magistrate judge goodman fee order

8/13/2019 Magistrate Judge Goodman Fee Order

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UNITEDSTATESDISTRICTCOURT

SOUTHERNDISTRICTOFFLORIDA

MIAMIDIVISION

CASENO.1224356CIVGOODMAN

[CONSENTCASE]

PROCAPSS.A.,

Plaintiff,

v.

PATHEONINC.,

Defendant.

_______________________________/

ORDERONREQUESTSFORATTORNEYSFEES

CONCERNINGTWOMOTIONSTOCOMPELDISCOVERY

Writers, scholars, musicians, and many others have all commented on the

concept of consequences. Robert Louis Stevenson noted that everybody, sooner or

later,sitsdowntoabanquetofconsequences.StephenR.Coveyobservedthatwhile

weare free to chooseouractions,wearenot free to choose the consequencesofour

actions.Andinasong,bluesguitaristRobertCrayadvised[o]h,listenbaby,itsjust

commonsense,soonerorlaterweregoingtosuffertheconsequences.1

ConsequencesareattheheartofthisOrder,whichconcernstheramificationsof

PlaintiffProcapsS.A.(Procaps)andDefendantPatheonInc.s(Patheon)discovery

positions. Specifically, this Order concerns Patheons two motions to compel against

ProcapsandPatheonsdemand for more than $260,000 inattorneys fees incurred in

1 ConsequencesonMidnightStroll(Mercury1990).

Case 1:12-cv-24356-JG Document 223 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/03/2013 Page 1 of 41


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litigatingthosemotions(i.e.,therequestedconsequences).2ProcapscontestsPatheons

entitlement toattorneys feesand takes issuewith theamountof feesPatheon seeks.

ProcapsalsoseeksitsownattorneysfeesrelatingtoPatheonsdiscoverymotions.

For the reasons outlinedbelow, the Courtgrants inpartPatheons attorneys

feesrequestanddeniesProcaps laterpropounded, reciprocalattorneys fees request.

Specifically, the Court awards Patheon $40,451.50, which is approximately 85% less

than the amount requested ($261,479.50). Five reasons explain the reduction: (1)

Patheondidnotprevailonallaspectsofitstwomotionstocompel;(2)someofProcaps

discovery positions were substantiallyjustified or other circumstances made a fees

award unjust for some of the specific disputes; (3) the Court is using South Florida

hourlybillablerates,notthesignificantlyhigherratesusedbyPatheonsWashington,

D.C. law firm; (4)Patheonsattorneysusedblockbillingand thenestimated the time

spentontasksencompassedbythefeesrequest;and(5)Patheonslawfirmappearsto

havesomewhatoverstaffedtheworkonthetwodiscoverymotionsandProcapsshould

notberesponsibleforthebeyondnecessarytimespentbyPatheonscounsel.TheCourt

makes clear that this Order on fees is not based on a finding that Procaps or its

attorneysacted inbadfaith.Instead,thefeesaremerelythefeeshiftingconsequences

mandatedbyFederalRuleofCivilProcedure37.

2 Patheon says the attorneys fees actually totaled $328,632.50but it adopted a

conservativeapproachandvoluntarilydiscounteditsinitialfeesrequestby$67,153,toa

totalrequestof$261,479.50.Thus,Patheoncontendsthatthefinancialconsequencesfor

Procapsareactuallylessgravethanjustifiedbythecircumstances.



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ProcapsattorneysdeclinedtoadvisetheCourthowmuchtheclientknewabout,

or what role the client played in, the instant discovery dispute. Procaps counsel

contends thatproviding such informationwould violate the attorneyclientprivilege.

Procapscounselalsodidnotrevealwhichattorneyson itsmultiattorneyteammade

thediscoverydecisionswhich ledtothisRule37award.Instead,theyadvisedthatall

attorneysworkingonthecasecooperatedcollaborativelytodevelopProcapsresponses

toPatheonsdiscoveryrequests.

Given this lack of information,3 it is difficult for the Court to determine (1)

whetherthefeesawardshouldbepaidbyProcapsorbyitslawfirm,(2)assumingthe

law firm is solely or partiallyobligated topay the fees award,whether the law firm

should shoulder the entire amount or whether individual attorneys should be

responsible,(3)ifindividualattorneysarerequiredtopayallorsomeofthefeesaward,

thenwhichattorneysmustpay,and (4) ifattorneysare individuallyresponsible,then

aretheyallequallyresponsibleonaproratabasis,orshouldsomeattorneyspaymore

thanothers?

BasedonexplanationsprovidedbyProcapscounsel thattheclientwasandis

involved in all major decisions, including discovery decisions, and that all attorneys

jointlyparticipatedindiscoverydecisions responsibilityforthefeesawardwillbeas

3 TheCourtisnotfaultingProcapsforassertingtheattorneyclientprivilegeand

takesnopositiononthemeritsoftheprivilegeclaim.Nevertheless,thepracticaleffect

ofaprivilegeassertionisalwaystheabsenceofinformation,andthatispreciselywhat

happenedhere.



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follows: Procaps shall pay 25%; Procaps law firm shall pay 65%; and the seven

individuallawyersshallequallypaytheremaining10%.

I. BACKGROUNDA.GeneralOverviewInJanuary2012,Procapsentered intoaCollaborationAgreementwithPatheon

todevelopandmarketabrandofsoftgelproductscalledPGels.[ECFNos.1,69;

21,p.3]. Inshort,Procapswoulddevelopandmanufacture thePGelsandPatheons

role was to market and sell the PGels. [ECF No. 1, 42, 4750]. But in late 2012,

PatheonacquiredBannerPharmcapsEuropeB.V.(Banner),acompanyProcapscalls

acompetitor.[ECFNos.21,p.3;50,p.2].

Procaps lawsuit alleges that Patheons acquisition of Banner renders the

CollaborationAgreementillegalunderantitrustlawsbecauseProcapsandPatheonwill

become horizontallysituated competitors in the softgel market. [ECF No. 21, p. 3].

Procaps seeks various forms of relief (declaratory judgment, permanent injunction,

damages,etc.)arisingfromPatheonsacquisitionofBanner.[SeegenerallyECFNo.1].

B. ThePartiesareonNoticeRegardingRule37AwardsPrior to Patheons two motions to compel, which underlie this fees Order,

ProcapsandPatheonhaveraisednumerousdiscoveryrelated issuesbeforetheCourt.

[SeeECFNos.69;96;117;122].TheCourtadvisedthepartiesinwritingearlyonabout

theconsequencesofRule37.[ECFNo.72].InanAugust26,2013discoveryhearingona



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Procapsdiscoverymotion[ECFNo.96],theCourtagainreiteratedthatittakesseriously

Rule 37s mandate to award attorneys fees to the prevailing party in a discovery

dispute. [ECFNo.120,pp.6062]. Initially,Procapscounselexplained thathewould

nothaveexpectedthisbasedonhis37yearsofexperienceasalitigatorinthisdistrict.

[Id.atp.60]. In response, theCourtadvised that its standardpractice is to regularly

award attorneys fees to the party prevailing in a discovery dispute. [Id. at p. 61].

Nevertheless, despite the numerous prior discovery disputes, the Court has yet to

awardattorneysfeesagainsteithersideunderRule37.

C. PatheonsMotionstoCompelProcaps and Patheon became embroiled in significantbattles over Patheons

written discovery requests. The disputes flowed from, in part, the parties different

viewson theantitrust implicationsof thediscoverydisputes.Thesedisputes, in turn,

ledtolengthyletterssummarizingthevariousmeetandconfermeetingsandoutlining

thereasons foreachpartysdiscoverypositions. [See, e.g.,ECFNos.1323;1324;153

17].

Many of the disputes were not resolved despite additional communications

betweencounsel,andPatheonfiledthetwomotionstocompelatissue.[ECFNos.131;

132;133;134].TheCourtheldanalmostsixhourhearingonthemotionstocompelon

October 7, 2013. [ECF No. 147]. During that hearing, Procaps counsel confirmed his

priorrepresentationsthathisclientisinvolvedinvirtuallyeverydecisioninthiscase.



