity. In Plato's

case, the way that God generates the world is analogous to the way that a

potter works with clay or a smith with iron.l9 The similarities and differ-

ences between these three views will be further examined.

The fifth question raises the critical issues involved in the fourth ques-

tion: although there never has been a time at which there was no universe,

clearly the universe did not merely happen; its existence was determined by

God. Did this determination occur through an act of will, by necessity, or

by some other means? Again, the Torah view's answer is will, Aristotle's

necessity, and the two claims seem to be mutually exclusive.

The disagreement itself cannot be clear until these alternatives are clari-

fied. Related to them is the sixth and final question: given that the universe

has in some sense a beginning, what can be said about it prior to its origin?

The Torah view says that there was absolutely nothing, while, according to

Maimonides, both Plato and Aristotle denied this possibility. In Maimonides'

words, the Torah view says that before creation the universe was "abso-

lutely nonexistent" (ha-he'derha-muhlat),whereas for Plato and Aristotle

what comes to be can only come to be "from some-thing" (mi-davar).

The lines separating creation from "something" and from "nothing" are

not as sharp as they might at first appear to be. Greek literature gives us

two ways to say "out of nothing." Something could be said to come into

,uil £tval ("out of what is not"). These two expressions may function as

synonyms or they may be used to express alternatives between being some-

describe something that does not exist, but, because it is a thing, is some-

apply to Pegasus.

Out of these two ambiguous Greek terms developed six Arabic, four

Hebrew, and six Latin ways of saying "out of nothing." The Arabic expres-

19Ibid., 2.13, p. 283.








NORBERT

M.

SAMUELSON

255

sions

are

mina

al-m'dum

("from

the

lacking"),

min

lays ("from

[an is]

not"),

la min shay'

("not

from

a thing"),

min la shay'

("from

no thing"),

min la wujud("fromno existent"),andba'daal-'adam("after or, accord-

ing to]

the lack").

The Hebrew

dioms

are

me-'ayin

("from

[an is]

not"),

mi-lo davar

("from

no

thing"),

mi-lo

me$iy'ut

("from

no existent"),

and

'ahar

ha-he'der

("after

[or,

according

to]

the lack").

Finally,

the

Latin

translations

re

ex non

esse ("out

of [an] is

not"), ex

nihilo

("out of

noth-

ing"),

non ex

aliquo ("not

out

of some[thing

or other]"),

ex non

existente

("out

of no

existent"),

post

non esse

("after

or,

according

o] [an]

is not"),

and non fit

ex

aliquo ("is

not

madeout

of some[thing

or other]").

The relations

of historical

nfluence

rom the

distinctions

n

any

of these

languages nto the othersare sufficientlycomplexthatprima acie linguis-

tic

expression

alone is

insufficient

to

provide

any

insight

into

what a

medieval

philosopher

meant

when

he

deniedthat

the universe

was created

out of something.

Maimonides

xamined

n

detail

the arguments

f

Aristotle

and

his fol-

lowers

for an

eternal

universe

created

by

God through

necessity.20

He

at-

tributed

four

directly to

Aristotle

and

another

four

to his

followers.

Maimonides

contended

that

even

Aristotle

did not

consider

these

argu-

ments

to be demonstrations;

hat is, they

do

not show

that this

account

s

necessarily rue.Rather,Aristotle'sonly intentionwas to show that of the

various

contemporary

pinions

about

the origin

of the universe

this

eter-

nity/necessity

account s

the

most reasonable

and

logically

the

most

prob-

able.

Maimonides'

wn

position

was

that in

this

case proof

lies beyond

the

limits

of human

reason

uninformed

by revelation

or authentic

religious

tradition

rooted

in revelation.2l

Reasoning

s a process

of drawing

nfer-

ences from

premises,

but

it cannot

on

its own provide

the initial

premises.

For

people like

Aristotle,

who

were

neither

prophets

nor

heirs to

a true

prophetic

radition,

he only

available

source

of

first premises

was

sense

experience.Fromsenseexperiences t is possibleto drawvalidconclusions

beyond

experience

about

the sensible

world,

but

this domain

s

limited

to

the

sublunar

world.

What

is

true of an

observed

part

of this

world

can be

extended

to the

whole

of it,

because

in this

case the

part and

the

whole

have the

same nature.

It

is not logically

necessary,

however,that

the uni-

verse

in its

entirety

has the

same

natureas

the

sublunar

world.

Further-

20Ibid.,

.14,

15, 17-23.

Maimonides

also considered

a

set of arguments

y anunnamed

groupof his contemporariesha-'abaronim)whosepositionhe identified, n Guide2.21, as

Aristotelian.

While these

philosophers

explicitly

affirmthat

the universe

was

createdwith

intention

kavanah),

Maimonides

rgued

heirso-called

purpose

was reallyAristotle's

neces-

sity.

2lIbid.,

2.16.








256


more, it need not be the case that the specific natureof an entity after

generation s the same as it is prior to its generation.Hence, even if it

were valid to infer something about the nature of the universe as such

from a single spherewithin the universe the sublunarworld-it does not

follow that the laws that govern generationafter the universecomes into

existence are applicableprior to that generation.Specifically in terms of

Aristotelianphysics, the state of being of an entity when it is actual s not

identical with its state of being when it is potential. For example, the

nature of a potential human being when it is a "feminine seed" differs

radically rom its naturewhen it becomes a child.22This is the fatal logi-

cal flaw in every Aristotelian rgumentf it is intended o be a demonstra-

tion. Each demonstrationmakes an inference from true claims based on

observation n the sensible world to claims about the universe in its en-

tirety and its origin. However, the inference is invalid.

In contrast,Aristotlehimself understood hese argumentsn a more lim-

ited way. Given that we know nothingaboutthe universeas a whole, it is

not impossible that the universe has the same nature as its constituent

domains; t is better to draw an inferencefrom what is known than from

what is unknown, rom a reasonedtruth than from an imagined fantasy.

Hence, withoutany alternative ourceof truth, t is most reasonable o base

opinions about the universe as a whole on analogies to the scientifically

known natureof the sublunarworld. However,Maimonidespresented wo

distinct arguments hat prove even this inference nvalid.

The first23 s based solely on the logic of the claim, and the second24s

based on astronomical bservations.First, f the universecame about n the

way that Aristotle claimed, the existence of the universe is a necessary

effect of the natureof God as a necessarybeing. To say that God's nec-

essary being entails necessarilythat the universe exists is comparable o

saying that the definitionof a triangleentails necessarilythat the sum of

its internalangles are 180°. The same notion of cause and effect applies in

both cases. Yet nothing n the sensible world is caused in this way. Con-

tingententities, because they are contingent,merely happen o bring about

all sorts of effects. Hence, no valid inference,even one the force of which

is merelyprobable, an be made from contingent ffects producedby con-

tingent entities to the necessaryeffects of a necessarybeing.

