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MADHYAMAKA -THE PHILOSOPHY OF

GREAT HUMOR?

JGnagarbha’s Commentary on the Distinction Between the Two Truths. An Eighth Century Handbook of Madhyamaka Philosophy. Malcolm David Eckel. - State University of New York Press. 1987. - pp. 220.

Recalling how vital a comprehension of the distinction between two truths/realities (satya) is for a proper understanding of Madhyamaka religious philosophy as a whole, already Nagarjuna had pointed this out in his magnum opus (MK XXIV.9): ye ‘nayor na vzjtinanti vibhtiga? satyayor dvayo$/ te tattvav na vu&anti gambhire (read thus!) buddha&sane //, it may strike us as strange that in the huge body of extant Indian Madhyamaka literature it is not until the eighth century, with Jrianagarbha’s Satyadvayavibhtiga/vibhafiga-vytti, that we finally find a treatise, or more properly an essay, having this distinc- tion as its main topic.

It is true that a distinction between two truths, a satyadvayavibhtiga, runs as an undercurrent through all Madhyamaka texts before Jiiana- garbha, and it is true that it occasionally comes to the surface or even tends to become the focus of debate (in the case of Bhavya and Srigupta, Jrianagarbha’s immediate predecessors), but in all these cases it still retains a somewhat subordinate role within a broader context. It is not until JZnagarbha’s work, of which David Eckel has now given us an admirably translated and annotated edition, that it becomes unquestionably the main focus of attention and even finds its way into the title of the text.

What the historical background for this state of affairs may be, is partly suggested by Jfianagarbha himself (p. 70):

The Lord knew what would benefit others, and he distinguished the two truths in various ways to help those of lesser intelligence. Others, including NFigFijuna, have explained them further. But great Buddhists have misunderstood, to say nothing of the others who follow them.

Journal of Indian Philosophy 18: 249-260, 1990. 0 1990 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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So it is the fact that “great Buddhists”, in the verse Jiianagarbha, somewhat sarcastically speaks of “my great predecessors”, “have misunderstood” that prompts him to bring an old issue on the agenda anew. But there is another factor, more positive, about which Jt’iana- garbha himself is silent but about which the very words of his essay speak most eloquently: The enormous influence that Dharmakirti exerted as far as style, terminology and philosophical thought are concerned.

There are thus three major factors that account for the appearance of JrGnagarbha’s essay and enable us to place him in a proper histori- cal context. On the one hand, Jfianagarbha sees himself as vindicating Madhyamaka tradition formerly represented by Nagarjuna, Bhavya, and others. Then there is the challenge from Yoga&a with its fierce criticism of the Madhyamaka interpretation of such concepts as emptiness, and two truths. In this debate JriGnagarbha takes sides with Bhavya, who all his life had participated in a debate with Dharmapala and Sthiramati and their predecessors Asariga, Vasubandhu, and Dignaga, and others. Third, there is the deep and overwhelming impact of Dharmakirti. The innovations from his hand could not be rejected or neglected in the eighth century; they could only be adopted, and Jrianagarbha, to the best of our knowledge, is the first Madhyamaka author to do so. If Dharmakirti was “untouchable”, at least his student, Devendrabuddhi, was not. Since Dharmakirti, in my opinion (see my paper in Wiener Zeitschrifr fiir die Kunde Siidasiens 28 (1984), 149-175) should be seen as a Yoga&-a of the Sakaravada branch, this also means that Jiianagarbha’s work to some extent can be seen as an attempt to diminish the differences created between the two schools of Mahayana philosophy, above all after the appearance of Bhavya’s MadhyamakahydayalTarkajwib.

In his Preface (p. 1) Prof. Eckel says that: “Jiianagrabha’s work on the two truths records his struggle to adapt Madhyamaka thought to the philosophical innovations of his contemporaries without losing what is distinctive in his own past.” And in his Introduction (p. 5) he observes, more specifically, that:

Jiianagarbha stood at a point in the history of Madhyamaka when Madhyamaka authors were asked to respond to YogSira critics while making a subtle accommoda- tion to the style of the Buddhist logicians. And all this had to be done in a form consistent with the convictions of the Madhyamaka tradition itself.