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[ECFNo.147,pp.14950].Neartheendofthehearing,Patheonoutlineditsattorneys

feesrequestandsoughtapproximately$143,000 in fees. [Id.atpp.13840].Becauseof

the large amount of attorneys fees, in addition to voicing its objection to the fees

requestatthehearing,Procapswaspermittedtosubmitaposthearingmemorandum

onPatheonsattorneysfeesrequest.

Followingthehearing,theCourtenteredanordergrantinginpartanddenying

in part Patheons motions to compel (more on the merits of the parties discovery

positions at issue in this Order later). [ECF No. 146]. In the order, the Court also

imposed additional requirements on the parties concerning the attorneys fees issue.

[Id.].TheCourtrequiredPatheontofirstsubmititsbillingrecordssothatProcapscould

reviewandevaluatethem.[Id.atp.6].IfProcapswasgoingtochallenge(whichitdid)

Patheonshourlyratesandthereasonablenessofthetimeentries,thenitwasrequired

totakecertainsteps.Specifically,Procapswasrequiredtosubmitanaffidavitlisting:

the attorney time relating to the discovery dispute, including,but not

limitedto,timespentreviewing,researchingandrespondingtoPatheons

motions to compel, participating in the various meet and conferrals,

reviewinganddraftingthevoluminousmeetandconferletterssentby

eachside,andpreparingforandattendingtheOctober7,2013discovery

hearing.

[Id. at p. 8 (emphasis added)]. The affiant was required to certify that all hours

concerning the discovery dispute havebeen accounted for in the total and that the

billing records represent all of the time incurred in connection with the discovery

dispute.[Id.(emphasisadded)].



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D.TheAttorneysFeesPatheons counsel filed a comprehensive declaration and outlined Patheons

request for $143,865 in fees. [ECF No. 153]. In the declaration, Patheons counsel

outlinedhowPatheonwasactuallybilled$211,018 in fees,but thatPatheonscounsel

haderredonthesideofcautionanddiscounteditsoriginalfeesrequestbyabout32%,

or$67,153.[Id.atp.18].

Procaps filed its response in opposition and did in fact challenge Patheons

entitlementtoafeesawardandPatheonscounselshourlyratesandtimeentries.[ECF

Nos. 160; 165]. In addition, Procaps sought attorneys fees for the parts of Patheons

motionsthatweredenied.[ECFNo.160,p.15].Procapscounselinvokedtheattorney

clientprivilegeanddeclinedtoadvisetheCourthowmuchtheclient(Procaps)knew

about, or what role the client played in, the instant discovery dispute. [Id. at p. 20].

Despite the requirement to do so in the Courts order, Procaps counselalso did not

revealwhichattorneysonitsmultiattorneyteammadethediscoverydecisionswhich

led to this feesaward. [Id.atp.21]. Instead,Procapscounselstated that if theCourt

were to award attorneys fees, it should do so against counsels law firm, not the

individualattorneys.

Procaps response also did not include the abovenoted Courtordered

certificationanditdidnotincludeallthetimemandatedbytheorder.Rather,Procaps

intentionally carved out the attorney time associated with the meet and confer



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meetings. [ECF No. 165]. To be sure, in its memorandum opposing Patheons fee

request,ProcapsarguedthatPatheon isimproperlyseekingfeesfortimeexpendedin

the meet and confer process. [ECF No. 160, p. 15]. But the mere fact that Procaps

disagreedwithPatheonsentitlement forcertain timedidnotgenerategoodcause to

notcomplywithanorderrequiringthatveryinformation.

Confrontedwithapartyrefusingtofullycomplywithaspecificorder,4theCourt

entered two additional orders requiring Procaps to include the time incurred in the

meetandconferprocessandtosubmitadditionalinformationconcerningitslawfirms

fees.[ECFNos.191;192].

Procapscompliedwiththesetwoorders.[ECFNo.201].5Indoingso,itrevealed

that the amount of attorneys fees generated in the meet and confer process was

virtually the sameas the fees listed in the firstdeclaration. [Id.].Specifically, the first

declarationdisclosed feesof$26,346.46,while theseconddeclarationdisclosed feesof

$26,321.59foronlythetimerelatedtothemeetandconferprocess.Procapstotalfees

4 Acourtneednotbegapartytocomplywithitsorders.PetersTurnballv.Bd.of

Educ.oftheCityofNewYork,No.96CIV.4914(SAS),1999WL959375,at*3 (S.D.N.Y.

Oct.20,1999).

5 ProcapsalsosoughtastayoftheentryofthisOrderpendingtheresolutionofthe

case. After giving Patheon the opportunity to respond, the Court denied Procaps

request.[ECFNo.209];seeIndus.AircraftLodge707,IntlAssnofMachinists&Aerospace

Workers,AFLCIOv.UnitedTechs.Corp.,Pratt&WhitneyAircraftDiv.,104F.R.D.471(D.

Conn.1985)(denyingmotiontostayenforcementofRule37feesawardorderuntilfinal

judgmentwasentered).



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for the discovery dispute are $52,668.05. Procaps law firm also confirmed that its

hourlyratesforthiscasewerediscountedfromitsstandardhourlyrates.

Patheonfileditsreplyandrequestedanadditional$117,514.50inattorneysfees

incurred in connection with the discovery dispute. [ECF Nos. 182; 183]. It did not

reducethefeesrequestedinthesecondrequest.Patheonseeks$261,479.50infees.

II. DISCUSSION:WHOISENTITLEDTOATTORNEYSFEESUNDERRULE37A.Rule37Rule37 requires theCourt toenteranawardof reasonableexpenses, including

attorneys fees,against thepartyorattorneyadvising theconductwhichnecessitated

thesuccessfuldiscoverymotionunlessoneofthesethreeexceptionsapplies:

(i)themovantfiledthemotionbeforeattempting ingoodfaithtoobtain

thedisclosureordiscoverywithoutcourtaction;(ii)theopposingpartys

nondisclosure, response, or objection was substantiallyjustified; or (iii)

othercircumstances

make

an

award

of

expenses

unjust.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A). If any of these three exceptions apply, then the Court is

prohibitedfromenteringanaward.Id.Anawardisrequiredevenifthenonproducing

partyultimatelyagrees toproducediscovery.Thatsbecause theRulealso includesa

provisionforanaward ifthedisclosureorrequesteddiscovery isprovidedafterthe

motionwasfiled.Id.(emphasisadded).

Indiscussing the1970amendments toRule37, theAdvisoryCommitteeNotes

explain thatthechangerequires thatexpensesbeawardedunless theconductof the

losing party or person is found to havebeen substantiallyjustified. SeeDevaney v.



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ContlAmer.Ins.Co.,989F.2d1154,1159(11thCir.1993)([t]herulewastoughenedin

1970 tomandate that expensesbeawardedunless the conductof the losingpartyor

person is found to havebeen substantiallyjustified). As one acclaimed treatise has

noted,[t]hegreatoperativeprincipleofRule37(a)(5)isthattheloserpays.8BCharles

AlanWright,ArthurMiller&RichardMarcus,FederalPracticeandProcedure2288

(3ded.2010);seealsoBrownv.StateofIowa,152F.R.D.168,173(S.D.Iowa1993).

WhenatrialcourtgrantsaRule37motiontocompel,then itmaynotdenyan

awardoffeesunlessitdiscussesandappliesthecorrectlegalstandard.SlepToneEntmt

Corp.v.Johnson,518F.Appx815 (11thCir.2013) (reversingorderdenyingattorneys

feesbecause the trial court did not analyze the fees award under the ruleimposed

standardandnotingthatthedesiretoendthelitigationbetweentheseparties,while

understandable,isnotaproperreasontodeny...attorneysfees).

Theburdenofestablishingsubstantialjustification(orotherexception)isonthe

losingparty.KramerScientificLab.Prods.Corp.v.GolfMed.Corp.,No.1161610CIV,2011

WL5914255,at*2(S.D.Fla.Nov.28,2011)(Rosenbaum,J.)(internalcitationsomitted).