Second, observedcelestial phenomena eem to defy any kind of struc-

tural explanation.There does not seem to be any reason for heavenly ob-

jects to rotate from east to west rather han from west to east, or to have

22Ibid.,.17.

23Ibid.,.19,p 303

24Ibid.,p.306-7








NORBERTM. SAMUELSON

257

their

specific differentangular

velocities. Nor does there seem to

be any

reason why

different

spherescontaintheir exact, but

different,numbersof

bodies.25The issue here is not merely that we do not yet knowenough to

explain these concrete

peculiarities.

Rather,Maimonides' laim

was that,

based on

what we know

and do not know, the most

reasonable nference

would be that there is

no necessity

for these phenomena.

Furthermore,

there

would be no way to demonstrate

why the circuits of the

spheresare

epicycles

or eccentric

rather hansimplecircles.26

Aristotle's asis forclaim-

ing

necessity was that it

is the most reasonable

assumption romwhat we

know.

Maimonidesreplied, however,

that, given

the apparentarbitrary

nonuniform

distribution f objects

within spheres as well as the

apparent

arbitrary ector characteristics f their motions, the most reasonableas-

sumption

would be that,contrary o

Aristotle's

premise, he heavensare not

governed

by necessity.27

The

problems nherent n both

arguments re

avoided if we opt for the

Torah

view.

Furthermore,t is more reasonable o

infer that the present

multiplicity

n the

universe is derived from a single

agent who acts with

purpose

hroughwill than

to deducecomplexity rom

the natureof a source

that is essentially

simple.28 n other

words, based on Aristotle'sown

meth-

odology

and independent

of any considerationof

revelationor authentic

religioustradition,Maimonides eached he conclusion hat therecan be no

scientific

(i.e., certain)knowledgeof

creation,and

that the notion that the

universe originated

througha

purposefulact of divine will is the

most

rationalbelief based on

empiricaldata.

Again, the universeexists

eitherby

intention,

by necessity,or by chance.

In the light of

specific quantitative

peculiarities f the

observedheavens,necessity is

unreasonable.29ristotle

provideda

valid

demonstrationhat chance is the

least reasonable

alterna-

tive.30

Therefore, he

universecame into existence

for a purpose

ntended

by a

willing agent.

25SpecificallyMaimonides

oted hat hereseemsto be no way to

demonstratewhy

spheres

need to be

located withinspheresrather han

existing

independently f each other n space,

why ten stars

should be clustered ogether n the

eighth sphere

while other spherescontain

only a single

globe, or why

these celestial bodiesshouldhave

differentareas. Ibid.,

pp. 309-

10)

26Ibid., .24-

27"EverythinghatAristotlesaid aboutall that

exists from

beneath he sphereof the moon

to the center

of the earth s

indubitably orrect,. . [but]

everything hat Aristotleexpounds

with regard o the sphereof themoon and thatwhich is above it is, except for certain hings,

somethinganalogous o

guessing andconjecturing." Ibid., 2.22,

p. 320.)

28Ibid.

29Ibid.,

2.19 and 22.

30Ibid.,

.20.








258

HARVARD

THEOLOGICAL

EVIEW

It

should

be

noted

that

Maimonides

alled

the

view

he

affirmed

hat

of

the

Torah.

However,

the

manner

by

which

he

affirmed

t

does

not

signifi-

cantly

differ from the opinion of Plato. While Maimonidesstartedout

considering

our

views,

he

eliminated

consideration

f

the

Platonic

view.

The

standard

ssumption

s

that

this

second

opinion,

dentified

as

the

view

of

the

"philosophers,"

as

reduced

o

the

Aristotelian

ternity

hesis.

How-

ever,

that

is

not

what

the

text

of

the

Guide

says.

Maimonides

merely

stated

that

he

was

not

going

to

consider

every

philosophical

position

but

instead

would

focus

his

analysis

solely

on

the

Aristotelian

arguments.3l

He

did

assert

that

both

the

Platonic

and

the

Aristotelian

heories

shared

he

claim

that

the

universe

is

eternal

and

not

temporally

created.32

Yet

we

already

have notedthatinsofaras the Torahview claimsthattime itself is partof

creation,

t

also

claims

that

creation

cannot

ake

place

in

time.

Furthermore,

eternity

s

not

the

only

major

distinguishing

haracteristic

f

the

four

opin-

ions

listed.

Equally

mportant

s

how

the

world

was

created.

n

this

respect

there

are

three

and

not

four

alternatives

isted,

and

the

Platonic

view

is

identifiable

with

the

opinion

of

the

Torah

view

rather

han

with

Aristotle's.

Consequently,

while

Maimonides

did

not

explicitly

say

so

and

in

fact

his

language

uggests

otherwise,

he

so-called

"Torah

view"

does

not

exclude

the

Platonic

view.

Maimonides

admits

as

much

later

in

the

Guide.33

TheGuidediscussestherole of revelationn a case where udgments re

made

about

central

eligious

questions

hat

are

in

principle

ndemonstrable.34

We

have

already

noted

Maimonides'

main

conclusions.

First,

no

correct

interpretation

f

scripture

will

contradict

known

scientific

truth.

f

revela-

tion

encompasses

all

truth,

then

reason

is

a

tool

to

determine

revelation.

Therefore,

were

it

the

case

that

any

particular

pinion

about

creation

was

demonstrated,

ncluding

he

necessity/eternity

iew,

scripture

ould

be

in-

terpreted

o

conform

with

it.35

In

fact,

Maimonides'

laim

was

even

stron-

ger.

In

this

case

such

an

interpretation

ould

be

a

religious

obligation.

A

specificexample s the questionof divineattributes.36he literalinterpre-

tation

of

scripture

s

that

God

has

a

body.

However,

since

this

belief

is

known

with

certainty

o

be

false,

the

interpretation

s

inadmissible.

To

read

scripture

iterally

in

this

case

is

actually

idolatry.

Hence,

with

respect

to

31Ibid.,

.14,

p.

28s.

32Ibid,

33Ibid.,

2.27.

34Ibid.,

2.23,25-28.

35Ibid.,

2.25.

36Maimonides

himself

(Ibid.,

2.2s,

p.

327)

ontrasted

what

scripture

says

about

creation

in

ime

with

divine

corporeality.








NORBERTM. SAMUELSON

259

divine attributes, nonliteral eadingof the Torah s a basic religiousprin-

ciple. Literalism s not to be tolerated.