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Before going into details let me try to give a survey of what Eckel’s fine book has to offer its readers: the first part (pp. 15-65) entitled ‘Jfianagarbha and the Growth of the Madhyamaka Tradition’, discusses Jiianagarbha’s Madhyamaka background, the works ascribed to him, the structure of the argument in the SDV, and, finally, his debt to Dharmakirti. The second part gives us Eckel’s translation of the Tibetan text, which is given as part four, after selections from Santaraksita’s Putijikti with explanatory notes. Finally the blockprints of the Derge edition, a bibliography and indexes covering Sanskrit terms and phrases as well as proper names are given.

Speaking of the principles that govern his translation Eckel (p. 9) with approval quotes Dryden: “I have endeavor’d to make Vergil speak such English as he would himself have spoken, if he had been born in England, and in this present age”. Eckel is perfectly aware of the difficult problems posed by condensed and technical Sanskrit prose that has to be rendered into a modern and “easy” language. The reader will find his translation clear, reliable and extremely readable. I have not been able to detect any of the serious sort of misunder- standings that disfigure an alarmingly high percentage of recent American translations of Madhyarnaka texts from the Tibetan and Sanskrit.

The edition of the Tibetan text on the basis of Derge and Cone, there being no Narthang or Peking ed. available, is very accurately done. The SDV consists of a vGti in prose and 120 stanzas (46 basic ones, 74 “additional” ones). A pity that the editor did not add num- bers of lines which would have facilitated reference to the text. In the Tibetan text I have noted the following misprints: p. 156, 1.3: for lhag ma’1 read lhag ma’o; p. 157, 1.10: after phyir add rollde nyid kyi phyir mdo sde las ‘ga’ yang mthong ba med pa ni de kho na mthong ba zhes gsungs so, and delete ngo bo . . . gsungs so; p. 157, 1.23: for gno read ngo; p. 158, 1.26: for synad read snyad; p. 159, 1.24: for ma ma read ma; p. 162, 11. 15, 18 & 20: for bi read bl; p. 169, 1.6: for sa read xi; p. 171, 1.16: for rnams read rnams las; p. 182, 1.21: for sha read shti; p. 188, 1.21: for kun du read kun tu; p. 189, 1.9: for kun du read kun tu.

As far as Eckel’s translation and annotations are concerned I would like to make the following remarks:

p. 70: “great predecessors”, shing rta the dug. As the commentary

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shows this is a synonym of rang gi sde pa, S. svanikaya, svaytithya. Siintaraksita also uses the term shing rta then po in his work Madhyamakalamkarav~ti, p. 56 (ed. Ichigo). Here it also refers to masters of Mahay5na. Note, in this connection, the expression tshul gnyis shing rta, the vehicle of two principles. In MadhyamaktilamkrI- ravrtti, p. 302 it refers to Madhyamaka and Yogacara. Santaraksita seems to have borrowed the image from Madhyamakaratnapradipa V. Here, however, it refers to the two kinds of truth.

p. 71: I am not sure that “cowherds and women” (gopalangana) “is a stock phrase in Madhyamaka literature”. Bhavya ad MHK III, 26 has Sahara and mtitariga, in MRP I sabara and gopala in the same context. For Candrakirti, see Eckel, p. 111.

p. 72: In a note on Jiianagarbha’s somewhat obscure position on the idea of svasamvedana IchigO, op. cit., pp. brxx-lxxx& rightly argues that JGinagarbha accepts self-cognition of knowledge to the extent that he is forced to when he refutes Sakkara- and Nirakkarajfianavada, but rejects the Yoga&a claim that it can be employed to prove pratytit- magatijr&ina as cognizing the absence of parikalpitasvabhava (i.e. in paratantrasvabhava). Jiianagarbha’s position becomes much clearer when seen in the light of Candrakirti’s refutation of self-cognition as a means to prove the existence of paratantrasvabhtiva, the vastumatra. See Madhyamaktivatara, pp. 165-173. The other important source for this before Jrianagarbha is MRP IV/2 (see my “Bhavya’s critique of Yoga&a in Madhyamakaratnapradipa”, in Buddhist Logic and Epistemology, Dordrecht 1986, pp. 239-263.)