Whetherapartywassubstantiallyjustifiedinresistingdiscoveryisdeterminedbyan

objectivestandardofreasonablenessanddoesnotrequirethatthepartyhaveactedin

good faith. Underdog Trucking, L.L.C. v. Verizon Servs. Corp., 273 F.R.D. 372, 377

(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (internal citations omitted). Substantialjustification is present when

reasonable people could differ as to the appropriateness of the contested action.



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Devaney,989F.2dat1163(quotingPiercev.Underwood,487U.S.552,565(1988));seealso

Maddowv.Procter&GambleCo., Inc.,107F.3d847,853 (11thCir.1997).Acourt isnot

required to find that a party or counsel acted inbad faithbefore awarding Rule 37

attorneysfees.Devaney,989F.2dat116162.

Given Procaps position that Patheons fee request is obscenely inflated and

eyepopping, it is appropriate to note that a party cannot litigate tenaciously and

thenbeheardtocomplainaboutthetimenecessarilyspentbythe[opposingparty]in

response.CityofRiversidev.Rivera,477U.S.561,580n.11(1986)(internalcitationand

quotationsomitted).

B. AnalysisIf a court grants in part and denies in part a discovery motion, then it may

apportionthereasonableexpensesbetweentheparties.Fed.R.Civ.P.37(a)(5)(C).That

is the scenario herebecause Patheons motions to compel were granted in part and

deniedinpart.[ECFNo.146].Consequently,theCourtwillrevisitthepartiesdiscovery

dispute on a requestbyrequestbasis to determine which party prevailed on each

requestandifthelosingpartycanavailitselfofoneofRule37sexceptions.

Asathresholdmatter,theCourtrejectseachpartysaccusationthattheotherdid

notmakeagoodfaithattempt to resolve thediscoverydispute.The record indicates

thatthepartiesengagedinnumerousdiscussionsregardingthediscoverydispute.[See,

e.g.,ECFNos.1323;1324;1325;15317].Thus,thisRule37exceptionisnotavailableto



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either party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A)(i). That means that the only two possible

exceptionsherearewhetherthelosingpartywassubstantiallyjustifiedinitsdiscovery

positionorifthecircumstancesmakeanawardofexpensesunjust.

i. PatheonsMotiontoCompelProcapstoAnswerInterrogatories1. Interrogatory13

Interrogatory13relatedtoProcapsgoodwillandreputationdamages.[ECFNo.

1342, pp. 67]. Procaps objected to the interrogatory on the basis that it sought

information that was developedby Procaps experts. [ECF No. 138, p. 2]. But after

Patheonfileditsmotiontocompel,Procaps,initsresponseinopposition,withdrewits$25

millionclaimforgoodwillandreputationdamages.[Id.;ECFNo.1348,pp.1012].At

the discovery hearing, the parties agreed that Procaps concession mooted this

interrogatory.[ECFNo.147,pp.78].

Patheonnowseeksattorneys fees for the time incurred in filing themotion to

compelrelatedtothisinterrogatory.ProcapsarguesthatawardingPatheonfeesforthis

mooted interrogatory would constitute unsound public policy because it would

encourage litigants to not compromise like it did by dropping its goodwill and

reputationdamages.[ECFNo.160,pp.1415].

While Procaps policy argument sounds appealing, it ignores the policy

articulated in Rule 37. Specifically, the Rule makes clear that an expense award is

required if the disclosure or requested discovery is provided after the motion was



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filed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A) (emphasis added);Reyes v.Wyeth, Inc., No. 03CV

20471,2011WL4389896,at *3 (S.D.Fla.Sept.21,2011).That iswhathappenedhere.

Procaps dropped its goodwill and reputation damages only after Patheon filed its

motion.Settingasidethefactthatdroppinga$25millionelementofadamagesclaimin

a response toadiscoverymotion is, to say the least, slightlyunorthodox,Procapshas

provided no explanation as to why it could not have made this concession in the

numerous meet and confer meetings and communications before Patheon filed its

motion.AllthatProcapssaysisthatPatheonwasonnoticethatProcapsdamagesclaim

wassubjecttochangebasedonexperttestimony.[ECFNo.160,p.15].Butthatisnot

very illuminating or persuasivebecause it does not explain when Procaps knew, or

shouldhaveknown,thatitdidnothaveasoundbasisforthesedamages.

As a result, the Court finds that Patheon is the prevailing party on this

interrogatory.TheCourtfurtherfindsthatProcapswasnotsubstantiallyjustifiedinits

discoverypositionandthattherearenoothercircumstanceswhichmakeanawardof

expensesforthisinterrogatoryunjust.

2. Interrogatory15Patheon requested that Procaps identify specific products, services, customers,

etc.,thatweresubjectedtomarketdivisionorpricefixingbyPatheon.[ECFNo.1342,

p. 7]. Procaps argued that it should not have to provide this information because

Patheonhasit,asPatheonistheonewhowasandisallocatingmarketsandcustomers.



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[ECFNo.138,pp.45].TheCourtgrantedPatheonsrequest.[ECFNo.146,p.2].Asthe

Courtstatedatthehearing,thiswasastraightforwardcontentiontypeinterrogatoryfor

whichPatheonwasentitledtogetananswer.[ECFNo.147,pp.4649;5354].

Procaps argues that Patheon is not entitled to attorneys fees for this

interrogatorybecause Procaps answer (every single customer, service, product, etc.)

hasbeen conveyed in its other discovery responses and in its correspondence with

Patheons counsel. [ECF No. 160, pp. 57]. According to Procaps, because Patheon

receivedthesameanswerithadbeforebyvirtueofProcapspriordiscoveryresponses

tootherdiscoveryrequests,Patheondidnotinfactprevail.

Procaps argument attempts to focus on the substance of its response to the

interrogatory.Butthatsnottheissue.Theissueiswhatwasthebasisfornotanswering

the interrogatory.Inthatrespect,Procapsargument isunavailing.IfProcapsanswer

was every single customer, service, product, etc., then, as the Court noted, it simply

couldhavesaidthat.[ECFNo.147,p.54].Asaresult,theCourtfindsthatPatheonis

the prevailing party on this interrogatory and that Procaps position was not

substantiallyjustifiedandthattherearenoothercircumstanceswhichmakeanaward

ofexpensesforthisinterrogatoryunjust.

3. Interrogatory17Likeinterrogatory13,interrogatory17wasmootedbyProcapswithdrawalofits

claim forgoodwilland reputationdamages. [ECFNos.138,pp.23;147,pp.78].As



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such,thesameanalysisapplicabletointerrogatory13isapplicabletointerrogatory17.

Accordingly,theCourtfindsthatPatheonistheprevailingpartyonthisinterrogatory

and thatProcaps positionwasnot substantiallyjustifiedand that therearenoother

circumstanceswhichmakeanawardofexpensesforthisinterrogatoryunjust.

4. Interrogatory18Interrogatory18wasmootedbecauseProcapswithdrewitsclaimforreputation

andgoodwilldamagesandbecauseitagreedtoproduceits2013financialinformation

byadatecertain(October17,2013).[ECFNos.138,p.3;146,p.3;147,p.7].Asaresult,

theCourtfindsthatPatheonistheprevailingpartyonthisinterrogatory.Totheextent

thattheinterrogatorywasmootedbyProcapswithdrawingitsclaimforreputationand

goodwilldamages,theanalysisfrominterrogatory13isapplicable.Thus,Procapswas

notsubstantiallyjustified innotansweringthis interrogatoryonthatbasis.TheCourt

willexaminetheotherbasisforthemootnessoftheinterrogatory Procapsagreement

toproduceits2013financialinformation inmoredetail.