Second, thereare tluths accessible through evelation hat go beyond the

limits of the domainof rationalknowledge.Creation s one example.While

reason leads to the conclusion that the so-called creation-in-time iew is

the most probableopinion about the universeas a whole, it does not lead

to certainknowledge.From his perspective he Guideonce again considers

three options:those of the Torah,Plato, and Aristotle.This time the Epi-

cureanview is excludedand the Platonicopinion s considered ndependent

of the Aristotelianeternity view. Here the views of both Plato and the

Torahstand n direct opposition o the doctrineof an eternaluniverse.The

Torahview is advocatedbecause it is the literal interpretationf scripture.

Maimonides resented wo argumentsn its support.First, the eternityview

cannotbe demonstrated.Hence, an alternative iew is permissible.Second,

if the universe s a necessaryeffect of the divine nature, hen there can be

no miracles,and the reality of miracles s one of the "foundations f the

law."37Hence,to interpret reation n agreementwith the Aristotelianheory

is prohibited. n other words, any doctrine that logically entails another

doctrine hat "destroysa foundationof the law"38must be rejected.How-

ever, this principle s clearly secondary o the first. In respect to the Ar-

istotelian theory, Maimonideswrote:

On the other hand, the belief in eternity he way Aristotle sees it. . .

destroys the Law in its principle, necessarily gives the lie to every

miracle,and reducesto inanity all the hopes and threats hat the Law

has held out, unless by God ne interprets he miracles figura-

tively also, as was done by the Islamic internalists; his, however,

would result in some sort of crazy imaginings.39

If the universe exists by necessity, then there can be no miracles. If

thereare no miracles, hen there is no basis to believe in divine reward or

observing he law and divine punishment or disobeying t. If divine provi-

dence does not apply to the law, then people will not obey it. If people do

not obey the law, then the law will be destroyed.Hence, the Aristotelian

view is prohibited.This argumentassumes, however, that the view is not

demonstrable. f it were known to be true, then it would be obligatory o

interpret cripture's ccount of creation n conformitywith it. If scripture

37Ibid., . 328.

38Ibid.

39Ibid.








260


were so interpreted, hen the doctrineof miracles also would have to be

interpreted.While there could be no miracles n the sense of direct acts of

divine intervention hat are exceptions to the general rule of natural aw,

they could be affirmed n some other ess literal sense and in this way the

law could be preserved.However,such interpretations ould be, to say the

least, forced they would be "crazy imaginings."40 one of this extreme

and creativementalmanipulations necessarywith regard o a mere logical

possibility,particularly n opinion hat is not even the most reasonable ne.

At this point Maimonidesnoted that none of the religious problems

entailed by the Aristotelianopinion applied to the Platonic view and that

the only reason for following the Torah view instead was that it is the

literal sense of scripture.4l y inferenceMaimonides rovideda thirdprin-

ciple, subordinate o the first two, for interpreting he law. Given three

alternative iews, all of which are logically possible, but only one of which

entails concepts that would endangerobedience to the law, that one is

prohibitedwhile the remaining wo are permissible.Of the remaining wo,

the one that admits the more literal interpretation f scripture s to be

preferred.By implication,however, n this case the more literal interpreta-

tion is not required. n otherwords,while the Torahview is preferable, he

Platonicopinion s a permissible nterpretationf scripture.As Maimonides'

subsequentdiscussion n Guide 2.26-28 shows, all that is at stake in reli-

gious terms is that a purposefulview of the universebe affirmedover a

purelymechanisticone. Fromthis perspectiveboth the Epicurean rinciple

of chance and the Aristotelianprincipleof cosmologicalnecessity are pro-

hibited,but either a Platonicor a Torah eleologicalaccount s permissible.

In fact, in the light of early rabbinicmidrash42 nd Ecclesiastes,43 Pla-

tonic interpretation ould be preferable, ince it would be more literalthan

the so-called Torah nterpretation.

It might be arguedthat Maimonidesbelieved that the Platonic view is

better suited to determine he true interpretation f creation in Genesis.

Both the Torahand the Platonicopinions easily fit the Genesis accountof

creation.On the otherhand,thereare some traditional ewish texts that can

be more easily read in the light of the Timaeus han by the Torah view.

Maimonides xplicitly mentioneda few of them. He noted that the rabbis

stated in the midrashthat both the divine throne and the souls of the

virtuousare createdand imperishable.Othermidrashim laimed that addi-

tional created entities existed before the creation recounted n Genesis.

40Ibid.

41Ibid., pp. 328-29-

42Ibid., 2-26-27-

43Ibid., 2.28.








NORBERT

M. SAMUELSON

261

These

preexistent

entities

included

paradise,

hell, the

heavenly

sanctuary,

the

Torah,

heaven,

earth,

he deep,

fire,

and the

greatgarment.44

Maimonides

did not mention hesetexts, buttherecan be little doubtthathe was aware

of

them.Furthermore,

he

account

of creation

n

Genesis

1 lists

a number

of

uncreated

ntities.

These

are

earth,water,

darkness,

oku, voku,

the

deep,

and the

wind

of God.

It is

not too

difficult

to

find related

passages

in

scripture

hat mention

he creation

of each

of these entities,

but that

is not

the

point.

Rather,

he most

literal

interpretation

f the

single

most impor-

tant

biblical

text

about

creation

s more

in

accord with

the

Platonic

nter-

pretation

than

it is

with what

Maimonides

called

the

Torah view.

To

summarize,

he true

account

of creation

cannot

be demonstrated,

he

Pla-

tonic interpretationin contrastto the Aristotelian)does not entail any

conceptual

problems

or

the

viabilityof

Jewish

law,

and it (in

contrast

o

the Torah

view)

facilitates

the

most

literalreading

of biblical

and rabbinic

texts

on creation.

Maimonides'

onclusion

should

therefore

have been

that

the law

requires

an

interpretation

f Genesis

1 in

conformity

with

the prin-

ciples

of something

ike

Plato's Timaeus.

MAIMONIDES'

OSMOGONY

N CONTEMPORARY

CHOLARSHIP

From the previoustextualanalysiswe may concludethat Maimonides

ought

to have interpreted

and

may

actually

have interpreted)

he requisite

rabbinic

belief

in God's

creation

of the

universe

in

terms of

the

cosmic

schema

of

Plato'sTimaeus.

The basis

for this

interpretation

s

not thatit

is

what

science and

philosophy

demand.

Rather,

his interpretation

rovides

the

most

coherent

iteral

reading

of what

the Hebrew

scriptures

ay.

Students

of

medieval

Jewish

philosophy

will recognize

thatthis

conclu-

sion

differs significantly

from

what

other

contemporary

cholars

in the

field

have

argued.