p. 74: For the passage from the Akqayamatinirdesa, see my Nagar- juniana, p. 149. There are allusions to this passage in all the works of Bhavya and Candrakirti.

p. 75: According to Jrianagarbha tathyasamv$(-satya) is a vastu- matra “which is not confused with anything that is imagined and arises dependently”. Moreover, such a “mere thing” is arthakriyasamartha, and it “corresponds to appearances” (yathadarsanam). Again Ichigo, op. cit., pp. lxvi-lxix, provides a good summary of Jtianagarbha’s view of samvrtisatya and its influence on SGrtaraksita. His own definition shows the impact of Bhavya, Candrakirti, Dharmakirti and Srigupta. In Mahayana the term vastumatra first plays an important role in the Tattvartha-patala of the Bodhisattvabhumi, pp. 28, 31, 32, 34, 36, 37

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(ed. N. Dutt). Here it is the ultimately real that cannot be denied, cannot be spoken of, but at the same time is a fact providing the foundation of prujfiupti. The early Yogacara teachers identified it with the paratantrasvabhava, and to the Buddhist logicians, even prior to Dharmakirti (see PV I, 190, etc.), as is proved by Bhavya’s TJ ad MHK III, 285 (Peking ed., 138b2: rtog pa dung bcas pa ni rjes su dpag pa? shes pa stel rtog pa dung rjes su dran pa? rnam pa’i rnam par rtog pa yod pa ‘i phyir roll rnam par rtog pa med pa ni mngon sum gyi shes pa stel dngos po tsam la dmigs pa? phyir ro/l), it is virtually the same as svalaksana (see e.g. Nyayabindu: svalaksana is paramarthasat, arthakriyastimarthyalaksanatvad vastunah), or at least the cognitive aspect of vastumatra. Jrianagarbha is here as careful as Bhavya and Candrakirti; he does not identify the vastumatra with svalaksana, nor does he make it solely an object of pratyaksa. He is more “open” when speaking of two sorts of experience, darsana, viz. savikalpa and nirvikalpa. Hence &intaraksita is reading too much of himself and Dharmakirti into Jrianagarbha when he says: dngos po tsam dung mthun par byed pa’i ngang can gyi sems ni rang gi mtshan nyid kyi yul can gyi shes pa la byu’o (Peking ed., lOb8). When using the “deliber- ately vague” term yathadarsanam Jiianagarbha is, as Eckel points out (pp. 56-57) b orrowing from Dharmakirti, whose yathanudurSanam, according to Eckel, “treads a narrow line between the hypothetical term yathaprutyaksam (consistent with perception) and yathabhasam (consistent with appearance).” I do not, however, think that Eckel has understood Dharmakirti’s position properly. When he translates the celebrated PV II, 2: arthakriyasamartham yat tad atra paramarthasatl anyat samvrtisat proktum by “Here [the object] that is capable of effective action is called ultimately real and the other is relatively real” (p. 54), he is, like others before him, overlooking the significance of atra. Here, as PVin II, 55 (arthakriyasamartham yat tad atra paramar- thaw), the atra is actually interchangeable with yuthanudarSanam. As I have pointed out (WZKS 28 (1984) 156) Dharmakirti acknowledges a samvyavahtin’ka- and a paramarthika-pram&a. Had he not, as a Yoga&a, had his reasons for wanting to avoid Madhyamaka termi- nology, he could easily have used samvrtjxi for yathanudarSanam. So when Dharmakirti speaks of samvrtisat and paramarthasat both terms refer to what a Madhyamika would consider samvrtisatya. See Siddhi,

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pp. 549-550 for the various sorts of satyu current in Yoga&a in the time of Dharmakirti and his predecessors. JSnagarbha, in other words, follows Dharmakirti closely, and Dharmakirti cannot be said to be “deliberately vague” once we recognize the context properly.

p. 76: Jfianagarbha’s verse: ni!edhytibhtivatah spa$ap na ni!edho ‘sti tattvatah, is almost an echo of Vaidalya, see my Nagarjuniana, p. 93.