Several discovery disputes related to Procaps ability or desire to produce its

2013financialinformation.Initsrespectiveresponsestothemotionstocompel,Procaps

agreedthatitwouldproducethisinformationwhenitbecameavailable.[ECFNos.138,

p.3;139,p.7].Procaps iscorrect that in themeetandconferrals itnever said that it

wouldnotproducethisinformation.[ECFNo.138,p.3].Buttheconverseisalsotrue:it

didnotunequivocallystate that itwouldproduce the2013 financial information. [See



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ECF Nos. 1344, p. 11; 1345, pp. 23]. Rather, Procaps counsel was vague and non

committalabout theproductionof the2013 information. [SeeECFNo.1345,pp.23].

Andevenwhenitagreedtoproducetheinformation(initsresponsestothemotionsto

compel),Procapsdidnotstatewhenitwouldproduceitorexplainwhyithadnotdone

soalready.[SeeECFNos.138,p.3;139,p.7].

Atthediscoveryhearing,ProcapscounselstatedthatProcapswouldproduceits

2013financialinformationandexplainedindetailthereasonforthedelayinproducing

this information. According to Procaps counsel, because Procaps is a Colombian

companyitdoesnothavethesamereportingobligationsasapubliclytradedcompany

here in the United States. [ECF No. 147, pp. 10304]. Therefore, at the time of the

hearing,Procapswas still in the process ofputting its first semester 2013 financial

informationtogether.[Id.atpp.10304,11516].Statedanotherway,Procapssimplydid

nothavethe2013financialinformationtoproduceandwouldnothavebeenexpected

tohave itunderColombian law.Procapscounselalsoexplainedthat in the lastmeet

and confer (September24, 2013) with Patheons counsel, they explained toPatheons

counsel that the 2013 financial information was not prepared yet and would be

produced when it was completed. [Id. at p. 116; ECF No. 160, pp. 1112]. Procaps

counseldidnot state that theyexplained toPatheonscounselwhy the2013 financial

informationhadnotbeenpreparedyet,however.



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On its face, Procaps reason for the delay in producing its 2013 financial

information seems defensible. If this information had not yetbeen prepared in the

course of Procaps normalbusiness operationsbecause of applicable Colombian law,

then it wouldbe difficult to fault Procaps for not producing what it does not have.

Indeed, if Procaps had expressly committed to Patheon that it would produce this

informationandexplained thereason for thedelay, thenPatheonwouldbe theparty

havingtoexplainwhyitfiledamotiontocompeltogetthisinformation.Butthatsnot

whathappened.

Despitemultipleopportunities todo so,Procapsdidnotunequivocallyadvise

Patheonthatitwouldproducethe2013financialinformationuntilSeptember24,2013

(wellafterPatheonsmotionwasfiled)anddidntexplaintoPatheonwhytherewasa

delay. [ECF Nos. 1324, pp. 11, 13; 1326, pp. 23; 15317; 160, pp. 1112]. Nor did

Procaps take the position that Patheon was not entitled to this information. Rather,

ProcapsresponsetoPatheonsrepeatedinquiriesforthisinformationwas,essentially,

the ubiquitous well get back to you on that. After specifically pressing for this

informationand receivingnoncommittal responses [see, e.g.,ECFNo.1326,pp.23],

Patheonwasforcedtofilethemotion.

Therefore,themotionresultedinjudicialinterventiontoresolvewhatisactually

anonissue.Thisispreciselyoneofthekindsofproblemsthatthemeetandconferrules

wereintendedtoprevent.RoyalBahamianAssn,Inc.v.QBEIns.Corp.,744F.Supp.2d



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1297,130102&n.7 (S.D.Fla.2010).Thus, theCourt finds that there isno substantial

justificationforProcapsdiscoveryposition.

Nevertheless (because the Court is adopting an extremely onetime lenient

approachtowardProcapslessthanclear,equivocalresponses),theCourtfindsthatthe

uniquecircumstancesheremakeanawardofexpensesagainstProcapsunjust.Tobe

sure,ProcapsshouldhavebeenclearerwithPatheonsoonerregardingtheproduction

of the 2013 financial information.But it isdifficult for the Court to fault Procaps for

failingtoproduce,ornotcommittingtoproducebyadatecertain,somethingitwasnot

obligated toalreadyhavecreated in itsnormalbusinessoperationsunderColombian

law.Ofcourse,Procapscouldeasilyandtimelyhavesaid,our2013financialsarenot

yetpreparedand theywillnotbeprepareduntilat least [date certain].Asa result,

whiletheCourtfindsthatPatheonistheprevailingpartyandthatProcapsdiscovery

position was not substantially justified, the Court declines to award fees against

Procaps resulting from the delayed production of its 2013 financial information. For

future discovery disputes, the Court will likely not adopt such a flexible position

toward a party who does not clearly articulate its discovery position in response to

repeatedrequeststodoso.

5. Interrogatory19Patheon requested that for each document Procaps had produced to identify

whichof thosedocuments contained confidential informationand todescribehow



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Procaps was, or willbe, harmedby Patheons use of the document outside of the

Collaboration Agreement. [ECF No. 13413, p. 6]. Procaps objected to the request as

undulyburdensomebecauseofthelargevolumeofconfidentialinformationexchanged

bythepartiesintheduediligenceperiodleadingtotheCollaborationAgreementand

undertheCollaborationAgreement.[Id.].TheCourtgrantedinpartanddeniedinpart

therequest.[ECFNo.146,pp.23].

Insum,Patheonwon inthatProcapswasrequiredtospecifywhatconfidential

information it knows was misused and to specify the documents containing that

misusedconfidentialinformation.[ECFNo.147,p.69].ButProcapsalsowonbecauseit

wasnotrequiredtogobackthroughallthedocumentsitproducedandidentifywhich

ones contained confidential information. [Id.]. Under these circumstances, the Court

findsthatneitherpartyprevailedonthisdiscoveryrequestand,assuch,neitherpartyis

entitledtoanexpenseawardforthisrequest.

ii. PatheonsMotion toCompelProcaps toRespond toPatheonsRequestsforProduction

In its discovery order [ECF No. 146], the Court paired some Patheon requests

togetherinitsdiscoveryrulings.ForpurposesofthisOrder,theCourthaskeptsomeof

thesepairingsandsegregatedotherswhereappropriate.

1. RequestforProductionNumbers29,42Like interrogatory18, theserequestsrelated to theproductionofProcaps2013

financial information. As such, the relevant analysis applicable to interrogatory 18 is



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20

applicablehere.Accordingly,theCourtfindsthatPatheonistheprevailingpartyasto

theserequestsandthatProcapspositionwasnotsubstantiallyjustified.ButtheCourt

findsthatthecircumstancesaresuchtomakeanawardofexpensesfortheserequests

unjust.

2. RequestforProductionNumbers30,31ThesetworequestsrelatedtoProcapsfinancialprojections.TheCourtfashioned

a resolution where both parties would exchange their projections for their softgel

businessinsideandoutsidetheterritoryandfield.[ECFNos.146,p.4;147,pp.111

15].Inthisregard,Patheonwonandlost.Patheonwonbecauseitsucceededincausing

Procapstofinallyproduceitsprojections.ButPatheonalsolostbecauseitdidntobtain

what itoriginallywanted:allofProcapsbusinessandoperationsprojections,notjust

thoseinthefieldandterritory.[ECFNos.1324,p.14;15318,pp.56].Underthese

circumstances,theCourtfindsitunjusttoawardexpensesagainsteitherparty.

3. RequestforProductionNumber32ThisrequestwasmootedbecauseProcapsrepresentedatthehearingthatithad

nodocumentsresponsivetothisrequest.[ECFNo.147,pp.10407].Likeinterrogatory

13, this isanother example of a nonissue that should havebeen resolvedbefore the

hearingandbeforePatheonfileditsmotion.Asaresult,theCourtfindsthatPatheonis

theprevailing party as to this request. The Court further finds that Procaps was not



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21

substantiallyjustifiedinitsdiscoverypositionandthattherearenoothercircumstances

whichmakeanawardofexpensesforthisrequestunjust.