Warren

Zev

Harvey

claimed

that

underthe

pressure

of

the dictates of reason Maimonidessecretly affirmedAristotle'sview.45

Herbert

Davidson

also

believed

that

Maimonides

held a

hidden position

that

is

a consequence

of reason

rather

han

revealedtradition.46

ccording

to Davidson,

however,

the scientific

cosmogony

affirmed

s Platonic,

not

Aristotelian.

Finally,

Marvin

Fox

denied that

Maimonides

had

any secret

44Maimonides

ibid.,

2.26) noted

this

objectin the

name

of RabbiEliezer

as a source

of

perplexity.

45Warrenev Harvey, AThirdApproacho Maimonides' osmogony-Prophetologyuzzle,"

HTR74 (1981)

287-301.

46Herbert

avidson,

"Maimonides'

ecret

Position

on Creation,"

n Isadore

Twersky,ed.,

Studies

in Medieval

Jewish

History

and Literature

2

vols.; Cambridge,

MA:Harvard

Uni-

versity

Press,

1979)

1. 16-40.








262

HARVARD

HEOLOGICAL

EVIEW

belief

about

creation.47

ather,

Maimonides-affirming

what

he

believed

to

be

the

standard

abbinic

nterpretation

f the

Hebrew

scriptures,

nd

oppos-

ingboththePlatonicandthe Aristotelian cientifictraditions-accepted

he

extreme

nterpretation

f

creation

as

generation

out

of

absolutely

nothing

whatsoever.

shall

now

use

the

above

textual

analysis

to

critique

he

argu-

ments

of

these

scholars.

Herbert

Davidson

Davidson

argued

that

Maimonides

affirmed

a

Platonic

interpretation

f

creation

as

a

consequence

of

reason

rather

han

revelation.

Based

on

the

previousdiscussion,I do not thinkthathis interpretations impossible,but

I

do

not

believe

that

there

is

sufficient

textual

support

or

his

conclusion.

At

best

all

that

can

be

concluded

is

that

whatever

Maimonides

actually

believed,

he

ought

to

have

affirmed

a

Platonic

nterpretation

f

creation.48

My

major

objections

to

Davidson's

analysis

are

the

following:

(1)

He

argued

hat,

at

the

beginning

f

his

discussion

f

creation,

Maimonides

quated

the

Platonic

and

Aristotelian

ositions.49

My

contention

s

that

he

merely

set

aside

the

Platonic

view

to

focus

attention

n

the

will

vs.

necessity

ssue.

(2)

Davidson

believed

that

Maimonides'

ffirmation

f

a

universe

that

has

no

temporalbeginning s "secretlyembraced."50have argued hat,basedon

what

Maimonides

xplicitly

says

about

the

creation

of

time,

it

is

no

secret.

Furthermore,

y

rejecting

the

notion

of

an

eternal

universe,

Maimonides

meant

hat

the

universe

was

generated,

ven

if

the

act

of

creation

s

not

itself

temporal.

3)

Contrary

o

Davidson,

Maimonides'

bjection

to

the

eternity

view

was

not

that

necessity

s

incompatible

with

free

choice.51

Maimonides

argued

rather

hat

this

schema

cannot

admit

direct

intervention

by

God

to

generate

unusual

acts

contrary

o

the

normal

ourse

of

events.

Even

that

was

not

his

main

objection,

ince

he

admitted

he

possibility

of

a

different

nter-

47Marvin

ox,

"Creation

r

Eternity:

God

in

Relation

o

the

World,"

n

idem,

ed.,

Inter-

preting

Maimonides:

tudies

n

Methodology,

Metaphysics,

nd

Moral

Philosophy

Chicago/

London:

University

of

Chicago

Press,

1990)

251-96.

48In

act

this

is

what

Levi

Ben

Gershon

Gersonides)

oncluded

n

Treatise

6

of

The

Wars

of

the

Lord

(Riva

di

Trento:

n.p.,

1560

and

Leipzig:

Lark,

1866).

Cf.

Gad

Preudenthal,

"Cosmogonie

t

Physique

chez

Gersonide,"

REJ

145

(1986)

295-314;

Jacob

J.

Staub,

The

Creationof the WorldAccording

to

Gersonides

(Chico,

CA:

Scholars

Press,

1982);

and

Charles

Touati,

La

Pensee

PhilosophEque

t

Theologique

e

GersonidesParis:Minuit,1973).

49Davidson,

Maimonides'

ecret

Position

on

Creation,"

1.

50Ibid.,

2.

5lIbid.,

29.








NORBERTM.

SAMUELSON

263

pretation f

miracles.Rather,

his concernwas that such

a view could under-

cut people's willingness

to obey revealed

law. It also is tlue that

another

foundationof the law is the existence of humanchoice, but that issue is

irrelevant

ere. In any case, while there

might be some

connectionbetween

creation nd

he dogmaof

human hoice(behirah enoCit),

ree choice(behirah

hofBit) s never an issue.

Lawrence

Kaplan52

Harvey argued that

Maimonides really believed

in Aristotle's

view.

Harvey's nterpretation

f Maimonides'

osition on cosmology presupposed

LawrenceKaplan's nalysis of Maimonides' ositionon prophecy.53 ence,

before I can

discuss Harvey,

I must say something

about Kaplan.

Kaplan's

ssay was a critical interpretation

f what

Maimonidesmeant

when he introduced

his discussion of

the differentviews of prophecy

by

saying that

the "opinions of people

concerningprophecy

are like their

opinionsconcerning he

eternityof the

world or its creation n time."54

He

listed the

views on creation

as (C1) that of the law

of Moses (i.e., the

Torah), hat says (to paraphrase

Kaplan's

ummary) he universewas

cre-

ated in time

out of nothing, (C2) that

of Plato,

who believed that the

universewas createdout of eternalmatter,and (C3) that of Aristotle,who

believed in an eternaluniverse

hat was not created.

The differentviews

on

prophecy

are (P1) that of the masses,55

who believe that there are

no pre-

conditions

or prophecybecauseGod may

choose anyone

he wills to choose,

(P2) thatof the Aristotelians,

who believe that anyone

with the appropriate

degreeof mentaland moral

excellence

will become a prophet,and (P3)

that

of the law

of Moses. What

P3 says is a matterof

dispute. Kaplan

noted

that most

modernscholars nterpret t

as a kind of synthesisof P1

and P2

that says that

prophecypresupposes oth

the appropriate

umanexcellences

(as P2 stipulates)and an act of divine will (as P1 stipulates).56Kaplan

52Thewriting

of this sectionwas motivated

by an addressat the 1990 AnnualMeeting

of

the Academyof JewishStudies

by RoslynWeiss,

entitled"TorahwithoutRevelation:

A New

Approach o

Maimonides n Creation." he was

kind enough o share

with me a writtendraft

of her as yet

unpublished ssay.