p. 77: Eckel suggests (notes, p. 127) that Jfianagarbha’s term tuttvtirtha is similar to the term Stinyattirtha in Nagarjuna’s MK XXIV, 7, and renders it “reality as object”. It is said to refer to the expressi- ble ultimate. (Note, to be sure, that only &intaraksita, not JGnagarbha himself, employs the two technical terms saparytiya and apatytiyu (or nihparytiya). What Nagarjuna actually means by Gyat&tha is not immediately clear. He seems to have taken it over from LarikGvuttiru- stitra II, 145 which would, of course, settle the question of interpreta- tion. If, however, we are to believe Candrakirti, p. 491, we should understand the term in the light of XXIV, 18 so that the meaning (of the word) Gnyatti is the same as that of pratityasamutptida. Or should we rather say that the three concepts in XXIV, 18 correspond to the three concepts in XXIV, 7? In any case, Ratmivali I, 98 has the term tattwirthanir~ya, and in V, 37 praj% is defined as satytirthani&aya. The additional artha may well suggest that tattva as artha is con- sciously distinguished from tattva “as such”. For tattvajfitina, etc., without artha, see Nagarjuniuna, p. 270. Assuming that Nagarjuna did make a deliberate distinction between two approaches to tattva, which is, after all, very natural, we could more easily understand MK XVIII, 8-11, q.v.

p. 77: The antarailoka is clearly an allusion to the same Prajfilfptir- am&i passage as the one alluded to by Nagigarjuna, MK XXII, 11. It is quoted in MadhytintavibhrigabhG~ya, p. 18 (ed. Nagao): sarvam idaq na Stinya~ ntipi cG2zyam. It seems that Eckel’s addition in brackets should be deleted as it refers to the aparytiyaparamttrtha being ni;pra- pafica, cf. MK XVIII, 9.

p. 78: To understand the first antaraSloka it must be recalled that the VimalakirtinirdeSastitra introduces the term abhiitaparikalpa (Lamotte, p. 270) perhaps from the Bodhisattvapitaka (see Peking ed., vol. XXII, 294b) and that this term was later interpreted as a synonym

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of paratantrasvabhava by Yoga&a masters, beginning with Maitreya. Had Vimalakirti been prepared to accept an interpretation such as the one given in Madhyantavibhaga I, 1, to which JiGnagarbha here alludes, he could and would not have remained silent. Just as Dignaga and others speak of svalaksana, though by definition it cannot be described, so Vimalakirti should have been able to speak of the paratantrasvabhava if this were what was referred to when the stitra mentions abhtitaparikalpa. So, according to JiGnagarbha, it is an anachronism to interpret abhtitaparikalpa in the stitra as paratantras- vabhava.

p. 79: What distinguishes correct relative truth from incorrect is that it possesses the ability of arthakriya. This distinction, and causality in general, is only valid according to experience (yathadarsanam), not in the light of paramarthasatya, or nyaya. (For nyaya, Tib. rigs pa, cf. Nagarjuna’s usage of yukti, Tib. also rigs pa, in Yuktisastika, etc. . . . Nagarjuna’s usage comes very close to that of the Larikavatara, and, indeed, JiGnagarbha may not be as innovating as suggested by Eckel.) For yathadarsanam Jrianagarbha sometimes uses terms such as yathaprasiddha, yathapratiti, Tib. ji ltar grags pa (kho na) bshin. This terminology can be traced back to Bhavya and Candrakirti, but mainly Dharmakirti, as in the case of yathadarsanam yathanudarsanam.

p. 83: The introduction of the idea of atisaya, a causal surplus, again shows the influence of Dharmakirti.

p. 85: The term vastugraha is inspired by Nagarjuna, in whose Acintyastava we find bhavagrahagrahavesa (v. 16) bhavagrahagrhita (v. 52) and vastugraha (v. 54).

p. 85: Whereas authors such as Kambala and Candrakirti prefer to define samvrti in terms of avidya, later authors such as Santadeva (sic!) and Jiianagarbha define it in terms of buddhi (locus or instru- ment), a usage of buddhi fairly remote from that of early Madhyamaka (intellect, intelligence). Again one feels the influence of Dharmakirti with whom it is a favourite term.

p. 86: On the Prajriaparamita passage dealing with viparyasa, see Conze, Large Sutra . . . p. 633. There is also an allusion to this canonical passage in MRP III.