4. RequestforProductionNumber34Patheon sought a duplicate of Procaps database that tracks or includesbids,

opportunities,wins,lossesorsalesofSoftgelproductsormanufacturingservices.[ECF

No. 13214, pp. 45]. Procaps objected to this request on the grounds that it was

overbroad,burdensome, and not feasible. [Id.; ECF No. 147, p. 134]. At the hearing,

Procapscounsel stated thathedidnotknowanythingabout thecostsofduplicating

thedatabase,butthatheventureditmightbeinthetensifnothundredsofthousands

ofdollars.[ECFNo.147,pp.12728].Assuch,theCourtreservedrulingonthisrequest

and ordered Procaps to submit an affidavit detailing the costs of producing the

requesteddatabase.[ECFNo.146].

Procaps filed the required affidavit. [ECF Nos. 159; 1591]. Procaps affidavit

severely undermined its counsels discovery position regarding the database. For

instance,theaffidavitrevealedthattherewereinfactthreedatabases,notonedatabase,

andthat,forthemostpart,thefeasibilityofgrantingPatheonaccesstoorduplicatinga

databasediffered fromdatabase todatabase. [ECFNo.175].Evenmore startling, the

affidavitrevealedthatoneProcapsdatabasecouldbeexportedwithlessthanonehour

oftimeexpendedbyaProcapsemployee afarcryfromProcapscounselsunduly

burdensome objection. [Id. at pp. 23 n.2]. After reviewing the affidavit, the Court



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22

grantedPatheonsrequest inprincipal,butrequired theparties tomeetandconfer to

try and work out the logistics of the database production. [See ECF No. 175].

Fortunately,thepartieswereabletoresolvetheirlogisticalissues.[ECFNo.188].

TheCourt finds thatPatheon is theprevailingparty.TheCourtalso finds that

Procapswasnot substantiallyjustified in itsdiscoverypositionand that thereareno

circumstanceswhichmakeanawardofexpensesforthisrequestunjust.

5. RequestforProductionNumbers35,51Patheonwithdrew these tworequestsafterProcapsconcessionsat thehearing

regardingpursuingaruleofreasonantitrustclaim,anditsrepresentationthatithas

producedallresponsivedocumentstorequest51.[ECFNo.147,pp.84101].Eachparty

arguesthattheother isatfaultforfailing toresolvetheruleofreason issueduring

the various meet and conferrals. [ECF Nos. 160, pp. 910; 179, pp. 1314]. The Court

disagrees.Atthehearing,theruleofreasonissuewaslikelythemostcontentiousand

drawnoutissuebetweentheparties.TheCourtisnotconfidentthatthepartiescould

haveresolvedthisissuewithouttheCourtshelpinbrokeringtheresolutionsreachedat

thehearing.

Moreover, the Court understands both parties positions. Patheon wants an

answersoonerratherthanlateronthekindofantitrustclaimithastodefend.Procaps,

ontheotherhand,wantstohaveallitsoptionsavailableforaslongaspossible.Tobe

sure,Procapshadtochoosewhichwayitwouldgoatsomepointintime.[ECFNo.98,



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23

p.42].Butwhenitultimatelyhadtodosoisamatterreasonablepeoplecoulddifferon.

Asaresult,theCourtfindsthatneitherpartyprevailedonthisdiscoveryrequestand,

assuch,neitherpartyisentitledtoanexpenseawardforthisrequest.

6. RequestforProductionNumber40TheCourtdenied thisrequestbecause it found therequestdidnot specify the

actualfinancialdocumentswhichPatheonwasseeking.[ECFNos.146,pp.34;147,pp.

12124].Therefore,Procapswouldbeentitledtofeesif,amongotherthings,Patheons

discoveryrequestwasnotsubstantiallyjustified.To thatend,while theCourtdenied

this requestbecause it found it inartful, the Court did find that Patheon wouldbe

entitled to propound additional requests seeking these specific documents. [ECF No.

147, p. 124]. Consequently, the Court finds that Patheons discovery position was

substantiallyjustifiedanddeclinestoawardProcapsexpensesforthisrequest.

7. RequestforProductionNumber50Like interrogatories 13 and 17, this Patheon discovery request was mootedby

Procapswithdrawalofitsclaimforgoodwillandreputationdamages.[ECFNos.139,

pp. 45; 147, pp. 7879]. Therefore, the same analysis applicable to those two

interrogatories is applicable here. Accordingly, the Court finds that Patheon is the

prevailingpartyandthatProcapspositionwasnotsubstantiallyjustifiedandthatthere

arenoothercircumstanceswhichmakeanawardofexpensesforthisrequestunjust.



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C. ConclusionTherewere15discoveryrequestsatissue.Assetforthabove,theCourtfindsthat

ProcapsisnotentitledtoanexpenseawardonanydiscoveryrequestandthatPatheon

isentitledtoanexpenseawardon6ofthe15requests.Therefore,theCourtfindsthat

Patheonisentitledtorecoveronly6/15(or40%)ofthetimeitspentonthisdiscovery

dispute.SeeCalDiveIntl,Inc.v.M/VTzimin(ExStenaSeahorse),127F.R.D.213,21718

(S.D.Ala.1989) ([t]heapportionmentof reasonableexpensesby themagistrateona

70%/30%basiswasfactuallyacceptableandlegallypermissible);accordS2Automation

LLCv.MicronTech.,Inc.,No.CIV110884JB/WDS,2012WL3656454,at*4243(D.N.M.

Aug.9,2012).

III. DISCUSSION:AMOUNTOFATTORNEYSFEESPatheon states that its actual attorneys fees for this discovery dispute totaled

$328,632.50. [SeeECF Nos. 15330; 1832]. But it states that it adopted a conservative

approach and discounted its original request by $67,153, for a total request of

$261,479.50.6 [See ECF No. 153, pp. 1419]. Thebreakdown of the attorney time and

hourlyratesPatheonseeksisasfollows:

6 Patheons supplemental request for attorneys fees included time incurred for

preparingthefeesrequest.[ECFNos.1831;1832].This time,alsoknownasfeeson

fees,isgenerallycompensable.See,e.g.,Minorv.Christies,Inc.,No.C0805445WHA,

2011WL902235,at*2223(N.D.Cal.Jan.29,2011)reportandrecommendationadopted,No.

C0805445WHA,2011WL902033(N.D.Cal.Mar.14,2011)



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AttorneyYearsin

Practice

Requested

HourlyRate

Requested

Time

Marc

Schildkraut37 $995 51.0

MichaelKlisch 23 $945 54.6

RobertCahill 18 $785 50.2

MaryKathryn

Kelley20 $740 26.2

MazdaAntia 13 $685 5.0

GraceKwon 8 $670 79.1

JoshuaSiegel 7 $665 38.5

Sarah

Talkovsky1 $355 51.6

ProcapsobjectstoPatheonsfeerequest.[ECFNo.160,pp.1619].Amongother

things,ProcapsclaimsthatPatheonstimeentriesareexorbitant,itshourlyratesaretoo

high,andthatPatheonisnotentitledtorecoverfeesfortimespentduringthemeetand

conferprocess.

A.GeneralLegalPrinciplesThe

most

useful

starting

point

for

determining

the

amount

of

areasonable

fee

is

thenumberofhoursreasonablyexpendedonthelitigationmultipliedbyareasonable

hourlyrate.Hensleyv.Eckerhart,461U.S.424,434 (1983).Thisamount isordinarily

referred toas the lodestar.Thorntonv.Wolpoff&Abramson,L.L.P.,312F.Appx161,



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26

16364 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal citations and quotations omitted). The resulting fee

carries a presumption that it is reasonable. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984). In

computingthelodestar,theCourtmustfirstdeterminethereasonablehourlyrate.Once

the hourly rate is set, the Court must determine the reasonable number of hours

expended.

Because the fees requested are significant and comparatively voluminous, the

Court isnot required toengage inanhourbyhouranalysis.Lorangerv.Stierheim,10

F.3d776,783(11thCir.1994).