53Lawrence

aplan,"Maimonidesn the Miraculous

Element n

Prophesy,"HTR0 (1977)

233-56. Harvey,"A ThirdApproach,"

88-89,

293, 298-99.

54Maimonides,

uide 2.32,

p. 360.

s5Or, n

Harvey's ranslation "A ThirdApproach,"

90), "the

vulgar.'

S6Themoderncholarswhose

positionsKaplan iscussdare,most

notably,ZeviDiesendruck,

Isaac Husik,

and HarryAustrynWolfson.








264

HARVARD

THEOLOGICAL

EVIEW

interpreted

ll

medieval

commentators

s

presenting

yet

another

position-

hat

while

(as

P2

stipulates)

veryone

with

the

appropriate

xcellences

should

ecome

prophets,

and

(contrary

o

P1)

no

one

else

can

prophesy,Godmayithholdprophecy romthosewho arequalified.

Kaplan

himself

favored

a

odified

version

of

the

medieval

interpretation

ver

the

modern

one.

Ac-

ording

o

Kaplan,

P3

affirms

the

possibility

of

miracles

(in

opposition

o

he

Aristotelian

position),

but

that

in

fact

everyone

qualified

for

prophecy

eceives

t

(in

agreement

with

P2).s7

Kaplan

concluded

that

what

Maimonides

meant

when

he

said

that

the

ossible

ositions

on

creation

and

prophecy

are

analogous

i.e.,

"are

alike")

s

hat

there

is

a

one-to-one

correspondence

etween

each

set

of

positions

i.e.,

ach

position

on

creation

s

correlated

with

a

single

positionon proph-

cy

o thatthey entail each other).Hence, if it can

be

determined

which

pinion

Maimonides

eld

from

one

set,

what

he

believed

from

the

other

set

an

e

logically

deduced.

Kaplan

concluded

hat

C1

and

P3

are

mutually

ntailed,

s

are

C2

and

P1,

and

C3

and

P2.

He

then

argued

hat

Maimonides

elieved

n

the

Kaplan

interpretation

f

P3,

which

entails

that

Maimonides

lso

elieved

in

the

Aristotelian

laim

that

the

universe

s

eternal

and

(by

mplication)

ot

subject

to

creation.58

I

have

two

major

objections

o

Kaplan's

nalysis

of

the

Guide.

First,

he

eems

o

have

misinterpreted

3.

Second,

he

may

have

misunderstood hataimonideseantwhenhe said thatthe views

on

creation

and

prophecy

re

nalogous.

My

reading

of

Maimonides'

interpretation

f

the

law

of

Moses

on

proph-

cy

uggests

that

Maimonides

argued

that

while

moral

and

intellectual

xcellence

re

necessary

conditions

or

prophecy

in

opposition

o

P1),

they

re

ot

sufficient

conditions

in

opposition

o

P2).

Instead,

only

the

com-

ination

f

human

excellence

and

divine

will

constitute

sufficient

condi-

ions

or

prophecy.59

his

is

in

effect

the

position

that

Kaplan

attributed

o

evi

Diesendruck,

saac

Husik,

and

Harry

Austryn

Wolfson. Kaplande-otednly one paragrapho refuting his

interpretation.60

e

merely

quoted

saac

bravanel

o

say

that

on

this

analysis

there

is

no

difference

between

he

iew

of

the

Aristotelians

nd

the

view

of

the

law.

However,

how

they

iffer

s

apparent

rom

the

previous

discussion.

It

seems

to

me

that

the

ource

f

Kaplan's

and

Abravanel's)

misreading

f

Maimonides'

ext

is

the

57Kaplan,

"Maimonides

on

the

Miraculous," 249-52.8Ibid.,50-56.

59Cf.

Maimonides

Guide

2.32-33,

36-38,

esp.

2.36.

60Kaplan,

"Maimonides

on

the

Miraculous,"

236.








NORBERT

M. SAMUELSON

265

failure to distinguish between

necessary

and sufficient conditions

of an

event,6l and

the assimilationof these two

categoriesas "causes."62

Second,it seems clearthat Maimonidesdid not intendto claim thatthe

set of opinions

on creation

and the set of opinionson

prophecyare isomor-

phic. To

begin with, the two sets do

not have the

same numberof ele-

ments. Whilethere are three

opinionson prophecy,as

we have seen

above,

thereare four

opinionson creation.Kaplan

and Harvey

as well) do not list

the position

attributed o Epicurus.More

significantly,

he associatedbe-

liefs in Kaplan's

analysis

are not mutuallyentailing.

There is no logical

reason why it could not

be the case that

God created he world in time

out

of nothing

(C1) and that God could either

make anyone

a prophet(P1),

make everyonequalifieda prophet(P2), or make some (but not all and

only those)

who are qualified

to be prophets P3). The

same can

be said

even if the

universe was created out

of eternalmatter(C2), or is

eternal

6lThereare

many cases in Kaplan's ssay where

he should have

distinguishedbetween

necessaryandsufficientconditions.

For example,

he claimedthatthe interpretations

f both

the medieval

and moderncommentators

re untenablebecause"Maimonides

s not speaking

of God's withholding

prophecybut of God's granting

prophecy" ibid.,

244). However,this

is a differenceof no significance.

Because humanexcellence is a

necessaryand not

a suffi-

cient condition or prophecy,God must do something or someoneto be a prophet,but there

is nothing he

must do to preventsomeone from

being a prophet.

By not willing someone

qualified o be

a prophet,Godwithholds he prophecy.

However, o "withhold"s an

absence

of action, not an action, and hence,

as such, does

not violate the principlethat "God

eads

man to perfection"

ibid., 242). No one has ever

claimed that God

must do everything o

perfecteveryoneor everything.

f that were the case, then everyone

or everything

would be

God, since to

the extentthatthey

are not God theyare not perfect.

Cf. Ibrahim bn Daud,The

ExaltedFaith

2:6:2 202al 1-203a2

of Solomon bnLavi'sHebrew

ranslation opy, Mich 57,

BodleianLibrary,

ndmy commentaryn it in Norbert

M. Samuelson

andG. Weiss,eds., The

ExaltedFaith

of Abraham bn

Daud (Cranbury/London/Mississauga:

ssociatedUniversity

Presses, 1986)

24142.

62A econdproblemwith Kaplan'snterpretations his understandingf whatMaimonides

and othermedieval

Jewish philosophersmeantby

"miracles."He

took the term "miracle"o

mean,as it oftendoes in a modern

ontext,an event"brought bout

by the directwill

of God"

(Kaplan,"Maimonides

n the

Miraculous," 34) that is contrary o

the laws of nature. Also

note Kaplan's

use of the concept

of miracles n his discussion of

Shem Tob and Efodi on p.