p. 88: Jfianagarbha’s remark that “The inference (anumana) and the thing to be inferred (anumeya) are made up of a subject (dharmin),

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a property (dharma), and an example (d@infu) that appears to the minds of both parties to the discussion. Otherwise there is no infer- ence . . .“, is clearly reminiscent of Dignaga’s celebrated sentence:

_ _ sarva evayam anurruin~numeyavyavah~ro buddhyaru(thena dharma- dharmibhedena na bahih sadasattvam apekate. See E. Frauwallner, Kleine Schrifen, p. 840. - In the Tib. text p. 173, 1. 23 ‘di tha snyad kyi should probably be emended to tha snyud ‘di ni. - Note that ktiriktis 18- 19 are quoted in the Tib. doxographical work Blo gsul grub mtha’, pp. 178-180 (ed. Mimaki). Furthermore, the same text quotes ktiriktis 17ab (p. 144) 3 (p. 148), 36 (p. 152), 12 (p. 154) 8 (p. 156) 21 (p. 170) 28 (p. 200) 18-19 (p. 208) 29-30 (pp. 210- 21 2) and 9cd-1 Oab (p. 226). On p. 126 ktirikti 9ab is quoted. Mimaki claims that it differs considerably from the canonical version. This is a mistake. The third line is actually part of the Vrtti! It is true that we in Tib. doxographical works often find quotations from Jnanagarbha’s SDV. Though minor variants occur, they are always, to the best of my experience, only orthographic, or due to lapsus memoriae. There is, on this ground, no reason to assume the existence of some “paracanonical” version of Jiianagarbha’s SDV.

p. 88: The canonical quotation is not from the ,&yadharmadhtitu- pruk~tyasumbhedanirdeSa where the interlocutors are Maiijusri and Sariputra. The PrujCiptirumitti passage here referred to has been quoted by R. Hikata, Suvikrtintavikrtimi-paripycchti . . . p. lxix, q.v.

p. 88: The verse attributed to Nagarjuna by Santaraksita could either hail from his Lokaparik+, or, more likely, Vyavahtirusiddhi. See my Nagarjuniana, pp. 14 and 96.

p. 89: Coming to the third part of the definition of correct relative truth, “not subject to analysis”, Eckel (p. 138, note 104) remarks that “The three elements of the formula could not have been brought together before the time of Dharmakirti, since he introduced the term artha-kriyti into the vocabulary of Buddhist logic. But elements of. the formula occur separately in earlier works.” I need not here speak of hetujtita and arthakriytisamartha. The relevant passages in Candrakirti have been mentioned by Eckel. Candrakirti uses terms such as avictiraprasiddha and itthat+c&Gprasiddhi. In the same sense Dharmakirti has avikalpya, ma brtags par. Even earlier we have Alokamtflti 44, q.v. I still prefer to regard the verse in MRP I: . . . ma

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brtags nyams dga’i mtshan nyid can/ rgyu las skyes dang don byed nusll tshu rol mthong ba’i kun rdzob yin// as the source of all later authors, beginning with Srigupta. See JIP 9 (1981) 196. It is not unlikely that Bhavya adopted arthakriyasamartha from Dharmakirti (whom he quotes later in the MRP), though, of course, the idea is at least as old as the Vrtti to Vigrahavyavartanl 2, q.v. (karyakriyasamartha). The source of the compound avicaramanohara (or avicararamaniya) is still not clear. With regard to arvagdarsana Bhavya’s source is probably the Vrtti to Vakyapadiya I, 15 1, q.v. it is also used by Dharmakirti, in his Pramanaviniscaya, at least twice. There are, to be sure, several other references to Bhartrhari in the MRP.

p. 90: Emend abhinivesa to samklesa, Tib. has kun nas nyon mongs.

p. 90: For the idea that samvrti, previously defined as buddhi by Jtianagarbha, has no Graya, see already Alokamaki 3 1.