B. Analysis:ReasonableHourlyRatei. ApplicableLegalPrinciples

A reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing market rate in the relevant legal

community for similar services by attorneys with reasonably comparable skills,

experience,andreputation.Normanv.Hous.Auth.ofCityofMontgomery,836F.2d1292,

1299 (11th Cir. 1988). The fee applicantbears theburden of establishing the claimed

marketrate.SeeACLUofGeorgiav.Barnes,168F.3d423,427(11thCir.1999).Generally,

the relevant market for purposes of determining the reasonable hourly rate for an

attorneys services is the place where the case is filed, id. at 437 (internal citation

omitted), provided that local attorneys have the skills to handle the specific type of

matter at issue. SeeMaceira v.Pagan, 698 F.2d 38, 40 (1st Cir. 1983). A fee applicant

seekingtorecoverthenonlocalrateofanattorneywhoisnotfromtheplaceinwhich



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27

thecasewasfiledmustshowalackofattorneyspracticinginthatplacewhoarewilling

andabletohandleitsclaims.Barnes,168F.3dat437.Aprevailingpartyisnotentitledto

havethelosingpartypayforanattorneywiththemostexpertiseonagivenlegalissue,

regardlessofprice;instead,aprevailingplaintiffmayrecovermarketratefeesonlyfor

anattorneywithreasonableexpertise.Id.

In determining the prevailing market rate, the Court should consider several

factors includingtheattorneyscustomaryfee,theskillrequiredtoperformthe legal

services,theattorneysexperience,reputationandability,thetimeconstraintsinvolved,

preclusion of other employment, contingency, the undesirability of the case, the

attorneysrelationship to theclient,andawards insimilarcases.Malloryv.Harkness,

923F.Supp.1546,1555(S.D.Fla.1996)(referringtofactorssetoutinJohnsonv.Georgia

HighwayExpress,Inc.,488F.2d714,71718(5thCir.1974),abrogatedinpartbyBlanchardv.

Bergeron,489U.S.87,90(1989)).TheCourtmayuseitsownexperienceinassessingthe

reasonablenessofattorneysfeesandmayformanindependentjudgmenteitherwithor

without witnesses. Loranger, 10 F.3d at 781; see also Crescenzo v. Healthcare Revenue

RecoveryGrp.,LLC,No.1160384CIV,2012WL291431,at*2(S.D.Fla.Jan.31,2012).

ii. AnalysisHere,Patheonhasnotsatisfieditsburdenthatitshourlyratesareinlinewiththe

prevailing local market rates. While the Court acknowledges the experience and

credentialsofthedefenseattorneysrepresentingPatheon,theCourtnotesthatthefee



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requestsandsupportingmaterialsdonotcontainevidencesuggesting thatanyof the

requestedhourlybillableratesareconsistentwiththeprevailingmarketratein[South

Florida]forsimilarservicesbylawyersofreasonablycomparableskills,experienceand

reputation. Loranger, 10 F.3d at 781. Procaps filed this case in Florida, yet Patheon

requestsWashington,D.C.hourly rates,whichareamong thehighest in thecountry.

Hourlybillingrates,however,mustbebasedontheprevailinglocalmarketrate,notthe

billingratesinanothergeographicallydistinctmarket.NorhasPatheondemonstrateda

lackofSouthFloridaattorneyswhocoulddefenditinthislawsuitatsignificantlylower

localrates.SeeLilJoeWeinMusic,Inc.,v.Jackson,No.0620079,2008WL2688117,at*10

(S.D.Fla.July1,2008).

Patheons requested rates are well above those used in South Florida by

attorneys practicing sophisticated commercial litigation. For instance, Procaps law

firm, Carlton Fields, submitted an affidavit establishing that their attorneys hourly

ratesfortheinstantcasearelower.Specifically,AlanRosenthal,aFloridaBarmember

since1976, isbilling$590.63perhourforthiscase;ChrisCoutroulis,whohasbeen in

practicesince1980,isusinganhourlyrateof$678.13;DonaldSchmidt,whohasbeenin

practice since1979, isbeingbilledat$481.25perhour;D.MatthewAllen, inpractice

since 1990, is using $520.63 per hour; Natalie Carlos, who hasbeen practicing since

1988,isbillingat$485.63perhour;MacMcCoy,whohasbeenpracticingsince2001,is



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29

billingat$395.007perhour;andJoannaGarcia,whoearnedherJ.D. in2000, isbeing

billedat$371.88perhour.8

Ingeneral,mostoftheCarltonFieldsattorneys involved inthiscasehavemore

yearsofexperiencethantheCooleyattorneysworkingonthismatter.

Moreover, there does not appear to be a significant difference in relevant

experiencebetween the attorneys involved in the case. For example, Mr. Schildkraut

spent 17 years as an assistant director of the Federal Trade Commissions Bureau of

Competition,wherehedirected investigationsofmergers.Incontrast,Mr.Coutroulis,

the Carlton Fields antitrust law specialist, is board certified in antitrust and trade

regulationlawbytheFloridaBar,wasafoundingmemberoftheFloridaBarAntitrust

and Trade Regulation Certification Committee, and has written on antitrust issues.

7 ThesupplementaldeclarationexplainsthattheinitialdeclarationdidnotincludeMr.McCoystimebecausehewasnotinvolvedinpreparingProcapsresponsestothe

motions to compel or preparing for the hearing on the motions. Because the Court

ordered(onceagain)Procaps to list the time incurred inthemeetandconferprocess,

thesupplementaldeclarationincludeshistimebecausehewasinvolvedinthisactivity.

Mr.McCoygraduatedfromlawschoolin2001.Inthatregard,hehassimilarexperience

toMr.Antia,aCooleyattorneywhograduated in2000.Mr.McCoy,aCarltonFields

shareholder,hadastandardhourlyrateof$395.Mr.Antia,aCooleypartner,hada$685

hourly rate. But, tobe complete in this comparison, Mr. McCoy isbased in Tampa,

wherethehourlybillingratesaregenerallylowerthaninMiami.

8 Inasupplementaldeclaration [ECFNo.2011]requiredby theCourt,Procaps

leadtrialcounselsummarizedhisfirmsstandardratesandexplainedthattheratesin

thiscasewerediscountedby12.5%fromthefirms2012standardrates.InSeptember1,

2013,CarltonFieldsincreaseditsstandardratesbutdidnotincreasetheratescharged

toProcaps.



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30

Therefore, it seems as though each side is represented by experienced, competent

counselwhohavesubstantiallysimilarbackgroundsandexperiences.

Forpurposesofevaluating thereasonablenessofPatheonsoutofdistrictrates

totheratestypicallychargedbySouthFloridafirms, it ishelpful tocomparethemto

Procapsattorneysrates,whicharenotedabove.ButtheCourtwillnotsimplyadopt

thehourlyratesusedbycomparableCarltonFieldsattorneysforthetimeincurredby

theCooleylawyers,astheCourtfindsthatCarltonFieldsratesareonthehighsidefor

theSouthFloridalegalmarket.

Whendetermining thehourly fee, theCourtmuststep[] into theshoesof the

reasonable,payingclient,whowishestopaytheleastamountnecessarytolitigatethe

caseeffectively.ArborHillConcernedCitizensNeighborhoodAssnv.Cnty.ofAlbany,522

F.3d182,184(2dCir.2008)(emphasisadded);TiaraCondo.Assn,Inc.v.MarshUSA,Inc.,

697F.Supp.2d1349,1364(S.D.Fla.2010)(internalcitationsomitted).Tobesure,there

areSouthFlorida law firmswhich charge the samehourly feesas theCarltonFields

attorneys.AndthereareSouthFloridafirmswhichattimeschargehigherhourlyrates.

But therearealso similarlyexperiencedandcompetent law firmswhichcharge lower

hourlyrates,andthosearetheratestobeusedwhencalculatinganhourlyfeesaward.