247.) However,

I thinkthat this is not what Maimonides

meant.Rather,

or him (andevery-

one else in this tradition),a miracle

s an eventwitnessedto and interpreted

y a prophet

o

have profound

ignificance for understanding ow

God functions

n the world. Rather han

being an event

that is contrary

o the laws of nature, t is an event

that uniquelyverifies

that

the laws of nature

are expressions

of divine will. This interpretation

f whata miracle

s does

not affect the

main line of my

argumentwith eitherKaplanor Harvey,

so there s no

reason

to present t here.

However, have

argued orthis interpretationn connection

withRosenzweig's

analysis f the

traditionaloncept

of miracles, n NorbertM. Samuelson,

Halevi ndRosenzweig

on Miracles,"

n David R. Blumenthal,

d., Approaches o Judaism

n MedievalTimes

BJS

54; Chico, CA:

ScholarsPress, 1984) 157-72.








266


and uncreated C3). In other words, the two sets are logically independent.

Theremay, however,be some analogybetweenthe two. Most notably,both

lists involve rabbinicand philosophicalalternativesand deal with funda-

mentalmattersof Jewish faith concerningwhich Maimonides laimedthere

are opinionsbut not knowledge.These similaritiesare sufficientto consti-

tute the analogy of which Maimonides poke.63

Warren Zev Harvey

While HarveyacceptedKaplan'sargument hat the sets of beliefs about

creation and prophecyare isomorphic i.e., there is a one-to-one logical

correspondence etweenthe membersof each set), he rejected he specific

way that Kaplanordered he particular iews. Harveyargued hat the way

that Maimonideshimself listed the positions in fact expresses the corre-

spondence.The world was createdout of nothing n time (C1) if and only

if prophecy s solely a matterof divine will (P1); creation s an atemporal

act (C2) if and only if moral and intellectualexcellence are the sole con-

ditionsfor realizingprophecy P2); and the universe s eternaland uncreated

(C3) if and only if God may withholdprophecy rom those who are quali-

fied (p3).64

63Other oints of comparison etween he two sets also seem likely. For example, n both

sets there are positions attributed o the Aristotelians C3 and P2) and to the law of Moses

(C1 and P3). Furthermore, s Harveyhas shown convincingly ("A ThirdApproach," 92),

within each set one view can be read as a qualificationof anotherview. For example,P3 is

a qualificationof P2 not everyone qualified for prophecyreceives prophecy;and C2 is a

qualification f C3 not everything s subject o generation ndcorruption,.e., while every-

thing within the universe is subject to change in time, the universe (everythingthat is,

includingprime matter) s eternal,and thereforecreation s not a temporalact.

64Harvey, "A ThirdApproach," 89-300). Harvey'sargument or the entailmentof C1

andP1 seems to involve a misunderstandingf the term"supernatural"hatparallelsKaplan's

apparentmisunderstandingf the term"miracle."Maimonides xplicitly stated hata motive

for rejecting he Aristotelianopinion on cosmogony (C3) is that it excludes the possibility

of miracles. However, Harvey did not take this to be a serious objection to C3, because

Maimonides lso stated(Guide2.25, p. 328; 2.29, pp. 345-46) thatthe view of the Torahon

prophecy P3) "neednot be takenas referring o a supernaturalmiracle" Harvey,"A Third

Approach," 91), and hat,according o Guide2.25, it is possible to interpretmiracles n such

a way as to be coherentwith "Aristotle's heory of eternity" Harvey,"A ThirdApproach,"

291 n. 15). The implicationof this footnote is that Harveybelieves that a miracle s some-

thing supernaturaln the sense that it contradictsa law of nature. However, as we have

already tated, his is not whatMaimonidesmeantby a miracle.If such an act is "supernatu-

ral," it is not in the sense of being unnatural; ather, t is an act that goes beyond human

nature.Clearlya prophet s seen to do somethingbeyondhumannature he has a disposition

to act in a way thathumanbeings who are less thanprophetsare not able to do. In this sense

prophets,becausethey can prophesy,naturallyare superhuman. imilarly,humans,because








267

Harvey's

strategy

was

to

argue

positively

that

Maimonides

held

what

he

called

the

Aristotelian

view

(C3),

rather

than

arguing

negatively

against

the

other

two

alternatives.

However,

he

did

adopt one argumentagainst the Pla-tonic view (C2)

from

Kaplan.

Harvey

believed

that

Kaplan

argued

"deci-

sively"65

against

C2

when

he

said

that

the

Platonic

view

entails

that

the

heavens

be

subject

to

generation

and

corruption,

which

further

entails

that

there

exists

no

"rational,

natural

order."66

However,

none

of

these

entail-

ments

holds.

The

Platonic

universe

is

no

less

eternal

than

the

Aristotelian.

As

we

have

already

seen,

time

itself

is

an

object

of

creation,

which

means

that

the

dimension

of

time

extends

to

everything

within

the

universe,

but

not

to

the

universe

as

a

whole.67

The

heavens

are

within

the

universe,

and

therefore

subject

to

time.

However,

as

the

universe is eternal, the domain of timewithin the

universe

may

be

infinite,

that

is,

without

beginning

or

end.

Fur-

thermore,

here

is

no

logical

reason

why

something

within

the

universe

(e.g.,

the

heavens)

could

not

persist

within

endless

time

without

change.

Even

if

the

heavens

were

subject

to

change,

that

fact

in

itself

would

not

entail

that

there

was

no

fixed

natural

order,

since

such

change

could

follow

natural

aws

that

are

as

invariable

as

the

laws

that

Maimonides

believed

applied

to

all

of

the

changing

things

within

the

sublunar

world.

Maimonides

clearly

argued

that

he

laws

of

the

superlunar

world

are

not

the

same

as

those

of

the

sublunar

world,68

ut

nowhere

did

he suggest that there is not a different set of laws

that

govern

the

heavens.69

Although

Harvey

did

not

believe

that

it

is

possible

to

prove

what

was

Maimonides'

rue

position

on

cosmogony,

he

did

claim

that

the

following

factors

make

the

Aristotelian

position

the

most

likely.

First,

Maimonides'

proofs

of

the

existence,

unity,

and

incorporeality

of

God70

in

the

Guide

2.1-2

presuppose

the

Aristotelian

position.

However,

Harvey

seems

to

have

misstated

Maimonides'

arguments

for

God.

The

argument

does

not

begin

in

they

an

reason,

naturally

are

super-animal,

nd

animals,

because

hey

can

initiate

their

own

locomotion,

re

super-mineral.

urthermore,

s

we

have

seen

above,

Maimonides'

ualifica-

tion

bout

nterpreting

he

biblical

witness

in

a

nonliteral

way

is

to

establish

he

viability

of

the

latonic

position

of

eternal

creation

C2),

and

not

the

position

of

the

Aristotelians

C3).