p. 92: Here, in ten antaraslokas, Jrianagarbha refutes an opponent, “notorious for his bad arguments”, who claims that “if something does not arise in a real sense (tattvatah), it does not arise in a relative sense (samvrtya), like the son of a barren woman and so forth , . .” The name of the opponent is not mentioned. More or less following Ruegg, Eckel refers to Candrakirti’s Madhyamakavatara VI, 36-38. See, however, also VI, 12 and, above all, the references to Bhavya in Prasannapada, that come even closer to Jtianagarbha. All this seems to indicate that Jrianagarbha may have had Candrakirti in mind here. The arguments against “Candrakirti” are in fact already to be found in the extant works of Bhavya. In any case we here have a “Svatantrika” refuting a “Prasangika”. Some of the verses are rather obscure. In the two final couplets Jnanagarbha is referring to the ineffable absolute (aparyayaparamartha) in relation to which arguments and causality make no sense. The final words run ‘di nyid kyis ni thal bar yang/ dogs pa rnam par bzlog pa yin/. Eckel translates: “From this it follows that the objection is refuted.” But somehow Jiianagarbha wants to conclude his refutation of “Candrakirti” by saying that even his prasariga- arguments are impossible unless samvrtisatya is somehow accepted.

p. 94: With regard to the numbering of the verses I would prefer to count brtags pa’i ‘og tu khas blang gi as 27a, and mngon sum la sags ‘gal zhe na as 27b, thus dropping what Eckel prints as 27b on p. 180.

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p. 97: Here Jiianagarbha speaks of “a gradual teaching of aggregates (skandha), realms (dhtitu), sense media (tiyutuna), mind-only (cittu- m&a), and the selflessness of dharmas, adjusted to the mental capacities [of his listeners].” This brings us back to a major issue discussed by Eckel in his introduction to the translation. I do not think that Eckel (p. 55) is justified in claiming that “We do not see in Jiianagarbha the same understanding of mind-only that is found in Santaraksita.” Indeed, Santaraksita’s stand-point on cittumtitru “can be traced back to Jiianagarbha”, and “his position has not been well defined or properly recognized by Tibetan sources.” See Ichigo, op. cit., p. lxxxv. Furthermore, Jrianagarbha’s passage is almost an echo of the oft-quoted Bodhicittuvivurunu 25, q.v., Nugurjuniunu, p. 192. The idea is at least as old as the celebrated Luriktivuttiru verses quoted by Eckel, p. 60. But what about Bhavya’s attitude to the doctrine of cittumatru? Does Jnanagarbha depend on Bhavya in this regard? According to Eckel (pp. 17-18, with note 14 on p. 60) Bhavya does “not treat it as a necessary step in the ascent to a higher level of understanding, etc.“, it is rather, on the basis of MHK/TJ V, 54 “like mud that has to be washed away.” However, what Bhavya is criticizing in this passage is not at all cittumtitru as a spiritual krumu, but, on the contrary, the manner in which the opponent uses this doctrine in an argument. If external objects do not exist in the first place why then argue that they are “parts of cittu.” It is silly and superfluous to get in touch with mud only in order to wash it away again. Also from MHK/ TJ IV it is clear that Bhavya certainly accepts the idea of cittumtitru, which is, after all, canonical, but he does not accept the Yogacara interpretation aiming at negating the existence of external objects. The problem is really, as Eckel also suggests, that cittumtitru may occur in a “theoretical” as well as in a “practical” context. In Madhyamaka texts these two sides are always kept clearly apart. So whether Bhavya also accepted citumtitru as a spiritual kramu depends on whether we accept the authenticity of the MRP or not. In any case, there can be no doubt that cittumtitru was accepted also as a spiritual practice already at the time of Luriktivuttiru and Bodhicittuvivurunu, that is, long before the time of Bhavya.

p. 97: Verse 33ab is an echo of Mudhytintuvibhtigu I, 8ab: ubhzitu- purikufpus’ cu CittacuittEs tridhGtuk&.

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p. 99: The first anturaSloka is an echo of Dharmakirti’s PVin III, 2ab or PV IV 54ab: riktasya jantor jtitasya gunado;am apaiyatah.