UponreviewofthematerialssubmittedandinconsiderationoftheCourtsown

knowledgeof the localmarket,Loranger,10F.3dat781, theCourt finds the following



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31

hourlyratesreasonableforasophisticatedfederalantitrustcaseinaSouthFloridafiled

federalcase(andthechartbelowalsoreflectsthecorrespondingrequestedrates):

Attorney Requested

HourlyRateAwarded

Hourly

Rate

Marc

Schildkraut$995 $565

MichaelKlisch $945 $515

RobertCahill $785 $425

MaryKathryn

Kelley $740 $410

MazdaAntia $685 $395

GraceKwon $670 $285

JoshuaSiegel $665 $260

SarahTalkovsky

$355

$220

See, e.g.,GolfClubsAway, LLC v.HostwayCorp., No. 1162326CIV, 2012 WL 2912709

(S.D.Fla.July16,2012)(awardingArthurMiller(nationallyknown lawprofessorand

authorofleadingfederalpracticetreatise)only$500perhoureventhoughherequested

$995per

hour);

MKT

Reps

S.A.

De

C.V.

v.

Standard

Chartered

Bank

Intl

(Americas)

Ltd.,

No.1022963CIV,2013WL1289261(S.D.Fla.Mar.28,2013)(findingratesofattorneys

atlargeMiamibasedfirmtobeexcessiveandloweringhourlyratesfrom$610to$500

andfrom$475to$350);Hermosillav.CocaColaCo.,No.1021418CIV,2011WL9364952



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32

(S.D.Fla.July15,2011),aff d,492F.Appx73(11thCir.2012)(usingblendedrateof$425

forattorneysinmultinationalfirm).

The Courtset hourly fees are appropriate for a comparatively complicated

federalantitrustlawsuitinvolvingentitiesintwodifferentcountries.TheCourtisinno

way suggesting or even implying that these hourly rates would apply to a garden

varietybreachofcontractlawsuitoraroutinecommerciallitigationcase.

C. Analysis:ReasonableHoursExpendedNowthatthehourlyrateshavebeenestablished,theanalysisshiftstoPatheons

requestedtime.Inthatvein,Procapsobjectstoanentirecategoryoftimeitsaysshould

notbeincludedintheattorneysfeecalculation Patheonstimespentin,andrelated

to,themandatorymeetandconfermeetings.ProcapsarguesthatPatheonshouldnotbe

awarded fees for the76.8hoursof time itsattorneys incurred in themeetandconfer

process.[ECFNo.160,pp.1617].

Procaps does not cite any onpoint, applicable law to support its position. Its

relianceonTollettv.CityofKemah,285F.3d357(5thCir.2002),isunhelpful.Thatcase

concernedcostsincurredinpreparingdiscoveryrequests,anitemforwhichPatheonis

notseekingfeesandwhichissignificantlydifferentthantimePatheonwasrequiredto

spendinthemeetandconferprocessasapreconditiontofilingmotionstocompel.Id.

at36869.InTollett,thecourtexplainedthatfeesincurredinpreparingtheunderlying

discovery requests were not causedby any failure to complybecause those fees



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33

wouldhavebeen incurredeven if therehadnotbeenadiscoverydispute. Id.at368.

Thus, the court reasoned that those fees were not recoverable. Id. at 36869. But this

common sense findinghasnobearingonwhether the time incurred in themeetand

conferprocess whichwasgeneratedbythediscoverydispute iscompensable.

TheCourtfindspersuasivetheanalysisprovidedinWoodlandv.Viacom,Inc.,255

F.R.D. 278 (D.D.C. 2008). There, the court ordered the plaintiff to pay all reasonable

attorneysfeesandcostsincurredbythedefendantinfilingamotiontocompel.Some

ofthefeesrequestedwerefortimeexpendedbydefensecounselpreparingemailsand

placing telephone calls toopposing counsel.Theplaintiffobjected toa feeaward for

thosetimeentries.

Inawardingfeesforthoseemailsandphonecalls,thecourtfoundthatanear

but for relationship must existbetween [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] Rule 37

violationsandtheactivityforwhichfeesandexpensesareawarded.Id.at283(internal

citations and quotations omitted). In addition, the court held that [a] party is only

entitledtocompensationfortheworkthatisusefulandofatypeordinarilynecessary

to secure the final resultobtained from the litigation. Id. (internalcitationsomitted).

Becausedefensecounselengagedintheactivitiestocomplywithalocalrulerequiringa

prefiling conference and because the court also required counsel to arrange a

conferencecallwiththecourt,theywereusefulandofatypeordinarilynecessaryto

filethemotiontocompel.Id.at284.



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In the instant case,both the Local Rules and this Courts discovery practices

orderrequiredtheprefilingmeetandconfermeetings.Therefore,Patheonsmeetand

confer activities meet the useful and of a type ordinarily necessary test, thereby

entitlingPatheontorecoverreasonableattorneysfeesforitsmeetandconferactivities.

Asexplainedabove, the timePatheon incurred in themeetandconferprocess

wasnecessary,reasonableand,ingeneral,compensable.But,settingasidethemeetand

confer time, Procaps contends that Patheons attorneys did not otherwise work

efficiently.ItnotesthatPatheonscounseladvisedtheCourtthateverylawyeronthis

teamworkedon thediscovery litigation, therebycreatingwhatProcapsdescribesas

numerous inefficiencies. Procaps takes issue with the numerous conferences for

whichPatheon is seeking attorneys fees, arguing thatthe Cooley lawyers spent far

moretimetalkingaboutthemotionsthanactuallydraftingthem.[ECFNo.160,p.18].

Procaps also argues that Patheons counsel engaged in duplicative work, which it

brandsasredundantorunnecessary.

Procapsalsoobjectstotheamountoffeesrequestedbecauseitsaysthefeesare

grossly disproportionate to the work needed on only two motions to compel. As

discussedabove,however,themotionstocompelarenottherunofthemill,standard

motionswhicharemoretypicallyfiledinthisdistrict.Therefore,themerefactthatthe

litigationeventsat issueare twomotions to compel isnot controllingor particularly

persuasiveinassessingthereasonablenessofthetime.



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TheCourtdoesnotdoubtthatPatheonsattorneysworkedallthehourslistedin

thebillingrecords.Nevertheless,itisalsoclearthatanentireteamofattorneysworked

onthediscoverydisputeandthatsomeofthetimespentwasinefficientlyincurred.For

example, Procaps argues that Patheons attorneys spent an excessive 32 hoursjust

editingthetwo5pagebriefsandone10pagereply.[ECFNo.160,p.17].

There is, of course, nothing inherently unreasonable about a client having

multipleattorneys.And it iscertainlynotunusual inamajor lawsuit likethisone for

law firms to assign a team of attorneys, ranging from senior partners to junior

associates, to the case.Butwhenmultipleattorneysare involved in representingone

client in litigation, there isalways theriskof inherent inefficiencies.Thus, inorder to

recovertimeformultipleattorneys,thefeeapplicantbearstheburdenofshowingthat

thetimespentbythoseattorneysreflectsthedistinctcontributionofeachlawyertothe

caseandthecustomarypracticeofmultiplelawyerlitigation.Barnes,168F.3dat432.

Patheon may have instructed its attorneys to pursue a leavenostone

unturned approach for this case (in general) or for the discovery dispute (in

particular), and the firm may have followed its clients instructions. Or maybe the

Cooleyattorneysadoptthislitigationphilosophyineverycase.Ormaybetheypursued

thisapproachonlyforthiscase.TheCourtisnotfaultingPatheonsattorneysforbeing

comprehensiveandexceptionallydiligent.WhilePatheoniscertainlyfreetopayitsown

attorneysfullrackratesforafullcourtpresslitigationeffort,courtsarenotauthorized



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36

tobegenerouswiththemoneyofothers,anditisasmuchthedutyofcourtstoseethat

excessivefeesandexpensesarenotawardedasitistoseethatanadequateamountis

awarded.Barnes,168F.3dat428.

In its initial fee request [ECF No. 153, p. 10], Patheons lead trial counsel

explained that he made every effort to push work down to attorneys with lower

billablerateswheneverpossible.TheCourtdoesnot inanywaychallenge thisgoal,

but the end result demonstrates that the attorney with the highestbillable rate (Mr.