65Harvey,

A

Third

Approach,"

92.

66Kaplan,

Maimonides

n

the

Miraculous,"

50,

253.

67Harvey

"A

Third

Approach,"

93)

in

fact

granted

hat

there

s

no

logical

incompatibil-

ty

etween

the

claim

that

the

universe

s

created

and

the

claim

that

it

is

eternal.

68I

take

this

to

mean

that

Maimonides

imited

the

validity

of

Aristotelian

science

to

Aristotle's

hysica,

to

the

exclusion

of

both

De

caelo

and

Metaphysica.

69Inact, it wouldbe obviousto anyAristotelian hatthe laws are

different.

For

example,

whereas

atural

motion

n

the

sublunar

world

s

rectilinear,

natural

motion

n

the

heavens

s

circular.

70Henceforth

his

threefold

claim

about

God

will

simply

be

referred

o

as

"God."

NORBERT

M.

SAMUELSON








268

HARVARD

THEOLOGICAL

EVIEW

2.1,

but

rather

n

1.73.

Maimonides

rgued

hat

either

the

universe

s

eter-

nal

(in

the

sense

of

C3)

or

created

in

the

sense

of

either

C1

or

C2);

if

we

assumethatit is created,we may demonstrateGod. This is the argument

in

1.73-76.

Similarly,

f

we

assume

that

the

universe

is

eternal,

we

may

also

demonstrate

God.

This

is

the

argument

n

2.Introduction

nd

2.1.7l

The

premise

of

the

whole

argument

s

neither

that

the

universe

s

eternal

nor

that

it

is

created;

rather,

t

is

that

these

two

alternatives

encompass

all

possibilities.72

Second,

Maimonides

tated

that

many

believing

Jews

affirmed

he

eter-

nity

of

the

world.73

Maimonides'

nterpretation

f

the

first

verse

of

Genesis

also

established

that

creation

is

not

a

temporal

act.

This

interpretation,

however,is just as consistentwith the Platonicpositionas it is with the

Aristotelian

hesis.

Harvey's

key

argument

was

his

third

and

final

one.74

He

argued

hat

on

careful

analysis

there

s

no

conceptual

difference

between

Maimonides'

nd

Aristotle's

descriptions

f

necessity,

divine

will,

and

purpose.

Hence,

there

is

no

basis

for

Maimonides'

xplicit

denial

of

an

Aristotelian

osmogony

(C3).

Maimonides'

major

objection

o

C3

is

that

it

entails

necessity,

which

is

logically

incompatible

with

divine

will

and

purpose.

A

consequence

of

God's

oneness,

however,

is

that

all

attributes

of

God

are

identical.

For

example, o say thatGod has will meansthe sameas sayingthatGod has

wisdom.

Hence,

Maimonides'

nalysis

of

divine

unity

"effectively

strips

the

concept

of

God's

will

of

any

cognitive

meaning."75

he

same

judgment

applied

to

divine

purpose,

because

all

attributes

predicated

of

God

are

absolutely

equivocal

with

attributes

predicated

of

anything

else.

Further-

more,

here

are

specific

texts

within

the

Guide

where

Maimonides

ffirmed

divine

necessity.76

What

s

problematic

n

this

argument

hould

be

clear

from

my

previous

analysis

f

the

relevant

exts

in

the

Guide.

Harvey

missed

the

point

of

why

Maimonides istinguishedbetweendivine will and purpose,on one hand,

and

necessity,

on

the

other

hand.

Neither

Aristotle

nor

Maimonides

be-

lieved

that

the

universe

is

totally

determined.

Both

granted

hat

absolute

71Harvey

"A

Third

Approach,"

96)

identifies

the

text

as

Guide

2.1-2.

72The

orm

of

argument

mployed

here

is

a

modus

ollens,

that

is,

(1)

either

A

or

B;

(2)

if

A,

then

C;

(3)

if

B,

then

C;

(4)

therefore,

C.

In

this

case,

A

=

the

world

s

created;

B =

the

world

s

eternal;

C

=

God.

Cf.

Norbert

M.

Samuelson,

"Comments

n

Maimonides'

Concept

of

Mosaic

Prophecy,"CentralConferenceof AmericanRabbisJournal 18 (1971) 9-25.

73Maimonides,

uide

2.26.

For

Harvey's

discussion,

see

"A

Third

Approach,"

96-97.

74Harvey,

A

Third

Approach,"

97-98.

75Ibid.,

97.

76Ibid.,

97

n.

40.

Cf.

Maimonides,

Guide,

2.13,

p.

284.








269

determinism xtends only to the level of the species; at the level of the

spatial/temporal articulars, here is indeterminism. imilarly,both agreed

that even particulars ave causes. Aristotle, however, understoodall par-

ticularevents in termsof pnnciples of chance, whereasMaimonidesunder-

stood humanparticularvents n termsof divine will andpurpose.Therefore,

Harveyought not to have concluded rom Maimonides' nalysis of divine

attributes hat this difference s insubstantial.What is at stake here is not

anythingabout the natureof God; rather, he issue is what kind of causes

explain particular vents. As we learn from Plato's Timaeus,necessity is

associated with chance, which in turn is associated with what Aristotle

called mechanicalor efficient causes.77Given Maimonides' nalysis of the

natureof God, a universe that exists by necessity can be explainedcom-

pletely by these kinds of causes. In other words, there is no need for what

Aristotlecalled formalor teleologicalcauses. The consequenceof this view

is that the universe has no purpose.78

In the end the purposeof the universe s at stake n Maimonides' efense

of creation.Both Aristotle's C3) and Plato's(C2) cosmogoniesaffirm that

the ongin of the universe s an atemporal, ternaldivine activity. Similarly,

both affirm cosmologies in which time is endless within the universe,the

universe tself is eternal i.e., not subject o temporalmodification), nd for

every event there are both necessary and sufficient conditions.However,

Maimonides aw precisely what Spinozawould see centunes later, namely,

that Aristotelian osmogony ogically entails a universethe very existence

of which is attributableo chance, with the consequence hat (as is true of

modern cience)knowledge onsistssolely in determiningmechanical auses

for events. It is this consequenceof C3 that Maimonides ound to be ob-

jectionable.He did not reject this position on the groundsof reason, but

becausethe notion of a purposelessuniverse s in fundamental onflict with

the kind of universe presupposed n all of the Hebrew scnptures. The

cosmogony of the Timaeus C2) enabled him to adopt a world view that

was consistentboth with what can be known n science through easonand

77In he Timaeusnecessity (avac) is intimatelyassociatedwith spontaneity o

azxo,uaxov), nature ¢zo15), and chance (XzXll)- ts complement,however, is associated

with design (X£xvll) or more literally, with what requires"skill" and "craft."Cf. Plato

Timaeus47e48e; FrancisMacDonaldCranford,Plato's Cosmology Indianapolis:Bobbs-

Merrill,n.d.) 165; Plato Leges 10; Aristotle Physica 2.4-6; Aristotle MetaphysicaA3-10,

B2; and FriedrichSolmsen, Aristotle's Systemof the Physical World:A Comparisonwith

his Predecessors (Ithaca:Cornell UniversityPress, 1960) 102-17.