The title of our text - is it Satyadvayavibhatigu or Satyudvayavib- h&u? Eckel (pp. 61-62) is aware of the problem and prefers -vibhatiga with the Tibetan colophons. Since, however, the “Sanskrit” in Tib. colophons is often merely a reconstruction based solely on Tib. this argument is in itself not of much weight. Tib. rnam par ‘byed pa, or rnam par dbye ba can, to be sure, render vibhtiga as well as vibhariga, so it is of no help in deciding the question. No doubt the title contains an allusion to Nagarjuna’s celebrated verse: ye ‘nayor na vijtinanti vibhtigam satyayor dvayoh . . . In similar contexts vibhtiga is always used, never vibhatiga, but this in itself is not sufficient to say that -vibhtiga would be more proper in the title of a text (or chapter) than -vibhariga. In Pali (we need not go outside Buddhist tradition) we have, of course, the Vibhatigu. In (Buddhist) Sanskrit we find titles such as Karmavibhauiga, Vinayavibhariga, etc., where - vibhariga would mean “classification” of a large number of topics. On the other hand -vibhciga is well attested in the Sanskrit mss. pertaining to early philosophical works such as Madhytintavibhtiga, Ratnagotravibhciga and Dharmadh&uvibhcIga. See Gokhale’s ‘Yogacara Works Annotated by Vairocanaraksita’, in ABORI: Diamond Jubilee Volume, Poona 1977-78, pp. 635-639. Also, correct Takasaki, A Study on the Ratnugotravibhtiga (Uttaratuntra), Rome 1966, p. 14 1, n. I accord- ingly. Here the term -vibhtiga signifies a distinction made between two or more opposite concepts. I cannot agree with Eckel when he says that (p. 62) “vibhafiga in the sense of ‘distinction’ is acceptable Buddhist usage” as long as we are dealing with the usage in philosoph- ical Mahayana texts. It is, therefore, almost certain that the title of Jiianagarbha’s text is SatyadvayavibhcSga.

Eckel (pp. 35-49) makes a very interesting point about paradoxes in Madhyamaka literature and philosophy, and he speaks about “the sense of balance” and the “dynamic character” of Madhyamaka. First, as Eckel points out, the philosopher assumes a certain distinction (esp. that of two truths), then he denies the distinction just made, and finally the philosopher reappropriates these distinctions. See also, most recently, Eckel’s ‘Bhavaviveka’s Vision of Reality’ in JAAR LV/l (1987), 39-54, for a development of the same idea. He concludes that

260 REVIEW ARTICLE

Perhaps the best category to describe Jfianagarbha’s mode of argument is not dialectic or paradox, but irony. No one would make the mistake of claiming that Jiiinagarbha is one of the world’s great comic writers, but there is much in his argument that reminds a reader of the deep sense of playfulness that in Indian civilization charac- terizes the freedom of the enlightened mind.

Eckel has certainly made an important point here. There are elements, moments, that go beyond dry logic, &qkaturka, surely. And apart from the sense of balance, playfulness and irony, there is a sense of the beauty of a condensed and polished style, the beauty of the religious imagery, etc. There is a tendency to be cryptic, elusive, and sarcastic, and what if it turned out that Jfi&agarbha, like %ntaraksita, behind the academic faqade, was an ardent adherent of Vajraytia? Very ironic, indeed!

Personally, at the risk of being taken too seriously, I find that Madhyamaka presents itself as a “system of great humor.” Humor has to do with an awareness of opposites. Here it is more than just an occasional attitude; it is rather a deep sentiment, a Lebensgefihl. A Madhyamika has, to begin with, a belief in (or experience of) some absolute values, but like all of us, he is also confronted with the everyday world of plurality and relativity. One can very well say that it is his sense of “great humor” that enables him to overcome the opposites and incompatibilities of life, or, as he himself would say, to follow a middle path between extremes. “Great humor”, when having to express itself in communication, is sensitive to the inexpressibility of the absolute, and finds a certain satisfaction in expressing itself in paradoxes and negations. It achieves a certain dynamics, or agility, which is the very soul of a “spiritual” attitude adverse to any sort of dogmatic, clinging mode of behaviour. Madhyamaka texts are full of sarcasm and sophistry, but it should not be forgotten that they are always the outcome of “great humor” that has its deepest basis in a belief in absolute values.

CHRISTIAN LINDTNER

Institut for Orientalsk Filologi KBbenhavns Universitet Njalsgade 80 2300 Kabenhavn. Denmark