Schildkraut)billedapproximately the thirdmostamountof timeamongeightCooley

lawyers.Whenatrialcourtisconfrontedwithafeesrequestwhichdemonstratesbilling

inefficiencies, it is appropriate to make an overall reduction in the fees awardby

adoptinganacrosstheboardpercentage reduction.MKTRepsS.A.DeC.V.,2013WL

1289261,at*12(imposing20%reductionafterreducingthehourlybillingrates).

Patheons fee request includeda selfimposed reductionofapproximately20%

(by reducing its fee request from $328,632.50 to $261,479.50).9 Given this significant,

voluntary reduction, the Court finds that an additional reduction of only 5% is

warranted.

But the Court also finds that another 5% reduction is warranted. Patheons

counselexplainedthathisfirmusesblockbillingtobillPatheon.Asaresult,Patheons

9 The selfimposed reduction was made only on the first of the two fee

submissions.Thereductionamountedtoapproximately32%ofthefeesrequestedthere,

butthetotalreductionforbothsubmissionsisapproximately20%.



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37

attorneyshad togobackandpinpoint the specific time related to these twomotions

fromtheiroriginalblockbillingentries,whichincludedotherworkforPatheon.While

theCourtdoesnotdoubtPatheonsattorneyssincerityandeffortsinpinpointingtheir

hoursafterthefact,theCourtalsorealizesthatsuchanexercise is inherentlydifficult

andmay lead to impreciseestimations.Accordingly, inanabundanceofcaution, the

Courtfindsthatafurther5%reductioniswarranted.

D.ConclusionIn sum, the Court has substantially reduced the hourly rates requested by

Patheonand inadditiontoonlyawardingPatheon40%ofthetime itseeksrelatedto

the motions to compel, the Court has also imposed an additional 10% reduction.

Consequently, theCourt isawardingPatheon for30%of the timeassociatedwith the

discoverydispute.TheCourtstotalfeeawardis$40,451.50,brokendownasfollows:

AttorneyAwarded

HourlyRate

Awarded

HoursTotal

Marc

Schildkraut$565 15.3 $8,644.50

MichaelKlisch $515 16.4 $8,446

RobertCahill $425 15.0 $6,375

MaryKathryn

Kelley$410 7.9 $3,239

MazdaAntia $395 1.5 $592.50



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38

GraceKwon $285 23.7 $6,754.50

JoshuaSiegel $260 11.5 $2,990

SarahTalkovsky

$220 15.5 $3,410

IV. DISCUSSION:WHOPAYSTHEFEESAWARDFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5)(A) mandates an order requiring the

party or attorney advising that conduct, or both, to pay the successful movants

reasonableexpenses,

including

attorneys

fees.

The

rule

does

not

use

the

phrase

law

firmanditdoesnotprovideanyspecificguidanceonhowtodeterminewhenanaward

shouldbe against aparty,when it shouldbe against anattorney, when it shouldbe

againsttheattorneyslawfirm,orwhenitshouldbeagainstsomecombinationofthose

potentialpayors.

Procapsnotesitspositionsweredevelopedjointlybetweenclientandcounsel,

butrepresentsthatitcannotprovideanygreaterclaritywithoutviolatingtheattorney

client privilege. [ECF No. 160, p. 19]. The Court is sensitive to the inherently

problematic scenario which wouldbe generated if Procaps were to provide further

informationandisthereforenotgoingtopressProcapsforadditionaldetails.

Federal courts routinely award Rule 37 expense awards (including attorneys

fees) againstboth thepartyand its counsel.SeeBiovailCorp.vMylanLabs., Inc., 217

F.R.D. 380 (N.D. W.Va. 2003). In other cases, federal courts award Rule 37 expense



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awardsagainsttheattorneypersonally.SeeFDICv.Conner,20F.3d1376(5thCir.1994)

(affirming Rule 37 award of $6,045 against FDIC attorney);UnitedStates v.Sumitomo

Marine& Fire Ins. Co., Ltd., 617 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1980) (affirming Rule 37 award

against government attorney). In other cases, courts award Rule 37 fees against the

partys lawfirm.McCoov.Dennys Inc.,192F.R.D.675 (D.Kan.2000). Inmanyother

instances, courts merely grant an expense award, sometimes deeming them

sanctions,10withoutspecifyingwhoshouldpay.JSRMicro,Inc.v.QBEIns.Corp.,No.

C0903044 PJH, 2010 WL 1957465 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2010) (awarding $130,212.08

against defendant); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Natl Gasoline, Inc., No. 10 CV 1762

(RRM)(ALC),2011WL2490808(E.D.N.Y.June22,2011);UnderdogTruckingL.L.C.,273

F.R.D.372.Andcourts sometimesenter theRule37expenseawardagainst theparty

itself.Design Basics, LLC v. Strawn, 271 F.R.D. 513, 52930 (D. Kan. 2010) (awarding

expenses,includingattorneysfees,againstplaintiff).

In some instances, it is relativelyeasy todeterminewho shouldbeordered to

pay the award. For instance, if an attorney repeatedly gives his client improper

instructionstonotanswerdepositionquestions,thenitisthatattorneywhoshouldpay

10 As the Court previously advised counsel, the Court does not consider a Rule

37(a)(5)(A)expenseshiftingawardtobeasanctionortheimpositionofdisciplineoran

indicationthatanyoneactedinbadfaith.Rather,itismerelyaconsequenceoftaking

certain unsuccessful discovery positions. Thus, this Order would not require the

CarltonFieldslawfirmoranyofthesevenattorneysinvolvedinthediscoverydispute

toansweryesifeverasked(e.g.,byaprospectiveemployer,byaninsurancecarrier,

byajudicialnominatingcommission,byaclient,orbyaprospectiveclient)ifthefirm

ortheattorneyshadeverbeensanctionedordisciplined.



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theexpenseawardassociatedwithasuccessfulmotion tocompelanotherdeposition.

On theotherhand,aclientwhorepeatedly (and inaccurately) tells itsattorney that it

doesnotarchiveemailsshouldpayanexpenseawardtriggeredbyasuccessfulmotion

tocompelproductionofelectronicallystoredinformation.

Here,however, the linesare fuzzy,andProcapscounselhasnotprovided the

informationnecessarytoclearupthelackofclarity.Becauseanexpenseawardshould

onlybelevieduponthepersonresponsiblefortheviolation,anexpenseawardagainst

apartyrequiresspecificfindingsthatthepartywasawareoftheconductcausingthe

award.McCoo,192F.R.D.at697.

Procapscounselhasexplained,ingeneral,thatthelawfirmregularlyupdatesits

clients with all significant developments in the litigation. Likewise, counsel has

represented, ingeneral, that thediscoverydecisionswerejointlymadebetweenclient

and counsel. Given these representations, the Court concludes that there is sufficient

record evidence to find that Procaps itself was aware of the discovery positions

articulatedbyitscounsel.Therefore,itisappropriatethatProcapsassumesomeofthe

financialresponsibility.

Ontheotherhand,Procapscounselhasexplainedthatthis lawsuit isProcaps

first lawsuit in the United States, suggesting that it is not as sophisticated as other

similarlysituatedUnitedStatesbasedfirmsinthepharmaceuticalindustry.Asaresult,

theCourtbelieves itwouldbeundulyharsh tosaddleProcapswith theobligation to



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payhalfoftheexpenseaward.Therefore,Procapswillpay25%($10,112.88),theCarlton

Fieldslawfirmwillpay65%($26,293.47)andthesevenattorneyswilleachpay1/7thof

theremaining10%($577.88perattorney).

V. CONCLUSIONProcaps, the Carlton Fields law firm, and the seven lawyers shall make their

respective payments within 14 days of the entry of this Order and they shall each

submitanaffidavitordeclarationintheCourtsefileinbox([email protected]),

notCM/ECF,confirmingthepayments,withinfivedaysofmakingthepayment.The

sevenattorneysmay,iftheywish,submitoneomnibusaffidavitordeclaration,signed

byallofthem.

DONEANDORDEREDinChambers,inMiami,Florida,December3,2013.

Copiesfurnishedto:

AllCounselofRecord


magistrate judge goodman fee order

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