78I uspect that Spinozaread Maimonides n muchthe way that Harveydid and that this

misreadingof Maimonides'position is at the heart of Spinoza'saffirmationof mechanical

necessity and denial of purposivecausation n his Ethics.

NORBERTM. SAMUELSON








270

HARVARD

THEOLOGICAL

EVIEW

with

what

is

the

most

literal,

coherent

reading

of

the

revealed

scriptures

f

the

Torah.

MarvinFox

Fox

thought

hat

Maimonides

had

a

definite

position

on

creation

hat

is

not

esoteric,

that

s

contrary

o

the

stated

positions

of

both

the

Aristotelians

and

the

Epicureans,

nd

that

is

affirmed

ultimately

because

of

the

evidence

of

scripture.

n

this

reading

he

andI

are

in

agreement.

However,

n

oppo-

sition

to

my

conclusions,

Fox

claimed

that

Maimonides

believed

that

his

affirmed

dogma

of

creation

out

of

nothing

includes

creation

n

time

and

excludes

the

cosmological

model

of

the Timaeus.

Concerning

reation

n

time,

the

critical

text

against

Fox

is

the

Guide

2.13,

p.

281,

where

Maimonides

explicitly

says

that

time

is

created.79

f

time

is

an

object

of

creation,

hen

the

act

that

produces

his

object

cannot

itself

take

place

in

time.

Concerning

Maimonides'

ejection

of

Plato's

view,

Fox's

critical

text

against

me80

is

the

Guide

2.13,

pp.

283-84,

where

Maimonides

ays

that

Plato

"does

not

believe

what

we

believe."

In

other

words,

Fox

may

reasonably

claim

that

Maimonides

ejected

Plato's

view.

My

response

s

to

offer

an

alternative

eading

of

the

passage

in

question.

In

the

Guide

2.13 Maimonides ntroduced he differentpositions to be

considered.

Here

the

pedagogic

intent

was

to

make

the

alternatives

harp

and

clear.

Consequently,

e

simply

identified

Plato's

position

as

an

example

of

those

views

that

say

that

the

world

was

created

"from

a

thing.''8l

In

contrast,

Maimonides

said

that

"we

believe"

that

it

was

created

la

min

shay'

'ila

ba'd

al-'adam

al-mu.tlaq,82

hich

literally

means

"not

from

a

thing,

but

according

o

the

absolute

ack."

At

this

early

stage

of

the

discus-

sion,

Maimonides'

tatement

f

Plato's

position

s

clear

and

straightforward;

it

is

this

shaxply

drawn

position

that

he

rejected.83

However,

Plato

need

not,andprobably, ughtnot,be interpretedo simplistically.As Maimonides

cryptically

noted

later,84

Plato

and

Genesis

can

be

intexpreted

o

be

in

agreement,

hat

is,

they

both

claim

that

God

created

he

universe

out

of

a

79See

n.

12

above.

80Fox,

"Creation

or

Eternity,"

290.

81"min

hay"'

n

the

original;

"me-davar"

n

Ibn

Tibbon's

Hebrew

translation.

82"1o

me-davar

ela

ahar

ha-he'der

ha-muElat"

n

Ibn

Tibbon's

Hebrew

translation.

83In

act

Maimonides

(Guide

2.

13,

p.

283)

explicitly

said

that

at

this

stage

of

the

argument

heis oversimplifying the alternatives, "The people belonging to this sect [who affirm a

Platonic

view]

are

in

their

turn

divided

into

several

sects.

But

it

is

useless

to

mention

their

various

sects

and

opinions

in

this

Treatise."

84Ibid.,

2.25,

pp.

328-29.








NORBERTM. SAMUELSON

271

prime matter hat is not a thing.85 n fact this is the move that Gersonides

would make explicitly in his account of creation.86

Finally, a word about how Maimonidesunderstood he relationshipbe-

tween reason and revelation s in order.With the exception of Fox, all of

the cntics seem to believe that Maimonideswas faced with sets of oppos-

ing faith commitments those of scientific reason(expressed n the writing

of the Platonistsandlor the Aristotelians)and those of revealed tradition

(expressed n the Hebrew scriptureswith their rabbiniccommentaries)-

between which he had to make choices. This opposition,however, s false.

Maimonides elievedthatboth sets of writingsexpresseddifferingbut valid

ways for humanbeings to strive to discover truth. Fox claimed that for

Maimonides his commitment onsisted n affirminga "dialectical ension"

between "diverging" eliefs, necessitatedby the incongruent esults of the

two sources.87On this interpretationMaimonides ould live with belief in

what he recognized o be incoherencies n-thought.The precedinganalysis

of Maimonides' octrineof creationsuggests anothermodel for this dialec-

tic that can be best described in the languageof JohnRawls) as "reflective

equilibrium."88 aimonides' oal was to discover what is true and what is

right. To attain his end, neither ndependent xercise of humanreasonnor

obedienceto a tradition s sufficient. For Maimonides he path to wisdom

was an asymptoticprocess of intexpretinghings throughreason and texts

as they are inhented romtradition.Of course,Maimonides new thathuman

beings cannotreach this end as long as they remainhuman.To paraphrase

HermannCohen, Maimonides' eity of truthand goodness stands fixed as

the messianic ideal towards which we, guided by universal reason and

particular raditions, n act and in thought,direct our lives.89

85"Primematter" s not the same thing as the "existentmatter" hat Maimonides Guide,

2.13, p. 283) discussed.

86LeviBen Gershon Gersonides),The Warsof the Lord, Treatise6. Cf. n. 48 above.

87Marvin ox, "Maimonides'Methodof Contradictions:A New View," in idem, Inter-

preting Maimonides,67-90.

88JohnRawls, A Theoryof Justice (Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversityPress, 1971).

89Cf.Steven S. Schwarzschild,"MoralRadicalismand 'Middlingness' n the Ethics of

Maimonides," tudies n MedievalCulture11 (1977) 65-94, reprintedn MenachemKellner,

ed., ThePursuitof the Ideal: Jewish Writings f StevenSchwarzschildAlbany:SUNY Press,

1990) 137-60.

maimonide's doctrine of creation

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